Only 40 min in, and will have to watch the rest later, but loving the convo so far. I really like how Alex shares the development of the argument. It's such a crucial element, and yet it's so often skipped or traversed with haste.
I think some of this depends on a person’s understanding of “time”. Time seems to only have any determinate meaning in a world with matter, otherwise there is no way to measure it. If we separate our understanding of time from matter, it is unclear there is any distinction from a single second passing or an infinity of time passing. In this way a Christian could affirm that time (beginning of matter) is finite in both its start and end, but time is infinite in the second sense in both directions. Considering the Christian view of the resurrection of the body, they are not committed to that being a “body” that necessarily fits within our construction of a time dependent on the existence of matter.
34:34 At the resurrection, the biblical texts describe God creating new bodies for the righteous who continue to live on forever (2 Corinthians 5). So from the theological perspective, it never actually says that we would have the same physical bodies that we have now as you were describing. I’m enjoying this video, thanks again for the content.
Hi Joe, great stuff. I would appreciate your take on the following: I think that the "future Grim Reaper" story and Malpass' dry eternity paradox actually confirm causal finitism and do not represent a strong argument for the impossibility of an infinite future. In fact, the only reason they work as paradoxes is because they transform future events into present (or past) intentional causes. It is not the future Grim Reapers (or the future days of not drinking) per se that cause the paradoxical effect, but them being objects of a present (or past) knowledge (or revelation). So, you might as well say that the future could be (potentially) infinite but that no agent can act on the basis of infinite causes (or reasons), regardless of these objects of thought being past, present or future. Now, you might say in response that also in the original Grim Reaper story the (infinite) causality is in some way intentional (each Grim Reaper must consider if the conditions have been met by the previous ones). You might also say, in a similar manner, that "the past could be infinite but that no agent can act on the basis of infinite causes (in the way postulated by the Grim Reaper story)". But I would argue that in this respect, there isn't really a symmetry between the past and the future Grim Reaper story. Here is why: in the infinite past version, the paradox (or contradiction) doesn't really arise from the fact that a final event (or effect) has infinite intentional causes. The "intentional" aspect characterises the particular Grim Reaper story, but you could imagine many paradoxes similar to the "past" Grim Reapers that involve only physical causality (for example, you could have mechanical Grim Reapers…. Or you could imagine an eternal universe, with finite space, where particles of type A and B have a non-zero probability to interact every day and where particle B is destroyed iff it interacts with A. If we suppose that there is only one particle of type B, then the paradox would be that it is certain that particle B has already been destroyed but it is impossible to say when or which particle A has destroyed B: for any particle or moment in time you pick, it would have already been certain that particle B was destroyed before. This is not meant to be a fully worked out paradox, but you can see that with a bit of imagination you can build a "Grim Reaper-like scenario" with only physical entities and causality (particle B would be a bit like Fred, particles A like the Grim Reapers). In more general terms, the reason for this "symmetry breaker" is that causes are typically temporally prior (sometimes simultaneous) to their effects, never posterior (at least on any plausible temporal model). So, the "past Grim Reaper" simply illustrates a typical causal dependence (future events depend on past events) that would be infinite if the past was infinite. On the other hand, the "future Grim Reapers" and the Dry eternity paradox do not represent a typical causal relation: they only manage to make present (or past) events dependent on (infinite) future events by rendering these ones objects of thought, i.e., present or past intentional causes. You would not be able to build a similar future paradox using only physical causality, while you could do it for the "infinite past" versions. In short, causal infinity paradoxes are stronger arguments against a beginningless past, because a series of events with a beginningless past is typically instantiating an infinite causal series. A series of (endless) future events do not typically instantiate an infinite causal series in the same sense (only as a potential infinity, metaphysically speaking), except in the particular case in which the future events are made intentionally present (or past). I'm not saying that the "past" Grim Reaper scenario is a knock-down argument against the infinity of the past or for causal finitism, but - in light of the above - it does seem to be a much stronger argument against the infinity of the past, than the "future" Grim Reaper scenario (or the dry eternity) is (or would be) against the infinity of the future .... and all of them could turn out to be arguments for causal finitism. By the way: the fact that future events can be causally efficacious only if intentionally present is traditionally an ingredient of the argument for the existence of an intelligence if there is a "final cause". The final cause (“that for which”) - a reality that is typically instantiated at the end, or after its effect - is a proper cause (so it is argued) only if it is in some way before the effect (that is, not physically, but intentionally). E.g. “cutting” is the final cause of the knife. But you need to have the knife first for the “cutting” to take place. So, the “cutting” can be a cause of the knife not physically but intentionally (say, as the goal in the mind of the bladesmith while and before he makes the knife). ….. sorry that was long….
Thanks for the lovely comment! “I think that the "future Grim Reaper" story and Malpass' dry eternity paradox actually confirm causal finitism and do not represent a strong argument for the impossibility of an infinite future. In fact, the only reason they work as paradoxes is because they transform future events into present (or past) intentional causes. It is not the future Grim Reapers (or the future days of not drinking) per se that cause the paradoxical effect, but them being objects of a present (or past) knowledge (or revelation). So, you might as well say that the future could be (potentially) infinite but that no agent can act on the basis of infinite causes (or reasons), regardless of these objects of thought being past, present or future.” I have many, many, many things to say in reply. First, I think this misses the point of the Future-GR and Dry Eternity paradox. Alex and I can grant that causal finitism is true. The point of the paradoxes is that the following syllogism will present itself: 1. *If* the future could be endless, *then* there could be a paradoxical Benardete construction. 2. But there cannot be such a construction. 3. So, the future cannot be endless. The reason for (1) is exactly parallel to the CF proponents’ arguments [e.g. those in Koons (2014)] that *if* the past could be beginningless, *then* there could be a paradoxical Benardete construction. Koons uses a patchwork principle to get there: provided we have enough room in spacetime, and provided that an individual GR with its intrinsic causal powers is possible, we should be able to duplicate the GR however much we want and stitch together a world where the room in beginningless-past-spacetime is populated by the relevant infinite series of GRs. But by the same token, we can simply use a patchwork principle as applied to the spatiotemporal framework of an infinite future: provided we have enough room in spacetime (which we do if the future is endless), and provided that an individual GR with its intrinsic causal powers is possible, we should be able to duplicate the GR however much we want and stitch together a world where the room in the endless-future-spacetime is populated by the relevant infinite series of GRs. And so on for the rest of the purported justifications CFists level for the claim , such as Pruss’ and Erasmus & Luna’s mysterious force objection. [if we have enough room in time (which we do if the future is endless and, by the CFists’ lights, if the past is beginningless), what would *prevent* the paradoxical reconstruction from obtaining? Some mysterious force stops it?] Now, perhaps the CFists will object that the consequent of premise (1), in the above argument, does not follow from its antecedent, since CF is true and CF blocks the relevant inference from the possible infinitude of the future to the possible construction of Benardete Paradoxes. But this just pushes the endless future objection back a step. For the following argument then manifests itself: 1. *If* the future could be endless, *then* there could be a violation of CF. 2. But-by the CFists’ own lights-there cannot be such a violation. 