Q&A-Hypothetically, regardless of any casualties to the Eastern Fleet. How does the IJN go forward with the Battles of Coral Sea and Midway having only CarDivs 1 and 5 making up the Kido Butai?
Why did the Japanese decided that mattresses and similar padding is the best option for splinter protection and never moved past it for something more permanent and less likely to be blown/burned away ?
Could think of half a dozen admirals I would rather have in place of Nagumo in those situations. A nice deep dive would be the details in how Nagumo got command of a naval element that required aggression and intuition.
The IJN was, from its creation, staffed primarily by the members of one or two legacy clans from feudal Japan and their client families. That's probably one reason Nagumo managed to climb as high as he did. Another is probably that, during peacetime (or, at the least, when one isn't fighting an opponent of equal or superior ability), it's often not innovative, aggressive thinking that paves the way to advancement. Instead, a stolid, make-no-waves approach and by-the-book responses that can *always* be defended by quoting doctrine (even if selectively) is what gets officers promoted. Nagumo is a *perfect* example of that. Yes, you occasionally get exceptions that slip through the cracks. Admiral Yamamoto was one such. But he was not only brilliant and innovative, he was also a very skilled political player with the connections at the highest levels to keep his career (and possibly himself) alive when he ruffled too many feathers.
Nagumo was very cautious, Yamamoto wanted to replace him after Pearl Harbour for not launching the 3rd wave. If Somerville had maintained the element of surprise and creamed Carrier Division 2, which is quite possible, Nagumo most likely would have panicked, thought there was a huge task force and land based force out there looking for him. The indecision he showed at Midway would have surfaced. Keep in mind the scenario in Midway was quite similar to the scenario here in Ceylon except it was likely that Somerville would have maintained complete surprise where Spruance was spotted by the Japanese. The night fighting would have been to the Japanese disadvantage and with about 8 hours of darkness to go, if Somerville found the main force he could have landed, rearmed and sent out a second strike against Nagumo and the Japanese would have been helpless because of their lack of radar. Even if the second strike did not do much damage it is dollars to donuts that Nagumo would have hightailed it out of there before daylight to preserve what he had left of his force. Coming home with 3 out of 5 carriers would have been better than what happened at Midway and coming home with no carriers. Nagumo would also likely have been sacked then as opposed to put out to pasture after Midway.
@@christopherreed4723 I think that Ozawa could be considered the best all round Japanese Admiral. One that definitely understood Carrier warfare but that was in comand when it was too late.
My grandfather, Cyril "Charlie " Carr was on the Royal Sovereign at this time. He said he was very happy they didn't run into the Japanese, he knew they didn't stand a chance if things got serious. The R's needed a lot to bring them up to speed. As he put it they "hid at the Andaman Islands " and then got out of the way of danger asap. Grandad gave me a book he found on the attack on Sri Lanka (Ceylon) "The most dangerous moment ". A really informative book on the attack, I still have the copy he gave me 45 years ago. As he handed the book to me he said "I'm in that!". I could hear the price in his voice. He's been gone 21 years this year. Gee I miss him.
I think you may have made a critical error in your assumption that Warspite would come out on the losing end of a tussle with the Kongos. Did you remember to take into consideration her plot armor?
PS - I’ve always loved your what if/alternative history specials. They are very well thought out and take into consideration the vast majority of possible outcomes, mostly just leaving out the “golden bb” scenarios
I think she could take on two at night with her radar, presuming the IJN floatplanes are not up to their night-time tricks like in the Solomons. I also think Drach is right that Nagumo would keep at least two of them back to backstop the rest of the KB.
Warspite signals, before she melees the whole japanese force on it's own: "Steering gear jammed. Full speed ahead. England expects that every man will do his duty." Because everybody on board of Warspite had major case of the main character syndrome.
Is there also plot armour for HMS Enterprise, as she is required to still be in service later in the war to serve in US Admiral Kirk's fleet off Normandy?
Just think of the implications if Warspite caught Hiryu and Soryu; so many future battles (or battles that wouldn’t happen) would be impacted. Maybe Coral Sea doesn’t happen, and now the U.S. Navy has both Lexington, and a very undamaged Yorktown available. The Doolittle Raid would still go off, but would Yamamoto risk trying to ambush now four American fleet carriers with only four of his own? How would the IJN respond to the Guadalcanal invasion with potentially two American carriers at large (and maybe three if you count Wasp and Saratoga in the theater) assuming Fletcher has the same covering force? The ripple effects are mesmerizing.
The carriers would never be in range of the Warspite. Also, the numerical and technical air superiority of the Japanese would prevent that from happening even more.
You’re assuming Warspite ever manages to fire a shot before the Swordfish attacks destroy CarDiv2. Frankly that would be for the best: both sides of WWII already had a massive problem with overestimating their own battleships (and building a combined 29 of them, all of questionable strategic value at best if not outright detrimental to themselves).
@@bkjeong4302 If you really think having battleships in WW2 is detrimental, I invite you to consider what the British strategic situation would have looked like if they scrap/cancel all their battleships pre-war but the Germans and Italians keep theirs. People read about Pacific carrier battles and get carried away imagining naval warfare as something that always takes place across thousands of miles of open ocean with pristine tropical weather, where of course carriers are dominant. The reality was mostly not like that and battleships were massively important.
@@imperium3556 First of all, battleship engagements in the Mediterranean on both sides involved pre-existing old battleships: nobody needed to build anything new like the Littorios or KGVs for those engagements. And even then, a lot of those battles could have been handled by cruisers or airpower (both carriers and land-based). As for Germany…..do take a look at how much of an epic fail the German surface fleet was and how much they sabotaged themselves (more than any other major power of WWII) by building their four (poorly designed) capital ships.
One additional implication: One could argue that losing Lexington was a win for the US navy, since it taught them the lesson to put water in their fuel lines. If they hadn't learned that lesson before Midway, the US carriers might be blown up much like the Japanese carriers there did. (or at least the US carriers hit at Midway would face a much riskier/more serious damage control challenge) I believe the "cover everything in AA guns" report also stems from Coral Sea... So really the US _benefitted_ from losing there, and thus indirectly from the UK losing in the Indian Ocean. The historical changes, had the British done some damage to the Kido Butai near Ceylon and thereby perhaps altered Coral Sea and thereby Midway, could be insanely far-reaching! (of course, Midway was eventually a success by weird/lucky timing from the US, and it all could've gone very different anyways by making much smaller changes to history than anything involving the Indian Ocean or Coral Sea)
The Political implications of Sommerville wiping out carrier division 2 would be incredible, there are major butterflies regarding the US Pacific fleet it's options and doctrine do they try to adopt night fighting etc. There are also major changes regarding Australia after the loss of Singapore the Aussies went super paranoid regarding the Japanese forces and many Aussie politicians pivoted towards the USA as they felt the UK couldn't protect them. This still impacts Aussie politics today. This would arguably be the first major victory over the Japanese by allied forces if carried out by the RN that massively boosts British prestige. This would also have major implications regarding the BPF etc as this would be seen as a Midwayesqe scale victory and would predate it.
@@robruss62 If CarDiv 2 is wiped out, Midway won't happen. Midway was mostly a reaction to the Doolittle Raid, but relied on the expectation that the US carriers would have to come back from the SW Pacific short 2 (Lex & York at Coral Sea), so the ratio of forces was 6 or 4 to 2. If the KB gets a bloody nose and loses 2, you can bet Coral Sea doesn't happen so Midway would be a 4 vs 4 setup. But Yamamoto would have to re-orient to protect the oil-field gains in DEI, so he'd have to base out of Singapore and look toward getting more forward bases to warn about approaches of the Eastern Fleet. He might even pull the KB back to Japan like the BBs and use it as a deep reserve.
@@gregorywright4918 very possible, and if Midway were to happen, would be under different circumstances, apart from carrier ratio of 6-4. Reason Midway might still happen is because Doolittle Raid is April 18th, so assuming Divs 1&5 make it back from Eastern Fleets super Matapan more or less on schedule (whether they detour to hit Trinco on the 9th or not), Yamamoto would likely have the opening to launch some form of AF especially as the now disastrous Operation C wasn't his pet project. Assuming no massive change of Japanese codes, though possibly without Rochefort proving his theory at the dry run of Coral Sea, Nimitz would likely be able to piece together some semblance of Nagumo's strike. Yamamoto would still have enough ships for AF's four main components, and would be able to substitute the unsunk Hosho for one of the bigger light fleet carriers in Hosogaya's force as compensation to deal with the unsunk Lexington. Question is, while one can imagine similar damage being inflicted on KB by Helldiver's, without lessons of Coral Sea, would American carriers have improved damage control? One could imagine Fletcher losing two carriers had the first counter strike hit a less prepared Yorktown or Lexington, and then the second one falling to torpedoes. A loss ratio of 2-1 instead of 4-1 would still make it a clear cut US victory though. Other factor that might benefit Americans, while Hara was a competent admiral he wasn't Yamaguchi, who at this point would be presumably lost with both his carriers off Ceylon. In a more or less concurrent Midway scenario, after losing 3 carriers in five minutes, would Hara have lashed back so forcefully with Shokaku? There might only have been one counterblow instead of two, so the loss ratio might still have been 4-1 anyway.
