*_List of mistakes for Part 6_* 1:12 Mistake 142: Defining omnipotence in terms of logical possibility 2:42 Mistake 143: “Omniscience and freedom entail perfect goodness!” 4:06 Mistake 144: If DDS is false, then God depends on his properties! 9:08 Mistake 145: “If God can change, then God can stop loving us” 10:12 Mistake 146: “A _necessary_ being must be _purely actual_” 12:08 Mistake 147: Merely asserting change is the actualization of potential 15:30 Mistake 148: “Divine simplicity is the simplest view!” 17:09 Mistake 149: Being uncritical about molinism 25:39 Mistake 150: Composition entails contingency 25:59 Mistake 151: Thinking non-CT views anthropomorphize God 32:54 Mistake 152: The label ‘theistic personalism’ 39:02 Mistake 153: “God is being itself, he’s not a being” 40:28 Mistake 154: Conflating Thomism and classical theism 41:27 Mistake 155: “Analogical predication is non-literal” 41:58 Mistake 156: “If CT is true, God is just an abstract, causally impotent property” 42:43 Mistake 157: “Euthyphro dilemma proves DDS” 43:05 Mistake 158: “The God of non-CT is different from Zeus only in degree” 44:07 Mistake 159: “Only DDS secures monotheism” 45:35 Mistake 160: Common misunderstandings of existential inertia 51:21 Mistake 161: The simple modal collapse argument 52:36 Mistake 162: “Open theists deny divine omniscience”
Perhaps the most relevant thing would be my video here ( th-cam.com/video/BYhV5JAy48g/w-d-xo.html ) and chapter 9 in here ( link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-031-19313-2 ) 🙂
The biggest ethical dilemma I face every week is to continue working, or to first watch the new Majesty of Reason video before getting back to working on things that have 0 correlation to philosophy of religion. Oh, the struggle
8:55 If you reject nominalism and relational ontology or if you grant it to be false, and acknowledge the intrinsic attributes of God's ontology are dependent on His essence, you can argue deductively that this ontological dependency leads to contingency. Consequently, there are contingent aspects intrinsic to God's ontology that could be different in other possible worlds, indicating a change in God's ontology. Thus, if God can be otherwise, He is contingent. how does this not follow?
I think I've seen a strange example of Mistake 152 "The Label Theistic Personalism". I've come across some unusual Christians on reddit who accuse atheists of primarily being critical of personalism, and they fashion this into an accusation that atheists are likely committed the content of Classical Theism (and its supposed opposition to personalism). They charge that atheists only deny the label 'Classical Theist' out of ignorance of what it entails. (These people being big Jordan Peterson fans might explain some of this thinking. I'm not sure.)
I remember commenting about the euthyphro objection not long ago, and although it was a non-ct argument, objection 1a, 2, and 3 in the section of the ct video you referred to described my problems with it much better. So thank you very much.
Would you like to do a debate with Chris Langan? He is underrepresented in the philosophical territory. I highly doubt that you would regret it! He is one of a kind.
Love this series Joe! I am curious what WLC wouls say about your critiques of Molinism that you bring up. If i remember correctly he rejects PAP and opts for a source incompatibilism.
Joe, nice video. I am wondering, while you argue that divine simplicity is not that simple because of its ideological complexity, would you agree that it is at least exceedingly ontologically parsimonious, in that, fundamentally, there are no longer any distinct kinds of things, as all things are essentially just God viewed through different guises? (At least this is how I understand the view. I am not well read on this, so correct me if I'm wrong)
Thanks for the comment! :) Yeah, I think divine simplicity is both very ideologically *and* very theoretically complex. As for ontological parsimony, you bring up a great question. Ontological parsimony can be broken into four classes, depending on whether it concerns the number of *kinds* (of entities) or the number of *entities* simpliciter, *and* depending on whether it concerns *fundamental* entities/kinds only or both fundamental *and* non-fundamental entities/kinds. This gives us: (1) General categorical ontological parsimony: the number of (natural) kinds posited (2) Fundamental categorical ontological parsimony: the number of fundamental (natural) kinds posited (3) General entitative ontological parsimony: the number of entities posited (4) Fundamental entitative ontological parsimony: the number of fundamental entities posited Answering your question depends on which notion of parsimony among (1)-(4) is at issue. It also depends on whether the proponent of divine simplicity posits fundamental entities and kinds of entities distinct from God, such as a realm of Platonic abstract objects. Traditionally, classical theists (who accept divine simplicity) think only God is fundamental. If these are the people we're talking about, then yes, they only posit a single fundamental entity and a single fundamental kind. So their view is very ontologically parsimonious along axes (2) and (4). But as for axes (1) and (3), they posit God in addition to the natural order, and so their view will be inferior to the naturalist's view in terms of ontological parsimony along at least axes (1) and (3). (And if the naturalist posits a single fundamental entity -- say, the universe, as in Schaffer's priority monism -- then the naturalist is just as well off as the classical theist along axes (2) and (4).) Two final points worth noting. First, non-classical theists who deny divine simplicity typically still think that only God is the sole fundamental reality. God has distinct attributes, and distinct mental states (some of which are contingent, such as contingent beliefs, desires, and intentions), but these are all *non-fundamental* aspects of God for the non-CTist. Second, we need to keep in mind that CTists are not pantheists; they do not think only God exists. They simply think only God is fundamental; non-fundamental things like you and me exist too (and are distinct from God), but they depend on God. Hope all this helps!
