Arguments for Classical Theism | Part 1/2
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- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 3 ก.ค. 2024
- In this two-part series, I explain and assess arguments for classical theism. In a separate two-part series, I'll examine arguments against classical theism.
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Outline for Part 1:
1 Purpose and Dialectic
2 Models of God: Classical and Neo-classical Theism
2.1 A closer look
3 Motivations for Classical Theism: A survey
3.1 Euthyphro Dilemma
3.2 Securing monotheism
3.3 Aseity
3.4 Theological
3.4.1 Preserving Trinitarianism
3.4.2 Tradition, Authority, Magisterium
3.4.3 Biblical
3.5 Natural Theology
3.5.1 Feser
3.5.1.1 Aristotelian
3.5.1.2 Neo-Platonic
3.5.1.3 Augustinian
3.5.1.4 Thomistic
3.5.1.5 Rationalist
3.5.2 The Five Ways
3.5.2.1 First Way
3.5.2.2 Second Way
3.5.2.3 Third Way
3.5.2.4 Fourth Way
3.5.2.5 Fifth Way
3.5.3 Aquinas’s De Ente Argument
0:00 Intro
2:10 Outline
2:44 Purpose and Dialectic
8:50 Models of God & DDS
20:49 Motivations for CT
23:38 Euthyphro Dilemma
34:45 Securing Monotheism
43:35 Aseity
52:12 Preserving Trinitarianism
54:45 Tradition and Magisterium
55:42 Biblical Arguments
58:56 Natural Theology - Feser
1:04:26 Aristotelian Proof
1:24:55 Neo-Platonic Proof
1:36:35 Augustinian Proof
1:48:59 Thomistic proof
1:53:20 Rationalist Proof
1:55:56 The Five Ways
1:56:50 First Way
2:02:47 Second Way
2:03:08 Third Way
2:04:03 Fourth Way
2:04:44 Fifth Way
2:11:52 Aquinas’s De Ente Argument
2:52:20 Q&A
Note: The Link to the document is removed because it is under significant construction for my series "Arguments Against Classical Theism". The link will be placed in the description of the latest video in that series.
Note on defining 'classical theism': there is some controversy over how to define classical theism. It's going to be difficult to find unanimous support for certain theses across all traditions (e.g. Eastern traditions like (strands of) Hinduism, Eastern Orthodox and Palamite traditions, Islamic and Jewish traditions, Western Christian traditions, etc.). The definition of classical theism I use (which follows classical theist scholars like Rogers, Brower, Grant, Bergmann, Dolezal, Stump, and so on) is broadly situated in the tradition following Augustine, Boethius, Lombard, Maimonides, Anselm, Aquinas, etc. and on through contemporary thinkers like Kate Rogers and W. Matthews Grant. I focus less on versions/variations of classical theism found in (e.g.) Scotus, Palamas, and so on. [Though, note that the vast majority of things I say in this series of videos apply mutatis mutandis to such variations.]
And the usual links:
My book: www.amazon.com/Majesty-Reason...
My website: majestyofreason.wordpress.com/
Hi Joe! As a teenage amateur thinker who loves philosophy of religion, discovering this channel has been great! I may have to respond at some point, as I am a classical theist due to these arguments:
1) Pruss’ contingency.
2) The Kalam (a Bayesian formulation works best).
3) Fine tuning - I think your objections are rather questionable when the argument is properly expounded.
4) The Grand Teleological Argument (a creation of my own which takes a holistic approach to various aspects of the universe and its laws, which proposes that their collective set is more expected under theism than naturalism.
5) The argument from the improbability of a) conscious b) complex creatures under naturalism.
6) The experiential argument (tying together religious experience, NDEs, and evidence for miracles).
Looking forward to the watching through the video again :)
@@ob4161 Very true.
@@calebp6114 Christian?
@@maxpayne3628 Yep :)
I don't think any fine tunning argument works because of the weak anthropic principle.