What I’m really interested is in Somerville managing to get in that radar-equipped Swordfish night strike on the bulk of the Kido Butai, or Nagumo finding Addu Atoll right when the bulk of the Eastern Fleet is there…
@@altanativeftw2625 TBH, though these scenarios would result in a definitive victory for one side I doubt they’d result in one side being annihilated: even with radar and no AA or fighter opposition I doubt Somerville is going to wipe out the entire Kido Butai in one go (though he’s almost certainly sinking one or two Japanese carriers, hopefully the Shokakus though those were pretty tough); and the fact the British carriers actually can scramble fighters in time for it to matter could reduce the effectiveness of an attack against Addu Atoll.
@@opvjg Why? the japanese would still have massive air superiority over the british fleet with superior planes and pilots and numbers. But the japanese would have lost their margin of superiority over the US navy.
@@opvjg If the bulk of the Kido Butai gets attacked, depending on which carrier gets the bulk of the British attention the Japanese probably would still have either Akagi or at least one of their two new superweapon carriers (the Shokakus-and yes, the Shokakus were intended as superweapons in the same vein as the Yamatos, which they were built alongside). Not enough to overwhelm the British, but enough to challenge them given the smaller air group sizes on the British carriers.
For anyone who has the computer game "Carrier Battles 4 Guadalcanal", there is an Operation C scenario as a DLC for wargamers to try to see what happens in all of what's been discussed in this video. (NOTE: This is not intended as an endorsement or promotion of the game, but merely as an FYI for those who might be interested.)
This has always been one of the most interesting counter-factuals for me, especially as the very plausible scenario of losing at least one of Carrier Div 2s ships, if not both, would have huge impacts on the course of the Pacific war; whether the Japanese would even attempt the post-Doolittle raid operations in the Solomons & New Guinea, Midway and the Aleutians go up in the air, or if they do they would be very different. It's an unfortunate artefact of history that the Indian Ocean raid is just a minor footnote in the 'Japanese wiping the floor with everyone December 1941-May 1942 Edition', when it potentially could have ended as a mini-midway.
@@ReichLife very true, but the ultimate effect on the war would have been relatively inconsequential and wouldn't alter the outcome. The material loss of one of, or both, Hiryu and/or Sorry alone, never mind the psychological impact of the loss on Japanese planning for future operations however would've been immense. Even with the total destruction of Somerville's force, it would still have been viewed as a near pyrrhic victory for the IJN. It isn't as though any of those RN fleet units played any significant role in the defeat of Japan aside from being one of dozens of like American ships against an already effectively defeated enemy anyway.
@@JohnSmith-jj2yd It's interesting because this is something that comes up in *Shattered Sword*, the Kido Butai was an absolutely priceless asset that basically carried the fate of Japan's war effort with it. The Indian Ocean raid was not a good use of something that important because it didn't really achieve much in the way of strategic objectives and risked the one thing Japan could not afford to lose. Nagumo gets shit for not being aggressive enough, but he also had the single most valuable military asset in Japan in his hands and being careless with it would be worse than being too careful.
Might even make the IJN rethink the utility of the Soryu/Hiryu/Unryu design lineage if the RN gets a few decent torpedoes into one or both (I'm betting they have a hard time dealing with one, and definitely sink with two or more). Aside from Taiho, that was the historical core of their carrier future when they did not continue building Shokakus. It would also punch a hole in their "victory disease" two months before it was deflated at Midway, causing a reassessment of what they were trying to achieve out there with Kido Butai and probably leading it to become a reserve force like the rest of the capital ships.
@@JohnSmith-jj2yd Thing is, basically any outcome would only help Japanese in hindsight. Full success? They neutralized British threat for full year or two. Loss of 2nd division and some surface escort? Far less possible then they would go with Midway operation, which means no battle in which allies trade mere 1 carrier against 4. US push in later part of 1942 could go drastically different if Japan had 2 more fleet carriers then from 1st division.
One other interesting tidbit about the 2b and 2c scenarios. If Nagumo sends any or all of the Kongos to investigate/counterattack, the senior surface admiral and thus the commander of that engagement on the Japanese side would have been the commander of BatDiv 3 - VAdm Gunichi Mikawa, the historical victor of Savo Island. Obviously he would have been up against much tougher opposition in these hypotheticals, but we at least know that the Japanese surface forces would have been led by a skilled night surface commander in those cases. Love this exploration of the hypotheticals. :)
Very informative. The actions that take place between the Royal Navy and IJN tend to get lost between Pearl Harbor and Coral Sea, and over shadowed by Midway. If you ever find the time for an another alternative history, I think a great "what if" would be: what if Tirpitz had actually made a run for PQ-13 in Operation Rosselsprung and risked facing Duke of York and Washington.
There is no question there, both of those ships on their own was a match for Tirpitz - especially Washington, whose gunnery was legendary. The two together would blow Tirpitz out of the water.
@@PalleRasmussen Do note that Adm. Lee wasn’t in command of Washington at this point, so her crew quality wouldn’t be at that level (and it should also be remembered that much of Washington’s accuracy at Second Guadalcanal was down to the fact she was shooting from point-blank range and was literally too close to miss). That said, Washington doesn’t really need memetic levels of accuracy to beat Tirpitz entirely by herself since she has significantly more firepower and arguably superior protection (less armour of lower steel quality but it’s in the modern AoN layout). Tirpitz does have speed advantage, but in this scenario she’d have to take the fight to Washington and remain in her effective range anyways.
@@bkjeong4302 it was not Lee that made Washington shoot so well, it was her captain, who was also a gunnery and precision fanatic. Lee only added the final touches. Go watch Unauthorized History of The Pacific's "The Night The Giants Rode", they go in depth with the subject.
Keep em coming Drach, no one is doing the kind of stuff you are doing. Also pls do more table top reenactments(I know they must be immensely tiring and costly) but they offer such a nice image to add perspective to the battle. That and the lovely models.
FYI a full broadside from each of HMS Formidable and HMS Indomitable is 16x 4.5 tubes (all 8 twin mounts). The reason why they are in those slightly raised pillboxes is so they can fire over the deck ...
"Who the heck is going to come out standing at the end of that?" Why am I betting Warspite's rudder jams dodging a torpedo and leading to a lucky salvo that knocks out a Kongo....
One of the things you missed is that in April 1942 the capability of the long lance was totally unexpected. In the Battle of the Java Sea, the Allies thought that there were Japanese submarines since they were obviously outside surface ship torpedo range. This could allow the British to move to ranges where they thought they were outside torpedo range and be surprised.
Well, it definitely matters in one count. At shorter ranges, the long lance could go 50 knots. Another is that it sort of depends on what kind of night it was. Full moon or moonless make a huge difference in terms of night visual range. I don't know what the atmospheric conditions were at the time in question.
@@MrTScolaro it was a couple of days after a full moon if I'm reading the reports right, although haven't found specific mention of night cloud cover, can infer no low cloud from the willingness to launch torpedo bombers but also expecting heavy flare use so clearly not pristine visibility
My most memorable quote from this battle when Admiral Somerville was testing the radar on Warspite, after it was newly refitted in USA: “Type 281 minus interrogator resembles blind man without dog. Type 284 works up to 18,000 yards, provided the guns don't fire. Two types 285 are remarkable in their consistency in that they give negative results. Type 273 is the only radar I have. Admiralty, please help my flagship”. Type 273 is the surface search radar, Type 284 is the surface gunnery radar, Type 281 is the air gunnery radar, and the type 285 is the air warning radar. Of course, such technical failures do not bother Warspite and her plot armour, where she detected Kido Butai’s at near the maximum air warning range of the Type 285 at 84 miles
I think the quote has some degree of hyperbole, given the successful performance of both the air warning and gunnery radar sets in 1941 Mediterranean. But, yes: These were first generation examples of the technology. So reliability was a real issue.
USS Robin provided the US Navy with the procedures and operational training on how to do CAP and Air intercept. You really need to do that one. It also taught the RN how to do UNREP right, at least according to HMS Victorious summary report.
I like to dim the lights and relax on a comfy chaise lounge with a glass of wine and listen to drach whisper sweet squarespace in my ears. Got cold in here I’d better put more layers on.
To Quote Colonel Kilgore in "Apocalypse Now"....."OUTSTANDING BLUE TEAM!!" Really savoring this one. Waiting for an uninterruped morining with my coffee to enjoy. The counterfactual history and possible dominoes are fascinating. I'd always figured if Nagumo caught Sommerville the Rs ,etc would have been wiped out. But your research is granualar and top shelf and makes one remember the distances involved and the complexity of carrier ops while the commanders are pretty much blind and guessing a lot. Great point about the CAP and fighter direction of the RN. Having experience int the Med and earlier in Battle of Britain, UK was ahead in this department. Excellent job. Cheers!!