@@MajestyofReasonThank you for responding! Very interesting comment, I appreciate how you've laid out the different kinds of ontological simplicity that one might be concerned with. I wonder, however, if there's a further layer that one could ask about (which I think your comment about God's attributes being non fundamental aspects of him on non CT perhaps sort of suggests?). I wonder, more specifically, if in addition to being concerned with the number of fundamental and non fundamental entities and kinds of entities, you could be concerned with the intrinsic complexity of the fundamental/non fundamental entities/kinds of entities in question. For instance, perhaps priority monist naturalists and theists agree that there is only one fundamental entity, but the theist would still argue that God is a simpler fundamental entity than the universe. How one would want to go about analyzing the simplicity of a fundamental entity, I'm not exactly sure... perhaps one would want to talk about how much it takes to completely describe that beings most fundamental aspects? I think I may be talking past you here, these are just some initial further thoughts I had after reading your comment.
@majestyofreason love your content and explainers, but this episode confounds me. Seems like these mistakes are just camps fighting with word salads. My not skydaddy can beat up your skydaddy because i have made up a "better" definition. As much as i love philosophy it doesnt seem to get past this flacid jousting until something external provides soundness. Is there something i am missing here?
It’s a good question, and there’s a lot that could be said here. But the real point of the example doesn’t concern water; the point is simply that many things are metaphysically impossible even though they’re formally consistent, and any example of this sort will pose a challenge for the stated conception of omnipotence. So I would just urge you to pick another example. For instance, letting ‘j’ be an individual constant referring to me, Joe, and ‘Bx’ mean that x is a banana, the following is entirely consistent: ∃x(Bx & x=j). But that’s not metaphysically possible - I couldn’t be identical to a banana!
@@21stcenturyrambo16 I think the example of water is correct; but I don’t want to get into the weeds, in responding to the commenter, of explaining why it’s a metaphysical, rather than mere physical, impossibility. (It has to do with Kripke, Putnam, and the nature of reference.) So, pedagogically, for someone who doesn’t understand (like this commenter) why it’s a metaphysical impossibility, it’s just easier and more effective pedagogically to take another example🙂
@@MajestyofReason And why would the one and only limitation of God's power have *anything to do* with the nature of reference? Why would things like reference constrain God in that way? That's about as implausible (to me) as saying that whether of not God can be eternal (existing at every moment in time) depends on the nature of _how time zones work in Australia._ It's that kind of category mismatch.
I’m not at all persuaded by 142 the definition by logical possibility. I don’t see the issue of God creating water as h3o can you provide more detail please? Are we ruling out other physical systems? That seems to be a very bad idea.
This objection begins with Saul Kripke. Basically, Kripke defends a theory of reference to objects that implies they have an essence, which is a set of properties necessary for that object to be what it is. A famous example he uses is that water is essentially H2O, so there is no possible world where water exists without H2O. Therefore, when you say "creating water with H3O," for Kripke, it's like saying a square without four sides.
@@magno1177 Saying "Kripke" doesn't make it any more persuasive. Water doesn't seem to be essentially h2o it seems to be essentially wet and hydrating and accidentally h2o in the context of our physical laws
@@magno1177that's ok, but if one says "water being H30" is akin to "square being a circle", doesn't that mean both are logical impossibilities, then the example doesn't serve its intended purpose.
@@Khjbyiuvytvu I wasn’t clear enough. The idea I wanted to convey is that the statement "water being H3O" is an impossibility, similar to "a square being a circle." While they are not the same type of impossibility, both are still impossibilities.
@@magno1177 fair enough, i wonder though if it is such that there is no possible world such that water is not h20, how is it not logically impossible for water to be anything else than h20. Sure it may not stem from the analysis of the term "water" being h20 as in a term "square" being 4 sided which is analytical, but still if A lacks the property of being H20 means it couldn't be water, then it seems to me say "A is water" is a contradiction and wouldn't be actualised in any of the logically possible worlds.
I was about to disagree with you on Mistake 142, but then I thought about St. Thomas saying it was impossible for God to sin because he’s metaphysically good by his nature. Would that count as a metaphysical contradiction if he sinned or logical. Because if God is by his nature sinless than saying God sinned would be both a logical and metaphysical contradiction.
Doesn't switching to "metaphysical possibility" generally make things *worse* for the one who does it, simply in virtue of the fact that the very existence of "metaphysical possibility" is incredibly controversial? At least with "logical possibility", we're all (sort of) on the same page as to what that is.
Have you ever went over arguments for god's goodness/omnipresence/other qualities? I feel like people discuss the Kalam cosmological/contigency/fine tuning arguments to no end but I rarely hear the "step after" to arrive to something similar to the abrahamic God, and I dont think it's as simple as "just His perfection bro"
Is it well established that dependence is an asymmetric relation? I guess i thought maybe things could mutually depend on each other. Like the Mitch Hedberg joke "my belt keeps my pants up, but my belt loops keep my belt up."
