Pantheism vs. The Kalam Cosmological Argument
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- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 11 พ.ค. 2022
- Pantheism vs. The Kalam - who would win the world philosophy championship?
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For some reason, my editing software increased my voice’s pitch by, like, an octave lol. Thankfully, that ends at 0:52! (Actually, I don’t know if it ends. I think we’re just gonna have to deal with it for this video. Thankfully I just got a new editing software!)
why do things not just pop into existence? maybe they can, but how does the universe "know" about them? beethoven and bicycles are human constructs - the universe has no idea about these things, of course they won't just pop into existence - humans had to MAKE these things in the first place - maybe they ARE popping into existence, as their base materials - virtual particles, dark matter......
Hilbert's hotel is actually always empty, one review says:
"One star, I had just settled into bed when my neighbour knocked on my door with her bags and said I had to move across by one room. That was frustrating enough, but when reception called and asked me to move from room 396,027 to 792,054, I just left and found a finite hotel."
@@HoneybunMegapack Thats a really good point, if you consider the people who are moving to their new room as "occupants" of that new room, then the hotel is over capacity (ie, 2 guests in a single room). If you consider them "non occupants", then you have displaced as many as you have received, neutralising the effect.
Also, fun fact, the chance of being in a room number less than 10^1000 (or pick your arbitrarily large number) is infinitely small, since there are infinitely many larger numbers.
Great having you on the show. Definitely one of our favorite episodes.
I have been leaning towards both panentheism and idealism for quite a while now, so really would love to hear more experts reflect on these ideas!
Definitely going to take some notes on this one!
I'm gonna need a bigger brain.
Hey Joe, have you or will you engage with Hegel at some point? Would be very interested to see videos regarding his phil. of religion and absolute idealism:))
Divinity ascribed to the Universe can simply be the attitude towards existence for eg. reverence. In reference to panentheism, the reverse can be equally applied. The Universe is the arena and a cosmic mind arises from its arrangement so in that sense, God is Intrinsic to the Universe but the Universe transcends it.
I think at some point you should get into the different structures of reality and types of metaphysical explanation. Not sure if you discussed these already.
Timelessness could refer eternity. Eternity in the sense that existence itself cannot change, if by change we define it as the gain/loss of a property.
I have a question you said in your last Kalam episode with Stephen that episode 5 will be on Loke's argument
Will you send the script of your Kalam Episode where you and Stephen will discuss Andrew Loke's argument for casual principle to Andrew Loke for His review/thoughts ? because If not i think Andrew Loke will write COMPLETE refutation of that episode in the comments section lol
?
41:00 Re: the artefact analogy - & 44:55, that it does have good explanatory power, & especially 50:50: adding mind of God makes it harder to defend - e.g how do we get to 'good intention'. Not if (i) my present physical cosmic environment is recognised phenomenologically as a deterministic unity, with an internal hierarchy of functions and the holistic function of enabling my mind to act (for good or bad) and (ii) my mind, which creates (good or bad) functionality to unified artefact - e.g. the glowing globe in the forest, but also a tree stump become 'chiar' - transcends the physical.
Ooh I’ve got my philosophy A Level exam next week, but this is far more interesting 😜
Good luck bro
@@eternalbyzantium262 Cheers man
I wish that TH-cam commentators would at least give credit where credit is due. Dozens of people, including the famous apologist William Lane Craig, have cited the translucent orb scenario without crediting Richard Taylor who uses it in the opening paragraph of his chapter on the cosmological argument in his book Metaphysics. The book is now largely forgotten, but the chapter itself is still included in some introduction to philosophy anthologies. Perhaps it is no big deal, but it would at least be a way of honoring the philosopher whose book Metaphysics first inspired many of us, way back in the day, down the path of philosophy.
As a South Africa, it's so strange seeing Joe with Mark Oppenheimer. A clash of worlds if you will!
How does pantheism score in explaining the problem of evil?
I don’t think Pantheism entails goodness, so probably fine. Assuming that it does, there is an argument to be made for universe-level soul building
@@whatsinaname691 Please explain. You can get to indifferent w/o postulating God. If it doesn't explain evil, it may be useless.
@@tammygibson1556 Pantheism isn’t a personal God. There’s nothing in pantheism that implies that nature gives a crap what happens to you. For that reason, omnibenevolent with omnipresent in discussion. Pantheism is consistent with the hypothesis of indifference
@@whatsinaname691 Is it nature or a God? Now I'm confused. Why postulate a God when no-God does the explaining?
@@tammygibson1556 Saying everything is God makes it ontologically simple I guess. I’ve never found the position that persuasive
Good luck Joe for next week
When you will Response to Trent horn face to face just right after his debate with Alex O Connor Lol
Somebody should record that moment
Joe looks like Elijah Fox lol
The flaw in the thought experiment ... the orb in the forest is there i.e. it's not (unlike gods and goddesses) imaginary i.e. (again) even though its origin is not immediately apparent, it's in the natural world therefore the proposed 'atheist response' is not the correct one.
That's not the flaw. The universe also exists and is immediately apparent.
The flaw in my opinion is that we "need" to explain everything. The proposed "atheist" response that it has no explanation is not what I'd say.
“Here’s an argument.” And here’s an argument against that. And here and argument against that. And here’s an argument against that…”
I love how thoroughly Joe has studied both sides of the argument and is really looking for truth, not to confirm a worldview (atheistic or theistic)
❤️
Coming here from the other channel. For pantheism, if we take the contingency and Kalam arguments together, God cannot be the universe.
A contingent existence is in abstraction possible to be rearranged, could cease to exist without logical absurdities, its constituents are dependent on something other than themselves for their existence, and its/their sustainable existence.
