Great video! Love that advice about not beating classical theists over the head with this cuz “we’re in this for the truth”. Huge respect. Keep up the good work 👍🏻
1. God is a mind 2. A property of mind is intentionality. 3. Intentional states such as beliefs, desires, i.e. 'contentful states' are normative (which is to say that they're not merely dispositions). 4. Normativity presupposes the possibility of failure. 5. Given that it is impossible for God to fail, he cannot have intentional states and therefore cannot have a mind. Argument for 3: There is typically a distinction between dispositions and normative states. I take a disposition to represent a causal tendency. And that's to be distinguished between normative states, that are states in which there is a standard in which one can be in accord with, or out of accord with. Intentional states are normative by virtue of being the kind of states one can be in accord with, or out of accord with. For example: a belief represents such a normative state. And a desire is such a normative state. How can we recognize this? Let's say I have the belief that it's raining outside and I have the belief that umbrellas protect me from the rain, & I also have the desire not to get wet. Now if I walk outside without my umbrella (all other things being equal) I am therefore out of accord with my intentional states with my beliefs and desires in this context. Because a rational agent would have taken their umbrella (all other things being equal). Now that is to be carefully distinguished from mere causal tendencies, that is to say-dispositions. For the prime example: when lightning strikes a tree rather than a house, we don't say, "oh, it tried to strike the house; failed, missed and hit the tree", because 'trying' is an intentional concept and it's normative. But in fact, all that's going on in the case of lightning is a mere causal tendency. As follows, we possess a standard distinction between causal tendencies (which are dispositional in character) versus normative states where there is a standard one can be in accord with, or out of accord with. Presently what I'm saying is that intentional states are normative, not dispositional and given that that's the case, it implies logically the possibility of failure, because if it were not the case that I could fail to be in accord with my intentional states; at that point all I would have is a disposition. It's the possibility of failure which is constitutive of the idea of intentionality itself, because it's the possibility of failure to be in accord with which is constitutive of the idea of normativity. Thoughts?
I’m curious how a fleshed out theory of the hypostatic Union could shed some light on this subject, since the Son is the logos/word/structure that creation adheres to, and he has a contingent nature while also sharing fully in the necessary divine essence
Might one index the property of 'being the creator of creation' (where creation rigidly designates the actual creation), so that it is true of God logically prior to divine act of creation? That is to say, although one can not say that God 'is' the creator of the actual world prior to the act of creation, it seems coherent to index the creation of the actual world, rigidly designated, to the logical moment of God's act of creation. Eg., At the moment where God creates, God is the creator of the world such that Joe is a philosopher etc. To explain myself better, we can draw an analogy from God's knowledge of tenseless facts about the future, by virtue of indexing those facts at times (which do not yet obtain).
Great video. This is a line of attack I've been using against Classical Theists for over a year now, though there is plenty of other ammunition you could be using. Note that God's immutability is identical to his omniscience which is identical to his being pure act which is identical to... Insofar as all these things are identical, all of them provide unique attack vectors that are "identical" insofar as the initial concepts are identical in God. Take omniscience. We can debate until the cows come home about whether God knows the future. But insofar as omniscience is a model assumption of "causal closure" for God, i.e. nothing has to "teach God" anything about his causal powers, his own will, his own will to use his causal powers "thus", or any other self referential statements, God knows all these necessarily insofar as God is omniscient. Without all of these, you can have all kinds of issues, such as God creating worlds without knowing it, or creating worlds because he didn't want to, or all kinds of other absurdities. Or even God creating worlds because he didn't know any better. So insofar as God has perfect self knowledge in his omniscience, your argument is very easy just from this fact alone. Given any contingent counterfactual scenario God would be a member of, God knows all reasons that would impress on him to act in various ways, God knows how he would adjudicate on those reasons to figure out which ones move him, and so on. So whatever God does, God necessarily does, because God knows God does it. Consider God's creating the world, for an easy example. Suppose God failed to create the world. Well, because God did so now, God had reasons for doing so now, God knows those reasons for doing so now, God knows how he would adjudicate on those reasons for against any reasons against, etc. So in any conceivable circumstance in which God fails to create this world, you're imagining some fact that God either doesn't know about himself or "knows different" about himself in the real scenario where he creates our world. But the immediate question is what causes that knowledge gap and how God would have closed it to create our world rather than that one? The question is impossible for an omniscient being because such a gap shouldn't exist in the first place! Then consider timelessness or immutability. Any statement about God is tenseless. So instead of saying "The postman will deliver mail" or "has" or some other tensed statement, you can only say things like "the postman is one who delivers mail". Statements like "God could have done otherwise" then betray the tenseless assumption about God because there is no proper "could have" tense which is applicable here. God is the being that doe X, tenselessly, for whatever X it is that we know this being to have done (like create our world). It's just a nonsense statement to say something like "it could have been the case that the postman, i.e. the one who delivers my mail (as a tenseless identity), fails (in the tenseless rather than counterfactual sense) to deliver my mail". Arguably such a statement is a blatant contradiction in terms, but I'll settle for statements about God being completely incomprehensible from a model perspective. The thing i hope you explore on the basis of these arguments is their relation to arguments from contingency. I get exceptionally frustrated at arguments from contingency when people ask loaded contrastive questions like "why is there something rather than nothing?" but then say "whoa whoa now! We don't need explanations to be contrastive!". Listen man, if you don't want people to corner you on contrastive explanations like "Why did God do A rather than B?" then don't ask contrastive questions like "Why is there something rather than nothing?" All of this ultimately ties in. They want a necessary, causally closed, being which can't be a mere character in a counterfactual - knowing that such a being closes off vicious counterfactual dilemmas it would find itself in. But when the machinery of closing off said counterfactuals is applied to the being, they want to taxicab fallacy that ASAP and insist that the being isn't really causally closed, just causally closed in the ways most convenient to them this Tuesday.
