If it were not for Lt J Powers...things would have gone differently at Coral Sea...and that would have made a difference at Midway as well because at least 1 more big carrier would have been there.
Peal Harbour December 1941, Coral Sea May 1942. My farther served with AIF and enlisted on 28th July 1942 and fought on the Kokoda track. Your presentation helps me understand what situation was in these Months around July 42. Thank you!
Thanks to all involved for an excellent presentation on all levels (discussion, depth, quality and balance) - looking forward to the rest of the series :).
I have recently taken an interest in the Pacific War and I found the podcast extremely valuable and interesting. I thought the whole presentation was excellent. Also I was very impressed with the 4 gentlemen in the discussion; each seemed to give a very well considered, unbiased and informed account. Well done all.
Taking Port Moresby would not have allowed the Japanese to significantly cut off supplies from USA to Australia, but it would have made it more difficult. The Japanese thrust into the Solomon Islands was the real effort to block those supply routes and it ended with the Japanese defeat on and around Guadalcanal Island.
It is great to have such Australian experts speaking about the Battle of the Coral Sea. Hopefully it helps to raise further discussion on how important a maritime strategy is to the defence of Australia.
This format, moderator, and guests are an effective brew to put strong light on what is otherwise a chaotic event. Covering the tactical, operational, strategic, and political stuff all at once is panoramic like a good historical novel.
The title of the video feels misleading. It probably should have been, “Australian contributions at the Battle of Coral Sea”. Yes, two Australian ships supported an American fleet but what Crace contributed is just a footnote to the overall battle (and if Fletcher hadn't detached him, there wouldn't even have been a footnote at that). One gets the sense of history being rewritten from this discussion. Americans died at the battle of Coral Sea, not Australians so I think a title change is in order.
Very fine talk on Coral sea! The guy asking the questions really sets the scene properly for a the large array of moving parts of this battle and the strategic view.
It is disapointing that an Austrailian group seem to be unaware that Australia working with UK made the initial break into the JN-25 system in 1939. Look up Ian Pfennigwerth's book A Man of Intelligence: The Life of Captain Theodore Eric Nave, Australian,October 2012 and Michael Smith's book The Emperor's Codes: The Breaking of Japan's Secret Ciphers .
Thank you for your feedback. You may want to watch our later episodes on Code breaking in the RAN which covers more fully JN-25 & the Allied co-operation.
Ive only started watching the program, and to this point am enjoying the conversation. ive stopped the video in the middle of the program where the panel is talking about breaking the JN codes. the question was presented "Did the Japanese know their codes were compromised"? My opinion would be yes I believe they knew that they were being monitored of course (even some sensitive information being known by the Allies), but to what extent Im sure they had no idea. I believe they wanted to change the codes but there was a time issue (especially to forward areas). With on going operations and the planing of soon upcoming operations aimed at Midway and the Allusions. There simply was not enough time to change the codes.
Commander Stama - 1st Tojo was not shot down by P38's, it was Admiral Yamamoto while on an inspection trip to Bougainville in the Solomon Islands. 2nd Again I reiterate to what extent did they know? There is a documented conversation (I will have to retrace my steps to find) That Admiral Yamamoto & his Chief of Staff Admiral Matome Ugaki discussed changing the codes but because of current and future Campaigns were under way. Time would not permit.
@@mikerich4999 Regardless of whether or not they had the time to change the codes, if the Japanese knew that their codes were broken, then they wouldn't continue to use it to pass on real information, like where Yamamoto was going to be at such and such a time, and how he was going to be arriving. Instead, they would use that to their advantage and to mislead the Americans, and set up a trap, something big. But in the case of Yamamoto, they could have communicated that he would arrive at noon by submarine, and show up at 2 pm by air instead. GET IT?