The video we have all been waiting for since the one Midway stream where you mentioned working scenarios of this exact thing with Dr. Clarke ... Something along the lines of aircraft carrier versus the same ... but with their guns. Lol. Edit: Love the channel. Great stuff. 👍🏻
It sounds like the way this situation happened historically was the best outcome for both side esspecially Carrier Division 2 as it they seem to just be doomed if Sommerville didn't get that dodgy report, though that hugh deathdall scenario does sound like an intresting war game to try out.
Strategic Studies Group had their game Carriers At War, and their magazine Run5 had scenarios that were based on some similar scenarios. Tremendously fun.
Maybe it's just me, but it seems like picking a fight with a battleship called "Warspite" feels like a good way to get seven shades of shyte knocked out of you. But what do I know.
Another thing that's interesting to think about, Though impossible to make any meaningful predictions. The sinking of carrier division 2 here, as outlined in scenario two, would have had massive knock-on consequences for the rest of the Pacific war. Even in scenario 2C while Warspite probably would not have survived facing down four Kongos, she probably would have crippled if not sunk at least one of them, that potentially means not having Kirashima available for Guadalcanal. The loss of carrier division 2 means fewer forces available for the battles of Midway and Coral Sea, meaning potentially Lexington and/or Yorktown survive those battles.
You have to wonder if Coral Sea or Midway even happen then. The IJN will have to rethink why they are risking the KB needlessly and probably reorient to face west rather than east. KB retreats to Singapore for repairs, does not react to Doolittle raid, and push southward is cancelled in favor of developing plans for push westward to create more strategic room around the oil-rich DEI.
I think warspite would deal with more than one kongo. Bigger guns, much beter armour, radar guidance, more experienced confident crew...and its Warspite. The ship that flipped off the german fleet at jutland
2c is very interesting. Let's say RN wins out on the massive night battle, Warspite is probably dead, a few of the Rs are still alive but damaged, all Kongos are dead (courtesy of Warspite and the Rs) the remaining Rs are sunk by the Kidou Butai strike in the morning after. Japan has obviously already lost CarDiv2. It is a massive blow to the RN but the loss of CarDiv2 and BatDiv3 both have enourmous impact on the Pacific War.
The very idea of CarDiv2 (Hiryu & Soryu) getting krumped is a naval disaster for the IJN. And by extension Japan's war aims in the Pacific. Japan already had things going down in New Guinea and other areas north of Australia. Coral Sea was fought two months later using CarDiv5 (Shokaku, Zuikaku) so that the IJA could attack Port Moresby by sea and not have to hoof it through jungle and mountains. There was already Yamamoto's plans for Midway where CarDiv5 was already expected not to participate, but CarDivs 1 & 2 would. But having lost CarDiv2 *before* Coral Sea? That changes the outlook of things. It also severely affects the balance of Pacific Carriers between the USN & IJN. These Carrier losses are something the Japanese cannot absorb and replace easily.
Coral Sea was ONE month later, and used CarDiv 5 because the other two were desperately in need of a refit. 1 & 2 spent late April and early May in port (Kaga was already there due to grounding damage). A triumphant RN fleet in the Indian would have forced IJN to re-orient westward to protect the oil-rich DEI. With the loss of 1/3 of KB they would not have detached CD5, thereby splitting their forces. Also a factor was the Doolittle strike on April 18, two weeks after Op C.
Warspite turning out if the line as the rest of force a runs 4 to gun's blazing would Hove mad a fantastic movie and a heroic sad end to a great lady of the sea.
I have been looking forward to this kind of video ever since the Ship Girls episode you did with Animarchy when you briefly touched on carrier vs carrier via deckguns when talking about Lexington and Saratoga.
Hi Drach. This has been a great pair of videos. I always thought Summerville should have continued east but your analysis about all four Kongos arriving at the party changes that view. It would have been the biggest battleship fight of the war, assuming Force B arrived as well. With two Japanese carriers sunk and possibly several Kongos ang maybe a Tone, even the loss of most of the British fleet might be considered acceptable. Those British forces would be missed later in the war, but consider the follow-on effects to Japanese operations: Does Coral Sea happen? Do the American carriers come out with only minor damage? How does Midway play out? Does it even occur? How does Guadalcanal then change? It's the decisive battle the Japanese always sought but with the wrong enemy. Again, excellent work.
Even if Sommerville's force was destroyed, a significant loss of Carriers this early in the war could have massive implications for the rest of the war not to mention the loss of face that would be huge with the IJN and it's relative relations with the Japanese Army....
According to what Nagumo did later at Midway, I hardly see him launching a partial strike or just Vals to anything more important than the 2 british cruisers especially at carriers and even more at a fleet of several carriers. Parshall wrote Japanese doctrine was to launch a full package of torpedo and dive bombers, imho Nagumo sticking to the book would have taken his time to launch a full package with escort.
Thing is, he has a full package of Vals prepped specifically, according to IJN accounts, to deal with warships if they find them. Launching a balanced strike package including Kates and Zeroes means significantly delaying things and hoping the FAA doesn't just shoot down his recon aircraft. It's possible he might delay, but it goes sgainst why the Vals were prepped and might cost the chance to strike.
To add on to Drachinifels response, Nagumo might be eager to strike quickly because he doesn't know the British are waiting until dark to launch their strike. In the Pacific War, carrier battles are all about finding the enemy before he finds you and sinking him as fast as possible. When he finds the British carriers, he isn't going to wait a few hours to get a full strike since this risks the British spotting him and launching their attack on his carriers.
@@fabianzimmermann5495 Disagree. He knows there are carriers and an unescorted strike would be suicide. If Nagumo doesn't feel he could get a strike off on day 1 he would sail East to avoid an engagement and come back in the morning. He launched on the two cruisers they had no air cover. To presume he would do that against aircraft carriers is foolish and would be out character anyway.
I'm with vlad and johnshepard on this one. While Nagumo was obviously happy launching just the dive-bombers against a lone pair of cruisers, I think he would have reacted differently if he knew he was striking a larger force, particularly if he knows there are enemy carriers. It seems highly unlikely that he would have knowingly sent in a one-dimensional strike with no escort against carriers. I think Nagumo would have done as he did historically at Midway (which was an almost identical scenario to this hypothetical), and taken the time to launch a full coordinated strike. The Vals may have been prepped to go after warships, but I have to assume that only meant lighter warships, not capital ships (which Vals alone couldn't have done much to). Plus, from what I've read, CarDiv 5's Kates were *also* supposed to be part of a potential antishipping strike along with CarDiv 2's Vals - the Vals were only sent out on their own because rearming the Kates took longer than expected, and presumably because Nagumo figured they weren't needed to handle two cruisers. If Nagumo was striking Force A instead, I think he would have known he needed to wait for the whole package plus escorts. Also, one other thing which seemed odd about Scenario 1 which could affect that above decision. Drach says the range between Somerville and Nagumo would have kept opening during the rest of the day as Somerville ran westward, making a Japanese strike more difficult the longer Nagumo waits. However, this doesn't account for the fact that Nagumo would certainly have turned his fleet west in pursuit (again, exactly what he did at Midway when he learned about the USN carrier force). Somerville was limited to 23 knots, or only 20 if he linked up with Force B, whereas Nagumo (given the crucial absence of Kaga) could make 30 knots or better with his entire fleet. Even if Nagumo doesn't ring up flank speed, he's still likely to close the range on Somerville as they both run westward, and he certainly won't *lose* ground.
Give Formidable's eagerness at Matapan to get into a fight and Unicorns later actions i imagine Formidable would take that nich scenario and i have a feeling Indomitable wouldn't want to be left out.
Thank you for this excellent two part series. It has been most helpful from a historical perspective, but also to understand some alternative scenarios.
Greetings Drach, I have only just found your channel and I was instantly hooked. Your knowledge, dedication and passion really shine in all of your videos, combined with your wit and insight. Apologies if you have already done this but I would love a video on anti-submarine warfare in the Atlantic, with a focus on the tactics and people involved such as captain F.J. Walker (personal hero) and the amazing innovation of the Western Approaches Tactical Unit. If you're interested, I have some pictures from Bootle town hall re captain Walker, including the original flags of the general chase signal flown from HMS Kite.
@gregorywright4918 Do you mean cat and trap ark royal with buccaneers and f4s..... Nagomos Gona shit a brick if buccaneers smash his carriers heads in.
Imagine it. Warspite, all four of her turrets targeting individual Kongos while her secondary guns targetting Japanese destroyers. The Japanese ships, circling her like hungry piranhas. A single, unencrypted radio message goes out into the air. "Have at thee, ye rapscallions. Come and have a piece if ya think yer hard enough."
While the idea of two pairs of opposing carriers getting into a gun duel is hilarious, that assumes that the British admiral was dumb enough to leave them without escorting destroyers.
Learnt a lot here I had always assumed Royal Navy force was greatly inferior to the IJN force in the India Ocean at this time, and effectively ran. The loss of Hermes and the two county class and previously POW and Repulse albeit without air cover probably steered me. Along with the numbers and quality of the respective aircraft, and the number of obsolete ships on the British side involved especially the Rs. However radar, night training, extensive battle experience, armoured flight decks clearly evened things up quite a lot. Would have been a heck of achievement if the Royal Navy had managed to seriously damage the IJN considering at the time it was fighting and defeating the Kriegsmarine and Italian Navy.
