I can't help but feel IJN promotion was a case of someone asking "Kantai Kessen?" "Kantai Kessen!", followed by much cheering and a promotion being handed out. And operational decisions being base around "thats not decisive enough" or not. Then followed on by needlessly complex plan #41 that requires the opposing force to be, act, and react in a needlessly convoluted manor. Vs the US "Here is your boat, here is your map square, if its not our sink it. Good hunting"
@@russellmz Good one!🤣 To OP: Exactly (maybe US strategy was a tiny bit more complex but hey.. 😉). That's how you win wars: 1:) have the biggest industrial base 2.) keep your strategy rather simple and grounded in reality aka effective.
28:12. That particular Dauntless was flown by VS-6 pilot Lt Clarence Dickinson. Who had been shot down during the attack on Pearl Harbor and would later bomb Kaga at Midway.
I believe he also makes an appearance in the movie “Tora! Tora! Tora!” when Halsey remarks that “he couldn’t hit a bull in the butt with a bass fiddle!” after he botches a training bomb drop. Ironic, considering what he would go on to accomplish once the war kicked off.
@@BleedingUranium They could be a reference to actual airmen. Though it would’ve probably made more sense to have Lt. Dickinson be the only pilot to land his bomb on target. Unfortunately, that training scene is the only time we see aircraft from Enterprise, as I don’t recall seeing any of her dive-bombers approach Pearl during the attack.
The lack of any anti-shipping campaigns in the Eastern Pacific shortened the war by a year at least, perhaps up to two. It blows my mind how hard the IJN continually threw the chances and opportunities given to them and wasted valuable resources because of the obsession with their Kantai Kessen doctrine
What other way did they have to win any war with the USA except Kansai Kessen? First that theory has a 2nd part that the Japanese had no chance of achieving even if they won a major battle. The 2nd part say after you destroy the enemies fleet, you can go after and crush the enemys merchant marine fleet and starve a nation of all imports and not allow exports to make the enemy surrender. This is a case of war blindness of hoping on a strategic level the enemy will do what the Japanese, in this case, needed the Americans to-do to win the war. General Lee during the Gettysburg campaign, and napoleon during the waterloo campaign both thought the enemy would do what they needed them to do, to win. As soon as the enemy doesn't do that, usually that starts before the battles are even fought, that is why I used campaigns vs battles, they are in trouble. Lee thought it would take more time for thr union to come after him and wanted to unite his forces before the union could unite theirs in order to beat them in detail. Well the union troops came out very quickly and united faster then he did, so Lee never enjoyed overwhelming numbers. Napoleon wanted to crush wellington and drive him west, while bluchers army would be chased east to separate them. Didn't happen. Brilliant generals guessing what the enemy would do on a tactical level but not so much strategically.
@@BHuang92 Actually, they were glass cannon. Great weapons, poor dive capability, shallow test depth. If they were more aggressive in commerce raiding, they would have suffered greater losses sooner.
Let's face facts regarding the Pacific vs European Theaters of Operations. Compared to the Germans, the Japanese were far less capable. TLDR is that the US economy was at least 10X that of Japan. IIRC, Japan had the same GDP in 1939 as that of Belgium. By 1941, the German-controlled economy was like the modern EU, covering nearly the same territory. Given the lessons the USN was learning from the U-boat war, they would have eaten the IJN subs alive in the Eastern Pacific. Never forget that neither Yamamoto nir Nagumo was fired for basically losing the war at Midway. Japan had egregious leadership problems to go with their economic inadequacies. After all, what nation would be unhinged enough to choose a war against the combined might of the Allies (minus the oh so trustworthy Stalin decreed neutrality) when it couldn't even finish the job against a very backwards China?
Anti-shipping campaigns where and against what? Even at its most busy the pacific theatre never had even _close_ to the kind of traffic volume that the atlantic routes had, and what did exist was spread out a lot more across a larger ocean. The germans were interdicting trade with the UK, which depended on imports for basic survival. But the US was significantly more than self-sufficient in terms of resources, Australia could survive without and who else WAS there to go after once the dutch got knocked out of the area? All you had was heavily defended shipping going to military bases. No soft targets _anywhere._
I've always been fascinated by IJN submarines; they had so many unique types. The Sen-Toku, Sen Taka-Sho, Sen-Ho, and Ko-hyoteki are excellent examples of engineering even though their impacts on the Pacific War were practically negligible. But the success of submarine I-19 in the Solomon Islands is legendary.
Though, as you said, their impacts were negligible, I quite enjoyed learning about the I-13 and I-14! They were for a brief period the largest submarines ever made, before the I-400 took their thunder a few months later.
With regard to the "Liberty" it was a US Army (not Navy) ship. 34:44 The USAT Liberty is a very popular dive site here in Bali, Indonesia. The USAT Liberty was a US Army Transport ship in its past life, and is now home to a lot of lovely sea life. I have personally dive her wreck more than 50 times.
13:17 "Second class submarines included the 'Type F' which appears to have just meant 'F' in a rather pleasing change of pace." 13:59 "The development of this sometimes bewildering variety of submarines..."
Back in the early .90s a friend's Mum informed me that her father had come out to his little backyard garden shed office on a Sunday morning prior to going to church, heard an aircraft and looked up and identified a Japanese float plane flying over a inner Northern suburb of Melbourne. I was absolutely amazed because I had never heard anything about this incident despite paying more than average school boy attention to WWII. Nothing. We learnt about the bombing of Darwin and the midget sub attack on Sydney but that was it. I questioned my friends Mum and it turned out that her father had been a Clerk of Works and as a government employee had been made the local Air Raid Warden, so his aircraft recognition skills were much better than the average person. It was only later while watching a documentary that I learnt the story of an Anti-Aircraft 40 mm Bofors gun battery at Point Cook RAAF Base had taken a bead on the same aircraft but were prevented from firing because their officer was trying to ring Victoria Barracks on a Sunday morning to get permission to open fire! What a Rupert! If you see a Japanese plane with Japanese markings and no Captured white markings, you open fire and try to knock it down! Having served in the Australian Army Reserve, I can only imagine that extreme frustration that gun crew must have felt. All of your training and time spent on duty and finally an enemy aircraft flies into your gun sights but your officer in charge won't let you open fire! Arrrgh! I later on learnt from an ex Digger that the fishermen on King Island would often spot lights at night in Bass Strait where the Continental Shelf dropped away. I surmise from this that the sub would have surfaced in that approximate area, launched the scout plane and then submerged to await their return. The aircraft would have flown along the West coast of Victoria, over Geelong and up the West side of Port Phillip Bay and so over the gun crew at Point Cook. I think from there they would have flown inland to the North to check out Broadmeadows Barracks which dated from WWI so I assume that the Japanese would have known about it. At that time Melbourne essentially ended not far North of Bell Street so the scout pilot would have used Bell Street as a reference until he got to the Reservoir train line and turned South to follow it back to the city. It was just near Crocston railway station that my friends Grandfather spotted the aircraft when he was just near his office shed. The scout plane probably flew down to the city, along St Kilda Road to check out Victoria Barracks and then followed the Bay shoreline down to the Heads and out over Bass Strait again to meet up with it's submarine. Now I want to know why the gun crews at Point Nepean and Point Lonsdale never attempted to fire on the aircraft? Anyway they got clean away having used a Sunday morning against Western Allies again just like Pearl Harbor. Mark from Melbourne Australia 🇦🇺
February 26 1942, The Yokosuka EI4Y (Glenn) from I-25. That flight took place BEFORE Radar facilities were installed, and being a single small aircraft whose markings would only be visible at close range (and on a Sunday morning) the lack of aggressive reception is probably quite understandable. Its very easy to sit back and say "they should have opened fire regardless" but AA fire over built up areas is far from without risk to citizens...the shrapnel (not to mention any unexploded shells) have to go SOMEWHERE, and THAT responsibility was squarely on the Officer you criticise as "A Rupert" for seeking permission as required by his orders. Orders that make a lot of sense. A US Study after Pearl Harbour concluded that 48 of the 68 civilian casualties in Honolulu itself (70%!!!) were caused by AA shrapnel or unexploded AA shells. British estimates just in London itself from the Blitz suggest that at least 1200 people died from AA shrapnel/shells. ("Secret Casualties of WW2- Uncovering the civilian deaths from friendly fire" by Simon Webb ) Given the Glen was NOT armed with bombs, any casualties would quite likely not have been Japanese airmen, but Friendly Fire casualties FROM the AA fire. I have little doubt that had that gun opened fire, missed the aircraft and killed a civilian on the ground, you would be scathing in your criticism of the recklessness in shooting at all. The chance of a single AA gun (or a small emplacement) actually bringing down a single aircraft prior to proximity fuses/radar ranging etc was very slim. But of course thats just the opinion of a Naval officer/Gulf War veteran with 14 years in... You might feel for the frustration of the troops...with all your Reserve time... but you clearly have no experience of the responsibilities and obligations of those you call "Ruperts".... I'd suggest you look up "The Battle of Barking Creek" for the consequences of opening fire "anyway".
