A Demonstration of God's Existence? | Response to Trent Horn
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- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 30 ก.ค. 2020
- Trent Horn recently claimed he had 'demonstrations' of God's existence that are relevantly analogous to 'ironclad' proofs. In this video, I argue that this is straightforwardly false.
Link to my debate with Randal: • Randal Rauser the Athe...
My website: majestyofreason.wordpress.com/
My book: www.amazon.com/Majesty-Reason...
SPECIAL THANKS to Dr. Alex Malpass, to whom credit goes for the 'respecting consistency' point concerning modal patchwork principles.
If Trent sees this video, consider this an open invitation to a discussion between the two of us! (Whether on my channel or Trent's or what have you). :)
Original video: • DEBATE: God's Existenc...
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I think that Trent still won the debate because Alex never responded to his arguments and just does what he always does and veers it into the problem of evil.
Yeah, that is probably right. When you go an entire debate without touching your "opponent's" opening statement, you've probably thereby caused yourself to lose. ("opponent" is in quotes because, as you know, I don't like such us-vs-them phrases :) )
Alex isn’t a good representative for atheists/non-believers, he isn’t a strong debater, most often way to soft, doesn’t articulate positions precisely and convincingly enough and is sometimes ill informed. He also mixes atheism with a whole lot of other positions like opposition to monarchy, moral relativism, nihilism and to a lesser extent veganism, whereas these are completely separate positions.
@@LomuHabanawho is the best then?
@@RumpyxD good question, I won’t pretend that I know it. I like Ridvan Aydemir (apostate prophet) a lot. Although it should be said that he almost exclusively criticises Islam. Purely on atheism I also like Stephen Woodford, but I disagree with him on transgender and other issues. Sean Carroll is a good one. Although he is also, how to put it, “is a little bit infected by wokeism”. And then you have the classic new atheists. They are strong debaters, but actually more anti theists than atheists. But in terms of debates, I like all of them more than Alex. Because they really press their opponent and (try to) debunk faulty claims by religious apologists and they usually try to separate their other beliefs from atheism, or make it clear that those beliefs are different from atheism.
As a Thomist I have to say that I love to see you bring up more obscure and powerful objections, even if I’m not fully convinced by them. Would you be interested in have a discussion/debating a theistic viewer of your channel?
It depends! I need to assess where the channel is going (the main reason being that school starts back up in three weeks, and I'm a full time student. That means less discussions and debates. But I will still post (e.g. I'm going to do a series on my book))
I love Trent Horn. He Is probably one of the nicest Classical Thomist in the modern era. However personally I think both he and Alex where in a very unusual area in the debate. Personally (This is just my subjective opinion) Trent did win by a small margin the debate mainly because I think Alex despite his intellect did not engage in the fundamentals of the arguments as you are doing in this video. However I (as a Deist) do admit that my views on Classical Theism are more aligning with Eastern Thought rather than Thomism. With that said if Trent was arguing for the position of "Is it logical or Justified to believe in a God" Then he achieved a good ground. But I wouldn't call his opening statements as "Iron Clad". More like solid basis which I think Alex did not distinguish well.
Overall I think Trent was amazing and respectful. Alex is also one of the more interactive atheist out there and less vulgar than what im used to so I give respects to that even if I disagree with him.
I agree!!! I was upset that Alex didn't really even touch Trent's arguments. The debate was primarily about animal suffering and utilitarianism.
@@MajestyofReason Exactly. It was still a fun debate though. Maybe one day you can make a video about where you think Alex did not understand some of Trent's views. Of course you are not obligated. I just think you did a better job in your debate (Which I congratulate you by the way) in presenting theism. So having your feedback might be beneficial to all. Take care brother.
@@maximusatlas9377 Much love
Majesty of Reason did you see that Trent responded to your video on Twitter?
@@anglozombie2485 I didn't see that, as I don't have twitter. I just asked a friend to send me a picture of his response.
I wasn't able to find the Thoughtology episode with Jeremy Kuhn on the 'modified euthyprho dilemma. Could you link that please?
