Feser's Neo-Platonic Proof: An Analysis
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- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 3 ก.ค. 2024
- Feser’s Neo-Platonic proof reasons from composite beings to the existence of an absolutely simple being. In this video, I critically evaluate the argument.
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This video is based on:
Schmid, J.C. Forthcoming. “Simply Unsuccessful: The Neo-Platonic Proof of God's Existence", European Journal for Philosophy of Religion.
The article above is a proper part of Chapter 9 of my book. I've linked that chapter below! [I'm currently speaking with various editors at different presses regarding this book, so I can't share the whole book.]
Chapter 9: drive.google.com/file/d/1dXMB...
Outline
0:00 Intro and Outline
1:52 Dialectical Context
4:07 Neo-Platonic Proof
7:45 Preliminaries
14:13 Neo-Platonic Causal Principle
16:00 Step One
26:49 Step Two
28:23 Step Three
43:20 Step Four
54:35 Internal Explanation
1:02:46 Mindedness
1:14:40 Trinitarianism
1:27:34 Incarnation
1:47:57 Existential Inertia
Existential inertia links, for those interested:
(1) IJPR paper: philpapers.org/archive/SCHEIA...
(2) Response to Hsiao and Sanders: majestyofreason.wordpress.com...
(3) A User’s Guide: • Existential Inertia: A...
(4) Response to Intellectual Conservatism, Part 1: • Existential Inertia De...
(5) Response to Intellectual Conservatism, Part 2: • Existential Inertia De...
(6) Response to Nemes: majestyofreason.wordpress.com...
(7) Response to RM and HoH: majestyofreason.wordpress.com...
(8) Response to Thomistic Disputations: majestyofreason.wordpress.com...
(9) Discussion with Oppy: • Dr. Graham Oppy on the...
(10) Covered in sections of this post: majestyofreason.wordpress.com...
(11) Sophia paper: philpapers.org/rec/SCHSOO-8
(12) My blog post, "Feser on Schmid on the Aristotelian proof": majestyofreason.wordpress.com...
(13) My blog post, "Feser on Schmid on Existential Inertia": majestyofreason.wordpress.com...
(14) Comprehensive blog post, "So you think you understand existential inertia?" majestyofreason.wordpress.com...
Valdi Ingthorsson's 2021 book: www.taylorfrancis.com/books/o...
References: docs.google.com/document/d/1e...
And the usual links:
My book: www.amazon.com/Majesty-Reason...
My website: majestyofreason.wordpress.com/
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This kid sounds like the nerd with braces in every Disney movie that gets bullied. FYI I still have no f’ing clue what the proof is cause you talk literally 100 mph, does everyone have to have a phd in philosophy to watch these vids?
Pin of Shame!
It would be very interesting to have Feser on your podcast in response.
Sup dawg!! Thanks for the dope content!
Outstanding analysis. Looking forward to the paper.
Amazing video. I think I agree with all of your points, except for your points on trinitarianism. I think that most, if not all, classical theists understand the three distinct persons as either 1) different relations the divine nature has with itself, or 2) qua-objects/qua-persons (such as Rob Koons). It seems like classical theists would simply respond with that. I can understand if someone thinks that these two views don't adequately capture the five theses of trinitarianism, but I think that it wouldn't been better if you gave some reasons for thinking that (at least a sketch) or if you pointed to somewhere where that's justified.
Aside from that minor nitpick, I think the vid is great and so is the channel. I think the argument from the Incarnation sounds quite promising.
Thanks Joe
Could you do a vid about the argument(s) from degree?
I'm gonna love this ! By the way, what microphone do you use ???
Well, for this video I used my mac mic haha. Though I do have a cheep mic
@@MajestyofReason oh I see. Thanks !
13:02 was that a Swinburne impression?? 😂
Good video on an important topic!
I would add that you can make a case that things have neither actual parts, nor potential parts, nor are they composed of metaphysical parts, if by parts one means something discrete to some extent. I could assume something complex without having to speak of such parts. As an aside, many Aristotelians do not believe in true metaphysical composition.
