As a result, the story that Blücher believed he had been impregnated with an elephant by a French soldier became famous. The problem is, Blücher wasn't being literal and had simply directly translated a common German idiom into French. The fact that this was a metaphorical way of speaking was lost on the Duke, and most other English speakers at the time, and was taken at face value. You see, the phrase "to be pregnant with an elephant by X" in German at the time simply meant that "X" was giving a person a problem, difficulty, or headache. What Blücher had done was made a joke; he had essentially said, "The French gave me such a headache. Can you believe it, French soldiers giving ME a headache?!" This anecdote, shared by Britain's greatest living national hero, combined with Blücher's eccentric behavior, history of depressive breakdowns, and bedraggled and excited appearance on the field at Waterloo combined to give the old Field Marshal a reputation for madness that simply wasn't true.
You honestly expect me to believe a German, a Prussian no less, was making a joke?! Joking aside though, it did always seem a strange thing to me, as their was no other signs of madness. That's a cool story though, I'm certain I'l use that in the future!
Interesting that you mentioned the mobilisation of the Austrian & Russian forces. Reminded me of an article I read many years ago about a post Waterloo action fought against the Austrians by forces under Rapp. 30 years on I must confess the details (beyond it being essentially a delaying action) rather escape me. I do however remember my surprise at the revelation of actions on other fronts in 1815.
Most people know Napoleon lost due to deploying his tanks piecemeal, failing to use close air support and his lack of cluster bombs. Wellington's secret weapon was the English longbow and a contingent of Balearic slingers. Blucher had his horse land on top of him but a few drafts of brandy and he was ready to fight again. Some of these statements may or may not be true, read at your own risk.
it really does make one wonder whether Napoleon was simply bitter that he had been forced to surrender the year before without being able to give battle and go out in a blaze of glory and wanted that opportunity and no more. On the oher hand I think the line from Sharpe's Waterloo about the british wanting a chance to beat old Boney must have been a sentiment held by most the army remembering the retreat from Corunna and gaining newfound pride in the Peninsula.
@@peterwebb8732 They retreated because the French were beating them. Stop being a fan boy. The British military was not up to the task of beating the grande armee in 1808, and ran away. People like you also think Dunkirk was a victory
Reason no 6 Dutch Belgians! Stubborn resistance and holding the ground at Quatre Bras before the British re-enforced prevented heavy Prussian loss at Ligny and enabled Waterloo to happen. Also initially held onto Hougomont and helped beat the old Guard at Waterloo. Re point 3 Napoleon was fighting to sue for peace, beating The British would have dramatic consequences for the campaign. Would the Austrians see an advantage in a broken Prussian army to make short term peace? I think all armies were war weary. Napoleon might have been persuaded to cement his legacy had Russia marched on Paris. Napoleon’s strategic ambition was to take Brussels garner support from old allies and protect the French boarders. Once this and his legacy been established might he have wanted a period of peace? Maybe not 😉
I think he probably would, but only for a while. That is one of the questions I've never really been able to satisfactorily answer...why did Napomeon go to war?! 🤣 its perhaps too big a topic here, but I suspect if he took Brussels and peace was achieved (I don't think it would have been), I suspect it would only have been temporary for him to rebuild his forces
The Old Guard was directly involved in fighting at Waterloo in only one operation, namely at Plancenoit against the Prussians where the Guard was defeated. On Wellington's front line only the Middle Guard attacked, while there the Old Guard was only on standby behind it. 'Would the Austrians see an advantage in a defeated Prussian army in order to make peace in the short term?' To close the knowledge gap: The largest part of the Prussian army in 1815 was not in Waterloo, but in Prussia! At this point, the army had already grown to at least 250,000 men, with the better quality troops still in Prussia. Napoleon wouldn't have allowed himself to be persuaded to do anything. that didn't work in 1814, before he was defeated. There were enough offers from the Allies back then, and in 1815 it was even more pointless, especially since he completely misjudged his situation. Just this incredibly stupid idea of his to return to France while the Congress of Vienna was still in session! ;-) He should have been aware of how quickly a coalition would form against him, and how the troops that had previously occupied France would simply turn around on their way back home to stop him. At the latest when the Allies declared war on him personally, and not on France, it was clear that he no longer had any future.