Excellent question - it’s definitely a dominant view in metaphysics that metaphysical dependence / grounding is asymmetric, irreflexive, and transitive; but it’s by no means universally agreed upon, and there are challenges to this dominant view (Eg, see Ross Cameron’s work)
@@MajestyofReason I also wonder if the Buddhist concepts of interdependent arising and shunyata (emptiness) would be a rejection of asymmetric dependence. It seems so to me, but I'm not confident enough in my own understanding to say for sure. If so, there's an entire tradition of philosophy that rejects asymmetric dependence.
I disagree that 142 is a mistake. It's an incredibly clear way of defining omnipotence, much better that the famously obscure way of defining it in terms of 'metaphysical' modality (which is in the top 3 of the most unclear concepts of philosophy. I don't see why an omnipotent being (understood in terms of logical modality) couldn't create water that is H3O. What's the arg for that Joe ?
Particulars matter, yes...But the delivery is like Dennis the Menace walking into Richard Carrier's body and then just before hitting the mic a ton of meta-amphetamine was gulped down with Monster energy drinks...
#152 as someone who grew up far more churched than you, the meaning of theistic personalism (and my utter lack of surprise to hear Ed Feser's name in the conversation) is second nature to me. Of course Feser would use it pejoratively. I don't think you've understood. You need more ecclesiology, not more philosophy, to understand that one.
If someone asked you, "I would like to go searching for God, to see if He is there and interactive. How should I go about that?" What would you advise?
Learn science. Learn about the magnificence of the universe, instead of looking for something that may not exist, and if it does then it doesn't want you to know about it...
@@pigetstuck It is the bedrock of all that we know, that is true. However, if you need a story to help you feel better about yourself, science won't help you.
For 144 ("If DDS is false, then God depends on his properties!"), your first reply was that God's distinct properties needn't be metaphysical parts of God. However, if God's distinct properties are not metaphysical parts of God, and God has no metaphysical parts (where metaphysical parts refers to really distinct intrinsic properties), then that sounds a lot like DDS. So, in responding to the argument by saying that properties need not be metaphysical parts, it seems like one has pretty much accepted DDS. You mentioned that someone can hold to relational ontology or nominalism, but again, as long as one affirms that God's distinct properties do not correspond to really distinct intrinsic properties i.e. metaphysical parts, it's hard to see how they haven't just affirmed DDS.
If we use "metaphysical parts" to refer to different intrinsic properties, then no neoclassical theist would deny that God has metaphysical parts in that sense. However, when Joe or any other neoclassical theist refers to "metaphysical parts," they are often thinking of something different. Most of the time, they are thinking of "metaphysical parts" as something that a being has but could lose, or something that a being depends on to exist, and this we reject. So when a neoclassical theist says "God has no metaphysical parts," they are often saying that God has no intrinsic properties that He could lose, or any on which He depends.
@@magno1177 It is not clear that what you have stated is what Joe was trying to convey when he said God's properties needn't be metaphysical parts. For Joe mentioned nominalism and relational ontology, which are ontologies that do not claim that a thing has its properties in virtue of really distinct intrinsic properties/constituents. So, from these examples given, it seems like Joe was saying that God's distinct properties needn't be metaphysical parts in the sense of really distinct intrinsic properties. In any case, the classical theist argument is that as long as there are properties which are really distinct and intrinsic, God will depend on them. If one does not believe God has really distinct intrinsic properties (even if they are a nominalist), then they have affirmed DDS.
Hey, I'm a little confused about Mistake #142, maybe someone can help me with this. Because as I understand it, one should not define omnipotence as the power to cause anything that is logically possible because there are things which are logically possible but metaphysically impossible. The example given is a being creating water that is H3O which is logically possible but metaphysically impossible since water is in its essence H2O. But... isn't this also logically impossible? I do not deny the metaphysical impossibility but I also doubt that this would be logically possible. What the example basically says is that it is logically possible for this being to create water that is H3O. But.. by my lights it isn't logically possible. As is correctly pointed out, water is essentially H2O. Therefore water and H2O are interchangable. And H3O is not water, since, again, water is H2O. So what the example is basically saying is that this being can create H2O (water) that is not H2O (H3O). In other words: The being can make it so there is X such that it is not X. It can bring about a state of X = not X. And that's a logical impossibility. Am I missing something?
Great question. In short, logic alone doesn’t license that substitution. That’s an extra-logical principle we need to add in order to validate the inference to X is not-X. In particular, we need to add the non-logical principle that if X is essentially Y, then whenever ‘X’ shows up in formula or sentence, ‘Y’ can be substituted for ‘X’. It is only if we add this non-logical principle that we can infer H2O is not H2O. So the logical contradiction is not logically derived from ‘water is not H2O’; instead, it’s logically derived from the conjunction of that sentence, together with the aforementioned principle, together with the claim that water is essentially H2O. Only *then* can we infer that ‘H2O is not H2O’. But this only tells us that this *conjunction* is logically impossible, not that any particular *conjunct* is logically impossible. Hope this helps!🙂
@@MajestyofReason Omg you're absolutely right. Thank you for the answer! I wasn't aware of the hidden assumptions/principles I was making. But of course you're right, "Water is not H20" is in itself no logical contradiction until more premises are applied and even then only this set of premises would be a contradiction. Thank you, Joe, that really helped😊
can you go more in-depth as to why alvin platingas argument against dds is a mistake? also can't you instead say this? “If God is identical with each of His perfections, He is Perfection itself”, which is to say that Perfection Qua Perfection is not inherent and abstract but subsistent and concrete?