@@RedRider1600 Japanese knew the Allies were trying to penetrate them. However which one? As Mike Rich suggest, they were meant to change the additive books for JN-25D on 1 May but they were unable to get the books to all if the far flung bases in time. So not to compromisethenew codes, they kept the old book in circulation until 1 June 1942. This obviously lead to Allies getting enough time to decipher enough of the Midway Operation to understand it. As a side note, they never knew the 2 battleship forces were at sea for Midway until Yamamoto withdraw order. After 1 June changeover, the United States were in the dark about Japanese plans and intentions all the way through Guadalcanal campaign and well into 1943. To go on with JN-25D, Japan had a myriad of codes (eg Merchants, Weather, bases, Admirals) of which most went unbroken throughout Pacific War eg Admirals codes which was the most sort after the Allies made almost no headway on it. So Japan could assume the Allies were trying to read all of them, but Japanese also believed the Japanese kanji/letters or language itself was also unbreakable and deterent enough JN25D was daily traffic code and its penetrated by about 60% or which the cryptanalysis guys only had time to read 40% of the messages. So the code could be read but the value of its information might have been lost after a day or two (Battle of Eastern Solomons. Such was life of codebreakers. So onto Yamamoto. He had his heart set on dying at that time. He could see the American steamroller warming up. it was probably a good thing too for the Japanese Navy as they needed to somehow ease him out of that position without upsetting the navy personnel (he was appointed CinC Combined Fleet on 1 Sep 1939, start of the war in Europe!) Or losing a battleship/carriers in the processed. Japanese needed fresh ideas going forward after attritional battles of Guadalcanal and Operation I Go, the air attacks on SW Pacific bases, another Yamamoto failure.
Even just the volume of signals traffic even if you cannot decrypt it is potentially valuable metadata. Only a spread spectrum or other method that can reliably hide the reality of that traffic can hide said metadata. It was really the sigint and counter sigint with decryptography that really one both wars: the author of the Art of War would be proud: information is key: a small piece of information can bring down a very large and complex war machine. And it was sigint again that really won midway for the Americans combined with some ballsy risk taking that paid off. In retrospect if they had only known one wonders if they could have avoided almost all of the conflict and simply using nuclear bombs on key oil infrastructure instead of civilian ones and have starved the Japanese Empire of oil into submission. The CCP is another evil fascist regime with whom war is perhaps inevitable unless it falls beforehand through domestic political unrest.
This is fascinating, in school all we ever heard about was the american point of view. Also shout out the the PC game World of Warships for getting me interested in WW2 history again
It's unfortunate that a flag forms the background of what should be an objective, non-partisan discussion. If this were a group of Japanese naval officers discussing the battle, a rising-sun flag behind them would not inspire confidence in their even-handedness.
AUSTRALIAN Naval History podcast . "One of the most significant battles in AUSTRALIAN history." Produced by the Naval Studies Group UNSW Canberra. These give you any clues?
Aaahh, silly me, of course! And just in case we didn't notice all that, we need an AUSTRALIAN flag in the background to remind us that this is an AUSTRALIAN perspective. I'd forgotten that we Australians don't pick up on these things very quickly.
The difference is, Australians can be proud of their contribution to the war. By almost every metric, the Japanese cannot be proud of how their military fought the war.
Obviously a somewhat biased view point related to the Battle of Coral Sea: 1. When we look at tonnage the IJN won this battle. The IJN sunk the Lexington and a destroyer and damaged Yorktown. The IJN only lost Shoho a small carrier. While the Shokaku was damaged and the Zuikaku not damaged. 2. There was nothing stopping the Port Moresby invasion at this point. It was simply the “decision” of the IJN not to invade. So a decision by the IJN simply turns this into a “strategic” victory for the US? Amazing how some folks re-write history. It’s easy to do so when we all know the final outcome of the war. 3. It was the IJN’s “decision” not to bring Zuikaku and Shokaku to the Battle of Midway. It’s been documented that both Shokaku and Yorktown would take 3 months to repair. Nimitz gave 3 days for the Yorktown and in the end they gave her up as a sacrificial lamb. Look at where they positioned Yorktown vs Hornet/Enterprise. While the IJN started to lack bomber pilots what they really needed was more fighter pilots and planes. 4. Had the IJN simply came up with a better plan at Midway then they easily could have won. Winning at Midway would only reinforce the victory at BCS. The mistake the IJN made at Midway was not utilizing their battleships properly. And had the IJN won at Midway its a whole different ball game. 1944 is 2 years away before US production really ramped up.
