Whatever begins to exist has a cause? | Dr. Daniel Linford
ฝัง
- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 15 ก.ค. 2024
- Today I'm joined by Dr. Daniel Linford to discuss the Kalam's causal principle that whatever begins to exist has a cause. In particular, we discuss the first half of a video produced by @ReasonableFaithOrg.
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OUTLINE
0:00 Intro
0:39 A false dichotomy
2:06 Three arguments for the causal principle
3:51 Argument from intuition (or magic?)
14:20 Argument from chaos
19:00 Science and everyday experience
26:52 Dan’s reasons for rejecting the principle
32:24 Conclusion
RESOURCES
(1) The video to which we're responding (from @ReasonableFaithOrg): • The Kalam Cosmological...
(2) Dan’s notes for this video (and our previous video on the scientific case for the Kalam): drive.google.com/file/d/1Jjfl...
(3) Dan’s dissertation, “Cosmic Skepticism and the Beginning of Physical Reality”: philarchive.org/archive/DAN_S...
(4) Dan’s paper, “A modal condition for the beginning of the universe”: philarchive.org/rec/LINAMC-2
(5) My analysis of the Kalam's causal principle: • The Kalam's Causal Pri...
(6) My Kalam playlist: • Kalam Cosmological Arg...
(7) My Springer book co-authored with Dan: (a) www.amazon.com/Existential-In... (b) link.springer.com/book/10.100...
THE USUAL...
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After reading Dan's paper, these videos are even more exciting to watch
Causation is likely an emergent phenomena that doesn't exist at a quantum gravity level or at least doesn't fit well with everyday language. I don't see this as a problem for theism but rather a problem for certain arguments for theism like those that rely on the idea that causality applies to everything
I love these videos with Dr. Linford! Thanks!
You guys agree with me so you must be right. Well done.
Kant already answered this question. The principle that every cause has an effect is not knowledge, but a principle constitutive of experience. It makes our experience of an objective time-order possible. It is licit for us to use this principle, but it is not a necessary truth about the empirical world. How could we ever come to knowledge of such a principle if it was universal and necessary, and applicable to any object, not just our limited experience? We could never possibly know that *every* cause has an effect through our senses; rather, it is a concept of the understanding we are bound to employ due to our perspective on the world.
My intuition is that "uncaused" existence can be allowed simply by being logically consistent; within the universe, existence requires time (existing "before" time is logically inconsistent only within the universe) but the universe itself can "just exist" in the sense that it doesn't contain logical contradictions.
It never ceases to amaze me the lengths and the mental gymnastics these “philosophers” would go to in order to avoid considering the possibility of a designer.
Joe, you and your channel are a treasure
❤❤❤
Great start pointing out the false dichotomy
took the words right out of my head
It is really cringe tbh. Craig did not mean to present the video as a rigorous argument, he quote obviously was presenting the argument in a manor that even a child could understand it
Joe, I find your content amazing. I also think your argumentation is consistently strong and informed.
Thanks for your videos Joe because you teach me new things and to be as objective with my own beliefs as i can be.
Re: Three ways of defining "nothing".
Defining nothing as something contradicts the very concept which is the complete absence of anything. Only a contrarian defines ‘nothing’ as ‘something.’ One can use it in a relational way, however, without clearly stating what the concept relates to then it necessarily obfuscates its meaning rendering it vacuous and incoherent. The need to clarify its intended meaning highlights the problem. If we start defining concepts in contradictory ways, it becomes difficult to convey clear messages and engage in meaningful discussion.
To assert something can come into existence and not be made from a pre-existing substance lacks justification. A substance is what things are made of. So it's hard to understand what is being meant by coming into existence if not from a substance? The existence of abstract objects assume platonism. Explanations requires causal, logical and linguistic relations. Hume's fork helps to qualify the distinction between ideas and facts. Thus, it can be argued that causation is required for the beginning of things if one argues that beginnings require explanations. Hume's view concerning causality has to do with epistemology as a skeptical position on the possibility of knowing about causal relations. These relations have also been thrown into doubt by F.H.Bradley, Parmenides and most recently, Michael Della Rocca.
Re: Hume's DIctum: There are no necessary connections between distinct existences.
I disagree with Kripke and others since it seems that it is inexplicable why there would be necessary connections between them if they are wholly distinct. We observe that A is often followed by B, but we cannot logically prove that A must always be followed by B. Thus, we cannot establish that connection are logically necessary. Two events would necessarily be distinct but there is no real distinction between events. cf. Resurrecting the Hume’s Dictum argument against metaethical non-naturalism by Noah Gordon Thus, nomological necessitarianism is held intact. Also, Spinoza provides an argument for why there cannot be separate substances.
Maybe we dont see objects poping out in existence because there is already stuff in the way. Like, there is already air and molecules and quantum fields everywere. But "before" the big bang the conditions were very different from today. Anyway, our day-to-day experience cannot be considered a fundamental truth.
I discuss this point in my long video on the Kalam’s causal principle, so I recommend checking that out! It’s in the section on the argument from chaos🙂
That doesn't make any f*cking sense. Also, the premise is false. I don't need to be there in the nothingness in order to know for sure that stg can not come from nothing, because the intuitive concept of nothing assumes that there is no casual power there to make things pop up from it.
You guys really are reaching here
@@inrisalvatore9520good point
@@redx11x ‘you guys’? I criticize his point in the video I mentioned.
[insert coping comment about how you're taking a popular video too seriously]
Craig doesn't want anyone to watch his videos. He just wants you to believe on the sheer number of arguments.
Dan!!! Love Dan!! Dan’s the man’s
Great videos Joe! I think it would be a good thing to make videos with Dr. Linford and Dr. Craig to give Craig a chance to respond. I’m sure it would be a fruitful discussion. Or at least feature him or a defender of the Kalam like Locke in a separate video. It seems a bit unfair to throw so many objections without having someone to defend to other side (I know that’s not possible in every video and that it’d be crazy to expect that).
Remember this Dan guy from Godless debates, where he was humiliated by high school drop outs, because they caught him not only misrepresenting phenomenal conservatism, but being completely unprepared to answer some of the most classical objections regarding PC which was odd as hell😂
Got a link?
I didn’t watch the entire thing but I remember you saying before ( spinoza vs craig video) that you find the first premise more plausible than not. Has that changed?
Here's how I put my most updated views to another commenter:
"I agree with you that the causal principle is the least objectionable part of the Kalam; in my view, the Kalam’s major problems lie elsewhere. I just think proponents of the Kalam are often far too quick with the causal principle, and the central arguments for it seem to have some notable difficulties (as do the central arguments against it, in my view). Personally, I think all beginnings have *explanations* , but I haven’t seen sufficient reason to think that they must have specifically causal explanations." [Note that I also haven't seen sufficient reason to think that some beginning *does* have a non-causal explanation; I don't think there are sufficient reasons either way. Perhaps that makes me agnostic on the causal principle]
What do you think about the argument from psycophiscal harmony
Arnt there certain experiments that have proven time symmetry can be broken?