'ere ya go!
th-cam.com/video/sPMrIlxN0A4/w-d-xo.html
@@MajestyofReason Thanks so much. Super hyped about coming across your work by seeing you on the Capturing Christianity channel!
@@NomadOfOmelas Much love
@@MajestyofReason That was a great podcast! I'm curious, while I know you're namely focused on philosophy of religion, how much you may have taken a dive into ethics?
Relevant to that, in JL Mackie's book Ethics, he discusses another proposal for theists to resolve the Euthyphro Dilemma. I posted on the Thoughtology episode comment section, but thought you might be able to address it as well!
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong p.229-232.
Essentially, my understanding is that the standard of goodness does stand outside of God's nature, yet because of His omniscience, he knows descriptively what is indeed Good for man. He then, through his creative will, made man in such a way to make their obedience to such descriptive rules in man's best interest, and can therefore provide objectively prescriptive declarations that are not arbitrary. Given that the descriptive moral facts stand beyond human epistemological methods, but not beyond God's, it seems this might work to resolve the dilemma? Or, more specifically, it at least shifts the goal posts back to whether there's sufficient evidence to believe in such a God. Would be very curious your thoughts!!!
Oh dang I missed his original debate going to check it out. I would love to see Trent on your channel.
Two things:
1. I played the video with speed x 0.75
2. I like how you destroy Feser ‘s argument, which leads to my question: Do you have any video on Feser?
Thanks, pal.
Hey!
I have a paper on Feser (see the description of my video "Existential Inertia Defended", and I will be posting videos on Feser's work in the future
What does "pedisse" mean? I can't seem to find a definition online. Maybe I'm spelling it wrong
Maybe you're referring to 'per se'? I pronounce it as it is pronounced in latin (or at least how I was taught it), so the 'r' sounds like a 'd'. I define per se causal chains in my video on Aquinas's First Way :)
I'm only 20 minutes in and so far, in my estimation, your arguments are much better than Dr. Oppy's in his debate with Dr. Feser, maybe you should have debated him instead!
Joe, I would definitely look into getting a free software like OBS to record your screen and desktop audio more clearly. Great video 👍
Nice analysis. I'd love to hear your thoughts on the rest of the debate.
Hey Joe, I was hoping to get your thoughts on PSR since its defended by a lot of theists like Trent and also top academic theists like Pruss and Feser. Do you agree with it? If not why, and do you think there's any arguments or scenarios which could force theists to accept some kind of brute fact about God and thus reject their own PSR? Cheers in advance!
Thanks for the question! I think it's plausible that every contingent thing has an explanation. So, I think Pruss' PSR is plausible! You may have already seen it, but you should check out my video on cosmological arguments from contingency! I discuss PSR-like principles in there. :)
@@MajestyofReason Thanks, I’ll have a look! But if every contingent fact has an explanation would this mean there are no brute facts?
@@maxstevens2231 That depends on how we define brute fact! From what I've read, many philosophers take brute facts to be contingent facts that have no explanation. So, the PSR that I articulated above would, indeed, entail that there are no brute facts.
@@MajestyofReason Don’t Pruss and Rasmussen’s most recent arguments allow for Brute Facts?
Could you go over WLC objections to atheists on Capturing Christianity and provide better answers(objections)?
Do you have a video about overcoming bias?
Yes! Josh and I discuss this in our discussion on my channel
Have you ever reached out to Ed Feser to have some sort of discussion? I agree with him on most philosophical points but you seem to be really smart and to have interesting counterpoints, so I think some sort of interaction between y'all two would be really productive and fruitful.
I think we'll be going back and forth in print, since my recent paper addresses his work head on -- and he normally responds. So there will likely be fruitful dialogue back and forth in philosophy journals. :)
But I'm open to any discussion with him. He's hard to contact (I've tried before myself). I would have to utilize a third party to get ahold of him.
@@MajestyofReason Did you ever ask Cameron from capturing christianity how he got in contact with him? Either way I still want to see Ed's response to Oppy's paper he is suppose to be working on.