I dont see how an open future is compatible with an omniscient god. The future is not comparable with fictional characters like harry potter or unicorns, it is integral to the christian belief that god "exists outside of time" (which I consider to be a contradiction of terms) and has a divine plan for the future, the book if revelation is supposed to be a series of predictions about the future, how therefore can god NOT know the future?
I dont understand what it means for god to only be able to do things that are "logically possible". When you get down to it, everything is able to only do that which is logically possible for that being. I feel that physical limitations are really logical limitations in the same way that water is H2O and not H3O. Its not logically possible for fire to be cold because fire is physically hot by the process of combustion which releases heat.
With regard to what? If you mean with regard to an object (as sth dependent on it) then I think it is a substantial quality but if you mean with regard to space-time (as sth more basic) then I agree that it is not a substantial quality.
I fail to see how mistake no. 145 is a mistake at all! "That would only be possible if that were consistent with God's nature." Indeed. And who knows what God's nature is? How is knowledge about God's nature derived and proven? I can conceive of a world in which God's nature consists of three states: non-interventionist apathy, benevolence, and belligerence. Even if you don't know which stage God is currently at, the fact that He could change His mind means He can switch between mental states, for the lack of a better word, states which are part of His nature. Very much like my nature as a Human being is complex in that it contains a number of different mental states. Who's to say God doesn't change His mind at set or random intervals?
I can conceive of a world in which God's nature consists of 100 states, *all* of which are different flavors of benevolence. In that world, God can change, but can't stop being benevolent. Therefore, the statement "God can change" does not automatically imply "God can stop loving us". That's all there is to this mistake. One can even imagine that some sort of holy text *explicitly lists out* all the 100 states that God can be in. That would pretty much solve your "who's to say" and "how do we know" questions: it's just God giving you the entire model.
@@СергейМакеев-ж2н I agree that it doesn't automatically mean that, but there's a POSSIBILITY, as God is essentially a black box from a human perspective, i.e., we don't have access to a bonafide model detailing God's nature/mental states with 100% inerrability. We can all conceive of a myriad of different possible mental states for God and have no reliable way to know who's right, or even if such an Entity even exists. Now, within the framework of some religious text, e.g., the Bible, etc., then I agree no. 145 would probably be a mistake because said texts don't allow for that kind of deviation.
Isn't mistake #142 also meaningless? Because doesn't this statement say that if there are some things that x can do, it can do those things? This statement doesn't say that it's impossible for y to exist, such that y could do everything x could do, PLUS some other things.
I think I have a problem with your problem number 142. It entirely depends on the God that you are speaking about. If the God we are talking about is a God who is personal, and as such intelligible to his creation, at least one species, then it makes perfect sense to say God is omniscient in the sense that he can do all logically possible things. If God wasn’t interested in being intelligible to us, in at least some capacity, then he might as well do everything in an illogical manner. Except this would completely undermine everything we know about God, not just the fact that we believe and he says he is logical. God is the Logos, or the logic, or the word. God is logical by his own admission. If there is no logic to an action or thought, how does it follow that we can explain it at all? Any attempt would simply leave one confused. Which is why we say illogical actions aren’t “things to do”, they are just a jumble of random words creating nonsense. One cannot “create a square circle”, that simply makes no sense, it’s unintelligible.
@@miguelatkinson The whole point of philosophy is to think properly, illogical thoughts leave proper thinking unattainable. If one is completely illogical, there is no proper thinking, because anything, and everything is thereby on the table.
*_List of mistakes for Part 6_*
1:12 Mistake 142: Defining omnipotence in terms of logical possibility
2:42 Mistake 143: “Omniscience and freedom entail perfect goodness!”
4:06 Mistake 144: If DDS is false, then God depends on his properties!
9:08 Mistake 145: “If God can change, then God can stop loving us”
10:12 Mistake 146: “A _necessary_ being must be _purely actual_”
12:08 Mistake 147: Merely asserting change is the actualization of potential
15:30 Mistake 148: “Divine simplicity is the simplest view!”
17:09 Mistake 149: Being uncritical about molinism
25:39 Mistake 150: Composition entails contingency
25:59 Mistake 151: Thinking non-CT views anthropomorphize God
32:54 Mistake 152: The label ‘theistic personalism’
39:02 Mistake 153: “God is being itself, he’s not a being”
40:28 Mistake 154: Conflating Thomism and classical theism
41:27 Mistake 155: “Analogical predication is non-literal”
41:58 Mistake 156: “If CT is true, God is just an abstract, causally impotent property”
42:43 Mistake 157: “Euthyphro dilemma proves DDS”
43:05 Mistake 158: “The God of non-CT is different from Zeus only in degree”
44:07 Mistake 159: “Only DDS secures monotheism”
45:35 Mistake 160: Common misunderstandings of existential inertia
51:21 Mistake 161: The simple modal collapse argument
52:36 Mistake 162: “Open theists deny divine omniscience”
Have you ever covered the neoplatonic theology / metaphysics? Would be fun to see you on Proclus and Plotinus
As a Christian, I’ve loved this series , and has showed me many mistakes I myself have committed. Keep up the good work Joe.🎉
Extraordinary mistakes require extraordinary Joe Schmid videos 🤓
Have you ever covered the neoplatonic theology / metaphysics? Would be fun to see you on Proclus and Plotinus
Perhaps the most relevant thing would be my video here ( th-cam.com/video/BYhV5JAy48g/w-d-xo.html ) and chapter 9 in here ( link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-031-19313-2 ) 🙂
It’s interesting how many mistakes I had as a thinker in my 33 years of age, being addressed by only 3 hours of contents
Thank You Joe..!