I personally prefer the consciousness argument for the soul over the fine tuning or grand design argument.
I never really liked those arguments that start in the physical world and work there way up to divinity (Ex: Cause and effect Cosmological argument, Teleological argument, Fine tuning Etc . . .) I always preferred the metaphysical arguments for the existence of God just because it makes it easier to include certain aspects about the nature of god that fit more into the model of the Christian God that we worship.
It is hard to explain but I hope I did a good job.
Great video! I am thoroughly enjoying it! Thanks!
Three hours! Early birthday gift.
Enjoy!🙂
Woah this will worth a couple of watches! I just read through most of your book Joe, and I am on the chapter on philosophy of mind. Really fun so far.
Much love
What's interesting, is before the presentation began, I noticed in the "Vivaldi's Winter" at 0:38 was raised a half step. So instead of the melody starting on a G, it started on an Ab. Nice touch Joe!
Thanks Joe
I cant wait to watch this fully!
I currently sit in the Thiest camp at the moment. I'm a cradle catholic, and over the last three months I have gotten super deep into philosophy and history, adding that with bible study has honestly been an incredibly entertaining ride of knowledge in which I have discovered the deep philosophical traditions. I've spent so much on books over the last few months 😭
I have a question though, I'm currently reading some Ed Feser books on Aquinas, but I want to get the full theological tradition of Philosophy. Can you recommend any books breaking down the work of St. Augustine like how Feser does to Aquinas (or just straight up intros to platonic ideas)?
Edit: also, I found you through Capturing Christianity
That’s a wonderful question-unfortunately I don’t know of resources like that for Augustine! Though, there are some accessible English versions of Augustine’s work. I really enjoyed reading his “On Free Choice of the Will”, translated by Thomas Williams (Hackett, 1993)
Hello! Could I ask do you still hold the same position or has it cahnged?
Yessir!! Best books fleshing out classical theism?
WM Grant’s 2019 book on universal causality is a good one to check out!
You can also check out books by William Lane Craig, David Bagget, Richard Swineburne, Edward Feser, Richard Koons, Alexander Pruss among others.
Consider a two premise argument
P1 (some premise)
P2 (some premise)
C (an entailed conclusion)
C is true iff P1 and P2
Then what should be our standard for accepting C. Craig once said that these type of arguments succeed if the premises seem more plausible than not (I take this to mean a credence of 50+%) .
I think Craig's hypothesis fails:
Consider the case where my credence in P1 is 60% and my credence in P2 is also 60% and let's say the premises are independent variables (to make the calculations easier).
Then my credence in C should be
0.6 × 0 .6 = 0.36 = 36%
That's not enough, given my credence I should actually believe "not C" with a credence of 64%. Surely arguments for C should make me believe C not make me believe "not C".
What is required is that I believe the conjunct of P1 and P2 has a probability of >50% taken together. (Or that my credence in both being true is over 50%.)
Now consider Faser's 15 point proof, you would (given independent variables) need an average credence of >95% in each premise to just get slighlty over 50%. And a lot of the premises are hard metaphysical intuitions and really complicated stuff with a lot of (brilliantly put forth by Joe) rebutting defeaters.
I love this point! I wish I could have made this in the video. Nice!
@@MajestyofReason Oh thank you so much
This is amazing. I never thought of this. Thanks for sharing this.
Thanks for the video Joe. You've given us classical theists quite a bit to think about.
I have a question regarding the objection you mention at 2:17:51 against the argument for why pure esse cannot be more than one. I just want to check my understanding of the objection is correct.
From my understanding of the De Ente argument, pure esse cannot be more than one, for if there was more than one pure esse, then they would have a common feature of pure esse. Now, since they share something in common, we must have some distinct principle that makes them different. However, pure esse cannot have such a distinct principle (for pure esse is simple), so there cannot be more than one pure esse.