Universe is made of parts, it depends on space, time, energy, dark matter etc .. it's flawed, yet fine-tuned for life, including our life, so by induction needs a tuner. Universe is complex which is another way of saying that complexity needs explanation rather than no explanation. ( as a step ahead, no, God is not complex as in a mixture of many parts, he's one part, his essence, and he does not need an explanation because it's the stopping point of the principle of sufficient reason, as the contingency argument goes to prove via stage 1 and stage 2.).
I disagree. You wrote:
"Universe is made of parts, it depends on space, time, energy, dark matter etc .."
You state here that that the Universe is made of parts. On some views, such as the priority monism defended by Jonathan Schaeffer and possibly the wavefunction monism defended by Sean Carroll, the entirety of the Universe is more fundamental than any of its parts. On their views, instead of understanding the Universe as decomposible and therefore explainable in terms of parts, the whole Universe turns out to be the fundamental entity. And on a view like that, one might argue that there is a sense in which the Universe is not "made of parts".
Second, you stated that he Universe depends on space, time, energy, dark matter, etc. That's a strange way to talk about what the Universe depends on. I would have said that the Universe *contains* space, time, energy, dark matter, etc, and not that the Universe depends on those things for the Universe's existence.
"it's flawed, yet fine-tuned for life, including our life, so by induction needs a tuner."
Whether or not the Universe is fine-tuned for life depends on how we understand the notion of fine-tuning. While many philosophers of religion and religious apologists have understood fine-tuning as a feature of the Universe, most physicists think of fine-tuning as a feature of physical theories. A physical theory is said to be fine-tuned just in case, on the probability distribution induced by that theory, some set of observations that we have are improbable. The two notions of fine-tuning are related in that if we take the existence of life as a datum, then any physical theory that poorly predicts the existence of life will be fine-tuned with respect to the existence of life. If we then imagine that the theory is a true description of physical reality, we might imagine that some extraneous factor -- i.e., a fine-tuner -- would have to adjust the Universe in order to ensure life's existence.
For example, on the hypothesis that the cosmological constant is the vacuum energy, the predicted value of the cosmological constant is wildly different from the observed value. But galaxy formation wouldn't have been possible unless the cosmological constant had a value very close to the observed value. Thus, we might imagine that there must be some additional something-or-other that adjusts the value of the cosmological constant in order to ensure that galaxies form and are subsequently stable, for otherwise life wouldn't exist.
However, I think there is a better way to think about fine-tuning. Insofar as our physical theories poorly predict life, our physical theories are probably incorrect. We need better theories that make better predictions. The fact that the hypothesis that the cosmological constant is the vacuum energy predicts a wildly incorrect value for the cosmological constant should be thought of as showing that the cosmological constant is probably not the vacuum energy. But if that is the right interpretation, no fine-tuner is neeeded.
"Universe is complex which is another way of saying that complexity needs explanation rather than no explanation."
Why do complex things require explanation? Why think that simple entities, like God, do not require explanation?
"as a step ahead, no, God is not complex as in a mixture of many parts, he's one part, his essence, and he does not need an explanation because it's the stopping point of the principle of sufficient reason, as the contingency argument goes to prove via stage 1 and stage 2."
We need to carefully distinguish two senses of 'simple' and two senses of 'complex'.
When God is said to be simple, what's being claimed is that God is metaphysically simple, that is, God cannot be understood in terms of parts or in terms of numerically distinct properties. Craig and several other defenders of the Kalam argument actually deny that God is metaphysically simple, so it's difficult to see what relevance this sort of simplicity has for the present discussion.
There is another kind of simplicity that we can discuss. Sometimes, a hypothesis is said to be simple. For example, the claim is sometimes made that simpler hypotheses are more probable than complex hypotheses. We can call this sort of simplicity "epistemic simplicity". The hypothesis that God is metaphysically simple is not epistemically simple. Consider, for example, that metaphysical simplicity states that God is numerically identical to all of God's properties. We can list out those properties, i.e., P1, P2, P3, ... To say that God is numerically identical to all of God's properties is then the statement the following statement: "God = P1 and God = P2 and God = P3 and ..." Stated that way, the hypothesis that God is metaphysically simple turns out not to be epistemically simple. In other words, the hypothesis that God is metaphysically simple is a complex hypothesis.
@CJ Baierl You know of a greater universe?
If God is simple and created a universe, then complexity doesn't need an explanation, it's the logical product of simplicity.
@@libere1001
Ok. first : your answer to the question (why is there something rather than nothing?) will first set your idea about the world. Please write that down, then continue with my response if you feel that your time is worthy of philosophical discussion in a respectful manner. :) I will declare all my arguments while also answering your points.
I have prepared this response to summarize 62 pages from a book called Burhan in just one or two pages, only concerning your response, and of course can be expanded to deal with other objections/notions etc ..
I can say "yes, my argument is actually an argument from dependence such that *There cannot be a world with only dependent things without reference to an independent thing, as dependent things cannot continue existing on their own. Existence is only explicable with reference to an independent existence, as impossible existences do not exist by logical necessity. Furthermore, dependent existences cannot self-generate or self-maintain*
I distinguish between the terms ‘causality’ and ‘dependence,’ as an object can be caused by something but not be dependent on it to exist (i.e. a child in relation to his parents, a house after being caused to exist can still exist).
However, the latter term entails that an object relies upon something for its beginning and continued existence.
Proof 1:
1- everything made up of pieces is dependent . ( a set made up of elements depend on those elements. even a triangle, that is a shape that can't be smelled, touched, etc, that doesn't exist physically/cosmologically in the real world, still depends on the existence of what ? triangularity, i.e. depends on the three sides to exist even in the mind, let alone Platonism or in physical reality.)
2- the universe and even multiverse is made of pieces.
3- therefore the universe/multiverse is dependent.
*This proof above is an ontological and mathematical argument, not basing itself on cosmos or inductive reasoning, so it does not fall to the fallacy of composition ( This is because it shows that the mereological distinctions of part/whole and dependence can be reasoned on a priori grounds.)*
At this point you may ask what is the distinction between dependence and independence on the one hand, and contingency and necessity on the other? Simply put, *necessary things do not have to be independent.* This is especially clear in the case of ‘scientific necessities’. For example, ‘Human beings cannot sprint 100 meters in one second.’ This type of necessity does not need to be true in all possible worlds.
