Causal finitism is NOT the best solution to infinity paradoxes
ฝัง
- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 15 ก.ค. 2024
- How should we solve paradoxes of infinity like the Grim Reaper Paradox? One candidate solution is causal finitism. In this video, Alex Malpass and I argue that there’s a better solution: the unsatisfiable pair diagnosis (UPD).
Like the show? Help it grow! Consider becoming a patron (thanks!): / majestyofreason
If you wanna make a one-time donation or tip (thanks!): www.paypal.com/paypalme/josep...
OUTLINE
0:00 Intro
1:45 Summary of the paper
3:08 Grim Reaper paradox
8:07 The Kalam
9:52 Causal finitism
12:55 The UPD
23:16 Problems with causal finitist solution
44:30 Mysterious force objection
56:47 Patchwork objection
1:13:20 Finite Benardete-like paradoxes
1:15:35 Final notes
LINKS
(1) The original video from @PhilHalper1: • Replying to the New Ka...
(2) The paper discussed in the video is “Benardete Paradoxes, Causal Finitism, and the Unsatisfiable Pair Diagnosis”, Mind (Forthcoming, with Alex Malpass): philarchive.org/rec/SCHBPC
(3) My Kalam playlist: • Kalam Cosmological Arg...
(4) Here are four other papers of mine mentioned in the video:
(4.1) “Branching Actualism and Cosmological Arguments”, Philosophical Studies (2023, with Alex Malpass): philpapers.org/rec/SCHBAA-22
(4.2) “Benardete paradoxes, patchwork principles, and the infinite past”, Synthese (2024): philpapers.org/rec/SCHBPP-3
(4.3) “The End is Near: Grim Reapers and Endless Futures”, Mind (Forthcoming): philpapers.org/rec/SCHTEI-19
(4.4) “Grim Reaper Paradoxes and Patchwork Principles: Severing the Case for Finitism”, Journal of Philosophy (Forthcoming, with Troy Dana): philarchive.org/rec/SCHGRP-4
(5) My Springer book with Dr. Dan Linford: (a) www.amazon.com/Existential-In... (b) link.springer.com/book/10.100...
(6) The Majesty of Reason: A Short Guide to Critical Thinking in Philosophy: www.amazon.com/Majesty-Reason...
THE USUAL...
Follow the Majesty of Reason podcast! open.spotify.com/show/4Nda5uN...
Join the Discord and chat all things philosophy! dsc.gg/majestyofreason
My website: josephschmid.com
My PhilPeople profile: philpeople.org/profiles/josep...
The thumbnail is Metal AF 🤘
\m/
Ugh this is so much fun, thanks to all! Your uploads get me more hype than anything else
How did you manage to be so well read and written at such a young age? I'm 22, super interested in philosophy, but I feel like I have not made much progress despite my efforts.
Interest from a young age and countless hours of work. No matter where you’re at when you’re starting, there’s always room to improve. It’ll help you to have someone else to be working/discussing with too
19:39 best philosophical analogy I’ve ever heard. It makes everything clear.
Yeah that was a golden moment. Very clear.
great video and great paper, thanks!
Joe the Goat
Man, you really are a genius. I enjoy your lecture. Love from Bangladesh for you. 🇧🇩
This is beautiful because I always saw the Kalam and its defenses as a neat novelty, since I don’t see any issues with infinitism… But I am curious to see the response that would arise if Bertuzzi gathered Craig, Koons, and Rasmussen or Kenny Pearce.
Hii Joe, I'm sorry if this random but want to know whether saying "_omnipotence_ means the ability to perform all logically possible tasks" is ad hoc redefinition of the term... Is it?
Love your videos and work, you've been an immense help in my philosophy journey. Thank you ❤
Hey Joe! Loved your channel and your videos. Found out about you from Alex O’Connor.
Do you ever plan to do a video about natural law(Thomas Aquinas) and its problems? Would love to see it ☺️
Welcome aboard! It's great to have you here :)
Here's something close to the video you're looking for. I ultimately find several of Dustin's objections convincing: th-cam.com/video/dPen831EkYg/w-d-xo.html&pp=ygUUbmF0dXJhbCBsYXcgY3J1bW1ldHQ%3D
@@MajestyofReason thank you so much!! 🫶🏻
Please look into the problem of personal identity and open individualism and make a video about it
Infinite divisibility of space!!! I am agnostic about it, but if it is discrete, the parts will still bear a relation.
And a Second Question Joe.
Recently I have been interested in the philosophy of science and religion. I have noticed many times that from some theistic positions biological evolution is questioned saying that it is "just a theory" almost equating it to an opinion or at the same level as a religious belief.
I certainly understand that a philosopher (whether theist or not) can argue that the natural sciences have an epistemology and ontology that is not questioned by scientists.
I also understand that scientists do not focus so much on questioning the ontology and epistemology of their disciplines because in that case they would be doing philosophy but not science. However, I also understand that the above does not invalidate the knowledge that has been obtained about reality from the natural sciences.
What I would really like to understand is how the natural sciences conclude that "evolution" and "natural selection" "exist" and that this theory/fact is not simply an opinion that is formulated ad hoc to replace God (as some theists would say ).
I also know that in principle a theist can believe in God or hold the proposition "God exists" without denying that evolution "exists" or that it is a "fact" (but that is not what interests me at the moment).
Could you please recommend bibliography?
I'm a theist and I have to agree that many layman theists are very confused by the word "theory," as in "just a theory." People like Ken Ham do not represent the majority of theists and hopelessly make us look bad. William Lane Craig and many others outright condemn him publicly.
I am an atheist, and i think science can't, even in principle, prove or conclude with certainty anything. In science, there is only the most probable or plausible explanation for phenomenon. Some atheist philosophers like Kane B. believe science can't provide any true knowledge of the world, and all things discovered by science are actually just very useful constructs.
