Do abstract objects prove God?
ฝัง
- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 1 ก.ค. 2024
- Can you prove God exists from the reality of abstract objects? That’s the question I investigate in this video. I examine Feser’s Augustinian proof and Anderson & Welty’s argument from logic.
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Outline
0:00 Intro and Outline
1:07 Background
4:19 Augustinian Proof
11:08 Premises (9), (7), and (11)
14:25 Premise (4)
19:31 Incompatibility with Classical Theism
35:38 Platonism
36:35 Epistemic Access
40:43 Explanatory Impotence
43:47 Incoherence
46:10 Third Man Argument
49:38 Individuality and Incoherence
53:28 Immanence Problem
56:47 Brentano Problem
1:16:44 Theistic Conceptualism
1:39:15 Conclusion
Resources:
“Existential inertia and the Aristotelian Proof”, IJPR: philpapers.org/rec/SCHEIA-20
“Stage One of the Aristotelian proof: A Critical Appraisal”, Sophia: philpapers.org/rec/SCHSOO-8
Chapter 3 of my book: drive.google.com/file/d/1vJ4U...
Arguments for Classical Theism | Part 1/2: • Arguments for Classica...
Feser’s Aristotelian Proof: An Analysis: • Feser's Aristotelian P...
Existence and Ontological Pluralism | Dr. Trenton Merricks: • Existence and Ontologi...
Feser on Schmid on the Aristotelian proof: majestyofreason.wordpress.com...
Feser on Schmid on Existential inertia: A Comprehensive Response: majestyofreason.wordpress.com...
So you think you understand Existential Inertia?: majestyofreason.wordpress.com...
“Simply Unsuccessful: The Neo-Platonic Proof of God’s Existence”, EJPR: drive.google.com/file/d/1dXMB...
Feser’s Neo-Platonic Proof: An Analysis: • Feser's Neo-Platonic P...
From Abstracta to Atheism? | Dr. Felipe Leon: • From Abstracta to Athe...
Platonism and the Objects of Science | Dr. Scott Berman: • Platonism and the Obje...
Feser’s “Insuperable” Arguments Against Platonism: majestyofreason.wordpress.com...
Aquinas’s Third Way: An Analysis: • Aquinas's Third Way: A...
Arguments Against Classical Theism | Part 1/3: • Arguments Against Clas...
And, of course, the usual resources:
My book: www.amazon.com/Majesty-Reason...
My website: majestyofreason.wordpress.com/
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Joe’s war against Feser continues until Ed actually reads Joe’s 40k word essay.
Nerds for the nerd throne
going through this it seems like that your objections to the view consist in implicit rejections of Aristotelian notions/positions.
@LEEK then he should be attacking the underlying aristotelian notions instead of doing this
Great video. Two thoughts.
1) Suppose all propositions are shareable. Then consider your counterexample to Malpass: "this thought I'm entertaining right now has a qualitative character." Suppose this thought has itself as its own content. Is this content shareable? When you think "this thought I'm entertaining right now has a qualitative character," and I think "this thought I'm entertaining right now has a qualitative character," are we sharing the same proposition in common? I'm not sure, because you're thinking about your thought and I'm thinking about my thought.
2) I think the Theistic Conceptualist could say something similar back to the Platonist: If Platonic propositions didn't exist then 1+1 would still be 2. Presumably the Theistic Conceptualist would think that this would be nonvacuously true, yet presumably this would not move the Platonist.
tHiS wHoLe ViDEo BeGs ThE qUeStioN though bro
You got me UwU
@@MajestyofReason In the name of Merlin, never type out "UwU" ever again please.
@@MajestyofReason HAHAHAHA wait, did ya just "uwu" us?
best channel EVER uwu!
The Platonists say that there is a real difference between the universal and the individual, others (DUNS SCOTUS) say that there is a formal difference, still others (Thomas Aquinas) say that the distinction is not real at all, but only applies in relation to reason. There is even an opinion (Henry Harclay) which says that the same thing is universal in one respect, singular in another.
All agree in some sense that the universal is something that exists at least potentially and incompletely in the individual.
I like this video.
Could you do a video on moral propeties? The debat about moral realism with naturalist/non naturalist/supernaturalist ground seems to me very close to debat between platonic/nominalism/theist conceptualism. Do you think the moral normativity is compatible to a simple naturalism ?