@@anglozombie2485 Now he has another paper to respond to! ;)
Feser has gotten very busy the last 2 years. In the past, he would engage with people on his blog in the comments sections, but less so now. I do recommend the two discussions with Graham Oppy which are on youtube, as they get into some good stuff.
@@MajestyofReason I doubt this is the place to ask, but what do you think about the TAG argument for God?
If the actualizer is an actualizer for existence, then, we need an actualizer for existence which is purely actual w/ respect to existence. What is purely actual w/ respect to existence is pure esse. What is pure esse is pure act, since esse is a kind of act. Therefore it's not a non sequitur. There's just this extra step: esse is a kind of act, which you skipped, that's why it appeared to you to be a leap
(1) I'm responding to Trent, who restricted himself to change. Trent did not mention actualization of existence at all. Hence, my criticisms retain their force.
(2) "If the actualizer is an actualizer for existence, then, we need an actualizer for existence which is purely actual"
No. This does not follow. All we would get -- assuming that infinite per se chains of actualization are impossible -- is that there is an *unactualized* actualizer of the existence of less fundamental objects. But that's perfectly compatible with such a being having some potencies that simply have nothing to do with its existence. For instance, neo-classical theists think there's an unactualized actualizer of all contingent things' existence, but that's perfectly consistent with the being having *some* potential, so long as it is not a potential for the substance's existence that is being actualized. For instance, it may have the potential to become incarnate, or to answer prayers, or whatever. Merely being an unactualized actualizer does not entail in the slightest that such a thing is *purely* actual.
There are far more problems with your proposal -- indeed, I address this in a paper I've had under review at the journal Sophia on the Aristotelian proof for about 5 months (fingers crossed for acceptance).
Hi, new to your channel and really love what I see. Look forward to going through your back log and watching future videos. I think the response from Classical Theists to your statement "that's perfectly compatible with such a being having some potencies that simply have nothing to do with its existence" would be "All the potencies of a thing are related to its existence because its being is fundamental to all the ways that it could be." In other words, if part of it were in potency, then you could not say of the whole, as it were, that it is unactualized. In fact, part of its being would be unactualized. This is why simplicity follows from "unactualized actualizer" as well.
Majesty of Reason To add to my previous comment: With respect to (1) The Aristotelian would deny that change and existence are unrelated. Change just is a way of being. Its a move from being in potential to being in actuality, so when Trent is talking about change he is talking about existence. Existence is fundamental to, and assumed by every change.
@@TheHadenClarkShow I'm talking about the *substantial existence* of the substance or supposit in question, which persists and remains identical regardless of whether various accidental modifications of the substance occur.
Interesting response. I am going to make a long post with my thoughts which no one needs to feel obligated to respond to.
@19:40 I agree that arriving at a first cause and even a changeless being does not thereby make something a purely actualized being.
However, in my estimation there could not be more than one fully actualized being because while an elephant and amoeba are different in terms of their actualized features, they also only have some features actualized as opposed to other logically possible features actualized. On the other hand a being that is purely actualized would have all logically possible features actualized (starting with the most general features like presence, power, intelligence), which would then seem to entail that a fully actualized being is necessarily a one of a kind thing, since there would be no general feature to distinguish one all present, all powerful, all intelligent being from another.
You could argue that a being could be fully actualized in terms of what is metaphysically possible for it and it just isn't metaphysically possible for it to be fully actualized in regards to all logically possible features (like how you were saying it may not be possible for you to be platinum) and so something could be fully actualized in regards to what is metaphysically possible for it, but not be fully actualized in regards to what is logically possible for it. However, I am inclined to think that if something is logically possible then it is metaphysically possible unless a plausible reason can be provided as to what would thing or principle would make something metaphysically impossible. But, I don't see how there could be any thing or principle that would prevent a fully actualized being from being able to obtain all logically possible features (stating with the most general features).