@@MajestyofReason No problem Joe, I always appreciate the conversation your videos start! Usually my comments get a like, but I never know if it's a "courtesy like" or if you really read them, so I usually just write them for other people to keep the conversation going. Now that I know you value them too, I'll try to keep them to a good standard. Happy holidays!
A "gap is possible" and "God could have done otherwise" because the things under consideration are contingent objects. Your whole tirade seems to trade on a nominalist assumption that formal causes don't enter into the picture, that God is a jumble of factoids susceptible of more or less. God is pure act, the exemplar of all finite things. So He is immutable and omniscient while his effects & choices concerning them are contingent: He is purely actual, "eminently all things", while his effects are potency/act composites. He is radically indifferent to them as extrinsic happenings, gratuitous in respect to and compatible with them all. If He actuates them or not, His action is the same and precontains them. There is no "closing off" of contingent counterfactuals. This is only a problem if we assume like you that all final causes are univocal and mutually exclusive (that God having done or known is different than God who hasn't). Here the point is God, the final cause of creation, is already fully actual in respect to finite perfections in either case. Creatures remain contingent and superfluous to the divine essence (His free effects ad extra) according to their ontological constitution. The "gap" between God's necessity and creaturely contingency is here. Your inability to discern a determinate reason for a contingent choice, which you seem to think is scandalous for the theist, seems like backwards attestation that God is capable of free choices (and that none of his finite effects are identical to Him despite issuing from Him). It is not nonsense to say "the mail could have failed to be delivered", something contingent might not have happened: this is included in the definition of a contingent thing, a potency distinct from actuality. It likewise only poses implications for an agent itself actuated by the passage into action, for whom acting and not are distinct ontological situations. Edit: Merry Christmas & may the Triune God bless you 😁
@@mikegreendragoncvr1287 "A "gap is possible" and "God could have done otherwise" because the things under consideration are contingent objects." Begging the question; merely asserting that things "just are" contingent objects has nothing to do with whether the objects in question are contingent as the result of your model. If it turns out that reality is some necessary idea held in the mind of God, then it could be coextensive with God and thus dependent but failed to be otherwise. Just asserting what you're trying to demonstrate will get nowhere with me. "God is pure act" Yes, and that's a big problem for any position that wants to claim God could have done anything else. There are no potentials "in God" for God having done anything else than we know God has done. "So He is immutable and omniscient while his effects & choices concerning them are contingent:" Again, just asserting what you need to actually demonstrate. "He is radically indifferent to them as extrinsic happenings, gratuitous in respect to and compatible with them all." Then you're trying to say that a dice has free will. Have fun with that and Merry Christmas. I've used up enough time in my life talking to unhinged Classical Theists who don't fully think through their positions, and I don't plan on wasting a minute more.
@@logos8312 @Logos I guess you missed in your accusation of question begging the multiply stated ratio of contingency I provided: composition of potency/act, distinction of essence and being. Something not identical to being is contingent because its being, as not identical to it, is extrinsically actuated. I likewise explained that all reality is indeed excluded in God, its exemplar cause (He is "already eminently all things, fully actual, nothing to acquire"). So what? Any existence apart from Him in any permutation will be contingent and superfluous/free/not-necessary as not purely actual, involving a transmission of act to potency. Likewise no extrinsic permutation of things or events can add any actuality to God, He is superfluous, an ontological excess over all and any. You haven't (deep in the thickets of your nominalism) told me why this is not a sufficient explanation of contingency, or what else it might even consist in! I'm not saying "dice have free will", but that contingent things can be the object of a gratuitous choice of a rational agent. "Contingent things exist to be chosen freely" is not the same statement as "contingent things are or make free choices" (missing the formal causality again in the latter). God doesn't "do anything else", different or no things can happen extrinsic to Him without implications for His essence ("which is already eminently all things"). Your "vector of attack" presupposes a very particular metaphysics where being and divine exemplarism are diversified by particular contingent things as if by extrinsic differences. Best wishes!
Hey Joe, have you read Joe Schnieder's (2021) book on the Darwinian Problem of Animal Suffering? He refutes traditional theodicies and responses including Lapsarian and Only Way type theodicies, before presenting his own aesthetic one. It is very thought provoking, and I thought it might benefit you. :)
Hello! The classical theist might respond that God can actuate finite things ad extra, without contingent free choice to do so posing implications for divine simplicity; this is because He is already "eminently all things", the act of all acts. His essence is compatible with creating or not, as He is purely actual and there is nothing for Him to acquire. The only question is if creation itself implies a contradiction, "can there be more being than God"? We say there can: pure actuality, as surely as it is unique, is necessarily capable of creation (superfluous extrinsic actuation). This is not a contingent predication of God (that His excess of being is radically indifferent in its fullness to any or no extrinsic effects). Likewise there is no circularity ("God only choosing to create because of a choice he hasn't made") because God does not in any way create the finite thing for its own sake. His own essence (to gratuitously manifest it in ordered multitude), not the creature, is the final cause of His creative act. The created effect, each and every thing composed of essence/existence, remains contingent and gratuitous as not-identical to God's unique essence, though it issues from an end identical with His essence (God is the formal, efficient & final cause of creation). The pagan philosophers (the thomists say) believed in creation despite thinking creatures were eternal: the contingency of creatures is rooted in their distinction from essential being, even as their possibility is necessarily implied by it!
Great video. I'm just starting to explore these ideas. Could the classical theist just embrace modal collapse and say that YHWH has a conditional ability to do otherwise? That is He could have created a different world had He wanted.