Joe, what is your definition of "explanation", such that non-causal explanations make any sense? I'm asking because your argument about dividing cookies seems to me like an equivocation on "explain".
Joe, when you said that the necessary God of neoclassical theism, can possibly exist, are you referring to metaphysical possibility, or epistemic possibility?
I think he meant epistemic
Unrelated, but I was thinking that you should (I'm suggesting) probably write a book on a rigorous defense for existential inertia. Whilst, I'm not in favor of it, you seem to provide good arguments for it!
PS: Yes I’m aware (for anyone who’s asking) that he has an article on his blog that goes through it but it would be cool to have a book on it since I'm not aware of any books on the topic specifically.
I've got some news coming out on this front sometime soon...
In short, I have written a scholarly monograph entitled "Existential Inertia and Classical Theistic Proofs". The whole book is on existential inertia, arguments for and against it, as well as Feser's five proofs, plus Aquinas's first way and De Ente argument. I'm actually sending it to an academic editor in the coming 2-3 weeks, and then it will be under peer review. Then, after a few months under review, hopefully it gets accepted for publication. More news later on this front... The review process takes a long time. :)
@@MajestyofReason Thank you!!!
So you also agree with Plotinus:
"[T]he multiplicity of the Ideas means that Intellect [("a thinking of all the Platonic Ideas")] does not possess the total simplicity which belongs to the One. Indeed, it is this complexity of Intellect that convinced Plotinus that there must be something else prior to it and superior to it. For, he believed, every form of complexity must ultimately depend on something totally simple." (Anthony Kenny - A NEW HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY volume 1 Ancient Philosophy)
Aside question: What is your opinion on The False, or Meinongian nonactualities?
I do agree with Plotinus here🙂
As for Meinognianism, I think there are no non-existent things, and that “there are” captures existence, and that being=existence, and so I reject Meinong’s view🙂
With much excitement I skipped straight to the conclusion to find out if a god exists.
Such a shock to find out [spoiler].
This proposition is always true.
This proposition is false.
The word "this" seems to sometimes fail to refer to an actual subject, which should render the proposition incomplete. But this seems to require that there are objective propositions that statements can correspond to or not.
I've always struggled to understand Platonism, so although your defenses of it against Feser's objections (which also resemble my own objections) maybe correct, it's difficult for me to really understand how you responded to them. I think I might need to solve this just by studying it more, but for instance, on the second objection: if universals don't causally explain commonalities, but explain them in the way mathematics explains things, then this is perfectly compatible with nominalism (where universals come after abstraction from particulars, which are what really exist) unless you assume mathematics acts in a Platonic way in the first place.
38:50
But if those abstract objects do not cause my observations or believes in them or the apparent resemblance between objects then in what sense do they explain them?
Even if we have something like a mereological explanation in which for example the behavior of water is explained by the interactions and collective behavior of particles, it would still seem like that if the particles that compose the water do not cause any observations that they would become explanatorily useless.
One way they could explain is through grounding - for more details on grounding as a well-established non-causal explanatory relation, see plato.stanford.edu/entries/grounding/
Great video overall, probably your most brutal takedown of Feser yet, which never gets old. I am going to have to push back a bit on the Third Man problem. As an ex-Platonist, I think that and Benacerraf's identification problem are the two biggest problems for Platonism that caused me to switch to Modal Structuralism.
For the Third Man problem, you really don't want to deny that forms have properties, or instantiations, of their particulars. The idea that a form of F-ness is itself F is so core to Platonic philosophy, to try and defend Platonism by watering it down in any way is basically a subreption of Platonism from within. It's core to the Elenchus structure of the dialogues, Platonic Recollection, even core to one of my favorite ideas from Plato (Philosophy is the art of dying and staying dead). Without it, I just don't know how what's left resembles anything of Platonism.
The solution to the Third Man problem, to me, is to deny the idea that forms do not partake in themselves but this relies on a shift in thinking about the forms as objects of possibility in modal logic rather than these abstract forms in Platonic Heaven somewhere. You lose some of the tension in the Platonic dialogues, but arguably a lot of the core is still there, but what you get in exchange is a simple semantic solution to the third man problem.
