The Aloneness Argument Against Classical Theism
ฝัง
- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 18 พ.ค. 2020
- I explain a new argument against classical theism (more specifically, the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity) and rebut three objections to it.
Outline
0:24 Doctrine of Divine Simplicity
3:40 Intrinsic and Extrinsic Features
5:27 Divine Creative Freedom
5:59 Divine Omniscience
6:09 The Argument
14:07 Platonism
26:58 Relations to non-existent things
31:41 Restricted Modal Collapse
38:04 Ending thoughts
Book: www.amazon.com/Majesty-Reason...
Blog post mentioned at the end: majestyofreason.wordpress.com...
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Classical Theist here and KUDOS TO YOU, Majesty of Reason. You've presented a formidable challenge. Atheists normally completely ignore CT. You are owed an answer that I have neither the ambition nor confidence in my own skills to provide, but I can at least give you credit for not going after the low hanging fruit!
Consider this answer - I think there is an answer that you might not have considered, at least I didn't hear it in this video. In Aquinas' view, there is prime matter, which is real existing stuff, of pure potentiality. He disagrees with Aristotle about it. Aristotle says it is eternal, whereas Aquinas says God causes it to exist. Thus there are two types of real things. There are real things that are potential and real things that are actual.
In this view unicorns really exist but as potential and trees which really exist but as actual. Thus there are potential worlds and actual worlds, all which really exist. Think of God creating the multiverse, but instead of all possible worlds in the many worlds interpretation being actual worlds, they are mostly potential worlds.
There are thus two types of existing worlds. Real existing worlds that are made of potential and real existing worlds that are made of Actuality.
Thus God has knowledge of all possible worlds intrinsically, and because God is act and his knowledge is act, God causes all things he has knowledge of to exist. He causes them to exist in two ways. Some he causes to exist as potential and some he causes to exist as actual.
Thus there is a real world where only God exist, and this world exist as potential. There is a real world where man never went to the moon, but this world existing as potential. There is a real world where man did go to moon, and this world exist as actual.
So all knowledge God has of things obtains, but in these two fundamental ways. So God doesn't know things contingently, but he does know of contingent things.
This is a brilliant argument
38:30 very reasonable assessment of what your argument does. Again, first class job.
Much love
OK so the proposition I am defending is as follows [edit: paragraphing has just gone no idea why - apologies]
[The IAT to Q.14 A.15 Prima Pars]
I answer that, Since the knowledge of God is His substance, as is clear from the foregoing (Article 4), just as His substance is altogether immutable, as shown above (I:9:1), so His knowledge likewise must be altogether invariable.
Now Aquinas says in Article 8 that
His knowledge must be the cause of things, in so far as His will is joined to it.
Now in Q.14 of the Prima Pars - discussing the will of God - the main article to focus on is article 3 - "Does God necessarily will whatever He wills?" Aquinas discusses this at length and comes to the following conclusion as the proper object of the divine will is the divine goodness Aquinas states
Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition, for supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot change.
[Side note: Necessity by absolute occurs when the predicate is contained of the subject, as man is an animal, and necessity by suppositum occurs when the predicate is true of the subject, as granted that Socrates is sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting.]
Thus - it can be said that God necessarily knows all things, and that these things can be contingent or necessary, if and only if the divine will wills them. Now in God the divine will is the divine act of knowing, thus it can be said that God knows all things as they are in themselves and whether they are contingent or necessary, on account of the divine will. We would not be able to say that God contingently knows a contingent but only that God necessarily knows a contingent, given it is contingent according to the free divine will.
Thus premise 2 of your argument stipulates that "Necessarily, God has contingent knowledge". Accordingly this is false if taken as meaning that the knowledge God has could have been different, but true if taken as meaning that the knowledge God has, in conjunction with the divine will, is known necessarily as a contingent truth. However premise 6 of your argument demonstrates that you mean the former and thus both premise 2 and premise 6 are false and the argument does not follow.