3. So, the future cannot be endless. And again, the reason for (1) is identical to the reasons CFists offer for the inference fro the possibility of an infinite past, or the possibility of infinite causal chains, to the possibility of Benardete constructions. In particular, they’ll use something like a patchwork principle or a mysterious force objection. But the same things apply here: if the future is endless, then we could just as easily patch together a world, provided there is enough room in space and time [which there will be, since time is future-infinite in this scenario], in which we duplicate individually possible things with all their intrinsic causal powers, so as to engender a violation of CF in the present. This, then, is my first response to the quoted paragraph: it misses the point of the future-GR and dry eternity paradoxes. My second response: I would argue that if the future is endless, then it simply follows that an omniscient and provident God acts on the basis of infinitely many objects of knowledge. It seems plausible, in particular, that God’s actions in history are done with the knowledge of the future in mind. E.g. it is precisely because God knows that Jesus would eventually die on the cross that he orchestrated history so that OT prophets would foreshadow, in their actions, statements, characteristics, personalities, prophecies, etc., the coming of Christ. So, God orchestrates things at earlier times on the basis of his knowledge of what goes on in the future. But in that case, if the future is endless, surely God then orchestrates what’s going on now partly in light of his knowledge of all future truths-future truths, mind you, which are infinite in number if the future is endless. So, if the future is endless, it seems to straightforwardly follow that God’s actions in the present are done on the basis of infinitely many objects of divine knowledge [namely, infinitely many truths about what happens in the future]. And so if the objector wants to rule out acting on the basis of infinitely many objects of thought, they will ipso facto have to concede, it seems, that the future must come to an end. My third response: Pruss (2018, pp. 184-185) actually gives some pretty strong avenues for responding to the objector’s criticism. In particular, Pruss considers the following argument: 1. If God exists, God’s creation of the cosmos is made on the basis of infinitely many reasons. 2. An action done on the basis of a reason is caused by that reason. 3. So, if God exists, causal finitism [on which nothing can have infinitely many direct or indirect causes] is false. “Ir is particularly plausible”, writes Pruss, “That there are infinitely many reasons favoring the actualization of our world if there is an infinite number of goods g1, g2, … in the world, say an infinity of good future days. For then the fact that the world includes good gn is a reason in favor of actualizing this world.” This alone would provide a sufficient response to the objector’s complaint. If the future is endless, there are infinitely many reasons upon which God’s creation of the world depends; but by the objector’s own lights, there cannot be such an infinity; hence, the future cannot be endless. But there are also other responses I would make, following Pruss. Pruss, on p. 185, notes that ‘reason’ is ambiguous between mental contents or abstract thinkables [on the one hand] and actual token thinking events that realize these contents [on the other]. But, notes Pruss, “it is not the reasons considered as abstract thinkable that are causes of an agent’s actions. Rather, it is the token thinkings that realize these thinkable that re the causes of the agent’s actions.” The problem, though, is that multiple thinkables can be realized in a single act of thinking. “[M]ultiple reasons”, writes Pruss, “can be realized in a single act of thinking”. [NB: Classical theists must accept this, since God has a single act of knowledge and thought [with which he is identical] but infinitely many *contents* of that thought like distinct truths and reasons etc.] And in that case, while there are infinitely many thinkables, there need only be one token thinking that realizes them all. And it is only this one token thinking upon which God’s act is dependent. So, it’s simply false that we have a violation of causal or even dependence finitism, since the dependence relation holds between the act and the single token thinking, not the act and the infinitely many abstract thinkables or mental contents.
So far, I have only replied to the first paragraph you sent. I would request, though, that if you chatted with a philosopher and they gave you that response [e.g. Rob Koons], I would humbly request that you send them my response in the comment above. :) I may continue to respond to the other stuff said, but we shall see. What I said so far might be sufficient. If I decide to respond to the other stuff, I'll just add one or two more comments below that respond to the other bits. Much love
@@MajestyofReason Thank you for the thoughtful responses and the time you dedicated. Here are my thoughts. On your first response: My first paragraph should be read together with the second. I think my considerations do break the symmetry between the past and future cases. We both know that one of the major problems using paradoxes (Grim Reapers etc.) as arguments against the infinite past or future is the extra assumptions that are implicit in the argument. Consider your first syllogism. If we are thinking of a paradoxical Benardete construction such as the future Grim Reapers, I would deny the first premise: in fact, the conditional statement would only be true if an additional premise is true (or additional premises are true), namely: an agent can act on the basis of infinitely many reasons; (and future events can all be known - at least by one intelligent being). Now, one difference between the “past” Grim Reaper story and the future story is that this additional assumption is not needed in the past case. The future story not only needs the patchwork principle but the additional “infinite reasons” principle (which already may violate causal finitism, as I shall argue). This leads us to another potential symmetry breaker between the “past” and “future” paradox: in the past Grim Reaper scenario, each Grim Reaper must only check if Fred is (presently) alive or dead and if (only) the previous Grim Reaper did his job. So, each “step” involves a straightforward causal dependence which could be easily instantiated in the real world. On the other hand, in the future Grim Reaper story, each Grim Reaper must check not only what the next one does, but what all of them in the infinite future do. Hence the symmetry breaker and the extra assumption(s) that one has to make. For the above reasons, I would deny the first premise of your second syllogism too. If the future could be endless, there could not be a violation of causal finitism. Your conditional would only hold if you made an extra assumption which - by my lights - already violates causal finitism (“infinite reasons”). Therefore, the reason for (1) is not identical to the reasons CFists offer for the inference from the possibility of an infinite past, or the possibility of infinite causal chains, to the possibility of Benardete constructions. On your second response: Ultimately, the merits of your second response depends on which model of God you have in mind. I think that many classical theists, especially with Thomistic background, would deny that God’s action depends upon the knowledge of infinitely many events. I would deny that an omniscient and provident God acts on the basis of infinitely many objects of knowledge. I do think that God knows infinitely many “things” however, I just don’t think that any infinite collection of objects of thought in God’s mind has a causal influence on a single outcome (God’s decision or action). When you say: “It seems plausible, in particular, that God’s actions in history are done with the knowledge of the future in mind”, I would respond that God’s knowledge doesn’t work like ours. He does not “look” into the future to see infinitely many events and then act on that basis. Rather, he is more like an author who - for whatever reason - writes a story with infinitely many events. Thus, the infinitely many events in the future (as in the past, if possible) would only be an effect of God’s creative intellect, not also a cause on which God somehow depends. And causal finitism rules out an effect depending on infinitely many causes, not infinitely many effects