We are always told about the deluge the night before. But it is not emphasised enough in my opinion. Napoleon's men had been marching most of the night in the rain in sodden clothing over muddy trails already churned up by Wellington's men before them. Most had not eaten for 48 hours, would not get breakfast because the supply train was still working its way through the mud. I think when Napoleon woke that morning, seeing that bold maneuver would be impossible, immediately recognising the strength of Wellington's position and all the force multipliers it had, and the condition of his own men, his moral cratered. He put up a show of bravado in front of his very shaky officers that morning; his angry jibe about the "sepoy general" is so telling, but his sluggishness during the battle is a reflection of the sluggish nature of the battle itself. I think in his confidence broke and he just let events take their course.
I believe the number 1 asset of the allies was the good communication between Wellington and Blücher, they were able to converge on Napoleon at Waterloo, and as i insist on pointing out (because I’m a Napoleon fanboy) the British centre was buckling and when Wellington withdrew his army to just behind the hill, the French cavalry charged to force the British into squares to stop Wellingtons army reforming properly. The plan was to then send in infantry reserves to decimate the squatted, however it was at this point all reserves were directed to face the Prussians. Ney kept charging to try and buy time but ultimately this destroyed the French cavalry. I believe if the allies didn’t coordinate and converge at Waterloo, there is a good chance Napoleon would have taken the field gassing Wellington in a close style victory such as Wagram. Given the fact Wellington said ‘it was the nearest damn run thing I’ve ever seen in my life’ shows how close a call it was even WITH Prussian support. Take that away and I don’t see the allied centre holding.
"Given that Wellington said "It was the closest damn thing I ever saw in my life" shows how close it was even WITH Prussian support. If you take that away, I don't see the Allied center holding out! " It was only "close" for Wellington, whose ranks were on the verge of collapse, even though he was already being directly supported by the Prussians at this point, after General Ziethen, contrary to the orders he had received from Blücher, based on the war situation and at the request of the Prussians Liaison officer Müffling on Wellington's staff, decided to occupy Wellington's left wing so that Wellington could then withdraw his own troops there and thus strengthen his center. In the end, Napoleon could have won in Wellington's center and nothing would have changed his defeat. At the end of the battle, 50,000 Prussian soldiers were involved, and another 30,000 were still on the way from Wavre to Waterloo. The Prussians still had more artillery than the French, but above all a large majority of cavalry, and while the French were slowly running out of ammunition, the Prussians had more than enough of that too.
The 1st Division, only had two Brigades, of two Guards Regiments each. Total strength 5000, under Cooke in 1815. It was the only Division that was not mixed.
According to the Nafziger order of battle it was. Its possible that the division was split with the militia being separated off on the battlefield? www.napoleon-series.org/nafzigger/815FBF.pdf
In all the other divisions yes, except the strict Dutch/Belgians Div in the 1st corps. They were in the same corps as the Guard. In the Pinnisula the Guards were Brigaded with KGL. Love your channel.
I would describe Waterloo as a pyrrhic Allied victory. Whilst the Armee du Nord may not have been France's best army it was good enough to beat Prussia's best at Ligny and push back the Anglo-Allies at Quatre Bras. Do you think the real issue was that the French army had no depth - so no significant reserve? Naploleon's impetus was lost with Grouchy's absence? It was an all or nothing campaign with no possible margin for error? Every effort was potentially their last.
That's a good point. At his best, Napoleon had foxed the enemy in place while marching around them with another corps surrounding thrm, and he didn't have the opportunity to do that here. By having no reserve, his army were probably in pretty rough shape after the hard fought battle of Ligny
“Phyrric” is probably the wrong term. The Allies won, finally and completely, and their casualties were not disproportionate. They did not need to fight again, hence they were in no danger of being worn down over an extended campaign.
The best Prussian army with the most Line and guard regiments were still in Prussia! Blücher only led about 50% of the army. The French victory at Ligny cost the Prussians 16,000 men, but the French also 12,000 soldiers, and could only be achieved with the crowbar by Napoleon sending his old guard into battle. The onset of night prevented further confrontation and the Prussians withdrew in a relatively orderly manner.