Now with regards to the intrinsic and extrinsic, step 5 - I would need to brush up on my trinitarian theology, however when we say that the divine relations between the persons are a real distinction, we do not mean an accidental distinction within God, nor do we mean an essential feature of God - I suppose however we would predicate of the divine persons that the son is necessarily and essentially from the Father, given He is the son. However in this, we do not discuss the divine essence itself - it is not within the divine essence that the 3 persons relate to each other in the way they do, for if it did, it would follow each of the 3 persons is essentially different - by way of essence and ontology - to one another which would be heretical. In any case I would think it to be sound but the way you are using wholly intrinsic here is causing an issue in the back of my mind but I can't put my finger on it.
Anyhow - thanks for the video.
Thanks!
"Thus premise 2 of your argument stipulates that "Necessarily, God has contingent knowledge". Accordingly this is false if taken as meaning that the knowledge God has could have been different, but true if taken as meaning that the knowledge God has, in conjunction with the divine will, is known necessarily as a contingent truth. However premise 6 of your argument demonstrates that you mean the former and thus both premise 2 and premise 6 are false and the argument does not follow."
I don't see how this targets the argument, though.
It's easiest to see that God contingently knows something like so:
If S knows x, then x is true/obtains.
So, if x is false/doesn't obtain, then S doesn't know x.
Now, if x is contingent, there are some worlds in which x is true/obtains, but some words in which x is false/doesn't obtain.
Now, suppose x is, indeed, contingent.
So, in some worlds, God knows x, and in other worlds, God doesn't know x.
And that's all I mean by God contingently knows x (in worlds where x obtains, ofc). This is all my argument requires.
Another way to see this:
1. x is contingent.
2. So, not necessarily x. (1)
3. Necessarily, if S knows x, then x.
4. Assume, for reductio, that it is necessary that S knows x.
5. So, necessarily x. (3,4, Distribution Axiom)
6. So, it is not necessary that S knows x. (2,4,5, reductio).
7. So, it's contingent that S knows x. (6)
8. If it's contingent that F(g), then g contingently is (or has) F.
9. So, S contingently has knowledge of x. (7,8)
@@MajestyofReason
[Again paragraphing just goes haywire... sorry]
Ok so in Q14 - Aquinas affirms that God knows things that do not exist - in so far as they exist in potentia as opposed to in act. He also affirms that God knows all of our thoughts
thus when it is said "Can God create a square circle" by me - God knows that as well even though He knows the two concepts are mutually exclusive and so are not a potential in reality. And He also says that "there are other things in God's power, or the creature's, which nevertheless are not, nor will be, nor were; and as regards these He is said to have knowledge, not of vision, but of simple intelligence." I.E God knows that which is not possible, and He knows this not because He sees them as He can't see that which is not "seeable" but knows them by virtue of "simple intelligence". Just as you and I know a square circle is impossible.
The idea that "If X is false/doesn't obtain, then S doesn't know X" is in itself an incoherent statement - this is where paramenides comes in and says you can't know what is not. So X here refers to literally nothing, complete non-existence, the thought of X doesn't even exist in any mind not even the divine mind. So as mentioned above we could say "If Ab tries to conceive of a square circle, God knows that Ab tries to conceive of a square circle but God also knows through simple intelligence that a square circle is impossible."
So the first idea "If S knows X, then X is true/obtains" only follows if we mean it in accordance with the above. Something does not have to obtain in reality for God to know it. And as I mentioned crucially in my first statement - God knows its contingency or necessity in accordance with whether the divine will actualised it or not. So to further say that
"In some worlds, God knows X, and in other worlds, God doesn't know X" is incoherent because God knows X in all worlds - if He knows it in one He necessarily knows it in all of them, as His knowledge is necessary - and the will "attaches" to that in so far as God also knows if He willed it a necessary existent, a contingent existent, or something which does not exist ever outside of the divine mind.
So for further clarification on 3. what does "then X" mean - because if you mean then X obtains in being (outside of the divine mind) it needs to have the will attached to it.