depending on one (or many) cause(s). In this sense, it is not that God “found out” that Jesus would eventually die on the cross and so he orchestrated history so that OT prophets would foreshadow Him, etc. On the contrary, he “orchestrated” the whole story including Jesus’ death, maybe on the basis of a single reason (or a finite number of them, in any case). I think it doesn’t even make sense to say that “God orchestrates things at earlier times on the basis of his knowledge of what goes on in the future”. There could be a sense in which this is true, if we are talking of a “final cause”, but there can be finitely many or even one final cause (say God’s Glory) that explains even infinitely many events. To sum it up: yes, I would say that God has in mind infinitely many future events (if the term “future” has any meaning in this case) but God’s decisions, actions or reasons do not depend on them, quite the contrary. On your third response: I do not find plausible - considering what I have just said, and contrary to Pruss on this point - that “If God exists, God’s creation of the cosmos is made on the basis of infinitely many reasons”. As I said, it depends on the model of God and many classical theists would object. Think about this: God might have only one reason to create infinitely many angels, namely that “Infinitely many is better than finitely many” (of course this is only an example), so even one reason can be a sufficient explanation for the actualization of an infinite multitude (or at least for the multitude to be infinite as opposed to finite), and this would not violate causal finitism. The mistake (in my humble opinion) in Pruss’ plausibility argument is to assume that just because an infinite number of goods (g1, g2…) are actualized, these must serve as “reasons”. Now, good gn could be a reason for something, but is doesn’t have to be. And - in God’s case at least - one good reason may ground an infinite number of good effects. (It would be interesting to explore if Pruss’ argument assumes something like a strict “difference principle”, but I will not go into that…😊 On Pruss’ last consideration: I don’t find it very plausible. In particular, I don’t think that “it is the token thinkings that realize these thinkables that are the causes of the agent’s actions”, if by that we mean to exclude any causal influence of the mental contents themselves. After all, if it is hot and I decide to buy a lemon flavoured ice-cream specifically, plausibly it is not only the “token thinking event” which causes me to go to the ice-cream shop, but also (and maybe above all) the desirability of the ice-cream and of the lemon flavour, both intentionally present in my mind. In this case we have one “token thinking” but (at least) two thinkables which do have some causal influence as such (if it wasn’t ice-cream, OR if it wasn’t lemon, maybe I wouldn’t have gone to buy an ice-cream). Therefore, I maintain that we still would have a violation of causal or dependence finitism if the thinkables were infinite AND one outcome depended on all of them, as it is implausible to affirm that mental content per se cannot have any causal influence.
@@alessandrofiore7102 Short question about your reply to Joe’s 1st response. Why can’t God have infinitely many reasons? Couldn’t the proponent ask “what’s stopping God from having infinitely many reasons? Isn’t a mysterious force stopping him?” Or something like that. Also, do you have some questions about this stuff. I’ve been thinking a lot about the grim reaper paradox and you seem to know a lot. Could I get your email or social media (or of you’re not comfortable with that I could give you mine).
@@doggoslayer5679 thanks for the interaction. Just a small clarification: I did not state that God cannot have infinitely many reasons full stop, but that it is impossible that "any infinite collection of objects of thought in God’s mind has a causal influence on a single outcome (God’s decision or action)". Causal finitism doesn't rule out "having infinitely many reasons" per se, if there is no single outcome/action/decision that depends on infinitely many reasons (God could have infinitely many reasons if they are "spread out" over infinitely many things/decisions/effects: say - for example - Reason1 explains good1; R2 explains g2; R3 explains g3 ...). The reason why - if this interpretation of causal finitism is correct - God couldn't have infinitely many reasons (in the sense illustrated above) would be that causal finitism establishes a metaphysical impossibility: it's not that any mysterious force prevents God from behaving that way, anymore than a mysterious force prevents Him from creating a square circle. An "infinite reason dependence relation" would imply a sort of indeterminate determination on a single effect (see also Pruss' reasons for rejecting causal infinitism on theoretical - non paradoxical - grounds, in the book mentioned), and so would be contradictory, im-possible, and out of the reach even of a Being that can do any possible thing. As for email, I prefer not to share my private contacts in public and I hardly use social media so If you're confortable you could share yours. Otherwise here is my fb profile which I don't use very often: facebook.com/alessandro.fiore.1840/
Luckily I'm a causal finitist non "traditional" theist in the sense of eternal life, etc. so I dodge most objections while biting the bullet. The one thing I want to add is that, as a causal finitist, I can think there will be an infinite amount of moments in time, but I separate that from talk of an "infinite future" and here's why. My future involves all moments of time there will be, featuring me as a causal link in all of them to form the "will be" of my own causal history. Similarly "the future' takes for granted that the universe will be what it is and we're talking about the future of our existence right now. I don't think such a future will exist forever, but rather that eventually they may be some other universe with other things in it that will have a finite future for themselves, and so on with another causal history. Basically my model of CF is: ... --- {causal history} --- {causal history} --- ... And within each causal history you have: {E1 -> E2 -> ... -> Ek} where each arrow denotes causal relations within the history, i.e. each even is causally connected in the sense meant by Pruss. Or they are causally connected in a strong enough sense that Benardete rules will make sense to talk about in that context. The dashes denote merely temporally distinct events which have no causal connection with each other in the slightest. For an analogy, consider repeated instances of i.i.d. sampling at various times. You get one sample point at t1, another at t2, and thus the x1 and x2 sample points are temporally distinct, but not causally related, i.e. exhaustive information about x1 could never provide any information about what x2 is going to look like. I think this i.i.d. analogy about distinct causal histories allows for an infinite number of previous moments in time that have been / will be, but we just have to be careful of talk about a "past" and "future'. I think the loaded nature of those words are only fully supportable within a causal history but not between them.
Why is this conundrum so much different than the paradox of change and having to decide whether everything always changes or whether nothing ever changes? Is it possible we are constructing a paradox that seems unavoidable with regards to time, in the same way that Parmenides and Heraclitus did with change? Is there a reason a move like Aristotle pulled to get out of the change paradox is not in principle possible here that I’m missing?
I loved your mathematical summary of the UPD. I typed it up as is below. Did I get it right? 1. Let S be a strictly totally ordered set. 2. Let A be "Assume S is an infinite set with no least element." Example: S={0, -1, -2, -3, ...} with
Thanks for this! I think that’s right. (If you want a resource wherein I explain both the endless future problem *and* explain - in a reasonably intuitive/basic manner - the contradiction in the UP, email me! I can share with you a paper on this.) Briefly, while we avoid the contradiction by adding a minimal element to the otherwise beginningless series of past things in the series, this doesn’t seem like a genuine possibility. To me, at least, I can’t make sense of there being an infinite past *with a beginning*. One reason is that I can’t make sense of starting a process and then later having completed a traversal of an infinite number of events within that process (where the events are each have equal, non-zero, non-infinitesimal duration).
@@MajestyofReason *-"I can’t make sense of starting a process and then later having completed a traversal of an infinite number of events within that process (where the events are each have equal, non-zero, non-infinitesimal duration)."* Isn't this solved by supertasks ?