Let G1 be the form of {A, B, C}, then G1 is the expression that: "Possibly M" where M is the minimalist set of facts which are in common to A, B, C. Since G1 has M, G1 relates to A, B, C to make {A, B, C, G1}. Well now there's a form G2 that expresses: "Possibly M2" where M2 is the minimalist set of facts which are in common to A, B, C, G1. But note that G1 was just "Possibly M, the set of minimal facts which are in common to A, B, C". So since G1 already has an essence of commonality to A, B, C, call it M, then M2 would just be M, since G1 hasn't added any novel information that would cause on extra restriction on M (it's just M itself!).
So G2 would just end up saying: "Possibly, Possibly M, the set of minimalist facts which are in common to A, B, C". This is because the first "Possibly M" already distilled them. Next we rely on the fact that Possibly(Possibly X) is just Possibly X in modal logic to say:
G2 is just: "Possibly M, the set of all minimalist facts which are in common to A, B, C". But then G2 is just G1 and the Third Man regress is averted.
But yeah, the Third Man problem is a big one, and there's no easy solution to the Platonist. It's going to cost something, just a matter of figuring out what price you're willing to pay.
Thanks for the lovely comment! I haven't the time to provide lengthy feedback, but my brief feedback is: I agree with you that on one more traditional version of Platonism, it has been associated with what we might call the 'self-instantiation principle' -- the principle that the form of F instantiates F-ness or F-hood [or, as one of my profs comically puts it, F-hoodedness], and I actually agree that accepting this principle leads to a devastating third man problem for this specific version of Platonism. But I think there are lots of [contemporary analytic] versions of Platonism -- we could call them Platonism* if we like -- that don't fall prey to the argument precisely because they reject the self-instantiation principle.
I know, it's brief, but I need to prepare to move back to Purdue. :) Always nice to see your engagement my man!!!
@@MajestyofReason Hey no problem, Joe, it's understandable that you're busy. Life happens!
Some time I'd like to pick your brain more on this question though, since it seems that even Platonism* relies on having something like the self-instantiation principle in order to give forms explanatory power.
For example, why do we think our pondering about "a triangle" in the abstract will help us explain something about "this" triangle?
Or why is it that thinking about "an abstract 23 split 3 ways" gives us information about "these 23 cookies split 3 ways"?
What really seems to be doing explanatory work here is that there's something in the abstraction which is also in the "thisness" case under consideration. Now I don't think the connection is that the particular generalizes to the abstraction, because I think that's too strong, and it doesn't give account of things like inventions. Because in this case, you can't talk about the form of something yet to be invented until it already has. So questions like "hey, what are you working on?" are unanswerable on this view.
Platonism strikes me as a more moderate Aristotelianism on this matter since abstracta don't rely on concreta for their being, but we want to say that at minimum there are shared properties between them such that talking about abstracta translates into equivalent discussion of concreta. This gives it the explanatory power that Platonism* needs (Berman's discussion on your channel was super interesting!).
My view on the Third Man problem is that what Platonism or Platonism* REALLY want to deny is that forms don't partake of themselves. How they do that though is going to be very important. The way I think of leads me to Modal Structuralism, but I think there are other ways too.
Anyway, best of luck on your moving! :)
Have you taken a gander at feser response to oppy in the published new article?
Yep! I made a blog post commenting on Feser’s article the day it was published (my 21st Bday!). Here’s that post: majestyofreason.wordpress.com/2021/08/06/comments-on-feser-on-oppy-on-thomistic-cosmological-arguments/
Spider-Man going all out against feser now!
Best introductory books on the various views of universals? Also books arguing for various positions? Edit: nvm you've just started mentioning some lol
Here are some others that are great! [No order]
(1) Universals: An Opinionated Introduction (Armstrong)
(2) Several chapters in each of the following: -(a) Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction (Loux + Crisp)
-(b) The Atlas of Reality (Koons and Pickavance)
-(c) Metaphysics: The Fundamentals (Koons and Pickavance)
-(d) A Survey of Metaphysics (Lowe)
(3) Universals (JP Moreland)
(4) Realism and Anti-Realism (Stuart Brock, Edwin Mares)
(5) Nominalism about Properties: New Essays (Edited By Ghislain Guigon, Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra)
(6) God Over All (WLC)
*patron* : oh wow what’s this 🧐
I wonder if the concept 'human being' existed as an abstract object before human beings.
Joe what is your opinion on the argument of the natural numbers of dr tyron goldschmidt?