Notwithstanding, the case for a differentiation in ‘independence’ and ‘necessity’ is made easier with so-called ‘scientific necessities’ - but what of logical ones? The argument being expressed here is that *the category of necessary facts (like 2 + 2 = 4) presupposes existence.* This is because the most foundational thing conceivable is that ‘there is no doubt that there is existence’.
The category of existence is more basic than the category of facts; facts need to exist, but existence does not rely on anything. Thus, this may be said in the following manner:
Proof 2:
Part I
1- existence is presupposed in everything that is real. ( existence is the foundational ground. )
2- necessary facts are real.
3- therefore, necessary facts presuppose existence.
Part II
1. If necessary facts presuppose existence, they depend on it.
2. Necessary facts presuppose existence.
3. Therefore, necessary facts depend on existence.
Now, When I use the term ‘independent’, I mean self-sufficient; not needing anything outside of it to explain or cause it. Nor does it have to depend on anything for its existence. As we have previously shown, not all necessary things are independent, as they rely on presupposed states of affairs in order to exist. Consequently, independence is more specific than necessity. *Something which is independent must be necessary, but not all necessary things are independent.*
If this is true, then the argument of dependence above should bring about a critical reflection which concludes with an independent entity. This is because all things in the world have pieces, and all ontological composites depend on their members. To explain anything, we therefore need an independent entity upon which all other things depend, while it itself depends on nothing. This independent being will be necessary by definition, as anything ‘independent’ is necessary. If this is true, then it cannot be conceived of in any other way. If something cannot be conceived of in any other way, it must be so in all times and places, or independent of time and place.
Proof 3:
1- anything that can be *conceivably / in abstraction* rearranged, is contingent. ( like a set of elements of ABC, it can be conceived as BAC, or CAB, etc.. so it's contingent)
2- the universe and its constituents can be conceived / in abstraction to be rearranged.
3- therefore the universe is contingent.
*The reason for mentioning ‘abstractly’ in this context is to circumvent the deterministic objection that all things are necessary because of an uninterrupted line of causal events. Ironically, atheists may deny or doubt causality when confronted with the Kalam cosmological argument, yet they affirm it when making a case for determinism. :D So, convenient, right ? :p*
*// So, your first point about Sean's monism and a universe not made of parts is a-priori false. Moreover, if you think that the whole universe is the independent necessary existence, the burden of proof is on you. How can you describe a set to be independent whereas its members can be rearranged without logical absurdity, Same with the universe that has parts within it that are logically possible to be rearranged, destroyed etc... Also, the universe is made of space and energy because if you take those away, the universe ceases to exist. So, it's not only a container that could still exist when those go away. //*
Connected to this argument is the argument of particularisation, *which establishes a will for the necessary existence, and not some force obliged to create the same dependent things* It runs as follows:
@@libere1001
Cont..
Proof 4
1. Anything that could be conceived of otherwise in abstraction was arranged by something else.
2. The universe could be conceived of otherwise in abstraction.
3. Therefore, the universe was arranged by something else.
Following Proof 1 mentioned above, the ‘something else’ responsible for arranging the contingent thing must ultimately terminate in an independent/necessary ‘something else’. The fact that an independent/necessary existence is capable of doing this would suggest the capacity to make choices. To arrange the universe/multiverse in one logical/ontological way rather than another indicates a choice; it chose that it should be one way rather than another. A question may be asked: is not the choice making capacity or ‘will’ of the independent existence itself something which can be conceived otherwise in abstraction? well, the fact that the independent existence is necessary means that all ways of describing the independent existence will also be necessary. That is to say that any attribute of the necessary existence, including ‘will’, is necessary. Therefore, if we establish that everything about the necessary existence is necessary, we also establish that nothing about the necessary existence is or can be contingent.
*// on your point about God's simplicity, our Islamic theology argues that God is simple but not in the Thomistic sense or the DDS in classical theism, but rather God is only one essence, not made of pieces, has attributes that are necessary to him, not distinct from him, not detachable. So, yeah, Craig's attempt does not address Islamic theology, and he is right in actually going against God's simplicity doctrine that Christian apologists uphold, because they say God = God's actions, attributes, etc.. and that will bring moral collapse argument. Also, what you said about God being identical to his properties, yes true of those apologists too for the DDS reason. However, that's not the case for Islam as I said. God is only identical to his existence, essence. He doesn't have detachable properties, but necessary attributes. //*
Furthermore, one can argue that a necessary being of no will doesn't have to create a universe, it could create a table or only water, why such complexity, and indeed, why not even more unfathomably complex as in multiverse portals and 3 or more spidermen coming and going as in No way home :D . Such limits of existence can only be explained by a will.
* // about fine-tuning and stability of the universe //*
*// You stated that fine-tunings are just our theories probabilistic implications. That's true, because certain constants being in a very marginal decimal range, all coming together ( so multiplication of all probabilities ) is immensely hard and I claim to be impossible to fathom as either coincidence or brute necessity.
However, I think there is a better way to think about fine-tuning. Insofar as our physical theories poorly predict life, our physical theories are probably incorrect. We need better theories that make better predictions. The fact that the hypothesis that the cosmological constant is the vacuum energy predicts a wildly incorrect value for the cosmological constant should be thought of as showing that the cosmological constant is probably not the vacuum energy. But if that is the right interpretation, no fine-tuner is neeeded. //*
I mean, you are against all physicists that have proven that some constants have been predicted and shown to be accurate within minute decimal points which fit our models. ( th-cam.com/video/BljrAME1LLw/w-d-xo.html&ab_channel=LukaszStolarczuk ) Yet, you claim that based on one constant's wrong calculation, we should neglect the rest. I disagree with you, many physicists agree with you, but the majority go along with the evidence even when some are athesits. But anyway, that will dig a deeper rabbit hole, so let's cut to the chase, the most seen feature of the universe: stability.