Man, that’s wack. Glad to see my nagging the three (technically four; including Cameron) of you had some pay off, at least. Hopefully they can try discussing something again in the near future. Appreciate you setting this up, tho. 👍
Btw, there’s a bunch of topics I’d love to see you cover which I’m sure you’d enjoy doing yourself (such as deductive atheology, symmetry breakers to the possibility premise in OA’s, atypical OA’s, problems of evil & nonbelief and their respective theodicies, to name a few). But I’m not a fan of patreon/monthly donations. Would you be willing to compromise by covering a topic from a single donation?
@@dr.h8r Absolutely! I would totally follow through with a video request via a one-time donation. I think it would be really fun to look at symmetry breakers for the modal ontological argument; but the choice is up to you, given that it's your donation! :)
Grim reaper seemed interesting until I discovered Zeno arrow paradox. While not directly analogous the arrow does reach the target so i tend to think that the way we intuit around this kind of situations is just wrong and there is smth wrong with the whole thing.
Perhaps I'm not understanding these paradoxes correctly (and there's a very strong likelihood of that) but it appears to me they all boil down to two things... The first is they are attempting to "start" at the "end" of an infinite (endless) series, which is nonsensical to start with. The second is they seem to involve situations that require us to go backwards in time for our causal relations which also seems nonsensical to me. So it appears to me that these aren't paradoxes so much as they are poorly formed questions that superficially make sense, but don't really have any direct correspondence to reality. If anything it appears that the apparent unidirectionality of time is what is preventing these things from becoming _actual_ paradoxes. What am I missing?
@@gabri41200 Well, it depends on what kind of infinite set we're talking about. Plenty of infinite sets have boundary conditions which could be considered at least somewhat analogous to an "end" but in the case of infinite time, we're talking about a boundless less. So talking about an "end" to infinite time is nonsensical, whether we're talking about pure math, or otherwise.
Question about the UPD. Is there anything else that you could point to as an apology with this. I would be more likely to accept this as the solution if there was another thing where combining twin non contradictory and possible things together made something logically impossible. Are there any other examples? It would seem wierd to me if this was the only one.
@@MajestyofReason Thanks. I will take a look at it. Is there a syllogism of the dry eternity Paradox anywhere? Im having a hard time seeing how it leads to a finite future and it would be helpful to have the premises laid out.
Hello, I’m pretty lay and limited in understanding because of my lack of philosophical background. Do you think I’ll still be able to understand this well enough? Thanks for the vid too btw
I think most of it should be understandable!! If you have questions about it -- however simple or complex -- you can direct message me on Facebook and I'll answer :) If you're curious to grow your philosophical background, too, check my dozen (or so) book recommendations in my video "What is Philosophy?"
@@deathnote4171 I've been told that this is a great one :) www.abebooks.com/Introduction-Philosophy-Language-Cambridge-Introductions-Morris/30916483937/bd
@@deathnote4171 He emailed me the other day; from what I can gather, he needs a break from the chaos of social media etc. He hasn’t updated me (yet) about the status of his channel going forward, though. It could potentially be a temporary deactivation; but we shall see as time progresses! I believe he probably over-worked himself making three videos a week and wants to take his hiatus/break seriously 🙂
He emailed me the other day; from what I can gather, he needs a break from the chaos of social media etc. He hasn’t updated me (yet) about the status of his channel going forward, though. It could potentially be a temporary deactivation; but we shall see as time progresses! I believe he probably over-worked himself making three videos a week and wants to take his hiatus/break seriously 🙂
@@MajestyofReason your response is my deepest gratitude and appreciation. Hoping for your channel to grow even further. I'll be opening mine soon. I just finished my High school with a Valedictorian award (I'm not bragging, I'm just looking for others who appreciate it). It's not stimulus for me to create a channel, but a factor in some sort. I hope you get the picture. I'll be enrolling to the course of philosophy. I'm deeply inspired to these kinds of channel. Thank you, Godbless (theoretics of: Farewell, Goodluck) 😜 You earned a new subscriber
@@shawnchristophermalig4339 I love it! Congrats on the Valedictorian status!!! That’s dope. We’re twins, in that regard😉 Best of luck on your new channel, too. Let me know when it’s up-I’ll subscribe!
He emailed me the other day; from what I can gather, he needs a break from the chaos of social media etc. He hasn’t updated me (yet) about the status of his channel going forward, though. It could potentially be a temporary deactivation; but we shall see as time progresses! I believe he probably over-worked himself making three videos a week and wants to take his hiatus/break seriously 🙂
@@MajestyofReason sure, I understand that. Ok, well I just wanted to make sure everything was ok on his end. Thanks for taking the time to respond, I appreciate it!
@@RadicOmega Craig, in their discussion on Capturing Christianity. For an excellent response, check out the video on @Thoughtology between Alex, Wes Morriston, and Landon Hedrick. [Link in the description] :)
The closest Alex ever comes to calling someone a hypocrite is "the most interesting thing for me is this notion of symmetry and how it mutates or modulates as you change dialectical places with your interlocutor." But that's the cynical interpretation. Alex is most likely genuinely interested in the Psychological phenomena that results in someone using the same types of arguments they were just arguing against only moments ago now that an their beliefs are shown to entail an undesirable or even contradictory consequence. I think it's some form of rationalization but formally it's known as ...apologetics. Damn...there's that cynicism again. Sorry!
I can't wrap my head around an infinite past. It's crazy. An actually infinite number of events came to an end in the present? Give me a break. William Lane Craig, if you're reading this, please put an end to this "infinite past" nonsense. I want you to pwn Joe and Malpass.
Only 40 min in, and will have to watch the rest later, but loving the convo so far. I really like how Alex shares the development of the argument. It's such a crucial element, and yet it's so often skipped or traversed with haste.
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Super underrated channel Joe! You’re brilliant and entertaining, which is a great combo. Keep it up
Much love❤️
I diagnose the pair of you two satisfactory.
I think some of this depends on a person’s understanding of “time”. Time seems to only have any determinate meaning in a world with matter, otherwise there is no way to measure it.
If we separate our understanding of time from matter, it is unclear there is any distinction from a single second passing or an infinity of time passing.
In this way a Christian could affirm that time (beginning of matter) is finite in both its start and end, but time is infinite in the second sense in both directions.
Considering the Christian view of the resurrection of the body, they are not committed to that being a “body” that necessarily fits within our construction of a time dependent on the existence of matter.
34:34 At the resurrection, the biblical texts describe God creating new bodies for the righteous who continue to live on forever (2 Corinthians 5). So from the theological perspective, it never actually says that we would have the same physical bodies that we have now as you were describing. I’m enjoying this video, thanks again for the content.
Dun dun DUNNNNN!