IJN subs were headed by an incompetent admiral who was closely associated with the royal family. This is part of why I have never understood military historians who believe the IJN picket line between Hawaii and Midway was a real factor. Those subs would have to see fast moving task forces, not get themselves damaged or sunk, and accurately (!) report what they had observed to Yamamoto. Add to this that nothing seemed to sway Yamamoto from his Midway timetable and I think that picket line was a non-factor. As it was, the picket line was only in place after TF16 and TF17 had rendevoused at Point Luck.
@@wwoods66 Little known or commented on by historians is that about 9am on June 3, the Midway invasion force of troop transports was spotted by a PBY, 600 miles west of Midway. Nagumo could have had no expectation of surprise with his first wave Midway attack force 22 hours later. If there was any doubt, the troop transports found themselves dodging Midway-based B-17s at 2 pm on June 3. The admiral in charge of the invasion task force was criticized by Yamamoto, but the timetable rolled on like a shinkansen bullet train as if the Americans would sleep walk into destruction by the Japanese. Surely, Nagumo's staff officer for operations stated that it was highly unlikely Midway would have aircraft on the ground at 7am on June 4, so multiple waves would be required to put that unsinkable carrier out of action. Nagumo's and Yamamoto's intelligence staff officers should have been alarmed that PBYs were patrolling hundreds of miles west and northwest of Midway, giving the defenders an information edge. This would imply a likelihood of USN subs also, a serious threat to warships and troop transports. An IJN oiler was hit by a PBY dropped torpedo about midnight, roughly seven hours before the attack on Midway. The B-17s left Midway on the morning of June 4, headed for the invasion task force again. When the PBY "Strawberry 5" spotted the IJN carrier task force, the B-17s were rerouted and ended up only harassing the Japanese. Again.
@@amerigo88 Parshall and Tully made the hypothesis Nagumo and his staff were perfectly aware they would need to make a second strike on the Island to put it out of business given the absence of carrier division 5 with Shokaku and Zuikaku because the need to make a second strike was coded. They just could not put enough planes in the air. They were also confident they could thwart any attack coming from Midway therefore they probably expected not to catch anything on the ground too but the initial goal was to prevent any further attack and take the Island and then wait for the US counter-attack. For the rest the japanese ships were under strict radio silence. Japanese HQ did not even relay some signs US carriers could be there thinking Nagumo's would have caught the news. What they did not expect was that the americans would have sent their carriers there so soon. Losing the surprise on June 3rd didn't change much for them. Knowing the US carriers were already there was an entirely different matter.
I disagree. Had Nagumo been sure there would have been carriers out there he would have launched a much better prepared search plan, perhaps even earlier which could have given him the US ships location in time to strike them before they could launch (I agree that seeems hardly possible but we have to take into account US launch was quite late and took a long time). As it was the spotting airplanes sent were just a precaution, they did not expect to find anything and were lucky to spot the americans. Furthermore, in this case Nagumo would not have attacked Midway. Spotting and sinking the US ships should probably have taken priority. I say should because japanese planning was not flexible, maybe he would have launched a strike on Midway anyway but there would have been no second strike planned before dealing with US carriers which in turn would have meant the US would have received almost the full might of Kido Butai's best pilots and planes at least once meaning in turn they would probably have had at least one carriers put out of action before the japanese second strike. Sending the second strike early means the US attack of 10h20 would perhaps have dealt less catastrophic damages. At least the bomb on Akagi would not have landed in the middle of torpedo planes fully fuelled and loaded (can't say if that would have been enough to keep Akagi in the fight given the damage to the rudder it suffered from) same on Kaga and Soryu (even if that doesn't mean they would still have been combat capable) which in turn means the japanese second wave would have had more planes and things start to snowball from there to a more likely draw with both force being utterly gutted rather than a miserable defeat. If Nagumo doesn't attack Midway knowing US carriers are there, then all bets are off, anything is possible including another coral sea with 2 or 3 carriers lost on both sides. But this in turns means no Guadalcanal. Therefore yes the simple fact of spotting the US task force at the beginning of June could have completely changed the course of the war. It would most probably not have changed the outcome but it could have altered significantly the first 2 or 3 years and maybe the invasion of Japan would not have been in sight by summer 45 when the US built the bomb.
@@vlad78th First, historian Mark Stille is publishing a new book on IJN submarine operations as he just discussed on the TH-cam channel called WW2-TV (about 29NOV2023). I asked him about this very topic and he said the IJN submarine picket lines were often used, but usually ineffective. The ships were too widely spaced, insisted on using optics rather than radar, and we're not adjusted regarding their field of view limitations when driven down by nearby aircraft, slashing their lines of sight. I agree that IF the picket line had been in place, spotted a carrier task force, and reported it in an accurate and timely fashion, it would have greatly affected Nagumo. Per Shattered Sword, it is very possible that IJN HQ back in Japan could have received such a report, sent it out, and only had it received by Yamamoto. Yes, Parshall and Tully pointed out that Yamamoto and his staff often assumed Nagumo was receiving all the same radio traffic from Japan. My understanding is that by this point in the war, the Japanese staff officers had grown to distrust the efficacy of an I-boat picket line. It was a bit like expecting Mark 14 torpedoes to sink warships. The USS Nautilus hit Kaga at Midway amidships. The front half of the torpedo broke off and sank. The rear half remained afloat. After punching it with their fists in frustration, Japanese sailors who had abandoned the burning Kaga used the rear of that Mark 14 torpedo as a life raft. An issue that bothers me about the Nagumo strike on Midway was that he got so close to the island. Everyone knew IJN warplanes had a significant range advantage over USN warplanes. Why not keep Kido Butai near their warplanes' limit? It would have reduced the risk from Midway-based aircraft. However it would have slowed the sortie rate. To me, it smacks of a lack of respect for American airpower. By striving to maintain their distance, Hiryu might ultimately have been saved. Given the radar, PBYs, and B-17s, I just don't see how Midway flight operations could have been truly terminated by Kido Butai, especially if remaining truly vigilant to potential US carriers.
The WW2 Japanese experience seems to boil down to “high command had a very specific idea of how the war should go, but for some reason nobody else agreed to play ball.
My father was aboard the U.S. Princeton during Leyte. When it was hit by a single bomb dropped by what was thought friendly plane. Unsuing havoc. Ultimately brought about it's sinking. Quite a story
These discussions show who much the Human element of warfare of any Nation effects on outcome both long and short term can not be underestimated or overstated.
This was a brilliant presentation. One can clearly see how Japanese submarine doctrine and operations favored the "Kentaii Kesen" idea of decisive battle. I am eagerly looking forward to the second part. Why the Japanese never really seriously considered a war against commerce, "Guerre de Course" can only be attributed to cultural viewpoints. Bushido ran deep within the Japanese mindset. Sinking cargo ships was not as honorable in the minds of many Japanese Sub skippers I am thinking.
And a war against commerce is based on the idea, that you can weaken the enemies economy so much, that your economy is stronger. The enemy will crumble, you will prevail by sheer economic power. But that idea is absurd if the economies at war at that of Japan against that of the US. Japan had no chance of beating the economy of the US, no matter how much damage subarines did to it. A decisive battle that takes the will out of the enemy to fight was the only chance the Japanese had of winning. Yeah, it did not work - but a war against commerce had 0 chance of winning, while Kentaii Kesen had at least a very small chance of winning. A very small chance is still better than 0 chance.
I doubt that misconceived notions of "honor" had something to do with it. After all, they had no trouble machine-gunning survivors in the water, using them for sword practice, etcetera.
It's amazing how all the supporting arms of Kantai Kessen doctrine ended up withering away while spending years trying to set up a decisive battle that's supposed to end the war in a few months.
