God & Morality - General Philosophy (2018 Peter Millican)

In this lecture on General Philosophy, Professor Peter Millican discusses God and morality. Among other things, he discusses the hypothesis of God, the fine-tuning argument from design, the Euthyphro dilemma, divine command theory, and the problem of evil. This comes from a 2018 series on General Philosophy.
This series of 8 lectures on General Philosophy was delivered to first year Oxford University undergraduates in Michaelmas term 2018. The lectures cover six main topics: Knowledge and Scepticism, Induction, Mind and Body, Personal Identity, Free Will, God and Evil. But they set these topics within a much broader context, encompassing humanity’s history of discovery about the natural world (both in physics and biology), and our place within it (linked to issues of both evolution and morality). Main themes of the lectures are: (1) Introduction and views of the cosmos from Genesis to Descartes; (2) Humanity’s place in the scientific picture of the world; (3) Scepticism and the problem of induction; (4) More on induction and facing up to scepticism; (5) The mind and personal identity; (6) Identity, self-interest, morality, and free will; (7) Free will, causality, explanation, and moral responsibility; (8) God and morality.
More lectures on General Philosophy: • General Philosophy - P...
Source: podcasts.ox.ac.uk/series/gene...
#Philosophy

[@NondescriptMammal]

Technically speaking, Ockham's Razor doesn't really suggest what hypotheses are most likely true, it is just a guideline for deciding which should be tested first.

[@Philosophy_Overdose]

No, it isn’t just used in deciding which theories should be tested, but in deciding which theories should be accepted.

[@NondescriptMammal]

@@Philosophy_Overdose It would be entirely unscientific to accept a theory based on its simplicity. Theories are accepted based on confirmation through experiment and observation. To accept a theory prematurely because it is the most simple, or elegant, or beautiful, is to dispense with the skepticism that is integral to evaluating a theory. Such an acceptance would be in direct contradiction to the scientific method.

[@Philosophy_Overdose]

@@NondescriptMammal It’s not that one is accepting theories merely based on simplicity alone without evidence, but it’s just that the available evidence is often not sufficient to decide between competing hypotheses or theories. And when there are multiple theories that are just as consistent with the available data or evidence, then one won’t be able to choose between them without having to appeal to theoretical virtues like that of simplicity, explanatory power, etc. Sometimes one can wait for more evidence to come in, but even in that case one will be going beyond the evidence since there’s always a gap between the theory and the observational evidence. Indeed, this is simply a logical point, since for any given data or evidence, there will always be multiple theories or hypotheses which are equally consistent with that data. Even our best scientific theories go far beyond the available evidence that supports them.

[@NondescriptMammal]

@@Philosophy_Overdose Yeah, that's the thing, if you have several possible theories that fit the facts, and are more or less equally plausible, there is no scientific reason to choose one as "accepted" or "preferred", other than as a guideline to further experiment and study. If one seems simpler than the others, that might be a good reason to spend time investigating that one first, but it isn't a good scientific reason for accepting that theory.

[@Philosophy_Overdose]

@@NondescriptMammal While the competing hypotheses may be more or less equally consistent and compatible with the available observational evidence, that doesn’t mean that they will be equally plausible. On the contrary, they precisely _won’t_ be equally plausible if one theory is more parsimonious, less ad hoc, has more explanatory power, etc. In other words, theoretical virtues like that of simplicity themselves contribute to the plausibility of hypotheses and theories. And this is true both inside and outside of science. Consider as an example the following two rival hypotheses: the first hypothesis is that we’re living in the material universe that we seem to be, while the second hypothesis is that we are actually living in some kind of Matrix-like simulation of a physical universe. Now, supposing that these two hypotheses are just as consistent with all the available empirical data and observational evidence, any observation or empirical data that can be pointed to would equally support and fit both hypotheses. And yet, I would say that the one hypothesis is nevertheless a better, more plausible explanation. But what would make the one hypothesis better and more plausible in such a case? It is precisely considerations like that of parsimony, simplicity, being less ad hoc, etc. Of course, it may turn out to be false and the other hypothesis is the correct one. And if evidence ever becomes available in the future which supports the one over the other, then we may have to abandon the more parsimonious one. But the point is just that equivalence of empirical evidence does not imply equivalence in plausibility, nor that of equivalence in theory-choice. Again, there is always going to be multiple hypotheses that more or less fit the available empirical data and evidence. But that isn't a reason for skepticism, it just shows the importance and indispensability of theoretical virtues.

[@daab]

All 8 were up, the one where he's in a white shirt, can't seem to find them now

[@Philosophy_Overdose]

This is actually a whole new channel. I haven't decided whether to re-upload them all, but they can all be found here: podcasts.ox.ac.uk/series/general-philosophy-2018

[@Anonymous-mp7yr]

It's ironic that a layman such as myself can even develope a stronger counter argument to someone who has vastly more experience and are more educated than myself.

[@georgepuedel6892]

let's hear it! :)