Answering Classical Theist Objections to Neo-Classical Theism | Dr. Ryan Mullins
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- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 7 มิ.ย. 2020
- Isn’t Neo-classical theism silly? Not so fast. In this video, Dr. Ryan Mullins, Micah Edvenson, and I discuss prominent classical theist objections to Neo-classical theism (“Theistic Personalism” as some folk call it).
Here are the criticisms we cover:
1. Prisoner of Time objection (against Divine temporality)
2. Aseity entails DDS
3. Composition entails causal dependence
3a. The argument from this-such-ness (Nemes, Vallicella)
3b. Feser’s Neo-Platonic proof
3c. Thomistic essence-existence argument
4. Neo-CT entails God is a creature
4a. Anthropomorphism
5. Biblical arguments for CT
6. Simplicity is necessary to rule out polytheism (Feser)
7. Platonic argument from perfection
8. Problems for passibility
8a. Horny God objection
8b. Interminable suffering and hell
Abbreviation key:
CT: Classical Theism
Neo-CT: Neo-Classical Theism
DDS: Doctrine of Divine Simplicity
Curious to learn more about CT, Neo-CT, and the work of those features in the discussion? Check these out:
Ryan’s podcast: www.rtmullins.com/podcast
Micah’s channel: / @crusadeagainstignoran...
My blog post on CT: majestyofreason.wordpress.com...
My book: www.amazon.com/Majesty-Reason...
Here’s a special link to our show notes:
docs.google.com/document/d/19...
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It is fun listening to you guys and I learn things. Thanks for sharing!
Thank you!!! Appreciated!
great convo. loved it!
Thanks for that excellent discussion!
Thanks for this!!
Great content. God bless.
Much love
This is a great video and I really like this channel 👍
At 12:25 Dr Mullins says that it's "weird" that if you need change and succession to exist in order for time to exist you never have time existing in a moment. But the apparent contradition is really only semantic. We use the term "moment" in this sense to refer to an irreducable slice of time, but of course this "moment" is infinitely small, and indeed *needs* not to contain time in order to function conceptually. This "moment" doesn't exist in physical reality because change is constant, but in the abstract we are able to refer to a durationless slice of time between microevents without implying that this is in some way a real-world actuality. Consider as a thought experiement that all matter in the universe suddenly ceases all motion for an undefined amount of "time". In what sense can we measure that time? We could say that were we to perceive it it might be five years. But that "time" exists between moments of measurable or perceivable time, and thus no time has elapsed. It is apparently a paradox but refers to two kinds of time: time as abstraction (Time A) and real-world rate of change (Time R). We can say that during this freeze of matter Time A elapses while Time R does not. They are not, however, the same kind of "time".
If we don't clarify this dinstinction we end up with all kinds of paradoxes all in the same spirit as Zeno's arrow. If the arrow much change the position it occupies in order for change to occur, but at any durationless moment of time it is static then we need to invoke some kind of external agent (such as God) to overcome this apparent deadlock. But "to my lights" (to snaffle a phrase from you!) there is no contradiction in the flight of the arrow: a durationless moment of time is durationless, and time is not constituted of durationless moments. All moments must, by virtue of being part of time, have some kind of time value. The phrase "durationless moment of time" is self-contradicting, and thus doesn't serve as a useful axiom for arguments about time.
At 20:29 you talk about needing a principled way to measure change qua its temporal dimension, but that there is a circularity to defining time as "change over time" because it invokes time in the definition. However, I don't think that's the case for the reasons outlined above. Rather, I think we construct the idea of time after the fact as a way of making sense of change, rather than time needing to actually "exist" in order to "contain" events. To my mind, time isn't some kind of metaphysical or physical substance but a grammar by which we create a cognitive synthesis between [that which stays the same] and [that which changes] and the relationship between the two.
Hi Joe! As you can see, I am quite into this topic haha Can you direct me to resources you mentioned about Pruss and Koons about hylomorphism?
Classical theism really boils down to the idea that anything that has an essence distinct from its existence, is contingent. If that is true, then based on that and the further premise that what is contingent, requires a cause for its existence, there must be that which doesn't have a distinction between essence and existence, it cannot even have an essence, for if it would have an essence, its existence would be distinct from its essence. That is the crucial premise, that whatever has an essence distinct from its existence, is contingent. Classical theists, including myself take that premise as self evident.