@@peterwebb8732 What? But the war was far from over after Waterloo ! A few more battles had to be fought before the Prussians finally marched victoriously into Paris. This can easily be overlooked, as Wellington and his troops hardly played a role ;-)
@@raka522 ….. Not quite. The Anglo-Dutch and the Prussian Armies advanced almost simultaneously, Wellington’s men being delayed 24hrs due to the state if the army after fighting most of the day at Waterloo. They affected a juncture before Blucher’s men entered Paris from the most advantageous side. The “Battles” you refer to are better considered heavy skirmishes. One Prussian cavalry brigade was quite cut up and the French lost several thousand prisoners. French morale was very low and reinforcements barely made up the numbers lost to desertion. The rest was taking fortifications….. nothing that could be considered a major action likely to change the course of the campaign.
Thank you! Great content, as ever. I think that you are right when talking the strategic perspective in consideration. I do not think that Napoleons empire would have lasted in the long run anyway. In that way it was just a matter of time and Waterloo happened to be the end. However, I don’t think that Napoleon and the French lacked confidence in believing that they could win. Of course they believed in victory otherwise they would not have continued. I think it is easy to be blinded by that we know what actually happened. Even if the allies would not have thought that they could loose , the prussians still did at Ligny. And the French could have won the Waterloo battle as well, but we know they didnt. Looking at Napoleons quite recent track record of 1814 it shows that he still had it in him. He didn’t have that great marshals to support him at that time either but still managed to out manouvre several oponents and beat them one by one. At that time politiks got in the way, so to speak.
Napoleon had his faults. He was warned regarding the superior quality of the British infantry, and chose to disregard the information. He failed to choose and properly mentor more good Marshals. …. and if Grouchy chose to obey explicit orders instead of marching to the sound of the guns, who taught him that it was best to do that?
Of course all have their faults. And I think you are missing the point. My comment was about Napoleons and the French supposedely lack of confindence in that they could win. I think it is self evident that they could have won and I think that they had good reasons to have such perceptions, given Napoleons track record. Napoleon had succeseeded several times with less trained infantry from 1813 and onwards, so even if the british infantry would have been better trained he wouldnt have any reason to back off. The French could have won the battle (if I remember properly even Wellington thought so) but I think that they would have lost the war in the long run.
Ive read an article saying that Davout was left in Paris because his relation with Napoleon deteriorated over the years. So in my opinion it was more like 'Napoleons ego was too big' rather than 'He expected to lose'. In a sense it was a bit like what happened with Murat. I get that he literally betrayed Napoleon, but he was a more than competent cavalry commander. He could have used his abilities and then find a way or a reason to subtly get rid of him If you want to read the article, and i strongly suggest it because it was extremely interesting, you could google 'Davout and Napoleon: A Study of Their Personal Relationship By John Gallaher'. The website is called the napoleon series. I would place a link but I cant.
Wellington’s correspondence from the Peninsula includes some very strong complaint and criticism regarding some of the officers foisted upon him due to their personal and political connections. Both by the British Government and the Spaniards. By Waterloo, it seems likely that he had enough clout of his own to do something about that. Given the degree to which Napoleon-romantics wish to blame Boney’s Marshals for the French loss, I’m not sure we can say the same thing about them, or Boney’s ability to choose and mentor his officers. Counter to your narrative that Napoleon was pessimistic, is an account that on the evening prior to Waterloo, Boney was warned by one of his Peninsular officers that the British infantry was superior to any that Boney had yet faced. Boney responded that the battle would be “a picnic”. I think it more likely that Boney had too much faith in his own legend. He believed his own press.
Bonaparte had pushed the British out of Spain before he left to go off to invade Russia so I see no reason why he would have thought the British were impossible to beat. In any case Napoleon knew that the French govt, if not the people were brittle and would not accept a long war. His best Marshalls, Davout and Murat were not present. Davout had consistently defeated the Prussians and would very likely not have dithered at Ligny, as D’Erlon did. Grouchy was a reluctant appointment, and replaced the disgraced Murat. Just those two changes would have made the 100 days a completely more precarious affair for the Allies.