The difference is that scientific theories are not mere opinions or assertions based on immediate intellectual seemings they are well-supported explanations based on empirical evidence, sensory seemings and logical reasoning that has been tested and is falsifiable. Evolutionary theory is consistent with findings in genetics, paleontology, biogeography, and other fields. In science, a theory is a well-substantiated explanation, while a fact is an observation. Evolution is both a fact (observed change in species over time) and a theory (the explanatory framework of how and why these changes occur).
Some bibliography
"The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" by Thomas S. Kuhn
"Conjectures and Refutations" by Karl Popper
"Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science" by Peter Godfrey-Smith
Evolution and natural selection "exist", because of it's robust predictive power, and becase it has more testing behind it than the theory of gravity. Both natural selection and evolution in general can be observed in labotary setting. Most famous test is the still ongoing one called E. coli long-term evolution experiment, that constantly both validates our current theory and provides additional evidence of how it works. The way we gather evidence for evolution is no different from other fields of science, and as such its results are as reliable as every other field. Unless one is willing to throw all of science under the buss, then they ought to accept the theory of evolution. General science denial would be its own discussion, so I will not comment on that.
It is not ad hoc attempt to "replace God", because it in no shape or form actually replaces God if you just are willing to accomodate scientific observations into your theology. You can fully believe in God, and also know evolution is true, as majority of Christians do. The people that originally formulated ideas behind evolution were Christians, so from the start evolution is not meant to "replace God". To say evolution "replaces God" is like saying that theory of star formation "replaces God". There are thousands of ways to let the two concepts co-exist. For example, if you are willing to say "that is the natural mechanism that God chose to use in the creation of our world," then there is no tension between these things at all.
As some theists would say, evolution denial is pseudo science with no good science backing it.
Another pro-evolution theist here. The “just a theory” model relies on a naive simplification of what a theory is in science. Even from a broadly anti-realist perspective on science, I would notice that evolution is an observed phenomenon that makes novel, testable predictions and has been overwhelmingly successful in its application. Everyone is justified in an ontological commitment to macroevolution. (Not necessarily every single model of macroevolution since they conflict, but to the general theory)
Alex's "in the pub" explanation was so clear
Joe, do you think the UPD could also resolve the grandfather paradox, allowing for backwards time travel with constraints?
Great question! Actually, what many have called the standard solution to the grandfather paradox in the literature is a deflationary solution very similar to the UPD :)
Hey Joe, I was watching your conversation with Alex on ontological argument and you said that you don't think that something can explain itself on why it exists. Does that mean if there is a necessary entity, its existence is a brute fact?
If it exists, it exists.
If it does not, it doesn't.
Personally, I believe it is a brute fact... that it does NOT exist.
A necessary entity could depend on another necessary being N2 that could explain why the first necessary being exists.
So, in mapping the Bernadette paradoxes onto a Kalam argument, what is the "pair"?
The pair is causation and infinite past times. You can't have both. What UPD does is create a metaphysical dilemma. Causal finitism accepts causation and denies infinite past times. This is an acceptable resolution of the UPD. The other acceptable resolution is the denial of causation, and the acceptance of infinite past times. The latter is certainly an interesting choice, kind of a Humean view.
So it is Leibniz Compossibility in the end?
1:14:42 What a fantastic counterexample! Next time you gotta lead with this!
...
And now I know with certainty that light bulbs can't exist.
How is the UPD any different than the law of non-contradiction?
Hi Joe .Would you be so kind as to explain to us how theistic philosophers (Like Enric F. Gel ) support the idea that if theism is true, there must be such a thing as "divine judgment"?
What do you understand by “divine judgment” and what scenarios could be expected if that proposition were true?
Even if theism were true, would the concepts of "condemnation" and "salvation" also be true? Do they make any sense?
Why should a god judge not only the actions but also the beliefs of finite and limited creatures?
Finally, regarding discussions about the fundamental nature of reality: Is Believing different from Knowing?
Can you believe that a proposition is true and know that it is true?
If our prejudices and experiences influence our beliefs and apparent certainties (or de facto certainties) which then influence our actions, is "divine judgment" fair?
Could you please recommend bibliography?
being the offended and at the same time being the judge of the offensor is considered a bad practice, a conflict of interests in civilized societies. I don't see how God could be both, and at the same time be fair and just. and remember: God (any flavor) has no needs. what would be the point of judging and rewarding/punishing people?
Philosophers need to study mereology!
Suppose there is eternal being paving tile on the infinite floor from eternity , He chooses the colour based on previous tile
He chose white for the last tile bcz previous tile is white , he choose white for previous bcz it’s previous tile is white so on ad infinitum
Now we have contrastive explanations why each tile is white , since every tile being white entails the floor being white ,we have explanation why floor is white
The explanation of why floor is white has to external to it (else circular) ,but the colour of each tile is dependent upon colour of other tiles which is part of the floor ,so we don’t have an (external) explanation why floor is white
When do you think you will be done publishing things on causal finitism? I would like to make a response eventually, but I would want to wait until everything is finished before I actually respond.
At 45:35 I thought Alex said 'magicians', but then I realized it was 'logicians'. Well, they're essentially the same anyway!
Hey peeps
Generally when you've explained the Grim Reaper Paradox in the past, I've often thought:
"I know philosophy majors don't have to take calculus, but they have at least *heard* of it, right?!"
But from this video, I think I finally understand why calculus doesn't actually negate the paradox.
Do elaborate
About the last bit ("The UDP can be applied more generally in other domains"), I vaguely worry it could lead to some skeptical conclusions. Don't we infer a lot of substantive stuff from logical contradictions ? Maybe there's some parody argument to be made ("no you can't infer that the speed of light is finite ! only that this two propositions are incompatible").