Really glad you are getting to this topic. I read a book on IJN submarines in WW2 a while back, and I was left a little confused as to why they were so ineffective. The book did point out some problems and issues, but I still found myself feeling like I was failing to grasp what key factors truly caused their problems. So, I'm looking forward to the part 2 of this.
Thank you for another splendid video. In this one you explained something I never understood - Japanese submarines in WWII didn't go much for merchant ships. Reasons in books I read over they years left it at they were proud, and merchant shops were weak so not worth their efforts. Very unsatisfying reason. This video logically explained why this was largely the case with several related sensible reasons. Thanks!
And a war against commerce is based on the idea, that you can weaken the enemies economy so much, that your economy is stronger. The enemy will crumble, you will prevail by sheer economic power. But that idea is absurd if the economies at war at that of Japan against that of the US. Japan had no chance of beating the economy of the US, no matter how much damage subarines did to it. A decisive battle that takes the will out of the enemy to fight was the only chance the Japanese had of winning. Yeah, it did not work - but a war against commerce had 0 chance of winning, while Kentaii Kesen had at least a very small chance of winning. A very small chance is still better than 0 chance.
@@wedgeantilles8575 Disagree. The Pacific was a theater of logistics. At one point the USN was down to only 6 fleet oilers. Every base had to be supplied or it became useless. The flood of Kaiser-built Liberty ships was still in the future early in 1942. A serious dent in allied shipping could have cut off major operations for USN and RN that year. Japan had no chance of crippling the whole US economy, but it did have a chance of crippling Pacific supply lines and frustrating USN operations, most especially the "shoestring" Guadalcanal campaign. As for the "decisive battle that takes the will out of the enemy", that was hopelessly lost on Dec. 7th, the "date that will live in infamy", by turning all those isolationists into staunch "we will fight on to ultimate victory" unconditional-surrender-demanders. Humongous strategic mis-calculation on Yamamoto's part. He should have known better.
Wow! Thanks for the video. I am really interested in IJN and am fascinated with how actually good these subs were. I was waiting for a while for a video on a topic of IJN subs.
As an Oregonian, I hold an additional interest in the history & development of Japanese submarines. Brilliant work, thank you Drach. As with most japanese ww2 ship history, it's much shallower from destruction of documents & language barriers. So I was very excited to see you touch upon the subject. Cheers dude!
Wow the devs of World War 2 really had it out for the Pacific Submarines on both sides in patch 0.3 to patch 0.4. The Americans has massive Torpedo Glitches and the Submariner players would be outright banned if they hit NPC transport ships.Thankfully by patch 0.5 most of the problems would go away.
the book SUNK written by a Japanese submarine commander [Hashimoto] provides great insight into the use of submarines. they were restricted in using torpedoes on merchant ships,
32:00 - the submarine attacks in 1942 did cause the US to begin the AlCan Highway, and the CANOL Project - both assumed that Japanese sub activity would cause serious issues for fuel shipments. The CANOL project especially was very expensive for the results it achieves.
Wow. Why am I surprised that this is so detailed? Figured the first episode might cover the period before the subs were needed so desperately for resupplying Japanese positions on islands that couldn't be reached any other way.
Yay new video! Started playing a very simplified sub game on my phone lately and it kinda rekindled my interest in the Pacific Theater of War, as in it you run around with the Salmon. Sinking Japanese shipping in various tasks.
The problem with the Long Lance was that if it was on the deck of a ship and was hit by anything that liquid oxygen/Kerosene combination would explode. Even a fighter plane strafing the ship could set them off.
although it was especially risky for long lances its not fair to say that this problem was unique to the long lance, and the ijn knew this and there were cases of ships jettisoning their torpedoes prior to air attacks
you've often noted that the Kreigsmarine of WW2 was hilariously inefficient when it came to ship design and constantly went over the treaty limit, but if the Allies had been able to build ships as large as the Kriegsmarine did around the same time (IE we move the Washington Navy treaty's ship size limits to match the Kriegsmarine ships) just what would the allies (and japan) have built and how much more capable would it have been?
Was the type b1 submarine able to launch bomb carrying floatplanes, and if so was the plane used for bombing purposes. Any chance of a video focusing on submarine trading.
Hey Drach, is there a concrete reason why the Unprotected Cruiser concept died out around the turn of the century? Considering how funding usually was even in the best of times, and how developments turned out in the long run- with barely armored Scout Cruisers filling a glass cannon cruiser niche, and Destroyers ouright evolving into this same unarmored warship space (though with much more contemporary speed and overall potential for its later years, ala the Fletcher-class), it almost seems like Unprotect Cruisers were just forgotten about (and no the Duquesne-class doesn't count!) instead of directly evolving like literally every other major ship type as the 20th century progressed.
Germans: _"The Americans have these big fleet submarines that are so ostentatious!"_ French: _"We put a dual 8 inch gun turret on ours! *Le funny French noises*"_ Japanese: _"We have one that is also an aircraft carrier."_ I love submarines.
The wild experiments never really stopped on any side The Soviets built one that could do 43 kts submerged The Americans currently have four operational subs converted from carrying nuclear missiles to carrying 192 Tomahawks each Who knows what the Chinese are up to, footage of a brand new one of theirs got leaked on social media somehow
The US Navy had flying aircraft carriers in the 20s and 30s. Cool idea that proved impractical. Submersible carriers also have a cool factor but don't really count as real carriers due to their limitations.
Good one général! As a French I hope you will allow me to ask how goes your defense of the US bodily fluids? Without breaking any security measures of course...
Did I hear right about the aerial assault on the American fleet being on December 5th at the 24:54 time mark? "Yesterday, December 7th, 1941, a date that will live in infamy...." Hope I misheard. Great content, as usual.
You heard it right. The narrator made a couple of bloopers in his comments. He also mis-identified HMAS Deloraine as HMS Deloraine. Otherwise a good documentary.
Thanks. I have myself produced videos for TH-cam. Each minute of video was nearly an hour of writing and production time. Often rewriting and editing changed the flow. We’re all human.
I need a roller skate for my chin. The only popular-level book I've read, in the 19(mumble-mumble)s, was "I-Boat Captain". Being first hand, it is very good, but it also is formed by the author's experiences and the second-hand experiences of his colleagues. It amazes me how just-so Japanese strategy and ship building was. It reminds me of very very inexperienced chess players whose planning is, "I will do 'A', my opponent will do 'X', I will do 'B', my opponent will do 'Y', I will do 'C', my opponent will do 'Z', and checkmate. The USN was never going to send their whole battle fleet to attack Japan, the US never surrendered, so the "Decisive Battle" as the IJN conceived it, never happened, and the long war Japan could never win and hoped to avoid ensued.
When you "know" a war will be short, there are things you don't see a need to do. You don't see a need to have shipyards capable of repairing damaged ships AND build new ships. You don't see a need to attack enemy shipping. You don't see a need to train large numbers of pilots and other high-skilled specialists. You don't see a need to be able to transition to producing next generation aircraft. You don't have a strong culture of learning and adjusting strategy and tactics.
Kinda yes and kinda no. The U.S. Rainbow series of battle plans was based around a fleet engagement in the Western Pacific almost exactly like the Japanese planners wanted because everyone on both sides assumed the US would send the fleet to defend the Philippines. So "I will do A, my opponent will do X" was considered inevitable by both sides. Japan didn't get the big fleet engagement they'd spent decades preparing because Pearl Harbor forced the USN to ditch their prewar plans and start over.
39:40 Good attempt. "Lithgo" - in a similar way the Glasgow is pronounced "Glasgo". Looking forward to the coverage of I-24's bombardment of Sydney's Eastern suburbs on 8/9 June 42, which my mother in law experienced.
A question: Drach: Did any nation direct its submarine force to concentrate on the interception of its probable enemy's fleet train? Guerre du course/merchant raiding . . . then there is the doctrine of direct attacks on enemy fleet units . . . uh . . . guerre d'escard (?). Is there a similar doctrine directed at intercepting the enemy's fleet train? Seems to me that sinking the enemy's fleet oilers and ammunition ships would impel an enemy to use his carriers and battleships to refuel smaller ships (DD, DE). That places extra strain on the capital ships, and renders them predictable to enemy torpedo officers (as one cannot refuel a destroyer or recover floatplanes while zig-zagging). Once you've stripped the enemy commander of his self defense echelon of DDs and DEs, wouldn't his capital ships be extremely vulnerable to further attack by any and all friendly combat units?