I actually discuss its relationship to classical theism in particular in this video! I might make a separate video on whether or not it supports theism more generally. Maybe. :)
@@MajestyofReason thanks joe
Who do you think puts forth the best case for classical theism?
Definitely Gaven Kerr. If you're curious about the case for classical theism, check out my videos "Arguments for Classical Theism" Parts 1 and 2 :)
@@MajestyofReason Man that was a quick response. Thank you for responding. I also find his case very good. I watched him a lot on pat flynn's show and some others. I just finished part one and it was awsome. I am kind of starting with all the (hard and more rigorous) philosophy. Personaly, I'm a classical theist even tho i have a lot of reading to do to fully understand it. Thanks for all the great videos you make, they really get me thinking and challenge my views.
@@tomislavbrncic7337 Much love
@@MajestyofReason hey Joe it will be nice if you request Dr Ed feser for a discussion on your channel or you can request Capturing Christianity to host a discussion between you and Dr Ed feser
@@Hello-vz1md Cameron recently requested it, and Ed politely declined because of how busy he is (he’s currently working on a book on the [purported] immateriality of the intellect)
That bit on its incompatibility with classical theist is very good. As a theist who believes that Logic and other abstract objects have their grounding in God, I had like an "a-ha" moment in that section.
Some of my favourite quotes which would be really strange for someone to hear without any context:
"Socrates exemplifies humanity but does not exemplify the number 9"
"If abstracta are merely divine intentional objects, and the same is true of unicorns and pegasuses and Harry Potter and Santa and philosophically-informed New Atheists, if all those fictional objects have exactly the same ontological status as the abstracta then we simply render inexplicable the difference between realism about the abstracta and anti-realism about abstract"
And a few other favourites:
"This is just confused"
"This is just confused"
"This is just confused"
"So the first response is that this is just confused"
"This is just confused"
"This is utterly uninteresting"
Lolol
I also liked "This is just confused"
Im an idiot, so bear with me, but it seems to me like moderate realism, conceptualism, and nominalism are all… basically the same thing? with the only barrier between them being semantics? I feel like I must be wrong because people much much smarter than me have been debating these ideas for awhile but I really just cannot grasp what makes them or their implications so radically different
YASSS
1 hr 38m: sure 1 + 1 = 2 in all possible worlds, but God exists in all possible worlds too (as the theory goes), so my intuition leans toward the vacuous falsehood of all "If God did not exist" statements (and this applies symmetrically to "If God does exist" under atheism)
Regarding the moral problem of thinking reprehensible thoughts, I think there is a good Biblical reason why Bible-believing theists should reject the notion that God thinks all those thoughts.
Here is a direct quote from Jeremiah 32:35, where God says: "They [the people of Judah] built the high places of Baal in the Valley of the Son of Hinnom, to offer up their sons and daughters to Molech, though I did not command them, *nor did it enter into my mind*, that they should do this abomination, to cause Judah to sin." This means God did not entertain the thought "They should sacrifice their children to Molech".
I really wonder how classical theists would wiggle their way out of such direct speech that makes a gratuitous (unnecessary to communicate the message) statement about the contents of God's mind which is the exact opposite of what they consider to be fact, namely that God did entertain all thoughts.
This is fascinating! WLC cites some other Bible verses in his God Over All book against theistic conceptualism in this regard, too!
27:16 I also sometimes think about Daniel Dennett
Dennett is really bad at philosophy. He objects to cosmological arguments in one of his books by saying, “If everything must have a cause, then what caused God?”
He also objects to the existence of consciousness, which while common among the philosophers of modernity, I would hardly consider serious philosophy.
@@randomperson2078 By the way, how does he argue that consciousness doesnt exist? I havent read his book yet but Im curious
@@przemor1150 He said that we are just brain with biological robits that operate(the man is a naturalist eliminationist so don't expect to much of him)
@@pedrogonzalez9934 As far as I know he thinks that consciousness is illusion, but I really dont understand how it can be an illusion. Does that mean qualia is also illusion? How does he define what is illusion and what is real?
@@przemor1150 Personally i don't know how he defines everything but i know that he thinks that is a illusion and in the debates he have been part of he said that we are biochemichals robots. And i think in his book bacteria to back he said basically the same but i don't know how he defines everything and the things that you said i am aware that when is poiting to him as a way of criticing he said that the critics are bad blood, bigot of faiths etc. He evades that things the fact that i am aware
I'd like to see Joe analyzing atheistic arguments sometime!
