Unpickable? Enclave - an Ingenious New Lock Design
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- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 21 ก.ย. 2024
- Is this lock unpickable? It might just be the case 🔐😮
Check out Andrew Magill‘s website for more details on this amazing lock: ominoushum.com...
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#locksport #lockpicking #locksmith #pentest #hacker
![[636] Bowley Lock Analysis and Update](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/qV8QKZNFxLw/mqdefault.jpg)
![[1422] Did I Cheat On This Challenge? (Tamper-Sealed Abus)](/img/n.gif)
Is this lock unpickable? It might just be the case 🔐😮
Probably not but it is going to be extremely difficult to do. It will certainly defeat the average lockpicker.
@@seriousthree6071 More than average pickers. Andrew sent a few prototypes out to experienced pickers and, so far, we didn’t find any exploit. The lock can apparently be decoded but this is a extremely long and tedious process. I am trying to think out of the box but the design is excellent. So far no exploit has been found.
Hi Ash,
I have been playing with a copy for the last couple of weeks and there is something I would like to try but I don’t have an EPG. The only exploit I can think of would be to lift all the pins to the very first position so you have only the driver pins in the bible. Then we would need to get them move randomly while gently tensioning the bar and eventually get them falling into place progressively. I have tried bumping the core with a rubber hammer, no luck. I have tried moving the driver pins with the Magneto on the side of the bible, no luck even If I believe that I set a couple a pins this way. Now I would like to see if an EPG pulsing the keyway could do something. I highly doubt we could transfer enough energy to compress the springs without hitting directly the pins but it may worth a try… In any case, this is the best idea I had so far. The only other option is to decode the lock wafer by wafer but this is extremely tedious and very difficult to achieve given the binding order on the wafers.
Its gonna need a Sputnik/Lishi tool.
@@gargoyle7508 Yeah a sort of Lishi where you could lock any identified height would be ideal.
Glad you found it interesting! I'm going to get to work making more to sell to anyone interested in giving it a try. I'll update the website with details.
Look forward to having one of these in the collection, kudos on winning the brain lottery!
Well done mate.. fantastic concept !!
I’d like one! Really good engineering!❤️
Great lock well done
Absolutely! Would love to get this figured out. Patience is key to this one. Especially using lock noobs method! Very cool lock. Great engineering 👏👏👏😎. Hope to see some soon!
Now this looks like a challenge for the LockPickingLawyer. Especially since he doesn't shy back from using practical exploits, as demonstrated by the two locks stuff made here made. (both of which were great designs with a similar idea in the sense of checking the pins when the pins can't be manipulated anymore. But both had some practical exploits which still allowed picking and/or bypassing them.)
Questioning what material the slide bar is made out of..... wondering if a very powerful magnet would come into play
@@Arch3r666 looks like brass. Making stuff that's part of the locking mechanism from a magnetic metal would be stupid. For that very reason.
True, but it's clearly a prototype. "Unfortunately the designer made one fatal design flaw, he left these hex bolts all over the place..."
I'd love to see what LPL would make of this. The crux is that Andrew has ingeniously airgapped the stack from the core, you can't tension the lock and pick at the same time. I'm far from an expert but I can't see how it could be picked by anything other than an exploit. And that then just becomes a case of iteration, patch a vulnerability and repeat.
Astoundingly clever.
@@TmOnlineMapper sorry but there's a lot of stupid people in this world that would actually use a magnetic material for the lock mechanism and Lock Picking Lawyer knows too well that some locks are fantastic on the outside BUT dumb in design internally. LPL has a long history finding weakness in locks :)
Click on 1, nothing on 2, binding on 3, and it's open. Now with a spaghetti noodle
This feels like an evolution of the first Stuff Made Here "unpickable" lock, locking the pins at a certain height for verification. The actual mechanism is different, but it's still cool to see.
The mechanism is different, but principle is almost the same.
Yes exactly. It's the same idea, but this time with a better solution and execution.
Very similar to not only the finished mechanism but some of his prototype steps as well.
It certainly follows the "SMH" suggestion to separate the pin setting and pin testing parts of the lock, with a much simpler design.
I was just thinking that. I hope he notices this video, he'd probably find it interesting
This lock creator should send a version of it to LPL to get his input too. I am interested to hear the opinions of him too on this lock as it seems like a great way to keep pickers out.
for marketing purposes, could be bad, he really does shame so many companies with his skills and tools. lol
LPL only shows locks he successfully picks. He only shows awfully designed electronic locks.
He gives the impression that there is no safe system.
Meanwhile, he never shows high quality vault locks, high quality electronic locks. And he won't show fancy unpickable mechanical locks.
@@Bvic3 true. that's his style and that's why a lot of people overrate his skills. not saying he's not skilled but people seem to think he's a lockpicking god. The thing is his channel is about exposing weak locks and not to showcase his godly lockpicking skills.
@@Bvic3 Simply not true.
@@shapowlow This. Especially seeing how much he "improved" after he stopped taking locks apart - and gullible clowns still parrot same old tired BS failing to realize "picking" stuff in such conditions is utterly worthless, just remove all pins and pretend you do it...
I want to be seeing LockPickingLawyer take this on.
For too many years, people have put out substandard locks that can be opened with comb-picks or bumping and Andrew Magil's Enclave lock actually attempts to solve problems.
Actually, judging simply by the 3d graphics this lock is also susceptible to a comb pick attack, and not only that, but it might actually also break the lock permanently.
@@ФилиппГерт Resolving a comb vulnerability is trivial though. The height of the driver recess can be shortened, or even just one or two pins having slightly longer tail ends to catch the sidebar at maximum.
I give it 2 minutes lpl
@@ФилиппГерт How to spot brainless moron who failed to watch video and see big anti-comb feature - the post. Maybe watch next time before you make idiot post?
I don't know where you live but here in Paris France you'll see a lot of Fichet locks (their cheapest lock barrel is about 200 dollars), you'll rarely see anyone pick those.
What I like about this as opposed to other "unpickable" lock cores is that it isn't much more complicated to manufacture than a normal high-ish end lock core AND I don't see any reason why it couldn't use literally any other keyway, so key reproduction and sourcing could just be regular Schlage keys.
Also with that design, the physical security rests on the single transfer pin. With a keyway open like that, you could stick in a tool steel bit, and force the lock open.