Now, it is true that one could conceive of a purely actualized being that is binitarian as opposed to trinitarian. However, I think intuitively speaking, beings are first separated by their general features. If they are not separated by their general features, then they are the same being. Yet, two fully actualized beings would not have differing general features like differing amounts of spatiality, power, intelligence, etc. to separate one from another and so they would then both be the same being. There would then be no room for there to exist another fully actualized being to then have a different number of divine persons to distinguish it from another fully actualized being. So, my intuition is that the Trinity example does not pose a problem for actualization arriving at one singular being.
Also, I think that if something is purely actualized then it would have to be the first member of all per se causal chains (if one accepts that a per se series cannot have a brute first member). This is because a purely actualized being cannot be contained by anything else, since it is is maximally present. A maximally present being would seem to necessarily undergird everything else as there would be no finite entity that could causally undergird a being that is spatially unlimited. This consideration along with the consideration that there can only be one purely actualized being then entails that a per se causal series must then terminate in a fully actualized being since there would be no other first being for the per se causal series to terminate in (assuming there cannot be a brute first cause) as it can't be another fully actualized being since there can't be one and the series can't terminate in a non-fully actualized being, since any non-fully actualized being would necessarily be undergirded by the fully actualized being.
I know I through a lot of information into this post, which you may not agree with a lot of, please don't feel obligated to respond, unless you want to :)
Thank you for your comment my dude. Your feedback is so very valuable.
@@MajestyofReason I totally understand. I just wanted to leave my thoughts to get them out there :)
Looking forward for your next video!
I think at the end of the day, the main problem for defenders of the universe as necessary being is that the universe undergoes change. Even if we posit an infinite multiverse, we are left with a universe that has changed significantly throughout the years.(e.g. it has expanded, galaxies have formed, stars have been created/destroyed etc.)
A few other comments:
regarding whether there is a source of all change, or many sources:
Say we have an object which can heat stuff without itself changing, and without deriving its power to heat from something else. And there is a second object which can cool things, again without changing. Do these things exist necessarily or not? If not, then they
have no inherent power to exist, which means they don't really have underived causal power to heat or cool. For things can only heat or cool if they exist. But if so, then it is puzzling why there would be unchanged, changers that have exist necessarily, but are not omnipotent--they can only heat or cool, but not both. Prima facie, it seems more likely that there would be a single omnipotent source that exists necessarily, than that there exist several things that can only perform certain tasks, but are each themselves necessary.
regarding the quote "if the universe came into existence, it cannot be necessary."
You claim this is not true, since all necessary existence means is that something cannot be absent from reality. This seems odd to me: if the universe came into existence, then it didn't originally exist, and thus, at one point, say t1, it was absent from reality, until t2. Whatever existed at t1, it didn't need the universe to get itself going, since the universe didn't exist back then. So it is hard to see how things can get up and running without the universe, while still holding to the claim that the universe is necessary.
Thank you for your comment
I don`t remember this debate happening
Found this channel via Trent Horn. Great stuff. I'm glad I found this level of discourse with an equal level of charity towards the opposing view.
Much love
It'd really be fun if you'd debate him
I did place the open invitation in the description ;)
At 11:43 Trent says that 'a locomotive pulls without being pulled'- but that is not strictly true simply on the basis of conservation of energy. A locomotive does not pull on its own. It is 'pulled', say, by the burning of coal to generate heat and steam, which then powers its motion. The energy released by the burning of coal in turn can be traced back to energy contained in its chemical bonds, etc.
I mostly know Trent for saying some very embarrassing things about socialism...
Excellent work! For me, Trent’s most problematic premise is that God is personal. But to be fair, I haven’t encountered any arguments for a personal God that get off the ground.
"Personal" in the sense that He's a "person"? I think apologists like that this is easily conflated with "wanting a personal relationship" which divine simplicity seems to completely oppose.
My god what could he have said to warrant that vid length
When you use the Aristotelian proof, basically I'm guaranteed to be triggered lol
It always takes 2-3 times the length of original video to reply to anything - call it the law of video responses.
@@slamrn9689 EXACTLY!!!