As a Muslim this is a good video and I will keep this in mind, wonderful❤️❤️❤️
The biggest ethical dilemma I face every week is to continue working, or to first watch the new Majesty of Reason video before getting back to working on things that have 0 correlation to philosophy of religion. Oh, the struggle
This is such high quality content. Thanks Joe as always!
I Love your videos Joe. Incredibly inspiring and helpful as always.
Have you ever done a video on presuppositional apologetics? I’d love to see a rigorous response to that line of argumentation
8:55
If you reject nominalism and relational ontology or if you grant it to be false, and acknowledge the intrinsic attributes of God's ontology are dependent on His essence, you can argue deductively that this ontological dependency leads to contingency. Consequently, there are contingent aspects intrinsic to God's ontology that could be different in other possible worlds, indicating a change in God's ontology. Thus, if God can be otherwise, He is contingent.
how does this not follow?
extremely helpful series - thanks 😀
I think I've seen a strange example of Mistake 152 "The Label Theistic Personalism". I've come across some unusual Christians on reddit who accuse atheists of primarily being critical of personalism, and they fashion this into an accusation that atheists are likely committed the content of Classical Theism (and its supposed opposition to personalism). They charge that atheists only deny the label 'Classical Theist' out of ignorance of what it entails.
(These people being big Jordan Peterson fans might explain some of this thinking. I'm not sure.)
I remember commenting about the euthyphro objection not long ago, and although it was a non-ct argument, objection 1a, 2, and 3 in the section of the ct video you referred to described my problems with it much better. So thank you very much.
good to know that i never made any of these mistakes ever like a true boss😎😎😎
I was waiting for this!
I'm LEVELING the hell UP. absolutely shredding that philosophy of religion. big gains.
Would you like to do a debate with Chris Langan? He is underrepresented in the philosophical territory. I highly doubt that you would regret it! He is one of a kind.
yessss ur the goat.
have you ever read Mulla Sadra and Tabatabai? If so, what do you think about his ontological proof? Any videos on this topic? THANX!!
Love this series Joe! I am curious what WLC wouls say about your critiques of Molinism that you bring up. If i remember correctly he rejects PAP and opts for a source incompatibilism.
Joe, nice video. I am wondering, while you argue that divine simplicity is not that simple because of its ideological complexity, would you agree that it is at least exceedingly ontologically parsimonious, in that, fundamentally, there are no longer any distinct kinds of things, as all things are essentially just God viewed through different guises? (At least this is how I understand the view. I am not well read on this, so correct me if I'm wrong)
Thanks for the comment! :)
Yeah, I think divine simplicity is both very ideologically *and* very theoretically complex. As for ontological parsimony, you bring up a great question. Ontological parsimony can be broken into four classes, depending on whether it concerns the number of *kinds* (of entities) or the number of *entities* simpliciter, *and* depending on whether it concerns *fundamental* entities/kinds only or both fundamental *and* non-fundamental entities/kinds. This gives us:
(1) General categorical ontological parsimony: the number of (natural) kinds posited
(2) Fundamental categorical ontological parsimony: the number of fundamental (natural) kinds posited
(3) General entitative ontological parsimony: the number of entities posited
(4) Fundamental entitative ontological parsimony: the number of fundamental entities posited
Answering your question depends on which notion of parsimony among (1)-(4) is at issue. It also depends on whether the proponent of divine simplicity posits fundamental entities and kinds of entities distinct from God, such as a realm of Platonic abstract objects.
Traditionally, classical theists (who accept divine simplicity) think only God is fundamental. If these are the people we're talking about, then yes, they only posit a single fundamental entity and a single fundamental kind. So their view is very ontologically parsimonious along axes (2) and (4). But as for axes (1) and (3), they posit God in addition to the natural order, and so their view will be inferior to the naturalist's view in terms of ontological parsimony along at least axes (1) and (3). (And if the naturalist posits a single fundamental entity -- say, the universe, as in Schaffer's priority monism -- then the naturalist is just as well off as the classical theist along axes (2) and (4).)
Two final points worth noting. First, non-classical theists who deny divine simplicity typically still think that only God is the sole fundamental reality. God has distinct attributes, and distinct mental states (some of which are contingent, such as contingent beliefs, desires, and intentions), but these are all *non-fundamental* aspects of God for the non-CTist. Second, we need to keep in mind that CTists are not pantheists; they do not think only God exists. They simply think only God is fundamental; non-fundamental things like you and me exist too (and are distinct from God), but they depend on God.
Hope all this helps!