Thank you!! That’s an interesting response. However, I think the CTist will still want to avoid modal collapse for the reasons I discuss around 1:20:00 in my video “Arguments Against Classical Theism | Part 1/3”
@@MajestyofReason awesome video. But could the CTist respond to your 8 objections to modal collapse as follows? 1) Necessary Creation. YHWH would have obstained from creating if He had wanted to do so. This is appealing to a conditional as apposed to a categorical ability to do otherwise like I mentioned earlier. And it seems that the conditional ability to do otherwise(CoAO) is compatible with modal collapse. 2) Perfect Being Theology. It is better for a being's will to choose according to it's inclinations than for a being's will to choose randomly. But it seems that a being's will choosing according to it's inclinations is compatible with modal collapse. 3) Divine Providence. YHWH would have created the world differently if He had wanted to do so. Appealing to CoAO again. 4) Natural Theology. It seems that the CTist that embraces modal collapse might be able to run a "contingency" argument of sorts. There are two kinds of necessary beings. Ones that are the necessary effects of necessary causes and others that are necessary and uncaused. I call them second order necessary beings and first order necessary beings respectively. It seems to me that the CTist might be able to argue from second order necessary beings to a first order necessary being in a similar way that the CTist can argue from contingent beings to a necessary being. It seems to me that in some sense of the word second order necessary beings are contingent on their causes. 5) Grace. YHWH would have obstained from giving someone grace if He had wanted to do so. CoAO again. 6) Human Freedom. I think that the human will chooses according to the persons strongest inclinations desires and motives at the time of the choosing. But this is a compatibilist view of human freedom and is compatible with modal collapse. I am curious about this and I have not been able to find an answer. On Libertarian Free Will why does the will choose what it does? 7) Moorian Shift. It seems like you could blink your eyes any number of times. And you could if you had wanted to. CoAO again. 8) Divine Dependency. I don't see how YHWH necessarily creating the world would make Him dependant on creation. It would definitely make creation dependant on Him though. How can a cause be dependent on it's effect? Maybe I'm just missing something on this one🤣. Could a CTist respond this way to modal collapse? I myself am not convinced of Divine Simplicity. But I think that modal collapse does not bother me. All this to say I really like your videos and keep up the good work!!!!!
Are you on discord? Because I would love to speak to you about this! It’s something I have been musing on myself and perhaps all theists may hold the issue aswell! Edit: yes, I am a theist but it’s important to think on these issues.
@@MajestyofReason ahhh it’s fine, strangely enough the arguments against CT and Gods creative act seem to sacrifice the freewill or providence of God. However perhaps the system may still be able to maintain not in spite of the identity of the attributes, but because of it. How can we speak if we can?
So if DDS principle excludes God's actions, then there would be no modal collapse argument(s) ?! God's essence is only his omnipotence, omniscience, etc... but his actions cannot be his essence, because God is not God without say omnipotence, or omniscience , but definitely could be God without any certain action ( i.e. if God HAS to act/ have a creative act, then this would undermine his omnipotence, consequently, not adhere to the mainstream concept of God).
W. Matthews Grant has an interesting paper that relates to material in this video -- "Must a Cause be Really Related to its Effects?: The Analogy between Divine and Libertarian Agent Causality," Religious Studies 43 (2007): 1-23. A lot of what you say in this video can also be directed at creaturely libertarian free will. The agent *qua cause* is identical for both effects; it is not "ordered" or "directed" to the good choice or the evil choice. It is only the resultant mental state that has the good (bad) intention in it. Would we say that a human agent "can't act intentionally toward the world" just because the cause is not really related to its effect? What underwrites the truth that the agent qua cause is doing A is ad extra...It's the effect. "What explains the truth of the predication in PRIOR" (agent-qua-cause) that it is causing A (not B)? It seems to be "magic." 32:33 Lastly, contra Leftow, God, not God's causation, is what accounts for creatures' existence. God causes X. Not "God's causing X causes X."
Thanks for the reference! I enjoys Grant’s work a lot, even though I often find myself disagreeing with it. One thing to note is that I’m fine with my video’s objection directing towards libertarian freedom more generally; I take some objections to libertarianism very seriously, including the luck objection and-if the intentional collapse argument extends to libertarianism more generally-intentional collapse as well. Second, in the case of human intentional action, there are relevant differences with the God of classical theism, since at least in the case of humans, at least *something* about the agent-perhaps the agent’s intention, or perhaps something else-is directed towards the to-be-produced effect of the agent’s action. But under CT, *nothing* about the agent - not even an intention - is so directed.
@@MajestyofReason You write, "[U]nder CT, *nothing* about the agent -- not even an intention -- is so directed." Those who affirm divine simplicity can affirm a kind of intentionality in that the agent qua cause has reasons: "In actually bringing about [effect] E, God does so for a reason, and therefore his bringing about E is purposeful and intentional. Because it is purposeful and intentional, we speak truly if we say that ‘God brings about E intentionally’ or ‘God wills E.’ We can even say ‘God chooses E.’ Such truths, however, should not be taken to imply that God’s intending E, willing E, or choosing E pick out or involve counterfactually variant intrinsic states of God" (WM Grant, "Divine Universal Causality and Libertarian Freedom.") If having an undivided intention (one set on a *particular* effect) is what it takes to have intentionality, then it would follow that free agents don't have intentionality in causing A over B. The intention(ality) would be the effect of free will, rather than a guiding element (intrinsic aspect). So I don't see how your view is better. Anytime there's indeterminism, you're going to have an effect that wasn't "directed at" by the cause...an element of "random actualization."