@@minot.8931 … Napoleon entered Spain with over 280,000 men. The British had around 30,000 and still managed to defeat French forces at Corunna, before embarking. Under Wellington, the British had a string of victories against the French. All of this had been reported to Napoleon, so he had no excuse for dismissing the reports of his own officers, except hubris. The French Peninsular veterans did NOT tell Boney that theEnglish were “impossible to defeat”, but that their infantry was of exceptionally high quality. Boney misjudged and you can drop the straw-man invented to excuse him. On the subject of Boney’s Marshals. He knew what they were like, chose to place them in vital command posts, and did not manage their weaknesses accordingly. Boney chose them. Boney kept them there. Again, it is a commander’s responsibility to ensure that his orders to his subordinates are clear, unambiguous and fit for purpose. You can talk all you like about his “best” Marshals not being there, but the truth remains that Napoleon was the man who failed to either bring them, or to raise up suitable replacements. Grouchy appears to have received explicit verbal orders, followed by vague written orders which he seems to have accepted as advice, rather than as counter-orders . In his mind, the explicit directions from his Emperor were still in force and he was pursuing the Prussians as ordered. By the time the sound of the guns at Waterloo was heard, he was twice as far from Napoleon as Blucher was from Wellington. Blucher knew exactly what he was trying to do and had enough men to delegate a force to stand off Grouchy while still attacking Napoleon with two Corps. Had Napoleon not been slow to allocate forces to follow up the Prussians after Ligny, Grouchy would have been in less doubt as to their direction and intentions. Arguably, he was the wrong man in the wrong position…. and Napoleon put him there.
@@minot.8931 Napoleon actually invaded Russia 2/12 years later. He did however fight the Austrians in 1809. He thought he had done enough in Spain and left the Chase to Marshal Soult, who was defeated instead at Corunna by Moore's army.
They have rules in Albion Triumphant volume 2 I believe. There are a few companies that make them, Perry and Fromt Rank would ne my choice, but Eagle miniatures are much cheaper. For me, probably Front Rank
I was deep thinking after watching and went through some scenarios( of what i knew of the big day as a amateur historian ) Could Bonny have won and what would have happened ? But then it was occurring to me, at what stage could you say the French had the upper hand at Waterloo? I cannot answer that as most key events of the day were not enough . Well apart from taking La Haye Sainte.
It would have been a miracle if Napoleon had won! Even if Napoleon had defeated Wellington, his forces and especially his ammunition supplies would no longer have been sufficient to withstand the Prussians.
I went off Nafziger's Order of Battle. He puts the 3rd Hanoverian brigade in with the guards division. I'm certainly no expert on Waterloo so I took him at his word
You keep insisting the Prussian army of 1815 was the best, yet they literally lost every solo engagement against the French in the 100 days campaign, who, as you said yourself, were a rag tag poor quality army at this point. I can see why you praise the Prussians, they would go on to be the best and this was the nucleus, but still they were bested at all engagements by the French in the 100 days. Also Wellington performed very very good and Napoleon performed badly, yet it was still a ‘damn close run thing’ and that’s even WITH Prussian support. Great video btw I just disagree on some points
If the Prussians were so bad and lost all their battles against the French, can you probably explain to everyone here how it was possible that it was Prussia, and not Wellington's men, who defeated France and victorious in Paris forced France's to surrender?
When you say British I assume you are talking about the approximately 28,000 soldiers who were not Allies i.e. Dutch Belgians, etc But you need to exclude the approximately 8,500 Irish were in that "British" army, including Wellington himself
The reason I never mention the Irish distinctly as at the time they were all British. I did however do a 4 part series on Napoleon's Irish Regiment which you might enjoy
I’d disagree in this context, as the Irish, like the Scottish or even Welsh battalions, were a direct part of the British army, the other (allied) components were raised/served different entities but fought under wellington’s command.
The British were only about 27,000 soldiers out of Wellington's 68,000 men. Then came the approximately 18,000 Dutch people, and the rest were mostly Germans from various countries. When the Prussians all appeared on the ground, German was the most spoken language on the battlefield 😎
As a result, the story that Blücher believed he had been impregnated with an elephant by a French soldier became famous. The problem is, Blücher wasn't being literal and had simply directly translated a common German idiom into French. The fact that this was a metaphorical way of speaking was lost on the Duke, and most other English speakers at the time, and was taken at face value.
You see, the phrase "to be pregnant with an elephant by X" in German at the time simply meant that "X" was giving a person a problem, difficulty, or headache. What Blücher had done was made a joke; he had essentially said, "The French gave me such a headache. Can you believe it, French soldiers giving ME a headache?!" This anecdote, shared by Britain's greatest living national hero, combined with Blücher's eccentric behavior, history of depressive breakdowns, and bedraggled and excited appearance on the field at Waterloo combined to give the old Field Marshal a reputation for madness that simply wasn't true.