Hi Joe, great stuff. I would appreciate your take on the following: I think that the "future Grim Reaper" story and Malpass' dry eternity paradox actually confirm causal finitism and do not represent a strong argument for the impossibility of an infinite future. In fact, the only reason they work as paradoxes is because they transform future events into present (or past) intentional causes. It is not the future Grim Reapers (or the future days of not drinking) per se that cause the paradoxical effect, but them being objects of a present (or past) knowledge (or revelation). So, you might as well say that the future could be (potentially) infinite but that no agent can act on the basis of infinite causes (or reasons), regardless of these objects of thought being past, present or future.
Now, you might say in response that also in the original Grim Reaper story the (infinite) causality is in some way intentional (each Grim Reaper must consider if the conditions have been met by the previous ones). You might also say, in a similar manner, that "the past could be infinite but that no agent can act on the basis of infinite causes (in the way postulated by the Grim Reaper story)". But I would argue that in this respect, there isn't really a symmetry between the past and the future Grim Reaper story. Here is why: in the infinite past version, the paradox (or contradiction) doesn't really arise from the fact that a final event (or effect) has infinite intentional causes. The "intentional" aspect characterises the particular Grim Reaper story, but you could imagine many paradoxes similar to the "past" Grim Reapers that involve only physical causality (for example, you could have mechanical Grim Reapers…. Or you could imagine an eternal universe, with finite space, where particles of type A and B have a non-zero probability to interact every day and where particle B is destroyed iff it interacts with A. If we suppose that there is only one particle of type B, then the paradox would be that it is certain that particle B has already been destroyed but it is impossible to say when or which particle A has destroyed B: for any particle or moment in time you pick, it would have already been certain that particle B was destroyed before. This is not meant to be a fully worked out paradox, but you can see that with a bit of imagination you can build a "Grim Reaper-like scenario" with only physical entities and causality (particle B would be a bit like Fred, particles A like the Grim Reapers).
In more general terms, the reason for this "symmetry breaker" is that causes are typically temporally prior (sometimes simultaneous) to their effects, never posterior (at least on any plausible temporal model). So, the "past Grim Reaper" simply illustrates a typical causal dependence (future events depend on past events) that would be infinite if the past was infinite. On the other hand, the "future Grim Reapers" and the Dry eternity paradox do not represent a typical causal relation: they only manage to make present (or past) events dependent on (infinite) future events by rendering these ones objects of thought, i.e., present or past intentional causes. You would not be able to build a similar future paradox using only physical causality, while you could do it for the "infinite past" versions. In short, causal infinity paradoxes are stronger arguments against a beginningless past, because a series of events with a beginningless past is typically instantiating an infinite causal series. A series of (endless) future events do not typically instantiate an infinite causal series in the same sense (only as a potential infinity, metaphysically speaking), except in the particular case in which the future events are made intentionally present (or past).
I'm not saying that the "past" Grim Reaper scenario is a knock-down argument against the infinity of the past or for causal finitism, but - in light of the above - it does seem to be a much stronger argument against the infinity of the past, than the "future" Grim Reaper scenario (or the dry eternity) is (or would be) against the infinity of the future .... and all of them could turn out to be arguments for causal finitism.
By the way: the fact that future events can be causally efficacious only if intentionally present is traditionally an ingredient of the argument for the existence of an intelligence if there is a "final cause". The final cause (“that for which”) - a reality that is typically instantiated at the end, or after its effect - is a proper cause (so it is argued) only if it is in some way before the effect (that is, not physically, but intentionally). E.g. “cutting” is the final cause of the knife. But you need to have the knife first for the “cutting” to take place. So, the “cutting” can be a cause of the knife not physically but intentionally (say, as the goal in the mind of the bladesmith while and before he makes the knife). ….. sorry that was long….
Thanks for the lovely comment!
“I think that the "future Grim Reaper" story and Malpass' dry eternity paradox actually confirm causal finitism and do not represent a strong argument for the impossibility of an infinite future. In fact, the only reason they work as paradoxes is because they transform future events into present (or past) intentional causes. It is not the future Grim Reapers (or the future days of not drinking) per se that cause the paradoxical effect, but them being objects of a present (or past) knowledge (or revelation). So, you might as well say that the future could be (potentially) infinite but that no agent can act on the basis of infinite causes (or reasons), regardless of these objects of thought being past, present or future.”
I have many, many, many things to say in reply. First, I think this misses the point of the Future-GR and Dry Eternity paradox. Alex and I can grant that causal finitism is true. The point of the paradoxes is that the following syllogism will present itself:
1. *If* the future could be endless, *then* there could be a paradoxical Benardete construction.
2. But there cannot be such a construction.
3. So, the future cannot be endless.
The reason for (1) is exactly parallel to the CF proponents’ arguments [e.g. those in Koons (2014)] that *if* the past could be beginningless, *then* there could be a paradoxical Benardete construction. Koons uses a patchwork principle to get there: provided we have enough room in spacetime, and provided that an individual GR with its intrinsic causal powers is possible, we should be able to duplicate the GR however much we want and stitch together a world where the room in beginningless-past-spacetime is populated by the relevant infinite series of GRs. But by the same token, we can simply use a patchwork principle as applied to the spatiotemporal framework of an infinite future: provided we have enough room in spacetime (which we do if the future is endless), and provided that an individual GR with its intrinsic causal powers is possible, we should be able to duplicate the GR however much we want and stitch together a world where the room in the endless-future-spacetime is populated by the relevant infinite series of GRs. And so on for the rest of the purported justifications CFists level for the claim , such as Pruss’ and Erasmus & Luna’s mysterious force objection. [if we have enough room in time (which we do if the future is endless and, by the CFists’ lights, if the past is beginningless), what would *prevent* the paradoxical reconstruction from obtaining? Some mysterious force stops it?]
Now, perhaps the CFists will object that the consequent of premise (1), in the above argument, does not follow from its antecedent, since CF is true and CF blocks the relevant inference from the possible infinitude of the future to the possible construction of Benardete Paradoxes. But this just pushes the endless future objection back a step. For the following argument then manifests itself:
1. *If* the future could be endless, *then* there could be a violation of CF.
2. But-by the CFists’ own lights-there cannot be such a violation.
3. So, the future cannot be endless.
And again, the reason for (1) is identical to the reasons CFists offer for the inference fro the possibility of an infinite past, or the possibility of infinite causal chains, to the possibility of Benardete constructions. In particular, they’ll use something like a patchwork principle or a mysterious force objection. But the same things apply here: if the future is endless, then we could just as easily patch together a world, provided there is enough room in space and time [which there will be, since time is future-infinite in this scenario], in which we duplicate individually possible things with all their intrinsic causal powers, so as to engender a violation of CF in the present.
This, then, is my first response to the quoted paragraph: it misses the point of the future-GR and dry eternity paradoxes.