@@ObsidianTeen Thanks for the reply my dude! 😁♥ Regarding the Grant quote: First: I’m actually skeptical, at least prima facie, that the proponent of DDS - more accurately, the classical theist - can affirm that God brings about E for a reason. I struggle to see how an agent could bring something about for a reason without that reason influencing the agent in some way - without the agent being ‘moved to act’, so to speak, by the reason in question. If the reason doesn’t influence the agent in any manner at all, if the agent isn’t moved at all by the reason, I struggle to see how it could be true that the agent acted *for that reason*. But, crucially, it seems that the classical theist cannot say that God is moved or influenced by anything. This is part and parcel of the doctrine of divine impassibility. [This is, first, by and large how DDI is articulated and understood within the classical theistic tradition; but, second, there seem to be plausible arguments for it from other CT commitments. Suppose God could be moved or influenced by something. Since God=God’s existence under CT, it would follow that God’s very existence is influenced or moved by something. But this would seem to violate God’s aseity, for then his existence would in some manner be impinged upon by or dependent upon something.] Second: I’m skeptical that ’S acts intentionally to bring E about’ follows from ’S brings E about, and S has a reason for bringing E about’. Suppose that, for each number on a six-sided die, I have a reasons for bringing it about that I roll that number. [Maybe each is associated with some monetary reward.] And now suppose that I bring it about that I roll a 3. Here, I brought this about, and I had a reason for doing so, and yet I didn’t *intentionally* roll a 3. It is not enough that one intentionally produces E that one has a reason to produce E and that one causally produces E. Regarding the final paragraph: First: Once more, I’m fine if the intentional collapse argument is an argument more generally against libertarianism. I take luck objections very seriously, and the intentional collapse argument is similar in relevant respects thereto [but also relevantly different in several respects]. Second: Yes, the intentional collapse argument, if successful, entails that when C in indeterministically causes E, C is not intentionally directed toward E in particular. But libertarians need not say that the link between agent-causal events and the acts they cause is indeterministic; instead, they can say that the indeterminism is located further upstream - say, between (a) the prior mental states [beliefs, desires, reasons, deliberations, etc.], environmental conditions//circumstances, and character [on the one hand] and (b) the agent-causal event (i.e., the agent-causing itself) [on the other]. And it is not at all unintuitive, and nor is it contrary to libertarianism, to say that one’s prior mental states, circumstances, and character do not intentionally produce one’s agent-causing. What matters is that one’s agent-causing intentionally produce one’s acts. And the link here need not involve any indeterminism [indeed, if it does, that seems to undermine control].
@@MajestyofReason Let 'i->' mean 'indeterministically causes', 'd->' mean 'deterministically causes' and 'Ag' mean 'Agent.' On my view: For God: Ag i-> Effect A [rather than B] For humans: Ag i-> Effect A [rather...](action-triggering intention to c [rather than d]) d-> c I didn't mean to say that the act (c) caused by agent-causal events (Ag i->A) is indeterministic. Sorry if it came off that way. I place the indeterminism in the agent-causing itself. Depending on whether A or B is the effect, the detectable action c or d will follow. The way you described agent-causal libertarianism (the indeterminism being further upstream) makes it seem like there is a difference in the agent qua cause (for effects A and B], so with A... Ag [set on A] d-> A (...to c) d-> c ...something intrinsic is set on A. But an essential feature of LFW is that the agent is identical prior to both effects (choices). So your picture isn't LFW. And there's no explanation for why we got 'Ag [set on A]' rather than '[...B]'. It wasn't caused, or if it was, it wasn't intentionally brought about. The agent just found himself directed one way. This seems to "undermine control." (I think all views end up with limited control anyway. Even if you have control (causal power), you don't have power (control) over that control. You just find yourself with it. And unless you have control over your control, you can't open up the control panel on the power to set it toward 'do A' or 'do B' or 'do ?'. And even if you did, you wouldn't have control over your control over your control. With free will, your control is stuck on 'do ?'. Susan Wolf: "In order for an agent to be autonomous, it seems, not only must the agent's behavior be governable by her self, her self must in turn be governable by her self - her deeper self, if you like - and this must in turn be governable by her (still deeper?) self, ad infinitum." This is why I'm a universalist. Since ultimate control is incoherent, no one deserves eternal hell. It's inexplicable that A was produced by my power/control, since the control was set on 'do ?'.) "...and yet I didn't *intentionally* roll a 3" Perhaps every other classical theist isn't, but I'm inclined to agree with you. You intended something, and that something was "either 1-6" rather than "3." That 3 won is brute. The same goes with all agent-causal events. God intends "some universe will exist," but he doesn't intend a specific one. A human freely intends "either A or B" but not "A." That this universe, or A, occurs is fate.
Can anyone tell me what is wrong with the following argument? I am still a beginner in the subject. God is necessary and eternal. God is identical with His Will. Therefore, His Will is also necessary and eternal. A portion of His Will is dedicated to the creation of our universe, at least from its beginning to the present time. God is identical with every portion of His Will. Therefore, the very specific Will (just one portion of His General Will) to create our universe is necessary and eternal. That our universe, at least until now, is Willed by God, is proven by its very existence then and now. God's necessary and eternal Will is infallible. So, our universe had to be created necessarily from God's necessary eternity or from His eternal necessity by Himself. Are non-sequiturs present here?
@@MajestyofReason I have now taken a brief look at the relevant passage, I think I half understand the argument. However, I wonder if the classical theist does not have the burden of proof to clarify some things, such as God's freedom of choice, his relation to the world, indeterminism, and perhaps other things. Prima facie Mullins is right, but not secunda facie. But maybe only because there are still open and to be clarified questions. A possible vagueness in the dialectical context might protect Classical Theism here. I think I will have to look more into your work😀😀
Great video! Love that advice about not beating classical theists over the head with this cuz “we’re in this for the truth”. Huge respect. Keep up the good work 👍🏻
Invite Joe to TAP for discussions
Hey get out of here Abdul! No ammo for you! Lol 😆
@@jmike2039 ??
@@jmike2039 😄😄
1. God is a mind
2. A property of mind is intentionality.
3. Intentional states such as beliefs, desires, i.e. 'contentful states' are normative (which is to say that they're not merely dispositions).
4. Normativity presupposes the possibility of failure.
5. Given that it is impossible for God to fail, he cannot have intentional states and therefore cannot have a mind.
Argument for 3:
There is typically a distinction between dispositions and normative states. I take a disposition to represent a causal tendency. And that's to be distinguished between normative states, that are states in which there is a standard in which one can be in accord with, or out of accord with. Intentional states are normative by virtue of being the kind of states one can be in accord with, or out of accord with.