@@ionstorm66 You're not wrong and I did notice that as a weakness though I didn't mention it, but we're talking about destructive entry at that point. I did also notice that the pins are all steel. Usually when you're trying to do an attack like that, you want to be shearing 1 brass pin, not gouging a steel pin through billet brass.
The real problem for me was that the "sidebar" is also made of brass, which means that depending on the mechanical advantage of what forces the lock pin up, it could be really easy to deform that brass sidebar and punch that wedge through it.
I would like to see that sidebar made of steel and the cam area that the lock pin rides on also made of steel. It would be a solid order of magnitude harder to force then.
In fairness to who made it, its a low production prototype. All of those materials could change. If it were all steel and you didn't have the world's biggest keyway, I think you'd probably break that tool steel before the lock gave.
As it stands right now? You're definitely right. I bet a decent screwdriver and no leverage other than your hand would be enough to force it.
@@htomerif The problem with using a steel sidebar is that it opens up a magnetic force exploit. You'd need to have an incredibly thick case and/or have some kind of opposed motion like a second sidebar that only works in the opposite direction, otherwise the crux of the mechanism could be manipulated externally.
@@dustinbrueggemann1875 That's not really a concern. You've probably been watching to much LPL. Stainless steel, for example (which is the only kind of steel you'd want to use in a lock for corrosion purposes) can be essentially completely non-responsive to magnets.
I have a 3in diameter, 2in thick N52 strength neodymium magnet and my stainless steel silverware is unaffected by it. My stainless steel bucket is similarly unaffected. My stainless steel cookware just *barely* sticks but not enough to hold the weight of the magnet.
Note about LPL: I blocked his channel about a year ago after having been subscribed since before he had 10k subs. While LPL himself is very good, his channel is just a bunch of memes now and his comments section is 100 percent people with zero lock experience making jokes for likes. LPL's channel has zero utility for me.
That's why I'm on channels like this. You made a comment that happened to be incorrect, but was entirely relevant to the topic of the channel and very easy to clear up. Sometimes the shoe is on the other foot and I'm the one making the mistake. I appreciate channels that cater to people who want to learn and aren't just memes-4-views factories.
@@htomerifOh I'm aware of stainless and magnets, it's knowledge I've had to make all too much use of after knocking over a few part bins. That said, not every engineer jumps directly to stainless and so I would hardly dismiss the exploration of it as trivial nor would I harp on LPL for favoring a theme. The guy knows his audience, but he also knows his stuff. The fact that he's got so many examples is proof enough that a trivial idea to a few isn't quite as obvious to others.
LPL needs a shot at this. I'd very much like to see that. This is engineering at its finest. 🙏🏼
I'm starting to think that LPL is picking his locks because there is an abundance of low hanging fruits.
@@Buongona yes soo many bs locks out there and way way to many are meant to lock up guns very said but still think he has the skill to take on very good locks as well
@@kirkanos3968 yeah it's sad, that gun locks depicted here are so bad, but that is good. When I'll need to get mine, I'll look up in here what NOT to buy. So LPL is doing a good service to make theese videos.
Also there are situations where you might need a lock that is flawed such that it can be opened faster without the key.
Locks in general never really stopped anyone who wanted to get in, they are there to slow down the progress and to give a sence of false security.
As Isaac Arthur likes to say: "If brute force is not working, you just don't have enough of it"
@@Buongona he talked about this on a video he made a while back. He went from doing cool historical locks (like a lock version of forgotten weapons) to doing locks that the ordinary Joe wouldn't think twice about.
I think his lock picking skill is clear, you should check out the "Naughty Bucket Chronicles" th-cam.com/play/PLlXtDbvIEH-NIdGaTGYhHYTJIgF3CNST1.html
@@Buongona No doubt, the pool of those who underestimate LPL is wide and deep :)
I read the title and my brain said.. "This is the lock picking lawyer...." using his voice.
I wanna call it a “slide bar” instead of a side bar.
Also what an amazing lock. Gimmie gimmie!!!
That’s what I would call it, it’s a bar that slides
I would like to further add to this by calling it a "wafer stack slide bar".
lol had the same thought :D
This is a different implementation of the same idea of the Stuff Made Here lock. An actually practical version this time!
I remember seeing that video and LPL's video on that lock and I thought that he was soooo close to something great. I think we found that something great here!
Exactly! It basically uses the same trick of separating the keying from the checking, by using a second spring loaded mechanism. I think it could really be quite challenging to defeat.
@@coco805 yeah! We might look at an upcoming new meta for high security. It's already so good. Imagine when this technology matures!
All of these designs could be potentially be vulnerable to laboratory level attacks where you put all pins in a turnable position, but with one pin at a chosen height. Turn the mechanism all the way and use a machinist's dial indicator to determine the amount of turn. For this lock you will get 6 pins 5 positions. One of these (the binder) should let it turn just the tiniest bit more. Now you know the correct position of one pin. From now on, always use that height for that pin, and try to find the second binder. Now you have 25 positions to check to find the second binder, etc. Heck of a lot slower than picking most locks and not really feasible in the field, but in theory this approach should work.
@@kevincathcart4680 you might be able to put false gates in the upper pins which would make this approach much tougher
How prone is this lock to getting stuck?
One typically doesn’t put to much 1depth wafers in a lock, certainly not 2on top of each other because they risk sliding in between the rotor and the stator,
This one might have very good tolerances but that might be a big risk in a mass manufacturing setting.
If they move to mass production, they might make things bigger to accommodate sloppier tolerances.
Looks to me like (if the animation is too scale) the wafers are at least .5mm thick, while the tolerance of the lock body is under .1mm. the wafers aren't likely to get stuck in the rotation with such a ratio.
If mass production tolerances require larger tolerances, the ratio should still be able to be maintained and keep the jamming proof
What is so interesting is that in all other cylinder type locks the more wafers make it easier to pick because of multiple shear lines, this works completely opposite. Great work!
I wonder how much rotational impact it can take in the "false set" position, yes noisy, but depending on the environment, maybe not a problem.
Yep it is complete crap... you will be able to false pick it and then brute force it as your whole cylinder is protected by only one pin.
Most likely you can also just ignore the whole picking part and just jam some brute force tool in it and most of the shear lines will be "picked".