Let's talk about the regularity, stability, and uniformity of nature (which are presuppositions of scientific work).
On this point, John Haldane states:
Stability, regularity, and intelligibility in world and mind are underlying assumptions of even the most limited claims of scientific realism. But suppose we ask what reason we have for making these assumptions. The general answer cannot be that they are conclusions of scientific enquiry, since they are part of what makes it possible.
That water would boil at 100 degrees today, yesterday, and tomorrow is an assumption of scientists when measuring the temperature of water. It is not due to repeated investigation of water temperature for every day and in every environment.
If it were even possible that water could boil 100 degrees today, -100 tomorrow, and 1,000 the next day, scientific research would be fruitless. This, of course, also applies to quantum mechanics, which additionally requires axioms and assumptions to work.
That the universe is complicated (consisting of many pieces), stable, and mechanistic is evidence that the necessary existence (which preponderated it) has knowledge.
Having said this, an argument for uniformity could be stated in the following way:
Part I
1. The fact of the universe being uniform, regular, and stable must be either contingent or necessary.
2. If it is necessary, then a necessary existence must account for it.
3. If it is contingent, a necessary existence must also account for it.
4. The universe is uniform, regular, and stable.
5. Therefore, a necessary existence accounts for it.
Part II
Assuming that uniformity, stability, and regularity are necessary facts of the universe, one may argue reductio by stating:
1. A contingent existence cannot sufficiently account for the necessary fact of the regularity, stability, and uniformity of the universe.
2. The universe is a contingent existence.
3. Therefore, the universe cannot sufficiently account for the necessary fact of the regularity, stability, and uniformity of the universe.
*// you said : Why do complex things require explanation? Why think that simple entities, like God, do not require explanation? //*
I didn't say that simple entities don't need explanation, otherwise, I would be saying that we don't need explanation of fundamental particles. But no, I say, complexity of design need explanation. But anyway, this is an inductive argument. You can just address my dependence argument. //*
lastly, I argue for the oneness/unity of the necessary being. If there was anything to demarcate ‘necessary existence 1’ from ‘necessary existence 2,’ that property of demarcation would disqualify ‘necessary existence 2’ from being necessary, by definition. This is because it would be conceived that ‘necessary existence 2’ could be ‘another way’ and therefore ‘necessary existence 2’ would not be necessary at all in this case.
The collection of proofs and arguments I have provided above establishes the necessity, choice making capability, independence, and oneness of the necessary existence. As initially stated, a necessary existence must exist to account for the beginning and the continued existence of the world. Furthermore, a necessary existence must exist to account for any existence whatsoever, as ‘dependent existences’ could neither generate nor maintain themselves.
So at 7:45, you said that the contingency argument's stage 2, identifying a necessary being with God, is incredibly weak.
Well, a contingent being is a being that doesn't have to exist. So, it depends on something else for its existence, not that it necessarily exists in all possible worlds by its own necessity:
a quantum-field still depends on time, space and energy and is made of parts. *Contingent!*
wave-function, is like a law, an equation, nothing efficaciously causal, meaning we don't expect a law to be an agency, an event creator on its own ( gravity law doesn't do stuff on its own, it's just a law that we prescribe to a phenomenon with mathematical expressions. We can't blame gravity law for slipping a plate in the kitchen). Yet, it still needs a law maker anyways. *Contingent!*
fundamental particles depend on space and time. *Contingent!*
All in all, quantum theory is very immature now to just throw away first principles, causation principles out the window for it. Other interpretations like Bohm's theory of quantum world still sticks to first principles. *and above all, there cannot be a reality of only a set of dependent beings. There has to be an independent being, a necessary one.*
That is the stage you claimed to be extremely weak :) I don't see how you prioritized your scores for the stages, but I will stand corrected if I got it all wrong.
The contingency argument is a deductive argument that solidifies the case for God's existence, along with other inductive/abductive arguments.
Of course this is just a swift analysis. We can always have more in depth discussion. .
The case for the impossibility of infinite past is not strictly proven by Hilbert's hotel per se, it's proven by the impossibility of beginningless series of events.
How much would it take for our universe to be as it is now as you read this sentence ? if your answer is the past could be infinite, then it's infinite time. so, you see, if it takes forever/infinite time intervals to come this far of a universe, it will never reach this stage any way.
However, our afterlife as theists is starting at some point and could go forever. There is no logical contradiction here ! If our hearts start beating at time T, and continues beating forever, nothing will stop it except the deterioration of our body as a physical being. But God does not deteriorate, and of course nothing logical contradicts it.
Hilbert's hotel only concludes that there cannot be actual physical infinite stuff in our world now, as infinity is a destination not an actualized number of things, so it's potential infinite that we use for the angels praising or whatever , even for the infinity life duration in the Afterlife etc .. not an actual infinite within the physical world. So infinity is a mathematical instrument that we use in certain domains, but it does not reflect itself in actuality.
infinite perfection and omnipotence in God, however, is a qualitative feature, not numerical. God is one ( at least according to some theologies, and it can be proven that it has to be one via Contingency argument.
You just mixed stage 1 and 2
I disagee with your analysis.
"Well, a contingent being is a being that doesn't have to exist. So, it depends on something else for its existence, not that it necessarily exists in all possible worlds by its own necessity"
Is that true? Whether any contingently existing entity must depend upon some other entity for its existence is at least philosophically controversial. For example, Richard Swinburne has argued that God only contingently exists, but also that God does not depend upon anything else for God's existence. Other philosophers would argue that no entity could necessarily exist. If they are right no entity could have necessary existence, then either there is an infinite chain of dependent entities or at least one entity contingently exists yet does not depend upon any other entity for its existence.