For example: a belief represents such a normative state. And a desire is such a normative state. How can we recognize this? Let's say I have the belief that it's raining outside and I have the belief that umbrellas protect me from the rain, & I also have the desire not to get wet. Now if I walk outside without my umbrella (all other things being equal) I am therefore out of accord with my intentional states with my beliefs and desires in this context. Because a rational agent would have taken their umbrella (all other things being equal).
Now that is to be carefully distinguished from mere causal tendencies, that is to say-dispositions. For the prime example: when lightning strikes a tree rather than a house, we don't say, "oh, it tried to strike the house; failed, missed and hit the tree", because 'trying' is an intentional concept and it's normative. But in fact, all that's going on in the case of lightning is a mere causal tendency. As follows, we possess a standard distinction between causal tendencies (which are dispositional in character) versus normative states where there is a standard one can be in accord with, or out of accord with.
Presently what I'm saying is that intentional states are normative, not dispositional and given that that's the case, it implies logically the possibility of failure, because if it were not the case that I could fail to be in accord with my intentional states; at that point all I would have is a disposition. It's the possibility of failure which is constitutive of the idea of intentionality itself, because it's the possibility of failure to be in accord with which is constitutive of the idea of normativity.
Thoughts?
I would love to watch a kind of 24 hours (at min) conversation about classical theism between Tomaszewski, R. Mullins and you.
BTW, this was a quite intriguing video.
So true
Better: Gaven Kerr, Suan Sonna, Joe Schmid, Ryan Mullins, and Steven Nemes moderating!
I’m curious how a fleshed out theory of the hypostatic Union could shed some light on this subject, since the Son is the logos/word/structure that creation adheres to, and he has a contingent nature while also sharing fully in the necessary divine essence
Not sure why you'd be embarrassed by searching "sexy philosophers", unless it was to check your ranking 🤣
Might one index the property of 'being the creator of creation' (where creation rigidly designates the actual creation), so that it is true of God logically prior to divine act of creation?
That is to say, although one can not say that God 'is' the creator of the actual world prior to the act of creation, it seems coherent to index the creation of the actual world, rigidly designated, to the logical moment of God's act of creation.
Eg., At the moment where God creates, God is the creator of the world such that Joe is a philosopher etc.
To explain myself better, we can draw an analogy from God's knowledge of tenseless facts about the future, by virtue of indexing those facts at times (which do not yet obtain).
Great video. This is a line of attack I've been using against Classical Theists for over a year now, though there is plenty of other ammunition you could be using.
Note that God's immutability is identical to his omniscience which is identical to his being pure act which is identical to...
Insofar as all these things are identical, all of them provide unique attack vectors that are "identical" insofar as the initial concepts are identical in God.
Take omniscience. We can debate until the cows come home about whether God knows the future. But insofar as omniscience is a model assumption of "causal closure" for God, i.e. nothing has to "teach God" anything about his causal powers, his own will, his own will to use his causal powers "thus", or any other self referential statements, God knows all these necessarily insofar as God is omniscient. Without all of these, you can have all kinds of issues, such as God creating worlds without knowing it, or creating worlds because he didn't want to, or all kinds of other absurdities. Or even God creating worlds because he didn't know any better.
So insofar as God has perfect self knowledge in his omniscience, your argument is very easy just from this fact alone. Given any contingent counterfactual scenario God would be a member of, God knows all reasons that would impress on him to act in various ways, God knows how he would adjudicate on those reasons to figure out which ones move him, and so on. So whatever God does, God necessarily does, because God knows God does it.
Consider God's creating the world, for an easy example. Suppose God failed to create the world. Well, because God did so now, God had reasons for doing so now, God knows those reasons for doing so now, God knows how he would adjudicate on those reasons for against any reasons against, etc. So in any conceivable circumstance in which God fails to create this world, you're imagining some fact that God either doesn't know about himself or "knows different" about himself in the real scenario where he creates our world. But the immediate question is what causes that knowledge gap and how God would have closed it to create our world rather than that one? The question is impossible for an omniscient being because such a gap shouldn't exist in the first place!
Then consider timelessness or immutability. Any statement about God is tenseless. So instead of saying "The postman will deliver mail" or "has" or some other tensed statement, you can only say things like "the postman is one who delivers mail". Statements like "God could have done otherwise" then betray the tenseless assumption about God because there is no proper "could have" tense which is applicable here. God is the being that doe X, tenselessly, for whatever X it is that we know this being to have done (like create our world). It's just a nonsense statement to say something like "it could have been the case that the postman, i.e. the one who delivers my mail (as a tenseless identity), fails (in the tenseless rather than counterfactual sense) to deliver my mail". Arguably such a statement is a blatant contradiction in terms, but I'll settle for statements about God being completely incomprehensible from a model perspective.
The thing i hope you explore on the basis of these arguments is their relation to arguments from contingency. I get exceptionally frustrated at arguments from contingency when people ask loaded contrastive questions like "why is there something rather than nothing?" but then say "whoa whoa now! We don't need explanations to be contrastive!". Listen man, if you don't want people to corner you on contrastive explanations like "Why did God do A rather than B?" then don't ask contrastive questions like "Why is there something rather than nothing?" All of this ultimately ties in. They want a necessary, causally closed, being which can't be a mere character in a counterfactual - knowing that such a being closes off vicious counterfactual dilemmas it would find itself in. But when the machinery of closing off said counterfactuals is applied to the being, they want to taxicab fallacy that ASAP and insist that the being isn't really causally closed, just causally closed in the ways most convenient to them this Tuesday.