I find myself wondering where the devil Cornwall and Dorsetshire are for these potential night actions, since we began by presuming the Val strike went after Force A.
The IJN pulls the KB back to Singapore and re-orients westward to build a bigger buffer around the oil-rich DEI. Perhaps the Andaman islands become replacements for Midway?
If Cardiv 2 had been badly damaged or even lost a significant portion of its striking power in April...doesn't that mean that midway and maybe even MO are delayed or never happen?
One major difference if they do happen is that Nagumo would almost certainly not be in command. In almost any of the Scenario 2s (except maybe the version of 2c where his counterattack wipes Somerville out), losing an entire carrier division or more to a force that just merrily snuck up on him means Nagumo's head will almost certainly roll (figuratively, if not also literally) the moment he gets back to Japan.
This is great and Zeros getting kicked by Blenheims is bloody hilarious. Can you do this for Leyte Gulf as well, pls. Keep up the good work, hopefully I’ll get to see you on the High Seas.
A friend at my club surveyed all the actions of WW1 and almost all navel actions ended almost before they started when one side worked out that they were outnumbered and 'turned away'.
Top notch, and the details you present are a revelation to me here in the US about Operation C/the Indian Ocean Raid. Your follow on "What If" is just as informative and intriguing. My coments here relate specifically to those speculative scenarios you posit. 1. For #1. Given the unescorted Vals are roughly handled, that would cull some of the really experienced and skilled pilots. Dive bombing was extremely difficult to master. 2. For #2A. Given the successful night strike on Hiryu & Soryu, I would rate the result as more than 1/2 of a Midway. Both IJN carriers were veteran with veteran pilots and ships aircrew. Much more veteran than Shokaku & Zuikaku. I think tne carrier division commander was a firebrand as well, not sympatico with Nagumo. Thus, the loss of the 2 is a nearly total wipeout: ships, aircraft, commanders, pilots, ship crews and more - truly devistating. 3. For 2B. I give Nagumo a fair chance of investigating, ye😅s. He has to get some sense about what just occurred. This has to be shocking. So he would tread lightly, maybe even more so than you posit. If so, or even if he does as you think, then the 1/2+ Midway goes to near 2/3's. IMHO Nagumo woud not ever send 4 Kongo's. 3. Conclusion. If this happened, and after looking & thinking on this, I believe it missed happening by a cats whisker, Then the naval Pacific conflict changes dramatically. I won't guess in detail for that's too speculative. What I will say is that the IJN would then face more even or longer odds in any carrier clash if they initiated one. They woud face 2 fronts as well. I do not see a shorter Pacific War, as the IJN/IJA wold not yield an inch, no matter the endgame situation. The end would be signalled by the same fireballs. pr after say w
I suppose the question then becomes, if Somerville gained the victory in a night clash, with the Japanese losing two carriers, does Coral Sea happen at all? Midway was a planned battle & I imagine would still occur….but with the US Navy not having suffered the Coral Sea loses, does Midway’s outcome change? Could the IJN lose that battle harder than they already did?
The question I'm really interested in is what happens if the Japanese aren't delayed (or Somerville hears they are delayed and waits another night) and Somerville catches them all the night before they launch their strikes on Colombo. All five carriers would be together in the one place along with all four Kongos. If they are caught unawares like Carrier division 2 was in your scenario. How much damage can all those torpedo slinging Albacores do. Could they sink or cripple all 5 carriers in one attack? Or does that require something like 90% accuracy?
Presuming the torpedoes are aimed only at the carriers, and he manages a max strike or two close waves, say 6-10 hits would probably put down one or two Soryus and damage but not cripple the other three. Nagumo would be forced to pull back if he lost air superiority, but he might have enough left to be able to launch a small strike in the morning. He would probably be able to get a CAP up, frustrating any morning follow-up attack.
I don't think R-Class & Warpsite/Kongo brawl is that likely. I'd say Furious and Indomitable gunning Soryu and Hiryu is more likely (Especially as Furious has form in wanting to cosplay as a battleship...). Nagumo was a conservative commander (Not unreasonably I would add) and having learned two of his carriers have been destroyed by surface ships, he is (To my amateur mind at least) not going to risk sending the majority of his escorts, especially if any reports suggest that only one or two (A cruiser being mistaken for a battleship is not unknown) capital ship is present. That would mean he'd have to worry about where the rest of the RN force is. If his carriers get jumped while the Kongo's are chasing Warspite, he would know it would be game over. And Sommerville than running away would probably only convince Nagumo that another force is stalking his remaining carriers and probably see him recall the Kongo's before they catch Warspite.
Awesome video, thanks! What do you think the longer-term impact would be on the war in the Pacific were a) Carrier Div 2 destroyed or b) The Great Big Shitfight In The Dark took place, destroying the British Navy in the Indian Ocean but sinking or crippling a few of the Kongos and leaving a lot of Japan's capitals ships damaged in the Indian Ocean?
Scenario 1: Given the time that Force A would have been discovered Nagumo had plenty of time to recover his aircraft and get off one big strike late in the day. Nagumo was cautious, and that is his most likely course of action.
You presume that Somerville does not turn tail or launch a strike of his own in the interim? That was the conundrum at Midway, and it shows up again here.
@@gregorywright4918 A strike during the day would be suicide. The Swordfish and Albacore would be unescorted and the CAP would have a field day. Think Midway with only TBDs. My understanding of Scenario 1 is that Somerville only knows about Soryu and Hiryu and would not know a big strike was on the away until he picked it up on radar. There would not be time to do more than launch a few aircraft before the Japanese strike arrived. There is another possibility. We know Nagumo is cautious. Instead of an immediate strike he could get East for the night with the intention of going after the Eastern Fleet in the morning.
@@johnshepherd9676Somerville knows about the IJN strike on Columbo, so there is obviously more than two carriers around. You were positing that Nagumo could wait and launch a big strike "later in the day", but then you say "There would not be time to do more than launch a few aircraft before the Japanese strike arrived". That is contradictory. Either he sends the Val-only strike against Force A immediately or he waits to land and rearm the Colombo strike later in the day, which Somerville will be expecting and have all his fighters up to disrupt. As to the "other possibility", if Nagumo goes "East for the night", Somerville will be going west and the two forces will be hundreds of miles apart. Somerville will clear out the Addu Atoll base and head for East Africa knowing he cannot face 4+ carriers. If he gets some decent scouting reports he MIGHT try to slip back and do a night strike, but he will have to time that carefully so he can slip westward again the rest of the night.
You know if a scenario where Nagumo losses two carriers but heavily damages the British Fleet it actually ends up with a much changed situation following which might actually saves 4 Japanese Carriers. Midway and possibly Coral Sea, would be cancelled as the IJN lick their wounds. and Yamamoto has to plan a much more reduced plan or even going on the defensive for the rest of 1942 while trying to replace two fleet carriers. Even a loss here would also be just as beneficial as its still unlikely that the Royal Navy are going to sortie into the Pacific anyway (and could be dealt better by land based planes anyway). It will still probably halt both Coral Sea and Midway campaigns meaning they actually save 2 carriers sunk and 2 damaged later. The IJN will still loose long term but they might actually be in better state in 1942 in CVs and trained pilots than they actually were. Love What ifs.
Superb show Mr. Drach. Here's another scenario I was pondering. How about both fleets are armed with 1942 era American torpedoes? Ships would be dented and eventually skippers would realize they will have to use guns.
As far as the "carrier v. carrier" gun duel at the end, just think if Furious had been moved over from the Mediterranean as well. She could have been detailed to finish off cripples of all sorts, and had a lot of fun while doing it!
I like the R class against the Kongos. The R are slow by modern standards at the time but they were tough battleships and an improvement in many ways over the unmodified Queen Elizabeth class, except in speed. I suspect that if it came down to a night melee between the Warspite and the Rs against the Kongos, the Warspite and Rs could defeat the Kongos. That said, those long lance torpedoes are the wild card and could easily give Japan the win if they were well used.
Potentially a carrier vs. carrier night surface action might have involved all seven carriers. At Midway, after three of his carriers were set on fire, Nagumo attempted to close the American fleet and seek out a surface action. The authors of Shattered Sword criticise him for having Hiryu tag along, rather than opening the range to the American carriers, so there is precedent for him bringing Akagi, Shokaku and Zuikaku along with the Kongos in the scenario where he decides on all-out retaliation for having Carrier Division 2 trashed (I'm not suggesting that this is a sensible course of action, merely that there is evidence that Nagumo might do this). It raises the interesting question of whether the British carriers' armoured box was capable of protecting them against Akagi's 8" main battery.