I remain impressed with the sheer imagination the Japanese planners had by putting airplanes inside their subs to create such a covert strike force. When one of the I-400s surrendered, the Americans were amazed that the sub was longer than the destroyer! This idea of a submarine-aircraft carrier might not be practical in the 21st century, but we can only fantasize. The I-400s were certainly an inspiration to a 1980s Japanese anime show called "Blue Noah" where a giant submersible aircraft carrier was humanity's last hope against aliens.
A little surprised you didn't mention I-15's attempted torpedoing of the Golden Gate Bridge in 1941. The torpedo was found on a nearby beach in 1946. Mark Felton did a neat video on the subject.
Taking out the Golden Gate Bridge would have inconvenienced a lot of Americans - and there aren't that many easy targets on the west coast that have both military relevance and public interest. It's easy to see why I-15 thought it was worth a try.
Thank you. When I heard that I was wondering if age had finally caught up with my brain, or if I'd fallen through a crack in the space-time continuum... again.
Seems like all i have ever heard about ijn subs was Saratoga twice, pearl harbor and the mini- subs, the yorktown, and the shot that killed wasp, and hit the north Carolina, and o'bannon.so this series is most welcome. Bravo Zulu
Noooooo, in the Russian-Japanese war they didn't need subs to be firing torpedoes. They in fact had a VAST fleet of torpedo boats with a 10,000 mile+ range, capable of instantly teleporting across continents and fitted with cloaking devices. They did, honest. No seriously, they definitely did. Kamchatka? Is there something you need to tell us......? 🤔
So it is the opposite of Germany who had a very small Navy and leaned in heavily on commerce raiding in defeating the enemy by a sort ocean-going seige warfare.
Thank goodness the IJN didn't make as good use of their subs as the US eventually did. The concentration on sinking warships makes societal sense but it worked in the allies' favor in the end.
My mother was 19 years old and living with her brother and his wife in San Diego when the war started. The threat of invasion (no doubt furthered by the Japanese sub shelling Santa Barbara) so scared my aunt and uncle that they sold their house and moved back to Chicago from whence they came.
This is great, was always interested in IJN subs. Hope you cover I-1s story at Guadalcanal. The supply runs to there have always interested me, exactly how were the supplies carried ? Submerged on deck ?
I've read somewhere that the supplies were carried in sealed drums. The subs would surface close to the shore, the crew would dump/push them overboard and hope the tide would carry them in for the troops to retrieve.
Had special barge strapped on the deck Before release would surface and cut the outside lines go under and off the beach half surface release the inside line submerge and let it float a way Small boats were to tow it to shore Navy found many on the beach and realized what was happening and started anti sub patrols
I’ve see n drawing of barges on the subs, also heard about the barrels. I’m trying to figure out just how they did it , cargo nets or tarps lashed to the deck? I’m trying to build a model of one of the supply subs and hit an OCD wall
The I 1 submarine scrap with New Zealand ships is one which should be mentioned . The I 1 was 2500 tonnes compared with the NZ shipe of about 300 tonnes.
Arguably the best sub force turn 1 in WW2 that's amazing how much doctrine can limit your effectiveness. The Japanese would find out the hard way just how effective a submarine blockade could be.
Neh-chez; iirc. Thanks for the info Drach. I hadn't known the Japanese actually did attack cargo shipping. All I could recall ever hearing was that if they had forcused on civilian shipping, it could have been a West Coast Happy Time.
Unusually for Drach's channel, this video features quite a lot of stock period footage. (not that I deem it a bad thing). Reading the desciption we know it's from the US National Archives. What were the copyright issues that you had to solve for using such footage?
Luckily a lot of footage on NARA has been put there by the US DoD and is listed as public domain. Almost all footage I used is from that collection and given that there was some pretty rare footage taken of Japanese submarines available, I thought it was worth using! (Also, there are correspondingly few decent still pictures of IJN subs 😀 )
The main torpedo of the Japanese Submarines were the Type 95. Both on the I class and the small recon submarines - The I Class I believe was almost as big as the Surcouf of the French Navy.
The filming inside the boats is absolutely fascinating. I assume this is largely propaganda film, I’m surprised how clean the crews uniforms looked, I very much doubt if this was the reality while on patrol!
~33:00-34:00 IJN submarines off the west coast: (1) My aunt (then a child) told of being in Morro Bay CA when a (presumed) Japanese submarine was spotted off the coast. Bombers with depth charges came out to attack it, but she did not know the results (f any) of the attack. (2) A neighbor kid (close to my age) told me that his mother was in the San Diego Harbor area (onshore) when a dockside explosion occurred, supposedly a torpedo. I have no idea if that account/characterization was correct.
If Japan would have just picked a standard type submarine and built that in large numbers as did the US, Britain and Germany they would have been much more effective.
![ร้อยพ่อพันแม่ - WanMai [Official MV]](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/XY2pNYASEbg/mqdefault.jpg)
I can't help but feel IJN promotion was a case of someone asking "Kantai Kessen?" "Kantai Kessen!", followed by much cheering and a promotion being handed out. And operational decisions being base around "thats not decisive enough" or not. Then followed on by needlessly complex plan #41 that requires the opposing force to be, act, and react in a needlessly convoluted manor.
Vs the US "Here is your boat, here is your map square, if its not our sink it. Good hunting"
Picking up survivors from sunken non-us ship:
"Nespa ruski?"
"Awwww crap"
@@russellmz Good one!🤣
To OP: Exactly (maybe US strategy was a tiny bit more complex but hey.. 😉). That's how you win wars: 1:) have the biggest industrial base 2.) keep your strategy rather simple and grounded in reality aka effective.
“Here’s your torpedoes. . Good luck with those.”
@@CorePathway To soon, still.
28:12. That particular Dauntless was flown by VS-6 pilot Lt Clarence Dickinson. Who had been shot down during the attack on Pearl Harbor and would later bomb Kaga at Midway.
I believe he also makes an appearance in the movie “Tora! Tora! Tora!” when Halsey remarks that “he couldn’t hit a bull in the butt with a bass fiddle!” after he botches a training bomb drop. Ironic, considering what he would go on to accomplish once the war kicked off.
@@hourlardnsaver362 Ah, I think you're right! I had always wondered if the names in that scene were a reference to any particular people.
@@BleedingUranium They could be a reference to actual airmen. Though it would’ve probably made more sense to have Lt. Dickinson be the only pilot to land his bomb on target.
Unfortunately, that training scene is the only time we see aircraft from Enterprise, as I don’t recall seeing any of her dive-bombers approach Pearl during the attack.
Kudos for this Obscure Knowledge Benchmark comment. Obviously @ph89787 is a serious student of naval history.
a man with 3 navy crosses yet somehow he does not have his own wikipedia page.
The lack of any anti-shipping campaigns in the Eastern Pacific shortened the war by a year at least, perhaps up to two. It blows my mind how hard the IJN continually threw the chances and opportunities given to them and wasted valuable resources because of the obsession with their Kantai Kessen doctrine
What other way did they have to win any war with the USA except Kansai Kessen? First that theory has a 2nd part that the Japanese had no chance of achieving even if they won a major battle. The 2nd part say after you destroy the enemies fleet, you can go after and crush the enemys merchant marine fleet and starve a nation of all imports and not allow exports to make the enemy surrender. This is a case of war blindness of hoping on a strategic level the enemy will do what the Japanese, in this case, needed the Americans to-do to win the war.
General Lee during the Gettysburg campaign, and napoleon during the waterloo campaign both thought the enemy would do what they needed them to do, to win. As soon as the enemy doesn't do that, usually that starts before the battles are even fought, that is why I used campaigns vs battles, they are in trouble. Lee thought it would take more time for thr union to come after him and wanted to unite his forces before the union could unite theirs in order to beat them in detail. Well the union troops came out very quickly and united faster then he did, so Lee never enjoyed overwhelming numbers. Napoleon wanted to crush wellington and drive him west, while bluchers army would be chased east to separate them. Didn't happen. Brilliant generals guessing what the enemy would do on a tactical level but not so much strategically.
Their submarines were one of the most potential capable naval assets of all of the Axis powers, yet they squandered it off!
@@BHuang92 Actually, they were glass cannon. Great weapons, poor dive capability, shallow test depth. If they were more aggressive in commerce raiding, they would have suffered greater losses sooner.
Let's face facts regarding the Pacific vs European Theaters of Operations. Compared to the Germans, the Japanese were far less capable. TLDR is that the US economy was at least 10X that of Japan. IIRC, Japan had the same GDP in 1939 as that of Belgium. By 1941, the German-controlled economy was like the modern EU, covering nearly the same territory.