If you then put that lock to some EU certification lab then they gonna tell you that it can not have any good certification because it is simply to easy to simpy brute force it...
@@paulstubbs7678 Its is just a single small pin there will be no noise or impact resistance of any kind. The inventor got the silly idea that the picking is the only thing that he should be woried about. When in reality people that like to steal stuff love the brute force method and 5 or 6 pins holding the cylinder making it hard to rotate but in this case a kid would beable to do the tool and destroy the core with icecream in one hand and pulling the tool with the other hand...
@@Bialy_1 yeah especially with that big keyway, you can drive a truck thru there. Looks like it won't take much force to pop it. Great idea, needs to work on the back end to make it stronger.
Definitely an LPL challenge :)
I would be curious how hard this lock would be to pick with a Lishi style tool, that way you get past layer one of the lock quickly by putting in the same code. Then, when you try the combination, the force to turn the key changes based on how many pins are in the slot (the closer to the 45* pin=more force).
The key to picking it is seeing if you can feel any difference in the L2 lock tension or not and work back from there.
Assuming you can only feel what is happening at the shear line, this would be very difficult. With 6 pins and 5 shear line positions, you would be looking at 5^6 or 15,625 combinations.
Perhaps there is a way to glean information about what's happening near the side bar. With fine measurement, you could see how far the "false set" moves and then you could "feel" the pins touching the side bar. So, my idea-- use a long and rigid turning tool-- or attach a long piece to a turning tool for measurement. The longer it is, the more detail you can get from small movements. Then measure how far you can turn it after setting a pin at each possible height.
Then, you might be able to eliminate a pin after testing each of the shear lines. So you'd be looking at 30+25+20+15+10+5 or 105 different things to check. That would take a long time, but then you might just need a few hours to open it instead of a few days.
you don't understand the math of it.
Lishi style tools help when you have feedback. Lockpicking is done based on feedback.
If you have n pins and each pin can have m positions (potential cuts), brute force is O(m^n). If you have 6 pins, and 7 positions, that's 117 thousand combinations. With feedback, you cut it down to something like O(n*m) or O(n*n*m) which is way smaller than O(m^n). O(n*n*m) would be 252 (and in practice you do it with less than 100 interactions if you're experienced like LPL; that's why he does it in a minute or two).
This lock gives you no feedback, so O(m^n) is unavoidable.
This is the third lock I saw that's truly unpickable. Bowley lock is the best: it prevents access to the pins.
@@maolbz The Bowley has been picked.
th-cam.com/video/ai5Hf-wPXFE/w-d-xo.html
@@maolbz I think what they are saying is that you may be able to gain some feedback from the sidebar. Here's the method, it may be completely useless:
Use a pick to align 1 pin to a position (a lishi tool could help with distinguishing the positions) then rotate the lock and feel how much strain is on the rotation from the side bar. If all of the pins are out of the side bar it should have slightly more tension than if 1 pin is correctly aligned.
Repeat with the same pin at different heights until you find the correct height for that pin.
Repeat for each of the pins, it may be easier the further on you get as you'll feel more looseness as fewer pins are interacting with the sidebar.
Let's say you have 8 different pin heights for each of the 6 pins and you test each of these individually, the total number of tests with be 8 * 6 = 48. Each test will take quite long as you have to feel a tiny difference in tension but it makes the picking process actually plausible.
@@teh_jibbler only problem with that is theres no feedback from the sidebar or blocking pin at the back cos that blocking pin is only moved by the cam on the back of the cylinder, not the key. Once the core turns, all pin stacks are blocked from moving too so you cant feel through any of those what the sidebar is doing either. A brilliant design in that respect.
I have a hunch that the weak spot in this design is not the chamber and the pins, but the last special hidden pin.
It looks like depending on the materials the lock core, the hidden pin, hidden plate, and lock top are made of, it could be possible to just force the lock open after the 45 degree point by applying sufficient rotational force to the core.
Force open (shotgun, hammer, wrench, other locks, gallium) is not a valid lock picking technique.
This could be made such that a force too great will destroy the cam pin and the lock will be unusable but not opened. You can do this with a common lock too but they then require an alternate entry to remove and replace once damaged. This is not lock picking this is theft prevention. Then the thief may up the game and knock down the door.
@@cronostvgif this were a challenge lock, I would agree with you, but the first thing he said in the video was that this is a new lock design intended for production. In the hobby space, pick resistance is the highest metric by which to rate locks because you're intentionally limiting yourself to the rules of the game so to speak. Someone looking to bypass this lock to steal your things isn't going to care about the rules of picking, and is going to do the most efficient thing. In this case, it would be brute force.
I think this lock might be easier to pick after being used a lot.
If the lock is only used with the right key for a long time, which is expected, the tight tolerances might smooth out parts of the wafers. This would give back some feedback, like if you had serated pins with one of the gap being wider/deeper.
Lock: I'm unpickable
"Hello this is the lock picking lawyer."
Lock: why do I hear boss music?
10 hours?! Your tenacity is incredible
This is as technically complex as they come, and you did a brilliant job explaining it. You are a terrific teacher!
I'm convinced lock manufacturers don't care that much about security. The designer better start his own company if he wants to see this in production. It's very cool!
Because it doesn’t add any security that matters. Bad guys are not going to pick your locks. They will use brute force and speed.
@@hannes7695Plenty of criminals pick locks, and some situations do not have a brute option.
Bowley seems to care.
@@MattH-wg7ou Hopefully they continue care and the market doesn't wear them down.
Problem is, a cylinder is only as secure as it's surroundings. Most doors are easy to kick in. Most chains easily cut.
One possible attack I can think off is this: squirt in a slow working glue, that will glue the wafers together in say 24 hours. Then let the normal user open the lock with the key a few times, to break the glue between the correct wafers (and other moving parts). When the glue has set on all wafers (except the proper one), you could perhaps feel the correct wafer clicking in position.
Yep that’s the attack. Nice! How did u think of that? I could totally see this working. The user with the key probably wouldn’t even notice anything either. You have a good mind Sir. Good job.
Looking at the cam arrangements at the back and the angled pin I was thinking it would be susceptible to force it past the 45 degrees due to the mechanical advantage you get from the cam at the back. Brilliant idea.