Yes, there was Nobel Prize won for that discovery.
In the case of dividing 23 strawberries, what is 'beginning' to exist? To me, it seems that there is a 'failure' to begin to exist, also isn't distributing more of a phenomenon with pre-existing things, rather than any emergent property?
To clarify, I wasn’t giving an example of an explanation of something beginning to exist; I was simply giving an example of a non-causal explanation of a feature of concrete reality (Eg, an explanation for why Stephen’s desire is frustrated)
@@MajestyofReason oh ok
@@MajestyofReasonits an awful example. Stephens desire and his frustration has nothing to do with mathematic non causes. How many other explanations of causes can you think of for this feeling of frustration steven has?
@@redx11x No. The explanandum -- the fact being explained -- is not Stephen's frustration. Rather, the explanandum is the *frustration of Stephen's desire* , i.e., the fact that Stephen's desire is not satisfied, i.e.., the fact that the content of Stephen's desire doesn't obtain. This is very different from Stephen's feeling of frustration.
Here's a helpful document I put together for a future video on common mistakes people make. In this video, I discuss lots of examples of non-causal explanations, and I also give a bunch of references to philosophical literature that explores many such cases in depth! Link: docs.google.com/document/d/1yzFHzPldHXgVsoWZL9Wpu-Vb8LOc7V4TOhiBL5WvpUs/edit?usp=sharing
@@MajestyofReason thank you for your time. Do you think that there should be a distinction between material objects and thoughts/feelings. It is clear that Craigs video is not a deep dive into philosophy and that this video references material objects popping into existance rather than what you are saying.
2:39
This is really the argument from chaos right?
Here it is formulated in an imprecise way but I see multiple interpretations:
1) If the causal principle is false, something can begin to exist uncaused, then there is no explanation of why things don't begin to exist uncaused all the time
I don't really see any reason to think this, as you Joe pointed out as well. One explanation might even be that, even tho not all, most things that begin to exist have a cause.
2) If the causal principle is false, then *it is possible* for any number of things to begin to exist uncaused (Craig)
While I find this plausible, I don't really see how this would be problematic to accept.
3) If the causal principle is false, then *there would be* a large number of things beginning to exist uncaused all the time (Loke)
I don't really see the motivation for this either.
Im so early ❤
Joe, can you do a video with Michael Heumer talking about his argument for reincarnation and a soul. He is an atheist to my knowledge. Id want to see your objections to his arguments.
One thing i always wonder is: The whole Infinite Regress thing. Why is that not possible? We have circles, we have Thermodynamics that tell us that energy cant be created or destroyed, we have circular processes in Nature like the Rain Circle...
Why cant our Universe just be one house at a round about which other sides we dont see cause our houses does not have windows? And it just goes on and on... if thats even applicable outside time and space, given that eternal is a temporal attribute.
Infinite regress is not only possible it is probable. The problem with proposed first cause is - where did it come from?
Even Craig doesn't claim an infinite regress is impossible, only that it's "absurd".
Because it is not rational. It is just a believe you like to have
Are you planning to make an reaction or video about recent debate between Capturing Christianity and the Non-Alchemist
10:06 "even though that sufficient reason is not a causal reason". But it can still be determinism/necessary? I'm confused. Can someone elaborate
Edit: 13:40 "not causal connections" I'm still confused by this
I think they mean talking in terms of explanations vs causes.
'A explains B' doesn't mean the same as 'A causes B.'
eg: In physics, what happens can be stated in terms of explanations by appealing to laws and mathematics etc. How the state of the system evolves can be explained by the governing laws etc.
If someone is going to argue for a universal law of cause/effect, they need to be able to explain the Casimir effect, virtual particles and a variety of quantum phenomena.
These things do have causes…. you know that right? Overlapping of quantum waves and energy packets to create virtual particles that are unstable and go out of existence almost as quickly as they come into existence. This isn’t a good objection
@@aydentrevaskis8390 They're not quantum waves. The wave function is used to describe wave-like behaviour, but they're not actually waves in the strictest sense. We don't actually fully understand what exactly they are, but they're neither waves nor particles and are something else. Some people call it/them wavicles.
Virtual particles don't 'usually' have mass. Massless particles are not expected to experience time, at least as we understand it. So with no time, how does cause/effect even apply?
Proposition: Existence is a brute fact. Hopefully, this puts an end to anyone who still seeks an explanation for something rather than nothing.
Definitions:
1.Existence: a state of being, where being is the actualization of a metaphysically possible state of affairs.
2. Metaphysical/Ontological Explanation: a set of logical and linguistic relations used to describe phenomena or convey meaning. It exists regardless of whether Platonism or nominalism is true.
3. Brute Fact: A truth that cannot be explained any further
Syllogism:
P1. Existence is the set of what exists.
P2. If Explanations exist, then they are part of the set of what exists
P3. If Explanations are part of the set of what exists, then they cannot explain the set
C1. Existence, i.e. the set of what exists, cannot be explained
Metaphysical foundationalism entails ungrounded (brute) facts. From this, we can reasonably conclude that whatever exists and however it exists, does not necessarily require explanations. This is because metaphysical explanations are primarily epistemological human constructs. However, this would not necessarily entail that explanations are contingent, as it does not follow things could have been otherwise.
Re: Non-Causal Explanations.
The emergence of change can be seen as a non-causal explanation, as it does not necessarily rely on direct cause-effect relationships. It can be argued that an initial arrangement of a substance can lead to the emergence of change itself. However, this is debatable was well since one can claim the initial arrangement can be defined as a cause.
Circular Causation
Most philosophers hold to an asymmetric view of causation but it does not necessarily follow that causality must be asymmetric since causality has to do with the notion of becoming, rather than the concept of being. Causality is not necessarily relations between events since one can deny that events are more than mental constructs but they can also be relations between forms. Thus, an initial form (A) can cause many forms that lead back to the initial form i.e. A. There is nothing that entails this is a metaphysical impossibility. There is no assumption here that a new substance emerges via causality. Also, the existence of entropy does not prevent entropy from restarting. For more on this, see Grounding and Reflexivity by Ricki Bliss or Metaphysical Interdependence by Naomi Thompson.
Reflexive metaphysical explanations let us know that we have arrived at a breakdown in our explanatory progress. Thus, If the universe (i.e. the set of existents) is a brute fact i.e. it is not apt for explanation, then thinking distinctions require explanations commits such a proponent to a Taxi-Cab fallacy.
That's really interesting - thank you for sharing.
So with P3 - I'm guessing this is because P2 establishes that *all explanations are already 'existing.' ie: positing an explanation 'outside' of existence (to explain existence) would be nonsensical?
That is: to appeal to an explanation presupposes that it exists - that it's part of existence, but 'existence' is what one is trying to explain. So one isn't going to find an explanation for existence? As you say - it's a brute fact.
Thanks.
I don't think I can accept the definitions proposed by you except that of "brute fact".
