In looking at Joe's paper on the death of modal collapse arguments. I understand how the claim that God's creative act "indeterministically produces its effects" would rescue classical theism from modal collapse, but I don't see how that claim is actually consistent with classical theism. For one thing, it would seem to make God's *knowledge* of which creation is actual impossible unless God is epistemically *receptive* to creation. But the latter conflicts with divine impassibility and requires a distinction between contingent and necessary aspects of God's knowledge, something that is precluded by DDS. For another thing, that God's creative act "indeterministically produces its effects" entails a non-meticulous view of divine providence, perhaps something along the lines of open theism. But open theism is universally understood to be at odds with classical theism. So I'm not sure how that works for the classical theist. The issues Joe identifies regarding "intentional directness" and providence raise similar issues. In short, it may be possible to block the proposed resolution of the modal collapse argument by leveraging other aspects of classical theism *against* the indeterministic causation idea. In any case, I prefer to frame the modal collapse argument as a dilemma: If CT, then either we get a modal collapse, or God is essentially indifferent to creation. Arguably, both results are theologically unacceptable. If the specific content of God's creative will / knowledge is intrinsic to God, then by DDS they are identical to God and essential to God. If that content extends to all of creation, then we get modal collapse. Other the other hand, if that content (insofar as it concerns creation) is extrinsic to God (as on Matthews-Grant's proposal), then we get a God who is essentially and intrinsically indifferent to creation. The latter would seem to conflict with the doctrines of divine omniscience and divine providence. I know M-G thinks he can square that circle, but I don't think it works.
Hey Dr. Rhoda!!! Lovely to see you here🥰 I should have you on as a guest at some point. (Busy with midterms and whatnot right now) What the CTist will say, I think, is that God need not be receptive in the manner you specify; his contingent knowledge, instead, is partly *constituted* by the extrinsic facts themselves. God has one necessary intrinsic state, his act of knowing, and then the “ontological foundation” of his contingent knowledge is that one necessary act plus the contingent extrinsic facts themselves. It’s quite counter-intuitive, but I don’t think it’s strictly incoherent or entails God’s receptivity.🙂
I have a paper under review right now where I push a loooot of these buttons even harder. Eg i develop the providence point in much more detail; I also expand on the intentional action problem. This is why I think the death is ultimately very fruitful☺️
@@MajestyofReason, thanks for the reply, Joe. Yeah, I understand the "content externalist" move, but on my understanding of divine omniscience, I just don't find it plausible. Whatever reasons there may be for thinking that context externalism plays a role in *human* knowledge don't seem to apply (as far as I can tell) when it comes to an essentially perfect knower, such as God. So I think that response by the CTist implicitly winds up denying omniscience (and providence).
@@MajestyofReasonwrote: "If God is identical to God’s act of creation as divine simplicity requires, does creation exist necessarily? And does God have the potential to have created another universe if he's purely actual? I cover these questions and more." I can VERY easily answer that question but I'm not sure if you are ready for the truth, Joseph. :p
@@alanrhoda228 When I choose chocolate ice-cream at the ice-cream shop, in that very act of willing, I know what I have willed (the chocolate ice-cream) and what I have refrained from willing (all the other flavours). Likewise, when God wills the world to exist, He knows what He has willed, and hence what actually exists, and He knows what He has refrained from willing, and hence what doesn't actually exist. But, His willing the effects is just His causing of them while possessing all forms of existence and not being necessitated to cause any one of them. So, just as His causality of actual creatures implies no accidental modification of His being, neither does His willing and knowing of actual creatures.
It seems to me that the account of intentional action that requires something in the agent that directs it to the particular effect and no other removes free will, because if intentional action requires something in the agent that directs it to the particular effect and no other, then were it to be a different intentional action, that thing about the agent would have to be different to explain why it is directed to another effect. This seems to go against free will, because how I understand free will is that an act is free when the explanation why the agent did a particular thing could have also been the explanation why he did another thing (e.g. 'I am thirsty' can be the explanation for why I chose to drink the water or why I chose to drink the soda). But according to this account of intentional action, there needs to be 'something about me' that explains why I did this particular thing (why my act was directed to this particular outcome) rather than any other. But then, 'that thing about me' that directs me to a particular outcome seems to be a necessitating explanation (i.e. it is because of 'that thing about me' that I chose to do this particular thing such that were 'that thing about me' different or absent, then I would have done something else or not done anything at all), removing freedom of the will.