Might do divine hiddenness at some point!!🥰
Have you watched The Analytic Christian’s video defending post-mortem salvific opportunities? I think it presents a good solution to the problem of divine hidden ness and the soteriological problem of evil.
@@MajestyofReason that would be great! personally I would say that the argument from divine hiddenness might be *the* most challenging argument against Christianity and similar monotheistic religions
To answer the question about how abstract objects exist in God, I think the problem can be put very simply as follows: classical theists want to say the form of the number '2' exists in God (and any other form of existence). But, whatever is in God is God. So, God is identical to the number '2'. That already is an absurd implication that classical theists must answer.
I would say that the form of the number '2' exists in God but not as a distinct reality, as if the divine essence were a combination of multiple distinct limited realities. This form and all other forms exist in God in the sense they that are encompassed in His infinite being or reality. What does that mean? Well I understand it to mean that since God's reality is infinite, it is more real than the finite realities, not less. So, He doesn't lack the reality of the number '2', or the reality of 'a unicorn', or any other limited reality, since His unlimited reality surpasses their limited reality. This also means that God is not identical to the number 2 or any other limited form of being, since they are limited realities, while He is unlimited reality.
So, the statement "whatever is in God is God" just means that God is not composed of multiple distinct realities; He is one infinite reality that surpasses the reality of any finite form of being, including abstract objects.
In the end, I think the discussion comes down to how can a simple infinite being possess the forms of all things in Himself without compromising His simplicity.
Thanks for your wonderful comment! :)
I don't have much time to give long feedback, but my short feedback is that this seems to grant to that number 2, after all, doesn't exist. Sure, there's a sense in which God's unlimited and infinite reality doesn't lack the reality of the number two; but it's a separate question as to whether or not the number two *itself* exists under this view. And even if its reality doesn't add to God's, it seems that we still have anti-realism [or, at least, only moderate or Aristotelian realism, which Feser argues against] under the view you've espoused, since the number two (proper) doesn't exist; rather, only God's infinite being exists, and the infinite being is such that the number two adds no 'new being' to the world (as it were). [I find this way of speaking quite problematic, but I'll use it as precisely that: a facon de parler.]
@@MajestyofReason Well, I guess it depends on what you mean by the number 2 'existing in' God. I just take it to mean that it is present in God, since He doesn't lack the limited reality of the number '2', as He is infinite reality while the number 2 is a limited reality. So, to say that God doesn't lack the reality of the number 2 but encompasses it in His infinity just is to say that the number 2 exists in God, on this view.
@@anonymousperson1904 Yes but to say that God doesn't lack the reality of some thing, in the way you say, doesn't mean that this thing exists. For example, God doesn't lack the reality of unicorns. But it obviously doesn't mean that unicorns exists. So if you say that God doesn't lack the reality of abstract objects, then fine, but it doesn't answer the questions whether abstract objects exist or not. And if you want to maintain that God is the only necessary being, and is absolutely simple, then you have to say that abstract objects don't exist necessarily.
@@vituzui9070 So, it depends on what you mean by 'exists in God'. If you mean that the number '2' and the unicorn do not have an act of existence in God, then yeah, that's true. But, both of these realities are present in God as encompassed in His infinite reality. So, a classical theist would say, He has all these things within Himself without actually becoming any of these things i.e. intelligently. So, the same way you can have the number 2 or a unicorn in your intellect without becoming these things i.e. by thinking about them, is the way that God has these realities present in Him. And so, abstract objects exist in the intellect, not as Platonic objects existing in themselves.
I too felt irked by many of Feser's confidently made claims that struck me as just deeply confused, having just read Feser's 5 proofs! This response seemed like a pretty devastating takedown of Feser's Augustinian proof.
I forgot how pleasant reading through the comments of a philosophical Atheist/Agnostic's TH-cam channal. When they makes videos criticizing a Theist, the comment section only offers further respectful critiques rather than insulting and trashing the Theist as an idiot.
I agree that those objections to Platonism fail, but I think you should have taken a bit more time to show it.