Thanks for the excellent comment! Another commenter made a similar point. While I think it's a fascinating and important point, I don't think it's quite right. Here's what I wrote in response to that other commenter (slightly modified):
"The UPD does not, however, have worryingly skeptical conclusions, since the UPDist can provide a correct, principled account of exactly how and when we can determine, from the inconsistency of a conjunction (P&Q&…), that one of the individual conjuncts P is metaphysically impossible (and hence the UPDist can provide a correct account of when we can infer substantive metaphysical hypotheses about what's possible and impossible from an inconsistent conjunction). In particular, this happens exactly when this linking premise is true:
(Linking Premise) If P is metaphysically possible, then the inconsistent conjunction (P&Q&…) is (logically or metaphysically) possible.
If (Linking Premise) is true, then P’s metaphysical impossibility clearly follows. By contrast, if (Linking Premise) is false, then P could be metaphysically possible even though the conjunction (P&Q&…) is inconsistent and impossible, and hence we cannot infer P’s metaphysical impossibility from the inconsistency/impossibility of (P&Q&…). Thus, the plausibility of (Linking Premise), when considering any given contradictory/paradoxical set of claims, is a metric the UPDist (and everyone else) can (and should) use to assess whether we can infer that an individual conjunct is metaphysically impossible. And the UPDist holds that, at least in the cases of Benardete paradoxes, (Linking Premise) is *not* particularly plausible - or, at minimum, that the case for accepting it has not been adequately made. (To get the relevant (Linking Premise) here, we let P be the relevant infinity involved, such as continuous space or time, or infinite causal chains, or an actual infinite, or whatever.)
So no, I do not think the UPD has unwanted skeptical implications."
Thanks again for the great question! :)
@@MajestyofReason That makes sense, thanks :)
Excellent video! Btw, do you think the universe is eternal?
#COYG
I may be completely off here. Could one way of illustrating this be that 0 casues 1 only if -1 causes 0. All this shows is that it can't be true at the same time that -1 doesn't cause 0 and that 0 causes 1. This also basically applies to infinite sequences but we need to formalize it to be accurate given all the numbers in the series that could be one way only if all these other numbers are a another way and vice versa.
Doesn't the evidence of the violation of Bell's theorem blow up the Patchwork Principle? All events and "things" in a universe have entanglements between them that are not attenuated by only distance and time, therefore arguments for mutual isolation are muted.
Given the Patchwork principle, we could say ;
* If it is possible that Joe sits on a chair and is comfortable, and also, Alex sits on a chair and comfortable,
* we could have a possible world where Joe sits on a chair which is positioned on top of Alex, who's also sitting on a chair, and both are comfortable .
It seems to me that given the Patchwork principle, this would be absurd because, Alex could not be said to be SITTING and COMFORTABLE, while haven Joe sit on a Chair that is positioned on top of him.
That’s interesting! I wonder though, are we failing to patch in the original Joe system, if in the final product that Joe system is different, now feeling a great weight upon him.
Gravity is causing us trouble here, making our systems not just be next to each other in space, but interact and change each other. I’m not sure if it’s appropriate to try and take gravity out of the picture, or put a barrier between them.
I sort of intuit that if the patchwork principle is only trying to establish logical possibility, or metaphysical possibility (which is vague to me), then this won’t be a problem because we are only showing it entails a physical impossibility. It’s not clear to me though :)
@@HeyHeyHarmonicaLukeIf it is possible to have two possible sceneries and yet, reach a contradiction or absurd conclusion by mere arrangement of the sceneries, then this undermines the Patchwork principle and validates the UPD.
This is an interesting thought! It does seem plausible that [being comfortable] is an intrinsic feature of Alex (it's a matter of his internal mental and physical states). So the patchwork principle does, indeed, imply that it's possible for their to be a duplicate of me (a human exactly like me in all intrinsic respects), sitting on a chair, which itself is on top of a duplicate of Alex, who is comfortable. If this is absurd, then this is yet another absurd consequence of the patchwork principle. (I think proponents of the patchwork principle will just say it's not absurd -- it's genuinely possible.)
@@MajestyofReason How many bullets are patchworkers willing to bite 😂
@@HeyHeyHarmonicaLuke
I think your answer is correct. No one ever claimed it was possible for Alex to sit in a chair comfortably _with 100-ish extra pounds on him._
Halfway thru the video, I'm wondering, what about this solution to the paradox: you can't have an infinite number of things. You can have sequences that go on forever, so for any number you pick I can pick a bigger number, and in that sense numbers are infinite. But I can't collect all the numbers into a set, regardless what mathematics after Cantor says.
This also solves the problem of a book with a title like, "Everything you didn't learn at Harvard Law School"
I guess if you're talking about causal finitism, then you've already dealt with and dismissed ordinary finitism
@@txikitofandango What’s the largest possible number? Theoretically that could go on forever, but whatever number we stop at, it will be infinitely smaller than infinity.
Joe I thought you were a causal finitist yourself?
I feel betrayed
I just watched the introduction of the video with Adherent Apologetics. I feel betrayed. Disliked, unsubbed, reported, blocked. (jk)
Joe, if the UPD posits that the combination of 2 or more logical principles which form the contradiction is invalid, that would mean that the metaphysician who is grappling with infinite causal chains must discard either the infinite past or the element of causation in order to create a coherent metaphysic.
I think you are mistaken in seeing the UPD as a "solution" to the Bernadete paradox that competes with something like causal finitism. Rather, the UPD is a tool which reduces the potential solutions by identifying contradictory suppositions. Causal finitism, temporal finitism, and spatial finitism are all solutions that satisfy the UPD, though it is equally satisfying to the UPD to say that there are infinite ordered sets, just that they are not contingent, though they may appear so.
The UPD actually bolsters logical finitism by enumerating the potential solutions.
I would also say that the "profligate" nature of a stance is not really an argument against a stance. This argument against spatial finitism by way of profligacy is akin to arguing against the proposition that there are no unmarried bachelors because one hasnt taken a complete census of all bachelors to see if they indeed are unmarried.