(1) As for "existence", it seems to me that he treats it as a dispositional property. This is something relatively common in philosophical circles and that is that when they use the term "existence" they seem to mean something like a thing or property apart from what is being predicated on. For example, there are those who would be content to think that apples exist because they have a property that makes them exist and, in general, that things exist because they have "existence" as a property. Such a vision is simply absurd for me. The "existence" does not add anything to the concept of thing. Instead, I see dialectical and mundane exchanges, where the term "existence" is present, as processes where a discriminating device is used that limits the number of entities postulated in a theoretical body and tries to ensure its internal coherence. It seems obvious to me that we do not know which entities and which nature exactly form part of the set of the real. So we need something that helps us to identify under a certain label which entities, which we can conceive or postulate, are also part of the set of the real. For example, a 20 foot tall fire-breathing dragon is very plausibly a theoretical entity that is not part of the set of the real. But knowing which theoretical entities are or are not part of the whole of reality is not always so easy to know. For example, we don't know exactly what type of celestial body and its nature might or might not exist within 500,000 light-years of Earth.
(2) You know, I often think of "explanations" as propositions that are contained in other, larger propositions. For example, the proposition "It is the case that there are two people in the ring" is contained in the proposition "It is the case that there are two boxers in the ring". So, ultimately, there is only one fundamental proposition that contains the entire plurality of (derived) propositions with factual correlates.
(3) I tend to think of myself as an anti-realist about categories, and by that I mean I don't think there are such things as "relations" and "properties". Now, that's not to say that I don't believe that there is something in reality that intuitively compels us to believe that something is actually doing some kind of work. Let me explain: for example, it is evident that an apple can have the property of being red and also of having a certain height. What I reject, however, is that such "properties", like the apple's color and height, are things or objects other than the apple itself. So, for example, the red in the big apple is just the apple seen through the prism of color. Continuing with the example, the 4 cm of the apple is just the apple seen through the prism of height. And since I reduce "relations" to "properties", what was said above follows with equal force. In short, I think of "categories" as epistemic entities born of our own cognitive limitations, which are natural to us. This is so, because I see reality as indivisible. Although, if they ask me in what way I support the latter, I only have to answer that "by means of an intuition".
@@WilliamsRivera-km4wn Thanks for engaging with my argument.
So I think my argument can be modified to fit your demands.
1* Existence: The totality of whatever is real or the set of real things or simply put, reality (however, you choose to define reality).
2* Explanation: Propositions contained in larger propositions
4 Proposition: a statement that expresses an idea and can be either true or false. It can also be defined as a declarative sentence that makes a claim about the world or describes a state of affairs.
"when they use the term "existence" they seem to mean something like a thing or property apart from what is being predicated on"
Whilst that may be what some philosophers mean but I mean it as the set or totality of existents or distinctions. This set could have only one member or no member whatsoever as long as the set itself is real.
"It seems obvious to me that we do not know which entities and which nature exactly form part of the set of the real."
Is this a knowledge claim or an intellectual seeming? Even if it is the case that we do not know what is real, it seems incoherent to claim nothing is real. It follows logically that something is real. That's all that needs to be established for the argument to go through.
What is a proposition if not a real thing? Also, it seems incoherent that you believe in proposition(s) when propositions depend on relations to be coherent. What proposition is it you believe is real? Do you believe this proposition is an object? Are you a platonist? How do you define a proposition.
If you are an anti-realist about categories then you would hold a view similar to existence monism or maybe a parmenidean radical monism such as F.H.Bradley or Michael Della Rocca. However, relations are assumed to make distinctions and hence, you are assuming something. A thing is existent/real in the broadest sense.
"What I reject, however, is that such "properties", like the apple's color and height, are things or objects other than the apple itself. "
That fine! I believe Bradley's Regress doesnt treat those things as objects either. Even if you hold to a radical monism where there are no Categories whatsoever, there is still reality. So indirectly, you are supporting my argument since even if it is that case that there are no explanations or facts or distinctions, there is still reality and the quest for an explanation for it seems untenable.
However, you seem to act in way contrary to your view. Is it because you view actions as illusory and you are simply taking a dialectic approach. Parmenides too believe Existence was unchanging and indivisible but if that were the case, how are you able to have an illusion or what do you mean if relations are not part of what is real. I take it you are familiar with The Parmenidean Ascent?
@@CMVMic
Gratitude is mutual. I didn't expect you to answer me. How to put it, in general I am somewhat used to being ignored.
1) I would be willing to accept that I do have knowledge. However, what I mean by the fact that it seems obvious to me that we don't know which entities are part of the set of the real is not that we don't have any knowledge in general terms or that it denies reality in some way, where to deny reality it is to think that the real set is not formed by any entity. What he wanted to say was simply that we do not know all the entities that are part of the set of the real and that is why we need a device that helps us to discriminate between what we believe to be part of the set of the real and what is not: the "existence" as an attached tag would fill that role. This is so because, again, we do not know which entities are part of the set of the real in its entirety.
(2) I believe that propositions are real. However, my propositional realism is, so to speak, derivative. And this is because I believe that ideas, mental entities, are fundamental. This has brought me dangerously close to absolute idealism, but I am not sure I can make such a concession.
(3) Well, it is the case that I reject "relationships" if these are supposed to be entities in their own right, as something apart from those entities that serve to exemplify the fact called "relationship". I just see them as useful heuristic devices.
(4) I can make a stipulative definition of "proposition" as an adequate sentence for truth. But since I don't believe that propositions are linguistic tokens, this would lead me to redefine it "properly" as a mental entity. However, I have an intuition that fundamental things cannot be defined or explained. If, on the other hand, we could intelligibly explain or define something in other terms, then we would have a good guide to knowing that the thing, whatever it is, that we are trying to explain or define, is not fundamental. This is so on pain of accepting some circular definition.
(5) I do not intend to deny in the least reality or some kind of madness.
(6) It seems obvious to me that plurality exists. So the only thing at stake, at least as I see it, is its ontological status. Sometimes I have been referring to the plurality as derived entities, but since in philosophical circles the term "derived entity" seems to compromise the thesis that every derived entity is a "proper part" of a thing (where being a "proper part "is to be, ultimately, other than the thing about which it is predicated). This has led me to return to a scholastic term, known as "entity of reason." I don't believe that plurality is an illusion (where an illusion is a completely false appearance of reality, as a lake in a desert would be to a man stranded there), but it depends on the mind. For example, I don't believe that the height of an apple and its color are different things from the apple, but that doesn't mean that there isn't something in that piece of reality, which is the apple, that is doing the job that it is doing or that They have such powers.
(7) I have read the work of Dr. Della Roca a long time ago, but I do not see how denying all plurality even with respect to abstractions does not end in incoherence. To say that it is a feature of the dialectic surrounding the thesis simply does not do the job of making it tenable. Maybe I just didn't get it.
(8) I know I have a big job to do. I have intuitions that can be contradictory or at least difficult to reconcile. I have now come to the conclusion that even though reality is indivisible, it does not follow that there cannot be plurality. I'm not sure that both work, but let's take the case of real infinity. First, assume that actual infinity is a coherent and true concept. Now, try adding, subtracting, or sectioning something. It's just incoherent. Some would take this as a priori proof that actual infinity is absurd and therefore must be rejected. However, for that I asked you to suppose before that said concept is coherent and true. An infinite plurality is simply indivisible.