I suppose a useful way to see the distinction between a rigid and non-rigid designator in this context is that the latter simply isn't holy identical with that which it's designating.
Joe really has it out for Classical Theism. He's responded to Trent Horn's Apologetics 3 times, critiqued Feser's arguments, and now he's debunking an argument against Classical Theism in a way that creates more arguments against CT.
I must admit that I struggle to compregend either the motivation for, or intelligibility of libertarianism. However, might the classical theist preserve a measure of provenance by positing that God's intentions and act of creation function like a final cause (Telos)? Such an act might cause infinitely many possible worlds, but within a constrained range, such that they, for example produce creatures relating back to God. Would that satisfy libertarian concerns regarding freedom, as well as providence?
Doesn't "God's existence is identical to his actions" refer to "those actions" (specified actions)? Unspecified actions don't make sense. For example, God's existence is identical to his act of the creation of THIS world.
Some questions on neccessary beings? Let's assume at t0 there is some necessary being A, it neccessarily waits for a maximum of 3 days and then neccessarily creates a being B. It's my understanding that B is also a neccessary being. If that is true the requirement for being necessary is simple "existing in all possible world" rather than "existing in all possible worlds at all possible times". Let's now assume that when B is created, B necessarily destroys A after 1 day, it does so in all possible worlds. Now we have a neccessary being A that stopped existing and a necessary being B that started existing. If we imagine B neccessarily creates a being C that destroys B then B is a necessary being that both began to exist and stopped existing. It's just the fact that in all possible worlds B existed for some amount of time. Have I got this right?
It seems to me that your paper argues that a theist must accept Indeterministic causal link between god’s action and effect to avoid modal collapse. If that’s the case - in all possible worlds the God is existing with same intention but each world has different effects. Doesn’t it undermine other theistic arguments such as PSR , Contingency arguments etc which tends to conclude that ultimately the reason for existence of universe is explained with God. What are your thoughts on this?
A cause is an explanation. Therefore, an indeterministic cause is an explanation. On Classical Theism, everything contingent has an indeterministic cause. Therefore, on Classical Theism, everything contingent has an explanation. (By 'everything contingent' I'm referring to things, not propositions.) It remains that Classical Theism is compatible with the PSR and contingency arguments. It seems to me that analytic philosophers and those who read them, whatever they think about possible worlds, speak of them constantly as if they were real worlds "in" which things occurred. It a strange speaking habit - somewhat analogous to how we often refer to people being "in" paintings. Thus they ask the question "why does God create in this possible world and not in that?", imagining that God literally creates and not creates in two equally real worlds. In reality, there is only one "real world" (the actual one), and therefore only one requiring explanation. All the other "worlds" are abstractions of the intellect, logical objects associatable with lists of truth valued propositions. Besides, Thomists (and classical theists generally) hold that situating God in a possible world is a category mistake, insofar as God is the pre-condition for there being any 'possible worlds' at all.
If God is his act, why must it designate him? Surely one needn't be designed by themselves. However, if there is a level of identicality, or perhaps unity that is lacking between God and his act, such that gods act must designate him, simplicity is forfeited?
So I've read the preprint version of the paper, and I spoke with you a bit about it on Facebook. I am hesitant to say that this is a move classical theist can make consistently to avoid modal collapse, and perhaps that's why you call it a fruitful death, but I don't think they're really dead. Where does classical theism stand when it comes to the divine ideas, do they typically hold to a form of divine conceptualism? If so, it would seem that the divine ideas, upon which creation is patterned, are eternal and therefore existentially prior to any created thing. If the system of thought, includes a type of divine conceptualism , then I don't think it makes sense to speak of indeterminate causes as the divine ideas clearly cannot be said to manifest extrinsically to God.
Hey joe, I've been reading some the books you recommended in your previous videos and i absolutely love them uwu. i have another question and maybe you can use this question as an idea for a future video. what are some of the most important philosophy papers (top 20 maybe?) one must read as they are getting deeper into philosophy? anyways, love ya
Joe's 13 books recommendation in his previous video was Fantastic really helpful it will be great if he make another long video on HOW TO STUDY PHILOSOPHY (what is the best way to study philosophy ) ,Best Resources for philosophy basically a complete guide to study philosophy by yourself
So I have a dumb question. I don’t see the problem with the idea that we are necessary as well. How would this disprove classical theism. It seems that would just prove other worlds are impossible. Thoughts?