Yes it was a tactical victory for the Japanese and a Strategic victory for the US (because one it made the Japanese abandon the invasion of the Port and two because it lost two carriers that could have participated in the Battle if Midway). You’re looking at this with hindsight my guy looking back it might be obvious to us that the Japanese should have pushed the attack, but at that moment in time it was absolutely insane to send a lone carrier without air cover to provide cover for an invasion force.
Kory Chouinard the IJN didn’t lose 2 carriers at the Battle of Coral Sea. Do some research. The irony is that it was the IJN decisions that caused the “strategic” victory. In the end the Us won so obviously you or the Us can spin any defeat into a “victory”. 😂 It’s already well documented that had the IJN continued with the invasion there was nothing stopping them. Also Zuikaku wasn’t damaged. The IJN could have brought Zuikaku to Midway. They just chose not to. Do some research. It’s not necessarily “hindsight”. The IJN had the hindsight themselves to develop a better battle plan for Midway. Battle of Coral Sea should have already taught the IJN that getting into sole carrier and planes battle with the US is too costly for the IJN pilot wise. It was not even where the IJN had their strengths and advantages. The IJN edge was in their battleships. Battle of Wake Island should have taught the IJN also that aerial bombings wasn’t going to be enough. Destroyers firing at Midway wouldn’t work either because at Wake the IJN got too close within enemy fire and paid dearly. They should have easily concluded they needed to shell Midway with their battleships. Well?
@@f430ferrari5 Zuikaku didn’t participate in Midway because their air crew was depleted. The Japanese didn’t move pilots from other carriers so Zuikaku sat out the battle. The battle of the Coral Sea was the reason Zuikaku and Shokaku were knocked out of the Midway battle.
@@jimloesel2849 the aircrew was not depleted in 1942. Come on. Stop spreading misinformation. Sure some IJN doctrine preferred not to transfer pilots which they easily could have done from Shokaku to Zuikaku or even grab for their training program. The IJN had 1,500 pilots prior to the start of WW2. They didn’t lose many by Battle of Coral Sea or even after. So quit saying Zuikaku was knocked out. She wasn’t. It’s a historical fact she could have been used at Midway. The IJN made a dumb move not using her. It’s just that plain and simple. No idea why folks like you try to lie.
@@pimpompoom93726 my agenda is simply telling the truth. You have an agenda of spreading misinformation. Zuikaku could have easily been used at Midway. Don’t deny it. The IJN could have easily loaded her with all fighter planes. Do some research. The IJN had over 1,500 pilots at the start of the war. They were not depleted by mid 1942. Do some research.
The Battle of Midway was irrelevant as Japan did not have the resources or the economic/military/industrial capacity to simultaneously fight China, the United States and the British Empire.
![[TH] FS vs BME - VCT Ascension Pacific - Lower Bracket Final](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/wnygqsR2Fig/mqdefault.jpg)
Very interesting discussion. As an American, it puts events in a different and more complete perspective.
Subtitle could read: Second Guessing the Actions in the Battle of the Corral Sea.
Splendid work - well explained and illustrated. Nice to hear from people who are experts in their fields.
If it were not for Lt J Powers...things would have gone differently at Coral Sea...and that would have made a difference at Midway as well because at least 1 more big carrier would have been there.
Peal Harbour December 1941, Coral Sea May 1942. My farther served with AIF and enlisted on 28th July 1942 and fought on the Kokoda track. Your presentation helps me understand what situation was in these Months around July 42. Thank you!
It's hard to remember how truly Desperate the Allied position was before Midway.