@@WilliamsRivera-km4wn 1) Knowledge is a construct; we define what knowledge is. There are many theories of knowledge. Michael Della Rocca explained the problems with such theories in the Parmenidean Ascent. Regardless, my argument doesn’t require knowledge of what exists or doesn’t. All it requires is acknowledging there is atleast one thing that exists or is real.
2) Idealism makes a category error. It assumes Platonism. Propositions are themselves functions. Functionalism is more tenable than Idealism.
3) Relationships can be ideas. If ideas are fundamental then so too would relationships
4) Intuitions are not necessarily truth tracking nor are intellectual seemings. I see no reason to claim that fundamental things are incapable of being explicable, even if that was the case it would not follow that being able to make something explicable makes it non-fundamental either. This intuition seems unjustified or better put, unconvincing. It also doesn’t follow that for something to be intelligible, it must be definable. This is what is meant by existence i.e. the totality of what is real.
5) It seems you were denying my definition of existence, when it can be used interchangeably with reality. Are you saying you accept this definition? If so, my argument goes through. If you still don’t believe it is, please explain why.
6) It seems plurality exists to me as well. However, even if existence pluralism is true, it wouldn’t mean substance pluralism is. I would say it doesn’t depend on the mind, it depends on separation and change since I view the mind as a set of functions.
7) The point of his paper was to highlight the incoherence of analytic philosophy. I had a debate with someone over the paper, I could share this exchange with you but it is extremely long and it would have to be over email.
8) Yes, I would say your intuitions seem contradictory. Also, I see no reason to assume something is coherent, if it cannot be shown to be coherent. For this reason, I reject the coherence of actual infinites.
Anyways, I would prefer we stick to specific reasons why you would deny my argument since some of these lengthy comments seem to be carrying us off course.
Random question: how do you feel about Arsenal signing Kai Havertz?
Initially skeptical, but I trust Mikel. So I’m excited!
I don't understand why he says that _"coherentism isn't a circular view"_ (30:50) ?
We have a set of beliefs (or facts), and a "justification" (or causal) relation on that set (let's call it the J relation).
Belief/fact "a" justifies/causes belief/fact "b" would be written :
a J b
If we don't want to be in a case of foundationalism, we don't want there to be any belief without justification : there are no belief b such that :
∅ J b
If we don't want to be in a circular case then the J relation needs to be irreflexive :
a -J- a
And asymmetrical :
a J b → b -J- a
If J is transitif, we have that
a J b ∧ b J c → a J c
For any belief b in that set, it has to have a justification, and that justification cannot be itself, and cannot be transitively itself through a chain of justification. It is therefore justified by at least another belief b1.
For any belief b1 in that set, it has to have a justification, and that justification cannot be b, cannot be itself, and cannot be transitively itself or b through a chain of justification. It is therefore justified by at least another belief b2.
For any belief b2 in that set, it has to have a justification, and that justification cannot be b1 nor b, cannot be itself, and cannot be transitively itself or b1 or b through a chain of justification. It is therefore justified by at least another belief b3.
Etc...
Ad infinitum.
This may be relevant: suppose we think a sufficient condition for A 'justifying' B is A raising the epistemic probability of B. If this is so, then justification is symmetric, since it's a theorem of probability that whenever E raises the probability of H (i.e., whenever P(H|E)>P(H)), H also raises the probability of E (i.e., P(E|H)>P(E)). And, to those who accept the positive relevance account of evidence, we then get: whenever E would be evidence for H, H would also be evidence for E.
@@MajestyofReason Thanks for the response !
*-"And, to those who accept the positive relevance account of evidence, we then get: whenever E would be evidence for H, H would also be evidence for E."*
If you have belief A justifies belief B and belief B justifies belief A. Isn't it pertinent to describe this as being "circular" ?
@@MrGustavier it may be appropriate to do so! It just depends on how we’re using ‘circular’. Oftentimes, when people describe something as circular, they’re intending to say it’s *problematic* or *vicious* in some way. But the symmetry I described isn’t problematic or vicious. So, if by ‘circular’, we mean to imply problematic/vicious, then it won’t be circular; but if we don’t mean to imply that, then you may be correct that this is ‘circular’ in some sense. What really matters is that it isn’t circular in any problematic or objectionable or vicious sense🙂
When are you going to continue the kalam playlist? 😄
Ask Stephen!
@@MajestyofReason
Will do :))
Though it is objectible, I do think the premise is very plausible given our knowledge of the world. Over all I think the second premise is the weaker.
Yeah, me too. I personally prefer to think about the world in terms of explanations than causes, but I'm sympathetic to P1. Like you, I think P2 is where the Kalam falters.
Isn't any analysis of how cause and effect does, or doesn't, work in the universe irrelevant to the beginning of the universe? You are talking about relationships between things or events within the existing universe vs the beginning of that universe. So, in a way, it doesn't matter how cause and effect works within the universe for the purpose of the argument?
Wow so many triggered WLC fans in the comments.
5:41 it seems not everyone would agree with this statement for there are certainly mathematical realists who believe that mathematical objects exist and have causal power. Just a quick observation while listening, obviously this doed not weaken the argument immediately (and im not a mathematical realist anyway)
Hi Joe, I have three questions:
1. Have you ever encountered the work of John Vervaeke on the meaning crisis?
2. What do you think about his characterisation of himself as a non-theist?
3. How does it compare to your beliefs?
Just to clarify, how strong are the claims in Dan's first and second arguments? Is he claiming "causation does not apply to fundamental physics" or is he claiming "it's not clear that causation applies to fundamental physics, so the defender of the causal principle must first demonstrate causation applies (at all) and then rule out the alternative accounts of causation that do not entail the causal principle"?
Causation apply to causal physics as well I think Daniel mistaken and got mixed up by quantum physics and caused physics
I think he's referring to the fact that nothing "causes" negative charges to repel each other, etc. 🤔
We know that on occasion virtual particles pop into existence creating real particles. This happens randomly, no cause. So, to assume that anything anywhere that exists must have a cause is an assumption, a mere assumption.
well, no cause that we know of, yet
And they go a step further to assert the cause is a special kind of agent cause which somehow isn't random but also isn't affected by anything.
@@goldenalt3166 nobody said “isn’t affected by anything “ except you
@@scambammer6102 So what made God create the universe then?
@@goldenalt3166 lol wut? "god" is just a silly word. why are you attributing human motives to the universe?
Good
bro have you really contemplated the ramifications of the incompleteness theorem?
Gödel proved that rules within a system are limited to prove truths within the system.
the cause of the beginning of the universe isn't going to be found out by looking at evidence within the universe, or by rules that are true within the universe.
im not saying we can't learn things by looking at these topics, they just have Nothing to do with the beginnimg
its proven science that a system is limited for proving thing within the system. why is the universe any different?