Exactly what I thought. While being a destructive method this might leave the lock in a state where it still seems to be working, but is very easy to open with a pick or even the wrong key?
@@Clayne151 maybe solve it by making the back cam to be turned only by the tip of the key separating then cylinder from it. But only allowing it to turn with the cylinder (simple 45 degree dog linking them together )
Thanks for sharing- I’d love to see the Lock Picking Lawyer have a shot!!!
This is amazing!!
My thing is make the back of the core with a little less room and you can make the "false set" a little less witch would work better in an actual lock.
Also because you are using master wafers you can master key this lock you just add another slot in the driver pins where the "sidebar" could slide into.
This is a really good design IMHO!
Andrew McGill's lock? Completed it. Lol nah this is a major step forward in lock security. No one, literally no one has though of these mechanisms (I remember 'Stuff Made Here' done one and sent it to LPL) but this one is on another level.
Edit: saying that, LPL didn't really pick it, he merely bypassed it.
This is basically a rethinking of a segal pick proof, just changing the sleeve out for a sidebar
10:10 I think that's more like decoding than picking but it will get the lock open if you continue doing that for long enough. Especially if you measure how much you can rotate the plug with any given pin setting.
That said, this is the best pin tumbler design I've seen this far. I think it's vulnerable to brute force attack because the only thing holding the lock not open after a shear line for accessible pins have been set is that single pin with a diagonal ramp. Inserting a strong enough tool in the keyway and simply turning the lock open with force is probably going to work every single time either by compressing the pin with diagonal ramp or bending or cracking something inside the lock to allow the plug to rotate. In addition, the way this lock works, the actuator will rotate about 45 degrees with any key which may or may not be a problem depending on where this lock were used. Too bad it's patented or that could be a nice community project to try to improve the design further.
I've been trying to design a pin tumbler lock design myself which requires much less parts but more pins because my design can only have 3 positions per pin. I think it cannot be picked either but I think any mechanical lock will be vulnerable to decoding.
(The only mechanical lock (using a mechanical key) that I'm not sure if it can be decoded is Kromer Protector. And that's only because the actual specs of the lock have never been made public so the amount of possible cuts for each key location is unknown so you cannot test every possible cut for a single location. And that lock design requires that you have at least one correct cut for the whole key to be able to apply tension. Obviously, it would be easy if a single disk could have 6 different cuts, then you could have 6 different tensioning tools and just try which one works. The fact that the safety of that lock basically depends on not knowing how many different cuts a single position in a key can have makes it more like security by obscurity and that would obviously fail if many enough locks were in actual use.)
Whoever designed this lock is super clever seriously, sliding bar on top was great but adding all those wafers was truly ingenious. Usually Master key system by wafers increases the odds that you can get a pic but in this case it greatly reduces
The real problem with this type of system as you know is no locksmith can cut a key for it no keys available no settings on your key machine available so the only people that will buy this are individuals that would buy a lock with this already installed in it and the keys, and if they ever wanted more keys I guess they would have to get a hold of the supplier for more no key blanks are on the market for it and nobody in the US with this tight supply chain. Problem is going to make keys for that like Ilčo but I sure like how you showed us the insides of it. You’re so very detailed and the accent doesn’t hurt at all either. Thanks again your buddy Mike.
What a great concept for a lock 👍👍 really cool 😊 seems really challenging and near to impossible. Would this fit in a real world format like a Euro cylinder?
Maybe Max lifting and letting pins drop as controlled as possible could be a strategy?
Cool that he prevents overlifting from the start 👌 would have been my first guess
the lock could clearly fit in almost any cylinder format. it's been made the way it is here for demonstration purposes clearly and there's a lot of excess material that could be trimmed off. also the body is aluminum and that's bad for a final product.
At this point if you lift all the pins the shear line would prevent the pins from falling while there is tension on the bar. So when the pins are able to fall there is no way to put tension on the bar.
I'm no lock picker, I'm a design engineer, so excuse my terminology which won't marry with the video wholly.
At a glance it looks like the lock's strongest feature is to rely on typical picking conventions; gradually loading up each spring in each pin's bore.
It looks like the best methodology would be to fully preload each spring to it's stop and work backwards so that the undercut is aligned into correct position so that the shims in each bore don't have the opportunity to create the false positive.
Of course, there may be a feature to negate this method but a good design all the same.
i wonder how well it would survive a physical attack. once the core is in a false set, it is only the tapered part of the last pin that prevents rotation. i imagine that the brass bits would likely give out before the wedge of the steel pin failed.
The ingeniousness of the lock lies in the way it doesn't rely in any way on the tapered pin's structural integrity, but on the slider having that perfect groove to slide into. Without it, the seventh pin can't push the slider over. The idea of forcing that pin to push through the sidebar to allow plug rotation sounds unfeasible to me.
this was my first thought when Andrew posted on u/lockpicking. A bad person could make a nice strong key blank which lifts all the wafers to shear then put a spanner on it and brute force the last pin. Suggested remedy a thinner but of core between pins 6 and 7, which would fail if forced leaving the lock broken but locked.
Had the same thought. I was thinking to make a false open pop a big old screwdriver in the key hole and turn. Really depends on the Sidebar how and if it can deform in the casing. Cheers!
the Bible sits on top of the Slider and that sits on top of the 7th Pin. you'd have to be able to crush the Slider between the Bible and the 7th Pin. meaning you're saying that you're able to effectively cut that Slider into two pieces by the shape of the 7th Pin.
this is... theoretically possible, but the amount of Force i expect you'd need to do that, you're at the point where you may as well just Sledgehammer or Drill the Door.
Smashing a lock instead of picking is a vulnerability of all locks
I took a photo of the 3D design and measured the space of the spring on the top. In theory, you could push the key pins just above the sheer line since there is space given to do so with the length of the springs. Now there comes the problem of the bar, well, I also measured if the wafer pins would be in the position between the bar and that appears to be the case. If everything lined up, you would push all the pins above the sheer line and the bar would slide the wafer pins slightly making way for the piece connected to the core. What do you think?
At 2:14 he mentioned anti-overlift bars. As far as I could tell, those weren't in the 3d model. I'd imagine these are sized to prevent the wafers from ever getting to the hight of the slide bar.
Plausible?