Thank you! I think the CTist will want to avoid modal collapse for the reasons I discuss around 1:20:00 in my video “Arguments Against Classical Theism | Part 1/3”
I love, this complex logical thought, and that I just barely follow it...but @46:16 I wonder if the classical theist (Jesus) would have any clue of what you guys are talking about.
Gods creative act is not really an “act” or “action”… instead, the same that gods exists as “pure essence” or “esse” as is his creation. He IS creation. The same way he IS love. Etc. I believe that the very first cause that is naturally proposed by Oppy IS the first necessary and fundamental base of all reality FROM which all the other branching modal worlds branch from. So, I BLEND god WITH a first cause like Oppy proposes. This theory allows you to have both. As part of gods being there is this first cause or substance and god dosnt create it either. It has always existed WITH god as god. It IS god or an extension of god. And it is this “thing” that actually does all the creating and gives rise to the branching modal and contingent worlds thereafter. I believe the biblical story of the trinity is a poem trying to tell us this. The SON is part of god but not necessarily god himself and the son is positioned between god and man. This is what I consider to be Oppys first cause but instead of it being natural and uncaused I believe It is actual gods creative attribute or power manifest and has always existed (it was not created by god) it IS god… but this entity is not wholly god the same Way the son is not wholly god. There is a dual nature to this substance and it bridges the gap between god and the worlds… then, this first cause what ever it is is what actually extends into metric time and gives rise to the branching contingent worlds which is where SPIRIT is found… the way Dr rob koons suggests the trinity is god qua knower/known, god qua lover/loved, and then the two together is saying something similar to this. The part of god that is actually Oppys first cause exists as gods attribute which is to love. God IS love. As a maximally perfect being he CAN NOT logically exist absent this love made manifest as this first cause or creative power > this IS gods love > his creation IS his love which IS what I call Oppys first cause. In this sense Oppys first cause is essential and exists in every possible world but it is not uncaused > it is gods love > and gods love manifest is this creative power. The Bible analogy is god son here…. Then in every branching contingent world exists the propensity for god to be known. We come to KNOW these metaphysical truths through philosophical argument, truth seeking, and metaphysics. When we do this we can come to know god or love god or recognize gods love which is his creation power (Oppys first cause)…. So this theory gives us the trinity, gives us branching modal time, gives us gods nature and explains why there is a creation at all and what the point of it is…. There never was any act of creation instead gods creation has always been with god bc it IS god. Each of the modal or possible worlds causally can regress back to the first cause where Oppy stops the causal chain. So in this theory the chain stops exactly where Oppy says it stops too….but you get god too which grounds this first cause and what ever this first cause is it is that which actually does all the subsequent creating of the worlds…
For phil mind, check out Tim Crane’s excellent intro books (Eg, The Mechanical Mind). For phil time, check out the recent Intro to Phil Time published with Routledge. For paradoxes, check out Mike Huemer’s Paradox Lost🥰
I think you are mixing up intentionality and indeterminism. I guess it depends if you believe in 'free will' or not. If free will exists, it is by its nature indeterministic. That is not synonymous with 'free will acts' being random or unintentional. If all actions are deterministic, then there is no free will. Free will is by its definition indeterministic, but is not random or unintentional.
My claim was not that indeterminism entails unintentionality; I gave *reasons* for thinking that the *kind* of indeterminism CT requires implies that God doesn’t act intentionally to bring about a particular creation. See the final two sections of my IJPR article in the description as well as my semi-recent video on intentional collapse🙂
You're the man! Thanks for the plug for the pod!
In looking at Joe's paper on the death of modal collapse arguments. I understand how the claim that God's creative act "indeterministically produces its effects" would rescue classical theism from modal collapse, but I don't see how that claim is actually consistent with classical theism. For one thing, it would seem to make God's *knowledge* of which creation is actual impossible unless God is epistemically *receptive* to creation. But the latter conflicts with divine impassibility and requires a distinction between contingent and necessary aspects of God's knowledge, something that is precluded by DDS. For another thing, that God's creative act "indeterministically produces its effects" entails a non-meticulous view of divine providence, perhaps something along the lines of open theism. But open theism is universally understood to be at odds with classical theism. So I'm not sure how that works for the classical theist. The issues Joe identifies regarding "intentional directness" and providence raise similar issues. In short, it may be possible to block the proposed resolution of the modal collapse argument by leveraging other aspects of classical theism *against* the indeterministic causation idea.
