Battle of Gettysburg | July 2, 1863 | 161st Anniversary Special
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- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 30 มิ.ย. 2024
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• Battle of Gettysburg- ...
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During the early morning hours of July 2, an already sleep-deprived Union Army of the Potomac commander, George Gordon Meade, arrived at Gettysburg to find fresh Federal soldiers reinforcing the battered elements of the army from the previous day's battle. After conferring with his subordinates, Meade rode out to look at the ground. He decided to stay and fight.
The Union position was a strong one.
Cemetery Hill dominated the surrounding landscape and offered the Union defenders a strong artillery position. Two key roads that led into Gettysburg from Maryland intersected just north of the hill. Those two roads were crucial avenues of resupply and, if necessary, retreat for the Union Army. The side controlling the hill controlled the field, but the position had one weakness. When he arrived the previous day to act in Meade's stead, Union Second Corps Commander Winfield Scott Hancock assessed the position and reported to Meade that it was strong, but the Confederates could turn its left flank.
This fact didn't escape Robert E. Lee's experienced eye, either. He astutely turned his attention to planning the action for July 2, devising a strategy that would test the mettle of the Union Army.
With Meade deciding to stay, Lee needed to determine the best way to knock the Federals off their strong position. A direct assault on Cemetery Hill could prove devastating for Lee's infantry as they would have to cross open farm fields to attack the hill. Subordinate commanders convinced Lee not to attack the Union Right near Culp's Hill. Just before dawn, Lee dispatched reconnaissance parties to determine the terrain on the Union left and the dispositions of the Army of the Potomac. One such party returned and reported no Union soldiers in the area of Little Round Top. After conferring with his commanders, Lee made his decision. James Longstreet, his trusted second-in-command, his "old warhorse," would take two divisions and, under concealment, get into position to attack the flank of the Union Line. Once Longstreet was in position. His orders directed him to attack north, along the Emmitsburg Road, and roll up the Union left. While Longstreet was executing this move [getting into position?], Ewell's Second Corps would demonstrate on the Union Right to prevent reinforcements from being sent to meet Longstreet. Ewell's demonstration would become an attack if Ewell thought it feasible.
It was a bold plan; one that Confederate General James Longstreet did not care for, but, ever the consummate soldier, he followed orders.
Longstreet's Corps, consisting of three divisions under Generals McLaws, Pickett, and Hood, was initially delayed due to the absence of Pickett's division, which was still over 20 miles away. Despite Longstreet's request to wait for Pickett, Lee urged action but acquiesced to Longstreet's request to wait for one of the brigades from Hood's division before commencing the attack. It would be nearly One in the afternoon before Longstreet's march began.
While Lee dealt with the logistics of implementing his plans, Meade had his own difficulties with Daniel Sickles, a New York politician-turned-general and Meade's Third Corps Commander.
Meade had assigned defensive positions to all of his commands in what is now known as the Fish Hook line. The reason for Sickles' assigned position was either not made apparent to him or was certainly not to his liking. Throughout the morning, Sickles tried to get Meade's permission to redeploy his Corps to what he thought was a better position on higher ground along the Emmitsburg Road. Sickles believed that if the Confederates occupied that ground, they could use it as an artillery platform and make Sickles' position, and much of the rest of the Union line, vulnerable.
Every time Sickles tried, Meade brushed him off until he eventually reiterated his original order. Still nervous, Sickles ordered a reconnaissance into a stand of woods just west of the Emmitsburg Road. The reconnaissance discovered Rebels extending the Confederate lines along Seminary Ridge. This information convinced Sickles to take his entire Corps and occupy the ground he desired.
However, Sickles' decision to advance detached his Corps from the rest of the army, leaving his command exposed on neutral ground. This decision would prove to be a turning point, almost leading to the destruction of his Corps and having severe consequences for the Army of the Potomac.
But it also had the effect of confounding...
Ah, so there are perks to getting up at 2 in the morning. 😁
I'll be listening to this on my way down to my first battle anniversary visit, I know it'll be good.
Enjoy!
GREAT format! Very enjoyable listen. (Trademark)
Glad you enjoyed it!
Great episode, Matt!
Appreciate the telling of the Trostle Farm story involving Captain Bigelow and Bugler Reed. Reed would receive the Medal of Honor for saving his commanding officer.
These anniversary specials are very well done! Super entertaining. Thank you and keep up the good work!
Thanks, will do!
Matt, well done!!!
Thank you!
Good morning from Summerville Oregon.
Morning!
Thank you !
You're welcome!
Though maybe a little niche, Co K. of the 145th NY Infantry was also left behind when McDougall's Bde was pulled off Culp's Hill with the rest of the 12th Corps. They were on Picket at Rock Creek and apparently didn't get the memo...
Thanks Matt!
Yeah, this is not that in-depth. I’ll throw that into the narrative
Really a great job with these. I'm thinking these bring the "ask the guide" episodes togeather showing the big picture. Lot of good and new info.
Oh you repeated the Sickle's wounding recording. Ah don't worry only so much one can do in short order. Still good stuff.
Glad you like them!
Did I? F*ck! I can change that for the other platforms but it won’t come through on TH-cam. What’s the time stamp?
57:00. Love these episodes!! Great work Matt.
@@addressinggettysburg 56:57
Great job! Great listen on my 2 hour drive to the battlefield this morning.
Thanks for listening