I discussed the battle of Midway with my son and committed the error regarding the Japanese CAP being too low to stop the divebombers. I wish I had watched this video beforehand! Outstanding stuff!
That was a very impressive and informative presentation. I'm a Retired Chief who spent my entire career in the PAC FLEET (COMSUBPAC to be exact) on submarines out of Pearl. As such, I became a pretty big student of all things World War II in the Pacific, and love to learn new things or to look at them in a different way. Your video does both- thank you, and BRAVO ZULU!
Your book was excellent. My start was in highschool in the 80s, Guadalcanal Diary and the Helmet for My Pillow, then into carrier warfare I went. Your in person lectures and podcast are excellent...all of them. Thank you for keeping the knowledge and appreciation of it's history. The veterans that were my uncle's, teachers and neighbors are gone....but not forgotten.
I am struck, listening to this talk in 2023, with the parallels between Japanese/American industrial strengths and the situation in the war between Ukraine and Russia. Food for thought indeed. Thank you.
A fascinating talk! Another little-known fact regarding the Battle of Midway is that, thanks to the U.S. Navy's amazing damage control and repair regimens, the Japanese came away from the battle believing they had sunk two American aircraft carriers. But both "sinkings" were of the USS Yorktown, already repaired and underway under partial power after the first "sinking." (We also recovered quite a few of the vessels from the attack on Pearl Harbor, which saw action in later campaigns). Nobody sings songs or writes movies about the guys holding the water hoses or the wrenches, but they win battles -- and wars -- too!
I'm glad that I listened to the Q&A section of this lecture. Since I first heard the lecture part of the presentation, I wondered about keeping the fighter CAP refueled and rearmed. When going from sea level to combat patrol altitude, a LOT of fuel is burned. Combat is generally done at full throttle and that, too, burns a lot of fuel. Those pilots needed to get on the flight deck at some point or they would be taking a swim. Thanks, Mr. Parshall. You opened that door for me. Excellent lecture and dead-on conclusions.
Great lecture. Midway is a part of my family history. My grandfather's cousin and his pilot were the last two Americans who died at Midway on June 7, 1942. (They were the only plane shot down that day.) They were hit by antiaircraft fire while attacking the battleships Mikuma and Mogami. The Navy honored both men by naming destroyer escorts after them the following year. They were Kenneth Bunch of Hamilton, Iowa, (the USS Bunch) and Richard Griswold of Davenport, Iowa (the USS Griswold).
Iowans at sea. Its a reality that many Iowans fought at sea. The Sullivan brothers as well. I think it deeply appropriate you remember their sacrifice by name these many decades later.
Absolutely a stunning presentation by an amazing author. Johnathan Parshall. I bought your book and then found this video. I could not be happier. I was surprised by the meager amounts of participants in the lecture hall. "Fail to plan, Plan to fail". I hope that I have an opportunity to attend one for Jonathan Parshalls presentations. Thank you for your history lessons. I will remember this on forever. Col (Ret) Glenn Ekblad, 33 years and 2 months of service in uniform. USAFR Flight surgeon, Emergency Medicine Physician, preventive medicine physician and past commander. USA, 25th Inf field combat medic, 1969-1970.
A friend of mine was a seventeen year old seaman on the Yorktown during the battles of Coral Sea and Midway. It was always interesting to hear his perspective. He even did damage repairs and help man antiaircraft guns. He also worked in the engine room at some point in his stint in the navy. Sadly he died last year and will be missed. The one thing I remember about him in the last years of his life was all the ribbons he wore on his baseball cap. In fact he had enough ribbons to full several hats.
Your friend is a hero of the highest order. I hope there is a special place in heaven for him and all the others that fought for our way of life today.
Dad was an Em2 on the Yorktown and was in the forward elevator pump room on the bottom of the ship.They barely escaped thanks to dad I found out years later from his friends.
I was surprised, if not shocked to see all of the empty seats in the lecture hall. Parshall is a fine historian and speaker, one would have to place me under arrest to keep me away from his presentation if one were close to me.
I read your comment as a had started to watch this presentation and struggling to become engaged. Your comment kept me going and I became fascinated with it. Thank you for that, Mr Serpent....
I really like Jonathan Parshall, he has a talent of unwinding the convoluted accumulated data about a subject and then presenting it in a no-nonsense, common sense approach. Richard Frank also has that similar quality. My only problem with these lectures are they always have too short of time allotted to them so much is left out, I could listen to this lecture double the time, I know there's much more to be said.
I do too. and he certainly has debunked a lot of myths. But I also think his dismissal of Japan's alternatives to attacking US forces as "counter factual" is not well thought out. Of course it is hindsight, but hindsight is helpful in history studies. And if Japan had just attached UK and Dutch holdings it would have had the resources it needed, especially petroleum. Sure US presence on the Philippines would have been a threat, but his claim that it would have been a "knife at the that of Japan" is hyperbole
On one hand I agree with you, having thought the same thing back in the Seventies at least. On the other hand, FDR is trying to strangle Japan and force it out of China and was achieving great success by December '41. I think the President would have awaited the use of those shipping lanes and then something else would have brought us into the war-imagine the sinking of one of our "peaceful destroyers" or the like. In that scenario Japan would have been utterly vulnerable. The US would never cede the Pacific to anyone. Control of that ocean has been doctrine since 1895 or so. Whatcha think?@@thecooper1073
And he does the same with his books. Military history books can make it hard to follow the action. He makes it easy. Not simplified but easy to follow.
Great explanation!! Dick Best was one of the best of his breed. Without his actions on that June day in 1942, the war could have continued for considerably longer. We would have still won it all, but at a higher cost of lives on both sides.
Tellgryn not really because even if the Akagi launched its planes the IJN pilots may have hit the Yorktown themselves. It’s not a given they would have found Task Force 16 (Hornet and Enterprise) which was brilliantly positioned in back of Task Force 17. Most don’t even bring this up but it appears Task Force 17 which has the Yorktown was offered as sacrificial lambs. Now it’s hard to say if the Hiryu pilots themselves would have went after Hornet and Enterprise. They may have scored some major hits too but it would have been at a heavy cost and history showed us that it was never easy to sink a US carrier or two or three. Victory for IJN at Midway needed to include vessel vs vessel combat. The IJN had an 11 vs 0 battleship advantage. Most US historians try to downplay the battleships and say they were obsolete. They were not. The IJN had 4 fast battleships that could have easily caught wounded US carriers.
@@f430ferrari5 The position of Task Force 17 had to do with how, where and when their strike aircraft and CAP launches and recoveries occurred. Task Force 16 was further south and slightly east due to launching their strike aircraft earlier than TF 17 did and the fact that TF 16 was on a Southeastern heading to recover her strike planes. I strongly disagree with your opinion that TF 17 was offered as a sacrificial lambs.
Robert Den Dooven you have every right to disagree and I have every right to believe in what I believe in. I believe the evidence or lack of evidence on your side kind of shows who is really correct. Feel free to do research on Point Luck. Find anything where it shows where Task Force 16 and 17 were. They are rarely shown separately. Why? See map. We all know Task Force 17 departed later vs 16. It would make more sense to physically position TF 17 further east. Why have her travel further west and north? Yorktown is wounded and would take her longer to get into position. It would have been way easier for TF 16 to be positioned further West and North. But hey feel free to share whatever evidence you got. Remember. In the end the strategy worked. Also even after Yorktown got hit during the first Hiryu wave...Hornet and Yorktown could have in theory moved into those areas and Yorktown moved out. The gap between the first and second attack was an hour apart? I know we don’t like to term it this way but it is what it is. I would have done the same thing. Tough choices. The right call was made. www.google.com/search?channel=iphone_bm&source=univ&tbm=isch&q=point+luck+midway&client=safari&fir=KrREv2eV3XjV5M%252C5cpUOUFISVW47M%252C_%253BQOcjE9AXsYUDZM%252CuHzG8f_2rYMt-M%252C_%253BX0Hh73IKNDr5nM%252CDxu3LbfbofWvGM%252C_%253BN3lP3djpvEAdDM%252CsMz6gE0ymGueFM%252C_%253Bg91kM3DOz19ZfM%252CbRDcT2svhKtf2M%252C_%253BlbQ1Iy8T8X5_-M%252CpShxotVRTs9OFM%252C_%253BrPO03l53VGkTMM%252CWm7sVA0kApm4hM%252C_%253BGHnCdIi2zvWdTM%252CCOMtqiIvtpaw8M%252C_%253Bd2gMhhM3R6AueM%252C6_FhbSGncHHaSM%252C_%253BK-EwwJ-h6MhtSM%252CWm7sVA0kApm4hM%252C_%257Cbattlefield%25201942%253Bdestination%2520point%253Bdive%2520bombers%253Bpearl%2520harbor%253Bcoral%2520sea%253Baircraft%2520carriers%253Bernest%2520borgnine%253Bbattle%253Bfleet%253Bwar%2520ii&usg=AI4_-kRXWEGT4XbCdJzvS9HXWgNe_QgR1A&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjD1Oi2uqXrAhXfJzQIHeoWAWEQ7Al6BAgEEC4&biw=414&bih=833#imgrc=KrREv2eV3XjV5M
Thank You. Your teaching/lecture is the very top rate to me. These ware very brave men that changed the course of the war. Their sacrifice was a game-changer. Thanks to people like this I am here and alive at sixty-eight years of age as an unconquered U.S.A. American. Thank You, for the facts and figure information. They bombed us first. I am glad Japan was given two free atomic bombs (delivered).
I'll pick a fight.. Concerning the 'Battle of Midway' I ended up disagreeing with virtually all Mr. Parshalls statements. Check my (long winded..) umm.. rebuttal (in new comments..). Actually can't believe this passed the War College muster..
@@seanmac1793 Err.. didn't want to spam Jive Turkey's (to me the screen name was a bit of a tip off ;-) comment with something so long winded & why my response was brief but alluded to a more in depth response. If people judge my response worthy of further investigation it's there. Bottom line there were participating pilots on both sides of that conflict that wouldn't agree with Mr. Parshalls view of the events that transpired at the battle of Midway.