5. Becomes Necessarily, God knows this contingent truth X - in so far as God knows that the divine will did not have to actualise it
6. Therefore becomes false, it is necessary that S knows X - what you'd have to say is It is contingent that the divine will chose to actualise X outside of the divine intellect, which necessarily knows X.
7. It is still very much necessary that God knows X
8 and 9 then just don't really follow.
Now I myself am conducting a pretty thorough investigation on how it can be said that God freely will things and how God's freedom relates to His nature, and there is a possible point of contention you have raised - namely God could have known X to be contingent even though in this world it is necessary in which case God's knowledge could have been different according to whether the divine will moved X to be necessary or contingent. In that case - we would have to say God's knowledge is dependent on the divine will or we could be speaking of necessity by suppositum - namely given God wills X God knows X's contingency or necessity which seems plausible but I am not so sure how coherent that is to say "God is dependent on God" so it's all a bit of a OOF but we are talking about an infinite mind here and reasoning as finite and composite minds so if it wasn't complex I'd be having questions about whether this divine mind actually exists xD
@@michaeldonohue8870 true, lmao
Only a little bit through but I like the PowerPoint/Slide format. Much easier to follow!
This is awesome
0:24 Doctrine of Divine Simplicity
3:40 Intrinsic and Extrinsic Features
5:27 Divine Creative Freedom
5:59 Divine Omniscience
6:09 The Argument
14:07 Platonism
26:58 Relations to non-existent things
31:41 Restricted Modal Collapse
38:04 Ending thoughts
Much love
@@MajestyofReason my pleasure. Loving your content.
Subscribed and Liked!
I think there is an answer that you might not have considered, at least I didn't hear it in this video. In Aquinas' view, there is prime matter, which is real existing stuff, of pure potentiality. He disagrees with Aristotle about it. Aristotle says it is eternal, whereas Aquinas says God causes it to exist. Thus there are two types of real things. There are real things that are potential and real things that are actual.
In this view unicorns really exist but as potential and trees which really exist but as actual. Thus there are potential worlds and actual worlds, all which really exist. Think of God creating the multiverse, but instead of all possible worlds in the many worlds interpretation being actual worlds, they are mostly potential worlds.
There are thus two types of existing worlds. Real existing worlds that are made of potential and real existing worlds that are made of Actuality.
Thus God has knowledge of all possible worlds intrinsically, and because God is act and his knowledge is act, God causes all things he has knowledge of to exist. He causes them to exist in two ways. Some he causes to exist as potential and some he causes to exist as actual.
Thus there is a real world where only God exist, and this world exist as potential. There is a real world where man never went to the moon, but this world existing as potential. There is a real world where man did go to moon, and this world exist as actual.
So all knowledge God has of things obtains, but in these two fundamental ways. So God doesn't know things contingently, but he does know of contingent things.
Hey, Joe. I'm curious: Can one get around this objection if one commits to necessitarianism?
Could you explain how some knowledge becomes contingent for god ?
Bach is a married bachelor.
@majesty of reason
Good video.
What are your thoughts on the cosmological argument for atheism/falsity of perfect being theology, or the problem of non-God objects as presented by Justin Schieber and others?
(1) PB wouldn't create imperfections.
(2) At least one imperfect thing exists.
(C) PB doesn't exist.
(1) would seem to follow from the concept of moral perfection: choosing anything but the best possible outcome when there's nothing to stop you from doing so given omnipotence seems like an immoral or imperfect thing to do, and a state of affairs in which God exists and that's it is perfect by definition.
As for (2) anyone can just point to themselves. Just knowing that you're not God seems sufficient to infer your imperfection if God is the unique perfect being and we're not parts of God on (classical) theism unlike in panentheism.
Thanks for the comment!
I'm skeptical of (1). I don't see any difficulties with a PB creating imperfections provided it has a morally justifying reason for doing so (perhaps certain goods can only be obtained if imperfections are allowed).
The classical theist would probably object to the notion of 'creating imperfections', since imperfections are privations of being, i.e. they're absences. And so technically speaking, a PB couldn't create an absence of being -- one can only create things that have being.