You honestly expect me to believe a German, a Prussian no less, was making a joke?!
Joking aside though, it did always seem a strange thing to me, as their was no other signs of madness. That's a cool story though, I'm certain I'l use that in the future!
That must be a really outdated idiom
Missed opportunity of no.1 being the cavalry commander failed his order roll and Ney decided to use the c and c reroll and rolled a double 6 🤣
Yes!
Ha "Hard on for the Dutch Belgians" cracked me up even though I actually have an army of them for the 100 days campaign.. 😂
Haha, they are a cool army tbf!
Interesting that you mentioned the mobilisation of the Austrian & Russian forces. Reminded me of an article I read many years ago about a post Waterloo action fought against the Austrians by forces under Rapp. 30 years on I must confess the details (beyond it being essentially a delaying action) rather escape me. I do however remember my surprise at the revelation of actions on other fronts in 1815.
La Souffel
@@richiehall3042 cheers for that 👍
An excellent analysis. Well done.
Most people know Napoleon lost due to deploying his tanks piecemeal, failing to use close air support and his lack of cluster bombs. Wellington's secret weapon was the English longbow and a contingent of Balearic slingers. Blucher had his horse land on top of him but a few drafts of brandy and he was ready to fight again. Some of these statements may or may not be true, read at your own risk.
it really does make one wonder whether Napoleon was simply bitter that he had been forced to surrender the year before without being able to give battle and go out in a blaze of glory and wanted that opportunity and no more. On the oher hand I think the line from Sharpe's Waterloo about the british wanting a chance to beat old Boney must have been a sentiment held by most the army remembering the retreat from Corunna and gaining newfound pride in the Peninsula.
Retreat TO Corunna, surely.
At which point they beat the French before embarking.
@@peterwebb8732
They retreated because the French were beating them. Stop being a fan boy. The British military was not up to the task of beating the grande armee in 1808, and ran away. People like you also think Dunkirk was a victory
Always great content 🎉
You forgot, the secret weapon, Sharpe!
Where is your review video on Ridley Scott's "Napoleon"?
Reason no 6 Dutch Belgians! Stubborn resistance and holding the ground at Quatre Bras before the British re-enforced prevented heavy Prussian loss at Ligny and enabled Waterloo to happen. Also initially held onto Hougomont and helped beat the old Guard at Waterloo.
Re point 3 Napoleon was fighting to sue for peace, beating The British would have dramatic consequences for the campaign. Would the Austrians see an advantage in a broken Prussian army to make short term peace? I think all armies were war weary. Napoleon might have been persuaded to cement his legacy had Russia marched on Paris. Napoleon’s strategic ambition was to take Brussels garner support from old allies and protect the French boarders. Once this and his legacy been established might he have wanted a period of peace? Maybe not 😉
I think he probably would, but only for a while. That is one of the questions I've never really been able to satisfactorily answer...why did Napomeon go to war?! 🤣 its perhaps too big a topic here, but I suspect if he took Brussels and peace was achieved (I don't think it would have been), I suspect it would only have been temporary for him to rebuild his forces
The Old Guard was directly involved in fighting at Waterloo in only one operation, namely at Plancenoit against the Prussians where the Guard was defeated.
On Wellington's front line only the Middle Guard attacked, while there the Old Guard was only on standby behind it.
'Would the Austrians see an advantage in a defeated Prussian army in order to make peace in the short term?'
To close the knowledge gap: The largest part of the Prussian army in 1815 was not in Waterloo, but in Prussia!
At this point, the army had already grown to at least 250,000 men, with the better quality troops still in Prussia.
Napoleon wouldn't have allowed himself to be persuaded to do anything. that didn't work in 1814, before he was defeated. There were enough offers from the Allies back then, and in 1815 it was even more pointless, especially since he completely misjudged his situation.
Just this incredibly stupid idea of his to return to France while the Congress of Vienna was still in session! ;-)
He should have been aware of how quickly a coalition would form against him, and how the troops that had previously occupied France would simply turn around on their way back home to stop him.
At the latest when the Allies declared war on him personally, and not on France, it was clear that he no longer had any future.