In any case, I prefer to frame the modal collapse argument as a dilemma: If CT, then either we get a modal collapse, or God is essentially indifferent to creation. Arguably, both results are theologically unacceptable. If the specific content of God's creative will / knowledge is intrinsic to God, then by DDS they are identical to God and essential to God. If that content extends to all of creation, then we get modal collapse. Other the other hand, if that content (insofar as it concerns creation) is extrinsic to God (as on Matthews-Grant's proposal), then we get a God who is essentially and intrinsically indifferent to creation. The latter would seem to conflict with the doctrines of divine omniscience and divine providence. I know M-G thinks he can square that circle, but I don't think it works.
Hey Dr. Rhoda!!! Lovely to see you here🥰 I should have you on as a guest at some point. (Busy with midterms and whatnot right now)
What the CTist will say, I think, is that God need not be receptive in the manner you specify; his contingent knowledge, instead, is partly *constituted* by the extrinsic facts themselves. God has one necessary intrinsic state, his act of knowing, and then the “ontological foundation” of his contingent knowledge is that one necessary act plus the contingent extrinsic facts themselves. It’s quite counter-intuitive, but I don’t think it’s strictly incoherent or entails God’s receptivity.🙂
I have a paper under review right now where I push a loooot of these buttons even harder. Eg i develop the providence point in much more detail; I also expand on the intentional action problem. This is why I think the death is ultimately very fruitful☺️
@@MajestyofReason, thanks for the reply, Joe. Yeah, I understand the "content externalist" move, but on my understanding of divine omniscience, I just don't find it plausible. Whatever reasons there may be for thinking that context externalism plays a role in *human* knowledge don't seem to apply (as far as I can tell) when it comes to an essentially perfect knower, such as God. So I think that response by the CTist implicitly winds up denying omniscience (and providence).
@@MajestyofReasonwrote: "If God is identical to God’s act of creation as divine simplicity requires, does creation exist necessarily? And does God have the potential to have created another universe if he's purely actual? I cover these questions and more."
I can VERY easily answer that question but I'm not sure if you are ready for the truth, Joseph. :p
@@alanrhoda228 When I choose chocolate ice-cream at the ice-cream shop, in that very act of willing, I know what I have willed (the chocolate ice-cream) and what I have refrained from willing (all the other flavours). Likewise, when God wills the world to exist, He knows what He has willed, and hence what actually exists, and He knows what He has refrained from willing, and hence what doesn't actually exist. But, His willing the effects is just His causing of them while possessing all forms of existence and not being necessitated to cause any one of them. So, just as His causality of actual creatures implies no accidental modification of His being, neither does His willing and knowing of actual creatures.
Lmao I loved that joke about reaching out with a hand zapper to the person that Ryan has just pushed down. 😆
It seems to me that the account of intentional action that requires something in the agent that directs it to the particular effect and no other removes free will, because if intentional action requires something in the agent that directs it to the particular effect and no other, then were it to be a different intentional action, that thing about the agent would have to be different to explain why it is directed to another effect. This seems to go against free will, because how I understand free will is that an act is free when the explanation why the agent did a particular thing could have also been the explanation why he did another thing (e.g. 'I am thirsty' can be the explanation for why I chose to drink the water or why I chose to drink the soda). But according to this account of intentional action, there needs to be 'something about me' that explains why I did this particular thing (why my act was directed to this particular outcome) rather than any other. But then, 'that thing about me' that directs me to a particular outcome seems to be a necessitating explanation (i.e. it is because of 'that thing about me' that I chose to do this particular thing such that were 'that thing about me' different or absent, then I would have done something else or not done anything at all), removing freedom of the will.
I suppose a useful way to see the distinction between a rigid and non-rigid designator in this context is that the latter simply isn't holy identical with that which it's designating.
Great video Joe!
Joe really has it out for Classical Theism. He's responded to Trent Horn's Apologetics 3 times, critiqued Feser's arguments, and now he's debunking an argument against Classical Theism in a way that creates more arguments against CT.
To be fair, Feser is the only one of those that requires a great deal of mental activity.