Before long MoR videos will prove WL Craig is wrong about actually infinite series existing in reality.
@@thomistica597 In due time! ;)
I actually will be having Alex Malpass on to discuss his recent paper against Craig's counting down from infinity argument (his paper got accepted into the journal Mind -- which is the best or second best philosophy journal in the world (Mind and Nous are the two best))
you are too dang smart. I'm happy I've found this channel this was great
Thank you my dude! I hope this channel serves you :) Much love
Thank you for this truly excellent video and analysis! Regarding the open question of the necessary existence of God (10:30), couldn't a classical theist simply respond that, just as a triangle's essence is having 3 sides, God's essence is existence, and therefore God exists necessarily? Of course, the cogency of this line of argument would depend on the theist demonstrating (not just stipulating) that God's essence is existence.
Defining "God" as necessary and the "universe" as contingent. He now needs to defend the idea that this definition is God.
Have you done a critique of "palamite classical theism"? Because it's the second biggest church youll be sure to get many views.
These inductions how the cause had to be personal or all powerful or free or good seem so obviously flawed. It's strange to me that they are as popular as they are.
I remember hearing a creation mythos where the god created it on accident and deeply regretted his mistake. And as a way to make up for the mistake he himself entered the creation and remains within it until its end as a way to redeem himself. But I can't find it anymore.
Not saying that story is true, just conceptually, it seems like creation may well have been flawed.
Definitely the weakest part of the extended Kalam :)
That rant against the argument from change, especially the inference to pure actuality bit, was pure gold.
You know I love to rant LOL
@@MajestyofReason I'm a firm supporter of the rant. Keep up the great work on the channel!
Great analysis, thank you for your excellent work.
Nothing to add, just commenting and liking for the TH-cam algorithm :-)
THANK YOU!!!
In 1:03, you're wondering where the "abstract objects" thing came from, It's because it's from William Lane Craig's debates. You can see him bring up and argue against them there. I think Trent took inspiration from Craig here.
What if 2 actual beings have a difference in terms of mental life. I dont see how that is an unactualized feature
Exactly! I agree, there seem to be a number of counter-examples to Feser's reasoning there. :)
I REALLY want to see Feser respond to these kinds of criticisms but I doubt we will see it anytime soon.
Joe, what actually _is_ your position of abstract objects? I know you're a realist, but of what kind?
Good question! I *lean* toward realism. I don't think I would say I'm a *realist* ; but it is true that I lean toward realism. As for what kind of realist, I find both Aristotelian and [contemporary analytic] Platonic defensible. If I were forced to choose one, I would choose Platonic, mainly because the Aristotelian account [it's more-so a family of accounts] seem to have difficulties accounting for the *necessity* of some abstracta. Though, a pretty forceful recent defense of an Aristotelian realist view is given in James Franklin's 2014 book
I saw Trent Horn jump from an unactualized actualizer to a Purely Actual Actualizer and knew you’d get triggered. Sure enough, 5 minutes after I saw that you posted this 😂 (this is Angelo btw)
hahaha
So much love for you my homie
If i were cosmic skeptic i would just deny moral realism. No need to get into complex metaphysics. Just good ol occams razor no need to invoke real moral properties to explain our beliefs/experiences. If god is omnibenevolent then it would necessarily entail that he doesnt exist
Pretty sure he pretty much did that in the debate! Think he said he was a non-cognitivist, which is a anti-realist moral theory iirc
@@adamkennedy3800 oh okay cuz i didnt watch all the way to the very end.
Excellent Joe. Well Done!
Much love
Hey you shouldn’t get to debate him on God before I get to take him down on socialism #dibs
Wow, that was fast!
Basically, when I get somewhat triggered, my work ethic and motivation become extreme lol
@@MajestyofReason Got it. Just trigger Joe and we get more videos. Noted. Lol
@@anthonyrowden hahahaha
@@anthonyrowden It's sad that this is literally true lol
Having an "actual" feature that distinguishes one pure esse from another would entail that such differentiating "actual" feature is not identical to pure esse, and is therefore isn't really a property of that which is pure esse/act.