We are always told about the deluge the night before. But it is not emphasised enough in my opinion. Napoleon's men had been marching most of the night in the rain in sodden clothing over muddy trails already churned up by Wellington's men before them. Most had not eaten for 48 hours, would not get breakfast because the supply train was still working its way through the mud. I think when Napoleon woke that morning, seeing that bold maneuver would be impossible, immediately recognising the strength of Wellington's position and all the force multipliers it had, and the condition of his own men, his moral cratered. He put up a show of bravado in front of his very shaky officers that morning; his angry jibe about the "sepoy general" is so telling, but his sluggishness during the battle is a reflection of the sluggish nature of the battle itself. I think in his confidence broke and he just let events take their course.
I believe the number 1 asset of the allies was the good communication between Wellington and Blücher, they were able to converge on Napoleon at Waterloo, and as i insist on pointing out (because I’m a Napoleon fanboy) the British centre was buckling and when Wellington withdrew his army to just behind the hill, the French cavalry charged to force the British into squares to stop Wellingtons army reforming properly. The plan was to then send in infantry reserves to decimate the squatted, however it was at this point all reserves were directed to face the Prussians. Ney kept charging to try and buy time but ultimately this destroyed the French cavalry. I believe if the allies didn’t coordinate and converge at Waterloo, there is a good chance Napoleon would have taken the field gassing Wellington in a close style victory such as Wagram. Given the fact Wellington said ‘it was the nearest damn run thing I’ve ever seen in my life’ shows how close a call it was even WITH Prussian support. Take that away and I don’t see the allied centre holding.
"Given that Wellington said "It was the closest damn thing I ever saw in my life" shows how close it was even WITH Prussian support. If you take that away, I don't see the Allied center holding out! "
It was only "close" for Wellington, whose ranks were on the verge of collapse, even though he was already being directly supported by the Prussians at this point, after General Ziethen, contrary to the orders he had received from Blücher, based on the war situation and at the request of the Prussians Liaison officer Müffling on Wellington's staff, decided to occupy Wellington's left wing so that Wellington could then withdraw his own troops there and thus strengthen his center.
In the end, Napoleon could have won in Wellington's center and nothing would have changed his defeat.
At the end of the battle, 50,000 Prussian soldiers were involved, and another 30,000 were still on the way from Wavre to Waterloo.
The Prussians still had more artillery than the French, but above all a large majority of cavalry, and while the French were slowly running out of ammunition, the Prussians had more than enough of that too.
The 1st Division, only had two Brigades, of two Guards Regiments each. Total strength 5000, under Cooke in 1815. It was the only Division that was not mixed.
According to the Nafziger order of battle it was. Its possible that the division was split with the militia being separated off on the battlefield? www.napoleon-series.org/nafzigger/815FBF.pdf
In all the other divisions yes, except the strict Dutch/Belgians Div in the 1st corps. They were in the same corps as the Guard. In the Pinnisula the Guards were Brigaded with KGL. Love your channel.
I would describe Waterloo as a pyrrhic Allied victory. Whilst the Armee du Nord may not have been France's best army it was good enough to beat Prussia's best at Ligny and push back the Anglo-Allies at Quatre Bras. Do you think the real issue was that the French army had no depth - so no significant reserve? Naploleon's impetus was lost with Grouchy's absence? It was an all or nothing campaign with no possible margin for error? Every effort was potentially their last.
That's a good point. At his best, Napoleon had foxed the enemy in place while marching around them with another corps surrounding thrm, and he didn't have the opportunity to do that here. By having no reserve, his army were probably in pretty rough shape after the hard fought battle of Ligny
“Phyrric” is probably the wrong term. The Allies won, finally and completely, and their casualties were not disproportionate.
They did not need to fight again, hence they were in no danger of being worn down over an extended campaign.
The best Prussian army with the most Line and guard regiments were still in Prussia!
Blücher only led about 50% of the army.
The French victory at Ligny cost the Prussians 16,000 men, but the French also 12,000 soldiers, and could only be achieved with the crowbar by Napoleon sending his old guard into battle.
The onset of night prevented further confrontation and the Prussians withdrew in a relatively orderly manner.
@@peterwebb8732 What?
But the war was far from over after Waterloo !
A few more battles had to be fought before the Prussians finally marched victoriously into Paris.
This can easily be overlooked, as Wellington and his troops hardly played a role ;-)
@@raka522 ….. Not quite.
The Anglo-Dutch and the Prussian Armies advanced almost simultaneously, Wellington’s men being delayed 24hrs due to the state if the army after fighting most of the day at Waterloo. They affected a juncture before Blucher’s men entered Paris from the most advantageous side.