Seems to me the skeptic can also render it like thus:
1. Omni-benevolence entails permitting the most perfect world possible to obtain.
2. Necessarily, if God is omni-benevolent, God will permit the most perfect world possible to obtain
3. The most perfect world is one with no imperfections, to which its perfection could not be increased.
4. God is perfect- and necessarily omni-benevolent & omnipotent
5. Therefore a world where God alone exists is perfect by definition, since nothing can increase or add to its perfection.
6. The world where God alone exists is a possible world.
7. Therefore God would necessarily permit a world where he alone exists to obtain.
8 A world where God exists alone does not obtain.
9 Therefore God does not exist
1- follows from a definition of omni-benevolence. It does not necessarily by itself entail a perfect world. Theists tend to say 'possible' entails only what is logically possible- so maybe God can't logically eliminate all suffering/evil/imperfection in order to achieve some higher Good/perfection, if that good/perfection is achieved then God in permitting it is not acting contra his omni-benevolence.
2- Follows if the most perfect possible world is something God can actually bring about. Given his omnipotnece entails bringing about all logically possible worlds, the only question is- is the world sans creation possible? Yes (most theists think it actually obtained prior to creation).
3- I think this is pretty trivially true. A world lacking imperfections is presumably perfect. One could argue an empty world lacks imperfections, but is not perfect. But non existence is assumed to be an imperfection, so that doesn't follow.
4&5- God being perfect seems definitional to God. He is that which nothing greater than can be conceived, devoid of deficiency, possessing all the perfections. A world where God exists is by definition devoid of imperfections. Added to this, nothing permitted by God could add to its perfection- it could only ever add gratuitous imperfections. God could not justify that permittance by claiming to achieve some higher good or perfection, since by definition there could be none without suggesting a lack of perfection in the world prior to his permittance, which is to say that God alone is lacking a perfection, whcih entails he is imperfect, which is a contradiction.]
6- Again, it is clearly possible for God to permit a possible world where he alone exists. Many theists believe he did just this prior to creation. To suggest otherwise seems to suggest either such a world is logically impossible, or God is not omnipotent. The latter is clearly impossible for God, the former is clearly wrong.
7- This follows from the above premises. Essentially, what God's omnipotence/omni-benevolence entail is that God would only permit a world where he alone exists. Perhaps the theist want to appeal to his freedom- but that would only be a freedom to permit gratuitous suffering. Whilst God may have that power, he would no more exercise it than he would commit an act of wanton evil, or an unjustifiable lie. Perhaps the response will be that in creating a world with free agents God is adding some value that did not already exist. But this commits you to the view that a perfect world can be lacking a value- that would of course be an imperfection. Or that God existing alone is not a perfect world. Given God is co-extensive with that world (as it contains nothing else) this implies God is not perfect, which runs into similar problems.
8- is obvious given we are having this conversation.
9- this follows because God has clearly failed to permit a world where he alone exists to obtain. Given God can not fail in this and given God's omnibenevolence entails this is what he would do, we can conclude that no perfect being with the attributes of omnipotence/omnibenevolence could possibly exist and the world exists. Given the world exists, then it is impossible for such a being to exist. These attributes are essential to God, therefore God can not exist.
😳Joe over here putting me on new stuff
What if one responds, that gods knowledge of himself is necessary in all worlds, while his knowledge of other than him self is contingent.
in the world were he is alone only his knowledge of himself exists, and yes its intrinsic but since knowing himself is necessary in all worlds then that knowledge is not contingents but rather
necessary.
The extra knowledge of other than himself is not there in the world where he is alone (ie the contingent knowledge) !!
Hey man - theist here. Havent had a chance to watch yet - was hoping you could put the syllogisms in the comments/description in the meantime?
Thanks for the comment my dude! I provide steps of the argument in the video, so I will refrain from placing a syllogism in comments.
Am I right in concluding that step 4 is arguing that knowledge is wholly intrinsic? It seems like what you're arguing for is idealism in that case.
Thank you for the response!