@@NesconProductions I expect there were participating pilots from both sides that wouldn't agree with each other (i.e. other pilots on their own side as well as their enemy's) on some details of what transpired and on what might have developed if some things hadn't transpired.
Having these presentations shown on youtube, allow thousands of history nuts,such as myself the ability to see and hear what we are not able to attend.
Congrats to the commenters for remarkable insights and (mostly) gentlemanly behavior. Why is Midway so worthy of study? Midway & Coral Sea can be compared with Thermopylae and Salamis. Their lessons of courage, foresight, planning and follow-through are even more relevant in today's confusion than ever.
The tools of War change. The velocity of War changes. The principles of victory really don't. If you can get into the other guys decision Loop and disrupt it you're going to have a good day. If you look at the first Gulf War, we were able to get inside the decision Loop of the Iraqi Air Force and their air Defence Force making them react which takes longer then making a decision to act. If you look at the Battle of Marathon the Greeks ran down the hill and full armor hitting the Persians before they had even formed their Phalanxes. They changed the velocity of War forcing the Persians to react instead of act. The expectation was both sides form their phalanx and then March at each other and have at it. That's fine if both sides play by the same Playbook. But the Great's were using a different book. Consequently the Persian force was destroyed and forced to retreat from the Greek mainland.
This os a rehash of PAST HISTORY. Wake yp and smell the coffee: Aircraft Carriers are now "sitting ducks" (no longer succesful determiners in a modern World War scenario. The winner will then be the one with the MISSLE TECHNOLOGY (not the number of carriers, .i.e., "TARGETS" for thjose missiles). Compare the cost and you can see that while carriers are "showy", best is to have MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION to cause all aggressors to think twice before committing "national suicide". (In the end, it may come to that if the slanderers and back-biters hold sway--for kodern H-bombs are at least 1000 timea LARGER that the Hiroshima bomb. And there are enough to turn everyu hiuman being on the planet into "toast".
I have the Kindle version of "Shattered Sword" and I find myself reading it over and over again. There is always something more to learn from the book. If it was a paperback it would be dog-eared by now. An amazing story about an amazing event.
I've followed Jonathan Parshall since the early 200s when I was researching the Pacific War and happened upon his Kido Butai website. Amazing researcher.
Well done Jonathan. I thoroughly enjoyed your lecture. Lessons a-plenty with a rich mix of static but no less engaging action diagrams, absorbing micro-analysis (e.g., the C. Wade McClusk-Richard Halsey "Dick" Best roles in the battle) AND the macro-BIG picture view of the consequences battle (e.g., the balance of power swinging towards the US with its resources and production superiority). This was a quality military lecture! Never mind the sparse attendance, nearly 90K TH-cam views, more than make up for the then empty seats. This video should be made compulsory viewing for all military cadets, commanders and historians.
I remember watching war movies with my grandad. He was a navy man who fought for two years at the end of ww2. Even got sunk once, and had to be rescued. Midway was one of his favorite movies. I miss all the stories he used to tell.
I am likewise glad that I found this video. Every misconception Parshall discusses was one that I believed. Amazing what common sense and facts can do, not necessarily that he was correct in those facts and opinions but rather that they were DIFFERENT and POSSIBLE. My thanks to the War College.
The Battle of Midway, people tend to look at the number of carriers sunk. What's more important then the carriers themselves is the flight Crews. Between the Battle of Coral Sea and the Battle of Midway, the Japanese Navy lost most of their veteran Pilots. Yes they were able to build additional carriers. No they couldn't build as many carriers as we could. But if you look at the aircrews that were put on those carriers that were completed, at no point where they be fighting force the tip of the spear in other words that Japan had at the beginning of the war. To me the decisive aspect of the battle was the further attrition I've experienced air crews for the Imperial Navy. If you look at every subsequent battle the Japanese Naval aviators we're never of the same quality as they started the war. Where is United States who the rotation process was able to teach that experience to new pilots. We not only produced more pilots then Japan was capable of doing but they were better trained then their counterparts in the Imperial Japanese Navy. There's a number of aspects that impacted Japan's ability to train Pilots. Probably the most important was the availability of fuel.
Also losing the experienced Support/Deck crews on all four of the Japanese Fleet Carriers. These deck crews were what allowed such effective coordination between the different flight decks. Japanese doctrine was set-up for a level of coordination/communication that the US Navy really didn't get until mid to late 1944. Once spotted on deck, the Japanese could create essentially a 80%-85% Alpha Strike in less that 30 minutes, frequently 15 minutes. The US really couldn't create an equivalent strike in less that 45 minutes, more likely a hour. Losing that ability hurt them badly later in the war. Edit: One thing I found interesting in Saburo Sakai's biography was that as a tier 1 pilot, he really didn't find the quality of late war American pilots to be exceptional, but he DID find them to be good & CONSISTENT ACROSS THE BOARD. Pre-war & Early war Experienced Japanese pilots were individually better, but 1 vs. 4 or 1 vs 12, with subordinate pilots with less that 50 hours of combat time were odds that just ate the IJAAF & IJNAF's lunch by late 1943. Japan just COULDN'T keep up.
ovk8102 isn’t it kind of a moot point having discussions post 1942? Even Japan and Yamamoto knew himself that they had around 6 months to a year at most.
Thank you for this great presentation. Some personal notes: in 1987 my dad has a heart issue and was hospitalized in the Alexandria Hospital (in Virginia). He was given room with another heart patient, a B-17 pilot who served at Midway. I knew the man’s name but forgot it. I spoke with him briefly and he was very humble and unassuming. The B-17 pilot told me that his bombs came nowhere near the Japanese. He did say that he was chased by a Japanese pilot and dove for a cloud. He further said that the only thing that saved him was that cloud. In addition he said that the armament on his plane was of little practical use and intimated that it gave the crew the illusion of defense. His words, not mine. If anyone knows of a Midway B-17 pilot living in the DC area in 1987, please set forth the name. It might jog my memory. Thank you again.
The critical moment in the battle came when Dick Best realized that McClusky had failed to apportion his dive bombers and he Dick Best and his wingmen pulled out of their dives and attacked the Akagi. Bests's lone hit on Nagumo's flag ship, which doomed it, was perhaps the most significant bomb that was dropped in the entire war other than the atomic bombs that were dropped in August of 1945. Without Best's brilliant and decisive action, the Akagi might have been able to launch and the battle and the war might have played out quite differently. Dick Best's actions at the most critical moment of the battle not only sealed the victory but are worthy of legendary status!
tosius2 Great point and I would argue that the skill level to drop that "one" bomb was greater than what was achieved with the dropping of the atomic bombs. Their accomplishment was more in the laboratory not the pilot's/ bombardier's chair... I guess he had the bravery, fortitude, foresight and will (travelling to the other ships and dropping the bomb on target) to see the operation through to success.
k6151960 You have to know that Best and his wingmen were flying through some really severe (withering) flak and fire as the Akagi and all of her support ships were no doubt blasting away with everything they had and there were only three targets. Best literally dove through the jaws of death and the mouth of hell and had the focus and skill to deliver his bomb "on target". I've often wondered why he never received more recognition for his actions on that day. His quick, decisive and deadly action at precisely the correct moment is right there with Joshua Chamberlain's actions at Little Round Top during the battle of Gettysburg. Perhaps I should write a book about him
tosius2 I always thought Dick Best was amazing. He always struck me as a fierce fighter with a good head on his shoulders. I hope he and his family realized what a critical contribution he made to the war and his country. What a warrior!
tosius2 Steve Ewing PHD mentioned in the episode of Heroships USS Enterprise that Wade McClusky prior to spotting the Arashi in the water was searching in vain he explains that he looked down at the water to see which way the wind was blowing cause he new the Japanese carriers would have to turn into the wind to launch so when he saw the wind blowing towards the north thats the direction he took VS and VB 6 and shortly after that critical decision they spotted the Arashi and followed the destroyer and the rest is history
I'm a bit of amateur naval historian and Midway is a fascinating story. I have read almost all the popular books on the subject and based on your interesting lecture I look forward to reading your book! Wish you had a bigger audience on an important battle!
Mr. Parshall thank you for a lecture that is every bit as thought-provoking and riveting as your writing. I too have been fascinated by WWII, particularly the Pacific War, since childhood. It was only in retirement that I could make time to read the available historical literature. I became aware of and read your book Shattered Sword and combined fleet website fairly early on in this endeavor and they both stand out for me as unusually analytical and highly engaging work. I hope I get the chance to meet you in the future.
"...governed by the concept of calculated risk..." Excellent orders given by Nimitz to a commander who would understand exactly their meaning...Ray Spruance! Had Halsey been there, he'd have been dodging 18" shells before dawn the next morning, possibly losing the whole force. I'm sorry that Parshall didn't have an opportunity to discuss more deeply the issue of leadership and doctrine. Good lecture and great book!!
I think about those Americans with admiration, the individual pilots displaying such courage, flying those planes in this battle in the pacific, sometimes at a great disadvantage. My family speak of the Americans (I am British), who made common cause with us, those who came to live among us and fought along side us, with a deep reverence; very honourable men, and extremely courageous.
Wonderful, wonderful video. I've read a lot about the Battle of Midway and the U.S. campaign in the Solomons. I think you are spot on in that it was the campaign in the Solomons that was the real backbreaker for the Japanese. They simply could not replace either the excellent naval aviators that they had at the beginning of the war or the ships that were lost in the naval battles around Guadalcanal.
I disagree. The real back breaker was Midway of course. Had the IJN won then there would have been no battles down south. The area of future battles would have been around Hawaii. Also there was no way the IJN could achieve a decisive victory unless they made much better use of their surface ships in combination with their carriers. The US Navy War College declassified vid even states this so it’s always interesting how folks like Parshall never focus in on this.