I see it as a kind of Occam's razor moment. The argument is not that spacial or temporal finitism is incorrect, the argument is that it's not necessary for you to adopt it if you want to avoid the paradox. Our knowledge about the nature of things or even scientific knowledge is vastly insufficient to confidently stand by either finitism or infinitism. Therefore any solution that posits all these vast claims about the nature of time and space will always be less rational to pick than a solution which does not require that you stand by an argument that does require it.
It's not like Joe says he got it all figured out and causal finitism is moot, it's a proof that even though people like Craig and other proponents of causal finitism ( especially those who are theisticly motivated ) claim that they can prove that causal finitism is necessary because of this paradox, in fact, can not prove it.
The best way I can put it is a kind of
"A: I got it proven
B: No you didn't, here is why" situation.
To respond to your last paragraph, it's a false analogy because unmarried bachelors are contradictory, while causal finitism is not, it's just claiming things we have no way of proving at the moment, at all. Again, the problem is not that it might not be correct, the problem is that as a solution to the Benerdette paradoxes it's a hyper specific metaphysically insanely heavy baggage, that gets Occam's razored on any day of the week.
@@istvanvincze7411 "Occam's razor" is a heuristic, and not that good of one. I would reject that Occam's razor has any logical validity at all. After all, if there was a cake that was baked, we know there must be at least one baker. A single baker can bake a cake. But sometimes two bakers bake a cake. Occam's razor creates false results in this situation. (Occam's razor suggests that only one baker is necessary, and there were actually two). I think you have a misunderstanding that Occam's razor proves or disproves anything, which is not the case.
That said, my unmarried bachelor analogy might be better if I invert it. Causal infinitism is like saying there is a married bachelor.
@@istvanvincze7411 I think my question you is, do you think that there is causation? If you accept causation, you have to accept causal finitism. To deny causal finitism, you must deny the causal part.
The UPD says this:
"Pick one : Causation or Infinitism"
So which do you pick?
@@coreygossman6243 I think you misunderstand what Occam's razor fundamentally is. In your baker analogy, it is not according to the method if you insist there was only one baker because only one baker is necessary. Occam's razor simply states that if you insist there were two, you have a bigger ontologial burden and therefore a heavier burden of proof. It's a "razor" because you can dismiss their argument if and only if they still insist that they are right to believe there were two for the same exact reason I think there was one, the validity of this clam to me is self evidently correct. If they can provide that proof, good for them, we have covered a bigger "ontological ground" and have cautiously moved further than without that evidence. If for you it isn't intuitively obvious why this is a good heruistic, we have a difference of intuition, or I am wrong to assume the validity of Occam's razor is intuitively correct. I expect this to delve into grounds that are radically different to Benardete paradoxes and causality and I don't want to debate till kingdom come about this so I think it's wise to end the discussion here. I only brouight it up anyway because Occam's razor in this case only applies to people like WLC who insist finitism is the only solution because the other options are "metaphysically absurd", something that he never actually demonstrated, but for the purposes of this discussion more importantly, he doesn't recognize the bigger burden of proof the razor puts on him. It's not actually necessary to discuss UPD or finitism, unless you positively accept all of the extra stuff such a world might demand.
Also, we are glossing over one big fact that was stated in the interview. Causal finitism does NOT dispel the paradox. You can construct a non causal Benardete paradox, for it is simply an infinite beginningless set of things where it is true for each member of the set that something is true/false if and only if it is not the case for all the other members of the set. Causal finitism is vastly insufficient to get rid of the paradox, there are still infinite Benardete paradox configurations in a temporally or spacially finite universe. All you need is an infinite amount of... anything, really, in any configuration you choose. You need total, absolute finitism with respect to all that exists and could exist to fully evade the paradox from that side.
To steelman your argument, if I grant you that I still must choose between the two, here is my choice:
No choice. I am a total skeptic on the matter, and can not confirm or deny either worldview, or even consciously affirm either. I do intuitively lean towards infinity, but it matters none what "feels right in my gut", so I will not defend it, since I don't consciously support it.
@@istvanvincze7411 the point is that Occam's razor has no validity in fact, which you seem to agree. I agree that it is useful in the realm of theory, so long as we remember that even beautiful theories need not be fact.
As for causal finitism not solving the paradox, I agree. All it is is the choice to say "Okay, I'm going to try to understand physics and metaphysics, and so I have to make a choice between causal finitism and non-causal infinity. You say that you lean towards infinity over causation. To abandon causation also abandons the very basis of much of science. Are you prepared to abandon this basis?
So, if you also add in the observation that every form of the paradox is applying a boolean to a non-boolean spectrum, then you've constructed a more directly philosophical Schroedinger's Cat. In that case, perhaps the solution is quantum mechanics. (not being serious)
What happened to your kalam series with Rationality rule?
Long story short, (i) Stephen is busy, and (ii) the information that would be covered in the rest of the series has been covered in the various videos in my Kalam playlist, including (a) exploring arguments for and against the causal principle, (b) the scientific case concerning the universe's beginning, (c) the old Kalam's case for the universe's beginning (Hilbert's Hotel, successive addition argument, etc.), (d) the new Kalam's case for the universe's beginning (causal finitism, paradoxes, etc.), and (e) stage two of the Kalam.
@@MajestyofReason Thanks
Why do people take infinity paradoxes seriously? Are they not just thought experiments in our imagination, and convey a problem with our language rather than reality, which just "is"?
The issues is not with language but with what is being represented by that language. The law of non contradiction is not the language used to express the law. The language is an attempt at describing something that exists prior to its description.
The issues is not with language but with what is being represented by that language. The law of non contradiction is not the language used to express the law. The language is an attempt at describing something that exists prior to its description.
@@dantedocerto Coincidentally, I reject the law of non-contradiction (as something universal) and embrace non-classical logic. Likewise, I don't think any external reality is being represented or described by these thought experiments.