"a quantum-field still depends on time, space and energy and is made of parts. Contingent!"
Whether or not that's true will depend upon what specific interpretation we adopt of quantum fields. Quantum fields, as they are standardly mathematically formulated, take in spatio-temporal variables as inputs. However, some authors have formulated alternative conceptions of fields. For example, Einstein's view, which he expressed in various publications, was that fields are more fundamental than space-time.
"wave-function, is like a law, an equation, nothing efficaciously causal, meaning we don't expect a law to be an agency, an event creator on its own ( gravity law doesn't do stuff on its own, it's just a law that we prescribe to a phenomenon with mathematical expressions. We can't blame gravity law for slipping a plate in the kitchen). Yet, it still needs a law maker anyways. Contingent!"
There are a variety of distinct interpretations of the wavefunction. On some views, the wavefunction should be interpreted as a law. But other philosophers of physics and physicists disagree. For example, on the view developed by Alyssa Ney, David Albert, and Barry Loewer, the wavefunction is a distribution of properties on a high dimensional space. On other views, such as Sean Carroll's, the wavefunction is a non-spatio-temporal object and all of space-time should be understood as reducible to the wavefunction.
Likewise, your interpretation of laws as mathematical equations is philosophically controversial as is your contention that laws require law givers. For example, on some accounts of laws, laws should be explained in terms of the essences or dispositions had by various entities. In that case, so long as an entity exists that has a specific essence or disposition, it follows as a matter of metaphysical necessity that the corresponding laws are satisfied. You might still demand that there exists some entity that could have caused such entities to exist, but that's different than demanding that a lawmaker exists.
"All in all, quantum theory is very immature now to just throw away first principles, causation principles out the window for it."
What "first principles" does quantum theory throw away?
"Other interpretations like Bohm's theory of quantum world still sticks to first principles."
What first principles does Bohm's theory stick to?
If, by "first principles", you mean Craig's causal principle, we need to draw a distinction between nomological determinism and causal determinism. Nomological determinism is the thesis that all events are determined by laws. Causal determinism is the thesis that all events are determined by causes. While the non-relativistic version of Bohm's theory satisfies nomological determinism, you would need an additional argument to show that Bohm's theory satisfies causal determinism. A large number of philosophers of physics and physicists, inspired by arguments originally provided by Ernst Mach and Bertrand Russell, would argue that even though the non-relativistic version of Bohm's theory is nomologically deterministic, the non-relativistic version of Bohm's theory does not involve causation and so is not a causally deterministic theory.
"and above all, there cannot be a reality of only a set of dependent beings. There has to be an independent being, a necessary one."
Why think that to be true?
All the arguments, axioms and assumptions against necessitarianism can be questioned.
"a quantum-field still depends on time, space and energy and is made of parts. Contingent!"
--- What if there are those things in all possible worlds? Then something which depends on them could also exist in all possible worlds :)
First dear philosopher, the viewer of this repeated thread ( just because replies are hidden from new comers, so .. :D ):
Your answer to the question (why is there something rather than nothing?) will first set your idea about the world. Please write that down, then continue with my thread if you feel that your time is worthy of philosophical discussion in a respectful manner. :)
I have prepared this thread to summarize 62 pages from a book called The Burhan in just one or two pages, only concerning contingency argument, and of course can be expanded to deal with other objections/notions etc ..
My argument is actually an argument from dependence such that
"There cannot be a world with only dependent things without reference to an independent thing, as dependent things cannot continue existing on their own. Existence is only explicable with reference to an independent existence, as impossible existences do not exist by logical necessity. Furthermore, dependent existences cannot self-generate or self-maintain."
I distinguish between the terms ‘causality’ and ‘dependence,’ as an object can be caused by something but not be dependent on it to exist (i.e. a child in relation to his parents, a house after being caused to exist can still exist).
However, the latter term entails that an object relies upon something for its beginning and continued existence.
Proof 1:
1- everything made up of pieces is dependent . ( a set made up of elements depend on those elements. even a triangle, that is a shape that can't be smelled, touched, etc, that doesn't exist physically/cosmologically in the real world, still depends on the existence of what ? triangularity, i.e. depends on the three sides to exist even in the mind, let alone Platonism or in physical reality.)
2- the universe and even multiverse is made of pieces.
3- therefore the universe/multiverse is dependent.
This proof above is an ontological and mathematical argument, not basing itself on cosmos or inductive reasoning, so it does not fall to the fallacy of composition ( This is because it shows that the mereological distinctions of part/whole and dependence can be reasoned on a priori grounds.)
At this point you may ask what is the distinction between dependence and independence on the one hand, and contingency and necessity on the other? Simply put, necessary things do not have to be independent. This is especially clear in the case of ‘scientific necessities’. For example, ‘Human beings cannot sprint 100 meters in one second.’ This type of necessity does not need to be true in all possible worlds.
Notwithstanding, the case for a differentiation in ‘independence’ and ‘necessity’ is made easier with so-called ‘scientific necessities’ - but what of logical ones? The argument being expressed here is that the category of necessary facts (like 2 + 2 = 4) presupposes existence. This is because the most foundational thing conceivable is that ‘there is no doubt that there is existence’.
The category of existence is more basic than the category of facts; facts need to exist, but existence does not rely on anything. Thus, this may be said in the following manner:
Proof 2:
Part I
1- existence is presupposed in everything that is real. ( existence is the foundational ground. )
2- necessary facts are real.
3- therefore, necessary facts presuppose existence.
Part II
1. If necessary facts presuppose existence, they depend on it.
2. Necessary facts presuppose existence.
3. Therefore, necessary facts depend on existence.
Now, When I use the term ‘independent’, I mean self-sufficient; not needing anything outside of it to explain or cause it. Nor does it have to depend on anything for its existence. As we have previously shown, not all necessary things are independent, as they rely on presupposed states of affairs in order to exist. Consequently, independence is more specific than necessity. Something which is independent must be necessary, but not all necessary things are independent.