He didn't prove it's pure esse at all. He only argued that it is purely actual. Aristotle, for instance, believed in a purely actual being, but not a being whose essence is identical to its existence. That thought came with Thomas Aquinas; countless thinkers beforehand held that there nevertheless a purely actual or unchangeable being without holding that this being is ipsum esse subsistens. Purely actual just means unchangeable. Moreover, nothing Trent said justifies that such a being is pure esse. You're missing the point of the video: to respond to Trent.
Also, they could easily have a differentiation like this: pure esse #1 is Trinitarian, pure esse #2 is unitarian, pure esse #3 is binitarian, and so on. Unless you want to deny the compatibility of multiple really distinct hypostases intrinsic to a being of pure esse. [Which would be to deny the conjunction of Christianity and CT]
Oh, and also, is pure esse, then each of the divine persons -- in virtue of being identical to God -- would thereby be pure esse. But yet there are more than one divine persons. And hence either there need not be a differentiating feature to ground the possibility of more than one entity of a given type (in which case, the argument to the uniqueness of pure esse fails, since that was one of its premises), OR (if there DOES need to be such a differentiating feature) then it follows that having such a differentiating feature is perfectly compatible with being pure esse (since each of the divine persons is pure esse and -- under this horn of the dilemma -- they have differentiating features obtaining among them).
Either way, your argument doesn't succeed.
Yes Trent didn't flesh that out. I'm just trying to steelman his position.
@@markstevenpandan890 Your feedback is so valued and loved my dude
The distinction between the persons is not of their esse but just consists in the fact that they are mere relations within the same pure esse. Hence such relations are just pure esse. And they're not distinct from pure esse because they're relations intrinsic to pure esse.
well done,mate
The divine persons are not instances of the kind "divine personhood" since the distinction is relational. Each divine person is fully God, not I the sense of sharing one genus of Godhead. They are not different substances.
All my point in the video requires is that they are DISTINCT, not necessarily that they fall under the same kind. So long as they are distinct, my point goes through, since Feser's argument for uniqueness presupposes that in order for there to be a distinction between purely actual beings (such that there are two as opposed to one), some differentiating feature would have to obtain.
Hence, your point here does not succeed.
Also, nowhere did I say they are different substances. And nowhere did I deny that each person is fully God.
Also, I level lots of different arguments against this view you're sketching in section 12 of this blog post:
majestyofreason.wordpress.com/2020/06/30/an-unsuccessful-defense-of-classical-theism-a-systematic-response-to-sonna-kerr-and-tomaszewski/
@@MajestyofReason , as I see it, Mark is correct regarding the Trinitarian point. Feser's argument is that there cannot be more than one purely actual being. That argument is silent as to whether there can be mysterious internal generation *within* the one purely actual being.
@@JohnDeRosa1990 I don't think so. The reason Feser adduces as to why there couldn't be two or more purely actual beings is perfectly general.
The central premise employed is that for there to be two or more x’s, there would have to be some feature in virtue of which they are individuated. And since the possession of such a feature entails composition, there could not in principle be two or more absolutely simple beings.
But this line of reasoning is incompatible with Trinitarianism. For the exact same reasoning equally applies to there being two or more divine persons; the need for some individuating feature to distinguish two or more x’s seems a perfectly general one, applying to all x’s. The main reason favoring such a demand seems to be explicability: if there were no feature that one of x1 or x2 possesses that the other doesn’t, then (so the reasoning goes) the fact that x1 and x2 are distinct is inexplicable. In other words, if x1 and x2 share all and only the same features, then the non-identity between x1 and x2 would be inexplicable. But this motivation seems entirely general, applying to any distinct things.
And if that’s true, then it equally applies to divine persons. In order for there to be more than one divine person, there would have to be some feature that one had that the others lacked. But in that case - per Feser’s own reasoning - the divine person would not be absolutely simple (and hence wouldn’t even be divine after all!).
