Theism and the Argument from Material Causality | Dr. Felipe Leon
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- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 22 ส.ค. 2024
- Interested in God's existence? Theism? Atheism? Thomism? Creation? Panentheism, pantheism, and Spinozism? The origin and cause of the universe? Russelian monism? Causal finitism? We have just the discussion for you.
Thanks to Dr. Felipe Leon and Micah Edvenson (from Crusade Against Ignorance channel) for joining me to discuss Felipe's argument from material causality against creation ex nihilo.
IMPORTANT NOTE:
Near the beginning of the video, Felipe used the term 'classical theism' to describe people like Plantinga, Swinburne, and co. This is an incorrect usage of the term. But this is a mere terminological issue. He means 'traditional theists' or 'orthodox monotheism'. He doesn't mean to pick out the Big Four attributes characterizing classical theism: immutability, simplicity, impassibility, and timelessness.
He just means that the theists to which he refers affirm the omni attributes, monotheism, God's perfection, God's necessity, and God's causally originating and sustaining the universe ex nihilo. An alternative understanding of the term doesn't warrant not listening. It was a wonderful conversation.
Also, his target is ex nihilo creation. It's "classical theism*cvc*", i.e. classical theism plus classical view of creation. So, it doesn't really matter (in the present context) whether or not he gets immutability, timelessness, and so on correct. What matters is his characterization of ex nihilo creation, since that's his target. So, pointing out a misapplication of 'classical theism' with respect to something other than creatio ex nihilo is not quite relevant. His target is any view according to which there is creation ex nihilo. The specifics about the Divine nature are tangential.
I do want to stress, of course, that I disagreed with Felipe's use of 'classical theism'. Classical theism, as I use it, is meant to expressly pick out orthodox monotheism plus the Big Four: immutability, simplicity, timelessness, and impassibility. I would have preferred that he used 'orthodox monotheism' or 'traditional theism'. But the reason I didn't dwell on it or correct it in the dialogue was because (i) it's a terminological issue, and more importantly, (ii) it is irrelevant to his argument, since his argument has nothing to do with the Big Four but is instead aimed at ex nihilo creation.
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This was so fun!
Idea:
It seems that different stuff could have existed.
Possibilities are grounded in causal powers.
So, there are causal powers which can create or destroy stuff.
Great conversation on some key fundamental issues!
Thought about this a while. Here’s what I’ve come up with. :)
Is possibility coextensive with conceivability? Ooh. Such a shiny principle. This would make possibility nice and neat. I want it.
Unfortunately, possibility probably isn’t coextensive with conceivability. It’s sad, I know. But it seems we can conceive of metaphysically impossible things. Like stuff popping into existence uncaused out of nothing. Too bad.
But maybe not all is lost! Perhaps we can salvage something like our shiny principle: the abilities of an omnipotent Being are coextensive with conceivability. Cool! We can still have a really broad modality, but bar stuff like things popping into existence uncaused.
Btw, creation ex nihilo is conceivable.
Have a nice day! :)
Thanks for this!
(1) Even if I granted that creation ex nihilo is conceivable, it seems to me that creation ex deus is similarly conceivable--and hence granting your principle, both are possible. But at least under traditional theism, it is necessarily the case that if there is a non-God concrete object, it is created ex nihilo by God. Granted, we could deny this commitment of traditional theism; but it's a significant result nonetheless.
(2) I can conceive of naturalism being true, but that couldn't be in the abilities of an omnipotent being
@@MajestyofReason I won’t argue (1); I think my response may have a lot of such ‘significant results’ as you put it so aptly.
And to clarify for (2), I’m saying that any *action* that it is conceivable for God to do, God has the ability to do it. Naturalism is not an action that can be performed. Maaaaybe you’re talking about God making Naturalism true by annihilating Himself? But I can’t conceive of the annihilation of a necessary Being. :)
@@ApologeticsSquared I wanted to make a third point, too: it's not clear to me that I actually can conceive of creation ex nihilo. I mean sure, I can imagine some kind of 'popping into being', and I can slap a label on it saying 'came from no pre-existent stuff'. But I struggle to know how I could conceive it.