My second response:
I would argue that if the future is endless, then it simply follows that an omniscient and provident God acts on the basis of infinitely many objects of knowledge. It seems plausible, in particular, that God’s actions in history are done with the knowledge of the future in mind. E.g. it is precisely because God knows that Jesus would eventually die on the cross that he orchestrated history so that OT prophets would foreshadow, in their actions, statements, characteristics, personalities, prophecies, etc., the coming of Christ. So, God orchestrates things at earlier times on the basis of his knowledge of what goes on in the future. But in that case, if the future is endless, surely God then orchestrates what’s going on now partly in light of his knowledge of all future truths-future truths, mind you, which are infinite in number if the future is endless. So, if the future is endless, it seems to straightforwardly follow that God’s actions in the present are done on the basis of infinitely many objects of divine knowledge [namely, infinitely many truths about what happens in the future]. And so if the objector wants to rule out acting on the basis of infinitely many objects of thought, they will ipso facto have to concede, it seems, that the future must come to an end.
My third response:
Pruss (2018, pp. 184-185) actually gives some pretty strong avenues for responding to the objector’s criticism. In particular, Pruss considers the following argument:
1. If God exists, God’s creation of the cosmos is made on the basis of infinitely many reasons.
2. An action done on the basis of a reason is caused by that reason.
3. So, if God exists, causal finitism [on which nothing can have infinitely many direct or indirect causes] is false.
“Ir is particularly plausible”, writes Pruss, “That there are infinitely many reasons favoring the actualization of our world if there is an infinite number of goods g1, g2, … in the world, say an infinity of good future days. For then the fact that the world includes good gn is a reason in favor of actualizing this world.”
This alone would provide a sufficient response to the objector’s complaint. If the future is endless, there are infinitely many reasons upon which God’s creation of the world depends; but by the objector’s own lights, there cannot be such an infinity; hence, the future cannot be endless.
But there are also other responses I would make, following Pruss.
Pruss, on p. 185, notes that ‘reason’ is ambiguous between mental contents or abstract thinkables [on the one hand] and actual token thinking events that realize these contents [on the other]. But, notes Pruss, “it is not the reasons considered as abstract thinkable that are causes of an agent’s actions. Rather, it is the token thinkings that realize these thinkable that re the causes of the agent’s actions.” The problem, though, is that multiple thinkables can be realized in a single act of thinking. “[M]ultiple reasons”, writes Pruss, “can be realized in a single act of thinking”. [NB: Classical theists must accept this, since God has a single act of knowledge and thought [with which he is identical] but infinitely many *contents* of that thought like distinct truths and reasons etc.] And in that case, while there are infinitely many thinkables, there need only be one token thinking that realizes them all. And it is only this one token thinking upon which God’s act is dependent. So, it’s simply false that we have a violation of causal or even dependence finitism, since the dependence relation holds between the act and the single token thinking, not the act and the infinitely many abstract thinkables or mental contents.
So far, I have only replied to the first paragraph you sent. I would request, though, that if you chatted with a philosopher and they gave you that response [e.g. Rob Koons], I would humbly request that you send them my response in the comment above. :)
I may continue to respond to the other stuff said, but we shall see. What I said so far might be sufficient. If I decide to respond to the other stuff, I'll just add one or two more comments below that respond to the other bits. Much love
@@MajestyofReason Thank you for the thoughtful responses and the time you dedicated. Here are my thoughts.
On your first response:
My first paragraph should be read together with the second. I think my considerations do break the symmetry between the past and future cases. We both know that one of the major problems using paradoxes (Grim Reapers etc.) as arguments against the infinite past or future is the extra assumptions that are implicit in the argument. Consider your first syllogism. If we are thinking of a paradoxical Benardete construction such as the future Grim Reapers, I would deny the first premise: in fact, the conditional statement would only be true if an additional premise is true (or additional premises are true), namely: an agent can act on the basis of infinitely many reasons; (and future events can all be known - at least by one intelligent being). Now, one difference between the “past” Grim Reaper story and the future story is that this additional assumption is not needed in the past case. The future story not only needs the patchwork principle but the additional “infinite reasons” principle (which already may violate causal finitism, as I shall argue).
This leads us to another potential symmetry breaker between the “past” and “future” paradox: in the past Grim Reaper scenario, each Grim Reaper must only check if Fred is (presently) alive or dead and if (only) the previous Grim Reaper did his job. So, each “step” involves a straightforward causal dependence which could be easily instantiated in the real world. On the other hand, in the future Grim Reaper story, each Grim Reaper must check not only what the next one does, but what all of them in the infinite future do. Hence the symmetry breaker and the extra assumption(s) that one has to make.
For the above reasons, I would deny the first premise of your second syllogism too. If the future could be endless, there could not be a violation of causal finitism. Your conditional would only hold if you made an extra assumption which - by my lights - already violates causal finitism (“infinite reasons”). Therefore, the reason for (1) is not identical to the reasons CFists offer for the inference from the possibility of an infinite past, or the possibility of infinite causal chains, to the possibility of Benardete constructions.
On your second response:
Ultimately, the merits of your second response depends on which model of God you have in mind. I think that many classical theists, especially with Thomistic background, would deny that God’s action depends upon the knowledge of infinitely many events. I would deny that an omniscient and provident God acts on the basis of infinitely many objects of knowledge. I do think that God knows infinitely many “things” however, I just don’t think that any infinite collection of objects of thought in God’s mind has a causal influence on a single outcome (God’s decision or action). When you say: “It seems plausible, in particular, that God’s actions in history are done with the knowledge of the future in mind”, I would respond that God’s knowledge doesn’t work like ours. He does not “look” into the future to see infinitely many events and then act on that basis. Rather, he is more like an author who - for whatever reason - writes a story with infinitely many events. Thus, the infinitely many events in the future (as in the past, if possible) would only be an effect of God’s creative intellect, not also a cause on which God somehow depends. And causal finitism rules out an effect depending on infinitely many causes, not infinitely many effects depending on one (or many) cause(s).
In this sense, it is not that God “found out” that Jesus would eventually die on the cross and so he orchestrated history so that OT prophets would foreshadow Him, etc. On the contrary, he “orchestrated” the whole story including Jesus’ death, maybe on the basis of a single reason (or a finite number of them, in any case). I think it doesn’t even make sense to say that “God orchestrates things at earlier times on the basis of his knowledge of what goes on in the future”. There could be a sense in which this is true, if we are talking of a “final cause”, but there can be finitely many or even one final cause (say God’s Glory) that explains even infinitely many events. To sum it up: yes, I would say that God has in mind infinitely many future events (if the term “future” has any meaning in this case) but God’s decisions, actions or reasons do not depend on them, quite the contrary.