If this is true, then the argument of dependence above should bring about a critical reflection which concludes with an independent entity. This is because all things in the world have pieces, and all ontological composites depend on their members. To explain anything, we therefore need an independent entity upon which all other things depend, while it itself depends on nothing. This independent being will be necessary by definition, as anything ‘independent’ is necessary. If this is true, then it cannot be conceived of in any other way. If something cannot be conceived of in any other way, it must be so in all times and places, or independent of time and place.
Proof 3:
1- anything that can be conceivably / in abstraction rearranged, is contingent. ( like a set of elements of ABC, it can be conceived as BAC, or CAB, etc.. so it's contingent)
2- the universe and its constituents can be conceived / in abstraction to be rearranged.
3- therefore the universe is contingent.
The reason for mentioning ‘abstractly’ in this context is to circumvent the deterministic objection that all things are necessary because of an uninterrupted line of causal events. Ironically, atheists may deny or doubt causality when confronted with the Kalam cosmological argument, yet they affirm it when making a case for determinism. :D So, convenient, right ? :p
Connected to this argument is the argument of particularisation, which establishes a will for the necessary existence, and not some force obliged to create the same dependent things It runs as follows:
Proof 4
1. Anything that could be conceived of otherwise in abstraction was arranged by something else.
2. The universe could be conceived of otherwise in abstraction.
3. Therefore, the universe was arranged by something else.
Following Proof 1 mentioned above, the ‘something else’ responsible for arranging the contingent thing must ultimately terminate in an independent/necessary ‘something else’. The fact that an independent/necessary existence is capable of doing this would suggest the capacity to make choices. To arrange the universe/multiverse in one logical/ontological way rather than another indicates a choice; it chose that it should be one way rather than another. A question may be asked: is not the choice making capacity or ‘will’ of the independent existence itself something which can be conceived otherwise in abstraction? well, the fact that the independent existence is necessary means that all ways of describing the independent existence will also be necessary. That is to say that any attribute of the necessary existence, including ‘will’, is necessary. Of course, other attribute of mercy, power, etc .. can be argued on a different stage and on theologian arguments, but that is only after we set the foundation of reality as a necessary being. Therefore, if we establish later that everything about the necessary existence is necessary, we also establish that nothing about the necessary existence is or can be contingent.
*// on the point about God's simplicity, our Islamic theology argues that God is simple but not in the Thomistic sense or the DDS in classical theism, but rather God is only one essence, not made of pieces, has attributes that are necessary to him, not distinct from him, not detachable. So, yeah, William Craig's attempt to reject divine simplicity does not address Islamic theology, and he is right in actually going against God's simplicity doctrine that Christian apologists uphold, why ? because they say, by virtue of the doctrine divine simplicity, DDS, that God is identical to God's actions, properties etc.. and that will bring moral collapse argument. However, that's not the case for Islam as I said. God is only identical to his existence, essence. He doesn't have detachable properties, but necessary attributes. //*
Furthermore, one can argue that a necessary being of no will doesn't have to create a universe, it could create a table or only water, why such complexity, and indeed, why not even more unfathomably complex as in multiverse portals and 3 or more spidermen coming and going as in No way home :D . Such limits of existence can only be explained by a will.
Let's talk about the regularity, stability, and uniformity of nature (which are presuppositions of scientific work).
On this point, John Haldane states:
Stability, regularity, and intelligibility in world and mind are underlying assumptions of even the most limited claims of scientific realism. But suppose we ask what reason we have for making these assumptions. The general answer cannot be that they are conclusions of scientific enquiry, since they are part of what makes it possible.
That water would boil at 100 degrees today, yesterday, and tomorrow is an assumption of scientists when measuring the temperature of water. It is not due to repeated investigation of water temperature for every day and in every environment.
If it were even possible that water could boil 100 degrees today, -100 tomorrow, and 1,000 the next day, scientific research would be fruitless. This, of course, also applies to quantum mechanics, which additionally requires axioms and assumptions to work.
That the universe is complicated (consisting of many pieces), stable, and mechanistic is evidence that the necessary existence (which preponderated it) has knowledge.
Having said this, an argument for uniformity could be stated in the following way:
Part I
1. The fact of the universe being uniform, regular, and stable must be either contingent or necessary.
2. If it is necessary, then a necessary existence must account for it.
3. If it is contingent, a necessary existence must also account for it.
4. The universe is uniform, regular, and stable.
5. Therefore, a necessary existence accounts for it.
Part II
Assuming that uniformity, stability, and regularity are necessary facts of the universe, one may argue reductio by stating:
1. A contingent existence cannot sufficiently account for the necessary fact of the regularity, stability, and uniformity of the universe.
2. The universe is a contingent existence.
3. Therefore, the universe cannot sufficiently account for the necessary fact of the regularity, stability, and uniformity of the universe.
lastly, I argue for the oneness/unity of the necessary being. If there was anything to demarcate ‘necessary existence 1’ from ‘necessary existence 2,’ , then that property of demarcation would disqualify ‘necessary existence 2’ from being necessary, by definition. This is because it would be conceived that ‘necessary existence 2’ could be ‘another way’ and therefore ‘necessary existence 2’ would not be necessary at all in this case.
Same argument from omnipotence, if there are two Gods as necessary beings, then at least one of them cannot overrule or overpower the other. They would negotiate, you think ? or set rules of who does what and when, that they abide by ? why when one or both of them has omnipotence, certainly overruling the other's decision is not logically impossible? In fact, setting a set of rules already means compromise which is negating omnipotence.
Another argument from unity of the universe, it's stable and regular, and if two Gods have omnipotence, each God will overrule the other, leading to no universe or no stability at least.