I have to disagree with Dr Daniel with this one
Can you expand on why the strawberries example is not a causal explanation? Or is that covered in your book?
I understand Craig would want to say it's non-causal because he's committed to that view of abstract objects, so it's dialectically useful against him without even needing to provide an explanation.
Good question. We're pretty brief in the book; here's what we say (pp. 242-243):
"Suppose Stephen is hanging out with two friends, Cameron and Joe. Suppose Stephen has 23 cookies and wants to give each of his two friends the same whole number of cookies without any left over. To Stephen’s dismay, he finds that he can’t do this. What explains the fact that Stephen’s desire has the property being frustrated? The explanation is in terms of mathematical constraints: 23 cannot be divided by 2 to yield a whole number. Importantly, though, this is not a causal explanation. The relevant non-divisibility of 23 isn’t *causing* Stephen’s desire to be frus
trated. Nevertheless, it *explains* the frustration of Stephen’s desire. And, indeed, this is the only explanation of why the desire is frustrated. (We are not asking why Stephen exists, or why his desire exists, or whatever; we are asking why the relevant desire is frustrated given that he exists, has the relevant desire, and so on.)"
We don't elaborate on why the non-even-divisibility of 23 is a non-causal explanation because it just seems obvious to us; it just seems obvious to us that an abstract property of the number 23 isn't here causally producing anything. But as you rightly point out, our point can simply be put in dialectically useful terms against Craig :)
Wouldn't the cause of Stephen's frustration be his effort put into doing something impossible?
Also, if I try to do something physically impossible, my intention causes frustration when I can't do it. Similarly, if I try to think something that is impossible, my intention causes me frustration when I can't do it. When I hit a wall, mentally speaking, can't the mental struggle with that logic be the cause of my suffering?
Can you give an example of something where there is no causal agent involved at all?
@@collin501 they did, the cookies. the point isn't the frustration. the point is that the impossibility is not the result of any cause.
@@collin501 Note that the explanandum -- the fact being explained -- is not Stephen's frustration. I agree that Stephen's frustration has a causal explanation. Rather, the explanandum is the *frustration of Stephen's desire* , i.e., the fact that Stephen's desire is not satisfied, i.e.., the fact that the content of Stephen's desire doesn't obtain. This is very different from Stephen's feeling of frustration :)
Also, you ask for examples involving no causal agents; here's a helpful document I put together for a future video on common mistakes people make. In this video, I discuss lots of examples of non-causal explanations, and I also give a bunch of references to philosophical literature that explores many such cases in depth! Link: docs.google.com/document/d/1yzFHzPldHXgVsoWZL9Wpu-Vb8LOc7V4TOhiBL5WvpUs/edit?usp=sharing
@MajestyofReason I read through and I get the distinction between explanation and cause. But what I don't get is how an explanation of a certain physical or mental or social reality exists without a cause. You can set up different view points or reference points to provide explanations describing various relations, and that is not causal. But those things don't exist without real world instances to explain, which rely on effects and causes.
If Stephen's desire has a certain property, that may not be causal. But desires are a cause and effect sort of thing. A desire is a goal that you want to bring about or you want someone else to bring about. To bring something about is a cause and effect thing, at least as far as I can tell.
So it seems to me that the non causal explanations are just describing certain relationships among elements in cause and effect scenarios. Even the strawberries might have mathematical relationships, which is not causal, but were produced by farmers and natural processes. We can talk about numbers as potentials, but that's not good enough to generate actual reality even though explanations are very helpful for application. Explanations don't bring about reality, right? If I do the math to design a plane, the math didn't cause the plane to be built. But it did guide the path I chose to build a plane that will work.
Do you think any of the examples in the link you shared bring reality into being as opposed to just explaining it?
Daniel Linford & WLC discussion on the Kalam?👀
please, if you can accept a suggestion, use an image stabilization filter when you have guests with their camera. Daniel webcam is making me sea-sick... It made it harder to appreciate your arguments.
There is always the likely possibility that `things` in some form or another have always existed. Adding a god concept to the mix is just muddying the waters. Moving the goal post through special pleading really.
Plus their god came into physical existence by his own power, so things can bring about their own physical existence. Thus the universe causing itself is not ruled out.
@anti-colonialsunni8860 You answered your own objection. Unless you think Jesus isn't God.
@anti-colonialsunni8860 That clearly doesn't stop you from having opinions about God.
@anti-colonialsunni8860 Well, if the Kalam disproves the Christian God, then it should be discarded by Christians.
In regards to things popping into existence out of nowhere, I also find there to be an unjustified leap from the possibility of a thing to the pervasiveness of a thing. In other words, what justifies the assumption that because it’s possible for the universe to exist uncaused, that uncaused existence must necessarily happen with great frequency or regularity? I imagine Kalam proponents wouldn’t apply that same assumption to their uncaused cause ;)
If P is a sufficient condition for the existence of X, and P is the case, then X should be the case (where P is an actual state of affairs that does not include X).
I'm not sure this is the right way to capture the intuition behind the second argument for the first premise, but if it is, then it doesn't apply to uncaused things (such things would be eternal, and therefore there is no actual state of affairs that does not include them).
Note that by "actual state of affairs" I mean a certain moment of the actual world.
It seems to me that this talk is about descriptive explanations vs causal explanations. Science does often simply describe what the current state of something is, or change of state over time. But science also tries to describe causes. Describing gasses in terms of changing states in relation to each other is not causal. But describing why the states were changing is causal. A lot of times we have the description before we have the cause. We have a description of gravity, but we don't know the cause yet. But I don't see how this does away with causation, even in the beginning of the universe. If the universe got into a particular state in the beginning, you could provide a descriptive explanation. But why did it get into that state? Why did states start changing? There we get into causes, not just descriptions. In the end it gets to that question of why is there something rather than nothing. We can give a descriptive answer and say that's it, a brute fact. I've never been satisfied with that. I want to know why, and that gets to causation.
Existence is a brute fact and it does not require an explanation for the configuration it is in. Your request for one wouldnt entail that there must be one. For all we know, it is the only metaphysically possible way it could have been.
@CMVMic do you know that for a fact, though?
@@collin501
P1. Existence is the set of what exists.
P2. If Explanations exist, then they are part of the set of what exists
P3. If Explanations are part of the set of what exists, then they cannot explain the set
C1. Existence, i.e. the set of what exists, cannot be explained
Also, I stated an epistemic possibility that the world couldn't be any other way metaphysically. The Burden will be on someone else to show that it could since logical possibilities do not entail metaphysical ones.
@CMVMic how does p3 follow from p2? And are you saying the configuration of the universe is eternal(uncaused), therefore needs no explanation? I think that certainly has a burden to provide justification for view.
@@collin501 Defense of P3. Explanations cannot explain the set of explanations, if the set necessarily includes all explanations. It encounters a version of Russell's paradox.
"are you saying the configuration of the universe is eternal(uncaused), therefore needs no explanation"
No. I am saying it is epistemically possible that the world couldn't be any other way metaphysically.