Because the question inevitably arises with the occurence of an event
There may be a solution to the paradox. If you break a pencil in half and then a half in quarter, a quarter in an eight etc. in infinite pieces what will be the total length of the infinite set of pieces? Clearly it will be the length of the pencil.
You can prove that assembling the infinite set of pieces will sum up to a pencil length.
Yet when you ask to identify which piece will complete the pencil you will not be able to identify one.
In fact you can prove that no single piece will complete the pencil just like you can prove no concrete reaper will kill Bob.
Then again if the infinite pieces can be integrated into a pencil why can't the actions of the infinite reapers not be integrated into Bob getting killed?
Hi Joe, really interesting video but i have a question.
If i understand correctly this is the unsatisfiable pair of assumptions:
A. The linearly ordered set S has no first member
B. For all x in S, E at x iff E nowhere before x
If this true then why doesnt a past infinite universe requires both of these? Lets say E is me writing this comment at 2024.06.15 9:00, etc (exactly now) and I only write this comment now if I have never done so in the past. In which case either it has to be false that i write a comment now if i have never done so in the past or the past is not infinite (if UPD is true).
This sounds a bit like the Euler problem in your paper in a sense since im asking why an action is not possible. However in this case all possible actions are such actions arent they? Every action in the universe is such that it never happened before. So its unlike the Euler problem since there is no possible alternative 'path' to take that doesnt involve the paradox if the past is infinite.
Yes, it is similar to the Euler problem. The Euler problem refers to problems in combinatorics or graph theory, where paths or solutions need to satisfy certain conditions, often involving traversing edges or nodes without repetition. If every possible action is such that it has never happened before then this creates a unique challenge compared to the Euler problem. In the Euler problem, alternative paths or solutions exist, but in an infinite past where each action "must" be unique, there are no alternative "paths" that avoid the paradox. This leads to the conclusion that under these conditions, the very nature of actions and time become paradoxical. If every action in the universe is such that it never happened before, then the condition of uniqueness applies universally. Thus, to avoid this, we can simply suggest that there was a first action ( an initial transition between an initial state and the next). Another approach can be to consider cyclical models of B time, where all events are interdependent. This aligns with a form of perdurantism.
We can even modify B. For all x in S, E at x iff E nowhere before x. We can say E occurs if certain causal events or states have been met. For instance, E (writing a comment) happens if a particular sequence of discussions or events led or necessarily entail the decision to write the comment. Thus, E is necessarily entailed by the prior sequence of events or E happens if some threshold has been reached. Similarly, it can be said that E occurs if the number of previous actions F reaches a certain number, or if a particular cumulative condition is met over time. In this scenario, the occurrence of writing the comment depends on more complex conditions rather than the simple non-occurrence of writing any comment before.
Thanks for the comment! So, presumably we’re letting S be the set of past times linearly ordered by the ‘earlier than’ relation, and ‘E’ is you writing this comment. We should now ask: is it true that, for all times t in the past, you write this comment at t if and only if you didn’t write this comment before t? *This* is what we need to actually fit the unsatisfiable pair. But, crucially, this is certainly *not* true. For instance, it was clearly not true at some time t* a billion years ago that you write this comment at t* iff you don’t write this comment before t*. For this would imply that , and neither of those is true. (To see why this implication holds, notice that the biconditional implies the conditional , which is logically equivalent to .) So it is definitely *not* true that you satisfy the B condition here. It is not true, that, for all past times t, you write your comment at t iff you didn’t write your comment before t. It may be true that, for any past time t, a *necessary* condition for you writing your comment at t is never having written it before. But it is certainly not a *sufficient* condition, and thus there is no threat that B is satisfied. So there is no threat here that you cannot do a mundane action. :)
@@MajestyofReason thats a good point, I totally missed that. Thanks for answering!
Why can't we just say that a logical statement made of an infinite recursion is only solvable if it can be represented with a finite equivalent set. If there is no way to represent it in a finite it logically follows that the recursion can not be solved because the solution is a finite equivalent representation. Basically some infinites are irreducible.
The causal finitist solution makes no sense to me.
It's like they derive a contradiction, rightly conclude therefrom that the scenario is impossible, and then forget that and ask why it is impossible! Absurd!
To me this all just felt like just saying “paradox bad, therefore any world with paradox is logically impossible. Case closed”
Fax bro
@@phillwithskill1364 are they not saying it’s simply impossible as a matter of logical deduction a priori rather then needing to posit a metaphysical explanation?
@@tobiasyoder Yes you are right. I misread your original comment.
Causal finitism is compatible with atheism. I dont understand the motivations for thinking absolute infinites are metaphysically possible. They are contradictory notions. An ongoing process cannot be a completed process.
Absolutely agree.
Causal finitism is definitely compatible with atheism, yes! As for the motivations for thinking infinites are metaphysically possible, I recommend checking out, e.g., 56:15 of (th-cam.com/video/foXCrhSJjk4/w-d-xo.htmlsi=8vZLNOWl2sdkyiy4 ) and 1:18:22 of (th-cam.com/video/Q5NVfSZJkvo/w-d-xo.htmlsi=7e19gsPC_02EJob- ). Finally, infinites are not by themselves contradictory. To be sure, some stories involving infinity are contradictory, but the same is true of taxis! We also have provably consistent mathematical models involving infinite collections of things.
@@MajestyofReason I do believe potential infinites are metaphysically possible but not actual infinites because it is contradictory. An infinite set is a potential infinite, not an actual infinite. For e.g. the set of changes or events is a potential infinite, I see infinity as an ongoing process, not a completed process and that is why actual infinites are metaphysically impossible. Ofcourse, we may differ on the way we define metaphysical possibility, but to me, a metaphysical possibility must be empirically verifiable, and an infinite number of events in the past conflicts with the metaphysical possibility of any present experience. Thus, an infinite regress must too also have a beginning and if that is the case, then it is still causal finitism.
just a casual reminder: in REALITY, no contradictions exist. "REALITY" is the set of everything that exists. contradictions and paradoxes only exist at a conceptual level.