With this in mind, it seems to me that your point about primitive individuation is to reject the premise that if there were more than one pure esse, then these beings would all have a common feature of pure esse. Rather, they all have their own primitive distinct unique pure esse, and thus there is no commonality between these beings. Thus, there is no need for a distinct principle outside of pure esse that makes one pure esse different from another, for they are already distinct.
Is this a correct understanding?
Thank you for the lovely comment! I think you're right in your understanding. I'm not 100% certain since I only just now skimmed that portion of the video, but if my memory serves me correctly, you have correctly articulated/understood the criticism :)
Does anyone know what happened to Elephant Philosophy´s youtube channel? It is not there anymore.
He emailed me the other day; from what I can gather, he needs a break from the chaos of social media etc. He hasn’t updated me (yet) about the status of his channel going forward, though. It could potentially be a temporary deactivation; but we shall see as time progresses! I believe he probably over-worked himself making three videos a week and wants to take his hiatus/break seriously 🙂
@@MajestyofReason Ok. :) Though I do not entirely understand the deactivation-part (he could just leave the channel as it is), but ok. :)
I am looking forward to Scott Berman's appearance on your channel. It will be kind of like a metaphysical birthday present since it's in June. (1:38:43)
❤️
Is Joe Schimd related to any of the Schimd:s that you see on Wikipedia? :)
(I know it is a stretch, people have same the surnames all the time, but it is just a fun question.)
Let's hope not... en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Schmid
You could make it longer 😅
Thanks Joe for the nice video :)
I want to ask you a question because I am curious about your opinion on a subject. What do you think of those who say that rejecting classical theism will lead to atheism. Do you think there is only classical theism and atheism as options.As I understand it, classical theists argue that if we reject divine simplicity, God cannot be a necessary being, but I do not think it should be because God's unlimited perfection seems to help us say why his different attributes coexist.What do you think about this?
Wonderful question! I think it's very, very false to say that rejecting DDS leads to atheism. [Ironically, I think it would be more plausible [though still implausible] to say that *accepting* DDS leads to atheism.]
God can easily be a necessary being if DDS is false, and God's unlimited perfection can, by my lights, explain why his different attributes co-exist. So I think your comment is spot on :)
@@MajestyofReason thank you so much for your answer:)
@@muhammetrfat8629 Bro, what does Islam say about Divine Simplicity?
@@maxpayne3628 Sorry to see your message late :)
Among Islamic thinkers, there are those who accept divine simplicity and those who reject, for example, philosophers such as Avicenna Averroes endorsed the doctrine of divine simplicity. However, there are also those who reject this doctrine. For example, Al Ghazali criticized Avicenna in his book The İncoherence of Philosophers. The Quran, the holy book of Islam, does not say anything clear on this matter. Therefore, I personally see no problem religiously whether or not a Muslim accepts divine simplicity, because there are no beliefs such as triunity in Islam, but as a Muslim I reject the doctrine of divine simplicity for philosophical reasons.
Hey, I was mentioned. Nice!
Thanks Joe for these brilliant analyses! I'll surely have to watch this video several times to absorb all of the goodies in there. For now, I was wondering what are your thoughts about whether there is a conceptual tension between considering God as an omniscient intellect and his alleged utter simplicity and atemporality. How can such a divine intellect be simple and immutable/atemporal?
Also, despite the analogies given by classical theists such as Feser I'm not so sure that there really are such things as 'hierarchically ordered causal series" that cannot extend infinitely into the past or that require a primary 'sustaining cause'. Consider Feser's mug/desk/earth example. The cup rests on the desk due to its gravitational attraction to the earth (leaving aside here what the ultimate scientific explanation of gravity is, as it's still unresolved). The desk prevents the cup from crashing into the earth because of the inter-atomic forces that comprise the desk, which also prevent the desk from collapsing under its own weight. What does the earth rest on? Nothing! It's floating in the vacuum of space as it orbits the sun. So, we have 3 objects that are gravitationally 'stuck together' and floating through space as a unit: the cup, the desk, and the earth. Ok, so what's the problem? How does this scenario inexorably lead us to posit a 'purely actual actualizer' or God?