It finally dawned on me a year or so ago that Operation Torch must have meant different things to the Americans and the British. To the Americans, a Torch is dramatic, what the Statue of Liberty holds, a beacon to the world, freedom. The Brits, on the other hand, must have looked at each other quite bemused: Operation Flashlight? 🔦
I found this hypothetical scenario interesting. However IMHO you underestimated the IJN night fighting capabilities. Don't forget they had been doing fleet exercises practicing night fighting techniques for almost 15 years. Their abilities were shown in the battles in the Solomon's and like the RN they also used scout planes to drop flares and their ships were equipped with powerful search lights. Also while it is true they did not have radar, they had some of the best optics in the world and their lookouts were men who were specifically pick based upon their night vision. In some cases they were able to detect enemy vessels at far ranges and their torpedo crews were so well discipline they could launch a spread at extreme distances with their long lance torpedoes. In addition, their destroyers and cruisers carried twice the load of torpedoes than their RN counterparts. Finally, while it was true in the 1945 kamikaze attacks that IJA and IJN did not do significant damage to RN Armored carriers this may not have been true in 1942 when the IJN ordnance for Dive Bombers would have probably have included more armor piercing bombs which could have significantly damage the flight decks. In fact the Aichi dive bomber main weapon was a 250 kg, 550 lb bomb, which was the same ordnance that the Ju-87 carried when they damaged the Formidable flight deck and elevator in the eastern Mediterranean. This is just my critique and input. I do find the videos and discussion very interesting and informative.
If you look at the battles of the Solomons early on it basically comes down to who has surprise, plus the US not using radar effectively - that's unlikely to happen about an RN force, it's true that it might well not have been one sided but it's also true that the Japanese could well have ended up in alot of trouble. It's important to note that the RN spent alot of the interwar years preparing for night actions and had a good deal of battle experience doing just that.
@@tomriley5790 You make valid points. However, I respectfully disagree with you about some key points. First, if you study IJN carrier tactics, at that they were probably the best in the world in deploying a large Carrier strike force in a quick amount of time, as two Carriers air groups would be deployed. So even if the RN carriers noted their arrival, their superb A6M Zero fighters which had the longer range would probably have overwhelmed their defense. Also their B5N5 Torpedo bombers were better than the Sword fish planes. Also IJN destroyers were trained to react quickly and with their reload capabilities which neither the RN or USN destroyers had, they could launch a 2-1 amount of torpedoes.
Armored Carriers cites an author that only about 21 British fighters were operational so even a partial IJN air strike could have been effective. Armored Carrier also reported that Somerville thought the Japanese were not very good at night fighting.
The longer we discuss more scenarios, the more the fundamental tenet of doctrine holds true: Whomever puts the first ordinance on target has a HIGH probability of winning.
I knew that armament swap was a long and involved process, but I have to imagine that with better fleet training and efficiency they could reduce that turnaround. 2.5 hours explains quite a bit in the context of some famous carrier issues.
5 vs 4 line of battle with Warspite and Rs vs Kongos sounds like a British victory, numbers and tech advantage plus warspite plot armour vs some warmed over WWI battle cruisers with no radar and less armour than Queen Mary.
You’re assuming that the British can actually catch the Kongos in the first place. The British have a lot of advantages in that duel, but one that they don’t is speed, and in this scenario the Kongos don’t need to actually engage the British-they only need to buy time for the carriers and can thus run away and act as a bait.
@@bkjeong4302 British don't need to "catch" the Kongos when Japanese are the ones doing the attacking. You are right of course that the RN BBs can't chase the Kongos but they don't need to if battle is joined.
Pinned post for Q&A :)
Q&A-Hypothetically, regardless of any casualties to the Eastern Fleet. How does the IJN go forward with the Battles of Coral Sea and Midway having only CarDivs 1 and 5 making up the Kido Butai?
Which ship is Somerville aboard?
Why did the Japanese decided that mattresses and similar padding is the best option for splinter protection and never moved past it for something more permanent and less likely to be blown/burned away ?
@@iancarr8682 Warspite IIRC.
What an ABSOLUTE garbage POST... MY 1ST Drach DOWN VOTE EVER!!!!
A large share of the content about the WW2 tends to revolve around the question "What will Nagumo do?"
Could think of half a dozen admirals I would rather have in place of Nagumo in those situations. A nice deep dive would be the details in how Nagumo got command of a naval element that required aggression and intuition.
The IJN was, from its creation, staffed primarily by the members of one or two legacy clans from feudal Japan and their client families. That's probably one reason Nagumo managed to climb as high as he did.
Another is probably that, during peacetime (or, at the least, when one isn't fighting an opponent of equal or superior ability), it's often not innovative, aggressive thinking that paves the way to advancement. Instead, a stolid, make-no-waves approach and by-the-book responses that can *always* be defended by quoting doctrine (even if selectively) is what gets officers promoted. Nagumo is a *perfect* example of that.
Yes, you occasionally get exceptions that slip through the cracks. Admiral Yamamoto was one such. But he was not only brilliant and innovative, he was also a very skilled political player with the connections at the highest levels to keep his career (and possibly himself) alive when he ruffled too many feathers.
Nagumo was very cautious, Yamamoto wanted to replace him after Pearl Harbour for not launching the 3rd wave. If Somerville had maintained the element of surprise and creamed Carrier Division 2, which is quite possible, Nagumo most likely would have panicked, thought there was a huge task force and land based force out there looking for him. The indecision he showed at Midway would have surfaced. Keep in mind the scenario in Midway was quite similar to the scenario here in Ceylon except it was likely that Somerville would have maintained complete surprise where Spruance was spotted by the Japanese. The night fighting would have been to the Japanese disadvantage and with about 8 hours of darkness to go, if Somerville found the main force he could have landed, rearmed and sent out a second strike against Nagumo and the Japanese would have been helpless because of their lack of radar. Even if the second strike did not do much damage it is dollars to donuts that Nagumo would have hightailed it out of there before daylight to preserve what he had left of his force. Coming home with 3 out of 5 carriers would have been better than what happened at Midway and coming home with no carriers. Nagumo would also likely have been sacked then as opposed to put out to pasture after Midway.
@@christopherreed4723 I think that Ozawa could be considered the best all round Japanese Admiral. One that definitely understood Carrier warfare but that was in comand when it was too late.
@@EliteF22 the gargoyle Ozawa for example!
My grandfather, Cyril "Charlie " Carr was on the Royal Sovereign at this time. He said he was very happy they didn't run into the Japanese, he knew they didn't stand a chance if things got serious. The R's needed a lot to bring them up to speed. As he put it they "hid at the Andaman Islands " and then got out of the way of danger asap.
Grandad gave me a book he found on the attack on Sri Lanka (Ceylon)
"The most dangerous moment ".
A really informative book on the attack, I still have the copy he gave me 45 years ago.
As he handed the book to me he said "I'm in that!".
I could hear the price in his voice.
He's been gone 21 years this year.
Gee I miss him.
Thank him for his service, carry on :) courtesy of an American
I think you may have made a critical error in your assumption that Warspite would come out on the losing end of a tussle with the Kongos. Did you remember to take into consideration her plot armor?
PS - I’ve always loved your what if/alternative history specials. They are very well thought out and take into consideration the vast majority of possible outcomes, mostly just leaving out the “golden bb” scenarios
I think she could take on two at night with her radar, presuming the IJN floatplanes are not up to their night-time tricks like in the Solomons. I also think Drach is right that Nagumo would keep at least two of them back to backstop the rest of the KB.
With all four I am afraid even Warspite loses.
But she almost certainly sinks one, perhaps two and probably wounding at least two and possibly three.
Warspite signals, before she melees the whole japanese force on it's own: "Steering gear jammed. Full speed ahead. England expects that every man will do his duty."
Because everybody on board of Warspite had major case of the main character syndrome.
Is there also plot armour for HMS Enterprise, as she is required to still be in service later in the war to serve in US Admiral Kirk's fleet off Normandy?
Just think of the implications if Warspite caught Hiryu and Soryu; so many future battles (or battles that wouldn’t happen) would be impacted. Maybe Coral Sea doesn’t happen, and now the U.S. Navy has both Lexington, and a very undamaged Yorktown available. The Doolittle Raid would still go off, but would Yamamoto risk trying to ambush now four American fleet carriers with only four of his own? How would the IJN respond to the Guadalcanal invasion with potentially two American carriers at large (and maybe three if you count Wasp and Saratoga in the theater) assuming Fletcher has the same covering force? The ripple effects are mesmerizing.
The carriers would never be in range of the Warspite. Also, the numerical and technical air superiority of the Japanese would prevent that from happening even more.
You’re assuming Warspite ever manages to fire a shot before the Swordfish attacks destroy CarDiv2.
Frankly that would be for the best: both sides of WWII already had a massive problem with overestimating their own battleships (and building a combined 29 of them, all of questionable strategic value at best if not outright detrimental to themselves).
@@bkjeong4302 If you really think having battleships in WW2 is detrimental, I invite you to consider what the British strategic situation would have looked like if they scrap/cancel all their battleships pre-war but the Germans and Italians keep theirs.
People read about Pacific carrier battles and get carried away imagining naval warfare as something that always takes place across thousands of miles of open ocean with pristine tropical weather, where of course carriers are dominant. The reality was mostly not like that and battleships were massively important.
@@imperium3556
First of all, battleship engagements in the Mediterranean on both sides involved pre-existing old battleships: nobody needed to build anything new like the Littorios or KGVs for those engagements. And even then, a lot of those battles could have been handled by cruisers or airpower (both carriers and land-based).