@@davidcroft9320 A fair question.. Did not agree with a number of Mr. Parshalls assessments. First if Nagumo would have received word from Operation K that the US carriers were not at Pearl Harbor he most likely would have kept his all his aircraft in a ship attack configuration rather than land attack and searched to destroy the American taskforce(s) first. The battle of the Coral Sea weeks prior to Midway had American aircraft carriers show up unexpectedly interrupting the Japanese invasion of Port Moresby. Nagumo may have already had an idea their code may have been compromised. Destroying the American carriers remaining in the Pacific was considered 'the' top priority due to the danger their mobility & projected firepower posed. Also luring the American carriers from Pearl Harbor was a key part of the Japanese overall attack plan. This idea is strengthened by the fact Nagumo kept half his aircraft in reserve loaded with air to ship weapons when the Japanese carrier aircraft attacked Midway despite not knowing or expecting any American carriers (or major surface combatants for that matter..) to be in the vicinity so soon (earliest expected arrival from Pearl Harbor was 48 hours). A screen of Japanese subs was also utilized to detect the movement of American ships between Pearl Harbor and Midway which they fail to do so initially. After the first Japanese aircraft strike on Midway was deemed incomplete a second was ordered to knock out the runway and the decision was made to rearm the reserve aircraft to that of a land attack role. Due to a delay in the launch of one Japanese patrol aircraft (due to a catapult issue on the cruiser Tone) that subsequently spotted the Yorktown taskforce considerably later than it should have if launched on time. Combined with radio transmitter difficulties on the same patrol aircraft had dire consequences for the Japanese fleet. Half of reserve aircraft had already be switched to the land attack role before Nagumo finally learned of the Yorktown's presence. Thus the decision to have the aircraft switched back again to the ship attack role. A side-effect of this was fatigued carrier crews with weapons & fuel below decks out of their normal storage compartments hastily scattered about out in the open. Combined with flightdecks of fully armed and fueled aircraft proved a lethal combination. TBD torpedo attacks played a critical role in success in the overall American carrier strike. Their sacrifice drew down the Japanese Zero air cover down to near sea level and made them expend most if not all of their remaining ammunition. Most of these air defense fighters had landed to refuel and rearm just at the time the SBD dive bombers arrived overhead is not a false tale. What Mr. Parshall fails to mention also are the 4 separate attacks by aircraft from Midway (though ineffective at 7:10, 7:55, 8:10 & 8:20 - & all came from different altitudes) that came prior to the 3 carrier based torpedo attacks (from 9:25 to 10:00) These earlier attacks were using up the Japanese air defenses fuel and ammunition as well. Constant US attacks and surrounding air operation plus the recovery & rearming of aircraft from the first Midway strike took precious time. The first SBD's struck at 10:25 just 25 minutes after the last torpedo strike. With the time it would take to dispatch this last wave of enemy torpedo planes then land fighters to refuel & rearm while at the same time readying all the Japanese aircraft for a carrier attack mission timing wise would put the SBD dive bombers in perfect position for an unopposed strike (as reported by US flight crews that participated th-cam.com/video/oQjDk7HSVyA/w-d-xo.html see from 6:30 in the video). The Japanese didn't see the attacking SBD's until they were on their attack runs & too late to effectively maneuver. Such was also confirmed by a Japanese pilot who survived the battle and the war th-cam.com/video/NAKs-6xEzOg/w-d-xo.html (see Zero pilot Kaname Harada's comments from 00:24). So participants in the climatic air battle at Midway from both sides are in stark disagreement with Mr. Parshalls view & are aligned with the generally know/accepted historical record. Though it was most likely Lt. Best bomb that set the Akagi alight both of his wingmen had very near misses that damaged the ship rather severely. One of these near misses was reported as such (as written here - en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Midway ) "Another bomb exploded under water very close astern; the resulting geyser bent the flight deck upward in grotesque configurations and caused crucial rudder damage'. This is significant for a number of reasons. First of all if the flightdeck was sufficiently distorted the Akagi may have been unable to commence any air operations. Second if the ships rudder were severely damaged and the ship were turning (as it surely was) it would be likely jammed (much like the fate of the Bismark when it was hit by a Swordfish torpedo). See here also www.midway42.org/TheBattle/IJNCarrierDamage.aspx. The reason this is of critical importance is in two fold. First combat laden aircraft need a carrier to be facing & moving at speed into the wind to create enough extra lift for the aircraft to successfully take off. The other problem a jammed rudder caused when the Akagi was hit would mean the captain couldn't maneuver the ship to assist in firefighting to blow the smoke and flame a certain direction, say away from the ship. Needless to say the distortion to the flightdeck and severe damage to the rudder would have prevented air operations from the carrier for a considerable amount of time. The U.S.S Nautilus was in the area and might have gotten a good shot at a circling/stationary Akagi or on one of the tending escorts (much like the fate of the Yorktown & escorting DD Johnson). Much may have depended if the bad American torpedoes at the time would have run true and even detonated if they hit a target, but all merely speculation now. Also the other near miss may have been responsible for flattening the Akagi conning tower but may have been merely one of the side-effects of Lt. Best direct hit (little difference in the final analysis). Seems like Lt. Best did best, but both his wingmen did their part as well kudos to all of them. Interesting footnotes in the Japanese interviews is that flight officer Harada said that his wingman was shot down by one of the TBD torpedo bombers (see starting at around 8:30 in the video). I've never heard/read before of this & to my knowledge such was never credited to one of the US torpedo bombers. Since almost all of the torpedo bombers were shot down it the attack the torpedo bomber that shot the Zero was probably shot down a short time later and the kill never reported. It should also noted before the SBD's made their fateful dives (considering the extensive destruction of US carrier torpedo planes, Midway's aircraft & ground targets from the first aerial strike) the Japanese were winning the battle rather decisively. In closing I'd hope in the years since this presentation was given in 2014 (now 2019) Mr. Parshall has continued to refine his understanding of the battle which I frankly have never shared. My knowledge of the battle came mostly from an outstanding paperback book - The Battle of Midway by Donald S. Sanford circa 1976. The book didn't deal in hypothetical theories, just the facts & events surround the battle. Probably my favorite book of all time & read it more times than I could count.
A polished and masterful presentation. When I was looking at some kind of real estate open house, I noticed a fellow listening to an audiobook. I asked him what it was and he said oh it’s military history, you probably wouldn’t be interested. It’s about midway. I asked: “shattered sword?“ Then commenced a lively discussion. 39:35 interesting story about the genesis of “Shattered Sword.”
Fabulous presentation. Excellent points about the Emilys and Pearl Harbor recon, and the effect of VT6 and VT8 on time vice zero flight altitude. Learning has occurred. ;)
Today’s kids NEED to study this stuff, to speak with WWII vets while some are still alive. They’re all over 90 and quickly dying off. My Dad joined the Navy at 16, got through basic, but the war ended before he turned 18. He left for a year to finish high school, then went back in 1946-1962. Served Korea, USS St Paul, then in Pacific, early Cold War. If he’d stayed in, he’d have been in Vietnam, but that didn’t happen.
JP, awesome work. Fantastic book (Shattered Sword). Absolutely fascinating to me because that book brought perspective and knowledge that I could not have known otherwise.
Great detail and excellent explanation . The battle that immediately changed the tide of the war and I certainly believe that the Germans were devastated by the news. They knew the Americans industry and manpower were going to come in force to Europe much sooner than anticipated.
They all were great. Running out of fuel they kept going. When they saw the Japanese carriers were vulnerable, they took no quarter. That is what you are supposed to do in war. Best won a DSC, he should have been awarded the MOH. He saved the Navy's fleet.
No quarter means taking no prisoners and is a war crime you crass dipshit. Very juvenile view point, not to mention your idiotic fallacy in your comment.
@@-VOR Oh sweet mercy, you calling someone a 'crass dipshit' and berating them for 'idiotic fallacy' is so deliciously ironic. The phrase 'no quarter' has both exact and broad meanings, and is used interchangeably depending on context. Only a true fool would be so needlessly abusive and offensive over such a trivial thing while simultaneously displaying their own willful ignorance and misplaced arrogance.
Very good point at the end, one I had not thought of. Back in the late '60s when I was flying S-2Es off the USS Randolph and USS Yorktown, we would practice finding out way back to the carrier with no electronic emissions from the carrier. We knew where they were supposed to be, and even with inertial internal navigation in the aircraft (we could not transmit either) it was sometime a real close call. Now, not wanting to lose an aircraft and certainly not a crew, if we got real tight on fuel, we could break silence and ask for help at which point the carrier would turn on the navigational beacon and bring us home. If we were close to the US shore, we would divert and be grounded for the rest of the exercise as we had been "lost". Even as big as an Essex with the angle flight deck is, in the middle of the Med, she is just a spec. And there were four us us working the problem, back in WWII there was only the pilot and the second seater was not trained and facing backwards. Gives me a great deal of respect for those guys.
I am appalled at the low turnout for Jonathan Parshall's fine lecture. In the early 90's after Desert Storm I was stationed at the Masters Gunners branch at the United States Army Armor School @ Ft Knox Ky (now its at Fort Benning) and there were copious lectures that one could attend by authors, industry reps. engineers, and Officers from the United States Military Academy that were very VERY well attended. The best lecture I attended there was given by Dr. Philip W. Lett (Father of the M1 tank series) who was then the leader of the General Dynamics Land Systems design and development team. Standing room only.
Harold Moore gave a lecture on LZ X Ray during the 1CD Reuinion in 1995 at FT Hood. He gave the lecture, and then said we were released unless we wanted to participate in an after lecture talk. I was in 1-7. 2-7 was there too. When he said that, 2-7 as a unit got up and filed out. We stood fast. He stood and watched silently as 2/7 filed out. After they had left, he said; "That's why they will always be 2-7" There's a difference between the two, even at the time. LZ Albany is there. There's not a question about it. Anyone that has anything that they are willing to offer is worth being listened to is worth being listened to. BTW; I was a Medic....I went to basic at FT Knox. :)
37:28 - "...and so as we leave today and go off to our comfortable homes and our 'professionally malted beverages..." I wish we'd teach this history to our children today. Say a Prayer of Thanks for the Greatest Generation.