Re: naturalism
I thought the original claim was that 'conceivability is co-extensive with the abilities of an omnipotent being'. I took this to mean 'x is conceivable iff an omnipotent being is able to bring it about that x'. Perhaps I misunderstood the original comment! If so, I ask that (i) you please forgive me and (ii) that you be ever-so-kind as to clarify what you mean(t).
Now, the trouble with the above formula is that it's simply a datum that i can conceive of naturalism's truth and hence of its never being the case that there is an omnipotent being. But then the L side of the biconditional is satisfied for this case while the R side isn't [since no omnipotent being is able to bring it about that it is never the case that there is an omnipotent being] -- a counter-example.
@@MajestyofReason I thought of your third point, but I’d just point to the many many Christians over the years who believed in creation ex nihilo. That seems like good evidence that it is in fact conceivable.
And reading my original comment, I realize I did not make it very clear! I was saying, “If I can conceive of God doing x, then God has the ability to do X.”
@@ApologeticsSquared ah, that clarifies things--thanks! So, I think I can conceive of God believing the Goldbach conjecture, and I can also conceive of him believing the negation of the Goldbach conjecture. But the GC is either necessarily true or necessarily false; and it is neither within God's power to believe the negation of something necessarily true nor within his power to believe in something necessarily false.
[One might question whether I can conceive of each. But I mean... it's just conceiving of God mentally affirming something. Surely I can conceive of that. We at least know that it's within our humanly powers to affirm or deny the GC. [This might be the weakest part of what my line of reasoning.] Perhaps a better way: I can conceive of the truth but also the falsity of GC; and since God's beliefs track truth, I can conceive of God believing in either; but God cannot believe in either.]
Here's a general strategy for cooking up counter-examples, though: find examples [which are rife in the literature] of conceivable but necessarily false things that, importantly, don't involve the truth or falsity of theism. E.g. an iron bar floating on water, thoughts=neurophysiological processes [or, if one is a physicalist, use this example: thoughts=/=neurophysiological processes], water=/=H2O, etc.
I do understand that an omnipotent god is only capable of creating logically possible things. But I do not understand why creation out of nothing shouldn't be logically possible.
In the bible god spoke the world into existence. Doesn't that mean that his voice is the source of the material, which everything is made out of? Does that make me a non ex nihilo person?
1:09:10 "Conservation laws hold in all nearby worlds." The way I see the bible, there are three worlds. The physical world, the spiritual world and god himself. If you stretch the spiritual world, it could be counted as a nearby world, if I understood him correctly. But god himself I wouldn't consider a nearby world at all. And according to the bible, all three worlds are interconnected. I don't know why really different worlds have to be far apart. When I create a computer simulation, it can also be considered some sort of world (right?). And the laws there can be really different. I can program those laws after all. But that world is interactable from this world. Because of that I don't see why more similar worlds need to be closer and more different ones need to be far apart. What is far apart even in a realm outside of our three dimensions?
I'm still confused what you actually mean by "all possible worlds". Perhaps you will explain it in my first comment. What I would really appreciate is if you would make a two hour interview on that topic like you did on the topic of what is an argument. I do not understand a lot of things in those videos. But since you circle around a very specific issue for such a long time, I can pick up one or two points. Because of that I do think such a video would really help me out.
It seems like Dr. Felipe Leon hasn't really done his homework on the historical reliability of the OT or the NT. I am talking about his musings right at the end.
Yes what did he say that was wrong? I didnt catch that.
I do think that the term "material" is very problematic and if the same objection comes up again and again, he should probably refine the argument a little bit.
He does explain it, but I'm 25 minutes in and my best guess is still - naturalistic argument?
If you haven't already you should invest in a decent microphone. The audio isn't great.
"Out of nothing" can mislead people by suggesting that "nothing" stands for a building material. You wouldn't say, "Bill, here's a pile of nothing. Please make my bookcase of it."