The best thing to read regarding this topic is to read Dr jon hoovers ibn taymiyahs theodicy of perpetual optimism because ibn taymiyyah has defended islamic god strictly of scriptures and he has disagreed with many things that philosophers and kalam theologians had postulated about god.It will be great to see Dr jon hoover on your show.
Nice Indy Eleven jersey, I love their team crest.
Love the video! Good work, guys!
I have an objection to one of Joe's counterargument to the this-ness/such-ness argument for CT:
In the video, Joe suggests the possibility that God's this-ness and such-ness might not be intrinsically indifferent to each other, but wouldn't suchness simply not exist on its own without a thisness? And if this is the case then it can't be intrinsically disposed towards any particular suchness because non-existent things just aren't like that.
But I'm having a hard time grasping how these two principles can exist apart from eachother in the first place so maybe I'm just confused. 😅
For ease of reference, I'm commenting on Joe's 57th counterargument.
@@davidhouston3582 Hahaha
Thanks for the comment my dude! So, the claim wouldn't be that suchness (or God's suchness, say) could exist on its own without a thisness; rather, it was that (Nemes has given us no reason to deny) God's suchness is essentially and necessarily conjoined with his thisness (such that the two are *not* 'indifferent' to one another).
Do you think hylomorphism entails a classical theist God?
Good question! I don't think so. Hylomorphism only holds that material objects are composites of substantial form and prime matter. But this is compatible with non-classical theistic models of God
Would neo-classical theists who have an understanding of time similar to Ryan reject that it leads to an infinite regress? From the classical theists I interact with infinite regress seems to be a big concern. Also can God having distinct attributes convincingly avoid an infinite regress? The idea is that for a being to have attributes that they must have some sort of interaction, however, this would seem to lead to an infinite regress of interaction.
I'm not understanding the second issue about attributes and infinite regress, but I can address the first issue about time and infinite regress. On my view, there is a first moment of time, and this moment never began to exist. So there is no infinite regress. Similar positions are taken by Dean Zimmerman, Richard Swinburne, and Garrett DeWeese.
I should clarify one thing. Most contemporary thinkers have not even considered the idea that time is an attribute of God. The majority of contemporary philosophers who think God is temporal will most likely not immediately accept my claim. Yet there is a historical precedent in Isaac Newton and others. If you are interested, check out Emily Thomas' excellent book, "Absolute Time."
@@TheReluctantTheologian Wow thanks for the response I appreciate that! If you have time for the second part that's cool if not don't worry about it.
My friend who holds to divine simplicity put it this way "If God's Parts don't interact with each other, then they are distinct and do not compose one being, if these parts interact with each other from eternity, then this is a textbook example of a causal loop, which has an infinite regress."
It's been a few days since I watched the discussion, but if I remember correctly the neoclassical view being proposed is that technically God still doesn't have parts even though he has distinct attributes. If God did have parts would this criticism stand?
I have some questions about 40:00-50:00. First, I'll just say that the idea that an argument cannot be strong if it's based on controversial metaphysics seems problematic to me. It is a matter of opinion what counts as controversial, and so one could rule out any argument in advance just by dismissing the metaphysics as "weird." I'd instead want to back up a stage and debate the metaphysics to see if they are really weird, or whether I've just misunderstood them.
But my main question is whether or not radius + circumference count as an example of "necessarily co-instantiated parts." Perhaps R and C are just two attributes of the same thing, in a similar sense that God has attributes. If they are inseparable, then maybe they just aren't parts at all, in the way that tabletops and legs are.
Thanks for the comment!
"the idea that an argument cannot be strong if it's based on controversial metaphysics seems problematic to me."
Correct. Nowhere did we claim that an argument cannot be strong if it's based on controversial metaphysical assumptions. We simply did not claim this. Rather, we were in the business of making a point about the dialectical context: even if his argument had merit apart from all its other difficulties, it would nevertheless be resting on assumptions that are deeply controversial. And this is an important point about the dialectical context, since sometimes people fail to see that an allegedly bullet proof argument for substantive conclusion p actually rests on deeply contested assumptions q, r, and s. It also helps show that any proper defense of the argument in question will require demonstrating such assumptions, something that Steven Nemes has not done.