Here's the rub: any justification Feser would adduce for that central premise (in order for there to be two or more x's, there needs to be an individuating feature) will seem equally to apply to there being more than one divine person. Feser is appealing to perfectly general metaphysical considerations concerning explicability. To deny they apply to the divine persons is to jettison the very justification upon which the original argument (for uniqueness) rests.
@@MajestyofReason Yes, I’m familiar with your thoughts here. Let me try to explain where I disagree.
Re: *“The central premise employed is that for there to be two or more x’s, there would have to be some feature in virtue of which they are individuated. And since the possession of such a feature entails composition, there could not in principle be two or more absolutely simple beings.”*
First, this premise (in the form you put it) is not proposed by Feser anywhere in Five Proofs. Here are several of the relevant premises he offers:
Page 36: “In order for there to be more than one purely actual actualizer, there would have to be some differentiating feature that one such actualizer has that the others lack.”
Page 80: “In order for there to be more than [one absolutely simple] or noncomposite cause, each would have to have some differentiating feature that the others lacked.”
Page 110: “There cannot be more than one thing that is purely actual.”
Page 130: “Since there cannot in principle be more than one thing the essence of which is identical to its existence, this cause which is subsistence existence itself is unique.”
Page 186: “The reason is that for there to be more than one thing of a certain kind, there must be a distinction between the thing and the species of which it is a member, or (if the thing in question is a species) between the species and the genus of which it is a member. And there can be no distinction between a thing’s potentialities and its actualities.”
Second, the general premise employed by Feser needs to be understood in the context of philosophical reasoning. It’s not simply “for there to be two or more x’s…” but rather something like this: For there to be two or more x’s *which are material parts, distinct substances, instances of essence and existence, or substance and accidents,* there would have to be some feature one has that the other lacks (or in virtue of which they are individuated).
In other words, that sort of philosophical premise is silent as to whether there are other sorts of unique, mysterious, internally distinct x’s within an absolutely simple being. The philosophical premise simply says nothing about such x’s one way or the other.
Re: *“Here's the rub: any justification Feser would adduce for that central premise (in order for there to be two or more x's, there needs to be an individuating feature) will seem equally to apply to there being more than one divine person. Feser is appealing to perfectly general metaphysical considerations concerning explicability. To deny they apply to the divine persons is to jettison the very justification upon which the original argument (for uniqueness) rests.”*
As I see it, that rub does not go through. Feser’s central premise is philosophical in nature and based on what can be understood about reality apart from special revelation. So, when you say, “...will seem equally to apply to there being more than one divine person,” the Thomist can deny such seeming.
The reason that the justification does not “seem equally to apply” to a Thomist is that we do not claim to have any philosophical grip on *what* the distinct x’s are that we are talking about. We do not know *what* a Trinitarian person is. Rather, it has been specially revealed that within the one God, there exists (in some absolutely unique, mysterious way) three persons who share/have/possess the divine essence yet are really distinct from each other. But affirming the truth of those words does not entail a deep understanding of any of them.
To summarize, I see the situation like this. Feser’s central philosophical premise says that things which are multiple in the ways described by some set of distinctions, say, {A, B, C, D}, must have some differentiating feature that entails composition. But, through special revelation, we are told there is some other distinction, say, E, and we have no grasp on what it is or how it works, but we’re told *that* it is. The premise and justification related to {A, B, C, D} *may or may not apply* to E, but we have no reason to think it *must* apply to E, since we have no grasp on what E is.
At least, that’s how I’m seeing it.
@@JohnDeRosa1990 "First, this premise (in the form you put it) is not proposed by Feser anywhere in Five Proofs."
My dude, this is simply not true.