Thank you for this!! I always appreciate your feedback and insights🙂❤️
@@MajestyofReason No problem Joe, I always appreciate the conversation your videos start! Usually my comments get a like, but I never know if it's a "courtesy like" or if you really read them, so I usually just write them for other people to keep the conversation going. Now that I know you value them too, I'll try to keep them to a good standard.
Happy holidays!
A "gap is possible" and "God could have done otherwise" because the things under consideration are contingent objects. Your whole tirade seems to trade on a nominalist assumption that formal causes don't enter into the picture, that God is a jumble of factoids susceptible of more or less.
God is pure act, the exemplar of all finite things. So He is immutable and omniscient while his effects & choices concerning them are contingent: He is purely actual, "eminently all things", while his effects are potency/act composites. He is radically indifferent to them as extrinsic happenings, gratuitous in respect to and compatible with them all. If He actuates them or not, His action is the same and precontains them. There is no "closing off" of contingent counterfactuals.
This is only a problem if we assume like you that all final causes are univocal and mutually exclusive (that God having done or known is different than God who hasn't). Here the point is God, the final cause of creation, is already fully actual in respect to finite perfections in either case. Creatures remain contingent and superfluous to the divine essence (His free effects ad extra) according to their ontological constitution. The "gap" between God's necessity and creaturely contingency is here. Your inability to discern a determinate reason for a contingent choice, which you seem to think is scandalous for the theist, seems like backwards attestation that God is capable of free choices (and that none of his finite effects are identical to Him despite issuing from Him).
It is not nonsense to say "the mail could have failed to be delivered", something contingent might not have happened: this is included in the definition of a contingent thing, a potency distinct from actuality. It likewise only poses implications for an agent itself actuated by the passage into action, for whom acting and not are distinct ontological situations.
Edit: Merry Christmas & may the Triune God bless you 😁
@@mikegreendragoncvr1287 "A "gap is possible" and "God could have done otherwise" because the things under consideration are contingent objects."
Begging the question; merely asserting that things "just are" contingent objects has nothing to do with whether the objects in question are contingent as the result of your model. If it turns out that reality is some necessary idea held in the mind of God, then it could be coextensive with God and thus dependent but failed to be otherwise. Just asserting what you're trying to demonstrate will get nowhere with me.
"God is pure act"
Yes, and that's a big problem for any position that wants to claim God could have done anything else. There are no potentials "in God" for God having done anything else than we know God has done.
"So He is immutable and omniscient while his effects & choices concerning them are contingent:"
Again, just asserting what you need to actually demonstrate.
"He is radically indifferent to them as extrinsic happenings, gratuitous in respect to and compatible with them all."
Then you're trying to say that a dice has free will. Have fun with that and Merry Christmas. I've used up enough time in my life talking to unhinged Classical Theists who don't fully think through their positions, and I don't plan on wasting a minute more.
@@logos8312 @Logos I guess you missed in your accusation of question begging the multiply stated ratio of contingency I provided: composition of potency/act, distinction of essence and being. Something not identical to being is contingent because its being, as not identical to it, is extrinsically actuated. I likewise explained that all reality is indeed excluded in God, its exemplar cause (He is "already eminently all things, fully actual, nothing to acquire"). So what? Any existence apart from Him in any permutation will be contingent and superfluous/free/not-necessary as not purely actual, involving a transmission of act to potency. Likewise no extrinsic permutation of things or events can add any actuality to God, He is superfluous, an ontological excess over all and any. You haven't (deep in the thickets of your nominalism) told me why this is not a sufficient explanation of contingency, or what else it might even consist in!
I'm not saying "dice have free will", but that contingent things can be the object of a gratuitous choice of a rational agent. "Contingent things exist to be chosen freely" is not the same statement as "contingent things are or make free choices" (missing the formal causality again in the latter).
God doesn't "do anything else", different or no things can happen extrinsic to Him without implications for His essence ("which is already eminently all things").
Your "vector of attack" presupposes a very particular metaphysics where being and divine exemplarism are diversified by particular contingent things as if by extrinsic differences. Best wishes!
Hey Joe, have you read Joe Schnieder's (2021) book on the Darwinian Problem of Animal Suffering? He refutes traditional theodicies and responses including Lapsarian and Only Way type theodicies, before presenting his own aesthetic one. It is very thought provoking, and I thought it might benefit you. :)
Awesome! Thanks for the reference
Hello! The classical theist might respond that God can actuate finite things ad extra, without contingent free choice to do so posing implications for divine simplicity; this is because He is already "eminently all things", the act of all acts. His essence is compatible with creating or not, as He is purely actual and there is nothing for Him to acquire. The only question is if creation itself implies a contradiction, "can there be more being than God"? We say there can: pure actuality, as surely as it is unique, is necessarily capable of creation (superfluous extrinsic actuation). This is not a contingent predication of God (that His excess of being is radically indifferent in its fullness to any or no extrinsic effects).
Likewise there is no circularity ("God only choosing to create because of a choice he hasn't made") because God does not in any way create the finite thing for its own sake. His own essence (to gratuitously manifest it in ordered multitude), not the creature, is the final cause of His creative act. The created effect, each and every thing composed of essence/existence, remains contingent and gratuitous as not-identical to God's unique essence, though it issues from an end identical with His essence (God is the formal, efficient & final cause of creation). The pagan philosophers (the thomists say) believed in creation despite thinking creatures were eternal: the contingency of creatures is rooted in their distinction from essential being, even as their possibility is necessarily implied by it!
Great video. I'm just starting to explore these ideas. Could the classical theist just embrace modal collapse and say that YHWH has a conditional ability to do otherwise? That is He could have created a different world had He wanted.
Thank you!! That’s an interesting response. However, I think the CTist will still want to avoid modal collapse for the reasons I discuss around 1:20:00 in my video “Arguments Against Classical Theism | Part 1/3”
@@MajestyofReason thanks! I'll check that out.
@@MajestyofReason awesome video. But could the CTist respond to your 8 objections to modal collapse as follows?