@@MajestyofReasonThank you for responding! Very interesting comment, I appreciate how you've laid out the different kinds of ontological simplicity that one might be concerned with. I wonder, however, if there's a further layer that one could ask about (which I think your comment about God's attributes being non fundamental aspects of him on non CT perhaps sort of suggests?). I wonder, more specifically, if in addition to being concerned with the number of fundamental and non fundamental entities and kinds of entities, you could be concerned with the intrinsic complexity of the fundamental/non fundamental entities/kinds of entities in question. For instance, perhaps priority monist naturalists and theists agree that there is only one fundamental entity, but the theist would still argue that God is a simpler fundamental entity than the universe. How one would want to go about analyzing the simplicity of a fundamental entity, I'm not exactly sure... perhaps one would want to talk about how much it takes to completely describe that beings most fundamental aspects?
I think I may be talking past you here, these are just some initial further thoughts I had after reading your comment.
Epic series !
@majestyofreason love your content and explainers, but this episode confounds me. Seems like these mistakes are just camps fighting with word salads. My not skydaddy can beat up your skydaddy because i have made up a "better" definition. As much as i love philosophy it doesnt seem to get past this flacid jousting until something external provides soundness. Is there something i am missing here?
I dont understand how water being h20 is a metaphysical necessity and not just a physical one
It’s a good question, and there’s a lot that could be said here. But the real point of the example doesn’t concern water; the point is simply that many things are metaphysically impossible even though they’re formally consistent, and any example of this sort will pose a challenge for the stated conception of omnipotence. So I would just urge you to pick another example. For instance, letting ‘j’ be an individual constant referring to me, Joe, and ‘Bx’ mean that x is a banana, the following is entirely consistent: ∃x(Bx & x=j). But that’s not metaphysically possible - I couldn’t be identical to a banana!
@MajestyofReason my brother in christ you picked the example
@@MajestyofReason are you 100% sure you aren't a banana in a simulation though?
@@21stcenturyrambo16 I think the example of water is correct; but I don’t want to get into the weeds, in responding to the commenter, of explaining why it’s a metaphysical, rather than mere physical, impossibility. (It has to do with Kripke, Putnam, and the nature of reference.) So, pedagogically, for someone who doesn’t understand (like this commenter) why it’s a metaphysical impossibility, it’s just easier and more effective pedagogically to take another example🙂
@@MajestyofReason And why would the one and only limitation of God's power have *anything to do* with the nature of reference? Why would things like reference constrain God in that way?
That's about as implausible (to me) as saying that whether of not God can be eternal (existing at every moment in time) depends on the nature of _how time zones work in Australia._ It's that kind of category mismatch.
Are you going to publish the content of this series in one book all together?
I’m not at all persuaded by 142 the definition by logical possibility. I don’t see the issue of God creating water as h3o can you provide more detail please? Are we ruling out other physical systems? That seems to be a very bad idea.
This objection begins with Saul Kripke. Basically, Kripke defends a theory of reference to objects that implies they have an essence, which is a set of properties necessary for that object to be what it is. A famous example he uses is that water is essentially H2O, so there is no possible world where water exists without H2O. Therefore, when you say "creating water with H3O," for Kripke, it's like saying a square without four sides.
@@magno1177 Saying "Kripke" doesn't make it any more persuasive. Water doesn't seem to be essentially h2o it seems to be essentially wet and hydrating and accidentally h2o in the context of our physical laws
@@magno1177that's ok, but if one says "water being H30" is akin to "square being a circle", doesn't that mean both are logical impossibilities, then the example doesn't serve its intended purpose.
@@Khjbyiuvytvu I wasn’t clear enough. The idea I wanted to convey is that the statement "water being H3O" is an impossibility, similar to "a square being a circle." While they are not the same type of impossibility, both are still impossibilities.
@@magno1177 fair enough, i wonder though if it is such that there is no possible world such that water is not h20, how is it not logically impossible for water to be anything else than h20.
Sure it may not stem from the analysis of the term "water" being h20 as in a term "square" being 4 sided which is analytical, but still if A lacks the property of being H20 means it couldn't be water, then it seems to me say "A is water" is a contradiction and wouldn't be actualised in any of the logically possible worlds.
I was about to disagree with you on Mistake 142, but then I thought about St. Thomas saying it was impossible for God to sin because he’s metaphysically good by his nature. Would that count as a metaphysical contradiction if he sinned or logical. Because if God is by his nature sinless than saying God sinned would be both a logical and metaphysical contradiction.
Hi, what do you think about transcendental argument, are you familiar with Jay Dyer?
Doesn't switching to "metaphysical possibility" generally make things *worse* for the one who does it, simply in virtue of the fact that the very existence of "metaphysical possibility" is incredibly controversial? At least with "logical possibility", we're all (sort of) on the same page as to what that is.
hello friend. I would like to know, out of curiosity, how many books do you read per year on average? What is your reading routine?
Have you ever went over arguments for god's goodness/omnipresence/other qualities? I feel like people discuss the Kalam cosmological/contigency/fine tuning arguments to no end but I rarely hear the "step after" to arrive to something similar to the abrahamic God, and I dont think it's as simple as "just His perfection bro"
Is it well established that dependence is an asymmetric relation? I guess i thought maybe things could mutually depend on each other. Like the Mitch Hedberg joke "my belt keeps my pants up, but my belt loops keep my belt up."