@@CMVMic believers won't like the idea that God is unable to populate an infinite universe with infinite beings. I mean, if actual infinites are impossible, that would set a limit to God's omnipotence.
Didn't you write a paper in favor of casual finitism? I swear I am so confused.
Listen to the preliminary notes beginning at 1:12 in th-cam.com/video/xqG_ndPwjJA/w-d-xo.htmlsi=b7cmUR1KWnssPHcm
Don't these paradoxes argue against eternity, which many Religions boast?
Well, kind of, but they have (bad) answers to to that. William Lane Craig tries to say an infinite past is impossible because it would be an "actual infinite" but an infinite future is fine because it's a "potential infinite".
Joe tears WLC apart (very nicely!) in a previous video. WLC makes some basic errors understanding how infinities work and should take a discrete math course. It's in the video on Hilbert's hotel, if I recall correctly.
@@PlaylistWatching1234 Intuition, and philosophical arguments, may suggest there can not be an infinite regress, but the reality is, we don't KNOW that it's not possible. Christians tell me they KNOW it's not possible but then refer to WLC as their source.
if actual infinities are impossible, that sets a limit to God's omnipotence. but, why is that? is it because God's nature, or is there some kind of external limitation that God cannot defeat? mmhh...
They are used to argue against an infinite regress not eternity.
Joe wouldn't causal finitism offer more explanatory scope and power in solving paradoxes like Thompson's Lamp Paradox and the Infinity lottery paradox (both of whom are immuned from the UPD). The UPD wouldn't solve these paradoxes mentioned but causal finitism would. How about the very intuitive metaphysical principles that you've stated before in your paper step by step for causal principle like the Step Principle and Ineffective Principle. These principles would be violated by Thompson's Lamp but causal finitism can solve Thomson's Lamp and thus avoid violation of these very intuitive principles.
Moreover, there is a huge price to pay by rejecting Lewis' combination principle and accepting UPD. The Combination Principle is a very intuitive principle that we use all the time in our everyday common experience. So through induction we can know that this principle is true. We constantly imagine possible scenarios and combine these possible scenarios to see if the combination is possible. Denying this principle will make us modally blind and not know what really is metaphysically possible. This principle seems to be also widely accepted by philosophers as many philosophers would conclude that time travel is metaphysically impossible on the basis of the patchwork combination principle combining both time travel and the killing of the grandfather. The other major problem with denying the patchwork principle is that you get this mysterious metaphysical force that stops these combinations of possible scenarios from occurring. This seems absurd right. Therefore, the patchwork principle cannot really be rejected right.
Would love to know your thoughts and rejoinder to what I've said. God bless and Go Arsenal!!!
P.S. do you think that you can ever convert to Christianity? Or has your mind been made and you can never possibly convert? Thank you sir.
Great questions! I'll respond when I'm back at my computer :)
(Part 1/2) Thanks for the wonderful comment!
You write: “wouldn't causal finitism offer more explanatory scope and power in solving paradoxes like Thompson's Lamp Paradox and the Infinity lottery paradox (both of whom are immuned from the UPD). The UPD wouldn't solve these paradoxes mentioned but causal finitism would.”
Great question. Here are five responses:
First, in the paper, we’re only concerned with evaluating solutions to Benardete Paradoxes specifically. In effect, we’re asking: narrowing our focus to Benardete Paradoxes, what solves them best? And for the three reasons mentioned in the video and the paper, the UPD is the answer to this question. This also relates to a point Alex made near the end of the video: one might have reason to think causal finitism is true from reflection on other sorts of considerations - perhaps even other paradoxes. But our conclusion remains that, at least focusing on Benardete Paradoxes, the best solution thereto is the UPD.
Second, solutions that are exactly structurally similar to the UPD can be given in the context of those other paradoxes. Sure, the specific version of the UPD at issue in Benardete paradoxes won’t be relevant to those other paradoxes, but the specific version of the UPD at issue in Benardete Paradoxes is just a variant of a broader strategy for solving infinitary paradoxes: namely, the deflationary strategy of holding that the paradoxes simply involve jointly inconsistent (or jointly absurd) collections of statements involving infinity, and that while each individual statement may be possible, it’s simply their conjunction which is impossible. This ‘unsatisfiable conjunction diagnosis’ or UCD has very broad scope and can address the paradoxes you mention (together with Benardete Paradoxes too, since the UPD is just a specific application of the UCD.)
Third, even if causal finitism has more explanatory scope than the UPD in some respects, it has much less explanatory scope than the UPD in other respects. For instance, causal finitism is powerless to kill non-causal Benardete Paradoxes, which is a huge swathe of paradoxes involving brute correlation, grounding dependence, and more.
Fourth, even if causal finitism has more explanatory scope than the UPD in some respects, this must be weighed against the plethora of advantages the UPD enjoys over causal finitism - advantages in terms of (i) being overwhelmingly simpler, (ii) not committing us to a radical, deeply implausible, profoundly profligate, and widely rejected spatiotemporal finitist program, (iii) not conflicting with our best modal epistemological tools, and so on. In my estimation, these advantages of the UPD *more* than compensate for any disadvantage in terms of explanatory scope. (And again, I reject that the UPD suffers from an explanatory scope disadvantage.)
Fifth, causal finitism doesn’t actually adequately solve these other paradoxes. For there are also non-causal variants of Thomson’s lamp. For instance, just imagine that instead of someone toggling the lamp on and off infinitely many times, the lamp just uncausedly turns off and on infinitely many times. Causal finitism is powerless to solve this version of the exact same paradox. And as for infinite lottery paradoxes, Daniel Rubio very nicely explains in his review of Pruss’ book why causal finitism doesn’t solve these paradoxes. See drive.google.com/file/d/1158KOqbpLHi5pbblYob-ErokFpetyWtY/view?usp=sharing
(Part 2/2) You then write: “How about the very intuitive metaphysical principles that you've stated before in your paper step by step for causal principle like the Step Principle and Ineffective Principle. These principles would be violated by Thompson's Lamp but causal finitism can solve Thomson's Lamp and thus avoid violation of these very intuitive principles.”