Feser divides or dissects the complex thing, which is continuously structured in itself, only retrospectively and retroactively into discrete parts, i.e. after it has been naturally recognized as a holistic substance, and thus artificially arrives at his result. But one does not have to do that. I am not forced to see it that way.
Got to 4k so quick!
Its hard finding people with interests in these things. I'm glad I do
Be honest you have no clue what he’s saying here, no one does. It’s literally psychobabble by a kid talking with a retainer in his mouth
At around 20 minutes in: AAAAAAAAH your point about the Law of Identiy almost mimics a point I wanted to make in another something I'm writing about Feser's arguments, I guess I took too long to get it out ;-;
I’d love to see an analysis on the energy-essence distinction in Eastern Orthodox theology and if it provides a more coherent understanding of God as opposed to the philosophical notion of Divine Simplicity .
Thanks for this great video. So many flavors of God to choose from! But what is the common denominator of virtually all conceptions of deity worthy of the label 'God'? It seems to me that 'God' must be a person or mind who designs/creates/sustains the universe for a particular purpose (Telos) and that any conception of deity which excludes these attributes is bordering dangerously (or delightfully) close to atheism/naturalism. And insofar as a person with a mind and intentions cannot be considered absolutely simple, the conclusion of Feser's argument is inconsistent with the most minimalist conception of 'God'.
This audio quality is so good.
Your response to step one is quite controversial actually, as far as mereological grounding goes.
The relation between parts and their wholes is asymmetrical (Refer to SEP) contra to the mere biconditional relation/counterfactual dependency that you're arguing for in step one.
Thanks for your comment!
I don't think you've understand my point, however. I didn't claim that parts and wholes are counterfactually dependent on one another. My point was that counterfactual dependence is not sufficient for metaphysical/ontological dependence. Notice that my examples weren't about parts and wholes -- e.g., I used a set and its singleton as an example. Again, my point was simply that counterfactual dependence is not sufficient for metaphysical/ontological dependence, and that -- therefore -- Feser is mistaken to infer that wholes metaphysically depend on their parts simply because they counterfactually depend on their parts. x can counterfactually depend on y even though y metaphysically depends on x, as the examples show (and which are standard in the literature -- cf. Fine 1994).
For more, see philpapers.org/archive/SCHSUT-9.pdf
@@MajestyofReason Thank you for the response friend. It seems I did misunderstand your point as I thought the response was about how a typical grounding between mereological parts and their whole can somehow be symmetric.
I'm sure most people would agree with you that a counterfactual dependency is not at all sufficient for a real dependency relation :)
@@rationalistbanner8373 ❤️
"Metaphysical inquiry" - Jonathan Schaffer
Ahahaha my favorite
@@MajestyofReason Saw it for the first time this morning. Life changing.
@@Hello-vz1md probably later August🥰
What's interesting or significant about that quote?
@@ob4161 th-cam.com/video/Q2WgUUNB7Wo/w-d-xo.html
Joe, it seems like you're construing the word part to have reference to its actualized part-whole relationship, rather than as the previously unactualized component in its own right. It feels like a construal that just begs the question against parts causing their wholes in some sense or in some cases by equivocation on the word part. A hydrogen atom is a part of a water molecule not in virtue of its relationship in actuality to water but independently as that kind of thing on which a water molecule depends for its existence. Hydrogen atoms can exist without water molecules, but water molecules cannot exist without hydrogen atoms.
"A hydrogen atom is a part of a water molecule not in virtue of its relationship in actuality to water but independently as that kind of thing on which a water molecule depends for its existence."
I don't have to assume a dependence relationship. I can simply say that the water molecule is the hydrogen-oxygen structure. It would be an identity relationship and not a dependence relationship. There could always be an identity relationship and not a causal relationship if your understanding of dependence involves causality.
The question is: What does your concept of dependence mean? Efficient causal dependence? Material causal dependence or merely logical dependence or some other form of dependence?