So, Step 4 does not argue that God's knowledge is wholly intrinsic simpliciter. Rather, it argues that *in the alone world* God's knowledge is wholly intrinsic. This is because there exists nothing apart from him to which he could relationally stand (which is required for something to have an extrinsic feature).
@@MajestyofReason Ah yes, I think I see now. Where I would object is at the idea that God has contingent knowledge in the scenario where no other creature exists. God has knowledge of how His knowledge could potentially be related to contingent things, but I would maintain that knowledge in itself is not contingent since "in every possible world" it remains possible for his knowledge to be related to some contingent thing.
If you think about it, to claim otherwise would be to claim that God having knowledge changes the nature of his internal life, which is a big no-go for Thomists. So, rather, I would say that God's knowledge of something potentially being related to God continues to exist, it is just actualized by that relation, which of course, following Aquinas, is not a real relation in God, but only in the creature.
@@Tdisputations Thanks again!
So, I agree that God knows what he could potentially be related to. But this doesn't account for the following fact:
In the alone world, there are contingent truths. For instance, it is true that Earth doesn't exist; it is true that God chose not to create; and so on.
And God positively knows such contingent truths in the alone world. Hence, God has contingent knowledge. Again, this is because such knowledge is not merely of how he *could* potentially be related to contingent things. Rather, he positively knows *actual* contingent truths in the alone world.
@@MajestyofReason Sure, but that would be just an absence of a relation between God and creature. I don't think that would be a positive reality in God. There wouldn't be a part of God that is contingent so much as there would be an absence of that contingent thing. God would know that he potentially has a relation to the contingent being, and He would not know that potential relation as being actualized. So, we could think of it more as a privation in this sense.
Btw, there is a video series I watched recently that is very helpful with respect to understanding the Thomistic concept of knowledge based on "Man's Knowledge of Reality" by Wilhelmsen. The playlist is just called "Man's Knowledge of Reality" and it's by Christopher Anadale, if you want to check it out.
@@Tdisputations Thanks for the comment!
So, appealing to an absence of a relation doesn't avoid the argument. For an absence of a relation is an *absence of a feature* of God. But God's knowing a truth is not some *absence* or *lack* of God -- it's a positive ontological item. So, appealing to absence of relations won't work.
Moreover, *even if* it worked in the case of knowledge that some contingent thing T does not exist, it couldn’t work in the case of *positive* contingent facts in the alone world. For instance, God *chose* to refrain from creating in the alone world. This is not a mere absence of a contingent concrete thing, like the Earth - instead, this is a positive ontological item (namely, a providential and perfectly rational freely willed choice of God’s). So, *even if* appeal to absence of relations worked in the case of things like Earth (it doesn’t work, but supposing it does), it *still* won’t avoid my argument.
Thank you so much for the suggestion about the video series!!! I will check it out my dude!
Great video! Are you planning to do debates and/or discussions with Classical Theists? (maybe philosophers like Feser, Koons, Oderberg, Pruss, etc., or TH-camrs like Intellectual Conservatism, Classical Theist, Mathoma, etc.)
Also, 7:55 "whether or not God is the 45th president of the United States" 😂
Hahaha I knowwwww
I've been planning on reaching out to Koons to have a discussion on stage two of cosmological arguments with Oppy.
I reached out to Gaven Kerr a couple weeks back to discuss the De Ente argument with Oppy. Kerr says he probably won't be able to make it happen. Maybe I could try to get Feser? But Feser is too 'big' for my small channel -- that's my hunch.
I have a discussion with CTist Steven Nemes that will be posted next week.
I'd welcome discussion with Classical Theist, Mathoma, etc., though I do have a few misgivings with these two in particular. It pertains to attitudes towards non-Thomists. But that's a whole discussion for another day. Anyway, I'd be open to it.
@@MajestyofReason Steven Nemes? That's awesome! Can't wait!
I hope you can get the others on board too! Btw thanks for answering :)
There is in classical theism a view that God created the world ro express his attributes this idea of expressing his attributes in his creation whether love or justice seems to lead to a conclusion that God had to create his world.this ide was used by Jonathan Edward's conception of absolute determinism
You need to start a podcast!