The collection of proofs and arguments I have provided above establishes the necessity, choice making capability, independence, and oneness of the necessary existence. As initially stated, a necessary existence must exist to account for the beginning and the continued existence of the world. Furthermore, a necessary existence must exist to account for any existence whatsoever, as ‘dependent existences’ could neither generate nor maintain themselves.
Your proofs arent successful.
Proof 1. P2 can be denied. - the universe and even multiverse is made of pieces. This assumes the parts are prior to the whole. The whole can be prior to the parts and both whole and parts can be necessarily interdependent. Also, there are monism ontologies which can deny talk of parts.
Proof 2 pt 1. P1 can be denied. 'existence is the foundational ground' assumes metaphysical foundationalism.
Prrof 2 pt 2. P1 can be denied. 'If necessary facts presuppose existence, they depend on it' Necessary facts are part of existence. If Existence is brute, then the existence of necessary facts can also be brute facts. A necessary fact is an existent thing.
I already addressed your Proof 3.
Proof 4. Logical Possibility does not entail Metaphysical Possibility.
@@AShaif provide the link of that book for the viewers in a different comment
@@HoneybunMegapack my argument is not from cosmology, so it doesn't fall into the fallacy of composition as you said.
I said whatever is made of part is dependent on those parts. then I said in another proof that whatever is ontologically/logically conceivable to be rearranged or to be in another way, is not necessary. Why? because a necessary being is that which never fails to exist AND cannot be any other way as logical absurdities will occur. Why can't be any other way? because a necessary fact, like 2+2=4, never fails to exist and cannot be any other way , otherwise if you say no 2+2= 5, then logical absurdities will occur. in the same way, the reasoning will be applicable for necessary existences. If you take the universe for example, you can conceive of it in abstraction by itself that it could be any other way, i.e. logical absurdities won't occur : no logical absurdities arise when I say "yeah the sun could be revolving around the earth in another possible world, or that it ceases to exist, it's logically conceivable to me". So, it can be conceived any other way and can cease to exist without logical absurdities. So it's not necessary, i.e. contingent.
That's what I mean by my set example and what I mean by the word in abstract.
So going back, there can't be a reality in which only dependent things exist, there has to be an independent existence to account for their existences. This independent existence is not made of parts, and does not depend on anything for its existence. So, it exists with no prior conditions, so it is necessary. (proof 1 and 2 ).
@@HoneybunMegapack show me the logical absurdities that would occur if we think that the universe can be any other way. only then you can prove your point. Don't try to switch the burden of proof on me, as I already have demonstrated to you that a universe without a phone, a rock, TH-cam, a sandwitch, humans suffer no logical inconsistencies whatsoever !!! So you either prove your point or just might as well say ( just because ) or in more sophisticated terms ( the universe just is ) !
for your second line, I already told you that *my idea of God is the independent necessary being.* Then went through 4 proofs to prove that a reality with ONLY dependent things cannot be logically conceived. You can conceive of a Godless universe because you think of God as a religious fiction, well of course you can if you depict it as such as a bias, but if you think deeply about "a universe with no independent being upon which all things depend", I'm sure you will not have said what you have. :)
14:27 is really cringe. I bet this guy never read Spinoza. Spinoza doesn't identity God with the universe. Matter, or extended substance, is only one attribute among an infinity of God's attributes. God, for Spinoza, infinitely surpasses the material universe.
Wouldn't this depend on how we interpret Spinoza's identification of God with Nature, i.e., "Deus sive Natura"?
Einstein?
@@libere1001 Spinoza explains what that means. Nature for him is substance, which he takes as being only one and containing all of reality. Substance for him is threefold: substance, attributes, and modes. For Spinoza, God has an infinite amount of attributes and infinite amount of modes. Matter, is only one of those attributes according to Spinoza, and material things are modes of matter. All of this is explicitly stated in the first chapter of Spinoza's "Ethics".
There are different interpretations of Spinoza. You should refer to experts on the subject like Michael Della Rocca who believe Spinoza is an idealist, and Daniel Garber who holds to a different interpretation.
@@CMVMic Have you read the Ethics? Spinoza is very clear about this. He says all of this explicitly. Refer to his threefold distinction of substance, attributes, and modes.
Your argument that the absurdities of actualised infinity apply to post-eternal conceptions of the afterlife as is the case with Islam & Christianity is false.
It's important to make the distinction between perpetuity and infinity. We can imagine a perpetuating afterlife without assuming that it will by default reach this magical threshold of infinity. With the notion of a pre-eternal cosmos however, there's no escape from admitting that it entails actualised infinity. We can conceive of the afterlife going on and on without ever reaching infinity (while remaining consistent with the religious texts - rendering your argument a non-defeater of this position), but this cannot be granted to a pre-eternal cosmos.
My argument didn't at all rest on the claim that infinity is 'reached' in an afterlife; please listen to the arguments again. None of the premises, claims, or justifications that I offered relied on saying that infinity is 'reached'. The point was that -- if the future is endless -- then the number of praises, each of which is such that it will be sung, is aleph-null, and that even if you removed every other praise, the number would still be aleph-null. These are incontrovertible. And yet this is precisely what was alleged to be 'absurd' about Hilbert's Hotel. So no, the argument doesn't fail.
@@MajestyofReason Interesting how you assume our disagreement arose due to me not listening intently, rather than your failure to comprehend my points.
Whether you use the word "reached" or "actualised" is a frivolous non-issue. The point is that your argument against post-eternity rests on the assumption of actualised infinity (the fact that you've repeated - yet again - that there'll be X number of praises proves my point).
Let me explain further: there's not a single instance within a post-eternal world that encapsulates infinity of any sort, as opposed to instances within a framework that incorporates a pre-eternal cosmos would (e.g. our discussion at this very moment). You could say hypothetically that in a post-eternal world there'd be innumerable number of X and Y but then your argument would only be trivially true from an abstract perspective but would be false from an experiential angle as no instance within a post-eternal afterlife would entail actualised infinity. As opposed to a pre-eternal cosmos in which case both would apply.