Thanks for the comment! I will be discussing some of those potential tensions in my next series on arguments against classical theism. Stay tuned!
And as for the point about the desk and whatnot -- I think Feser would respond by saying that the cup, desk, and Earth [and, perhaps sun] are, of course, not further-held-aloft by any outside gravitational influences; but they are still not *unactualized* . I imagine Feser will say that their being is actualized by the molecules that make them up, which in turn are actualized by the atoms and forces that make them up, which in turn are actualized by the sub-atomic particles, and so on. This chain of actualizers, says Feser, must be finite and terminate in some unactualized actualizer. Now, I think it is a blatant non-sequitur to infer that this *unactualiazed* actualizer would have to be *purely* actual [and, as I argue in a forthcoming Sophia article, Feser's attempts to circumvent this problem fail]. And also, it seems that we're only going to arrive at a collection of 'uncomposed components' of things. And that is very far from God.
So, long story short, I think you're pretty much right.
@@MajestyofReason Thanks for the helpful reply! Another tension, or so it seems to me, is that an atemporal cause (the God of classical theism) cannot be a sustaining cause (if indeed things need a cause to 'sustain their existence'). To sustain something, e.g., holding a book in position above the ground in a gravitational field, is to sustain it over time. But how can a timeless cause create a sustaining, and thus temporal, effect?
At 12:30 you mention philosophers who hold to immutability, timelessness, and impassibility while rejecting simplicity, who are these people?
I’ve been told that Brian Leftow is an example. [Im more familiar with his work on God and Necessity, not so much the stuff he’s done on timelessness, so I cannot confirm this. I *know* he holds to timelessness and immutability, though, and some generally reliable people in the field have told me he denies the DDS I articulated on the video.] But, more generally, lots of people accept timelessness who don’t accept DDS; and with timelessness comes immutability [since something’s changing entails that it is temporal]. And among such people, I’m quite sure there are impassibilists
@@MajestyofReason tyty
@@MajestyofReason you should also consider doing episodes on Palamism, Panentheism, and Scotism, where discussions about the tri personal nature of God, his attributes/proterties (and categorical classifications like realism, antirealism, alethic realism / antirealism, nominalism, fictionalism, idealism, monism, dualism, contingency, etc) in modern philosophical terms for these older theological conceptions of God as workable philosophical models rather than just in house christian theological debates. There are many Orthodox Christian philosophers who have began to formalize orthodox theology in metaphysical and epistemological terms, as well as different types of Catholics who aren't exactly Thomists/Classical Theists or Personal Theists/ Neo-Classical Theists like mainstream catholicism and protestantism (like William Lane Craig, Ryan Mullins, Blake Giunta, Ed Feser, John Haldane, Bp. Robert Barron, etc) and conceptionalize God in different metaphysical terms based on early creeds and historical disputations that have't necessarily been popularly treated and translated in modern metaphysical terminology and categorized. It would be a refreshing take from the often belabored popular models that we have grown accustomed to here in the west, as well as a refreshing and new metaphysical thoughtful excercise.
@@MajestyofReason That would be strange since Leftow seems to explicity endorse simplicity in "Is God an Abstract Object?"
@@TheBrunarr I myself don’t take a stand on what his view is mainly because I don’t know it! My comment, as you know, was based on testimony of a few others, and testimonial evidence is highly defeasible🙂 [I do know he mounts a modal collapse objection to DDS in one of his 2015 papers, I believe, and he is also very very critical of extrinsic divine knowledge and action in one of his papers too. And these are really the only ways for DDS to avoid modal collapse, it seems. So, again, I think there is conflicting evidence about his views. I want to emphasize that I don’t claim that he denies DDS, since I’m not sufficiently familiar with his work!🙂]
Majesty of Reason I believe that God has a Free will and that He chose to be Good. In other words, He had the knowledge of good and evil and He chose to be good.