Why should one think that the configuration of the Universe requires an explanation? Please justify why should one accept such an assumption.
The strawberry analogy doesn’t hold.
It was simply an example of a non-causal explanation, not an analogy.
@@MajestyofReason I don’t see how that is an example of a non-causal explanation though. You need an agent who has the desire to divide the strawberries in the first place and technically you can divide them evenly by splitting one. I get that mathematically you can’t do it evenly with whole numbers but who says you must? But what exactly is it an explanation of?
@@rickbaker261 Yes, you need an agent with the desire in the first place. But that doesn't negate the fact that, *given* such an agent with such a desire, the explanation for why the desire is frustrated is non-causal. Explanations almost always take various facts as background. For instance, we explain why I drank water by appealing to my thirst. This is a perfectly kosher explanation, but obviously is assumes various background facts like the existence of water.
Whether you can divide the strawberries by splitting them is irrelevant. I explicitly state that the desire's content is to evenly distribute all of my *whole* strawberries. It is irrelevant to an explanation of why *this* desire is frustrated that strawberries can be split.
All of this is covered in our book, too. From pp. 242-243:
"Suppose Stephen is hanging out with two friends, Cameron and Joe. Suppose Stephen has 23 cookies and wants to give each of his two friends the same whole number of cookies without any left over. To Stephen’s dismay, he finds that he can’t do this. What explains the fact that Stephen’s desire has the property being frustrated? The explanation is in terms of mathematical constraints: 23 cannot be divided by 2 to yield a whole number. Importantly, though, this is not a causal explanation. The relevant non-divisibility of 23 isn’t causing Stephen’s desire to be frus
trated. Nevertheless, it explains the frustration of Stephen’s desire. And, indeed, this is the only explanation of why the desire is frustrated. (We are not asking why Stephen exists, or why his desire exists, or whatever; we are asking why the relevant desire is frustrated given that he exists, has the relevant desire, and so on.) The prin
ciple Kerr adduces, then, is false. For we can ask and answer the question of why Stephen’s desire possesses a property, and yet we can only non-causally explain the possession of that property. This is also a point more generally recognized in the literature on explanation (e.g., Lange (2018, p. 1345), Swenson (2016, p. 661), and Climenhaga and Rubio (Forthcoming)). Climenhaga and Rubio give an example of someone unwittingly losing a bet that they could pick eight people at random, none of whom were born on the same day of the week. Here, “losing the bet is non-causally explained by the mathematical fact that you can’t match up eight birthdays with seven days without at least two birthdays falling on the same day (the pigeon
hole principle)” (Climenhaga and Rubio Forthcoming). And there are many more examples besides (e.g., explaining the success of mature scientific theories by their truth)."
I appreciate the response. Good stuff. I still protest a mite:
There are causal reasons I can assume for the frustration of the desire, however. For instance, we take for granted that the cookies exist, but from where did they come? This thought experiment seems to take for granted that the cookies just appeared rather than having been baked (by the guy for instance). He baked 23 intentionally without thinking of sharing first. Or he baked 24 with the intention of splitting them but then got hungry and ate one. There are actually causal explanations.
Stating that there needn't be causal explanations is well and good, but when there are causal explanations in place which are reasonable, bringing up the possibility of non-causal explanations doesn't actually argue against the existence of reasonable causal explanations. @@MajestyofReason
My own sense is that the Kalam argument has much worse problems than its first premise. I suppose it MIGHT be false, although I don't find this video particuarly convincing, but who cares, since the rest of the argument is no good anyhow. Also, I think it's kind of funny to be appealing to McTaggart, who wrote a book defending personal immortality.
BTW, when I said the first premise "might be false"--I mean it's epistemically possible for me. I'm not intending to assert anything about metaphysical or causal possibility with that comment.
Fwiw, I agree with you that the causal principle is the least objectionable part of the Kalam; in my view, the Kalam’s major problems lie elsewhere. I just think proponents of the Kalam are often far too quick with the causal principle, and the central arguments for it seem to have some notable difficulties (as do the central arguments against it, in my view). Personally, I think all beginnings have *explanations* , but I haven’t seen sufficient reason to think that they must have specifically *causal* explanations.
@@MajestyofReason then you might just look at yourself: as an intelligent designer that can cause things to exist !
Or is you being intelligent??? not good evidence?
Not good enough to think that A something ( Universal) came from Nothing by 1. Nonintelligence ( less rational thinking not more, or 2. An intelligent mind that CAN design a Universe!
Just like U can design things or have intelligent thoughts to invent new things that don't exist.
But I do like all the hoops your jumping through to come up with something that isn't God as the First cause: its funny to watch people try and do that : using their intelligence to try and prove nonintelligence created the Universe that they evolved from into intelligent beings is just hilarious !
@@MajestyofReason So, you're comfortable with a Leibnizian requirement that the universe as a whole must have an explanation? Not sure I'd want to be saddled with that myself.
McTaggart defended immortality, but he was also an atheist who offered an interesting and seldom appreciated argument against the causal principle. He had some goofy views, but -- like some other philosophers with goofy views (e.g., Leibniz) -- he was utterly fascinating.
What does "begin to exist" even mean?
True. The concept of "begin" depends on time. But time is an aspect of the universe itself.
@@gabri41200 time was invented by people. In the infinite Cosmos, the subjective concept of human time is meaningless.
The "big bang" that we discuss is only a single expansion point from a singularity in our tiny speck of our observable universe in the infinite Cosmos.
We don't know that the cosmos are infinite. As you said we only know that our observable universe originated in the big bang, but we don't know how much bigger the entire universe or cosmos are or how long they've been around/ what (if anything) was before.
@Enaccul yes we do. Imagine you could fly @ an infinite speed, trillions of times faster than light. What would the end of the Cosmos be? A glass or brick wall? Nonsense. Most Cosmologists agree, it is infinite. It is infinite because it has to be. The Cosmos is everything.
Why is bro always supporting the gunners?
I didn’t see any explanation as to why the universe exists except for some cope. Nor any contradiction in positing transcendent “cause”. Ghazali the chad still got people crying 1000 years after his death.
We weren't trying to explain why the universe exists. Nor were we trying to find any contradiction in positing a transcendent cause. We were assessing the claim that whatever begins to exist has a cause, and offering undercutting defeaters for that claim (i.e., considerations which remove the justification for thinking it's true).
There could be a "noncausal explanation" yet to be discovered, just like there could be an explanation for God being the cause of the universe but is yet to be discovered by human beings tiny brains.
no, because tiny human brains invented all of the gods and all of their attributes. God isn't hiding behind a planet somewhere. It is a human invention.
I don't know how it's possible to discover "noncausal explanations". Do you have an example of such a discovery?
@@scambammer6102 Argument: Things that are invented by human brains don't exist. God is an invention of human brains. Therefore, God doesn't exist. That's your argument in a nutshell. It seems as though you're kinda begging the question with that one. Also, why does God have to be hiding behind a planet to be effectively hiding? If He is hidden, then maybe he's doing a great job of hiding from that segment of His creation who wants him to appear hidden.