Given the lessons the USN was learning from the U-boat war, they would have eaten the IJN subs alive in the Eastern Pacific.
Never forget that neither Yamamoto nir Nagumo was fired for basically losing the war at Midway. Japan had egregious leadership problems to go with their economic inadequacies. After all, what nation would be unhinged enough to choose a war against the combined might of the Allies (minus the oh so trustworthy Stalin decreed neutrality) when it couldn't even finish the job against a very backwards China?
Anti-shipping campaigns where and against what? Even at its most busy the pacific theatre never had even _close_ to the kind of traffic volume that the atlantic routes had, and what did exist was spread out a lot more across a larger ocean.
The germans were interdicting trade with the UK, which depended on imports for basic survival. But the US was significantly more than self-sufficient in terms of resources, Australia could survive without and who else WAS there to go after once the dutch got knocked out of the area?
All you had was heavily defended shipping going to military bases. No soft targets _anywhere._
I've always been fascinated by IJN submarines; they had so many unique types. The Sen-Toku, Sen Taka-Sho, Sen-Ho, and Ko-hyoteki are excellent examples of engineering even though their impacts on the Pacific War were practically negligible.
But the success of submarine I-19 in the Solomon Islands is legendary.
Though, as you said, their impacts were negligible, I quite enjoyed learning about the I-13 and I-14! They were for a brief period the largest submarines ever made, before the I-400 took their thunder a few months later.
So many varieties! I think of Pokémon!
The last time I was this early to a video, the Kamchatka hadn't seen any torpedo boats yet!
Last time we got here this early, Grognor's upside-down anklysaurus shell boat was still unarmed, and powered by just a single twisted pelican.
🤣👍🏻
The way that Kamchatka's legend grows I think the designers were hallucinating torpedo boats before the keel was even laid😂
😂😂😂😂😂😂
*dO yOu SeE tOrPeDo BoAtS!?*
With regard to the "Liberty" it was a US Army (not Navy) ship. 34:44 The USAT Liberty is a very popular dive site here in Bali, Indonesia. The USAT Liberty was a US Army Transport ship in its past life, and is now home to a lot of lovely sea life. I have personally dive her wreck more than 50 times.
Wow. That is so interesting
13:17 "Second class submarines included the 'Type F' which appears to have just meant 'F' in a rather pleasing change of pace."
13:59 "The development of this sometimes bewildering variety of submarines..."
Back in the early .90s a friend's Mum informed me that her father had come out to his little backyard garden shed office on a Sunday morning prior to going to church, heard an aircraft and looked up and identified a Japanese float plane flying over a inner Northern suburb of Melbourne. I was absolutely amazed because I had never heard anything about this incident despite paying more than average school boy attention to WWII. Nothing. We learnt about the bombing of Darwin and the midget sub attack on Sydney but that was it. I questioned my friends Mum and it turned out that her father had been a Clerk of Works and as a government employee had been made the local Air Raid Warden, so his aircraft recognition skills were much better than the average person. It was only later while watching a documentary that I learnt the story of an Anti-Aircraft 40 mm Bofors gun battery at Point Cook RAAF Base had taken a bead on the same aircraft but were prevented from firing because their officer was trying to ring Victoria Barracks on a Sunday morning to get permission to open fire! What a Rupert! If you see a Japanese plane with Japanese markings and no Captured white markings, you open fire and try to knock it down! Having served in the Australian Army Reserve, I can only imagine that extreme frustration that gun crew must have felt. All of your training and time spent on duty and finally an enemy aircraft flies into your gun sights but your officer in charge won't let you open fire! Arrrgh!
I later on learnt from an ex Digger that the fishermen on King Island would often spot lights at night in Bass Strait where the Continental Shelf dropped away. I surmise from this that the sub would have surfaced in that approximate area, launched the scout plane and then submerged to await their return. The aircraft would have flown along the West coast of Victoria, over Geelong and up the West side of Port Phillip Bay and so over the gun crew at Point Cook. I think from there they would have flown inland to the North to check out Broadmeadows Barracks which dated from WWI so I assume that the Japanese would have known about it.
At that time Melbourne essentially ended not far North of Bell Street so the scout pilot would have used Bell Street as a reference until he got to the Reservoir train line and turned South to follow it back to the city. It was just near Crocston railway station that my friends Grandfather spotted the aircraft when he was just near his office shed. The scout plane probably flew down to the city, along St Kilda Road to check out Victoria Barracks and then followed the Bay shoreline down to the Heads and out over Bass Strait again to meet up with it's submarine. Now I want to know why the gun crews at Point Nepean and Point Lonsdale never attempted to fire on the aircraft?
Anyway they got clean away having used a Sunday morning against Western Allies again just like Pearl Harbor.
Mark from Melbourne Australia 🇦🇺
Japs shelled Sydney and Newcastle. A Jap plane flew over Botany as well on a recce was seen but no action was taken!
February 26 1942, The Yokosuka EI4Y (Glenn) from I-25. That flight took place BEFORE Radar facilities were installed, and being a single small aircraft whose markings would only be visible at close range (and on a Sunday morning) the lack of aggressive reception is probably quite understandable. Its very easy to sit back and say "they should have opened fire regardless" but AA fire over built up areas is far from without risk to citizens...the shrapnel (not to mention any unexploded shells) have to go SOMEWHERE, and THAT responsibility was squarely on the Officer you criticise as "A Rupert" for seeking permission as required by his orders. Orders that make a lot of sense. A US Study after Pearl Harbour concluded that 48 of the 68 civilian casualties in Honolulu itself (70%!!!) were caused by AA shrapnel or unexploded AA shells. British estimates just in London itself from the Blitz suggest that at least 1200 people died from AA shrapnel/shells. ("Secret Casualties of WW2- Uncovering the civilian deaths from friendly fire" by Simon Webb ) Given the Glen was NOT armed with bombs, any casualties would quite likely not have been Japanese airmen, but Friendly Fire casualties FROM the AA fire. I have little doubt that had that gun opened fire, missed the aircraft and killed a civilian on the ground, you would be scathing in your criticism of the recklessness in shooting at all. The chance of a single AA gun (or a small emplacement) actually bringing down a single aircraft prior to proximity fuses/radar ranging etc was very slim. But of course thats just the opinion of a Naval officer/Gulf War veteran with 14 years in... You might feel for the frustration of the troops...with all your Reserve time... but you clearly have no experience of the responsibilities and obligations of those you call "Ruperts".... I'd suggest you look up "The Battle of Barking Creek" for the consequences of opening fire "anyway".
IJN subs were headed by an incompetent admiral who was closely associated with the royal family. This is part of why I have never understood military historians who believe the IJN picket line between Hawaii and Midway was a real factor. Those subs would have to see fast moving task forces, not get themselves damaged or sunk, and accurately (!) report what they had observed to Yamamoto. Add to this that nothing seemed to sway Yamamoto from his Midway timetable and I think that picket line was a non-factor. As it was, the picket line was only in place after TF16 and TF17 had rendevoused at Point Luck.
Even an inaccurate report of USN ships sailing west from Pearl might have gotten Nagumo thinking that surprise had been lost.
@@wwoods66 Little known or commented on by historians is that about 9am on June 3, the Midway invasion force of troop transports was spotted by a PBY, 600 miles west of Midway. Nagumo could have had no expectation of surprise with his first wave Midway attack force 22 hours later.
If there was any doubt, the troop transports found themselves dodging Midway-based B-17s at 2 pm on June 3. The admiral in charge of the invasion task force was criticized by Yamamoto, but the timetable rolled on like a shinkansen bullet train as if the Americans would sleep walk into destruction by the Japanese.
Surely, Nagumo's staff officer for operations stated that it was highly unlikely Midway would have aircraft on the ground at 7am on June 4, so multiple waves would be required to put that unsinkable carrier out of action. Nagumo's and Yamamoto's intelligence staff officers should have been alarmed that PBYs were patrolling hundreds of miles west and northwest of Midway, giving the defenders an information edge. This would imply a likelihood of USN subs also, a serious threat to warships and troop transports.
An IJN oiler was hit by a PBY dropped torpedo about midnight, roughly seven hours before the attack on Midway. The B-17s left Midway on the morning of June 4, headed for the invasion task force again. When the PBY "Strawberry 5" spotted the IJN carrier task force, the B-17s were rerouted and ended up only harassing the Japanese. Again.