Isn't it greater to have the choice of being good or evil and to chose to be good then to be good without the chance to be evil? Does that make any sense?
That is a fascinating view! I can definitely appreciate the strong intuition behind [choosing to be good]'s being better than or more perfect than or more praiseworthy than [be automatically good, without any choice over the matter]. One thing you could think about: someone might object to your view by saying it makes it at least *possible* [though not actual] that God be evil. But that does seem unintuitive as well; surely God *must* be good/perfect.
Theologically, if a god (technically, an angel since theologically Satan does not measure up to to being a god in Heaven but let´s just call it a god for the sake of simplicity.) would be evil he would be Satan och not God anymore (since God is by definition theologically anti-evil). May be you could say that Satan is a kind of god *in this world* (but not Heaven), but he still would not be the supreme god (which would be God). Philosophically, that is an entirely different kettle of fish - I am not sure whether there is a distinction between (non-supreme) god or (supreme) God in philosophy, or if they just lump everything together there. Though the idea that there really are things like good and evil did in the western world come from Christianity. So the evil god would be interpreted theologically as Satan anyway.
Wheres the document? It wasn't in the description?
nvm saw the note now
If you email me, I can supply it🙂
@@MajestyofReason Just did, thank you so much ^_^!
@1:02:41 this theistic intuition is flawed. This bootstrap paradox is not a paradox for circular causality. Your money example assumes the existence of the money or that one must have the money for it to be existent. There is no collapse. There is no need for a primary member. That being said, I think this was wonderfully done! It is the exact kind of rigiourous philosophy I admire.
Much, much love my dude❤️❤️❤️
At 43:10 this seemingly confuses the nature of the Trinity. The persons of the Trinity are each only relationally distinct, but are each of the one essence, God, and each *are* one with the essence of God. However, this relational distinction only works because the persons are of one nature. To say that two gods could each be one with the divine nature would entail them being the same God. They could only be relationally distinct as persons and not substantively distinct (and now we are back to the concept behind the Trinity).
So, in a way, the Trinity itself saves the Classical Theist from this line of argument.
At least, this is what jumped out to me in 5 minutes for a TH-cam comment.
Thanks for the comment!
So, I don't think it confuses the nature of the Trinity. If the persons are relationally distinct [such that they are distinguished by, say, their relations of origin and/or procession or what have you], it simply follows from this that they are numerically distinct [such that there is not one 'item' here but three, precisely because they are relationally distinguished from one another]. My argument, from what I recall, doesn't assume that they are substantively distinct [i.e. that they do not share one and the same substance]. My argument was only that they are numerically distinct from each other and from that one, shared substance [which follows from there being three of them and only one substance here]. So, my argument neither denies their relational distinction nor their sharing of one-and-the-same substance or nature. Each of the persons is still such that it is not numerically identical to that one substance [since there are three of them but only one substance, which would be impossible if each were numerically identical with the one substance]--though that one substance is, of course, their single shared nature. So I don't think my argument rests on any confusion whatsoever about the Trinity--indeed, it simply follows from the doctrine together with what numerical identity consists in.
@@MajestyofReason Thank you for the response!
Please note that I have no training in philosophy whatsoever, I just like reading the writings of the Saints. So I apologize if my writing is sloppy.
You say: “it simply follows from this [the persons being relationally distinct] that they are numerically distinct (such that there is not one ‘item’ but three...)”
However, I do not see that this is necessarily true. I think we can posit real distinctions between the persons that are not numerical distinctions and yet still steer clear of Sabellianism. In other words, I do not believe that relational distinctions are necessarily numerical distinctions. Furthermore, I do not think it could even in principle be said of God that within the divine there could be numerical distinction, and that this is itself suggested by the most authoritative and orthodox formulations of Trinitarianism. To expand on these points:
Blessed Scotus makes the distinction between Qualitative Identity and Numerical Identity. The former referring to a thing’s quiddity while the latter refers to a thing’s haecceity, but that is not to say that the Classical Theist must think of the persons of the Trinity as numerically distinct.