As for Germany…..do take a look at how much of an epic fail the German surface fleet was and how much they sabotaged themselves (more than any other major power of WWII) by building their four (poorly designed) capital ships.
One additional implication:
One could argue that losing Lexington was a win for the US navy, since it taught them the lesson to put water in their fuel lines.
If they hadn't learned that lesson before Midway, the US carriers might be blown up much like the Japanese carriers there did.
(or at least the US carriers hit at Midway would face a much riskier/more serious damage control challenge)
I believe the "cover everything in AA guns" report also stems from Coral Sea...
So really the US _benefitted_ from losing there, and thus indirectly from the UK losing in the Indian Ocean.
The historical changes, had the British done some damage to the Kido Butai near Ceylon and thereby perhaps altered Coral Sea and thereby Midway, could be insanely far-reaching!
(of course, Midway was eventually a success by weird/lucky timing from the US, and it all could've gone very different anyways by making much smaller changes to history than anything involving the Indian Ocean or Coral Sea)
The Political implications of Sommerville wiping out carrier division 2 would be incredible, there are major butterflies regarding the US Pacific fleet it's options and doctrine do they try to adopt night fighting etc. There are also major changes regarding Australia after the loss of Singapore the Aussies went super paranoid regarding the Japanese forces and many Aussie politicians pivoted towards the USA as they felt the UK couldn't protect them. This still impacts Aussie politics today. This would arguably be the first major victory over the Japanese by allied forces if carried out by the RN that massively boosts British prestige. This would also have major implications regarding the BPF etc as this would be seen as a Midwayesqe scale victory and would predate it.
You could say this would preclude Midway happening at all...
Midway likely still happens, as it was a pet project of Yamamoto, but a massive British victory ending threats to India and Australia saves the Empire
@@robruss62 If CarDiv 2 is wiped out, Midway won't happen. Midway was mostly a reaction to the Doolittle Raid, but relied on the expectation that the US carriers would have to come back from the SW Pacific short 2 (Lex & York at Coral Sea), so the ratio of forces was 6 or 4 to 2. If the KB gets a bloody nose and loses 2, you can bet Coral Sea doesn't happen so Midway would be a 4 vs 4 setup. But Yamamoto would have to re-orient to protect the oil-field gains in DEI, so he'd have to base out of Singapore and look toward getting more forward bases to warn about approaches of the Eastern Fleet. He might even pull the KB back to Japan like the BBs and use it as a deep reserve.
@@gregorywright4918 very possible, and if Midway were to happen, would be under different circumstances, apart from carrier ratio of 6-4. Reason Midway might still happen is because Doolittle Raid is April 18th, so assuming Divs 1&5 make it back from Eastern Fleets super Matapan more or less on schedule (whether they detour to hit Trinco on the 9th or not), Yamamoto would likely have the opening to launch some form of AF especially as the now disastrous Operation C wasn't his pet project.
Assuming no massive change of Japanese codes, though possibly without Rochefort proving his theory at the dry run of Coral Sea, Nimitz would likely be able to piece together some semblance of Nagumo's strike.
Yamamoto would still have enough ships for AF's four main components, and would be able to substitute the unsunk Hosho for one of the bigger light fleet carriers in Hosogaya's force as compensation to deal with the unsunk Lexington.
Question is, while one can imagine similar damage being inflicted on KB by Helldiver's, without lessons of Coral Sea, would American carriers have improved damage control?
One could imagine Fletcher losing two carriers had the first counter strike hit a less prepared Yorktown or Lexington, and then the second one falling to torpedoes. A loss ratio of 2-1 instead of 4-1 would still make it a clear cut US victory though.
Other factor that might benefit Americans, while Hara was a competent admiral he wasn't Yamaguchi, who at this point would be presumably lost with both his carriers off Ceylon. In a more or less concurrent Midway scenario, after losing 3 carriers in five minutes, would Hara have lashed back so forcefully with Shokaku? There might only have been one counterblow instead of two, so the loss ratio might still have been 4-1 anyway.
What I’m really interested is in Somerville managing to get in that radar-equipped Swordfish night strike on the bulk of the Kido Butai, or Nagumo finding Addu Atoll right when the bulk of the Eastern Fleet is there…
Either scenario results in the side that found the other first blowing the other side out of the water.
@@altanativeftw2625
TBH, though these scenarios would result in a definitive victory for one side I doubt they’d result in one side being annihilated: even with radar and no AA or fighter opposition I doubt Somerville is going to wipe out the entire Kido Butai in one go (though he’s almost certainly sinking one or two Japanese carriers, hopefully the Shokakus though those were pretty tough); and the fact the British carriers actually can scramble fighters in time for it to matter could reduce the effectiveness of an attack against Addu Atoll.
If Somerville sinks two Japanese carriers, he owns the Indian ocean
@@opvjg Why? the japanese would still have massive air superiority over the british fleet with superior planes and pilots and numbers. But the japanese would have lost their margin of superiority over the US navy.
@@opvjg
If the bulk of the Kido Butai gets attacked, depending on which carrier gets the bulk of the British attention the Japanese probably would still have either Akagi or at least one of their two new superweapon carriers (the Shokakus-and yes, the Shokakus were intended as superweapons in the same vein as the Yamatos, which they were built alongside). Not enough to overwhelm the British, but enough to challenge them given the smaller air group sizes on the British carriers.
For anyone who has the computer game "Carrier Battles 4 Guadalcanal", there is an Operation C scenario as a DLC for wargamers to try to see what happens in all of what's been discussed in this video. (NOTE: This is not intended as an endorsement or promotion of the game, but merely as an FYI for those who might be interested.)
The greatest naval battle that never was. I was really obsessed with the Indian Ocean raid for a while, this video scratched a long-lasting itch.
This has always been one of the most interesting counter-factuals for me, especially as the very plausible scenario of losing at least one of Carrier Div 2s ships, if not both, would have huge impacts on the course of the Pacific war; whether the Japanese would even attempt the post-Doolittle raid operations in the Solomons & New Guinea, Midway and the Aleutians go up in the air, or if they do they would be very different.
It's an unfortunate artefact of history that the Indian Ocean raid is just a minor footnote in the 'Japanese wiping the floor with everyone December 1941-May 1942 Edition', when it potentially could have ended as a mini-midway.
Well, even more potentially i could have ended in biggest disaster in Royal Navy history.
@@ReichLife very true, but the ultimate effect on the war would have been relatively inconsequential and wouldn't alter the outcome. The material loss of one of, or both, Hiryu and/or Sorry alone, never mind the psychological impact of the loss on Japanese planning for future operations however would've been immense. Even with the total destruction of Somerville's force, it would still have been viewed as a near pyrrhic victory for the IJN. It isn't as though any of those RN fleet units played any significant role in the defeat of Japan aside from being one of dozens of like American ships against an already effectively defeated enemy anyway.
@@JohnSmith-jj2yd It's interesting because this is something that comes up in *Shattered Sword*, the Kido Butai was an absolutely priceless asset that basically carried the fate of Japan's war effort with it. The Indian Ocean raid was not a good use of something that important because it didn't really achieve much in the way of strategic objectives and risked the one thing Japan could not afford to lose. Nagumo gets shit for not being aggressive enough, but he also had the single most valuable military asset in Japan in his hands and being careless with it would be worse than being too careful.
Might even make the IJN rethink the utility of the Soryu/Hiryu/Unryu design lineage if the RN gets a few decent torpedoes into one or both (I'm betting they have a hard time dealing with one, and definitely sink with two or more). Aside from Taiho, that was the historical core of their carrier future when they did not continue building Shokakus. It would also punch a hole in their "victory disease" two months before it was deflated at Midway, causing a reassessment of what they were trying to achieve out there with Kido Butai and probably leading it to become a reserve force like the rest of the capital ships.
@@JohnSmith-jj2yd Thing is, basically any outcome would only help Japanese in hindsight. Full success? They neutralized British threat for full year or two. Loss of 2nd division and some surface escort? Far less possible then they would go with Midway operation, which means no battle in which allies trade mere 1 carrier against 4. US push in later part of 1942 could go drastically different if Japan had 2 more fleet carriers then from 1st division.
One other interesting tidbit about the 2b and 2c scenarios. If Nagumo sends any or all of the Kongos to investigate/counterattack, the senior surface admiral and thus the commander of that engagement on the Japanese side would have been the commander of BatDiv 3 - VAdm Gunichi Mikawa, the historical victor of Savo Island. Obviously he would have been up against much tougher opposition in these hypotheticals, but we at least know that the Japanese surface forces would have been led by a skilled night surface commander in those cases.
Love this exploration of the hypotheticals. :)
Good point.
I like this Wednesday/Friday combo. I could see it as an effective way to analyze the impact and importance of certain engagements or nonengagements.
Very informative. The actions that take place between the Royal Navy and IJN tend to get lost between Pearl Harbor and Coral Sea, and over shadowed by Midway.
If you ever find the time for an another alternative history, I think a great "what if" would be: what if Tirpitz had actually made a run for PQ-13 in Operation Rosselsprung and risked facing Duke of York and Washington.