@@goldenalt3166 Did you watch the video? Starting at about 5:25 into the video stream, watch what is said. Clearly, the content maker of the video implicitly implied that non-causal explanations are "discoverable" by human reasoning, alone. A priori "discovery" via the faculties of cognition can provide one with the justification to infer that such "non-causal" explanations are possible. This is what seems to be the claim in the video. What did you think I meant by the word "discover"?
@@scambammer6102 Did you look behind the planet to see if God was hiding?
Linford, Linford… name sounds familiar. Actor? Athlete? Damn, recognize the name somewhere… 😂
Linford Christie is a famous athlete. He competed in the Olympics and has no relation to me. No clue how he ended up with my surname as his first name!
@@daniellinford9643 causation
@@scambammer6102yes
Have you ever considered responding to muhhamed hijab and hamza tortsiz?
Responding? What did they say about him?
@@Hi-cu2vx have you heard muhhamed hijab formulate a philosophical argument, the guy has hundreds of thousands of sub's and seems to get away with pedling essentially nonsense
@@Hi-cu2vx and then when I and many others try to correct him on his page he deletes comments of people who disagree
@@snowforest1998 he’s an Islamic channel not a philosophy channel. I do agree with you though. The problem is religion has to presuppose god so it’s not really a matter of philosophically objecting to arguments, but more of the specific doctrine within the initial claim that god is real. That’s kind of what religion is in and of itself anyway
@@snowforest1998 ?
Hahaha. Non-causal explanation like a metaphysical principle why the initial state of reality (prior to which nothing not even metaphysical principles existed) begins to exist! Stephen Linford and majesty of reason are very proficient gibernators!
I don’t think you understand the view at hand. The non-causal explanation obviously wouldn’t be in terms of something *temporally* prior to the initial state of temporal reality; instead a non-causal explanation might come by way of non-spatiotemporal abstract objects (Eg, laws, or metaphysical principles construed as abstract objects, or etc.), or (in Linford’s case) the coherence of the initial state with the rest of reality. Neither of these requires there to be something temporally prior to a temporally initial state of reality. They only require something to be *explanatorily* prior to it, and there’s nothing incoherent in that. (In fact, that’s exactly what proponents of the Kalam say about God.)
@@MajestyofReason I don't understand how something can be metaphysically prior to it beginning to exist. It beginning to exist is the first time it has properties and any metaphysical laws it would obey would depend on it having properties in the first place. But metaphysical grounding or explanatory grounding is irreflexive. If X grounds Y metaphysically, Y doesn't ground X. Or if X explains Y, then Y doesn't explain X. AS Loke points out, this would violate the irreflexivity of metaphysical grounding. Also how does an abstract object (non-causal) ensure that it only begins to exist uncaused? It can't as abstract objects are causally inert. But suppose you want to say the explanation is not metaphysically prior, it is only explanatorily prior. Loke responded to this. First how can you have explanatory priority without metaphysical priority. Second, responding to your tu quoque objection, if fires require oxygen, then we can conceive of how no fires would form beginninglessly, if there's a lack of oxygen. But if fires have no cause and they begin to exist at some point, then we can't conceive of how the lack of oxygen would prevent a fire from burning.
What Linford says about causation at the end is quite astonishing: The most widely accepted account of causation BY FAR is the counterfactual account and according to THAT account it's just nonsense to say that a) causal explanations don't appear in fundamental physics and b) causation depends on the laws of nature. Though he *does* mention that the latter only applies for *some* accounts of causation, he at the same time fails to mention the important detail that according to the most popular account by far both of his objections don't even get off the ground. If Craig did something similar, then both of you would probably be outraged.
Where are you getting the idea that it’s “BY FAR” the most widely accepted account of causation? PhilPapers survey indicates only 37% lean towards/acceptance among philosophers, and the number drops to 32% for metaphysicians. Most philosophers reject the counterfactual account, in other words. We wouldn’t be outraged at Craig if he made a point where he assumes, as background, the rejection of a view which the significant majority of philosophers reject and when he explicitly notes that his point only holds for some views.
Plus, Linford’s point (a) needn’t be interpreted in a way that denies counterfactual accounts of causation. Specifically, it can be interpreted as the altogether true observation that physicists working in fundamental physics don’t explain phenomena by saying things like ‘x causes y’. This is true even if the metaphysician would want to say that the physicist is still citing facts that make a difference to the explanandum and hence, when metaphysically correctly interpreted, are ultimately causal. As an analogy, suppose theistic idealism is true. Still, it’s clearly true, in at least one important sense, that divine mental explanations don’t appear in fundamental physics! This claim is true under at least one plausible interpretation: namely, that physicists working in fundamental physics don’t explain phenomena by saying ‘God’s mind does such-and-such’. This is true even if the metaphysician would want to say that the physicist is still citing facts that are divine-mental facts and hence, when metaphysically correctly interpreted, are ultimately divine mental in character.
Have you read the literature on causal republicanism? If you haven't, you may want to, since you'll find that it helps to illuminate my comments; causal republicans often *are* friends of the counterfactual account of causation and *do* endorse either the reductive or projective options (or both) that I described. Of course, they don't think that whenever there is a counterfactual, there is a causal relation; instead they think that causal relations correspond with a specific kind of counterfactual relation, e.g., perhaps a specific kind of time asymmetric counterfactual relation. That's precisely the sort of view defended by several authors in the anthology Causation, Physics, and the Constitution of Reality. Related views have recently been defended by Carlo Rovelli and Jenann Ismael.
For the view that the laws of physics are prior, in the order of explanation, to causation -- but which is distinct from the reductive or projective options -- see the causal process view developed by Phil Dowe and others.
@@MajestyofReason25% endorsed neither of the views, so to say that "the significant majority" reject the counterfactual account is just wrong. Being undecided on a topic is not necessarily a rejection of any view on that topic and you obviously know that.
Given that the counterfactual account has 37% endorsement and the second most popular account has 22% it was completely accurate for me to say that it's by far the most popular account, I never claimed that it has a clear absolute majority. "View X on topic Y is by far the most popular" means "No other view on Y comes even close in popularity to X", *not* "It is not even close that an absolute majority endorse X". Clearly what I said was true then.
@@dominiks5068 (1) I’m going to ask for clarity on what you mean by “25% endorsed neither of the views”. If you mean 25% of participants remained agnostic/undecided on the question as a whole -- and refrained from endorsing any particular view -- that’s only 12% among philosophers generally. But you may mean something different, which is why I ask for clarification! (Note that even among those 12%, a non-negligible number will think ‘I’m agnostic on which precise view is true, even though I think counterfactual accounts specifically are false.” For instance, as one of the participants in the survey, this is how I answered.)
(2) You say: “Given that the counterfactual account has 37% endorsement and the second most popular account has 22% it was completely accurate for me to say that it's by far the most popular account, I never claimed that it has a clear absolute majority. "View X on topic Y is by far the most popular" means "No other view on Y comes even close in popularity to X", not "It is not even close that an absolute majority endorse X". Clearly what I said was true then.”