I believe he said "refreshing" malted beverages. But I agree with your comment. Children today are taught ideology, not history. They are are ignorant of how much they owe to the sacrifices of those who fought and died for the freedom and prosperity that they enjoy.
excellent presentation. thought provoking and insightful. thanks for sharing. i think two major "issues" contributing to the successes of second front (germany first) were the failure of japanese anti-sub warfare (or success of USN subs) and the inadequacies of japanese pilot training (inability to replace the best of the best after Midway). a third contributing problem was the "meat grinder" of constant japanese pilot fight activity where the USN was rotating the combat vets back to the USA for training raw recruits. our quantitative and qualitative advantages compounded with every battle, whereas the japanese advantages evaporated. the Solomon campaign was the "knee of the curve"
Recall what Gen. Patton told his Third Army men about patriotism. It was not dying for your country. It was make the other poor SOB die for his country. The Japanese lost more quickly because their best thought it was their duty to die in combat even when their deaths accomplished little or nothing.
Those are not really the reasons. You’re looking from a perspective of a “long term” war which the IJN had no intention of fighting a long time war. So the analysis must be within only the first 6 months to a year.
The head of the math department of Georgia’s state military college, North Georgia College, CDR Marion Wycht, PhD, taught summers at the Naval War College. He was my faculty advisor and I was scared to death of him as he told us about how Naval officers would bilge out rather than cheat.
Thank you! This has been obvious to anybody who thinks logistics over tactics and strategy. Midway was just something we went through, our industry and fighting efforts won the war, not Midway
Best assessment of the Battle Of Midway by anyone. Regardless of the outcome the Japanese lost the war before it started at Pearl Harbor. The Japanese strategy was to negotiate not an American surrender but a concession and in no less than two years after which the Japanese could not defeat American resources and war manufacturing. The Japanese knew this but gambled America didn't have the willpower to sustain a war of attrition. The cruelty of the Japanese war culture demanded an unconditional surrender.
An interesting lecture. While there was mention that Admiral Nimitz had the advantage of being able to read the Japanese messages, in my opinion, this was not fully explained in regard to the Battle of Midway. From decoded messages (some from Australia) Admiral Yamamoto's plan to trap the American Navy by luring them to defend Midway and then swooping in with their Carriers and destroying them, was exposed and Nimitz was able to employ his own trap. I agree with the comment that the sailors & Marines still had to fight the Battle but they had an ace. It was this crucial intelligence that was the ace in Nimitz's plan and gave him a huge advantage. A very informative book on the intelligence situation is David Dufty's 2017 "The Secret Code-Breakers of Central Bureau". I realise this was not printed when the lecture occurred.
Interesting and well preseted lecture. In the mid 1920's (1925 I think) a man by name of Hector Charles Bywater wrote a book, "The Great Pacific War" -- a novel about a war between our country and Japan. The book involves a "decisive" naval battle somewhere in the middle of the Pacific. The book was probably read by Yamamoto and other Japanese naval officers. Yamamoto was naval attache in the United States so it would be no surprise if it was picked up and translated in Japanese. It describes the taking of the Philippines, Wake, and other islands as well as the routes to take in an attack on us. With some varations it is almost identical to what the Japanese actually did. Bywater was an interesting character, a British naval intelligence agent posing as a corespondent. He died under mysterious circumstances in Great Britain in 1940. War Plan Orange was somehow involved in what happened in the future. Another interesting book I found was "Visions of Infamy" by Williwm Honan. Hence Midway was that "decisive" battle that Bywater wote into his "novel"?
I've read Bywater's book. It opened with a Japanese sneak attack, a bloody debacle of the US trying to take the Bonins (Iwo Jima), and a climatic clash of battleships at Yap.
Good talk, but:(!) there was no mention of "the flight to nowhere", the abysmal performance of Hornet's air group and Captain (admiral designate) Mitscher, or the lack of direction provided by Spruance's air staff, especially Miles Browning.
Question 1. How long were the Japanese fighters in the air prior to destroying the two doomed torpedo plane squadrons? Question 2. Is it not possible that the process of fighting off VT-8 and VT-6 depleted the protecting Zeros fighting capacity by exhausting their fuel and ammunition supplies? Could this explain the reported absence of fighter cover during the subsequent attack by U.S. dive bombers?
The climb rate of Zeroes is one factor of many, and is likely a best case rating. For example , a truck with a lot of miles is not going to tow as much as a new, well-tuned truck.
The reason it was a turning point was that the Japanese lost more carriers than they could replace under conditions of war in a timely manner nor could they replace their elite air crews. They could train new pilots but not to the same level. They also were finding the Hellcats to be pretty much a match for their Zeros. They needed to upgrade to something better but what was an issue. We on the other hand were about the flood the Pacific with carriers and other ships and were training crews by the thousand besides upgrading planes.
He spent 38 minutes taking away our understanding of how the Battle of Midway went so that he could give them back to us - but on his terms. At 38:20 he acknowledges this and it is here that the valuable part of this clip starts.
Fantastic, Thank You. I believe there is wisdom in both the Japanese Kantai Kessen Doctrine and the Soviet Deep Battle Doctrine. Just like Guerrilla Warfare, they all exist to find a point in time where opportunity exceeds risk. I don’t claim to be able to calculate it, and it includes variable outside of the battle. I do know that many downed Zeros contained an irreplaceable ace; and the Japanese Aircraft Carriers were irreplaceable. Meanwhile, some American torpedoes were nonfunctional.
Very interesting and informative Presentation! Thank you. I truly believe we must have intelligent deciecive intuitive and common sense Commanders and Subordinates.
Welp! I know what my next book is going to be (currently reading "Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors") I think it is unfortunate that there doesn't seem to be enough professional and personal (memoirs) of The Pacific War (as compared to the ETO). One just needs to read E.B. Sledge or W. Manchester to get an idea of the appalling and savage conditions faced by the ground troops, while Ian Toll reminds us that the Pacific War wasn't just an "island hopping" campaign but lists the heroism (and sacrifices) of the Navy. Reminds me of the lack of Soviet material (especially first person accounts) regarding the Nazi-Soviet conflict. Looking forward to your book Sir!
Jon is brilliant. And of course he is correct that the Kido Butai CAP could have gotten back up to high altitudes. But 'coud of' is not the same as 'actually doing it'. Any assessment requires information Jon does not address 1. What did the CAP actually do. 2. Just what control did Nagumo have over his CAP. Did they have the capability of contacting the CAP and order them back up. 3. Did Nagumo recognize the danger and did he act immediately to order them back up. 4. Where was the CAP when the American dive bombers arrived. 5. The Japanese did bot have radar. And even if the CAP was in place, they may or may not have intercepted the American dive bombers.
One thing to consider regarding the Zero CAP. I will grant the aircraft had the performance to regain altitude in order to engage the dive bomber squadrons, but how much ammunition did they have left after obliterating the Devastators of Torpedo 6 and 8? They only carried a maximum of 60 rounds per 20mm cannon and 500 rounds for each 7.7mm machine gun. That's not much even before they destroyed the torpedo squadrons. When attacking the dive bombers and their escorts, they would have had less ammo. Perhaps a great deal less. So, in my opinion, the historical sacrifice of VT-6 and 8 is indeed justified, just in a way not usually discussed.
A friend of mine, who was a child during WW2, told me that prior to Midway, people in the US reallythought we might lose the war with Japan, but after Midway, we knew we'd win.
phtevlin At the time the US had a very small and Unequipped army. The fear was that the Japanese would get all way to Chicago before the US could train an equip an army to oppose them.
You give rock solid evidence on how historical "revisionism" is different from historical "revelation." Keep up your spectacular, myth-busting revelatory scholarship!
Thank you sir for the amazing presentation which help add a new knowledge and insight including visual scenario of the battle where my text book failed to provide
Jonathan, I read your book, and found it interesting and compelling. It is informative about how source material (Fujita's book) , while wrong, can lead to incorrect understandings of pivotal historical events. Thank you for going back and re-examining the basic assumptions and materials of this important battle.
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I'm humbled and appreciative of all the kind comments. I'm so glad so many of you enjoyed that talk!
thank you.
Thank you sir.
@Jason Forbes Current project is a new history of the year 1942, all theaters. It's a heavy lift, and it's taking a while... ;-)
I discussed the battle of Midway with my son and committed the error regarding the Japanese CAP being too low to stop the divebombers. I wish I had watched this video beforehand! Outstanding stuff!
Thank you!
That was a very impressive and informative presentation. I'm a Retired Chief who spent my entire career in the PAC FLEET (COMSUBPAC to be exact) on submarines out of Pearl. As such, I became a pretty big student of all things World War II in the Pacific, and love to learn new things or to look at them in a different way. Your video does both- thank you, and BRAVO ZULU!
Your book was excellent. My start was in highschool in the 80s, Guadalcanal Diary and the Helmet for My Pillow, then into carrier warfare I went. Your in person lectures and podcast are excellent...all of them. Thank you for keeping the knowledge and appreciation of it's history. The veterans that were my uncle's, teachers and neighbors are gone....but not forgotten.
I am struck, listening to this talk in 2023, with the parallels between Japanese/American industrial strengths and the situation in the war between Ukraine and Russia. Food for thought indeed. Thank you.
This professor is really good at what he does. He kept my attention easily, because he tells it like a story.
"Get them in a headlock. Kick the weasel snot out of 'em." Simplistic, perhaps, but essentially true.
If you haven't already, read Shattered Sword. It's a great read, and possibly the best single volume on Midway.
A fascinating talk! Another little-known fact regarding the Battle of Midway is that, thanks to the U.S. Navy's amazing damage control and repair regimens, the Japanese came away from the battle believing they had sunk two American aircraft carriers.
