ฝัง
- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 8 ก.ย. 2015
- This two-dimensional animated reconstruction shows the sequence of events in the accident, which occurred on May 31, 2014, about 2140 Eastern Daylight Time, when a Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation G-IV (N121JM), owned by SK Travel, LLC and operated by Arizin Ventures, LLC, crashed after it overran the end of runway 11 during a rejected takeoff at Laurence G. Hanscom Field, Bedford, Massachusetts.
The sequence of events were reconstructed based on information extracted from the airplane’s flight data recorder (FDR), the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcript, passive multilateration aircraft tracking data, ground scars, damage to airport structures, and aircraft performance data. For the purpose of visibility, the airplane is shown three times larger than actual size relative to the airport surroundings. The animation does not depict the weather or visibility conditions at the time of the accident.
The animated sequence of events is first shown at one-third actual speed and is then shown again at actual speed. The animation includes audio narration.
The animation begins as the airplane turns onto runway 11 at 2139:12 and ends at 2140:23 with the airplane coming to rest in a ravine formed by the Shawsheen River. The end of the animation transitions to two photographs. The first photograph shows the airport lighting, localizer antenna and airport perimeter fence that were struck by the airplane after it overran the runway. The second photograph shows the airplane at final rest in the ravine formed by the Shawsheen River. The airplane was destroyed by a post-crash fire.
In the animation, the upper portion of the screen shows an overhead view of the airplane as it moves down runway 11, across the paved safety area and into the grass. A scale indicates the distance along the runway in feet from the threshold to the end of the pavement. During the animation, red vertical marks and associated text callouts are used to locate specific events. The middle of the screen shows Eastern Daylight Time, airplane speed in knots, and the replay speed of the animation.
The lower left portion of the screen shows selected statements from the CVR transcript as text appearing at the time indicated in the transcript. The statements are attributed to either the Pilot-in-Command (PIC) or the Second-in-Command (SIC).
The lower right portion of the screen depicts selected indicators, which display parameters that were either recorded on the FDR or were calculated using the recorded data. The Engine Pressure Ratio is displayed in the center of the screen; the target Engine Pressure Ratio of 1.7 typically used by the pilots is highlighted with a green horizontal bar. On the far right side of the screen, from top to bottom, indicators shown are for activation of the autothrottle, flight power shutoff valve (FPSOV), brakes and thrust reversers.
Narration (one third speed)
The animation does not depict the night lighting conditions that existed at the time of the accident. Certain system parameters or settings are shown, but these displays are not intended to mimic the actual displays in the cockpit. Selected comments from the CVR transcript attributed to the pilot-in-command (PIC) and second-in command (SIC) appear as text at the time indicated in the transcript, on left side of the display area.
Based on a review of previous takeoff attempts, the flight crew likely targeted an Engine Pressure Ratio setting (or EPR) of 1.7, which is shown with a green horizontal bar. In addition, there are indications for activation of the Auto Throttle, Flight Power Shutoff Valve handle (or FPSOV), brakes, and thrust reversers
Note: Animation is available upon request to Office Record Management Division (CIO-40)
"Hey Bob, we have like five or six indications that the aircraft isn't configured correctly, what should we do?" "Hell Jim, I say we just go for it and sort it later. What could possibly go wrong?" Not to speak ill of those who lost their lives, but what in the hell were they thinking?
I remember the time I took off as a solo student in a J3 Cub with two 2" x 4" boards gust locking the rudder. I made two touch an goes asking myself why I had such limited rudder authority before I landed and taxied back to the FBO to complain. Boy was I startled to see the long red removal ribbon flapping in the breeze, Never missed a check list for the next ten thousand hours.
Gotta complete the take off and landing checklist all the way through every single time
No flight control check, not following checklist. Killed themselves.
Sounds like nice features to prevent a take off if theres something wrong. Very well thought out. Enough to stop it from leaving the ground, but not enough to stop the pilots from trying.
The first B-17 took off from Boeing Field in Seattle with the rudder gust lock in place killing test pilots and crew.
Wow... I guess more than anything, this is a lesson in habituation. Right from the start the PIC had an indication that the rudders were locked in place, which every pilot knows will almost certainly prevent a successful takeoff. In addition, if the person who was supposed to remove the rudder lock didn't remove the rudder lock, then very likely they also didn't remove the elevator lock (and possibly also aileron locks, depending on airplane). It is just amazing to watch the PIC and SIC notice things were wrong, yet
It is easy to get complacent. If folks stopped doing stupid things the NTSB could concentrate on fixing mechanical issues.
There are just so many clues that that something was wrong and so many opportunities to stop the takeoff but they persisted until it was too late. When things are going wrong in aviation they rarely get better but it seems some crews like to keep pushing the envelope. Just a pity they take innocent passengers with them
So sad, yet so preventable
The braking starts about half of the usable runway after V1, like 3000 ft , and like 14 secs after V1...
"Hey captain, looks like we got a bunch of stuff not configured. A ton of warning lights and auto throttles won't function correctly. I say we go ahead, take off and sort it out later.". Captain: "Sounds like a plan. Take your foot and see if you can force the throttles up a little further". Seriously, God bless but what the heck was going through these guys' minds?
Was the narrator at the dentist earlier?
If you reach V1, you
I could/should write a book on all the events I have seen but a few highlights. Watched a Cub get airborne dragging a cynderblock tied to his tail. A Citation in ATL was taxing out with a towbar still hooked to the nose.Fyi its huge. Not holding brakes leading to yanking out ext power. To many wring rnw/taxiway and even wrong airports and incursions to list.
Sad that they lost their lives but the pilots were at fault by not following pre-flight checklists, complacency leads to fatalities.
Why the hell did they leave the lock on and then attempt to rotate?
It' is weird with no lights on....
Many times corporate pilots will do anything to avoid what they perceive as an embarrassment (go around, rejected takeoff, delay for deice, etc). Rather than reject, they try to shut off hydraulics to the flight controls to circumvent the gust lock? Then reject, way too late, when that doesn’t work? Just like the Teterboro Learjet, rather than go around, and admit they messed up, they try to sneak in into the circle and screw that up, luckily without pax or injuries on the ground. Also shows the lack of systems knowledge amongst corporate aviation. They should’ve known what the rudder limit light was telling them, and then should’ve know what it meant when they could’ve advance thrust. This isn’t Monday morning qb this is simple fact. I’ve flown about 7 years in corporate and 15 in the airlines and it is night and day difference.
Can someone familiar with a G-IV tell us what was required to disengage gust locks while rolling?