For example, it may not be clear how it is possible to examplify animality without examplifyng non-rationality if animality itself examplifies non-rationality. To say it in another way: the form of animality is like a pattern. So how is it possible to embody this pattern without at the same time embodying all the content of this pattern (including non-rationality)? I think the right answer is that humans actually do examplify non-rationality in their animality, but animality is just a part of humanity (or humans). And just as a particular part of us (like our hand) may be non-rational in itself without preventing us to be rational as a whole, the fact that our animality is non-rational in itself doesn't prevent us to be rational as a whole..
Thanks for the wonderful comment!
I agree that I could have dwelt further on this point. If I did, I would have given the following example: the property of “being an animal” exemplifies the property “being a property”. I exemplify the property “being an animal”. But rather clearly, I don’t exemplify the property “being a property”! I am not a property-I’m an object (ie substance). Or: the property animality has the property being non-spatiotemporal; I have the property animality; but rather clearly, I don’t have the property being non-spatiotemporal!
Thanks again for your comment 🥰
Regarding Freser’s epistemic argument, inference to the best explanation relies on causal interaction between the explanans/explanandum and neurochemical events in my brain. For instance, if I walk outside and observe that the street and rooftops are wet, I can infer it likely rained only because I’ve *observed* previously that rain causes rooftops and streets to be wet. There was a causal chain from the explanandum/explanans to the neurochemical events in my brain, I.e. light waves from wet streets caused changes to my sense organs, which causes events in my brain that result in me forming a model that rain makes streets wet, which then allow me to make inferences about future events which fit the same pattern.
Thanks for the comment! I don't think this is plausible, though. Suppose we turned our telescopes to a corner of the sky and observe a galaxy we've never seen before, and it has the first 14 verses of the Gospel of John written in perfect Koine Greek spelled out by the stars, along with a signature "made by God". In this case, it is obvious that we should infer that God was the one who caused this. But it is simply false, in this case, that "we can infer God likely made this only because we've *observed* previously that God causes stars to be arranged in ways that spell out messages". More generally, we only need causal contact with the *explanandum* as well as certain models of the explanans and how well they make sense of the explanandum, which doesn't require causal contact with the explanans. And in the case of platonism, we have causal contact with the explanandum [namely, humdrum facts about ordinary particulars around us]. To put it in a Bayesian framework, all we need is that P(data | explanans #1) > P(data | explanans #2) to infer that data provides evidence for explanans #1 over explanans #2. And this doesn't require causal contact with either explanans; it only requires us to be able to draw out what we would expect from the respective hypotheses.
The reason we would assume that God made such a galaxy is because we have *observed* that (a) sentient agents use Koine Greek (b) that they spell out messages using language (c) they have causal powers to create things (d) they can communicate that they created certain things using language. Under the assumption that God has no causal powers to create galaxies, or influence out mental states it would be obviously unreasonable to believe that the galaxy was designed by God.
@@randomvideoblogs8012 but your response here misses the point. You originally claimed that we need causal contact with the explanans/explanandum. I just provided a case where we have causal contact with the explanandum but not the explanans but are nevertheless justified in affirming the explanans. Your claim was not that we have to have causal contact with the general type or pattern of explanation that the explanans fits. And even if it were, there would still be counter-examples. Consider, Eg, cases where we don’t even have any past experience with a phenomenon or concept. Suppose, for instance, that we just witnessed light bending and gravitational time dilation, and we have no clue what could possibly cause this or be operative here. Then suppose someone offers a theory T that predicts this data very well-a theory positing various unobservable entities and phenomena with which we’ve never had experience and never had causal contact. And suppose that any rival theory utterly fails to predict the relevant data. In this case, it is obvious that we should accept T. (In fact, this is all basically what happened when Einstein came along, with some modifications and idealization to fit the constructs, fictional scenario I’ve described.) And yet we have no causal contact with T, or its various unobservable entities and phenomena at work, and moreover we don’t even have prior observational contact with the *type* of phenomena and observable entities and so on. Even still, it is obvious that we should accept T. All that matters is that P(data | T) > P(data | ~T). It’s a mathematical theorem that this provides evidence for T. Nothing here requires prior causal contact with T or the type of explanans or entities or phenomena within T.