Thanks to all involved for an excellent presentation on all levels (discussion, depth, quality and balance) - looking forward to the rest of the series :).
I have recently taken an interest in the Pacific War and I found the podcast extremely valuable and interesting. I thought the whole presentation was excellent. Also I was very impressed with the 4 gentlemen in the discussion; each seemed to give a very well considered, unbiased and informed account. Well done all.
Taking Port Moresby would not have allowed the Japanese to significantly cut off supplies from USA to Australia, but it would have made it more difficult. The Japanese thrust into the Solomon Islands was the real effort to block those supply routes and it ended with the Japanese defeat on and around Guadalcanal Island.
It is great to have such Australian experts speaking about the Battle of the Coral Sea. Hopefully it helps to raise further discussion on how important a maritime strategy is to the defence of Australia.
This was wonderful. As an American it’s great to get a different point of view. Thanks for this history discussion.
This format, moderator, and guests are an effective brew to put strong light on what is otherwise a chaotic event. Covering the tactical, operational, strategic, and political stuff all at once is panoramic like a good historical novel.
This is great not like that crappy computer voice I just deleted now I can build my Monogram Devastator with joy
That old scallywag on the right has a very good voice. He could be a radio announcer.
The title of the video feels misleading. It probably should have been, “Australian contributions at the Battle of Coral Sea”. Yes, two Australian ships supported an American fleet but what Crace contributed is just a footnote to the overall battle (and if Fletcher hadn't detached him, there wouldn't even have been a footnote at that). One gets the sense of history being rewritten from this discussion. Americans died at the battle of Coral Sea, not Australians so I think a title change is in order.
Very fine talk on Coral sea! The guy asking the questions really sets the scene properly for a the large array of moving parts of this battle and the strategic view.
It is disapointing that an Austrailian group seem to be unaware that Australia working with UK made the initial break into the JN-25 system in 1939. Look up Ian Pfennigwerth's book A Man of Intelligence: The Life of Captain Theodore Eric Nave, Australian,October 2012 and Michael Smith's book The Emperor's Codes: The Breaking of Japan's Secret Ciphers
.
Thank you for your feedback. You may want to watch our later episodes on Code breaking in the RAN which covers more fully JN-25 & the Allied co-operation.
Please see our Season 3 Episodes 6 & 7 on codebreaking which covers this important aspect.
Ive only started watching the program, and to this point am enjoying the conversation. ive stopped the video in the middle of the program where the panel is talking about breaking the JN codes. the question was presented "Did the Japanese know their codes were compromised"? My opinion would be yes I believe they knew that they were being monitored of course (even some sensitive information being known by the Allies), but to what extent Im sure they had no idea. I believe they wanted to change the codes but there was a time issue (especially to forward areas). With on going operations and the planing of soon upcoming operations aimed at Midway and the Allusions. There simply was not enough time to change the codes.
Mike Rich If they knew tojo wouldn't of gotten shot down by P 38's
Commander Stama - 1st Tojo was not shot down by P38's, it was Admiral Yamamoto while on an inspection trip to Bougainville in the Solomon Islands. 2nd Again I reiterate to what extent did they know? There is a documented conversation (I will have to retrace my steps to find) That Admiral Yamamoto & his Chief of Staff Admiral Matome Ugaki discussed changing the codes but because of current and future Campaigns were under way. Time would not permit.
@@mikerich4999 Regardless of whether or not they had the time to change the codes, if the Japanese knew that their codes were broken, then they wouldn't continue to use it to pass on real information, like where Yamamoto was going to be at such and such a time, and how he was going to be arriving. Instead, they would use that to their advantage and to mislead the Americans, and set up a trap, something big. But in the case of Yamamoto, they could have communicated that he would arrive at noon by submarine, and show up at 2 pm by air instead. GET IT?
@@RedRider1600
Japanese knew the Allies were trying to penetrate them. However which one?