If, as Geach argues, numerical identity is relative to a sortal concept, then (as both Anscombe and Geach say we should read Saint Thomas Aquinas as saying, following Saint Anselm), we can posit relational distinctions between the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit that are not numerical or qualitative distinctions.
I am new to this formulation, but the principle behind it lies implicit in the writings of the Eleventh Synod of Toledo, the First Council of Nicaea, and Fourth Lateran Council:
On the Relational Thesis, Jebwab says, “Prima facie, the doctrine of the Trinity implies the sortal relativity of identity thesis, which says that where “R” and “S” are sortals, it could be that for some x and y, x and y are the same R but different Ss. The Father and the Son are the same God, else they are two Gods, which implies polytheism and so is false. But the Father and the Son are different divine Persons, else they are one divine Person, which implies the Sabellian heresy and so is false. So the Father and the Son are the same God but different divine Persons.” (What Jebwab is defending here is language straight from the Creed of St. Athanasius, lending credence to his claim that it follows naturally for orthodox Trinitarianism.)
But the buck does not stop there. For, as St. Thomas says, it is in matter which a form is individuate. So numerical distinctions can only be present in material things. An immaterial thing cannot have numerical distinctions (because if the immaterial thing has a different form then it is qualitatively rather than numerically distinct). Bld. Scotus even gives this away when he is forced to (unsuccessfully in my opinion) maintain a sort of “incorporeal matter” in an attempt to get around this and ground numerical distinction in the immaterial. And, as already established, the persons of the Trinity are each qualitatively identical. So, the persons being immaterial (God being immaterial) and therefore not numerical distinguishable, are numerically identical. What we are left with is relational distinctions as the only remaining possible distinction.
Edit: TL;DR I see no reason to assume that there are numerical distinctions implied by relational distinctions. This is argued by Anscombe and Geach to be the implicit position of St. Thomas Aquinas and is argued by Jebwab to be the natural result of the traditional orthodox (small o) Trinitarianism of St. Athanasius. Furthermore, positing numerical distinctions in God would seem to be incompatible with his immateriality, argued by both St. Thomas Aquinas and Bld. Duns Scotus.
@@carsonianthegreat4672
Isn't numerical identity transitive, though? If the Father, Son and Spirit are all numerically identical to God, then they're all identical which each other (which is false).
@@ob4161 they can be numerically but not relationally identical
Glad to see Scott Berman's book cited here. I was my second favorite book on Platonism to come out last year (after Lloyd Gerson's 'Platonism and Naturalism').
I look forward to watching your discussion with him later on. I thought his arguments against equivocity were compelling, but I'm not sold on univocity as an accurate interpretation of Plato's views on being. I'll be interested to hear more from him on the equivocity of being.
Guess who’s coming on my channel in June😉
I paused the video to post my comment right before you mentioned that! Lol.
48:50 Im thinking that what you say here might be untrue, not sure. My reasoning: The Person’s of the Trinity are not “within God.” We can go all the way back to St. Athanasius and his Creed where he states that “The Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God.” The Father is fully God. The Son is fully God. The Spirit is fully God. Your numerical dependency contention seems to rest on a sort of Partialism which is not what is held by orthodox (small o) Trinitarianism. The nature of God is also not dependent on the three persons themselves. That would be Partialism as well. The persons are relationally distinct from one another, as I said in my other comment, but that is not to say that the Godhead is numerically dependent on the persons.
Again, just watching this over my lunch break so this was a quick and dirty reply.