Another excellent question, and I’m genuinely honored that you’re familiar with some of my other work! :)
I have three responses here:
First, after reflecting on these matters in much more detail over the years since I wrote that Erkenntnis paper, those principles don’t strike me as very intuitive. I think they have *some* degree of intuitive plausibility, but I don't have strong intuitions here - at best, they're quite weak. And in any case, I think we may have good reason to distrust some of these metaphysical intuitions in infinitary contexts (cf. my discussion on Adherent Apologetics linked in my Kalam playlist).
Second, causal finitism - or, at least, many of the motivations for causal finitism - also conflicts with lots of my intuitions, such as the intuition that it’s possible for spacetime to be continuous, or for space to be infinite, and so on.
Third, and most importantly, causal finitism doesn’t actually solve Thomson’s Lamp, as explained above.
You continue: “Moreover, there is a huge price to pay by rejecting Lewis' combination principle and accepting UPD.”
I have two responses:
First, you don’t need to reject the recombination principle to accept the UPD. The UPDist can easily accept the recombination principle. As I explain in my Synthese article linked in the description, the recombination principle does *not* license the inference to the possibility of a paradoxical patched-together world conditional on the possibility of an infinite past or infinite causal chains, and hence the recombination principle does not lead to temporal or causal finitism. The UPDist can therefore easily accept the recombination principle. Likewise, the inference from the recobination principle to temporal finitism or causal finitism assumes that the realized power/disposition of a Reaper is intrinsic to it, and this assumption is false (as Troy and I show in our JPhil article linked in the description). Thus, once again, the UPDist can accept the recombination principle without worrying that it implies a metaphysically substantive solution to Benardete paradoxes.
Second, even if the UPDist had to reject the principle, I don’t think there’s a huge cost here. For the reasons specified in our Mind article, I don’t find the recombination principle plausible; theists already have to reject it, as do Aristotelians about causal powers, as do Aristotelians about laws, as do origin essentialists about individuals, as do origin essentialists about biological kinds, and so on. The recombination principle conflicts with many independently motivated views in philosophy and metaphysics, and it has come under sustained attack by anti-Humean philosophers.
You continue: “The Combination Principle is a very intuitive principle that we use all the time in our everyday common experience. So through induction we can know that this principle is true. We constantly imagine possible scenarios and combine these possible scenarios to see if the combination is possible. Denying this principle will make us modally blind and not know what really is metaphysically possible.”
This is not true. As we point out in our Mind article, we can deny the *unrestricted* recombination principle and replace it with a *restricted* recombination principle containing a consistency-respecting proviso. As we show in the paper, this principle is perfectly sufficient to vindicate our ordinary recombinatorial and modal reasoning. So no, there is no risk of modal skepticism, since we can still maintain a robust recombination principle with a consistency-respecting proviso, and such a principle delivers all the same verdicts as the unrestricted recombination principle in ordinary contexts.
And in any case, the UPDist can easily accept the unrestricted recombination principle.
You say: “This principle seems to be also widely accepted by philosophers as many philosophers would conclude that time travel is metaphysically impossible on the basis of the patchwork combination principle combining both time travel and the killing of the grandfather.”
“Widely accepted” is, I think, an overstatement. Philosophers are divided into Humeans and anti-Humeans, and there’s a roughly equal split among them (although my sense is that there are more anti-Humeans, and the PhilPapers survey indicates this too - see the question about laws of nature). The significant majority of Humeans accept the recombination principle, whereas the significant majority of anti-Humean reject it. Also, the ‘standard solution’ in the philosophical literature to the grandfather paradox is a deflationary solution that allows for the possibility of time travel (but simply says that, in any possible world in which one time travels, one fails to kill one’s grandfather for some reason or other). See Lewis, Vihvelin, etc.
And in any case, this would all spell disaster for theism if true, since the recombination principle is inconsistent with theism (as we explain in our paper, in the video, and as Pruss forcefully argues in his 2018 book.)
You say: “The other major problem with denying the patchwork principle is that you get this mysterious metaphysical force that stops these combinations of possible scenarios from occurring. This seems absurd right. Therefore, the patchwork principle cannot really be rejected right.”
This is a very odd point, since it is directly addressed in the video (see the mysterious force objection section) and in our paper (see the section on the mysterious force objection). It is simply false that there must be a mysterious metaphysical force that stops the combinations.
As for your final question, of course it’s possible that I become Christian. I don’t know how likely it is (though it’s not super likely given my current evidence), but it isn’t impossible.
@adamc8113 though causal finitism, defending God is the first cause of everything, is a very simple and possible solution, it does not excludes the possibility that God is a lesser deity created by an übergod and endowed with the powers required to create the universe and rule over it. and just like a 2D "stick man" could be forever unaware of 3D beings, and 3D beings could be forever unaware of God (if not for God's voluntary interaction), God can be unaware of an übergod. would Christianity exist if God had decided to stay hidden and not reveal himself to mankind, send Jesus, allow spiritual beings to interact with us, etc? absolutely not!
@@MajestyofReason (Part 1/2) Thank you so much for your response sir I have a few rejoinders to your comments and would love to know your thoughts!
First you write: "First, in the paper, we’re only concerned with evaluating solutions to Benardete Paradoxes specifically. In effect, we’re asking: narrowing our focus to Benardete Paradoxes, what solves them best? And for the three reasons mentioned in the video and the paper, the UPD is the answer to this question. This also relates to a point Alex made near the end of the video: one might have reason to think causal finitism is true from reflection on other sorts of considerations - perhaps even other paradoxes. But our conclusion remains that, at least focusing on Benardete Paradoxes, the best solution thereto is the UPD."