Perhaps that’s what you *meant* to say, but that’s not how many competent users of the English language (like myself) will naturally interpret it. What you said is clearly true under your newfound disambiguation, but it was not clearly true on a natural reading of what you said, and I went with that reading. To disambiguate, you may have said instead that “in a pairwise comparison of specific accounts, counterfactual accounts are the most popular - i.e., for each competing account, a counterfactual account outcompetes it”. But I can happily grant that I should have asked for clarification first to decipher between your intended interpretation and the reading that most naturally came to me! But now that we have your disambiguation, we don’t need to worry about linguistic disputes! Given your clarification on what you meant, we both agree that what you meant is definitely true :)
(3) You haven’t yet discussed my or Dan’s more substantive points [but perhaps that’s forthcoming] - namely, that (i) if Craig made a point assuming the falsity of a view which only around 32% of relevant experts (metaphysicians as opposed to, e.g., metaethicists) accept and 37% of philosophers more generally accept, *and* if Craig explicitly notes that his point doesn’t hold for all views, then we most certainly wouldn’t be ‘outraged’ -- and hence the double standard you allege is non-existent -- and (ii) (a) needn’t be interpreted as denying counterfactual accounts, contrary to what you claimed.
@@MajestyofReason 1) I am saying that out all of the people who answered the question, every fourth person didn't commit themselves to any view. Therefore it is wrong to say that the significant majority reject the counterfactual theory, because if we exclude all those who have not committed themselves, then non-counterfactual views only have a pretty tiny - and certainly not a significant - majority. There might be SOME people who answered like you did, but that alone is not enough to support the "the significant majority reject the counterfactual theory" claim.
2) I didn't just "mean" so say so lmao... I think the way I defined the term is how almost every native speaker would interpret it. Let's say that I make a poll with 100 options. And let's say that option A has 49 votes, the second most popular option has 6 votes and the rest of the votes are divided among the other 98 options. Then I am very confident that the vast majority of native speakers would affirm "By far the most people picked option A", despite A not having an absolute majority of the votes. I am quite shocked that this is even controversial. But if that is so, then of course my claim was completely right given ordinary English.
3) That might be forthcoming, yes. First it would be nice to settle points 1) and 2), because you made some pretty strong counter-claims to my claims about the popularity of the counterfactual theory which I don't think you can sufficiently back up.
19:10 Scientific evidence & everyday experience can say nothing about things beginning to exist. This is because we have never observed something beginning to exist, in the sense the theist means. We've only observed existing matter & energy rearranging. And we've certainly never observed a nothing, so we can't say anything about that either.
I feel like you are reacting to a video that isn't meant to be on a level of proffessional philosophy so it kinda looks weird.
First, a video that's aimed towards a popular audience shouldn't contain falsehoods and misrepresentations. It's entirely appropriate to point those out, even if the level of the video is only for a popular audience. In fact, such falsehoods or misrepresentations are perhaps *more pernicious* because lay people won't notice them. There's nothing 'weird' in pointing all this out.
Second, and more importantly, the video to which we're 'responding' is really just a jumping-off point to discuss Dan's published work and Craig's published work. This is evident if you listen to the two videos we produced. So we're really responding only secondarily to the video and primarily to Craig's published work.
@@MajestyofReason Hm, you know what. I guess you are right. I apologise for my misrepresentation of the video.
@@arandomguyontheinternet756 no worries at all my dude!
@@MajestyofReason the kalam has been debunked 8 ways to sundown, but that's no reason you can't take a shot at it
All things that begin to exist have a cause. But what about 23 not being an even number, which is something that did not begin to exist, huh! Checkmate.
The arrogance and ignorance is quite a combination.
I think you may be confused. That was an example of a non-causal explanation, not an example of something that doesn’t begin to exist, nor an example of something beginning without a cause.
Nobody representing the Majesty of "Reason" channel has made a single original objection to the Kalam which Dr. William Lane Craig and others have not already refuted. Funny thing is, Schmidt knows this and doesn't actually expect his content to carry any intellectual or academic weight. Rather, he is simply posting these videos in attempts to use Craig's fame and notoriety to garner attention and thus increase his viewership and subscriber count in order to grow his channel. That is the real reason these SERIES of videos are being posted.
Hes trying to educate people on potential counter arguments. If these arguments are sucsessful or not depends on the rest of ones system. The mind which wants to affirm one worldview looks for confirmation, but the opposite is more valuable for the philosopher.
So heres a counter which might be helpfull for you, if you care about that sort of thing, and don't want to just confirm your ready-made ideology.
Lets say all you said is true, it still doesn't do much when it comes to other worldviews, diffrent worldviews have equally good arguments for their position.
Considering that ideologies are about internal consistancy, there might exist diffrent approaches which are all equally internaly consistant.
Wether or not some of them are 'true' depends on the theory of truth you hold to, if its about corrispondens to reality, then you might have more luck with focusing on science when it comes to finding out how reality works in the first place, and that might destory the rest of the system one is trying to build which both seeks to accept empiricism in some domains, while not in others, and where you put the devining line, or how you try to unify them.
If you care more about intelectual 'virutes' and want simplicity, theism might lose to monism depending on how you define your god.
I can't speak for 'the truth', but i can say that internal consistancy is important, and learning about arguments is a good way to systematize your 'theory'. Ironically enough thats what Craig did when he found the kalam in the litterature.
I personally find more value in people giving me tools (arguments), rather then selling me some ideology, i choose to use the tools to find out for myself.
Please, tell me where Craig has addressed Linford's objection from causal republicanism to the causal principle. I'll wait :)
@@MajestyofReason "cAuSaL RePuBLiCaNiSm" haha nice try but you cannot fool people into thinking an argument is original by giving it some high faultin' silly name. Well maybe you can fool your cult subscribers but not anyone with even half a brain.
@@DeadEndFrog I don't actually think he is trying but if he was trying then he failed miserably.
@@elgatofelix8917 In what way? You didnt Learn anything, you think he gave bad arguments? Or you think he presented them in a bad way?
Space-time has mass, energy, and gravity. It is NOT "immaterial"!
That depends on how you define "material"!
@@daniellinford9643
Mass, energy, and gravity are material.
@@richardstevenwalz4968 In one sense of the term 'material', that's true. And if that's what you mean by 'material', then I agree that spacetime is material.
But that's not the sense that's been most widely used historically. Certainly, it's not the sense meant by, e.g., eighteenth century materialists. So, again, it comes down to how we want to use the word 'material'.
@@daniellinford9643
It *IS* material, the universe is made of it! The big bang came from it. ALL the mass-energy was already here at the great expansion! The big bang was only the expansion of space-time. QM proves this, no way around it! The universe never began, it only changed form!
Theists! From what God created Universe?
He popped things into existence out of nothing because apparently God can do anything and is not bound by laws of science 🤷♀️
Yup - God just has the ability/power to make thing(s) appear from nothing.
It's what they call: an argument from assertion (because it's just asserted God "has" this power).