You seem to be referring to existential dependence. In living things, for example, that would be dependence on oxygen for survival. With water it would be the temperature from 1 to 99 degrees Celsius for example.
In the end, it always comes down to whether you look at water holistically or reductionistically.
@@demergent_deist the part to whole relationship couldn't be an identity relationship, since a hydrogen atom isn't a water molecule
@@billj6109 That's right. But water is identical with a hydrogen and oxygen structure. If this structure is given, then one can no longer simply treat the hydrogen for itself and in isolation. If you realized this practically, the water molecule would no longer be present.
My point is this, that from a holistic perspective that structure is rather continuous and non-discrete. That is, the water molecule would be more like an organism than an artifact:
"for example, a chair is not actually, for itself, a chair-all we have is a collection of “simples” (more elementary objects “arranged chairwise”); so, although a chair functions as a chair, it is composed of a multitude of parts (wood, nails, fabric …) which are, in themselves, totally indifferent to this arrangement; there is, stricto sensu, no “whole” of which the nail is here a part. Only with organisms do we have a Whole. Here, the unity is minimally “for itself”; parts really interact." (Zizek, Slavoj. Less Than Nothing)
The water molecule could be characterized by a minimum of self-relating.
@@demergent_deist Water is a physical particular. The structure of a water molecule is an abstract universal. They can't be identical because while structure can be multiply instantiated in particulars, water, a physical concrete, cannot be multiply instantiated. All water has matter, therefore has location, age, etc. Structure is a universal abstract, has no place, no time.
@@billj6109 Thank you for your reply. It does make me think.
"Water is a physical particular."
I agree.
"The structure of a water molecule is an abstract universal."
Here it already becomes more complicated, because the molecule itself is perhaps already an abstraction. But apart from that: Suppose the water molecule is like a tiny concrete drop of water, then I might be able to see an extended structure in a particular sense. The water molecule is also drawn as a structure with seamless connecting lines to three circles on the blackboard or elsewhere. Perhaps I would be able to see such a structure in a real way with my eyes by means of a supermicroscope. It would be like looking at a rainbow. There I would also see a continuous structure. That this structure could be a being-for-itself and a self-relation, I have to add, of course, non-empirically in my mind from my side.
I think this is where our views diverge, as I think structures can certainly be considered particular in some sense.
Simply put, I am more of a nominalist than a conceptual realist. Of course, I could be wrong and you could be right, but from this point on we have come to a topic that has been hotly debated for ages.
But back to one of your statements. It is still not clear to me what it means when you say that the water molecule depends on its parts like hydrogen. What exactly does this "depends on" mean?
What I forgot to mention: "Parts" in a holistic whole are something different or even completely different from parts in a reductionistic "whole".
"Socrates singleton" is a descriptive sentence that describes Socrates.
we cannot state that Socrates' existence depends on this descriptive sentence, on the contrary, it is this descriptive sentence that depends on Socrates' existence.
I can still assume that Socrates exists and is not a singleton. but I can't imagine that Socrates never existed and that the sentence "Socrates singleton" existed.
Nice
😍😍😍😍
It's really interesting because I happened to re-create the NPCP a few years ago, as a rebutal to polytheism, and a friend told me to watch at your video. So here am I.
Regarding the internal explanation, I found the following physics description (which I had translated into English) which complements yours:
"In reality, however, the electric and magnetic fields are of great practical importance because these fields hold the electrons and protons in the atoms together, and they hold the atoms together. This allows the atoms to form larger structures, a piece of wood or a bird, for example. We don't notice anything of this in everyday life, because each thing consists of the same number of negative electrons and positive protons; from the outside, such a body is neutral: the electric fields act only within the atoms and also between the atoms, because the electric charge in the atom is not evenly distributed. But the fields do not penetrate beyond the electrically neutral body."
“This video is more dope than the paper” my guy you are the opposite of a boomer, awesome new gen of academia
Doesn't the "salt" example presuppose an external cause, that of the electromagnetic field, without which there would be no attraction between the Ions?