Excellent question - it’s definitely a dominant view in metaphysics that metaphysical dependence / grounding is asymmetric, irreflexive, and transitive; but it’s by no means universally agreed upon, and there are challenges to this dominant view (Eg, see Ross Cameron’s work)
@@MajestyofReason I also wonder if the Buddhist concepts of interdependent arising and shunyata (emptiness) would be a rejection of asymmetric dependence. It seems so to me, but I'm not confident enough in my own understanding to say for sure. If so, there's an entire tradition of philosophy that rejects asymmetric dependence.
I disagree that 142 is a mistake. It's an incredibly clear way of defining omnipotence, much better that the famously obscure way of defining it in terms of 'metaphysical' modality (which is in the top 3 of the most unclear concepts of philosophy.
I don't see why an omnipotent being (understood in terms of logical modality) couldn't create water that is H3O. What's the arg for that Joe ?
I think it's dumb that something could be logically possible but metaphysically impossible.
Are you down with Rybelsus?
Particulars matter, yes...But the delivery is like Dennis the Menace walking into Richard Carrier's body and then just before hitting the mic a ton of meta-amphetamine was gulped down with Monster energy drinks...
"I've been learning philosophy for years, I'm sure I've learned to properly avoid these pitfalls by now." Gets to mistake 2 "Well crap"
When are you going to do a compilation of your philosopher voice impressions?
Who knows, I might do some in my 1 million views AMA which should hopefully be coming up soon….
#152 as someone who grew up far more churched than you, the meaning of theistic personalism (and my utter lack of surprise to hear Ed Feser's name in the conversation) is second nature to me. Of course Feser would use it pejoratively. I don't think you've understood. You need more ecclesiology, not more philosophy, to understand that one.
typical atheist idea of god, bearded man in the sky
If someone asked you, "I would like to go searching for God, to see if He is there and interactive. How should I go about that?" What would you advise?
Learn science. Learn about the magnificence of the universe, instead of looking for something that may not exist, and if it does then it doesn't want you to know about it...
@@xenomorph6961 Cool. The church of science is rad. I'd be curious to hear Joe's response.
@@pigetstuck Church of science?
@@xenomorph6961 Yeah! Science is the bedrock of all that we need to know. A sure place to find wisdom and hope.
@@pigetstuck It is the bedrock of all that we know, that is true.
However, if you need a story to help you feel better about yourself, science won't help you.
For 144 ("If DDS is false, then God depends on his properties!"), your first reply was that God's distinct properties needn't be metaphysical parts of God. However, if God's distinct properties are not metaphysical parts of God, and God has no metaphysical parts (where metaphysical parts refers to really distinct intrinsic properties), then that sounds a lot like DDS. So, in responding to the argument by saying that properties need not be metaphysical parts, it seems like one has pretty much accepted DDS. You mentioned that someone can hold to relational ontology or nominalism, but again, as long as one affirms that God's distinct properties do not correspond to really distinct intrinsic properties i.e. metaphysical parts, it's hard to see how they haven't just affirmed DDS.
If we use "metaphysical parts" to refer to different intrinsic properties, then no neoclassical theist would deny that God has metaphysical parts in that sense. However, when Joe or any other neoclassical theist refers to "metaphysical parts," they are often thinking of something different. Most of the time, they are thinking of "metaphysical parts" as something that a being has but could lose, or something that a being depends on to exist, and this we reject. So when a neoclassical theist says "God has no metaphysical parts," they are often saying that God has no intrinsic properties that He could lose, or any on which He depends.
@@magno1177 It is not clear that what you have stated is what Joe was trying to convey when he said God's properties needn't be metaphysical parts. For Joe mentioned nominalism and relational ontology, which are ontologies that do not claim that a thing has its properties in virtue of really distinct intrinsic properties/constituents. So, from these examples given, it seems like Joe was saying that God's distinct properties needn't be metaphysical parts in the sense of really distinct intrinsic properties.
In any case, the classical theist argument is that as long as there are properties which are really distinct and intrinsic, God will depend on them. If one does not believe God has really distinct intrinsic properties (even if they are a nominalist), then they have affirmed DDS.
David Chalmers would disagree that logical possibility =/= metaphysical possibility lol
Hey, I'm a little confused about Mistake #142, maybe someone can help me with this.
Because as I understand it, one should not define omnipotence as the power to cause anything that is logically possible because there are things which are logically possible but metaphysically impossible. The example given is a being creating water that is H3O which is logically possible but metaphysically impossible since water is in its essence H2O.
But... isn't this also logically impossible? I do not deny the metaphysical impossibility but I also doubt that this would be logically possible.
What the example basically says is that it is logically possible for this being to create water that is H3O. But.. by my lights it isn't logically possible.
As is correctly pointed out, water is essentially H2O. Therefore water and H2O are interchangable.
And H3O is not water, since, again, water is H2O. So what the example is basically saying is that this being can create H2O (water) that is not H2O (H3O).
In other words: The being can make it so there is X such that it is not X. It can bring about a state of X = not X. And that's a logical impossibility.
Am I missing something?