But both "sinkings" were of the USS Yorktown, already repaired and underway under partial power after the first "sinking." (We also recovered quite a few of the vessels from the attack on Pearl Harbor, which saw action in later campaigns). Nobody sings songs or writes movies about the guys holding the water hoses or the wrenches, but they win battles -- and wars -- too!
😢
They thought the Yorktown had gone down at Coral Sea too, so according to them they had taken out 3 carriers instead of one.
I'm glad that I listened to the Q&A section of this lecture. Since I first heard the lecture part of the presentation, I wondered about keeping the fighter CAP refueled and rearmed. When going from sea level to combat patrol altitude, a LOT of fuel is burned. Combat is generally done at full throttle and that, too, burns a lot of fuel. Those pilots needed to get on the flight deck at some point or they would be taking a swim. Thanks, Mr. Parshall. You opened that door for me. Excellent lecture and dead-on conclusions.
Great lecture. Midway is a part of my family history. My grandfather's cousin and his pilot were the last two Americans who died at Midway on June 7, 1942. (They were the only plane shot down that day.) They were hit by antiaircraft fire while attacking the battleships Mikuma and Mogami. The Navy honored both men by naming destroyer escorts after them the following year. They were Kenneth Bunch of Hamilton, Iowa, (the USS Bunch) and Richard Griswold of Davenport, Iowa (the USS Griswold).
MIkuma and Mogami were cruisers of the Mogami class, they were not battleships. That fact in no way detracts from their heroism.
Remarkable! Have you read Herman Wouk's 'War and Rememberance'? One of the main characters dies under same circumstances as your relative.
Iowans at sea. Its a reality that many Iowans fought at sea. The Sullivan brothers as well. I think it deeply appropriate you remember their sacrifice by name these many decades later.
I call bs
@@kentamitchell This was my first thought, too. It's exactly the story of Warren Henry...
Absolutely a stunning presentation by an amazing author. Johnathan Parshall. I bought your book and then found this video. I could not be happier. I was surprised by the meager amounts of participants in the lecture hall. "Fail to plan, Plan to fail". I hope that I have an opportunity to attend one for Jonathan Parshalls presentations. Thank you for your history lessons. I will remember this on forever. Col (Ret) Glenn Ekblad, 33 years and 2 months of service in uniform. USAFR Flight surgeon, Emergency Medicine Physician, preventive medicine physician and past commander. USA, 25th Inf field combat medic, 1969-1970.
A friend of mine was a seventeen year old seaman on the Yorktown during the battles of Coral Sea and Midway. It was always interesting to hear his perspective. He even did damage repairs and help man antiaircraft guns. He also worked in the engine room at some point in his stint in the navy. Sadly he died last year and will be missed. The one thing I remember about him in the last years of his life was all the ribbons he wore on his baseball cap. In fact he had enough ribbons to full several hats.
Your friend is a hero of the highest order. I hope there is a special place in heaven for him and all the others that fought for our way of life today.
Unfortunately it looks like they don’t make them like that anymore!! Unless it’s fighting by video and social media!!
Dad was an Em2 on the Yorktown and was in the forward elevator pump room on the bottom of the ship.They barely escaped thanks to dad I found out years later from his friends.
I was surprised, if not shocked to see all of the empty seats in the lecture hall. Parshall is a fine historian and speaker, one would have to place me under arrest to keep me away from his presentation if one were close to me.
I was thinking the same thing. Then I realized 112,491 people viewed at least part of this presentation since then. That's a pretty big lecture hall.
i notice that also.
I read your comment as a had started to watch this presentation and struggling to become engaged. Your comment kept me going and I became fascinated with it. Thank you for that, Mr Serpent....
People would rather watch cat videos on YT...sadly.
@@jonlocke1624 But hopefully that does not apply to students, faculty, and staff at the Naval War College.
Outstanding Mr Parshall! The Naval War College is a fantastic program.
I really like Jonathan Parshall, he has a talent of unwinding the convoluted accumulated data about a subject and then presenting it in a no-nonsense, common sense approach. Richard Frank also has that similar quality. My only problem with these lectures are they always have too short of time allotted to them so much is left out, I could listen to this lecture double the time, I know there's much more to be said.
I do too. and he certainly has debunked a lot of myths. But I also think his dismissal of Japan's alternatives to attacking US forces as "counter factual" is not well thought out. Of course it is hindsight, but hindsight is helpful in history studies. And if Japan had just attached UK and Dutch holdings it would have had the resources it needed, especially petroleum. Sure US presence on the Philippines would have been a threat, but his claim that it would have been a "knife at the that of Japan" is hyperbole
On one hand I agree with you, having thought the same thing back in the Seventies at least. On the other hand, FDR is trying to strangle Japan and force it out of China and was achieving great success by December '41. I think the President would have awaited the use of those shipping lanes and then something else would have brought us into the war-imagine the sinking of one of our "peaceful destroyers" or the like. In that scenario Japan would have been utterly vulnerable. The US would never cede the Pacific to anyone. Control of that ocean has been doctrine since 1895 or so. Whatcha think?@@thecooper1073
And he does the same with his books. Military history books can make it hard to follow the action. He makes it easy. Not simplified but easy to follow.
Mr Parshall, you and your friend did an amazing job writing that book...! And that was a great lecture! 👏🏼👏🏼👏🏼👏🏼👏🏼👏🏼
Jonathan Parshall is a terrific public speaker as well as an expert on the topic. I’ve watched this presentation several times
I'm glad I ran across this lecture. Very informative. Thank you USNWC for posting it.
A very authoritative and informative lecture. I was really impressed. He gave the audience a fantastic insight into this great battle.
Outstanding talk, thank you for hosting it.
Great explanation!! Dick Best was one of the best of his breed. Without his actions on that June day in 1942, the war could have continued for considerably longer. We would have still won it all, but at a higher cost of lives on both sides.
If Dick Best does not hit the Akagi, the Japanese Navy likely would have won at Midway.
Tellgryn not really because even if the Akagi launched its planes the IJN pilots may have hit the Yorktown themselves. It’s not a given they would have found Task Force 16 (Hornet and Enterprise) which was brilliantly positioned in back of Task Force 17.
Most don’t even bring this up but it appears Task Force 17 which has the Yorktown was offered as sacrificial lambs.
Now it’s hard to say if the Hiryu pilots themselves would have went after Hornet and Enterprise. They may have scored some major hits too but it would have been at a heavy cost and history showed us that it was never easy to sink a US carrier or two or three.
Victory for IJN at Midway needed to include vessel vs vessel combat. The IJN had an 11 vs 0 battleship advantage.
Most US historians try to downplay the battleships and say they were obsolete. They were not. The IJN had 4 fast battleships that could have easily caught wounded US carriers.
@@f430ferrari5 The position of Task Force 17 had to do with how, where and when their strike aircraft and CAP launches and recoveries occurred. Task Force 16 was further south and slightly east due to launching their strike aircraft earlier than TF 17 did and the fact that TF 16 was on a Southeastern heading to recover her strike planes.
I strongly disagree with your opinion that TF 17 was offered as a sacrificial lambs.
Robert Den Dooven you have every right to disagree and I have every right to believe in what I believe in. I believe the evidence or lack of evidence on your side kind of shows who is really correct.
Feel free to do research on Point Luck. Find anything where it shows where Task Force 16 and 17 were. They are rarely shown separately. Why?
See map. We all know Task Force 17 departed later vs 16. It would make more sense to physically position TF 17 further east. Why have her travel further west and north? Yorktown is wounded and would take her longer to get into position.
It would have been way easier for TF 16 to be positioned further West and North.
But hey feel free to share whatever evidence you got.
Remember. In the end the strategy worked.
Also even after Yorktown got hit during the first Hiryu wave...Hornet and Yorktown could have in theory moved into those areas and Yorktown moved out. The gap between the first and second attack was an hour apart?
I know we don’t like to term it this way but it is what it is. I would have done the same thing. Tough choices. The right call was made.
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Excellent analysis and excellent presentation. I wish we had more like this. Thank you
Thank You. Your teaching/lecture is the very top rate to me. These ware very brave men that changed the course of the war. Their sacrifice was a game-changer. Thanks to people like this I am here and alive at sixty-eight years of age as an unconquered U.S.A. American. Thank You, for the facts and figure information. They bombed us first. I am glad Japan was given two free atomic bombs (delivered).
Outstanding lecture. The best I have seen on this topic.
I'll pick a fight.. Concerning the 'Battle of Midway' I ended up disagreeing with virtually all Mr. Parshalls statements. Check my (long winded..) umm.. rebuttal (in new comments..). Actually can't believe this passed the War College muster..
@@NesconProductions do you mind posting it in this thread
@@seanmac1793 Err.. didn't want to spam Jive Turkey's (to me the screen name was a bit of a tip off ;-) comment with something so long winded & why my response was brief but alluded to a more in depth response. If people judge my response worthy of further investigation it's there. Bottom line there were participating pilots on both sides of that conflict that wouldn't agree with Mr. Parshalls view of the events that transpired at the battle of Midway.
@@NesconProductions I can throw up a comment for you to copy and paste it into if your worried about it.
@@NesconProductions I expect there were participating pilots from both sides that wouldn't agree with each other (i.e. other pilots on their own side as well as their enemy's) on some details of what transpired and on what might have developed if some things hadn't transpired.
Having these presentations shown on youtube, allow thousands of history nuts,such as myself the ability to see and hear what we are not able to attend.
His book "Shattered sword" makes an exciting read
Congrats to the commenters for remarkable insights and (mostly) gentlemanly behavior. Why is Midway so worthy of study? Midway & Coral Sea can be compared with Thermopylae and Salamis. Their lessons of courage, foresight, planning and follow-through are even more relevant in today's confusion than ever.