1) Necessary Creation. YHWH would have obstained from creating if He had wanted to do so. This is appealing to a conditional as apposed to a categorical ability to do otherwise like I mentioned earlier. And it seems that the conditional ability to do otherwise(CoAO) is compatible with modal collapse.
2) Perfect Being Theology. It is better for a being's will to choose according to it's inclinations than for a being's will to choose randomly. But it seems that a being's will choosing according to it's inclinations is compatible with modal collapse.
3) Divine Providence. YHWH would have created the world differently if He had wanted to do so. Appealing to CoAO again.
4) Natural Theology. It seems that the CTist that embraces modal collapse might be able to run a "contingency" argument of sorts. There are two kinds of necessary beings. Ones that are the necessary effects of necessary causes and others that are necessary and uncaused. I call them second order necessary beings and first order necessary beings respectively. It seems to me that the CTist might be able to argue from second order necessary beings to a first order necessary being in a similar way that the CTist can argue from contingent beings to a necessary being. It seems to me that in some sense of the word second order necessary beings are contingent on their causes.
5) Grace. YHWH would have obstained from giving someone grace if He had wanted to do so. CoAO again.
6) Human Freedom. I think that the human will chooses according to the persons strongest inclinations desires and motives at the time of the choosing. But this is a compatibilist view of human freedom and is compatible with modal collapse. I am curious about this and I have not been able to find an answer. On Libertarian Free Will why does the will choose what it does?
7) Moorian Shift. It seems like you could blink your eyes any number of times. And you could if you had wanted to. CoAO again.
8) Divine Dependency. I don't see how YHWH necessarily creating the world would make Him dependant on creation. It would definitely make creation dependant on Him though. How can a cause be dependent on it's effect? Maybe I'm just missing something on this one🤣.
Could a CTist respond this way to modal collapse? I myself am not convinced of Divine Simplicity. But I think that modal collapse does not bother me. All this to say I really like your videos and keep up the good work!!!!!
Are you on discord? Because I would love to speak to you about this! It’s something I have been musing on myself and perhaps all theists may hold the issue aswell!
Edit: yes, I am a theist but it’s important to think on these issues.
Unfortunately I don’t use discord. I’m very grateful to hear, though, that my video has served you in thinking about these issues❤️
@@MajestyofReason ahhh it’s fine, strangely enough the arguments against CT and Gods creative act seem to sacrifice the freewill or providence of God. However perhaps the system may still be able to maintain not in spite of the identity of the attributes, but because of it. How can we speak if we can?
So if DDS principle excludes God's actions, then there would be no modal collapse argument(s) ?!
God's essence is only his omnipotence, omniscience, etc... but his actions cannot be his essence, because God is not God without say omnipotence, or omniscience , but definitely could be God without any certain action ( i.e. if God HAS to act/ have a creative act, then this would undermine his omnipotence, consequently, not adhere to the mainstream concept of God).
The Zizek part 😂😂😂
W. Matthews Grant has an interesting paper that relates to material in this video -- "Must a Cause be Really Related to its Effects?: The Analogy between Divine and Libertarian Agent Causality," Religious Studies 43 (2007): 1-23.
A lot of what you say in this video can also be directed at creaturely libertarian free will. The agent *qua cause* is identical for both effects; it is not "ordered" or "directed" to the good choice or the evil choice. It is only the resultant mental state that has the good (bad) intention in it. Would we say that a human agent "can't act intentionally toward the world" just because the cause is not really related to its effect?
What underwrites the truth that the agent qua cause is doing A is ad extra...It's the effect. "What explains the truth of the predication in PRIOR" (agent-qua-cause) that it is causing A (not B)? It seems to be "magic."
32:33 Lastly, contra Leftow, God, not God's causation, is what accounts for creatures' existence. God causes X. Not "God's causing X causes X."
Thanks for the reference! I enjoys Grant’s work a lot, even though I often find myself disagreeing with it. One thing to note is that I’m fine with my video’s objection directing towards libertarian freedom more generally; I take some objections to libertarianism very seriously, including the luck objection and-if the intentional collapse argument extends to libertarianism more generally-intentional collapse as well. Second, in the case of human intentional action, there are relevant differences with the God of classical theism, since at least in the case of humans, at least *something* about the agent-perhaps the agent’s intention, or perhaps something else-is directed towards the to-be-produced effect of the agent’s action. But under CT, *nothing* about the agent - not even an intention - is so directed.
@@MajestyofReason You write, "[U]nder CT, *nothing* about the agent -- not even an intention -- is so directed."
Those who affirm divine simplicity can affirm a kind of intentionality in that the agent qua cause has reasons: "In actually bringing about [effect] E, God does so for a reason, and therefore his bringing about E
is purposeful and intentional. Because it is purposeful and intentional, we speak truly if we say that ‘God brings about E intentionally’ or ‘God wills E.’ We can even say ‘God chooses E.’ Such truths, however, should not be taken to imply that God’s intending E,
willing E, or choosing E pick out or involve counterfactually variant intrinsic states of God" (WM Grant, "Divine Universal Causality and Libertarian Freedom.")
If having an undivided intention (one set on a *particular* effect) is what it takes to have intentionality, then it would follow that free agents don't have intentionality in causing A over B. The intention(ality) would be the effect of free will, rather than a guiding element (intrinsic aspect). So I don't see how your view is better. Anytime there's indeterminism, you're going to have an effect that wasn't "directed at" by the cause...an element of "random actualization."