Great question. In short, logic alone doesn’t license that substitution. That’s an extra-logical principle we need to add in order to validate the inference to X is not-X. In particular, we need to add the non-logical principle that if X is essentially Y, then whenever ‘X’ shows up in formula or sentence, ‘Y’ can be substituted for ‘X’. It is only if we add this non-logical principle that we can infer H2O is not H2O. So the logical contradiction is not logically derived from ‘water is not H2O’; instead, it’s logically derived from the conjunction of that sentence, together with the aforementioned principle, together with the claim that water is essentially H2O. Only *then* can we infer that ‘H2O is not H2O’. But this only tells us that this *conjunction* is logically impossible, not that any particular *conjunct* is logically impossible. Hope this helps!🙂
@@MajestyofReason Omg you're absolutely right. Thank you for the answer! I wasn't aware of the hidden assumptions/principles I was making. But of course you're right, "Water is not H20" is in itself no logical contradiction until more premises are applied and even then only this set of premises would be a contradiction.
Thank you, Joe, that really helped😊
@@sansy_trashbag8534 very happy to help!! Hope you enjoy the common mistakes series🙂
can you go more in-depth as to why alvin platingas argument against dds is a mistake?
also can't you instead say this? “If God is identical with each of His perfections, He is Perfection itself”, which is to say that Perfection Qua Perfection is not inherent and abstract but subsistent and concrete?
Do you cover the 2 mistakes in your title?
I dont see how an open future is compatible with an omniscient god. The future is not comparable with fictional characters like harry potter or unicorns, it is integral to the christian belief that god "exists outside of time" (which I consider to be a contradiction of terms) and has a divine plan for the future, the book if revelation is supposed to be a series of predictions about the future, how therefore can god NOT know the future?
I dont understand what it means for god to only be able to do things that are "logically possible". When you get down to it, everything is able to only do that which is logically possible for that being. I feel that physical limitations are really logical limitations in the same way that water is H2O and not H3O. Its not logically possible for fire to be cold because fire is physically hot by the process of combustion which releases heat.
I pronounce it 'Routledge'. No no! not 'Routledge', but 'Routledge'. Hope that helps!
👏👏👏
Mass isn't an intrinsic property
With regard to what? If you mean with regard to an object (as sth dependent on it) then I think it is a substantial quality but if you mean with regard to space-time (as sth more basic) then I agree that it is not a substantial quality.
I fail to see how mistake no. 145 is a mistake at all!
"That would only be possible if that were consistent with God's nature." Indeed. And who knows what God's nature is?
How is knowledge about God's nature derived and proven?
I can conceive of a world in which God's nature consists of three states: non-interventionist apathy, benevolence, and belligerence. Even if you don't know which stage God is currently at, the fact that He could change His mind means He can switch between mental states, for the lack of a better word, states which are part of His nature. Very much like my nature as a Human being is complex in that it contains a number of different mental states.
Who's to say God doesn't change His mind at set or random intervals?
I can conceive of a world in which God's nature consists of 100 states, *all* of which are different flavors of benevolence. In that world, God can change, but can't stop being benevolent. Therefore, the statement "God can change" does not automatically imply "God can stop loving us". That's all there is to this mistake.
One can even imagine that some sort of holy text *explicitly lists out* all the 100 states that God can be in. That would pretty much solve your "who's to say" and "how do we know" questions: it's just God giving you the entire model.
@@СергейМакеев-ж2н I agree that it doesn't automatically mean that, but there's a POSSIBILITY, as God is essentially a black box from a human perspective, i.e., we don't have access to a bonafide model detailing God's nature/mental states with 100% inerrability.
We can all conceive of a myriad of different possible mental states for God and have no reliable way to know who's right, or even if such an Entity even exists.
Now, within the framework of some religious text, e.g., the Bible, etc., then I agree no. 145 would probably be a mistake because said texts don't allow for that kind of deviation.
Isn't mistake #142 also meaningless? Because doesn't this statement say that if there are some things that x can do, it can do those things? This statement doesn't say that it's impossible for y to exist, such that y could do everything x could do, PLUS some other things.
If only your takes on soccer were as well thought out as your takes on the philosophy of religion. Matt is unimpressed.
My soccer takes are infallible
I think I have a problem with your problem number 142. It entirely depends on the God that you are speaking about. If the God we are talking about is a God who is personal, and as such intelligible to his creation, at least one species, then it makes perfect sense to say God is omniscient in the sense that he can do all logically possible things.
If God wasn’t interested in being intelligible to us, in at least some capacity, then he might as well do everything in an illogical manner. Except this would completely undermine everything we know about God, not just the fact that we believe and he says he is logical. God is the Logos, or the logic, or the word. God is logical by his own admission.
If there is no logic to an action or thought, how does it follow that we can explain it at all? Any attempt would simply leave one confused. Which is why we say illogical actions aren’t “things to do”, they are just a jumble of random words creating nonsense. One cannot “create a square circle”, that simply makes no sense, it’s unintelligible.
That only works if you believe in a personal god there those who don't believe in a personal god bit impersonal one
@@miguelatkinson Well, every discussion is in a particular context.
@@miguelatkinson The whole point of philosophy is to think properly, illogical thoughts leave proper thinking unattainable. If one is completely illogical, there is no proper thinking, because anything, and everything is thereby on the table.
Common mistakes about god? Um. Believing he’s real.
So cringe