@@amerigo88 Parshall and Tully made the hypothesis Nagumo and his staff were perfectly aware they would need to make a second strike on the Island to put it out of business given the absence of carrier division 5 with Shokaku and Zuikaku because the need to make a second strike was coded. They just could not put enough planes in the air. They were also confident they could thwart any attack coming from Midway therefore they probably expected not to catch anything on the ground too but the initial goal was to prevent any further attack and take the Island and then wait for the US counter-attack. For the rest the japanese ships were under strict radio silence. Japanese HQ did not even relay some signs US carriers could be there thinking Nagumo's would have caught the news. What they did not expect was that the americans would have sent their carriers there so soon. Losing the surprise on June 3rd didn't change much for them. Knowing the US carriers were already there was an entirely different matter.
I disagree. Had Nagumo been sure there would have been carriers out there he would have launched a much better prepared search plan, perhaps even earlier which could have given him the US ships location in time to strike them before they could launch (I agree that seeems hardly possible but we have to take into account US launch was quite late and took a long time). As it was the spotting airplanes sent were just a precaution, they did not expect to find anything and were lucky to spot the americans. Furthermore, in this case Nagumo would not have attacked Midway. Spotting and sinking the US ships should probably have taken priority. I say should because japanese planning was not flexible, maybe he would have launched a strike on Midway anyway but there would have been no second strike planned before dealing with US carriers which in turn would have meant the US would have received almost the full might of Kido Butai's best pilots and planes at least once meaning in turn they would probably have had at least one carriers put out of action before the japanese second strike. Sending the second strike early means the US attack of 10h20 would perhaps have dealt less catastrophic damages. At least the bomb on Akagi would not have landed in the middle of torpedo planes fully fuelled and loaded (can't say if that would have been enough to keep Akagi in the fight given the damage to the rudder it suffered from) same on Kaga and Soryu (even if that doesn't mean they would still have been combat capable) which in turn means the japanese second wave would have had more planes and things start to snowball from there to a more likely draw with both force being utterly gutted rather than a miserable defeat. If Nagumo doesn't attack Midway knowing US carriers are there, then all bets are off, anything is possible including another coral sea with 2 or 3 carriers lost on both sides. But this in turns means no Guadalcanal. Therefore yes the simple fact of spotting the US task force at the beginning of June could have completely changed the course of the war. It would most probably not have changed the outcome but it could have altered significantly the first 2 or 3 years and maybe the invasion of Japan would not have been in sight by summer 45 when the US built the bomb.
@@vlad78th First, historian Mark Stille is publishing a new book on IJN submarine operations as he just discussed on the TH-cam channel called WW2-TV (about 29NOV2023). I asked him about this very topic and he said the IJN submarine picket lines were often used, but usually ineffective. The ships were too widely spaced, insisted on using optics rather than radar, and we're not adjusted regarding their field of view limitations when driven down by nearby aircraft, slashing their lines of sight. I agree that IF the picket line had been in place, spotted a carrier task force, and reported it in an accurate and timely fashion, it would have greatly affected Nagumo. Per Shattered Sword, it is very possible that IJN HQ back in Japan could have received such a report, sent it out, and only had it received by Yamamoto. Yes, Parshall and Tully pointed out that Yamamoto and his staff often assumed Nagumo was receiving all the same radio traffic from Japan. My understanding is that by this point in the war, the Japanese staff officers had grown to distrust the efficacy of an I-boat picket line. It was a bit like expecting Mark 14 torpedoes to sink warships. The USS Nautilus hit Kaga at Midway amidships. The front half of the torpedo broke off and sank. The rear half remained afloat. After punching it with their fists in frustration, Japanese sailors who had abandoned the burning Kaga used the rear of that Mark 14 torpedo as a life raft.
An issue that bothers me about the Nagumo strike on Midway was that he got so close to the island. Everyone knew IJN warplanes had a significant range advantage over USN warplanes. Why not keep Kido Butai near their warplanes' limit? It would have reduced the risk from Midway-based aircraft. However it would have slowed the sortie rate. To me, it smacks of a lack of respect for American airpower. By striving to maintain their distance, Hiryu might ultimately have been saved.
Given the radar, PBYs, and B-17s, I just don't see how Midway flight operations could have been truly terminated by Kido Butai, especially if remaining truly vigilant to potential US carriers.
It's really quite staggering how much the IJN misused their excellent Submarine force.
Well not always, they did make quite a mess on US west coast! Saw a full documentary about it, quite interesting called 1942... 😇
@@khaelamensha3624 a masterpiece of cinema to be sure
1941 perhaps?@@khaelamensha3624
@@khaelamensha3624 Not gonna lie, you had me going in the first half.
As they did with everything in their military
The WW2 Japanese experience seems to boil down to “high command had a very specific idea of how the war should go, but for some reason nobody else agreed to play ball.
My father was aboard the U.S. Princeton during Leyte. When it was hit by a single bomb dropped by what was thought friendly plane. Unsuing havoc. Ultimately brought about it's sinking. Quite a story
The accompanying Japanese video is one of the best I’ve seen. As usual, the commentary is outstanding.
These discussions show who much the Human element of warfare of any Nation effects on outcome both long and short term can not be underestimated or overstated.
Getting in the car to head to work, thinking "what would I listen to?" *Ping* New Drach, that is perfect.
This was a brilliant presentation. One can clearly see how Japanese submarine doctrine and operations favored the "Kentaii Kesen" idea of decisive battle. I am eagerly looking forward to the second part. Why the Japanese never really seriously considered a war against commerce, "Guerre de Course" can only be attributed to cultural viewpoints. Bushido ran deep within the Japanese mindset. Sinking cargo ships was not as honorable in the minds of many Japanese Sub skippers I am thinking.
And a war against commerce is based on the idea, that you can weaken the enemies economy so much, that your economy is stronger. The enemy will crumble, you will prevail by sheer economic power.
But that idea is absurd if the economies at war at that of Japan against that of the US.
Japan had no chance of beating the economy of the US, no matter how much damage subarines did to it.
A decisive battle that takes the will out of the enemy to fight was the only chance the Japanese had of winning.
Yeah, it did not work - but a war against commerce had 0 chance of winning, while Kentaii Kesen had at least a very small chance of winning.
A very small chance is still better than 0 chance.
@@wedgeantilles8575 Thank you for such an astute answer. We must always try to understand the viewpoint of our foes. I appreciate your views.
I doubt that misconceived notions of "honor" had something to do with it. After all, they had no trouble machine-gunning survivors in the water, using them for sword practice, etcetera.
@@MalachiWhite-tw7hl
Honour is a funny thing...
Even though it's entirely arbitrary everyone thinks their idea of honour is the only proper one.
It's amazing how all the supporting arms of Kantai Kessen doctrine ended up withering away while spending years trying to set up a decisive battle that's supposed to end the war in a few months.
Really glad you are getting to this topic. I read a book on IJN submarines in WW2 a while back, and I was left a little confused as to why they were so ineffective. The book did point out some problems and issues, but I still found myself feeling like I was failing to grasp what key factors truly caused their problems. So, I'm looking forward to the part 2 of this.
I’m mylp
As a submariner I'm feeling blessed with all the sub videos coming out!
I love these submarine histories for both sides in the Pacific. Thank you, the quality is much appreciated!
A spectacular Rum Ration. All the footage and photos of the Japanese sub service was great. Thanks Drach.
Who else but Drach could find film of a dinner of flying fish and saki?
Thank you for another splendid video. In this one you explained something I never understood - Japanese submarines in WWII didn't go much for merchant ships. Reasons in books I read over they years left it at they were proud, and merchant shops were weak so not worth their efforts. Very unsatisfying reason. This video logically explained why this was largely the case with several related sensible reasons. Thanks!
And a war against commerce is based on the idea, that you can weaken the enemies economy so much, that your economy is stronger. The enemy will crumble, you will prevail by sheer economic power.
But that idea is absurd if the economies at war at that of Japan against that of the US.
Japan had no chance of beating the economy of the US, no matter how much damage subarines did to it.
A decisive battle that takes the will out of the enemy to fight was the only chance the Japanese had of winning.
Yeah, it did not work - but a war against commerce had 0 chance of winning, while Kentaii Kesen had at least a very small chance of winning.
A very small chance is still better than 0 chance.