Excellent question! So, from my very limited physics knowledge, the Na+ and Cl- are conjoined not because of the electromagnetic field but instead because of the electrostatic force between the respective cations and anions. And this attractive force is internal, not external, to the salt crystal.
@@MajestyofReason Cool! It's been a couple decades now since my last physics course, but that seems to sit right with my distant recollections...
That said, wouldn't the electrostatic force itself (that it does what it does to all charged particles everywhere ) be external to the salt crystal, though the individual ions' attractions actions based on that force be purely internal? Or am I way of from what you mean by "external / internal" here?
@@00lack that’s another excellent question. I think I would say that the only force relevant to explaining the togetherness of Na and Cl in a given salt crystal is, indeed, the *internally* operative electrostatic force. You are correct that ‘the electrostatic force’ (if we can speak in such abstract or general terms) is present in all other sorts of things and phenomena, and in *that* sense it is (partly) external to any individual salt crystal. But I would say that this abstract or general sense of the electrostatic force is not what explains the togetherness of an individual salt crystal’s components; instead, what explains that is the particular, internal electrostatic force interactions. 🙂
@@MajestyofReason I suppose that depends on whether the electrostatic force is intrinsic to the ions or some extrinsic particle or field interaction? No idea.
I suppose another analogy would just be a chair held together by glue. It's the inherent gluey-ness of the glue that holds it to the parts and the parts to each other. Does that track?
As I understand it, electric fields emanate from the charged particles of a body.
I feel kinda stupid because when you say "everything numerically distinct from God," or "numerically equal to his omniscience," I think I grasp your meaning, but I can't parse those well enough to understand what numbers have to do with things like God or omniscience or whatever. If you said "2+2 is numerically equal to 4," that would make sense to me, but outside of maths, "numerically equal," while I think I understand it, I feel like I'm missing some nuance of meaning
Good question - so numerical identity is basically just “being one and the same thing as”. So Clark Kent is numerically identical to Superman; I am numerically identical to myself; and so on. The “numerical” serves several functions - Eg, (1) to distinguish this kind of strong identity from “qualitatively identical”, where x and y are qualitatively identical just in case they’re distinct from one another but exactly similar-think of identical twins (except that they look *exactly* the same - same positions and numbers of hair, etc.), or think of identically-looking basketballs made en masse at an industrial facility, and so on. (2) “numerical” is also used because numerical identity is closely related to number - if x and y are numerically identical, then there’s only one thing here. X is one and the same thing as Y. And if x and y are numerically distinct, there are two things here.
Huh? 1:03:05 "a mind" _is_ an "abstract entity"
The concept _mind_ is surely an abstract entity, but a particular mind is concrete, no?
@@ob4161
I respectfully disagree.
It would be concrete in the same way that 'the sky' is concrete.
Defeated by salt. I guess Feser skipped high-school chemistry class.
Who says he got "defeated"? Thomistic Disputations already responded to Schmid's criticisms in his yt channel
@@logans.butler285 and joe responded to that aswell
@@deathnote4171 did someone then answer him so we can keeo going or was it over?
@@logans.butler285
He got defeated because Joe pointed out irredeemable logical errors in his reasoning. One would have to be dogmatically invested in Feser's arguments not to acknowledge them.
Feser is the one dislike
It's Canadian Catholic.
Second dislike is Thomistic Disputations
It's funny that classical theists and thomists in particular describe their god as some sort of metaphysical singularity in which an act or a thought or a will (they're all identical to one another and they're all identical to the singularity itself) brought forth the physical universe from itself like some sort of 'big bang'. 😂
1. Feser never claimed to be arguing to a first efficient cause. You've misrepresented him.
2. The Persons of the Trinity are both one and distinct in an analogous way to the way male and female are distinct "types" within the species Man, yet at the same time identically human. This comports perfectly with the Genesis claim that man was created--"male and female he created them"--in the image of God. In humans, the distinction between male and female is one of active vs. passive powers with regard to reproduction, since man is intended to reproduce himself and fill the world with the image of God. However, since God does not reproduce, the only distinction in the godhead is one of relation, not power or essence or anything else.