Secondly, the claim was that the *attributes* 'having a radius' and 'having a circumference' are necessarily co-instantiated despite being *distinct*. So, the point wasn't necessarily about 'parts' at all; it was primarily about properties/attributes. All the example was meant to show is that merely from the fact that x and y are distinct, it doesn't follow that x and y are separable, or contingent, or accidental to one another, or what have you.
@QQminusS we're not saying 'contingent on', we just mean 'contingent' in the sense of 'can fail to be'. And hence the two are not contingently co-instantiated; they are necessarily co-instantiated. Moreover, merely from the fact that x is an immediate inference of y, it doesn't follow that x is contingent on y. [Moreover: it's also true that the radius is an immediate inference of the circumference -- there's a strict entailment in both directions.]
Hmm...at 3:54, mainstream Open Theism posits that God _does_ have exhaustive foreknowledge of the future, it’s just not “exhaustively definite”. They believe God’s knowledge is coextensive with reality and that reality consists of at least _some_ possibilities.
Couldn’t God since he knows the future time continue He is going to make know what the beings He will create feel experience and think 🤔 and then not be locked into a loss of reality and this an imperfect. God would thus dodge an imperfection by being locked into timelessness.
Thank you for most of the content here, gentlemen. I just want to say that the irreverence at points, especially the end, is tragic. If yo wouldn't talk that way about your mother who gave you life, then how much less ought yo to speak this way about God who gave you everything? Other than that, as the Church Fathers unanimously taught to my knowledge, Christ did not experience the blameworthy passions but only the blameless passions like hunger, fatigue etc.
The idea that because the radius of a circle can not be separated from the circle, and that therefore this poses a problem for classical theism because this is an example of where distinct things can't be separated, is a misunderstanding of classical theism. Classical theists recognize that there are things that can only be what they are in virtue of their distinct attributes. For example 2 can only be 2 if it has 1 and 1, each 1 is distinct from 2, they aren't identical, but 2 can't be 2 without 1. Likewise a circle cannot be a circle without a radius, no classical theist denies this. We don't say that all distinctions are separable in the sense that they can exist independently from each other, we only say that parts are separable. So we wouldn't say that the parts of a circle can be separated from the circle, that would be nonsense, but what we would say is that the parts of a circle can be separated from each other, and then that circle wouldn't exist if its parts were to be separated from each other. Another point that we make is that whatever has an essence, is distinct from its existence, and is therefore contingent and would require a cause of its existence. It also follows from that, that there can be no distinctions in God, because then God would have an essence and attributes, which, like all things that have an essence, is distinct from its existence.
Really interesting video! One thing that's jumping out at me during the discussion of composition is the "thisness" / "suchness" distinction.
It seems to me that one can consider "suchness" without "thisness", indeed I think that's what modality exactly DOES. But we can't consider "thisness" without "suchness". Trying to do that is like trying to allow naive sets without predications. Instead of insisting that you consider: S = {x in U | p(x)} you instead just consider S as "any set of these, whatever these are". And it sounds like without the necessary structures we have on S, you're just going to run into a Russel's Paradox style problem on the "naive thisness" construction of S.
So not only do I lack good reason to think that "thisness" can be independent from "suchness", but I actually have good intuitions to the contrary, given my experience in set theory and seeing what "this's" without predicates can do. So in such a conversation I'm just flatly asserting that there is no "thisness" without "suchness" and we'll see where those chips fall.
But back to the original argument, I think there's something odd here. Isn't it the case that Thomists say that "essence" = "existence" in God, rather than that God lacks both? Surely that must have been a slip up from Stephen. I think what's going on is that, since one can consider "suchness" without "thisness", but God always exists of necessity, whatever "suchness" sufficiently predicates God must always correspond to a "thisness", it can't fail to be there (which makes the Thomistic proof kind of a Cartesian Ontological argument now that I think about it). So God's "suchness" contains within it, his "thisness" forcing equality of the concepts as far as God is concerned.
That seems to me what Thomists are trying to get at, without a risk of making God patently unintelligible.