The “Battles” you refer to are better considered heavy skirmishes. One Prussian cavalry brigade was quite cut up and the French lost several thousand prisoners. French morale was very low and reinforcements barely made up the numbers lost to desertion. The rest was taking fortifications….. nothing that could be considered a major action likely to change the course of the campaign.
If you haven't already Mercer's account is highly recommended. Interesting video. Thanks!
I have! In fact I did a short where I read an extract! You're right, it's superb
Thank you! Great content, as ever. I think that you are right when talking the strategic perspective in consideration. I do not think that Napoleons empire would have lasted in the long run anyway. In that way it was just a matter of time and Waterloo happened to be the end. However, I don’t think that Napoleon and the French lacked confidence in believing that they could win. Of course they believed in victory otherwise they would not have continued. I think it is easy to be blinded by that we know what actually happened. Even if the allies would not have thought that they could loose , the prussians still did at Ligny. And the French could have won the Waterloo battle as well, but we know they didnt. Looking at Napoleons quite recent track record of 1814 it shows that he still had it in him. He didn’t have that great marshals to support him at that time either but still managed to out manouvre several oponents and beat them one by one. At that time politiks got in the way, so to speak.
Napoleon had his faults.
He was warned regarding the superior quality of the British infantry, and chose to disregard the information.
He failed to choose and properly mentor more good Marshals.
…. and if Grouchy chose to obey explicit orders instead of marching to the sound of the guns, who taught him that it was best to do that?
Of course all have their faults. And I think you are missing the point. My comment was about Napoleons and the French supposedely lack of confindence in that they could win. I think it is self evident that they could have won and I think that they had good reasons to have such perceptions, given Napoleons track record. Napoleon had succeseeded several times with less trained infantry from 1813 and onwards, so even if the british infantry would have been better trained he wouldnt have any reason to back off. The French could have won the battle (if I remember properly even Wellington thought so) but I think that they would have lost the war in the long run.
Ive read an article saying that Davout was left in Paris because his relation with Napoleon deteriorated over the years. So in my opinion it was more like 'Napoleons ego was too big' rather than 'He expected to lose'. In a sense it was a bit like what happened with Murat. I get that he literally betrayed Napoleon, but he was a more than competent cavalry commander. He could have used his abilities and then find a way or a reason to subtly get rid of him
If you want to read the article, and i strongly suggest it because it was extremely interesting, you could google 'Davout and Napoleon: A Study of Their Personal Relationship By John Gallaher'. The website is called the napoleon series. I would place a link but I cant.
I'll take a look. It's certainly more than believable that's why he left Davout at home!
Davout was not commanding an army. He was minister of war.
Wellington’s correspondence from the Peninsula includes some very strong complaint and criticism regarding some of the officers foisted upon him due to their personal and political connections.
Both by the British Government and the Spaniards.
By Waterloo, it seems likely that he had enough clout of his own to do something about that.
Given the degree to which Napoleon-romantics wish to blame Boney’s Marshals for the French loss, I’m not sure we can say the same thing about them, or Boney’s ability to choose and mentor his officers.
Counter to your narrative that Napoleon was pessimistic, is an account that on the evening prior to Waterloo, Boney was warned by one of his Peninsular officers that the British infantry was superior to any that Boney had yet faced. Boney responded that the battle would be “a picnic”. I think it more likely that Boney had too much faith in his own legend. He believed his own press.
Bonaparte had pushed the British out of Spain before he left to go off to invade Russia so I see no reason why he would have thought the British were impossible to beat. In any case Napoleon knew that the French govt, if not the people were brittle and would not accept a long war. His best Marshalls, Davout and Murat were not present. Davout had consistently defeated the Prussians and would very likely not have dithered at Ligny, as D’Erlon did. Grouchy was a reluctant appointment, and replaced the disgraced Murat. Just those two changes would have made the 100 days a completely more precarious affair for the Allies.
@@minot.8931 … Napoleon entered Spain with over 280,000 men. The British had around 30,000 and still managed to defeat French forces at Corunna, before embarking. Under Wellington, the British had a string of victories against the French. All of this had been reported to Napoleon, so he had no excuse for dismissing the reports of his own officers, except hubris.