Given the nature of your comment, you're probably trolling; but I'll engage it nonetheless, since someone else reading this may benefit from it.
(1) No. Here's a quote from Feser's chapter on the Neo-Platonic proof: "Now, if some composite thing is caused by another composite thing and that by yet another in a hierarchical causal series, then for the reasons set out in the previous chapter, that series must have a first member. But the first member cannot itself be composite, for then it would require a cause of its own and thus not be first. So, it must be something noncomposite, something utterly simple in the sense of having no parts of any kind" (p. 74). Feser is here concluding to a first [his language] efficient cause of everything composite. There's obviously no misrepresentation, then. (NB: Feser also explicitly calls all of his arguments "arguments for a First Cause" on p. 195.)
Of course, Feser doesn't mean 'first' in the sense of *temporally* first; instead, he means *ontologically* first in the sense of foundational. But I have *never* claimed -- not a single time in my entire life -- that Feser meant *temporally* first, or that his argument is concerned with temporally first causes.
(2) Whether the distinction in God is one of relation or not is utterly irrelevant to my argument. All I need to run the trinitarian problem is that there is, indeed, some form of distinction in God. Once we grant that, there's the question of what explains the unity of the x's among which there is some form of distinction; and answers to that can be modified, mutatis mutandis, to answers to questions about what explains the unity of some foundational composite object, thereby undermining NPCP.
The Thomists will continue screaming that DS is compatible with Trinitarianism. It's really disturbing to see such delusion.
@@robertbutchko5066 If the father, holy spirit, and son are distinct from each other, then each one is not numerically identical to the divine essence, otherwise they would be numerically identical to one and the same thing, and each would therefore be numerically one and the same thing, and not numerically distinct.
@@robertbutchko5066 No, it isn't a mystery, it's a contradiction. What you have to do is take a more modest understanding of the Trinity, one which doesn't say the each of the persons is numerically identical to the divine essence, but only that each of the persons share in the same divine essence.
@@robertbutchko5066 You're not addressing what I'm saying. Instead you are talking about parts, I didn't say anything about parts, because different people have different understandings of what parts are, so I'm avoiding that fruitless language in this conversation. Instead, I have pointed out that the persons have to be numerically distinct from the divine essence, otherwise, each of the persons would be numerically identical to each other.
@@robertbutchko5066 There seems to be a misunderstanding here. I'm not opposed to DS, I myself am an adherent of DS, specifically a Neoplatonic DS. I'm opposed to the Trinity, because the Trinity is incompatible with DS. Again, I'm not talking about parts, what parts are, is a matter of contention. What I am pointing out, is that the persons of the Trinity share in the divine essence, but are really distinct from the divine essence and from each other, and this is opposed to DS, since on divine simplicity, real distinctions in God are inadmissible. Again, I didn't say anything about parts, so please stop talking about parts.
@@Bowen12676 Really! Why don't you address the Transitivity argument yourself?
I tried to leave a comment here -don't see it now. Maybe I just failed to actually leave it (didn't push the right button, etc) maybe it was deleted (I could, thinking about it, have been a little nicer in it, so...). Let me try again:
It strikes me that there is a fairly obvious problem with Joe's arguments here. Maybe it's just because of his hyperactive manner of presentation that he just presents some ideas and doesn't get around to dealing with my own personal objection, so... He might have some answer,so here goes!
The alternative to Classical Theism that he offers, here, is that there might be (so far as I can make out) an originally existing, simple "part" of God, and that that... thing generates every other part afterwards (either, I'd suppse, in a linear or a hierarchical causal series, as Feser would say). So...then a question comes to my head: if these parts are caused by the original part, how are they not creatures, rather than parts, of God? If they aren't different, not fully different, from the original "part", then how are they actually "parts"? (I think that's BASICALLY what the Classical Theist is calling Divine Simplicity, here. It's complicated!). If they are... quite different, then how are they still... God, in any sense?