@@wedgeantilles8575 Disagree. The Pacific was a theater of logistics. At one point the USN was down to only 6 fleet oilers. Every base had to be supplied or it became useless. The flood of Kaiser-built Liberty ships was still in the future early in 1942. A serious dent in allied shipping could have cut off major operations for USN and RN that year. Japan had no chance of crippling the whole US economy, but it did have a chance of crippling Pacific supply lines and frustrating USN operations, most especially the "shoestring" Guadalcanal campaign.
As for the "decisive battle that takes the will out of the enemy", that was hopelessly lost on Dec. 7th, the "date that will live in infamy", by turning all those isolationists into staunch "we will fight on to ultimate victory" unconditional-surrender-demanders. Humongous strategic mis-calculation on Yamamoto's part. He should have known better.
Wow! Thanks for the video. I am really interested in IJN and am fascinated with how actually good these subs were. I was waiting for a while for a video on a topic of IJN subs.
Thanks for this insight into the lack of activity by the Japanese Naval sub force compared to what I thought they should have done.😮
As an Oregonian, I hold an additional interest in the history & development of Japanese submarines.
Brilliant work, thank you Drach.
As with most japanese ww2 ship history, it's much shallower from destruction of documents & language barriers.
So I was very excited to see you touch upon the subject. Cheers dude!
Wow the devs of World War 2 really had it out for the Pacific Submarines on both sides in patch 0.3 to patch 0.4. The Americans has massive Torpedo Glitches and the Submariner players would be outright banned if they hit NPC transport ships.Thankfully by patch 0.5 most of the problems would go away.
I love this channel & community. Drach is so great, and I look forward to every installment of Naval History.
I've been pining for info on Japanese and Soviet submarine activities/tech/strategies/etc. for forever. Thank you, man!
Thank you for the many years of excellently narrated and researched content.
That's for this, more or less, 5 minute first chapter on Japanese submarine history. Looking forward to the rest.
the book SUNK written by a Japanese submarine commander [Hashimoto] provides great insight into the use of submarines. they were restricted in using torpedoes on merchant ships,
32:00 - the submarine attacks in 1942 did cause the US to begin the AlCan Highway, and the CANOL Project - both assumed that Japanese sub activity would cause serious issues for fuel shipments. The CANOL project especially was very expensive for the results it achieves.
Fascinating insight into a rarely covered topic.
Thank you for so many hours of near hypnotic levels of all things naval combat .
Great cudeo Drach, I knew little of how Japanese submarines operated before this
I looked it up for you: the USS Neches (at 35:10) is pronounced 'Nay- chiz' according to Wikipedia. Great video!
Wow. Why am I surprised that this is so detailed? Figured the first episode might cover the period before the subs were needed so desperately for resupplying Japanese positions on islands that couldn't be reached any other way.
Praise be to Kamchatka! It is the five minute video that keeps on giving!!!
Yay new video! Started playing a very simplified sub game on my phone lately and it kinda rekindled my interest in the Pacific Theater of War, as in it you run around with the Salmon. Sinking Japanese shipping in various tasks.
What’s the game called?
@@hourlardnsaver362 Crash Dive II the secondary title of it is 'Silent Service' I think.
Interesting and informative Drach. Thank you so much for this.
This was great can’t wait for more. Psyching me up for the release of Sensuikan a solitaire board game where you man IJN submarines in WWII!
This video proves that GI Joe was sort of right: knowing (the right doctrine) is more than half the battle.
And as i found out in another video, the rest is violence
@@GearGuardianGamingyup, violence of action is part of many miltary doctrine in whatever branch.
The problem with the Long Lance was that if it was on the deck of a ship and was hit by anything that liquid oxygen/Kerosene combination would explode. Even a fighter plane strafing the ship could set them off.
although it was especially risky for long lances its not fair to say that this problem was unique to the long lance, and the ijn knew this and there were cases of ships jettisoning their torpedoes prior to air attacks
@@kulot-ki1tuit’s not unique however the volatility of Japanese type 93 torpedoes was notably higher.
Pinned post for Q&A :)
Edit: Yes, I accidentally said Dec 5th instead Dec 7th for the Pearl Harbor attack!
are ya gonna make a video going into the French Alsace class Battleships??
What was Japanese ASW doctrine? I’ve seen nothing. About it anywhere. Axis ASW seems to be undocumented publicly.
you've often noted that the Kreigsmarine of WW2 was hilariously inefficient when it came to ship design and constantly went over the treaty limit, but if the Allies had been able to build ships as large as the Kriegsmarine did around the same time (IE we move the Washington Navy treaty's ship size limits to match the Kriegsmarine ships) just what would the allies (and japan) have built and how much more capable would it have been?
Was the type b1 submarine able to launch bomb carrying floatplanes, and if so was the plane used for bombing purposes.
Any chance of a video focusing on submarine trading.
Hey Drach, is there a concrete reason why the Unprotected Cruiser concept died out around the turn of the century?
Considering how funding usually was even in the best of times, and how developments turned out in the long run- with barely armored Scout Cruisers filling a glass cannon cruiser niche, and Destroyers ouright evolving into this same unarmored warship space (though with much more contemporary speed and overall potential for its later years, ala the Fletcher-class), it almost seems like Unprotect Cruisers were just forgotten about (and no the Duquesne-class doesn't count!) instead of directly evolving like literally every other major ship type as the 20th century progressed.
oh my god I've been diving into this topic in the past few days this could not be better timed.
Looking forward to the rest of this series, very interesting! I know nothing about the Japanese subs in WWII, thanks!
Germans: _"The Americans have these big fleet submarines that are so ostentatious!"_
French: _"We put a dual 8 inch gun turret on ours! *Le funny French noises*"_
Japanese: _"We have one that is also an aircraft carrier."_
I love submarines.
Americans: _”Train go boom.”_
Quite a few Japanese submarines carried floatplanes.
The wild experiments never really stopped on any side
The Soviets built one that could do 43 kts submerged
The Americans currently have four operational subs converted from carrying nuclear missiles to carrying 192 Tomahawks each
Who knows what the Chinese are up to, footage of a brand new one of theirs got leaked on social media somehow
The US Navy had flying aircraft carriers in the 20s and 30s. Cool idea that proved impractical. Submersible carriers also have a cool factor but don't really count as real carriers due to their limitations.
Good one général! As a French I hope you will allow me to ask how goes your defense of the US bodily fluids? Without breaking any security measures of course...
Did I hear right about the aerial assault on the American fleet being on December 5th at the 24:54 time mark? "Yesterday, December 7th, 1941, a date that will live in infamy...." Hope I misheard. Great content, as usual.
Ah, you scooped me. I heard the same.
You heard it right. The narrator made a couple of bloopers in his comments. He also mis-identified HMAS Deloraine as HMS Deloraine. Otherwise a good documentary.
Thanks. I have myself produced videos for TH-cam. Each minute of video was nearly an hour of writing and production time. Often rewriting and editing changed the flow. We’re all human.
I so enjoy your well designed and implemented historical videos.
I need a roller skate for my chin. The only popular-level book I've read, in the 19(mumble-mumble)s, was "I-Boat Captain". Being first hand, it is very good, but it also is formed by the author's experiences and the second-hand experiences of his colleagues. It amazes me how just-so Japanese strategy and ship building was. It reminds me of very very inexperienced chess players whose planning is, "I will do 'A', my opponent will do 'X', I will do 'B', my opponent will do 'Y', I will do 'C', my opponent will do 'Z', and checkmate. The USN was never going to send their whole battle fleet to attack Japan, the US never surrendered, so the "Decisive Battle" as the IJN conceived it, never happened, and the long war Japan could never win and hoped to avoid ensued.
When you "know" a war will be short, there are things you don't see a need to do. You don't see a need to have shipyards capable of repairing damaged ships AND build new ships. You don't see a need to attack enemy shipping. You don't see a need to train large numbers of pilots and other high-skilled specialists. You don't see a need to be able to transition to producing next generation aircraft. You don't have a strong culture of learning and adjusting strategy and tactics.
Kinda yes and kinda no. The U.S. Rainbow series of battle plans was based around a fleet engagement in the Western Pacific almost exactly like the Japanese planners wanted because everyone on both sides assumed the US would send the fleet to defend the Philippines. So "I will do A, my opponent will do X" was considered inevitable by both sides. Japan didn't get the big fleet engagement they'd spent decades preparing because Pearl Harbor forced the USN to ditch their prewar plans and start over.