As Mike Rich suggest, they were meant to change the additive books for JN-25D on 1 May but they were unable to get the books to all if the far flung bases in time. So not to compromisethenew codes, they kept the old book in circulation until 1 June 1942. This obviously lead to Allies getting enough time to decipher enough of the Midway Operation to understand it. As a side note, they never knew the 2 battleship forces were at sea for Midway until Yamamoto withdraw order.
After 1 June changeover, the United States were in the dark about Japanese plans and intentions all the way through Guadalcanal campaign and well into 1943.
To go on with JN-25D, Japan had a myriad of codes (eg Merchants, Weather, bases, Admirals) of which most went unbroken throughout Pacific War eg Admirals codes which was the most sort after the Allies made almost no headway on it. So Japan could assume the Allies were trying to read all of them, but Japanese also believed the Japanese kanji/letters or language itself was also unbreakable and deterent enough
JN25D was daily traffic code and its penetrated by about 60% or which the cryptanalysis guys only had time to read 40% of the messages. So the code could be read but the value of its information might have been lost after a day or two (Battle of Eastern Solomons.
Such was life of codebreakers.
So onto Yamamoto. He had his heart set on dying at that time. He could see the American steamroller warming up. it was probably a good thing too for the Japanese Navy as they needed to somehow ease him out of that position without upsetting the navy personnel (he was appointed CinC Combined Fleet on 1 Sep 1939, start of the war in Europe!) Or losing a battleship/carriers in the processed.
Japanese needed fresh ideas going forward after attritional battles of Guadalcanal and Operation I Go, the air attacks on SW Pacific bases, another Yamamoto failure.
76 years ago...
excellent video by the way.
We had just broken the Japanese code so we were able to somewhat be ready for Midway.
Even just the volume of signals traffic even if you cannot decrypt it is potentially valuable metadata. Only a spread spectrum or other method that can reliably hide the reality of that traffic can hide said metadata. It was really the sigint and counter sigint with decryptography that really one both wars: the author of the Art of War would be proud: information is key: a small piece of information can bring down a very large and complex war machine. And it was sigint again that really won midway for the Americans combined with some ballsy risk taking that paid off. In retrospect if they had only known one wonders if they could have avoided almost all of the conflict and simply using nuclear bombs on key oil infrastructure instead of civilian ones and have starved the Japanese Empire of oil into submission. The CCP is another evil fascist regime with whom war is perhaps inevitable unless it falls beforehand through domestic political unrest.
Great discussion.... well done
The sound quality is terrible. If you are going to use men with such extensive knowledge get the sound right!
Very educational and informative.
Great to get a different (Australian) perspective on this major Pacific battle.
This is fascinating, in school all we ever heard about was the american point of view. Also shout out the the PC game World of Warships for getting me interested in WW2 history again
It's unfortunate that a flag forms the background of what should be an objective, non-partisan discussion. If this were a group of Japanese naval officers discussing the battle, a rising-sun flag behind them would not inspire confidence in their even-handedness.
AUSTRALIAN Naval History podcast . "One of the most significant battles in AUSTRALIAN history." Produced by the Naval Studies Group UNSW Canberra. These give you any clues?
Aaahh, silly me, of course! And just in case we didn't notice all that, we need an AUSTRALIAN flag in the background to remind us that this is an AUSTRALIAN perspective. I'd forgotten that we Australians don't pick up on these things very quickly.
The difference is, Australians can be proud of their contribution to the war. By almost every metric, the Japanese cannot be proud of how their military fought the war.
The Australian Forces were truly tough. They fought to the death. The best friends an American could ever have.
No sound?
I personally wasn't expecting to see a bunch of writers & Professors sit & Talk! Waste of time here with this one.
Obviously a somewhat biased view point related to the Battle of Coral Sea:
1. When we look at tonnage the IJN won this battle. The IJN sunk the Lexington and a destroyer and damaged Yorktown. The IJN only lost Shoho a small carrier. While the Shokaku was damaged and the Zuikaku not damaged.