What is happening
yes
Check the description, there's a 136 page pdf. It's nuts
Wait, you say that the Augustinian Proof is incompatible with Simplicity, because abstracta would be both intrinsic to and distinct from God. But, by my understanding, abstracta exist within God only conceptually rather than really - just like how God's relation to the world exists conceptually rather than really - and surely when Classical Theists state "whatever is in God is God" they're talking about real, extra-mental attributes and predicates, no? It may be analogous to how Classical Theists often affirm that God doesn't have any relation to the world without qualifying that they mean a _real_ relation.
I think it's important to recall that the important doctrine "whatever is not God is created by God" stems from things having an act of existence distinct from their essence - and only a pure act of existence could cause them. But abstracta do not have any act of existence, for they have only a conceptual existence; their being is merely their "being thought about" by an intellect. As such, I don't see why Classical Theism would entail their being created or brought into being by God.
Anyways, those are just a couple of thoughts I had. Really enjoying these videos.
Wonderful question!!!
~
You write:
“Wait, you say that the Augustinian Proof is incompatible with Simplicity, because abstracta would be both intrinsic to and distinct from God. But, by my understanding, abstracta exist within God only conceptually rather than really - just like how God's relation to the world exists conceptually rather than really - and surely when Classical Theists state "whatever is in God is God" they're talking about real, extra-mental attributes and predicates, no? It may be analogous to how Classical Theists often affirm that God doesn't have any relation to the world without qualifying that they mean a real relation.”
This is a valuable point. At least in the context of Feser’s Augustinian proof, however, I don’t think this is available to Feser.
(1) First, it’s not quite clear to me what the distinction between ‘conceptual existence’ and ‘real existence’ is supposed to amount to.
When it comes to real relations, many CTists will say that creatures stand in a real relation to God, but the only relations God bears to creatures are in *our own minds*-i.e. in how we cognize, grasp, represent, conceive, etc.
But that can’t be what we mean when it comes to abstracta. For then we merely have human conceptualism-something Feser argued against. It also contravenes the *necessity* of abstracta, something Feser argued for.
But perhaps we simply mean that abstracta exist as concepts in *God’s* mind rather than in how *our minds* grasp or represent or cognize or conceive of God. But then we are right back to the original problem: there are more than one such concepts; and they are within God; and they are distinct from God. If we say that there aren’t more than one such concepts, then-since, ex hypothesi, abstracta *just are* the concepts in question-there aren’t more than one abstracta. And this contradicts not only Feser’s own reasoning that there are infinitely many such abstracta, but also just a fundamental datum any realist theory must account for [namely, there being more than one universal, or more than one shape, or more than one number, etc.].
(2) Second, we need to recognize that Feser argues that these things (propositions, mathematical objects, possible world, universals, etc.) *really exist*. They are in reality just as much as tables and chairs and particles and people are. In fact, they not only exist; Feser argues that they *necessarily exist*. So it certainly isn’t ‘conceptual existence’ in the sense that there is nothing in God corresponding to these things but only in how we *cognize* or *represent* or *conceive* of God. But maybe you mean ‘conceptual existence’ in the sense that they don’t really exist in God’s mind, an God only has one concept, but there are (?) infinitely many *intentional objects* of that concept that correspond to the infinitely many abstracta. But there are two problems with this: (i) the problem merely re-arises: for we can ask, “are there such things as these ‘intentional objects’? If there are-that is, if they exist-then there exist things within God but distinct from God, contra DDS. But if there aren’t such things as these intentional objects, then we’ve merely adopted anti-realism about abstracta rather than realism. And Feser was supposed to be giving us a realist theory; (ii) if abstracta are merely intentional objects, then it seems that nothing distinguishes them from Santa, unicorns, pegasus, Harry Potter, and so on. But any realist view should be able to distinguish universals like ‘redness’ and numbers like the number ‘2’ from things like unicorns and Santa Claus.