Catching up on Drach. I keep having to pause for work calls. Curses!!! I'm employed!!!
I'm glad to hear about lesser know parts of the pacific war.
39:40 Good attempt. "Lithgo" - in a similar way the Glasgow is pronounced "Glasgo".
Looking forward to the coverage of I-24's bombardment of Sydney's Eastern suburbs on 8/9 June 42, which my mother in law experienced.
So much film that is new to me! Thanks Drach!
A question:
Drach: Did any nation direct its submarine force to concentrate on the interception of its probable enemy's fleet train?
Guerre du course/merchant raiding . . . then there is the doctrine of direct attacks on enemy fleet units . . . uh . . . guerre d'escard (?). Is there a similar doctrine directed at intercepting the enemy's fleet train?
Seems to me that sinking the enemy's fleet oilers and ammunition ships would impel an enemy to use his carriers and battleships to refuel smaller ships (DD, DE). That places extra strain on the capital ships, and renders them predictable to enemy torpedo officers (as one cannot refuel a destroyer or recover floatplanes while zig-zagging). Once you've stripped the enemy commander of his self defense echelon of DDs and DEs, wouldn't his capital ships be extremely vulnerable to further attack by any and all friendly combat units?
I don’t think intelligence and sensors were good enough in WWII for that level of planning.
I remain impressed with the sheer imagination the Japanese planners had by putting airplanes inside their subs to create such a covert strike force. When one of the I-400s surrendered, the Americans were amazed that the sub was longer than the destroyer! This idea of a submarine-aircraft carrier might not be practical in the 21st century, but we can only fantasize. The I-400s were certainly an inspiration to a 1980s Japanese anime show called "Blue Noah" where a giant submersible aircraft carrier was humanity's last hope against aliens.
Full Metal Panic also has a submersible carrier.
Great to see you covering the Japanese Navy. Must had been a bugger since that information is hard to come by.
Very interesting story indeed. Thank you for the Video
A little surprised you didn't mention I-15's attempted torpedoing of the Golden Gate Bridge in 1941. The torpedo was found on a nearby beach in 1946. Mark Felton did a neat video on the subject.
He did at least a couple of videos on the various attacks along the west coast of the US and Canada, shockingly inept execution of those missions.
Accomplished their missions
If allowed to be aggressive would have caused more damage
Taking out the Golden Gate Bridge would have inconvenienced a lot of Americans - and there aren't that many easy targets on the west coast that have both military relevance and public interest. It's easy to see why I-15 thought it was worth a try.
@@tomhenry897 they actually didn't accomplish their missions.
Oooh. Only 55 seconds to our first "thee-aetor" Well done Drach, Record time.
Perfect,just finished the drydock 😊
TIMESTAMP: *24:54* Hey Drach, the attack on Pearl Harbor was December *7th* (not the 5th);
"...A date, which will live . . . .in Infamy."
Thank you. When I heard that I was wondering if age had finally caught up with my brain, or if I'd fallen through a crack in the space-time continuum... again.
thanks for the work you put into the channel Drachinifel, your audience appreciates you sir
Seems like all i have ever heard about ijn subs was Saratoga twice, pearl harbor and the mini- subs, the yorktown, and the shot that killed wasp, and hit the north Carolina, and o'bannon.so this series is most welcome. Bravo Zulu
Yes my Limey brother!!!
Been waiting on a vid from Japans submarine war!!!
When you come by Lancaster Pa-I will buy the beer!
Gotta appreciate the sources for drachma photos and films?
What a perfect thing to wake up to!
Noooooo, in the Russian-Japanese war they didn't need subs to be firing torpedoes. They in fact had a VAST fleet of torpedo boats with a 10,000 mile+ range, capable of instantly teleporting across continents and fitted with cloaking devices.
They did, honest. No seriously, they definitely did.
Kamchatka? Is there something you need to tell us......? 🤔
7:15 Was not expecting the attractive vase + flower arraignment. Someone's doing Ikebana?
Drach, how do you find such great videos to back up your lectures? I’ve certainly never seen any video of Japanese submariners in action before. Neat!
Those look like training or propaganda videos. Only a few seem to be real action.
So it is the opposite of Germany who had a very small Navy and leaned in heavily on commerce raiding in defeating the enemy by a sort ocean-going seige warfare.
The reasoning was they were trying to strangle an island based country. Same as USA in latter part of WW2.
Thanks Drach!
Thank goodness the IJN didn't make as good use of their subs as the US eventually did. The concentration on sinking warships makes societal sense but it worked in the allies' favor in the end.
Fascinating information
Goes to prove you need good tactics and doctrines to go along with capabilities and platforms.
Holy crap, drachinifel right in time to ignore my classes!
My mother was 19 years old and living with her brother and his wife in San Diego when the war started. The threat of invasion (no doubt furthered by the Japanese sub shelling Santa Barbara) so scared my aunt and uncle that they sold their house and moved back to Chicago from whence they came.
Japanese Imperial Navy: "We need a submarine class for every letter of the alphabet"
So 46 classes? Or would that be 71 with the modifiers? :-)
Cheers from the Pacific West Coast of Canada.
This is great, was always interested in IJN subs. Hope you cover I-1s story at Guadalcanal. The supply runs to there have always interested me, exactly how were the supplies carried ? Submerged on deck ?
I've read somewhere that the supplies were carried in sealed drums. The subs would surface close to the shore, the crew would dump/push them overboard and hope the tide would carry them in for the troops to retrieve.
Had special barge strapped on the deck
Before release would surface and cut the outside lines go under and off the beach half surface release the inside line submerge and let it float a way
Small boats were to tow it to shore
Navy found many on the beach and realized what was happening and started anti sub patrols
I’ve see n drawing of barges on the subs, also heard about the barrels. I’m trying to figure out just how they did it , cargo nets or tarps lashed to the deck? I’m trying to build a model of one of the supply subs and hit an OCD wall
The I 1 submarine scrap with New Zealand ships is one which should be mentioned . The I 1 was 2500 tonnes compared with the NZ shipe of about 300 tonnes.
Great episode, I can't for more on Japanese subs.
Arguably the best sub force turn 1 in WW2 that's amazing how much doctrine can limit your effectiveness. The Japanese would find out the hard way just how effective a submarine blockade could be.
Neh-chez; iirc.
Thanks for the info Drach. I hadn't known the Japanese actually did attack cargo shipping.
All I could recall ever hearing was that if they had forcused on civilian shipping, it could have been a West Coast Happy Time.
Amazing, film footage!
Unusually for Drach's channel, this video features quite a lot of stock period footage. (not that I deem it a bad thing). Reading the desciption we know it's from the US National Archives. What were the copyright issues that you had to solve for using such footage?
Luckily a lot of footage on NARA has been put there by the US DoD and is listed as public domain. Almost all footage I used is from that collection and given that there was some pretty rare footage taken of Japanese submarines available, I thought it was worth using! (Also, there are correspondingly few decent still pictures of IJN subs 😀 )
I miss your old intro music, Drach...
This new music sounds like incidental music from the ‘Transformers’ film series.
Would love to see more coverage of Soviet navy activity during world war 2 (and really russian imperial ships too).
Maybe the best looking ww2 subs
The main torpedo of the Japanese Submarines were the Type 95. Both on the I class and the small recon submarines - The I Class I believe was almost as big as the Surcouf of the French Navy.
Happy to be so early to a new video!!
The filming inside the boats is absolutely fascinating. I assume this is largely propaganda film, I’m surprised how clean the crews uniforms looked, I very much doubt if this was the reality while on patrol!
Probably shot during start of the deployment.
Great to see unique Japanese vids
~33:00-34:00 IJN submarines off the west coast: (1) My aunt (then a child) told of being in Morro Bay CA when a (presumed) Japanese submarine was spotted off the coast. Bombers with depth charges came out to attack it, but she did not know the results (f any) of the attack. (2) A neighbor kid (close to my age) told me that his mother was in the San Diego Harbor area (onshore) when a dockside explosion occurred, supposedly a torpedo. I have no idea if that account/characterization was correct.
Yay my Wednesday doesn't suck anymore
I’m really loving these submarine operations videos 👍
Fun fact: The British were still using Mark 8 variants during the Falklands War. That was the weapon Conqueror used to sink the General Belgrano.
So well researched
Never clicked so fast!
If Japan would have just picked a standard type submarine and built that in large numbers as did the US, Britain and Germany they would have been much more effective.
Thanks Drach.