The French Peninsular veterans did NOT tell Boney that theEnglish were “impossible to defeat”, but that their infantry was of exceptionally high quality. Boney misjudged and you can drop the straw-man invented to excuse him.
On the subject of Boney’s Marshals. He knew what they were like, chose to place them in vital command posts, and did not manage their weaknesses accordingly. Boney chose them. Boney kept them there. Again, it is a commander’s responsibility to ensure that his orders to his subordinates are clear, unambiguous and fit for purpose.
You can talk all you like about his “best” Marshals not being there, but the truth remains that Napoleon was the man who failed to either bring them, or to raise up suitable replacements.
Grouchy appears to have received explicit verbal orders, followed by vague written orders which he seems to have accepted as advice, rather than as counter-orders . In his mind, the explicit directions from his Emperor were still in force and he was pursuing the Prussians as ordered. By the time the sound of the guns at Waterloo was heard, he was twice as far from Napoleon as Blucher was from Wellington. Blucher knew exactly what he was trying to do and had enough men to delegate a force to stand off Grouchy while still attacking Napoleon with two Corps.
Had Napoleon not been slow to allocate forces to follow up the Prussians after Ligny, Grouchy would have been in less doubt as to their direction and intentions.
Arguably, he was the wrong man in the wrong position…. and Napoleon put him there.
@@minot.8931 Napoleon actually invaded Russia 2/12 years later. He did however fight the Austrians in 1809. He thought he had done enough in Spain and left the Chase to Marshal Soult, who was defeated instead at Corunna by Moore's army.
Unrelated to the last question but how would you build a Black Brunswicker army and what nation's rules would they use, Britain or Prussia?
They have rules in Albion Triumphant volume 2 I believe. There are a few companies that make them, Perry and Fromt Rank would ne my choice, but Eagle miniatures are much cheaper. For me, probably Front Rank
I was deep thinking after watching and went through some scenarios( of what i knew of the big day as a amateur historian ) Could Bonny have won and what would have happened ? But then it was occurring to me, at what stage could you say the French had the upper hand at Waterloo? I cannot answer that as most key events of the day were not enough . Well apart from taking La Haye Sainte.
It is a miracle that such a diverse army triumphed over the French.
It would have been a miracle if Napoleon had won!
Even if Napoleon had defeated Wellington, his forces and especially his ammunition supplies would no longer have been sufficient to withstand the Prussians.
@@raka522 I have heard the French side refgurlarly wins in war games
"If time aids thee in victory, he will aid
Thy foe anon to take a full revenge."
Al-Ma'arri
973-1057 CE
Sorry, I believe you are wrong. The first division only had two brigades, and all three foot guards regiments were present
I went off Nafziger's Order of Battle. He puts the 3rd Hanoverian brigade in with the guards division. I'm certainly no expert on Waterloo so I took him at his word
You keep insisting the Prussian army of 1815 was the best, yet they literally lost every solo engagement against the French in the 100 days campaign, who, as you said yourself, were a rag tag poor quality army at this point. I can see why you praise the Prussians, they would go on to be the best and this was the nucleus, but still they were bested at all engagements by the French in the 100 days. Also Wellington performed very very good and Napoleon performed badly, yet it was still a ‘damn close run thing’ and that’s even WITH Prussian support. Great video btw I just disagree on some points
If the Prussians were so bad and lost all their battles against the French, can you probably explain to everyone here how it was possible that it was Prussia, and not Wellington's men, who defeated France and victorious in Paris forced France's to surrender?
When you say British I assume you are talking about the approximately 28,000 soldiers who were not Allies i.e. Dutch Belgians, etc But you need to exclude the approximately 8,500 Irish were in that "British" army, including Wellington himself
I addressed that about 90 seconds in bud ;)
The reason I never mention the Irish distinctly as at the time they were all British. I did however do a 4 part series on Napoleon's Irish Regiment which you might enjoy
@@NapoleonicWargaming Loved them and have watched them several times now
I’d disagree in this context, as the Irish, like the Scottish or even Welsh battalions, were a direct part of the British army, the other (allied) components were raised/served different entities but fought under wellington’s command.
The British were only about 27,000 soldiers out of Wellington's 68,000 men.
Then came the approximately 18,000 Dutch people, and the rest were mostly Germans from various countries.
When the Prussians all appeared on the ground, German was the most spoken language on the battlefield 😎