On your third response:
I do not find plausible - considering what I have just said, and contrary to Pruss on this point - that “If God exists, God’s creation of the cosmos is made on the basis of infinitely many reasons”. As I said, it depends on the model of God and many classical theists would object. Think about this: God might have only one reason to create infinitely many angels, namely that “Infinitely many is better than finitely many” (of course this is only an example), so even one reason can be a sufficient explanation for the actualization of an infinite multitude (or at least for the multitude to be infinite as opposed to finite), and this would not violate causal finitism. The mistake (in my humble opinion) in Pruss’ plausibility argument is to assume that just because an infinite number of goods (g1, g2…) are actualized, these must serve as “reasons”. Now, good gn could be a reason for something, but is doesn’t have to be. And - in God’s case at least - one good reason may ground an infinite number of good effects. (It would be interesting to explore if Pruss’ argument assumes something like a strict “difference principle”, but I will not go into that…😊
On Pruss’ last consideration: I don’t find it very plausible. In particular, I don’t think that “it is the token thinkings that realize these thinkables that are the causes of the agent’s actions”, if by that we mean to exclude any causal influence of the mental contents themselves. After all, if it is hot and I decide to buy a lemon flavoured ice-cream specifically, plausibly it is not only the “token thinking event” which causes me to go to the ice-cream shop, but also (and maybe above all) the desirability of the ice-cream and of the lemon flavour, both intentionally present in my mind. In this case we have one “token thinking” but (at least) two thinkables which do have some causal influence as such (if it wasn’t ice-cream, OR if it wasn’t lemon, maybe I wouldn’t have gone to buy an ice-cream). Therefore, I maintain that we still would have a violation of causal or dependence finitism if the thinkables were infinite AND one outcome depended on all of them, as it is implausible to affirm that mental content per se cannot have any causal influence.
@@alessandrofiore7102 Short question about your reply to Joe’s 1st response. Why can’t God have infinitely many reasons? Couldn’t the proponent ask “what’s stopping God from having infinitely many reasons? Isn’t a mysterious force stopping him?” Or something like that.
Also, do you have some questions about this stuff. I’ve been thinking a lot about the grim reaper paradox and you seem to know a lot. Could I get your email or social media (or of you’re not comfortable with that I could give you mine).
@@doggoslayer5679 thanks for the interaction. Just a small clarification: I did not state that God cannot have infinitely many reasons full stop, but that it is impossible that "any infinite collection of objects of thought in God’s mind has a causal influence on a single outcome (God’s decision or action)". Causal finitism doesn't rule out "having infinitely many reasons" per se, if there is no single outcome/action/decision that depends on infinitely many reasons (God could have infinitely many reasons if they are "spread out" over infinitely many things/decisions/effects: say - for example - Reason1 explains good1; R2 explains g2; R3 explains g3 ...).
The reason why - if this interpretation of causal finitism is correct - God couldn't have infinitely many reasons (in the sense illustrated above) would be that causal finitism establishes a metaphysical impossibility: it's not that any mysterious force prevents God from behaving that way, anymore than a mysterious force prevents Him from creating a square circle. An "infinite reason dependence relation" would imply a sort of indeterminate determination on a single effect (see also Pruss' reasons for rejecting causal infinitism on theoretical - non paradoxical - grounds, in the book mentioned), and so would be contradictory, im-possible, and out of the reach even of a Being that can do any possible thing.
As for email, I prefer not to share my private contacts in public and I hardly use social media so If you're confortable you could share yours. Otherwise here is my fb profile which I don't use very often: facebook.com/alessandro.fiore.1840/
Luckily I'm a causal finitist non "traditional" theist in the sense of eternal life, etc. so I dodge most objections while biting the bullet.
The one thing I want to add is that, as a causal finitist, I can think there will be an infinite amount of moments in time, but I separate that from talk of an "infinite future" and here's why. My future involves all moments of time there will be, featuring me as a causal link in all of them to form the "will be" of my own causal history. Similarly "the future' takes for granted that the universe will be what it is and we're talking about the future of our existence right now. I don't think such a future will exist forever, but rather that eventually they may be some other universe with other things in it that will have a finite future for themselves, and so on with another causal history.
Basically my model of CF is:
... --- {causal history} --- {causal history} --- ...
And within each causal history you have: {E1 -> E2 -> ... -> Ek} where each arrow denotes causal relations within the history, i.e. each even is causally connected in the sense meant by Pruss. Or they are causally connected in a strong enough sense that Benardete rules will make sense to talk about in that context. The dashes denote merely temporally distinct events which have no causal connection with each other in the slightest. For an analogy, consider repeated instances of i.i.d. sampling at various times. You get one sample point at t1, another at t2, and thus the x1 and x2 sample points are temporally distinct, but not causally related, i.e. exhaustive information about x1 could never provide any information about what x2 is going to look like.
I think this i.i.d. analogy about distinct causal histories allows for an infinite number of previous moments in time that have been / will be, but we just have to be careful of talk about a "past" and "future'. I think the loaded nature of those words are only fully supportable within a causal history but not between them.
Why is this conundrum so much different than the paradox of change and having to decide whether everything always changes or whether nothing ever changes?
Is it possible we are constructing a paradox that seems unavoidable with regards to time, in the same way that Parmenides and Heraclitus did with change?
Is there a reason a move like Aristotle pulled to get out of the change paradox is not in principle possible here that I’m missing?
Ok, since nobody's addressed the elephant in the room: that new haircut looks good on you
Much love
@@MajestyofReason I still prefer the old haircut tbh 😞
@@rishabwarrier2769 it’s growing back slowly and surely! Aha
So you think complimenting someone right after insulting them by calling them an “elephant” is funny/appropriate?
Can’t wait!
I loved your mathematical summary of the UPD. I typed it up as is below. Did I get it right?
1. Let S be a strictly totally ordered set.
2. Let A be "Assume S is an infinite set with no least element." Example: S={0, -1, -2, -3, ...} with
Thanks for this! I think that’s right. (If you want a resource wherein I explain both the endless future problem *and* explain - in a reasonably intuitive/basic manner - the contradiction in the UP, email me! I can share with you a paper on this.)
Briefly, while we avoid the contradiction by adding a minimal element to the otherwise beginningless series of past things in the series, this doesn’t seem like a genuine possibility. To me, at least, I can’t make sense of there being an infinite past *with a beginning*. One reason is that I can’t make sense of starting a process and then later having completed a traversal of an infinite number of events within that process (where the events are each have equal, non-zero, non-infinitesimal duration).
@@MajestyofReason *-"I can’t make sense of starting a process and then later having completed a traversal of an infinite number of events within that process (where the events are each have equal, non-zero, non-infinitesimal duration)."*
Isn't this solved by supertasks ?
@@MrGustavier in supertasks, the events do not each have equal, non-zero, non-infinitesimal duration. Their duration gets smaller and smaller
Would love to see a discussion between Malpass & ElephantPhilosophy on exactly these topics. Nevertheless, hyped af for this 🔥 🔥 🔥
This was originally supposed to be a discussion between all three of us, yes! Unfortunately, EP’s internet was wacky so he couldn’t join us
Man, that’s wack. Glad to see my nagging the three (technically four; including Cameron) of you had some pay off, at least. Hopefully they can try discussing something again in the near future. Appreciate you setting this up, tho. 👍
Btw, there’s a bunch of topics I’d love to see you cover which I’m sure you’d enjoy doing yourself (such as deductive atheology, symmetry breakers to the possibility premise in OA’s, atypical OA’s, problems of evil & nonbelief and their respective theodicies, to name a few). But I’m not a fan of patreon/monthly donations. Would you be willing to compromise by covering a topic from a single donation?