There is no question there, both of those ships on their own was a match for Tirpitz - especially Washington, whose gunnery was legendary. The two together would blow Tirpitz out of the water.
@@PalleRasmussen
Do note that Adm. Lee wasn’t in command of Washington at this point, so her crew quality wouldn’t be at that level (and it should also be remembered that much of Washington’s accuracy at Second Guadalcanal was down to the fact she was shooting from point-blank range and was literally too close to miss).
That said, Washington doesn’t really need memetic levels of accuracy to beat Tirpitz entirely by herself since she has significantly more firepower and arguably superior protection (less armour of lower steel quality but it’s in the modern AoN layout). Tirpitz does have speed advantage, but in this scenario she’d have to take the fight to Washington and remain in her effective range anyways.
@@bkjeong4302 it was not Lee that made Washington shoot so well, it was her captain, who was also a gunnery and precision fanatic. Lee only added the final touches. Go watch Unauthorized History of The Pacific's "The Night The Giants Rode", they go in depth with the subject.
March or July 42, or September43, Tirpitz sunk if caught by Home Fleet.
@@robruss62 but seven times?
Keep em coming Drach, no one is doing the kind of stuff you are doing. Also pls do more table top reenactments(I know they must be immensely tiring and costly) but they offer such a nice image to add perspective to the battle. That and the lovely models.
You seem to forget about Waspites invincible plot armour
FYI a full broadside from each of HMS Formidable and HMS Indomitable is 16x 4.5 tubes (all 8 twin mounts). The reason why they are in those slightly raised pillboxes is so they can fire over the deck ...
Thanks Drach. I think that you done a heck of a job with the different scenarios.
"Who the heck is going to come out standing at the end of that?" Why am I betting Warspite's rudder jams dodging a torpedo and leading to a lucky salvo that knocks out a Kongo....
One of the things you missed is that in April 1942 the capability of the long lance was totally unexpected. In the Battle of the Java Sea, the Allies thought that there were Japanese submarines since they were obviously outside surface ship torpedo range. This could allow the British to move to ranges where they thought they were outside torpedo range and be surprised.
In daylight I would completely agree, but at night the average visual spotting range is similar to normal torpedo range
Well, it definitely matters in one count. At shorter ranges, the long lance could go 50 knots. Another is that it sort of depends on what kind of night it was. Full moon or moonless make a huge difference in terms of night visual range. I don't know what the atmospheric conditions were at the time in question.
@@MrTScolaro it was a couple of days after a full moon if I'm reading the reports right, although haven't found specific mention of night cloud cover, can infer no low cloud from the willingness to launch torpedo bombers but also expecting heavy flare use so clearly not pristine visibility
Conclusion, watch for those torps!
Somerville reports sighting Torpedo Boats!
Nagumo getting caught out by a need to swap munitions... where have I heard that before... 😊
29:25 King George the 5th boiling out of darkness would be pretty scary sight.
Even scarier if he took RN with him...
My most memorable quote from this battle when Admiral Somerville was testing the radar on Warspite, after it was newly refitted in USA:
“Type 281 minus interrogator resembles blind man without dog. Type 284 works up to 18,000 yards, provided the guns don't fire. Two types 285 are remarkable in their consistency in that they give negative results. Type 273 is the only radar I have. Admiralty, please help my flagship”. Type 273 is the surface search radar, Type 284 is the surface gunnery radar, Type 281 is the air gunnery radar, and the type 285 is the air warning radar.
Of course, such technical failures do not bother Warspite and her plot armour, where she detected Kido Butai’s at near the maximum air warning range of the Type 285 at 84 miles
I think the quote has some degree of hyperbole, given the successful performance of both the air warning and gunnery radar sets in 1941 Mediterranean.
But, yes: These were first generation examples of the technology. So reliability was a real issue.
USS Robin provided the US Navy with the procedures and operational training on how to do CAP and Air intercept. You really need to do that one.
It also taught the RN how to do UNREP right, at least according to HMS Victorious summary report.
Suggests a good working relationship if both sides were willing and able to learn from the other.
I like to dim the lights and relax on a comfy chaise lounge with a glass of wine and listen to drach whisper sweet squarespace in my ears. Got cold in here I’d better put more layers on.
To Quote Colonel Kilgore in "Apocalypse Now"....."OUTSTANDING BLUE TEAM!!" Really savoring this one. Waiting for an uninterruped morining with my coffee to enjoy. The counterfactual history and possible dominoes are fascinating. I'd always figured if Nagumo caught Sommerville the Rs ,etc would have been wiped out. But your research is granualar and top shelf and makes one remember the distances involved and the complexity of carrier ops while the commanders are pretty much blind and guessing a lot.
Great point about the CAP and fighter direction of the RN. Having experience int the Med and earlier in Battle of Britain, UK was ahead in this department. Excellent job. Cheers!!
"The Mark I Human Eyeball" line, Drach, is one of the many reasons why we love love love you and your content!
Absolutely hilarious!
It's standard naval terminology.
@@michaelsommers2356 Don't be a downer.
@@MarkJoseph81 Sorry to disturb your ignorance.
@@michaelsommers2356 Wooooooowww... THAT was totally uncalled for.
Thought we were all getting along here.
You must be a blast at parties.
@@MarkJoseph81 Don't be a downer.
I absolutely love your reference to Yes Minister/Prime Minister.
wait, wheres that, i beg u to tell me the timestamps thanks
Always great content, love alternate history and what could have been. Keep up the great work!
The video we have all been waiting for since the one Midway stream where you mentioned working scenarios of this exact thing with Dr. Clarke ...
Something along the lines of aircraft carrier versus the same ... but with their guns. Lol.
Edit: Love the channel. Great stuff. 👍🏻
It sounds like the way this situation happened historically was the best outcome for both side esspecially Carrier Division 2 as it they seem to just be doomed if Sommerville didn't get that dodgy report, though that hugh deathdall scenario does sound like an intresting war game to try out.
Never let Drach referee a wargame unless you are playing the British.
The mother of all night naval battles? Dear God I'd buy that poster!
Strategic Studies Group had their game Carriers At War, and their magazine Run5 had scenarios that were based on some similar scenarios. Tremendously fun.
Maybe it's just me, but it seems like picking a fight with a battleship called "Warspite" feels like a good way to get seven shades of shyte knocked out of you. But what do I know.
Another thing that's interesting to think about, Though impossible to make any meaningful predictions. The sinking of carrier division 2 here, as outlined in scenario two, would have had massive knock-on consequences for the rest of the Pacific war. Even in scenario 2C while Warspite probably would not have survived facing down four Kongos, she probably would have crippled if not sunk at least one of them, that potentially means not having Kirashima available for Guadalcanal. The loss of carrier division 2 means fewer forces available for the battles of Midway and Coral Sea, meaning potentially Lexington and/or Yorktown survive those battles.
if Somerville does get early warning you know damn well he's getting the R's involved in a rendezvous and make Callahan's night action look like joke.
You have to wonder if Coral Sea or Midway even happen then. The IJN will have to rethink why they are risking the KB needlessly and probably reorient to face west rather than east. KB retreats to Singapore for repairs, does not react to Doolittle raid, and push southward is cancelled in favor of developing plans for push westward to create more strategic room around the oil-rich DEI.
I think warspite would deal with more than one kongo. Bigger guns, much beter armour, radar guidance, more experienced confident crew...and its Warspite. The ship that flipped off the german fleet at jutland
2c is very interesting. Let's say RN wins out on the massive night battle, Warspite is probably dead, a few of the Rs are still alive but damaged, all Kongos are dead (courtesy of Warspite and the Rs) the remaining Rs are sunk by the Kidou Butai strike in the morning after. Japan has obviously already lost CarDiv2.
It is a massive blow to the RN but the loss of CarDiv2 and BatDiv3 both have enourmous impact on the Pacific War.
@@sugarnads One Kongo, certainly. I could even see her win against two but all four is probably not possible.
The very idea of CarDiv2 (Hiryu & Soryu) getting krumped is a naval disaster for the IJN. And by extension Japan's war aims in the Pacific. Japan already had things going down in New Guinea and other areas north of Australia. Coral Sea was fought two months later using CarDiv5 (Shokaku, Zuikaku) so that the IJA could attack Port Moresby by sea and not have to hoof it through jungle and mountains. There was already Yamamoto's plans for Midway where CarDiv5 was already expected not to participate, but CarDivs 1 & 2 would.
But having lost CarDiv2 *before* Coral Sea? That changes the outlook of things. It also severely affects the balance of Pacific Carriers between the USN & IJN. These Carrier losses are something the Japanese cannot absorb and replace easily.
Coral Sea was ONE month later, and used CarDiv 5 because the other two were desperately in need of a refit. 1 & 2 spent late April and early May in port (Kaga was already there due to grounding damage). A triumphant RN fleet in the Indian would have forced IJN to re-orient westward to protect the oil-rich DEI. With the loss of 1/3 of KB they would not have detached CD5, thereby splitting their forces. Also a factor was the Doolittle strike on April 18, two weeks after Op C.
Warspite turning out if the line as the rest of force a runs 4 to gun's blazing would Hove mad a fantastic movie and a heroic sad end to a great lady of the sea.