(3) Third, these things must *really exist* in order for them to serve the explanatory roles for which Feser employs them. Things with mere conceptual existence like Santa Claus and unicorns surely cannot *explain* objective resemblance among mind-independent particulars, abstract reference and quantification in mathematics and logic and whatnot, and so on. Consider: CTists don’t want to say that the relations God stands in to creatures *explain* why creatures exist. Why? Because they don’t really exist so as to explain anything! Instead, they say that *God* is what explains them.
(4) Finally, I have responded to Rob Koons and Dwight Stanislaw making a very similar (if not the same) point as yours, in case you’re curious! :) Just click on link and do command F search for “Rob Koons echoes” majestyofreason.wordpress.com/2020/04/01/a-plethora-problems-reconsidered-discussing-classical-theism/
At 41:45 you say that it is a non-sequitur to say that if God is distinct from His nature then it is possible that God’s nature be instantiated by different beings. But this charge seems untrue. If God were not identical with His nature, then there would be composition in God (God’s nature+whatever is differentiating God from His nature). This cries out for a cause. You’ve then just got the problem of universals, but for God. For the same reason that in man (man not being identical with his nature), the universal of man can be instantiated in many men, the universal of God (if we were to assume God was not identical to His nature) could be instantiated in different deities. You can’t accept the first without accepting the second-therefore it is not a non-sequitur.
God is perfect. There cannot be more than one perfect being, since ‘essentially being the source of anything apart from oneself, if such things are to exist’ is a perfection, and a perfect being has every perfection. But there cannot be two things that are the source of everything apart from themselves, since then they would be the source of each other, which is a vicious explanatory circle. So, there can only be one perfect thing. And this is true regardless of whether the perfect thing is distinct from its nature, since the argument is based on the very nature of perfection, not on anything about identity or distinctness from nature. And so it is, indeed, a non-sequitur: from God’s being distinct from God’s nature, it clearly doesn’t follow that there could be more than one God.
I think I see now why you say it’s a non-sequitur, in that context, but I still think it is nonetheless necessary that God is one with His nature due to the doctrine of divine simplicity and God’s aseity, and that this ties in with perfection. Because if God were not one with His nature then He would not be simple (definitionally). That lack of simplicity would be an imperfection, and so a god distinct from his nature could not be perfect. If a god distinct from its nature is imperfect, then I don’t see how it could be argued that there would necessarily be only one “perfect being that is not one with its nature” because that’s essentially saying “a perfect being that is imperfect” which is a contradiction.
Edit: Furthermore, I do not see how it could be said that a god distinct from its nature, being non-simple, “essentially is the source of all things apart from itself” if it is itself caused per se by its component parts (its nature, and whatever distinguishes it from its nature).
Sorry that this is rather sloppily worded. I am typing this on the fly
@@carsonianthegreat4672 Thanks for the comment! The non-classical theist would deny that simplicity is a perfection. [Indeed, they would say that simplicity is an imperfection, since it is impossible by their lights.] Second, I think your edit assumes that things are caused per se by their parts. But non-classical theists reject this. *God* grounds God's parts and so isn't caused by them in any sense. This is whole-to-part grounding and is a perfectly defensible notion both in contemporary philosophy and finds a happy home in many Aristotelian views of substances. For more on it, see Baddorf's (2016) article in Sophia and Greg Fowler's (2015) article "Simplicity or Priority?"
@@MajestyofReason I think that to deny simplicity as a perfection is an unsupported action, as the claim that absolute divine simplicity is a perfection is just as reasonable as to say that aseity is a perfection (as you have done).
And I think Baddorf in particular errs when he quotes Hegel in defending Aristotelian notions of whole-to-part grounding. He seems to be saying that because the limbs of an animal are posterior to the form of the animal, that they are grounded in the whole. But this is an equivocation. The animal might ground the parts in their form, but not in their actual being. A leg-less dog might less perfectly instantiate dog-ness, but that is not the same as saying the dog’s being isn’t posterior to its composition. To be a dog is to be a composite of both the form of a dog and the matter of a dog. To say that the matter is grounded in a dog’s existence is nonsensical
fardaus