You could put careful tension on the "sidebar" by rotating the core with a key with just the lowest bitting on all positions. By repeated impulses toward the top, the "sidebar"-pins will eventually find their correct position. This attack could be prevented in a future version by giving these "sidebar"-pins false gates.
I have been playing with another copy for some time and this is the only exploit I have imagined so far. That said I tried bumping the driver pins into place with repetitive strikes on the body, no luck. I also tried moving the drivers with a strong magnets, no luck. Apparently I successfully catched a few pins as I can hear them dropping when I release tension, but I never got the 6 of them. I don’t know if an EPG could bump the driver pins far enough to possibly make any combination. Remember that you don’t have access to the pin when you tension the bar, the only thing you can do is to induce pulses into the core.
Won't work, as the thin wafers will prevent the sidebar pins from coming down..Not all sidebar pins will need to go upward. In order to get tension on the sidebar lever, the key needs to be turned and this will remove access to the pins. See 1:56
@@MrDLRu It may work if you turn the core with all the wafers in the core and only the drivers left in the bible. However getting the driver pins to jump whitout any access to them is another story…
@@yom73 I'm thinkin' that is impossible to do. You may get 1 or 2, but at some point the small wafers will allow the cylinder to turn beyond the pins.
Bumping is the only way I see to move the real pins while the lock is tensioned. But the only way to do it is applying the bump to the whole lock and hoping the pins will randomly move the right way. In theory this could open the lock in less tries than trying all possible combinations, but when you realise that locks are usually in a door and cannot be bumped up/down...
send it to the Lock picking lawyer and when he cannot do this you have a 100% proof unpickable lock
Love the design!
Just wondering how much abuse it would take. I imagine someone turning it with a stronger tool after jiggling the pins into any false set. (disc-slip).
I am curious if metal in lock can deform by the forces leaving it unable to open later.
If it doesn't take realistic abuse, someone didn't put in enough work between prototype and final product.
Thats the common way to make attractive, but useless stuff.
I doubt the inventor will let us down like that- a manufacturer might, though.
Put a deep notch between pin 6 and pin 7. This will break the lock in the closed state.
If I understood you correctly the tension tool will turn 45 degrees on each pin changer at 6 places-each of the 5 wafers + the driver pin.
This would mean that you have 6 choices per chamber that can be repeated-since the correct position of each chamber can be the same as the correct position of another chamber.
Then lock is a permutation system of 6 choices that all seem correct.
You mentioned is no discernible feeling between each of these 6 positions.
If that is correct, you have 6 choices in each of the pin chambers, and there is no way of distinguishing the choices except by possibly estimating the height that you raised the pin of each chamber.
This would mean you would have to brute force the solution on a geometric progression.
Possible solutions per total chambers:
1 chamber-6 possible solutions
2 chambers-36 possible solution
3-216
4-1,296
5-7,776
6-46,656
Just being able to pick 4 chambers is quite a feat.
I saw when Andrew posted on the /r/lockpicking sub and looked at all the specifications, very innovative and original design. Beautiful lock, and I've seen others try to open it with no success. I love Bowley's lock's designs, but there is something about Andrew's design that is more beautiful (maybe not the right word, I'm at a loss). Either way, beautiful lock, great video.
Elegant is probably the word you're looking for.
If you raise up the pins while tensioning the top pin the wafers set before the bottom notch (where you would want it to set). Have you thought about picking the lock by raising a pin stack, tensioning, then slowly lowering the pins? Then the first set you get would be a true set (the bottom notch of the pin stack).
You can get information from the second row of pins by trying a few random combo, and see how far the lock can rotate.
Due to slight manufacturing errors, if say number 3 from second row would have been the first to bind, then if it's set at the correct height, the cam would push the sliding plate a bit further, and allow the lock to rotate a bit further. You can now try again with a reduced set of pins.
Obviously it needs to be tested, but the lock indeed leaks information on the key.. It's just not where it usually is. This is really the same principle as a traditional lock,
The build quality and compactness of it makes it just the perfect eye candy
Maybe pick proof but I'd be concerned about how practical/resistant to wear it is.
Lock - "Why can I hear Boss music"
New Combatant - "Hello and welcome to The Lock Picking Lawyer"
Things to note looking at this: there seem to be only 3 different types of driver pins and they can be placed in an up or down position. 1 and 6 are the same driver pin, 2 and 4, and finally 3 and 5. I bet if we somehow put a focus on those dimensions, we could get a way to decode it.
It could also be a coincidence that there are pairs of driverpins in this lock.
I'm not a lockpicker, so correct me if i'm wrong. But if you look at the math of the different driver pins, you can have 6 different positions per driverpin for it to be in the correct position because of the wafers. If you calculate the theoretical amount of variations it would ammount to 1,3e+17 (6!^6) different ones. Let's assume you don't want it to turn with everything in the down or up position, you still would have at least 3 billion (5!^6 = 3x 10^12) different possible combinations.
It seems that the challenge - born on the Internet - to develop an unpickable lock is producing results.
The absolute grinder which is LPL has stimulated some highly inventive brains to improve on a centuries-old lock design.
I saw the locks made from SMH and now Mr. Magill.
The design is improving fast. The result seems to be a mechanical device which include a feedback mechanism which iterate the effects of the key, and where there is no longer any association between the picking actions and the acoustic / mechanical reactions of the lock.
It is a great thing which is happening!
Id love to see LPL with this lock
A click on pin one, a click on two and we have an ope... . Oh ummmm grabs phone Bill fancy a trip to the firing range...
🤣🤣🤣🤣
It's not a $5 amazon lock or a car door so he wouldn't be interested
I bet he has one, and just hasn’t put the time into after seeing the internals😂🤷🏼😜.
😂 let's just make each pin stack have 27 wafers. Love the thinking here!
I think this lock is brilliant test lock, I was reading in a comment about having false gates. That is a excellent idea to, What about some wicked pins also. Very well explained brother man. Excellent video
I think it could be opened faster than trying out every combination possible. I'm not saying that it would be easy or that I personally could do it, but approach would be to:
1. Make the key turn (by lifting the initial binding pins) and observer how far it turns.
2. Go through each position of each stack one by one (not all combinations) and find the position where the key turns the furthest.
3. Keep that stack in the correct position and find the next binding stack and correct position by observing which configuration allows the key to again turn a bit further.