I'll consider it
Usually the idea of God needing to create other rational agents but it is not necessary since he would have the other members of the trinity for all eternity
Wouldn't God knowing about non-existent things cause them to be non-existant? Which to me seems to fit the knowing is causing. Maybe I am confused, great video btw!
Would a ontologicaly conception of God be outside of time or could such a God be in time
[The rebuttal is in the comments of this comment]
[On your argument I]
P1 - There is a possible world in which God is alone (God did not create anything).
P2 - It follows that, necessarily, God has contingent knowledge.
P3 - But, if you are aware of something extrinsically, partially intrinsically and/or extrinsically and intrinsically itself.
P4 - Of the modes of knowledge, only the intrinsic is up to God by definition.
Conclusion II - Therefore, God has intrinsically contingent knowledge.
Conclusion III - Therefore the God of classical theism is inconsistent because he should not have any contingency.
Before answering the argument itself, I ask three questions and answer them:
1. What does God know?
A: An omniscient being does know absolutely everything. Every single thing that can be qualified as an entity is subject to Divine knowledge.
2. How does God know?
A: God knows more *perfectly and in an immovable* way. There are two ways to know a thing (i) as its "idea" (it's immovable form) and (ii) as its current instance. These would be the "real" and the "ideal" existence (not proper definitions, but I think one can get the difference they represent). The knowledge of God, necessarily, is "ideal" (he knows everything as orderly ideas, including in its accidents as they happen). To make an analogy, it would be as if we humans saw a movie running at 60fps while God sees each possible *frame* simultaneously. This is the Divine knowledge. Despite immovable, this knowledge is eternal, we will take this info back in the counter argumentation.
3. How does God differ from us in knowing?
A: God is His own knowledge, so it is not surprising that He knows things immovably. To know in this way is like to know things in an ideal way because in order to know in the same way that *we know* - where the intellect can focus only on certain things per time and needs to be moving to get the knowledge of others - requires mobility and locality in time and space. Therefore, for God, there is no possibility of a movement and a partial perception of the intellect. Hence it follows that God knows everything *immovably* and "ideally", even as a thing's existence is instantiated. Take again the sample of we humans seeing a movie and "God seeing the same movie" to comprehend if it gets difficult.
Using these points, the path to counter-argument (more properly, a "scape route to the argument", we will get there) becomes clearer. The argument understands that in every possible world God would need to have some knowledge that in another world would be different. Using the argument's own example, which would be something like: "In the actual world God knows that DJ Trump is the 45th president of the United States. But if God was alone, he would know that such a statement is false. In the 'actual world', he could *never* know that Trump is *not* the 45th president, as such knowledge would be *false* ".
The argument is *really well* constructed, and it sounds like a *razor* because wherever you try to run from it the path is cut. So I have no choice but to *accept it* at first. Not the whole argument, I will accept only this conclusion: *"In every possible world, God has some knowledge that would be contingent, when related to other possible worlds"*
[On your argument II]
Taking note of that *"accepted conclusion"* I want to start analyzing the value of it and the rest of the argumentation. But I will trow my own reasoning, so whenever it gets dubious if I'm still making the argument as a basis, one can take back to where I exposed the premises. It goes like the following:
There are essentially *two scenarios* (although one of them has several possible subdivisions, their basis is the same and, in addition, the reasoning positively applies to each and every scenario):
Scenario A = The world (universe, creation) really exists
.
Scenario B = The world (universe, creation) does not really exist
.
In scenario A, God knows of scenario B as an idea of the possible world and an idea of the real world (which is to say that God knows that this scenario could be ideal or real, wherever it *is* ideal or real). And in scenario B, God knows of scenario A as an idea of the possible world and an idea of the real world. Therefore, the first thing to analyze is that God knows *both* worlds whether they exist or not. But there is *a possible problem* that can arise from analyzing the verification that one of these worlds is instantiated, as follows:
It is a fact that his "brute" knowledge does not change neither in scenario B nor in scenario A since he knows all the instances of both worlds and knows them ideally, he even knows the "idea that world B exists" and the "idea that world A exists" no matter if the one that exists *is the world B or the world A.