Thanks! hope this is...stimulating!
I don’t delete comments. Also, your comment here cut off-it only includes like two small paragraphs.
@@MajestyofReason that was an oopsy! If I don't miss the send button, it seems my thumb is over eager to hit it! 😂
I've edited in the finished comment, BTW!
Couple of nuances: this particular talk is a great help on Divine Simplicity: soundcloud.app.goo.gl/krG9CCKoPSRezRS49. I don't doubt that there is something, probably, like a casual relation between ASPECTS of God (I.e., the Persons of the Trinity)- that's both traditional and Biblical; what I do doubt is that this amounts to a difference of parts!
@@TheBookgeek7 Thanks for your comment!
You say: “The alternative to Classical Theism that he offers, here, is…”
But this is not quite an accurate way to set things up. I offer a whole panoply of potential explanations of the unity of an object’s parts at a given non-first moment of its existence. So it’s not a though there is some single alternative to classical theism I offer here, as indicated by your use of ‘the’ alternative. Among the explanations I offer are:
(1) whole-to-part grounding
(2) the metaphysical necessity of said unity
(3) the *kind* of thing in question simply *requires* the obtaining of the explanandum.
(4) one of the parts explains or accounts for the unity or togetherness of all the parts
(5) And any of the metaphysical accounts of EIT, covered in Section 5 here [ majestyofreason.wordpress.com/2021/07/31/so-you-think-you-understand-existential-inertia/ ] and briefly summarized below:
(a) A tendency or disposition to persist in existence (à la tendency-disposition accounts, which can be construed in metaphysically heavyweight or lightweight ways);
(b) Transtemporal explanatory relations (e.g., causal relations) obtaining among the successive phases of objects’ lives or among their temporal parts (à la transtemporal accounts);
(c) Laws of nature that govern or otherwise explain the evolution of systems and/or objects over time (à la law-based accounts);
(d) The primitive metaphysical necessity of the existential inertial thesis (à la propositional necessity accounts);
(e) The metaphysically necessary existence of some foundational temporal concrete object(s), such as the neo-classical theistic God or various naturalist-friendly proposals (à la objectual necessity accounts);
(f) Persistence being the absence of change and so adequately explained by the absence of sufficiently destructive change-inducing factors (à la no-change accounts).
Once more, see Section 5 of the linked post to explore (5a)-(5f) further.
My purpose, in this comment, is not to defend these explanations. It is simply to point out that it is inaccurate to construe my case as one according to which “the” alternative to CT is the one you go on to sketch. I have a whole panoply of alternatives, and I defend their explanatory legitimacy at length in Section 5 of the linked blog post as well as Chapter 9 linked in the description of this video on the Neo-Platonic proof (wherein I discuss (1)-(4) and briefly (5).
Continuing on with what you say:
“That there might be (so far as I can make out) an originally existing, simple "part" of God, and that that... thing generates every other part afterwards (either, I'd suppse, in a linear or a hierarchical causal series, as Feser would say).”
This is not the proposal, however. I did not say that one part causes the other parts, i.e., causally produces them or brings them into being. Rather, the reason why all the parts of God are combined or unified is because each of the other parts flow from one part: sheer perfection (i.e., the property of being perfect). I never claimed this is a *causal* flow. It’s not as though God’s perfection *causally produces* God’s omniscience and omnipotence and whatnot. Rather, it *non-causally explains* their compresence. Philosophers offer a wide variety of ways to understand non-causal explanation, but we could just pick one for simplicity: grounding. God’s perfection grounds God’s other properties like moral goodness, omniscience, omnipotence, and so on. This is entirely different from there being some originally existent simple part that causally produces each of the other parts. There is no point or state in which God’s perfection exists without any of God’s the properties, firstly; and secondly, God’s perfection doesn’t causally produce the other properties. Instead, it non-causally explains them, i.e. grounds them.
Once more, thanks for interacting with my video, and I hope my comment serves you in your pursuit of truth!
Jesus is God
Amen