4. Repeat step 3 until open.
So in short, this technique would rely on the imperfections/tolerances in the sidebar and would require extremely careful measurement of how far the key turns. Probably will require special tools too, so I don't see anyone picking it open on a busy street anytime soon. I'm not even sure if this could be called picking anymore :D
Practiccaly though, you could easily force this open with a strong lever because the cam at the back of the lock would force the steel pin through the sidebar and allow the lock to be turmed.
No.
@@tabaks that is not how you make a statement unless you are 7. But I agree for 1 reason. The pins are all steel and the bar and tumbler are brass. Brute force would ruin the bar an dtumbler and make the lock inoperable because the steel pins would damage the cam and wedge due to the small tolerances
I agree with you, though the I bet the patented design addresses this weak point and the version we see here is just a proof of concept
@@gtjack9 possibly. The brass plate in this version looked very thin. Ive seen what brute force can do with a core puller on a lock with steel pins and brass tumbler, hence my comment. but hopefully youre right as the design is otherwise very good. Its nice to see lock makers finally looking at more inovative designs.
Yeah, and like maybe Thanos could use the Infinity Gauntlet on it. Unpickable means just that, it does not mean you can twat it with a hammer until it breaks and then claim victory.
You need to send it to the Lock Picking Lawyer!!!
I'm wondering whether applying pulses of high pressure air to the front of the lock would be able to momentarily kick the driver pins up. If so, devising a situation where all the key pins and wafers are below the shear line and the driver pins are alone above it, playing with pulses of air and precise tension at the point where the "side bar" starts binding the driver pins might enable dropping them into place one by one...
There is a riddle toy- a wooden cylinder inside a bore- that you solve like that.
Its pretty amazing when the cylinder rises out of the bore once you blow on it with breath alone.
Your idea is the first promising one i've seen here- but, it could be defeated by a pathway next to each pin, quickly equalizing pressure above when you apply pressure from below.
It's nice when creators are thinking outside the box with their lock designs and coming up with something really unique, and more importantly: really secure
It seems like the sliding bar would have its own binding order which would be expressed in how far the tension wrench rotates when in a false set, so you might be able to get a bit more info by using a long tension wrench and marking the distance it rotates - it sounds pretty long winded though.
You can figour out where you are in the binding order so for the first pin 5 hights + 5 possible pins/ eliminate the 4 not binding rinse and repeat until Max trie 39 and you are in.
Every false gate would potentially double the number of attempts.
The sliding bar only moves about a millimeter, and assuming non-insane machining tolerances, you'd still only get maybe 3 to 5 degrees in difference in rotation with the tensioner, depending on which pins are open and which are still locked. When it gets worn... who knows...
The best picking attack is probably a lishi tool.
Yeah, it can reduce the amount of effort from worst case 6^6=46656 combinations to 126 (math see below).
But you'd still be lifting the pins while they aren't truly binding, which requires skill. And you'd need to measure the angle of your tensioning tool, which requires both a precise reference (with some painters tape a non-issue) and consistency in the force you apply (again, some basic skill). Alternatively, you could bring a couple dozen key blanks and file or clip them into shape in front of the lock.
But keep in mind that the purpose of a lock isn't to take a million years to pick. It's purpose is to make figuring out the combination a bigger hassle than any other method of entry (shimmying the latch, drilling the cylinder, grinding the hinges, convincing the neighbors that you're firefighters and need to axe through that door to put out a fire, ...). And having to try about half of those 126 combinations definitely is still discouraging enough.
Why 126? To find the first binding pin, you'd need to try 6*6 combinations (in each you lift one of the pins to one of the heights). Only once you found that correct height for the correct first binding pin will you know that you've done it. With blanks it would be a bit easier, because you could first find out what height the first binding pin needs to be set to, by lifting all 6 pins in parallel to the 1st position, then all to the 2nd, ... up to to 6th. And after that you'd figure out which pin it is that needs to be set to that height. Either you make 6 tries lifting only 1 pin or 3-ish tries lifting half of the pins. 9 tries total for the first binding pin, and they can be very fast if you bring those first 24 "blanks" pre-cut.
To find the next binding pin you try each of the 6 positions for the remaining 5 pins in order; and so on. In total it would be 6*(6+5+4+3+2+1)=126 combinations (max). Furthermore, when you're getting to the last pin, you first need to set the 5 known pins to their position and then the unknown one to a guessed position. In those (up to) 6 tries alone you are setting pins (up to) 36 times. And for blanks, you need to cut the known depths for all pins you've solved so far.
And as mentioned by "s s", any time you either fail to set one of the combinations or measure the angle wrong, you slow down your progress.
use a fine-tipped sharpie to draw a line between the cylinder bit and the body while it's in a false set, so that if the next position rotates slightly further or slightly less, the line will be broken. you'd probably have to redo the line per pin. and a quick wipe with some isopropyl and the lines are gone.
@@spambot7110 And how fine-tipped sharpie would you use? 0.25mm is kind of shitty for drawing on metal.
So a new standard for security locks. This is a nice simple design that seems to be very effective.
P.S. why not just add an L and call it what it is, a slidebar
i'm curious as to how it would stand up to a bump key test or a vibration test. the separation of the core from the pins via the slide mechanism does prevent a lot of feedback that you get from direct contact of the pins with the core at the sheer line, it's been cleverly removed with this design.
I don't think a bump key would do much. You need to bump the key stacks up and then rotate the lock core about 60° before the pin stacks are pushed back down by the springs. But even if you manage that, now the pins are blocked from coming down completely. So you cannot simply easy on the tension to let them slide into the bar.
And the lock does have overlift protection. So no bumping until a disc is at bar level.
@@HenryLoenwind I think the bump key vulnerability might be in the "sidebar". Because it is held in place with a spring it is possible you could hit the locking bar without turning the cylinder, and then once set, the rear pin the normally actuates the bar and prevents the lock from being turned without the key is just floating, and you could turn the lock. It probably depends on how stiff that spring is and how much shock you could translate to the lock,
@@rosecityrower The one issue with that is that the lock is usually mounted in a door. So bumping the body to get the topbar to move against its spring (or more exactly, move the body quickly and let inertia hold the bar in place) won't work.
A normal bump attack transfers an impulse to something you can touch and move (Newton's cradle). But here you need to move the bar and there's nothing you can touch that would transmit the impulse to the bar in the right direction. So it becomes an inertia attack instead.