*
But then a possible problem shows up, which needs to be analyzed. Suppose that what exists is *scenario B.* Now, God knows that scenario B is the one that *really* exists. Now, suppose that what exists is scenario A. God knows that scenario A is *the one that really exists.* It seems then that, *depending on the scenario,* God's knowledge changes, which would imply that his knowledge is contingent.
The solution to this is precisely to understand that God's knowledge is *perfect and eternal,* not concentrated in time. This does not mean that he "does not know that I exist right now", but it does mean that he *did not need me to exist* to know about my existence and that he necessarily *knew that I would exist* (even though there was virtually the possibility that I didn't exist).
Now, God always knew that *the current world would be "the current world".* Consequently, God has always known that *the possible world would always be the "possible world"* and that knowledge is necessary. So that knowledge, in God, is not contingent (despite knowing something that is "virtually" contingent). He, in fact, did "chose" the current scenario (because he could have chosen something else), but that choice did not happen in a specific time or in a specific space, and it was not a choice in the sense of "facing possibilities and excluding all but one", because *he didn't face possibilities.*
Thus, that is the eternal choice of God (which makes such a choice necessary, even if "there was" another possibility). So the existing world has always been the one that *would exist,* just as the possible world has always been the one that would be possible. This makes the possible world/scenario in which "God is alone" *not really a possible world* (since the premise of any possible world is that at some point it was possible). This world becomes a "possible world" then, only in a *"virtual"* way.
I make this distinction for a simple reason: When we are dealing with a "possible world" we are dealing with something that could be. Now, unicorns do not exist, but at some point, they could have existed or can come to exist (that only God knows, lol). The possible world in which "God is alone" was never "really" possible (there was never the possibility of God's will being another since this will is eternal) by definition of God's will itself, because the will that determined the current scenario as the real one *has always been the same.*
Our measure of "possible worlds" always bears in mind that at some point in the "path" that culminated in the current world, there could be another *realizable* path. The scenario in which God is alone could never even be real, even though - speaking in an abstract way - God's will could be directed to that scenario. So, lato sensu, it is a "possible world". But when it comes to the Eternal being we talk about eternal (not begun) choices, that is, in strictu sensu, we have to violate one of the premises of what is used to define a "possible world" (which is to say that "at some point, scenario X was possible" this principle for all possible sets of scenarios).
This reasoning even resolves an *apparent* aporia on the issue of creation. On the one hand, it seems that creation was necessary and this seems to conflict with Divine freedom, on the other hand, it seems that the possibility that there is a scenario in which God is alone conflicts with Divine necessity.
The solution is simple. God did not have to *face possibilities* when making his choice when determining his will, even because his will is eternal, so the "possible world in which God is alone", despite being a world that "could have occurred" virtually so to speak, could *never* have happened. It is, ironic as it may seem, an "impossible possibility" (because the whole idea of a possible world deals with the possible relations of things that can be with things that exist. Here, the thing that exists is eternal, as already said).
It is a possible world, insofar as it says what God's choice *could have been.* But this choice (this will) of God does not begin at some time and somewhere, but is eternal (I think the objector agrees with that since it is a *premise of classical theism* so I will not defend it right now). So even though there is an abstract of a possible world in which he wanted or could want something else, given the very existence of the current world (so we know what *"was" God's choice* from eternity) that world *was never really possible* ( this alone is enough to exclude all the relationships that one tries to derive from it with regard to contingency, since this expressed knowledge is necessary, even though it knows something not necessary in itself).
Anyway, the current and real scenario treated here is none other than scenario A (at least I think we exist, lol), because the world exists (the universe, the creation, exists). And God has always known that "that" would be the existing scenario. This makes the existence of scenario A *necessary in relation to the volition of God* since his will is from eternity directed towards the existence of scenario A (even though, again, there is the *virtual scenario* where God's volition is different).