The tools of War change. The velocity of War changes. The principles of victory really don't. If you can get into the other guys decision Loop and disrupt it you're going to have a good day. If you look at the first Gulf War, we were able to get inside the decision Loop of the Iraqi Air Force and their air Defence Force making them react which takes longer then making a decision to act. If you look at the Battle of Marathon the Greeks ran down the hill and full armor hitting the Persians before they had even formed their Phalanxes. They changed the velocity of War forcing the Persians to react instead of act. The expectation was both sides form their phalanx and then March at each other and have at it. That's fine if both sides play by the same Playbook. But the Great's were using a different book. Consequently the Persian force was destroyed and forced to retreat from the Greek mainland.
This was one of the most entertaining and informativ presentations ! Please more
This os a rehash of PAST HISTORY. Wake yp and smell the coffee: Aircraft Carriers are now "sitting ducks" (no longer succesful determiners in a modern World War scenario. The winner will then be the one with the MISSLE TECHNOLOGY (not the number of carriers, .i.e., "TARGETS" for thjose missiles). Compare the cost and you can see that while carriers are "showy", best is to have MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION to cause all aggressors to think twice before committing "national suicide". (In the end, it may come to that if the slanderers and back-biters hold sway--for kodern H-bombs are at least 1000 timea LARGER that the Hiroshima bomb. And there are enough to turn everyu hiuman being on the planet into "toast".
@@captiveexile2670 No reason not to study history, nor does it say that there are no lessons for today to be drawn from history.
I have the Kindle version of "Shattered Sword" and I find myself reading it over and over again. There is always something more to learn from the book. If it was a paperback it would be dog-eared by now. An amazing story about an amazing event.
Excellent lecture. Well paced and delivered. Thanks.
I've followed Jonathan Parshall since the early 200s when I was researching the Pacific War and happened upon his Kido Butai website. Amazing researcher.
... "early 2000s" ...
Outstanding presentation Mr. Parshall...
Thank you for a refreshing well thought out history lesson. I very much enjoyed this presentation 👍🤔
Well done Jonathan. I thoroughly enjoyed your lecture. Lessons a-plenty with a rich mix of static but no less engaging action diagrams, absorbing micro-analysis (e.g., the C. Wade McClusk-Richard Halsey "Dick" Best roles in the battle) AND the macro-BIG picture view of the consequences battle (e.g., the balance of power swinging towards the US with its resources and production superiority). This was a quality military lecture! Never mind the sparse attendance, nearly 90K TH-cam views, more than make up for the then empty seats. This video should be made compulsory viewing for all military cadets, commanders and historians.
Superb presentation by a Master of the subject. Thank you.
I remember watching war movies with my grandad. He was a navy man who fought for two years at the end of ww2. Even got sunk once, and had to be rescued.
Midway was one of his favorite movies. I miss all the stories he used to tell.
Finally some Lectures on Our Naval War battles!!!
navythomas8 Great to see your name there NT8! I agree Mr.Parshall is excellent!
I am likewise glad that I found this video. Every misconception Parshall discusses was one that I believed. Amazing what common sense and facts can do, not necessarily that he was correct in those facts and opinions but rather that they were DIFFERENT and POSSIBLE. My thanks to the War College.
The Battle of Midway, people tend to look at the number of carriers sunk. What's more important then the carriers themselves is the flight Crews. Between the Battle of Coral Sea and the Battle of Midway, the Japanese Navy lost most of their veteran Pilots. Yes they were able to build additional carriers. No they couldn't build as many carriers as we could. But if you look at the aircrews that were put on those carriers that were completed, at no point where they be fighting force the tip of the spear in other words that Japan had at the beginning of the war. To me the decisive aspect of the battle was the further attrition I've experienced air crews for the Imperial Navy. If you look at every subsequent battle the Japanese Naval aviators we're never of the same quality as they started the war. Where is United States who the rotation process was able to teach that experience to new pilots. We not only produced more pilots then Japan was capable of doing but they were better trained then their counterparts in the Imperial Japanese Navy. There's a number of aspects that impacted Japan's ability to train Pilots. Probably the most important was the availability of fuel.
Also losing the experienced Support/Deck crews on all four of the Japanese Fleet Carriers. These deck crews were what allowed such effective coordination between the different flight decks. Japanese doctrine was set-up for a level of coordination/communication that the US Navy really didn't get until mid to late 1944. Once spotted on deck, the Japanese could create essentially a 80%-85% Alpha Strike in less that 30 minutes, frequently 15 minutes. The US really couldn't create an equivalent strike in less that 45 minutes, more likely a hour. Losing that ability hurt them badly later in the war.
Edit: One thing I found interesting in Saburo Sakai's biography was that as a tier 1 pilot, he really didn't find the quality of late war American pilots to be exceptional, but he DID find them to be good & CONSISTENT ACROSS THE BOARD. Pre-war & Early war Experienced Japanese pilots were individually better, but 1 vs. 4 or 1 vs 12, with subordinate pilots with less that 50 hours of combat time were odds that just ate the IJAAF & IJNAF's lunch by late 1943. Japan just COULDN'T keep up.
ovk8102 isn’t it kind of a moot point having discussions post 1942? Even Japan and Yamamoto knew himself that they had around 6 months to a year at most.
The real meat grinder was the Guadalcanal campaign.
More Japanese flight crews were lost at Santa Cruz.
Thank you for this great presentation. Some personal notes: in 1987 my dad has a heart issue and was hospitalized in the Alexandria Hospital (in Virginia). He was given room with another heart patient, a B-17 pilot who served at Midway. I knew the man’s name but forgot it. I spoke with him briefly and he was very humble and unassuming. The B-17 pilot told me that his bombs came nowhere near the Japanese. He did say that he was chased by a Japanese pilot and dove for a cloud. He further said that the only thing that saved him was that cloud. In addition he said that the armament on his plane was of little practical use and intimated that it gave the crew the illusion of defense. His words, not mine. If anyone knows of a Midway B-17 pilot living in the DC area in 1987, please set forth the name. It might jog my memory. Thank you again.
Mr. Parshall is an outstanding expert. Semper Fi
The critical moment in the battle came when Dick Best realized that McClusky had failed to apportion his dive bombers and he Dick Best and his wingmen pulled out of their dives and attacked the Akagi. Bests's lone hit on Nagumo's flag ship, which doomed it, was perhaps the most significant bomb that was dropped in the entire war other than the atomic bombs that were dropped in August of 1945. Without Best's brilliant and decisive action, the Akagi might have been able to launch and the battle and the war might have played out quite differently. Dick Best's actions at the most critical moment of the battle not only sealed the victory but are worthy of legendary status!
tosius2 Great point and I would argue that the skill level to drop that "one" bomb was greater than what was achieved with the dropping of the atomic bombs. Their accomplishment was more in the laboratory not the pilot's/ bombardier's chair... I guess he had the bravery, fortitude, foresight and will (travelling to the other ships and dropping the bomb on target) to see the operation through to success.
k6151960 You have to know that Best and his wingmen were flying through some really severe (withering) flak and fire as the Akagi and all of her support ships were no doubt blasting away with everything they had and there were only three targets. Best literally dove through the jaws of death and the mouth of hell and had the focus and skill to deliver his bomb "on target". I've often wondered why he never received more recognition for his actions on that day. His quick, decisive and deadly action at precisely the correct moment is right there with Joshua Chamberlain's actions at Little Round Top during the battle of Gettysburg. Perhaps I should write a book about him
tosius2 I always thought Dick Best was amazing. He always struck me as a fierce fighter with a good head on his shoulders. I hope he and his family realized what a critical contribution he made to the war and his country. What a warrior!
Best inhaled something in his oxygen mask back on the carrier that disabled him from flying and that was the last he flew
tosius2 Steve Ewing PHD mentioned in the episode of Heroships USS Enterprise that Wade McClusky prior to spotting the Arashi in the water was searching in vain he explains that he looked down at the water to see which way the wind was blowing cause he new the Japanese carriers would have to turn into the wind to launch so when he saw the wind blowing towards the north thats the direction he took VS and VB 6 and shortly after that critical decision they spotted the Arashi and followed the destroyer and the rest is history
Great lecture and I'm enjoying the book "Shattered Sword".
I'm a bit of amateur naval historian and Midway is a fascinating story. I have read almost all the popular books on the subject and based on your interesting lecture I look forward to reading your book! Wish you had a bigger audience on an important battle!
this guy is a national treasure. his book is fantastic!
Mr. Parshall thank you for a lecture that is every bit as thought-provoking and riveting as your writing. I too have been fascinated by WWII, particularly the Pacific War, since childhood. It was only in retirement that I could make time to read the available historical literature. I became aware of and read your book Shattered Sword and combined fleet website fairly early on in this endeavor and they both stand out for me as unusually analytical and highly engaging work. I hope I get the chance to meet you in the future.
Such a wonderful and insightful lecture. Loved every minute of it!
Thank you for this respectful and excellent presentation.
If I were the commandant, I would have been embarrassed by the attendance. Parshall's book is THE penultimate description of the battle.
Very very good. Great confident Lecturer
"...governed by the concept of calculated risk..." Excellent orders given by Nimitz to a commander who would understand exactly their meaning...Ray Spruance! Had Halsey been there, he'd have been dodging 18" shells before dawn the next morning, possibly losing the whole force. I'm sorry that Parshall didn't have an opportunity to discuss more deeply the issue of leadership and doctrine.
Good lecture and great book!!
I think about those Americans with admiration, the individual pilots displaying such courage, flying those planes in this battle in the pacific, sometimes at a great disadvantage. My family speak of the Americans (I am British), who made common cause with us, those who came to live among us and fought along side us, with a deep reverence; very honourable men, and extremely courageous.
Wonderful, wonderful video. I've read a lot about the Battle of Midway and the U.S. campaign in the Solomons. I think you are spot on in that it was the campaign in the Solomons that was the real backbreaker for the Japanese. They simply could not replace either the excellent naval aviators that they had at the beginning of the war or the ships that were lost in the naval battles around Guadalcanal.
I disagree. The real back breaker was Midway of course. Had the IJN won then there would have been no battles down south.
The area of future battles would have been around Hawaii.
Also there was no way the IJN could achieve a decisive victory unless they made much better use of their surface ships in combination with their carriers. The US Navy War College declassified vid even states this so it’s always interesting how folks like Parshall never focus in on this.