@@ObsidianTeen Thanks for the reply my dude! 😁♥
Regarding the Grant quote:
First:
I’m actually skeptical, at least prima facie, that the proponent of DDS - more accurately, the classical theist - can affirm that God brings about E for a reason. I struggle to see how an agent could bring something about for a reason without that reason influencing the agent in some way - without the agent being ‘moved to act’, so to speak, by the reason in question. If the reason doesn’t influence the agent in any manner at all, if the agent isn’t moved at all by the reason, I struggle to see how it could be true that the agent acted *for that reason*. But, crucially, it seems that the classical theist cannot say that God is moved or influenced by anything. This is part and parcel of the doctrine of divine impassibility. [This is, first, by and large how DDI is articulated and understood within the classical theistic tradition; but, second, there seem to be plausible arguments for it from other CT commitments. Suppose God could be moved or influenced by something. Since God=God’s existence under CT, it would follow that God’s very existence is influenced or moved by something. But this would seem to violate God’s aseity, for then his existence would in some manner be impinged upon by or dependent upon something.]
Second:
I’m skeptical that ’S acts intentionally to bring E about’ follows from ’S brings E about, and S has a reason for bringing E about’. Suppose that, for each number on a six-sided die, I have a reasons for bringing it about that I roll that number. [Maybe each is associated with some monetary reward.] And now suppose that I bring it about that I roll a 3. Here, I brought this about, and I had a reason for doing so, and yet I didn’t *intentionally* roll a 3. It is not enough that one intentionally produces E that one has a reason to produce E and that one causally produces E.
Regarding the final paragraph:
First:
Once more, I’m fine if the intentional collapse argument is an argument more generally against libertarianism. I take luck objections very seriously, and the intentional collapse argument is similar in relevant respects thereto [but also relevantly different in several respects].
Second:
Yes, the intentional collapse argument, if successful, entails that when C in indeterministically causes E, C is not intentionally directed toward E in particular. But libertarians need not say that the link between agent-causal events and the acts they cause is indeterministic; instead, they can say that the indeterminism is located further upstream - say, between (a) the prior mental states [beliefs, desires, reasons, deliberations, etc.], environmental conditions//circumstances, and character [on the one hand] and (b) the agent-causal event (i.e., the agent-causing itself) [on the other]. And it is not at all unintuitive, and nor is it contrary to libertarianism, to say that one’s prior mental states, circumstances, and character do not intentionally produce one’s agent-causing. What matters is that one’s agent-causing intentionally produce one’s acts. And the link here need not involve any indeterminism [indeed, if it does, that seems to undermine control].
@@MajestyofReason Let 'i->' mean 'indeterministically causes', 'd->' mean 'deterministically causes' and 'Ag' mean 'Agent.'
On my view:
For God: Ag i-> Effect A [rather than B]
For humans: Ag i-> Effect A [rather...](action-triggering intention to c [rather than d]) d-> c
I didn't mean to say that the act (c) caused by agent-causal events (Ag i->A) is indeterministic. Sorry if it came off that way. I place the indeterminism in the agent-causing itself. Depending on whether A or B is the effect, the detectable action c or d will follow.
The way you described agent-causal libertarianism (the indeterminism being further upstream) makes it seem like there is a difference in the agent qua cause (for effects A and B], so with A...
Ag [set on A] d-> A (...to c) d-> c
...something intrinsic is set on A. But an essential feature of LFW is that the agent is identical prior to both effects (choices). So your picture isn't LFW. And there's no explanation for why we got 'Ag [set on A]' rather than '[...B]'. It wasn't caused, or if it was, it wasn't intentionally brought about. The agent just found himself directed one way. This seems to "undermine control." (I think all views end up with limited control anyway. Even if you have control (causal power), you don't have power (control) over that control. You just find yourself with it. And unless you have control over your control, you can't open up the control panel on the power to set it toward 'do A' or 'do B' or 'do ?'. And even if you did, you wouldn't have control over your control over your control. With free will, your control is stuck on 'do ?'. Susan Wolf: "In order for an agent to be autonomous, it seems, not only must the agent's behavior be governable by her self, her self must in turn be governable by her self - her deeper self, if you like - and this must in turn be governable by her (still deeper?) self, ad infinitum." This is why I'm a universalist. Since ultimate control is incoherent, no one deserves eternal hell. It's inexplicable that A was produced by my power/control, since the control was set on 'do ?'.)
"...and yet I didn't *intentionally* roll a 3"
Perhaps every other classical theist isn't, but I'm inclined to agree with you. You intended something, and that something was "either 1-6" rather than "3." That 3 won is brute. The same goes with all agent-causal events. God intends "some universe will exist," but he doesn't intend a specific one. A human freely intends "either A or B" but not "A." That this universe, or A, occurs is fate.
I retract any suggestions that free choices or intentions are random, lucky, a matter of chance, brute, or fate.
Can anyone tell me what is wrong with the following argument? I am still a beginner in the subject.
God is necessary and eternal.
God is identical with His Will.
Therefore, His Will is also necessary and eternal.
A portion of His Will is dedicated to the creation of our universe, at least from its beginning to the present time.
God is identical with every portion of His Will.
Therefore, the very specific Will (just one portion of His General Will) to create our universe is necessary and eternal.
That our universe, at least until now, is Willed by God, is proven by its very existence then and now.
God's necessary and eternal Will is infallible.
So, our universe had to be created necessarily from God's necessary eternity or from His eternal necessity by Himself.
Are non-sequiturs present here?
Yes, there are non-sequiturs🙂 I explain them in my IJPR article linked in the description❤️
@@MajestyofReason Thanks
@@MajestyofReason I have now taken a brief look at the relevant passage, I think I half understand the argument.
However, I wonder if the classical theist does not have the burden of proof to clarify some things, such as God's freedom of choice, his relation to the world, indeterminism, and perhaps other things.
Prima facie Mullins is right, but not secunda facie. But maybe only because there are still open and to be clarified questions.
A possible vagueness in the dialectical context might protect Classical Theism here.
I think I will have to look more into your work😀😀
@@demergent_deist my video, “does modal collapse disprove classical theism?” should be of help, too❤️
Shall is correct English, and has actual meaning in law. Don't berate yourself for using the language correctly, that is dumbing yourself.
I berate you.