Also, that bar can only move when the pins are in the right position, so you need to bump the bar while lifting all pins into the right position at the same time. But if you can do the latter, you can just turn the lock.
Lock picking Lawyers: hold my beer
Very clever design, it also seems relatively easy to produce compared to some other challenge locks.
all those thin wafers are going to cause problems if this gets mass produced. likely will need to be changed
@@Brain-washed2 these seem to be standard height two master pins.
rust attack on the sidebar spring.
awesome idea. especially how it removes the feedback from picking and makes a bump key/rattle gun drop into false sets...
Can't wait to see LPL take on this lock!
I feel pretty confident I know how to get in to this lock. I would like to get my hands on one of these.
This lock seems really similar to the challenge lock StuffMadeHere made for LPL to me. As far as I can remember his mechanism worked really really similar to this one, so I am curious what date the creator of this lock filed his patent on, because if that video from StuffMadeHere was uploaded before he files his patent than there is a good chance the patent is null and void because of the existence of prior art.
If you have a decoder tool, maybe you can start at the highest point for each pin and lower the position for all the pins until it starts turning. After you just need to push up the pins one by one; if it doesn't turn anymore, it means that you have reached the actual pin, if it still turns, then you're still at a waffer.
LPL can pinpoint when the wafer defense was first used. Hes done one or two vids on this concept.
This is very interesting not just because of the difficulty in picking but you can attach an picking alarm to the lock quite easily. If the core stays at 45DEG for longer than a minute, ups the alarm triggers and potentially blocks the door completely for 30 minutes, or until cops show up. But it matters how easy it will be to mass-produce and at what cost and failure rate.
i agree that it's an interesting design, certainly more pick resistant. i do wonder how well all those parts will continue to move over time, looks like it could get finicky, esp if it were exposed to the elements.
So just pick it until the only thing holding it is the sidebar, then brute force turn it with a hardened tool and a breaker bar.
That brass bar will deform like butter.
I'm slightly concerned about a brute forcing the cylinder once it's in the false set.
My idea too. But if the "slide bar" is steel that might help.
The slidebar is huge compared to the tiny 7th pin. And that 7th pin is all stopping you turning the lock. Even if it's steel, the 'slidebar' _and_ the plug will also need to be steel, and even then steel isn't magic.
Another brute-force exploit is to put a little piece of metal in the lock (to lift all pins to the first shear), then pull the core. The last pin isn't holding the plug at all, just 2 tiny screws in the back plate.
I think I can see two weaknesses:
Picking-wise: Overlifting with a comb, remove, then turn. Can be fixed with precise chamber length.
Destructive-wise: Only the lifting pin counters rotational force from the plug. Rotating too hard can damage the cam (brass vs steel), since the plug is rather sturdy, while allowing it to turn by brute force.
A third weakness *might* be Time: When grime an filth enters that plug and pins through regular use, those wafers could get sticky except for where they regularily shear thanks to the right key. I doubt this could be exploited, though.
What an excellent design! Thank you for posting and explaining it.
Send it to lockpicking lawyer.
And he even has a nice monogram! 😁 The church window design for A+M looks so cool.
Okay, you've had your fun with it. Now I wanna see what Lockpickinglawyer could do.
If I count correctly, there are 6 possible positions for a pin to turn, and there are 6 independent pins that give you no information about whether they are in the correct position when you turn the lock - that means it's 6^6 possible combination - so a very unlucky picker would have to guess a maximum of 46656 positions if they have something like a lishi tool to record their attempts (or if they are ridiculously talented and know which wafer they're turning)
A picker that guesses randomly would average 23328 guesses (that is, turning the lock) for each successful picking.
If the lock really doesn't give away any information about its position (which looks plausible here, but of course in the real world it's not that simple) then that's a really good lock for picking.
Two things tho:
You could drill into the horizontal piece, all the way to the end of the key, and it'll open up without further resistance. Or drill the top of the lock, and just push out all the pins.
This lock doesn't seem to fit an ordinary door.
Seems pretty good if you only have to worry about non-destructive entry.
If you could see the slide bar, even just from the front (e.g. drill a hole in the front and look in) you could tell when you've solved one of the pins at a time. Depending on tolerances, the slide bar is going to be in hard contact with only one pin at a time, and when it's pushed into position the slide bar will move the micrometer or whatever and be in hard contact with ...
nevermind, the only tension on the slide bar is from the 7th pin when you actively turn the key. But when you've solved the "first" pin, the slide bar will be able to move a tiny bit further and you should be able to turn the key slightly further as a result.
As a combat engineer...there is no lock that can't be defeated with enough explosives
Another benefit I can see with this lock is that if you lock your door with two turns of the key, then it'd really take a picker two successive picking attempts to try and open the door. - Because as soon as the lock body rotates once, if the key isn't there to keep the pins in place, it'll just drop that 7th pin, release the slide bar and cause all six main pins to reset. - Even if you got a tool in there to kinda press them all up, what if one slips? How'd you even know which one it is? You really would have to reset them all.
Or use a specialized tool to keep track of all the pins' different positions and at that point you're decoding the lock, not picking it. - And most pickers don't have access to those kinds of tools, and decoding it for the first time would anyway take you like... 5^6 tries. 15,625 possible combinations.
It's definitely not unpickable, but it's impractical to pick, requiring special tools and a lot of time and know-how.
put a long reach tension bar with channel down its length with a chamfered edge pin stack side, with a lishi bar just for the rear pin, pick the lock as normal, when you think its at the right height, then bump the lishi on the end. I would do the last part mechanically.
it is essentially a combination lock with about 3k possible combinations, and you have to do it blind while keeping track of combos in your head. pretty clever.
Hats off to the guy, very clever design.
Thats a really clever upgrade to the traditional design
Fascinating design! Andrew Magill is a mechanical genius.
I wonder if a "pop up and quick turn" tool would work.
As in:
1. Push in pins just enough so all plates discs are still in the chamber
2. Turn slightly so only piston thing is resting on top of the chamber, ever so slightly
3. Have spring loaded tool apply a knock to all pins simultaneously such that the disc movement can hit and force the pistons to extreme top, while the discs themselves can't move higher than the barrel (due to step 2).