Excellent, but too short. We need Jonathan Parshall's analysis in abundance. Great upload!
Actually his analysis was poor for a multitude of reasons..
@@NesconProductions ok, in what way?
@@davidcroft9320 A fair question..
Did not agree with a number of Mr. Parshalls assessments. First if Nagumo would have received word from Operation K that the US carriers were not at Pearl Harbor he most likely would have kept his all his
aircraft in a ship attack configuration rather than land attack and searched to destroy the American taskforce(s) first. The battle of the Coral Sea weeks prior to Midway had American aircraft carriers show up
unexpectedly interrupting the Japanese invasion of Port Moresby. Nagumo may have already had an idea their code may have been compromised.
Destroying the American carriers remaining in the Pacific was considered 'the' top priority due to the danger their mobility & projected firepower posed. Also luring the American carriers from Pearl Harbor was
a key part of the Japanese overall attack plan. This idea is strengthened by the fact Nagumo kept half his aircraft in reserve loaded with air to ship weapons when the Japanese carrier aircraft attacked Midway despite not knowing or expecting any American carriers (or major surface combatants for that matter..) to be in the vicinity so soon (earliest expected arrival from Pearl Harbor was 48 hours). A screen of Japanese subs was also utilized to detect the movement of American ships between Pearl Harbor and Midway which they fail to do so initially.
After the first Japanese aircraft strike on Midway was deemed incomplete a second was ordered to knock out the runway and the decision was made to rearm the reserve aircraft to that of a land attack role. Due to a delay in the launch of one Japanese patrol aircraft (due to a catapult issue on the cruiser Tone) that subsequently spotted the Yorktown taskforce considerably later than it should have if launched on time. Combined with radio transmitter difficulties on the same patrol aircraft had dire consequences for the Japanese fleet. Half of reserve aircraft had already be switched to the land attack role before Nagumo finally
learned of the Yorktown's presence. Thus the decision to have the aircraft switched back again to the ship attack role. A side-effect of this was fatigued carrier crews with weapons & fuel below decks out of their normal storage compartments hastily scattered about out in the open. Combined with flightdecks of fully armed and fueled aircraft proved a lethal combination.
TBD torpedo attacks played a critical role in success in the overall American carrier strike. Their sacrifice drew down the Japanese Zero air cover down to near sea level and made them expend most if not all of their remaining ammunition. Most of these air defense fighters had landed to refuel and rearm just at the time the SBD dive bombers arrived overhead is not a false tale. What Mr. Parshall fails to mention also are the 4 separate attacks by aircraft from Midway (though ineffective at 7:10, 7:55, 8:10 & 8:20 - & all came from different altitudes) that came prior to the 3 carrier based torpedo attacks (from 9:25 to 10:00) These earlier attacks were using up the Japanese air
defenses fuel and ammunition as well. Constant US attacks and surrounding air operation plus the recovery & rearming of aircraft from the first Midway strike took precious time.
The first SBD's struck at 10:25 just 25 minutes after the last torpedo strike. With the time it would take to dispatch this last wave of enemy torpedo planes then land fighters to refuel & rearm while at the same time readying all the Japanese aircraft for a carrier attack
mission timing wise would put the SBD dive bombers in perfect position for an unopposed strike (as reported by US flight crews that participated th-cam.com/video/oQjDk7HSVyA/w-d-xo.html see from 6:30 in the video). The Japanese didn't see the attacking SBD's until they were on their attack runs & too late to effectively maneuver. Such was also confirmed by a Japanese pilot who survived the battle and the war th-cam.com/video/NAKs-6xEzOg/w-d-xo.html (see Zero pilot Kaname Harada's comments from 00:24). So participants in the climatic air
battle at Midway from both sides are in stark disagreement with Mr. Parshalls view & are aligned with the generally know/accepted historical record.
Though it was most likely Lt. Best bomb that set the Akagi alight both of his wingmen had very near misses that damaged the ship rather severely. One of these near misses was reported as such (as written here
- en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Midway ) "Another bomb exploded under water very close astern; the resulting geyser bent the flight deck upward in grotesque configurations and caused crucial rudder
damage'. This is significant for a number of reasons. First of all if the flightdeck was sufficiently distorted the Akagi may have been unable to commence any air operations. Second if the ships rudder were severely damaged and the ship were turning (as it surely was) it would be likely jammed (much like the fate of the Bismark when it was hit by a Swordfish torpedo). See here also www.midway42.org/TheBattle/IJNCarrierDamage.aspx.
The reason this is of critical importance is in two fold. First combat laden aircraft need a carrier to be facing & moving at speed into the wind to create enough extra lift for the aircraft to successfully take off. The other problem a jammed rudder caused when the Akagi was
hit would mean the captain couldn't maneuver the ship to assist in firefighting to blow the smoke and flame a certain direction, say away from the ship. Needless to say the distortion to the flightdeck and severe damage to the rudder would have prevented air operations from the carrier for a considerable amount of time. The U.S.S Nautilus was in the area and might have gotten a good shot at a circling/stationary Akagi or on one of the tending escorts (much like the fate of the Yorktown & escorting DD Johnson). Much may have depended if the bad American torpedoes at the time would have run true and even detonated if they hit a target, but all merely speculation now. Also the other near miss may have been responsible for flattening the Akagi conning tower but may have been merely one of the side-effects of Lt. Best direct hit (little difference in the final analysis). Seems like Lt. Best did best, but both his wingmen did their part as well kudos to all of them.
Interesting footnotes in the Japanese interviews is that flight officer Harada said that his wingman was shot down by one of the TBD torpedo bombers (see starting at around 8:30 in the video). I've never heard/read before of this & to my knowledge such was never credited to one of the US torpedo bombers. Since almost all of the torpedo bombers were shot down it the attack the torpedo bomber that shot the Zero was probably shot down a short time later and the kill never
reported. It should also noted before the SBD's made their fateful dives (considering the extensive destruction of US carrier torpedo planes, Midway's aircraft & ground targets from the first aerial strike) the
Japanese were winning the battle rather decisively.
In closing I'd hope in the years since this presentation was given in 2014 (now 2019) Mr. Parshall has continued to refine his understanding of the battle which I frankly have never shared. My knowledge of the
battle came mostly from an outstanding paperback book - The Battle of Midway by Donald S. Sanford circa 1976. The book didn't deal in hypothetical theories, just the facts & events surround the battle. Probably my favorite book of all time & read it more times than I
could count.
@@NesconProductions i am not seeing your comment can you repost it please
@@NesconProductions her preferably
A polished and masterful presentation.
When I was looking at some kind of real estate open house, I noticed a fellow listening to an audiobook. I asked him what it was and he said oh it’s military history, you probably wouldn’t be interested. It’s about midway. I asked: “shattered sword?“
Then commenced a lively discussion.
39:35 interesting story about the genesis of “Shattered Sword.”
Fabulous presentation. Excellent points about the Emilys and Pearl Harbor recon, and the effect of VT6 and VT8 on time vice zero flight altitude. Learning has occurred. ;)
Excellent presentation.
Today’s kids NEED to study this stuff, to speak with WWII vets while some are still alive. They’re all over 90 and quickly dying off. My Dad joined the Navy at 16, got through basic, but the war ended before he turned 18. He left for a year to finish high school, then went back in 1946-1962. Served Korea, USS St Paul, then in Pacific, early Cold War. If he’d stayed in, he’d have been in Vietnam, but that didn’t happen.
Wow!
Thanks for posting this most interesting recusal of some long cherished notions.
Great presentation. I happened upon it, and I was pleased to hear so new information. Thank you
JP, awesome work. Fantastic book (Shattered Sword). Absolutely fascinating to me because that book brought perspective and knowledge that I could not have known otherwise.
Outstanding presentation!
Great detail and excellent explanation . The battle that immediately changed the tide of the war and I certainly believe that the Germans were devastated by the news. They knew the Americans industry and manpower were going to come in force to Europe much sooner than anticipated.
They all were great. Running out of fuel they kept going. When they saw the Japanese carriers were vulnerable, they took no quarter. That is what you are supposed to do in war. Best won a DSC, he should have been awarded the MOH. He saved the Navy's fleet.
No quarter means taking no prisoners and is a war crime you crass dipshit. Very juvenile view point, not to mention your idiotic fallacy in your comment.
@@-VOR Oh sweet mercy, you calling someone a 'crass dipshit' and berating them for 'idiotic fallacy' is so deliciously ironic. The phrase 'no quarter' has both exact and broad meanings, and is used interchangeably depending on context. Only a true fool would be so needlessly abusive and offensive over such a trivial thing while simultaneously displaying their own willful ignorance and misplaced arrogance.
@@Cailus3542 lol speaking of fallacies... thanks for chiming in with one
Very good point at the end, one I had not thought of. Back in the late '60s when I was flying S-2Es off the USS Randolph and USS Yorktown, we would practice finding out way back to the carrier with no electronic emissions from the carrier. We knew where they were supposed to be, and even with inertial internal navigation in the aircraft (we could not transmit either) it was sometime a real close call. Now, not wanting to lose an aircraft and certainly not a crew, if we got real tight on fuel, we could break silence and ask for help at which point the carrier would turn on the navigational beacon and bring us home. If we were close to the US shore, we would divert and be grounded for the rest of the exercise as we had been "lost". Even as big as an Essex with the angle flight deck is, in the middle of the Med, she is just a spec. And there were four us us working the problem, back in WWII there was only the pilot and the second seater was not trained and facing backwards.
Gives me a great deal of respect for those guys.
Thank you for the great presentation.
I am appalled at the low turnout for Jonathan Parshall's fine lecture. In the early 90's after Desert Storm I was stationed at the Masters Gunners branch at the United States Army Armor School @ Ft Knox Ky (now its at Fort Benning) and there were copious lectures that one could attend by authors, industry reps. engineers, and Officers from the United States Military Academy that were very VERY well attended. The best lecture I attended there was given by Dr. Philip W. Lett (Father of the M1 tank series) who was then the leader of the General Dynamics Land Systems design and development team. Standing room only.
