Question for Roger: ... At 55:30 the Little Napoleon Roger is on the march towards Milford with 20,000 men under Reynolds command. Why did Roger choose to give up on the attack? Granted, Stuart's cavalry presents a formidable force of 9,000 men in your way, but it's the last day of the campaign. Why not risk a manpower loss in what appeared to be shaping up to be a favorable +2 attack? If Roger wins, Patrick would certainly be unable to recover the six points in Milford.
Well... I probably should have risked it as things turned out. What I was looking at was if I got a negative result the MP losses would have but in the bind of having to grab two VP spots instead of only one. Stannards Mill was looking like my best possibility. Basically it boiled down to risk - reward and I did not like the risk.
Fearsome stuff, folks. Patrick’s repeated “pass” declarations on day 3 (= first day in this video episode) definitely made Hood nervous. When will the longed for evacuation order come? Well, too late… So, in fact now “Hood strikes north”! …to a POW camp. What Jackson (as on day 1 and 2, so further on day 3) marched too timid, Union Smith runs too reckless for my taste on the evening of day 3. Why to F4 at 36:00? What is to cover that urgently? Going form F0 to F1 on next day instead of frontloading it and starting at a F4->F1 leftover accomplishes exactly the same (position/fatigue) but on the morning without the need to roll for extended march with those harsh penalties. (Prudent to be patient here. I suppose: Patrick would have passed in the meantime anyway.) AP Hill was indeed too late on the southern front as predicted! 🚶♂🚶♂🚶♂🧎♂ And Debacle at Tabernacle of course! ⤵ But the victory level demands of this scenario are very (too?) steep for the Union. And so the showdown at Stannard’s Mill sealed the game. …of course, because Burnside said no at his potential (one more) glorious moment in time. Regards Holger
I thought you might have commented on my lack of attacking the Arty Reserve near Tabernacle Church. If I had done so, it might have prevented the outcomes of subsequent Jackson attacks.
Why did I take Smith to F4? The magic of Patrick's editing I spent a lot of time thinking about it. I wanted to use VI Corp to keep pressure on Guinea Station while at the same time blocking any move to Fredericksburg by Longstreet when I moved Reynolds towards Milford. As turn 3 was coming to a close I really felt the need to get to 32 points a quickly as possible in turn 4 to force Patrick to react. As it turned out I never did.
![HIWWHEE | OHM [Official MV]](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/OJJLtTLqLag/mqdefault.jpg)
The Burnside comment by Roger about a bridge brought a chuckle to my lips! Nice game fellows. Looking forward the next.
Thanks, Mike! Glad you enjoyed it.
Question for Roger: ... At 55:30 the Little Napoleon Roger is on the march towards Milford with 20,000 men under Reynolds command. Why did Roger choose to give up on the attack? Granted, Stuart's cavalry presents a formidable force of 9,000 men in your way, but it's the last day of the campaign. Why not risk a manpower loss in what appeared to be shaping up to be a favorable +2 attack? If Roger wins, Patrick would certainly be unable to recover the six points in Milford.
Well... I probably should have risked it as things turned out. What I was looking at was if I got a negative result the MP losses would have but in the bind of having to grab two VP spots instead of only one. Stannards Mill was looking like my best possibility. Basically it boiled down to risk - reward and I did not like the risk.
Roger's USA may have lost, but they did a whole lot better than their historical counterparts did.
Fearsome stuff, folks.
Patrick’s repeated “pass” declarations on day 3 (= first day in this video episode) definitely made Hood nervous.
When will the longed for evacuation order come?
Well, too late…
So, in fact now “Hood strikes north”! …to a POW camp.
What Jackson (as on day 1 and 2, so further on day 3) marched too timid, Union Smith runs too reckless for my taste on the evening of day 3. Why to F4 at 36:00? What is to cover that urgently? Going form F0 to F1 on next day instead of frontloading it and starting at a F4->F1 leftover accomplishes exactly the same (position/fatigue) but on the morning without the need to roll for extended march with those harsh penalties.
(Prudent to be patient here. I suppose: Patrick would have passed in the meantime anyway.)
AP Hill was indeed too late on the southern front as predicted! 🚶♂🚶♂🚶♂🧎♂
And Debacle at Tabernacle of course! ⤵
But the victory level demands of this scenario are very (too?) steep for the Union.
And so the showdown at Stannard’s Mill sealed the game.
…of course, because Burnside said no at his potential (one more) glorious moment in time.
Regards
Holger
I thought you might have commented on my lack of attacking the Arty Reserve near Tabernacle Church. If I had done so, it might have prevented the outcomes of subsequent Jackson attacks.
@@PatricksTacticsTutorials Yes, right, that indeed sounds like a good idea with hindsight.
Why did I take Smith to F4? The magic of Patrick's editing I spent a lot of time thinking about it. I wanted to use VI Corp to keep pressure on Guinea Station while at the same time blocking any move to Fredericksburg by Longstreet when I moved Reynolds towards Milford. As turn 3 was coming to a close I really felt the need to get to 32 points a quickly as possible in turn 4 to force Patrick to react. As it turned out I never did.