The problem here is that it seems that there's a stalemate between two solutions to the Bernadette Paradox: mainly causal finitism and UPD. To break the stalemate we might need to refer to other considerations to see which would have more explanatory scope. Now from considering other situations involving infinite paradoxes, causal finitism would have the more explanatory power as many of these infinite paradoxes are immune to the UPD (and I know you've responded to the Thompson's Lamp and Infinite fair lottery to which I'll respond later in the same comment).
You write: "Second, solutions that are exactly structurally similar to the UPD can be given in the context of those other paradoxes. Sure, the specific version of the UPD at issue in Benardete paradoxes won’t be relevant to those other paradoxes, but the specific version of the UPD at issue in Benardete Paradoxes is just a variant of a broader strategy for solving infinitary paradoxes: namely, the deflationary strategy of holding that the paradoxes simply involve jointly inconsistent (or jointly absurd) collections of statements involving infinity, and that while each individual statement may be possible, it’s simply their conjunction which is impossible. This ‘unsatisfiable conjunction diagnosis’ or UCD has very broad scope and can address the paradoxes you mention (together with Benardete Paradoxes too, since the UPD is just a specific application of the UCD.)"
The problem here is that it seems that if you commit this deflatonary strategy of denying the conjuction of a collection of statements that lead to a contradiction then you're essentially just denying arguments in which the conclusion of the argument is a logical contradiction. You're denying arguments which try to prove certain positions as logically absurd. However, it seems that under that view it becomes virtually impossible to know what really is logically impossible. Like I said eaerlier the acceptance of UPD can lead to a metaphysical modal skepticism and so it seems that the acceptance of UCD can lead to a logical modal skepticism.
You write: "Third, even if causal finitism has more explanatory scope than the UPD in some respects, it has much less explanatory scope than the UPD in other respects. For instance, causal finitism is powerless to kill non-causal Benardete Paradoxes, which is a huge swathe of paradoxes involving brute correlation, grounding dependence, and more."
I think this has been answerd by Dr. Koons in his discussion with you on Intellectual Catholicism where he says that he spent the vast majority of his early career dealing with Yablo paradox and similar non causal bernadette Paradoxes showing that these do not involve logical contradictions right. If they don't involve logical contradictions then UPD wouldn't really solve anything in that context right.
You write: "Fourth, even if causal finitism has more explanatory scope than the UPD in some respects, this must be weighed against the plethora of advantages the UPD enjoys over causal finitism - advantages in terms of (i) being overwhelmingly simpler, (ii) not committing us to a radical, deeply implausible, profoundly profligate, and widely rejected spatiotemporal finitist program, (iii) not conflicting with our best modal epistemological tools, and so on. In my estimation, these advantages of the UPD more than compensate for any disadvantage in terms of explanatory scope. (And again, I reject that the UPD suffers from an explanatory scope disadvantage.)"
(i) So I actually think that causal and temporal finitism is actually overwhelmingly simpler than an infinite causal regression or temporal infinitism. Infinite causal regression and temporal infinitism seem so inconceivable and counter intuitive right and much more complex than causal and temporal finitism.
(ii) actually the spatiotemporal finitist program would be very much in line with many other philosophical arguments like the successive addition argument (I know you did a video on that which I have rejoinders to) and the argument from viciousness dependence regression by Loke as an example and what current modern science is telling us like the Big Bang Theory in conjuction with the BGV (Bourde-Guthe-Vilenkin) theory in regards to there being a boundary to space, time and matter. So a spatiostemporal finitist program would be very much in line with current scientific evidences for the beginning of the universe and other philosophical inquiries regarding finitism for the universe. So given philosophical and scientific investigations I wouldn't say that causal finitism is a radical and deeply implausible view. Even Oppy, the leading atheist philosopher of religion believes in it right.
(iii) How would causal finitism conflict with our best modal epistemological tools?
You write:
"Fifth, causal finitism doesn’t actually adequately solve these other paradoxes. For there are also non-causal variants of Thomson’s lamp. For instance, just imagine that instead of someone toggling the lamp on and off infinitely many times, the lamp just uncausedly turns off and on infinitely many times. Causal finitism is powerless to solve this version of the exact same paradox. And as for infinite lottery paradoxes, Daniel Rubio very nicely explains in his review of Pruss’ book why causal finitism doesn’t solve these paradoxes."
For the causal variants of Thomson's Lamp, causal finitism would solve those right in which UPD can't right. Now for the non causal variants of Thomson's Lamp many like Dr. Koons have argued that these don't result in logical contradictions. They argue that the conditionality of causation would have to be involved to get a strict logical contradiction as mentioned before. I've read Daniel Rubio's review of Pruss' book and there are things he says that I think are mistaken. For example he says "But the paradoxical results are simply the consequences of applying standard rules of rationality to infinitistic situations. At no point in the derivation is the possibility of the infinitistic situation presupposed." Well, we should apply standard rules of rationality to all situations including infinitistic situations if we suppose that the past is infinite and that actual infinities can metaphysically exist. If we grant that actual infinities can metaphysically exist and we want to assess the rationality of believing in the existence of an actual infinite I don't see why we wouldn't apply standard rules of rationality to infinity. Nothing says that these rules of rationality only apply to finite situations. Actually, if that were the case then you would be proving in a way causal finitism being the viable metaphysical thesis than infinitism as infinitism doesn't involve rules of rationality and that would just make infinitism irrational. So granting for the sake of the argument the existence of an actual infinite and applying the rules of rationality to that actual infinite, causal finitism would actually solve the absurdities that result from the actual infinite which the UPD wouldn't be able to solve.
Oh, something came from nothing fans
None of me, Dan, or Alex have ever claimed that something came from nothing lol
Causal finitism is compatible with atheism
I have yet to come across a single person who actually holds that view.
@@anthonydesimone502 Keep looking
@@disassembledpurity the search continues