Harold Moore gave a lecture on LZ X Ray during the 1CD Reuinion in 1995 at FT Hood. He gave the lecture, and then said we were released unless we wanted to participate in an after lecture talk.
I was in 1-7. 2-7 was there too.
When he said that, 2-7 as a unit got up and filed out. We stood fast.
He stood and watched silently as 2/7 filed out.
After they had left, he said; "That's why they will always be 2-7"
There's a difference between the two, even at the time. LZ Albany is
there. There's not a question about it.
Anyone that has anything that they are willing to offer is worth being listened to is worth being listened to.
BTW; I was a Medic....I went to basic at FT Knox. :)
Garryowen!
I don't think the public is allowed onboard the NWC for these lectures.
37:28 - "...and so as we leave today and go off to our comfortable homes and our 'professionally malted beverages..."
I wish we'd teach this history to our children today. Say a Prayer of Thanks for the Greatest Generation.
I believe he said "refreshing" malted beverages. But I agree with your comment. Children today are taught ideology, not history. They are are ignorant of how much they owe to the sacrifices of those who fought and died for the freedom and prosperity that they enjoy.
excellent presentation. thought provoking and insightful. thanks for sharing. i think two major "issues" contributing to the successes of second front (germany first) were the failure of japanese anti-sub warfare (or success of USN subs) and the inadequacies of japanese pilot training (inability to replace the best of the best after Midway). a third contributing problem was the "meat grinder" of constant japanese pilot fight activity where the USN was rotating the combat vets back to the USA for training raw recruits. our quantitative and qualitative advantages compounded with every battle, whereas the japanese advantages evaporated. the Solomon campaign was the "knee of the curve"
Recall what Gen. Patton told his Third Army men about patriotism. It was not dying for your country. It was make the other poor SOB die for his country. The Japanese lost more quickly because their best thought it was their duty to die in combat even when their deaths accomplished little or nothing.
Those are not really the reasons. You’re looking from a perspective of a “long term” war which the IJN had no intention of fighting a long time war.
So the analysis must be within only the first 6 months to a year.
The head of the math department of Georgia’s state military college, North Georgia College, CDR Marion Wycht, PhD, taught summers at the Naval War College. He was my faculty advisor and I was scared to death of him as he told us about how Naval officers would bilge out rather than cheat.
One of the best books I ever read.
I also feel this is one of the best books ive ever read! Congrats.
Great lecture. I just bought his book.
Incredible story, incredible victory. Well done USN.
Thank you! This has been obvious to anybody who thinks logistics over tactics and strategy. Midway was just something we went through, our industry and fighting efforts won the war, not Midway
Scott Elmore think Vietnam and realize that logistics do not matter if the spirit to fight is gone.
Great discussion and information. Knowledge is Power.
Best assessment of the Battle Of Midway by anyone. Regardless of the outcome the Japanese lost the war before it started at Pearl Harbor. The Japanese strategy was to negotiate not an American surrender but a concession and in no less than two years after which the Japanese could not defeat American resources and war manufacturing. The Japanese knew this but gambled America didn't have the willpower to sustain a war of attrition. The cruelty of the Japanese war culture demanded an unconditional surrender.
An interesting lecture. While there was mention that Admiral Nimitz had the advantage of being able to read the Japanese messages, in my opinion, this was not fully explained in regard to the Battle of Midway. From decoded messages (some from Australia) Admiral Yamamoto's plan to trap the American Navy by luring them to defend Midway and then swooping in with their Carriers and destroying them, was exposed and Nimitz was able to employ his own trap. I agree with the comment that the sailors & Marines still had to fight the Battle but they had an ace.
It was this crucial intelligence that was the ace in Nimitz's plan and gave him a huge advantage. A very informative book on the intelligence situation is David Dufty's 2017 "The Secret Code-Breakers of Central Bureau". I realise this was not printed when the lecture occurred.
That was great. You should have had a packed audience. Can the general public attend these lectures?
Interesting and well preseted lecture. In the mid 1920's (1925 I think) a man by name of Hector Charles Bywater wrote a book, "The Great Pacific War" -- a novel about a war between our country and Japan. The book involves a "decisive" naval battle somewhere in the middle of the Pacific. The book was probably read by Yamamoto and other Japanese naval officers. Yamamoto was naval attache in the United States so it would be no surprise if it was picked up and translated in Japanese. It describes the taking of the Philippines, Wake, and other islands as well as the routes to take in an attack on us. With some varations it is almost identical to what the Japanese actually did. Bywater was an interesting character, a British naval intelligence agent posing as a corespondent. He died under mysterious circumstances in Great Britain in 1940. War Plan Orange was somehow involved in what happened in the future. Another interesting book I found was "Visions of Infamy" by Williwm Honan. Hence Midway was that "decisive" battle that Bywater wote into his "novel"?
I've read Bywater's book. It opened with a Japanese sneak attack, a bloody debacle of the US trying to take the Bonins (Iwo Jima), and a climatic clash of battleships at Yap.
Were the battles described involving carriers?
Good talk, but:(!)
there was no mention of "the flight to nowhere", the abysmal performance of Hornet's air group and Captain (admiral designate) Mitscher, or the lack of direction provided by Spruance's air staff, especially Miles Browning.
the Q&A before the last was really informative
Question 1. How long were the Japanese fighters in the air prior to destroying the two doomed torpedo plane squadrons?
Question 2. Is it not possible that the process of fighting off VT-8 and VT-6 depleted the protecting Zeros fighting capacity by exhausting their fuel and ammunition supplies? Could this explain the reported absence of fighter cover during the subsequent attack by U.S. dive bombers?
The climb rate of Zeroes is one factor of many, and is likely a best case rating. For example , a truck with a lot of miles is not going to tow as much as a new, well-tuned truck.
The reason it was a turning point was that the Japanese lost more carriers than they could replace under conditions of war in a timely manner nor could they replace their elite air crews. They could train new pilots but not to the same level. They also were finding the Hellcats to be pretty much a match for their Zeros. They needed to upgrade to something better but what was an issue.
We on the other hand were about the flood the Pacific with carriers and other ships and were training crews by the thousand besides upgrading planes.
He spent 38 minutes taking away our understanding of how the Battle of Midway went so that he could give them back to us - but on his terms. At 38:20 he acknowledges this and it is here that the valuable part of this clip starts.
breathtaking analysis
Fantastic, Thank You. I believe there is wisdom in both the Japanese Kantai Kessen Doctrine and the Soviet Deep Battle Doctrine. Just like Guerrilla Warfare, they all exist to find a point in time where opportunity exceeds risk. I don’t claim to be able to calculate it, and it includes variable outside of the battle. I do know that many downed Zeros contained an irreplaceable ace; and the Japanese Aircraft Carriers were irreplaceable. Meanwhile, some American torpedoes were nonfunctional.
Thank you for another excellent review!
I notice Pashall on Battle 360. It is a documentary worth watching.
Very interesting and informative Presentation! Thank you.
I truly believe we must have intelligent deciecive intuitive and common sense Commanders and Subordinates.
Wow, Jonathan is my idol for years now! Inspirational!
Absolutely Wonderful! Awesome presentation!
Welp! I know what my next book is going to be (currently reading "Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors") I think it is unfortunate that there doesn't seem to be enough professional and personal (memoirs) of The Pacific War (as compared to the ETO). One just needs to read E.B. Sledge or W. Manchester to get an idea of the appalling and savage conditions faced by the ground troops, while Ian Toll reminds us that the Pacific War wasn't just an "island hopping" campaign but lists the heroism (and sacrifices) of the Navy.
Reminds me of the lack of Soviet material (especially first person accounts) regarding the Nazi-Soviet conflict. Looking forward to your book Sir!
Jon is brilliant. And of course he is correct that the Kido Butai CAP could have gotten back up to high altitudes. But 'coud of' is not the same as 'actually doing it'. Any assessment requires information Jon does not address
1. What did the CAP actually do.
2. Just what control did Nagumo have over his CAP. Did they have the capability of contacting the CAP and order them back up.
3. Did Nagumo recognize the danger and did he act immediately to order them back up.
4. Where was the CAP when the American dive bombers arrived.
5. The Japanese did bot have radar. And even if the CAP was in place, they may or may not have intercepted the American dive bombers.
wonderfully enlightening.
One thing to consider regarding the Zero CAP. I will grant the aircraft had the performance to regain altitude in order to engage the dive bomber squadrons, but how much ammunition did they have left after obliterating the Devastators of Torpedo 6 and 8? They only carried a maximum of 60 rounds per 20mm cannon and 500 rounds for each 7.7mm machine gun. That's not much even before they destroyed the torpedo squadrons. When attacking the dive bombers and their escorts, they would have had less ammo. Perhaps a great deal less. So, in my opinion, the historical sacrifice of VT-6 and 8 is indeed justified, just in a way not usually discussed.
A friend of mine, who was a child during WW2, told me that prior to Midway, people in the US reallythought we might lose the war with Japan, but after Midway, we knew we'd win.
phtevlin
At the time the US had a very small and Unequipped army.
The fear was that the Japanese would get all way to Chicago before the US could train an equip an army to oppose them.
I'm very surprised to hear this.
I really enjoyed the lecture.
"The WRONG people were kinda calling the shots in japan at the time.
That is a hilarious understatement!
Agree, but it was a long time in coming, commencing around 1854.
You give rock solid evidence on how historical "revisionism" is different from historical "revelation." Keep up your spectacular, myth-busting revelatory scholarship!
Thankyou for posting.
Thank you sir for the amazing presentation which help add a new knowledge and insight including visual scenario of the battle where my text book failed to provide
Jonathan, I read your book, and found it interesting and compelling. It is informative about how source material (Fujita's book) , while wrong, can lead to incorrect understandings of pivotal historical events. Thank you for going back and re-examining the basic assumptions and materials of this important battle.