@@randomvideoblogs8012 and of course if we bake in assumptions you the hypothesis that prevent it from explaining the explanandum (like God cannot make stars do this, etc.), then obviously we won’t be able to infer that the hypothesis is true. But that’s perfectly compatible with everything I said. So long as the hypothesis leads us to expect the data more than it is expected under its rival(s), we have evidence for the hypothesis. The various assumptions you point out at the end of your comment prevent the hypothesis from leading us to expect the data more than its rivals, and so this is no challenge to what I said. And it is clear that drawing our expectations of a potential explanans hypothesis doesn’t require causal contact with it. (One reason being that we can do this with both naturalism and theism despite the fact that they have incompatible ultimate explanations, and hence we couldn’t in principle causally relate to one of them)
It would only be reasonable to infer that God made the galaxy if you assume that there’s a direct or indirect causal chain from the explanans to the neurochemical events in your brain. For example, a direct causal chain from the explanans to neurochemical events in your brain in this instance would be (A) God inspiring people to write the Bible in Koine Greek which you’ve come into causal contact with and (B) light rays from the galaxy hitting your retina which you come to believe might have been caused by God. But suppose you come to believe that there was no causal chain, and God, if he exists can’t cause anything, and the NT was based pure fabrication and God even if he existed couldn’t cause Galaxies to be in the shape of letters. Obviously in this case your justification in inferring that it was God who made the galaxy would be undermined.
abstracta don't need to exist more than the physical realm needs to exist. This degree of realism is enough it would seem. if physical realism doesn't create issues I don't see why abstract realism would
Interestingly enough, a Neo-Platonist I regularly chat with and I both independently came up with a similar argument that the existence of abstract objects poses a problem for monotheism by looking at both how such objects relate to Platonism and Theistic Conceptualism. I formulated it as a sort of teleological argument while Willdam made it a more independent argument. It focuses on Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem.
It essentially boils down to a few points (summarized for brevities sake):
If Mathematical Platonism is true, there exists immaterial things not contingent upon God.
If there can exist immaterial things not contingent upon God, then there can exist other immaterial beings.
If there can exist other immaterial beings, then polytheism can be true.
This part is mostly meant to limit the types of argument that can be used against polytheism (which then is combined with other arguments for polytheism to build a case).
[EDIT: of course, a weakness of this is that abstract objects, unlike immaterial beings, tend to be argued to have no causal power. Both him and I mainly focused on Theistic Conceptualism, and I am unsure if he has put much work into this part of the argument (I haven't yet, but it is on my todo list).]
If Theistic Conceptualism is true, then mathematics exists within the mind of God.
God is a purely rational being.
The product of a single rational being ought to be complete and consistent.
By Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem, no system of mathematics is both complete and consistent.
Therefore mathematics cannot be the product of a single rational being.
Therefore (since God(s) must be rational and theistic conceptualism is assumed true) mathematics is the product of multiple rational beings.
Therefore polytheism is true.
This ultimately, regardless on if you go to Mathematical Platonism or Theistic Conceptualism, strengthens the case for polytheism over monotheism (in one case by outright favoring it and in the other by weakening arguments against it).
You need to bring on a nominalist.
I sent an email to David Builes to ask him to come on and discuss nominalism🙂 [no response yet]
@@MajestyofReason F
The philosophy is fine, but man, those impressions
What's the nature of knowledge?? Only Knowledge exists.
1hr 21m - maybe: God can't choose to be aware of all propositions; the awareness is necessary. But humans can choose what to ruminate on to some extent, and choosing wrongly is...wrong. Plus when humans ruminate on bad thoughts, counterbalancing good thoughts can be pushed out, but not so for God who keeps all good thoughts in mind all the time.
No, because abstract objects do not exist, they are simple abstractions.
Waiting for his contingency proof!
Much love
@@MajestyofReason thanks
Nah feser is always right 😡
Seriously though, I can't imagine Feser being wrong. Maybe it's because I always thought Graham Oppy was the smartest man alive, and after seeing Feser basically owning him on their debate in Capturing Christianity, I started viewing Feser as s far superior dude. The man lives in a library XD
@@logans.butler285 yeah lol
Of course not.
Correct :)
Your arrogant dismissal of Freser’s arguments seems unjustified considering you haven’t even addressed his first argument let alone all the others.
I think and hope you’re joking, but you sound serious.
Also, there’s no arrogance here lol
Don't be a clown Joe clearly has no agenda and is just a non biased philosophy dude lol you people love feser so much it doesn't let you think goddamn.
Do you call arrogance everything you disagree with?
People always abuse the word "Arrogant "