Scenario B does not exist, nor could it ever exist, given what was said, because to say that it could exist is to say that at some point God *did positively chose* between B and A. What happens is that we can *virtually see* that God could have chosen otherwise. But his choice, his will, is eternal, has *no beginning.* Having no beginning, the current scenario could never be different, although one can think of the "virtual" possibility of another scenario. This is why, ironically, scenario B is an "impossible possibility".
Also, playing with words, we have that creation is a creation *"of free will and necessary"* (and in history, we find people who defend only the first and only the second). Of free will, because God could not create (a scenario, as already said, "virtually possible"), and necessary, because he did not have to choose between those two possibilities (to create or not), being his will and "the chosen path, the plan of God" eternal and immutable. Thus, there is no contingency in God, and classical theism is still based.
Note: Similar reasoning can be used to explain, in the doctrine of Trinity, why it is consistent to say that the son eternally processes from the father, although it was not created. For the son exists because of the father, but that relation of the procession has no beginning, still - if one admits the trinity (I'm not trying to demonstrate it by now) - one will have no difficulty to see that it is consistent.
Tks if you've read so far! Keep going in your videos and arguments.
Final note: bro, it's really good to see good thinkers on the other side of the debate. I'm tired of this new atheist/new agnostic wave, finally, someone good to debate with.
@@Gabriel-io2xq Bruh,What About modal collapse and arbitrariness problem?
@@user-qk2ic4vg2s I don't think it does configure a objection to my reasoning, for I've inserted a "real/virtual" distinction (or "lato/stritu") and related it in the final parts of the argument.
Speaking as a naïve, ignorant and Protestant classical theist, and after reading your exchange with Actus Purus: I think that our primary difference is in how we think about Platonic Forms.
In at least Thomism (it seems to me), things exist as manifestations of their Forms or essences. So far as I can tell, the Form Itself is largely unchanged when the object comes (or fails to come) into existence. Since we also hold (with pretty much all theists that I've ran into) that the Platonic Forms are in the Divine Intellect as their Home, God would know these things through these Forms- they don't change, essentially, so God doesn't change, essentially- whether the universe exists or not!
(yeah I'm basically biting the bullet and admitting these changes in God (sort of- in a periphery way), but saying that that isn't what Classical Theism is talking about! 😉)
Hope this helps!
Or that I can learn more!
Jonathan
Hey Jonathan! Thanks for your message! It's deeply appreciated. I wish I could interact more, but finals week is 1.5 weeks away, so my nose is buried in my books. But I appreciate your engagement with my stuff--keep thinking, and keeping appreciating reason's majesty :)
@@MajestyofReason Thanks! thanks for the like! I will try to continue to appreciate the Majesty of Reason- definitely!
@@MajestyofReason I should make myself clearer- I think:
Your argument seems to be something like this:
1. God would know if He created things or not.
2. But, if He didn't create things, that would be a fundamentally different thing than if He had not Created.
3. Therefore, He would be Fundamentally different (in knowledge) if He didn't create rather than if He did.
4. But, a God who was Fundamentally Different in different Worlds (in any respect), could not be Absolutely Simple.
Thus, God is not Absolutely Simple.
I would question step 2, there... a Form, or Essence would not Fundamentally change, by being created or not. The Idea of a Triangle doesn't change by a particular triangle's being red or black, say, or right or equilateral- then how much less by existing or not existing? These Forms are in the Mind of God... & the rest of my argument I have in the previous comment.
I am not at all clear as to what these Classical Theists are saying about God changing or not- from what I can see, I don't think they are denying that God could change (from "World" to "World") in a sort of (very) periphery way (creating or not creating, choosing Abram rather than Socrates, etc.)- the whole notion of Divine Simplicity seems to be about something more central (or, as Classical Theists put it, more "real"). Say: that God would always face the same decisions in every world, & this facing of decisions is more central & essential than the (non-God) things He has chosen.
Hope that helps.... & you have time to read this. Or, someone does!
Jonathan
I'm putting it very roughly!
The trinity itself being problematic