I must admit that I struggle to compregend either the motivation for, or intelligibility of libertarianism. However, might the classical theist preserve a measure of provenance by positing that God's intentions and act of creation function like a final cause (Telos)? Such an act might cause infinitely many possible worlds, but within a constrained range, such that they, for example produce creatures relating back to God.
Would that satisfy libertarian concerns regarding freedom, as well as providence?
Doesn't "God's existence is identical to his actions" refer to "those actions" (specified actions)? Unspecified actions don't make sense.
For example, God's existence is identical to his act of the creation of THIS world.
Some questions on neccessary beings?
Let's assume at t0 there is some necessary being A, it neccessarily waits for a maximum of 3 days and then neccessarily creates a being B.
It's my understanding that B is also a neccessary being. If that is true the requirement for being necessary is simple "existing in all possible world" rather than "existing in all possible worlds at all possible times".
Let's now assume that when B is created, B necessarily destroys A after 1 day, it does so in all possible worlds.
Now we have a neccessary being A that stopped existing and a necessary being B that started existing. If we imagine B neccessarily creates a being C that destroys B then B is a necessary being that both began to exist and stopped existing. It's just the fact that in all possible worlds B existed for some amount of time.
Have I got this right?
It seems to
me that your paper argues that a theist must accept Indeterministic causal link between god’s action and effect to avoid modal collapse.
If that’s the case - in all possible worlds the God is existing with same intention but each world has different effects.
Doesn’t it undermine other theistic arguments such as PSR , Contingency arguments etc which tends to conclude that ultimately the reason for existence of universe is explained with God.
What are your thoughts on this?
A cause is an explanation. Therefore, an indeterministic cause is an explanation. On Classical Theism, everything contingent has an indeterministic cause. Therefore, on Classical Theism, everything contingent has an explanation. (By 'everything contingent' I'm referring to things, not propositions.) It remains that Classical Theism is compatible with the PSR and contingency arguments.
It seems to me that analytic philosophers and those who read them, whatever they think about possible worlds, speak of them constantly as if they were real worlds "in" which things occurred. It a strange speaking habit - somewhat analogous to how we often refer to people being "in" paintings. Thus they ask the question "why does God create in this possible world and not in that?", imagining that God literally creates and not creates in two equally real worlds. In reality, there is only one "real world" (the actual one), and therefore only one requiring explanation. All the other "worlds" are abstractions of the intellect, logical objects associatable with lists of truth valued propositions. Besides, Thomists (and classical theists generally) hold that situating God in a possible world is a category mistake, insofar as God is the pre-condition for there being any 'possible worlds' at all.
@@Bowen12676 ISNT indeterminism just contingency
if your only options are necessary and contingent then indeterminism seems to be contingent
If God is his act, why must it designate him? Surely one needn't be designed by themselves. However, if there is a level of identicality, or perhaps unity that is lacking between God and his act, such that gods act must designate him, simplicity is forfeited?
So I've read the preprint version of the paper, and I spoke with you a bit about it on Facebook.
I am hesitant to say that this is a move classical theist can make consistently to avoid modal collapse, and perhaps that's why you call it a fruitful death, but I don't think they're really dead.
Where does classical theism stand when it comes to the divine ideas, do they typically hold to a form of divine conceptualism? If so, it would seem that the divine ideas, upon which creation is patterned, are eternal and therefore existentially prior to any created thing.
If the system of thought, includes a type of divine conceptualism , then I don't think it makes sense to speak of indeterminate causes as the divine ideas clearly cannot be said to manifest extrinsically to God.
Hey joe, I've been reading some the books you recommended in your previous videos and i absolutely love them uwu.
i have another question and maybe you can use this question as an idea for a future video.
what are some of the most important philosophy papers (top 20 maybe?) one must read as they are getting deeper into philosophy?
anyways, love ya
Joe's 13 books recommendation in his previous video was Fantastic really helpful
it will be great if he make another long video on HOW TO STUDY PHILOSOPHY (what is the best way to study philosophy ) ,Best Resources for philosophy basically a complete guide to study philosophy by yourself
@@Hello-vz1md YES, that sounds awesome. :DD
Has Ryan Mullins responded to these criticisms anywhere?
Not that I know of
So I have a dumb question. I don’t see the problem with the idea that we are necessary as well. How would this disprove classical theism. It seems that would just prove other worlds are impossible. Thoughts?
Thank you! I think the CTist will want to avoid modal collapse for the reasons I discuss around 1:20:00 in my video “Arguments Against Classical Theism | Part 1/3”
I don't have a problem with everything being necessary, though.