@@dr.h8r Absolutely! I would totally follow through with a video request via a one-time donation. I think it would be really fun to look at symmetry breakers for the modal ontological argument; but the choice is up to you, given that it's your donation! :)
@@MajestyofReason Didn't EP delete his YT channel?
Grim reaper seemed interesting until I discovered Zeno arrow paradox. While not directly analogous the arrow does reach the target so i tend to think that the way we intuit around this kind of situations is just wrong and there is smth wrong with the whole thing.
Perhaps I'm not understanding these paradoxes correctly (and there's a very strong likelihood of that) but it appears to me they all boil down to two things... The first is they are attempting to "start" at the "end" of an infinite (endless) series, which is nonsensical to start with. The second is they seem to involve situations that require us to go backwards in time for our causal relations which also seems nonsensical to me.
So it appears to me that these aren't paradoxes so much as they are poorly formed questions that superficially make sense, but don't really have any direct correspondence to reality. If anything it appears that the apparent unidirectionality of time is what is preventing these things from becoming _actual_ paradoxes.
What am I missing?
Actually the end of an infinite time is not so nonsensical in a mathematical sense. Many calculus devices make use of infinity.
@@gabri41200 Well, it depends on what kind of infinite set we're talking about. Plenty of infinite sets have boundary conditions which could be considered at least somewhat analogous to an "end" but in the case of infinite time, we're talking about a boundless less. So talking about an "end" to infinite time is nonsensical, whether we're talking about pure math, or otherwise.
Why did Elephant Philosophy delete his channel?
Edit: added a ?
Hmm, hadn't seen that. Unfortunate.
@ISAI GARCIA I hope so. At the very least, I’d love to see his videos back up. There was so much to unpack in each one.
seems very strong.
Question about the UPD. Is there anything else that you could point to as an apology with this. I would be more likely to accept this as the solution if there was another thing where combining twin non contradictory and possible things together made something logically impossible. Are there any other examples? It would seem wierd to me if this was the only one.
Great question! We touch on a number of them in the following video :). th-cam.com/video/uoTMs-kMny4/w-d-xo.html
@@MajestyofReason Thanks. I will take a look at it. Is there a syllogism of the dry eternity Paradox anywhere? Im having a hard time seeing how it leads to a finite future and it would be helpful to have the premises laid out.
@@williamkeller5541 you’re in luck! Alex explains it quite well in his blog post on the dry eternity paradox. I linked it in the description❤️
Hello, I’m pretty lay and limited in understanding because of my lack of philosophical background. Do you think I’ll still be able to understand this well enough? Thanks for the vid too btw
I think most of it should be understandable!! If you have questions about it -- however simple or complex -- you can direct message me on Facebook and I'll answer :)
If you're curious to grow your philosophical background, too, check my dozen (or so) book recommendations in my video "What is Philosophy?"
@@MajestyofReason Hi Do you know any great and easy book On philosophy of Language for beginners
@@deathnote4171 I've been told that this is a great one :)
www.abebooks.com/Introduction-Philosophy-Language-Cambridge-Introductions-Morris/30916483937/bd
@@MajestyofReason thanks
And Do you know Why EP deleted his TH-cam channel?
@@deathnote4171 He emailed me the other day; from what I can gather, he needs a break from the chaos of social media etc. He hasn’t updated me (yet) about the status of his channel going forward, though. It could potentially be a temporary deactivation; but we shall see as time progresses! I believe he probably over-worked himself making three videos a week and wants to take his hiatus/break seriously 🙂
Josh, please can you reply by saying anything about EP? I can't seem to find his channel :(
He emailed me the other day; from what I can gather, he needs a break from the chaos of social media etc. He hasn’t updated me (yet) about the status of his channel going forward, though. It could potentially be a temporary deactivation; but we shall see as time progresses! I believe he probably over-worked himself making three videos a week and wants to take his hiatus/break seriously 🙂
@@MajestyofReason your response is my deepest gratitude and appreciation. Hoping for your channel to grow even further. I'll be opening mine soon. I just finished my High school with a Valedictorian award (I'm not bragging, I'm just looking for others who appreciate it). It's not stimulus for me to create a channel, but a factor in some sort. I hope you get the picture.
I'll be enrolling to the course of philosophy. I'm deeply inspired to these kinds of channel. Thank you, Godbless (theoretics of: Farewell, Goodluck) 😜
You earned a new subscriber
@@shawnchristophermalig4339 I love it! Congrats on the Valedictorian status!!! That’s dope. We’re twins, in that regard😉
Best of luck on your new channel, too. Let me know when it’s up-I’ll subscribe!
Hey Joe, hope your doing well. Quick question. Did Elephant Philosophy delete his channel? I just wanted to make sure everything was ok.
He emailed me the other day; from what I can gather, he needs a break from the chaos of social media etc. He hasn’t updated me (yet) about the status of his channel going forward, though. It could potentially be a temporary deactivation; but we shall see as time progresses! I believe he probably over-worked himself making three videos a week and wants to take his hiatus/break seriously 🙂
@@MajestyofReason sure, I understand that. Ok, well I just wanted to make sure everything was ok on his end. Thanks for taking the time to respond, I appreciate it!
Ok the TLDR of this episode is:
God is a dry alcoholic.
Loved the football!
Much love
❤️
Joe, it's really irresponsible of you to recommend Alex's blog when it's so full of 'modal operator shift fallacies'...
Lololol
Hahaha
who accused Alex of that?
@@RadicOmega WLC
@@RadicOmega Craig, in their discussion on Capturing Christianity. For an excellent response, check out the video on @Thoughtology between Alex, Wes Morriston, and Landon Hedrick. [Link in the description] :)
The closest Alex ever comes to calling someone a hypocrite is "the most interesting thing for me is this notion of symmetry and how it mutates or modulates as you change dialectical places with your interlocutor."
But that's the cynical interpretation. Alex is most likely genuinely interested in the Psychological phenomena that results in someone using the same types of arguments they were just arguing against only moments ago now that an their beliefs are shown to entail an undesirable or even contradictory consequence. I think it's some form of rationalization but formally it's known as ...apologetics. Damn...there's that cynicism again. Sorry!
Lol pattern nice try grifter
I can't wrap my head around an infinite past. It's crazy. An actually infinite number of events came to an end in the present? Give me a break.
William Lane Craig, if you're reading this, please put an end to this "infinite past" nonsense. I want you to pwn Joe and Malpass.