2. There was nothing stopping the Port Moresby invasion at this point. It was simply the “decision” of the IJN not to invade. So a decision by the IJN simply turns this into a “strategic” victory for the US? Amazing how some folks re-write history. It’s easy to do so when we all know the final outcome of the war.
3. It was the IJN’s “decision” not to bring Zuikaku and Shokaku to the Battle of Midway. It’s been documented that both Shokaku and Yorktown would take 3 months to repair. Nimitz gave 3 days for the Yorktown and in the end they gave her up as a sacrificial lamb. Look at where they positioned Yorktown vs Hornet/Enterprise. While the IJN started to lack bomber pilots what they really needed was more fighter pilots and planes.
4. Had the IJN simply came up with a better plan at Midway then they easily could have won. Winning at Midway would only reinforce the victory at BCS. The mistake the IJN made at Midway was not utilizing their battleships properly.
And had the IJN won at Midway its a whole different ball game. 1944 is 2 years away before US production really ramped up.
Yes it was a tactical victory for the Japanese and a Strategic victory for the US (because one it made the Japanese abandon the invasion of the Port and two because it lost two carriers that could have participated in the Battle if Midway). You’re looking at this with hindsight my guy looking back it might be obvious to us that the Japanese should have pushed the attack, but at that moment in time it was absolutely insane to send a lone carrier without air cover to provide cover for an invasion force.
Kory Chouinard the IJN didn’t lose 2 carriers at the Battle of Coral Sea. Do some research.
The irony is that it was the IJN decisions that caused the “strategic” victory. In the end the Us won so obviously you or the Us can spin any defeat into a “victory”. 😂
It’s already well documented that had the IJN continued with the invasion there was nothing stopping them.
Also Zuikaku wasn’t damaged. The IJN could have brought Zuikaku to Midway. They just chose not to. Do some research.
It’s not necessarily “hindsight”. The IJN had the hindsight themselves to develop a better battle plan for Midway.
Battle of Coral Sea should have already taught the IJN that getting into sole carrier and planes battle with the US is too costly for the IJN pilot wise. It was not even where the IJN had their strengths and advantages. The IJN edge was in their battleships.
Battle of Wake Island should have taught the IJN also that aerial bombings wasn’t going to be enough. Destroyers firing at Midway wouldn’t work either because at Wake the IJN got too close within enemy fire and paid dearly. They should have easily concluded they needed to shell Midway with their battleships.
Well?
@@f430ferrari5 Zuikaku didn’t participate in Midway because their air crew was depleted. The Japanese didn’t move pilots from other carriers so Zuikaku sat out the battle. The battle of the Coral Sea was the reason Zuikaku and Shokaku were knocked out of the Midway battle.
@@jimloesel2849 the aircrew was not depleted in 1942. Come on. Stop spreading misinformation.
Sure some IJN doctrine preferred not to transfer pilots which they easily could have done from Shokaku to Zuikaku or even grab for their training program.
The IJN had 1,500 pilots prior to the start of WW2. They didn’t lose many by Battle of Coral Sea or even after.
So quit saying Zuikaku was knocked out. She wasn’t. It’s a historical fact she could have been used at Midway. The IJN made a dumb move not using her. It’s just that plain and simple. No idea why folks like you try to lie.
@@pimpompoom93726 my agenda is simply telling the truth.
You have an agenda of spreading misinformation.
Zuikaku could have easily been used at Midway. Don’t deny it.
The IJN could have easily loaded her with all fighter planes. Do some research.
The IJN had over 1,500 pilots at the start of the war. They were not depleted by mid 1942.
Do some research.
The Japanese won the Battle of the Coral Sea.
Most naval victories are contested like the Battle of Jutland.
Midway was irrelevant.
The Battle of Midway was irrelevant as Japan did not have the resources or the economic/military/industrial capacity to simultaneously fight China, the United States and the British Empire.
There was no turning point. Even if the Japanese had won at Midway they would still have lost the war.
The Japanese did not have the resources or the economic, military and industrial capacity to defeat China, the United States and the British Empire.