@@michaelfelix153 “Interesting how you assume our disagreement arose due to me not listening intently, rather than your failure to comprehend my points.”
It isn’t an assumption; I explained *why*.
“Whether you use the word "reached" or "actualised" is a frivolous non-issue.”
I never claimed otherwise.
“The point is that your argument against post-eternity rests on the assumption of actualised infinity (the fact that you've repeated - yet again - that there'll be X number of praises proves my point).”
No. I never claimed that the infinite is 'actualized'. My point is that the number of praises, each of which will be sung, is aleph null. This is obviously true. Note that I am NOT saying that there will come a time, in the future, at which it is true that infinitely many praises have been completed or actualized. That isn’t the claim. The claim, instead, is the clearly true point that the number of praises each of which *will* be sung *at some point or other* is aleph null. Here’s a demonstration of this, using days rather than praises.
Suppose it is now true that the number of days each of which will occur is just 10. Then, time will come to an end in 10 days. This is because we are supposing that there will only be 10 more days in reality. So, in 10 more days, time comes to an end. Hence, if time is endless - i.e., if time doesn’t come to an end - then it is false that the number of days each of which will occur is just 10. But 10 was just an arbitrary finite number. Let the number be 1.8 quadrillion. The same argument applies: if it is now true that the number of days each of which will occur is just 1.8 quadrillion, then time will come to an end in 1.8 quadrillion days. Hence, if time is endless, then it is false that the number of days each of which will occur is 1.8 quadrillion. What this proves is that if the future is endless, the number of days each of which will occur is not any finite number. It must instead be infinite. For if it were a finite number - say, n - then time will come to an end *n* days from now. But time, we are supposing, is endless. Hence, it is not a finite number. It is, instead, greater than any finite number, and hence infinite.
And this is obvious upon reflection. If the future is endless, then the days later than today can be paired in 1-to-1 correspondence with the natural numbers. In other words, there’s a bijective function that maps each day of an endless future to a unique natural number. This is undeniable: simply map tomorrow with 1, the next day with 2, the next day with 3, the next day with 4, the next day with 5, and so on for each natural number n.
Note that none of this implies that there will come a point at which one has completed or actualized infinitely many days or praises. That isn’t the claim. The claim, instead, is that the number of days later than today is aleph null is the future is endless. This is simply a fact.
I am sincerely requesting the following: before you post your next comment, I humbly and politely ask you to watch 22:44 to 49:19 of this video: th-cam.com/video/dqmIQcNrzTY/w-d-xo.html . I explain therein with greater clarity and precision why an endless future entails that the number of praises/days, each of which will occur, is aleph null.
“Let me explain further: there's not a single instance within a post-eternal world that encapsulates infinity of any sort, as opposed to instances within a framework that incorporates a pre-eternal cosmos would (e.g. our discussion at this very moment).”
This shows that you didn’t understand my point. Nowhere did I claim that there is a single instance within an endless future that ‘encapsulates infinity’. No one is claiming that there is some point in the future at which infinitely many events or days or praises have been actualized. This is patently irrelevant, as explained above.
@@MajestyofReason This is getting mildly embarrassing at this point. Let me try elucidating my points - using the same philosophical jargon that you’re familiar with, seeing as discussing concepts is of seemingly little utility without using terminology that you’ve memorised by rote. We’ll keep this succinct and to the point.
“No. I never claimed that the infinite is 'actualized'. My point is that the number of praises, each of which will be sung, is aleph null.” Let’s grant that you do not hold the view that infinity is “actualised”; you still, nonetheless, view a post-eternal world to belong to the category of actualised rather than potential infinity. Going out of your way to distinguish between infinity being actualised and “actualised infinity” is either equivocation or it demonstrates a lack of familiarity with the history of set theory/inifinity itself. The discussion of infinity initially (especially during enlightenment) revolved around continuums, with certain philosophers/mathematicians holding the view that since a continuum is infinitely divisible, it must eventually end at an indivisible unit, the sum total of which is infinite. The idea that the hereafter can be described as “infinite” (whether potential or actual) follows a similar rationale, albeit inversely so. Perhaps one could say that our understanding of infinity/set theory have evolved since then, but we can argue that the rationale/reasoning remains the same nonetheless. My choice of words was especially relevant to potential infinity, which we will get into shortly. You've literally used a similar choice of words to describe potential infinity in the past (rebutting yourself?).
Now, the reason why I stated (very aptly) that infinity will not be “actualised” in the hereafter is precisely because I hold it to entail merely potential infinity rather than actual. In my previous comment, when I stated that “You could say hypothetically that in a post-eternal world there'd be innumerable number of X and Y” & that “there's not a single instance within a post-eternal world that encapsulates infinity of any sort”, what I was alluding to here was potential infinity - with the latter quotation being an argument against categorising it as actual infinity. Thinking about it, this is an interesting topic, I plan on writing a paper on it - responding to those who assert there's a symmetry.
Instead of frivolous wordplay, try demonstrating that an afterlife should be categorised as actually infinite, rather than potential.
As you’ve stated in the very video you’ve linked to me at minute 25:56 “by contrast a potential infinity as it’s used in contemporary understandings, is a collection whose members, the member of whose numbers is always finite but increasing without end, increasing without bound or limit”. This is precisely the case with the Islamic, as well as Christian conceptions of an afterlife.
@@christaylor6574 Dude, what? With all due respect, Joe can respond for himself. It's not necessary to apply the same to Hilbert's hotel as it's a hypothetical thought experiment that seemingly demonstrates absurdities of actual infinity. Hilbert's hotel doesn't need to be interrogated in a similar vein as it's used to illustrate a point.
If Hilbert's hotel is successful, meaning infinity has been actualised, that would entail the absurdities that Joe expounded upon. The question here is whether an afterlife could be categorised as an actual infinite while the Hilbert Hotel illustration presupposes a hypothetical actual infinite.