4. Have same spring loaded tool rotate barrel extremely fast.
Thus the barrel will be rotated at "check sidebar" position before the pistons drop, and as the pistons drop, they get caught in the sidebar.
That "get caught as they fall" part is unlikely, but it may still work, idk.
Putting some false, half cuts into the pistons could mitigate my whole idea.
The press to highest point tools exist (like a rake), and the spin fast tool exists, and LPL has used them before (for those security "fall into place and freeze the lock if incorrect height" gates halfway through a rotation).
That lock is very cleaver! Here's hoping the manufacturer knows their metals and it's only used where it will be clean and dry when used.
This is an ingenious design and something I love about it is that you could theoretically incorporate this mechanism into a lock which looks totally normal and standard from the outside using a totally normal looking key. Sometimes you don't want a lock or other security device to appear as if it's securing something worth nicking. It also has the advantage that it could be used in existing master keyed systems alongside conventinal locks using the same key where extreme pick resistance is not reauired.
The lockpicking lawyer needs to get his hands on one.
This was genuinely fascinating to watch. Subscribed.
What about a kinetic attack? After all, that’s the most common exploit in America and if it can’t defeat that, then it’s just clever. I suspect that the wafers are of such a different mass than the key pins or drivers than that might be a successful attack. Also, an overlift attack might still work by letting the drivers fall sequentially into their sidebar grooves by gentle counter rotation.
wait this isn't a lockpickinglawyer video, but I'm not complaining
A well planed brute force can get the numbers down a ton. Trial and error you have 5^5 positions but since a mass-produced lock has much worse tolerances or it would be really expensive you can cut that number down to about 5^3 or even 5^2 because most keys don't make jumps of more than 2, so the key still slides in the first pin will also be a lower bit, especially if you have tight tolerances it is more likely to bind on big jumps between pins. If the tolerances are loosened a bit to lower cost and lower the chance of binding, the wafers would need to be thickened, or they will slide between the cylinder and body. You can essentially use numbers to lower the possibilities down to 25 and 125 tries as the worst case (with tight tolerances) with an average of 75 but assuming looser tolerances and removing unlikely combos like 555555 etc. you end up with a number much closer to that 25 number.
Pick to the first position on each pin, then once you are at the 45° angle you can use a small mallet to hit the lock and force the pins to fall into position while you are managing the tension to be not too high that pins don't move but not too low that they don't stay in position once they are set. This should work if the springs are not too strong and the tolerance on the side bar isn't too precise.
*a triangular piece of metal flies past and pings off a target in the distance*
Nice design but not unpickable.
It get the foundamental idea of decoupling "to set" and "to check".
Unfortunately the number of attempts needed to an opening is not exponential (as in trying every possible key) but quadratic in the number of pins.
Still better than locks that can be opened with classical picking: that attack has linear complexity.
Here is the quadratic attack, it was the first thing that come to mind to me and, looking at he comments, many others.
Let k be the number of possible pin height (what was that? 5 wafers?) and n the number of pin stacks (6?).
Using a sputnik like pick we can find the first binder for the s(l)idebar testing one stack at a time (at wost k*n attempts) and looking for the widest false set (maybe using a needle on the pick to watch against a reference in the background).
When the first binder is set the second one can be found the same way but with one less stack.
The worst case is the sum of the worst cases needed to find all the binders: k*(n+1)*n/2 attempts.
The average number of attempts is the sum of the averages i.e. half of the worst case: k*(n+1)*n/4.
105 attempts looks to me as a feasible attack, probably under 5 minutes with a bit of practice and a custom tool.
Obviously random notches on the pins would greatly frustrate such an attack.
Anyway the worst defect of the design is not a security one, is the risk of jamming with all those wafers.
Using small steel balls may be an improvement but it would reduce the parameter k.
As a couple of other commenters have noted, this lock is vulnerable to precision decoding. Basically each pin stops the core at a slightly different angle due to manufacturing tolerances. This then lets you try pin positions until the core rotates slightly then move on to the next pin. Needs a precise way to measure core rotation and a way to reliably set all 6 pins to any position. It will be much harder than picking, but easier than a brute force attack. Afik this is a solvable information leak, but would require a bit more internal complexity and more free rotation of the core. The Yuema 750 is an example of how to fix this info leak.
P.s. the Yuema 760 is another lock that works just like the Enclave.
I'm sure Lockpicking Lawyer is chuckling at this.
That's an absolutely beautiful design and lock
the wafers give it basically endless "oh you got it" points. so you might think you have it when you dont. the slide bar is the real goal and with it being completely locked away and needing multiple things to line up thats gonna be hard. i wouldnt say pick proof, enough time and youd figure out what goes to where, but that time is not something someones gonna bother with. would make a nice door lock setup.
Absolutely genius. It looks simple but it especially complicated. This stuff fascinates me.
I bet I know what LPL will do. He will lift all the pins past the set point, put tension on the lock to hold them there, and gently tap it with a hammer so the top pins fall into place one by one until that sidebar thing can move. He did that with a similar lock made by Stuff Made Here.
I was thinking the same thing, but I don't think that would work, because when the slide bar engages the pins, the cylinder is turned such that the little wafers have nowhere to go, so the top pins can't come down either.
Maybe you can lift the pins one by one, getting the slide bar to move by tapping the lock with a hammer without turning the cylinder, and feeling if the slide bar hits the pin you're working on? I think it would be mighty difficult to feel, considering you're tapping the whole lock with a hammer, but with a stethoscope or microphone on the pick, you might be able to hear the difference between just one tap (the hammer striking the lock), and two taps, with the second being the slide bar hitting the pin on return because of the spring. If the particular pin is in the correct position, the second tap would be absent.
It would still be very tedious and complicated, but maybe not quite impossible.
@@tonfleuren3536 Good catch! I didn't think about the little wafers that would be in the way of the pins dropping down. This thing would be a really tough nut to crack. I'd be fascinated to see how it could be done.
It essentially turned a key turn lock into a combination lock for lock pickers, wow
the only flaw I may see is the amount of waffers are always 5 so the height that can be be pushed is known, so a tool made to have a precise height push can be made. but I don't know much past that. the only way to avoid that problem would be putting a random amount of these waffers and execute the rest of the design accordingly so only the manufacturer knows how much there are waffers.
that's an awesome video !