I agree with Mr. Sam Curry’s examples of first and second order chaos systems, and that we need more legal help not only in how we respond to cybercrime, but also in the tools used and accuracy levels when trying to calculate unpredictable risk in the first place. It is easier to narrow the scope to a few months when talking about the risk of a hurricane than it is to predict when a malicious hacker might decide to take action. We can determine the impacts of each, but how can we more accurately predict them? Study the criminals. He also mentions a rush-to-market mentality among incompetent companies, which I agree also hurts society in the long run. How can we force them to slow down and integrate security into their development process? Jen Ellis’ points regarding security of hardware-connected devices are very true and should be taken seriously by anyone responsible for industrial control systems. Stuxnet was a rude awakening to those not in-the-know, regarding the capabilities of software and how it is now able to cross the line and physically affect hardware. If people don’t take security seriously now, things will only get worse as more devices are connected with no regard for digital safety. Mr. Schwartz reminds us that while the media and society tends to over-hype some giant inevitable catastrophic hacking event, “smaller”, average hacks happen every single day, with tremendous impacts that critical infrastructure cannot afford to keep paying. We need to be taking every single case more seriously, and cannot allow malicious actors to leverage the potential of bitcoin into this perverted tool of ransomware.
5:35 to skip intro... but why would you :-)
I agree with Mr. Sam Curry’s examples of first and second order chaos systems, and that we need more legal help not only in how we respond to cybercrime, but also in the tools used and accuracy levels when trying to calculate unpredictable risk in the first place. It is easier to narrow the scope to a few months when talking about the risk of a hurricane than it is to predict when a malicious hacker might decide to take action. We can determine the impacts of each, but how can we more accurately predict them? Study the criminals. He also mentions a rush-to-market mentality among incompetent companies, which I agree also hurts society in the long run. How can we force them to slow down and integrate security into their development process?
Jen Ellis’ points regarding security of hardware-connected devices are very true and should be taken seriously by anyone responsible for industrial control systems. Stuxnet was a rude awakening to those not in-the-know, regarding the capabilities of software and how it is now able to cross the line and physically affect hardware. If people don’t take security seriously now, things will only get worse as more devices are connected with no regard for digital safety.
Mr. Schwartz reminds us that while the media and society tends to over-hype some giant inevitable catastrophic hacking event, “smaller”, average hacks happen every single day, with tremendous impacts that critical infrastructure cannot afford to keep paying. We need to be taking every single case more seriously, and cannot allow malicious actors to leverage the potential of bitcoin into this perverted tool of ransomware.
Thanks for posting
So many "Uhhh" "Ummm" "Uhmmm" and fillers.. get to the point man!