Same, I think it provides a satisfactory explanation as to why things exist.
Why do you think that it's devastating?
I love, this complex logical thought, and that I just barely follow it...but @46:16 I wonder if the classical theist (Jesus) would have any clue of what you guys are talking about.
LORD Jesus (assuming there was such a Person), would have told them to believe without evidence (John 20:29). ;)
Gods creative act is not really an “act” or “action”… instead, the same that gods exists as “pure essence” or “esse” as is his creation. He IS creation. The same way he IS love. Etc. I believe that the very first cause that is naturally proposed by Oppy IS the first necessary and fundamental base of all reality FROM which all the other branching modal worlds branch from. So, I BLEND god WITH a first cause like Oppy proposes. This theory allows you to have both. As part of gods being there is this first cause or substance and god dosnt create it either. It has always existed WITH god as god. It IS god or an extension of god. And it is this “thing” that actually does all the creating and gives rise to the branching modal and contingent worlds thereafter. I believe the biblical story of the trinity is a poem trying to tell us this. The SON is part of god but not necessarily god himself and the son is positioned between god and man. This is what I consider to be Oppys first cause but instead of it being natural and uncaused I believe It is actual gods creative attribute or power manifest and has always existed (it was not created by god) it IS god… but this entity is not wholly god the same
Way the son is not wholly god. There is a dual nature to this substance and it bridges the gap between god and the worlds… then, this first cause what ever it is is what actually extends into metric time and gives rise to the branching contingent worlds which is where SPIRIT is found… the way Dr rob koons suggests the trinity is god qua knower/known, god qua lover/loved, and then the two together is saying something similar to this. The part of god that is actually Oppys first cause exists as gods attribute which is to love. God IS love. As a maximally perfect being he CAN NOT logically exist absent this love made manifest as this first cause or creative power > this IS gods love > his creation IS his love which IS what I call Oppys first cause. In this sense Oppys first cause is essential and exists in every possible world but it is not uncaused > it is gods love > and gods love manifest is this creative power.
The Bible analogy is god son here…. Then in every branching contingent world exists the propensity for god to be known. We come to KNOW these metaphysical truths through philosophical argument, truth seeking, and metaphysics. When we do this we can come to know god or love god or recognize gods love which is his creation power (Oppys first cause)…. So this theory gives us the trinity, gives us branching modal time, gives us gods nature and explains why there is a creation at all and what the point of it is…. There never was any act of creation instead gods creation has always been with god bc it IS god. Each of the modal or possible worlds causally can regress back to the first cause where Oppy stops the causal chain. So in this theory the chain stops exactly where Oppy says it stops too….but you get god too which grounds this first cause and what ever this first cause is it is that which actually does all the subsequent creating of the worlds…
Does indeterminism imply contingency?
Joe can you please recommend me best books and textbooks on paradoxes and Philosophy of Mind and Time
Thank you for your works
For phil mind, check out Tim Crane’s excellent intro books (Eg, The Mechanical Mind). For phil time, check out the recent Intro to Phil Time published with Routledge. For paradoxes, check out Mike Huemer’s Paradox Lost🥰
@@MajestyofReason thank you Much love ❤❤❤
@@MajestyofReason Joe what books would you recommend for Metaphysics and Philosophy of Religion?
@Oners82
No. Physical necessity ≠ metaphysical necessity.
I think you are mixing up intentionality and indeterminism. I guess it depends if you believe in 'free will' or not. If free will exists, it is by its nature indeterministic. That is not synonymous with 'free will acts' being random or unintentional. If all actions are deterministic, then there is no free will.
Free will is by its definition indeterministic, but is not random or unintentional.
My claim was not that indeterminism entails unintentionality; I gave *reasons* for thinking that the *kind* of indeterminism CT requires implies that God doesn’t act intentionally to bring about a particular creation. See the final two sections of my IJPR article in the description as well as my semi-recent video on intentional collapse🙂
I thought god died in the 19th century.
The type of guy you don't want to engage with in conversation.
@@stillnotatheist7688
Who? Nietzsche, Darwin, Marx or god?
@@Autists-Guide No, you. You do not engage in conversation with dead men.
@@stillnotatheist7688
Sound advice.
It would be kinda one-way.
They tried, but the ladder wasn’t tall enough and the knife wasn’t sharp enough.