Feser writes:
“For suppose there were two or more noncomposite or utterly simple causes of things. Then there would have to be some feature the possession of which distinguishes one of them from the other. Noncomposite or simple cause A would differ from noncomposite or simple cause B insofar as A has feature F, which B lacks, and B has feature G, which A lacks. But in that case neither A nor B would really be simple or noncomposite after all. A would be a simple or noncomposite cause plus F, and B would be a simple or noncomposite cause plus G. F and G would be different parts, one of which each of these causes has and the other of which it lacks.” (2017, pp. 74-75)
Here, Feser is explicitly appealing to the fact that there would need to be some feature in virtue of which the two things are individuated (“there would have to be some feature the possession of which distinguishes one of them from the other” - this is exactly what this sentences expresses). Hence, your claim is not correct.
“In other words, that sort of philosophical premise is silent as to whether there are other sorts of unique, mysterious, internally distinct x’s within an absolutely simple being.” Only if we jettison the metaphysical intuitions and reasoning that led us to the exact same reasoning in the case of different substances, etc. The reasoning is perfectly general: it’s based on explicability. To deny it for distinct trinitarian persons is to embrace inexplicability (per Feser’s own reasoning favoring the original application to non-Trinitarian contexts).
“philosophical in nature and based on what can be understood about reality apart from special revelation.”
It seems to me that you’re subtly shifting between metaphysics and epistemology. Sure, we need revelation in order to have epistemic access to the mystery of the trinity, and this is epistemically posterior to any metaphysical investigation. But that does not mean that the truths we discovered in our metaphysical investigation don’t or can’t apply to the *metaphysics* of the trinity and other revelation things. In fact, it is precisely *because* the metaphysical truths apply to being qua being, being as such, all of reality, that we are licensed in such application. And this seems true regardless of whether or not we know ‘what’ a Trinitarian person is; all we need is the metaphysical fact of distinction plus the metaphysics of explicability - both of which apply to trinitarian persons regardless of what they are and regardless of whether we have epistemic access to what they are.
This is how things strike my mind at present. :)
There’s nothing majestic about reason
thanks cutie
The man of this video: I'm going to dream that I'm Alex O'Connor and that I do "refute" Trent Horn. Do not wake me up.
The Bible 'book' = a compendium of fire side tales and fables,
recounted orally ,
for generations by goat herders and primitive tribes from the stone age,
until writing was invented,
and then, many different sources, transliterations, and versions were copied and written down..
''The Bible was created during a time where stories were verbally passed down over hundreds of years.
Stories constantly morphed and changed over time, and the Bible is a collection of these.
This is why it has the nearly identical flood story from Gilgamesh, and why Jesus has the same characteristics as Dionysus, Osiris, Horus, Mithra, and Krishna.
The contradictions and immorality in the stories are not evidence that God is flawed or evil,
but rather that humans invented him, just like the thousands of other gods that we used to, but no longer believe in.''
..and to answer the questions of the many fears and mysteries of our universe, like 'thunder' and earthquakes, since there was no science yet.
That was the old Testament....
The new Testes is also hearsay since these letters, 'gospels' and stories were written by the loyal faithful, the camp followers,
not by objective historians at that particular time,
or by any contemporary writers,
and these tales were written many years after the supposed events of this mythical Jesus.
There is essentially very little evidence of a Jesus in real documented history.
A couple of spurious Roman reports, and all the rest anecdotal.
...but more importantly ...a jesus' existence is not an issue!
A jesus is irrelevant without a god !
Then, many of these stories, but not all, as many were not chosen,
[ There are more than just four Gospels but only these four were agreed on ],
were compiled for one self-absorbed converted Roman Emperor in his Nicean Council,
for his expressed purpose of conquest
and
control of the people of Europe for his Holy Roman Empire.
He recognised that this was the perfect religion/mythology for the future domination of the populaces.
Half of the stories were ignored by the Nicean Bishops and none have been proven to be based on fact.
This 'Bable' book is backed up by absolutely no facts and no evidence.
It is not proof for any god(s) ....(or of any jesus as a god...)
The fables are intertwined within historical places and people...
eg Egypt and the Pharaohs existed,
whereas Moses and the Exodus did not happen...!
It is a historical novel
.... ie A book of fiction..
Only!
The Bible book is proof of a book ... ONLY (certainly not evidence of any gods...)
PROVE a god!