Thanks for making my Friday better, Drach!
Quite the story. Excellent analysis and narration ! Still trying to wrap my head around it ! Might have to give this one a re-roll.
I have been looking forward to this kind of video ever since the Ship Girls episode you did with Animarchy when you briefly touched on carrier vs carrier via deckguns when talking about Lexington and Saratoga.
Very interesting! Definitely would like more "what if" scenarios.
Hi Drach. This has been a great pair of videos. I always thought Summerville should have continued east but your analysis about all four Kongos arriving at the party changes that view. It would have been the biggest battleship fight of the war, assuming Force B arrived as well. With two Japanese carriers sunk and possibly several Kongos ang maybe a Tone, even the loss of most of the British fleet might be considered acceptable. Those British forces would be missed later in the war, but consider the follow-on effects to Japanese operations: Does Coral Sea happen? Do the American carriers come out with only minor damage? How does Midway play out? Does it even occur? How does Guadalcanal then change? It's the decisive battle the Japanese always sought but with the wrong enemy. Again, excellent work.
I love these naval what ifs, they make me see how much more differently the war could have gone
Even if Sommerville's force was destroyed, a significant loss of Carriers this early in the war could have massive implications for the rest of the war not to mention the loss of face that would be huge with the IJN and it's relative relations with the Japanese Army....
According to what Nagumo did later at Midway, I hardly see him launching a partial strike or just Vals to anything more important than the 2 british cruisers especially at carriers and even more at a fleet of several carriers. Parshall wrote Japanese doctrine was to launch a full package of torpedo and dive bombers, imho Nagumo sticking to the book would have taken his time to launch a full package with escort.
Thing is, he has a full package of Vals prepped specifically, according to IJN accounts, to deal with warships if they find them.
Launching a balanced strike package including Kates and Zeroes means significantly delaying things and hoping the FAA doesn't just shoot down his recon aircraft.
It's possible he might delay, but it goes sgainst why the Vals were prepped and might cost the chance to strike.
Don't forget the Zeroes required for any strike group.
To add on to Drachinifels response, Nagumo might be eager to strike quickly because he doesn't know the British are waiting until dark to launch their strike. In the Pacific War, carrier battles are all about finding the enemy before he finds you and sinking him as fast as possible. When he finds the British carriers, he isn't going to wait a few hours to get a full strike since this risks the British spotting him and launching their attack on his carriers.
@@fabianzimmermann5495 Disagree. He knows there are carriers and an unescorted strike would be suicide. If Nagumo doesn't feel he could get a strike off on day 1 he would sail East to avoid an engagement and come back in the morning. He launched on the two cruisers they had no air cover. To presume he would do that against aircraft carriers is foolish and would be out character anyway.
I'm with vlad and johnshepard on this one. While Nagumo was obviously happy launching just the dive-bombers against a lone pair of cruisers, I think he would have reacted differently if he knew he was striking a larger force, particularly if he knows there are enemy carriers. It seems highly unlikely that he would have knowingly sent in a one-dimensional strike with no escort against carriers. I think Nagumo would have done as he did historically at Midway (which was an almost identical scenario to this hypothetical), and taken the time to launch a full coordinated strike. The Vals may have been prepped to go after warships, but I have to assume that only meant lighter warships, not capital ships (which Vals alone couldn't have done much to). Plus, from what I've read, CarDiv 5's Kates were *also* supposed to be part of a potential antishipping strike along with CarDiv 2's Vals - the Vals were only sent out on their own because rearming the Kates took longer than expected, and presumably because Nagumo figured they weren't needed to handle two cruisers. If Nagumo was striking Force A instead, I think he would have known he needed to wait for the whole package plus escorts.
Also, one other thing which seemed odd about Scenario 1 which could affect that above decision. Drach says the range between Somerville and Nagumo would have kept opening during the rest of the day as Somerville ran westward, making a Japanese strike more difficult the longer Nagumo waits. However, this doesn't account for the fact that Nagumo would certainly have turned his fleet west in pursuit (again, exactly what he did at Midway when he learned about the USN carrier force). Somerville was limited to 23 knots, or only 20 if he linked up with Force B, whereas Nagumo (given the crucial absence of Kaga) could make 30 knots or better with his entire fleet. Even if Nagumo doesn't ring up flank speed, he's still likely to close the range on Somerville as they both run westward, and he certainly won't *lose* ground.
In Warspite we trust.
Those kongos dont stand a chance. One at a time or all at once XD
If you figure she can handle two, and Nagumo would not dare send more than two to "investigate" so the others could cover the KB, we're good.
@@gregorywright4918 i am saying it a little in jest.
We all just love Warspite XD
Nice job, balancing the hypothetcals
Give Formidable's eagerness at Matapan to get into a fight and Unicorns later actions i imagine Formidable would take that nich scenario and i have a feeling Indomitable wouldn't want to be left out.
😂 Almost a whole hour of "How many fleets can Warspite choke out in a single war and why no one was safe from the British"
Fascinating mate, really enjoyed this video. Yes, I'd love to see the Eastern Fleet vs the Kido Butai's escorts in a night action.
Thank you for this excellent two part series. It has been most helpful from a historical perspective, but also to understand some alternative scenarios.
Greetings Drach, I have only just found your channel and I was instantly hooked. Your knowledge, dedication and passion really shine in all of your videos, combined with your wit and insight. Apologies if you have already done this but I would love a video on anti-submarine warfare in the Atlantic, with a focus on the tactics and people involved such as captain F.J. Walker (personal hero) and the amazing innovation of the Western Approaches Tactical Unit. If you're interested, I have some pictures from Bootle town hall re captain Walker, including the original flags of the general chase signal flown from HMS Kite.
Welcome! There is a TON of fantastic content here to enjoy. Drach has numerous Playlist, including one on submarines I believe.
Welcome, sailor. Lots of great content on the Splendid.
What if Somerville had the mythical HMS Susan?
Rather the much angrier HMS Karen
HMS Audacious?
@gregorywright4918 Do you mean cat and trap ark royal with buccaneers and f4s..... Nagomos Gona shit a brick if buccaneers smash his carriers heads in.
Imagine it. Warspite, all four of her turrets targeting individual Kongos while her secondary guns targetting Japanese destroyers. The Japanese ships, circling her like hungry piranhas. A single, unencrypted radio message goes out into the air. "Have at thee, ye rapscallions. Come and have a piece if ya think yer hard enough."
(6 April 1942).
IJN: We have sunk the Enterprise.
(4 June 1942)
IJN: What do you mean we lost our carriers to the Enterprise?
Different Fleet bruh The One is Light Cruiser By Royal Navy one is Aircraft Carrier by United States Navy/Marines
While the idea of two pairs of opposing carriers getting into a gun duel is hilarious, that assumes that the British admiral was dumb enough to leave them without escorting destroyers.
This was a lot of fun. Honestly maybe in the future you can do a couple other alternate history videos like this.
Learnt a lot here I had always assumed Royal Navy force was greatly inferior to the IJN force in the India Ocean at this time, and effectively ran. The loss of Hermes and the two county class and previously POW and Repulse albeit without air cover probably steered me. Along with the numbers and quality of the respective aircraft, and the number of obsolete ships on the British side involved especially the Rs. However radar, night training, extensive battle experience, armoured flight decks clearly evened things up quite a lot. Would have been a heck of achievement if the Royal Navy had managed to seriously damage the IJN considering at the time it was fighting and defeating the Kriegsmarine and Italian Navy.
I find myself wondering where the devil Cornwall and Dorsetshire are for these potential night actions, since we began by presuming the Val strike went after Force A.
Coals to Newcastle, but it's a good question.
@@erichammer2751 in the night action, Cornwall and Dorsetshire are gone.
The night action assumes the Vals hit the cruiserd as historically
if they hadn't been then they turn the scales even more heavily in Somerville's favour.
Radar picket ala suffolk and norfolk v bismarck
Taking on the entire Kongo class in a 4v1... tough odds, but it's Warspite. I wouldn't bet against her holding the field at the end of that battle.
Well this is real wargaming! A truly interesting and likely analysis of what could have happened! As always, thank you Drach! Much fascinating!
@Drachinifel I would really like to see you wargame some of this out, perhaps with Dr Clarke?
"It would require approximately two and half hours to reequip the Kate torpedo bombers..."
Midway has entered the chat.
thanks for the friday upload drach!
The Sea Hurricane 1B substantially outperforms the Martlet II/IV, in everyway, but it does have less firepower and endurance.
It might be more nimble but is that what you want in a fight with a Zero?
@@ChrisHodgsonCorben-Dallas Better a Sea Hurricane than a Martlet or a Fulmar.
Long shot but I would love to hear about what would happen in the Pacific after a British won scenario 2B
The war is shortened, possibly to the point VJ Day happens before VE Day.
Or what happens in Washington when Ernie King hears that the Royal Navy has just given the Pearl Harbour strike force a drubbing.
The IJN pulls the KB back to Singapore and re-orients westward to build a bigger buffer around the oil-rich DEI. Perhaps the Andaman islands become replacements for Midway?
If Cardiv 2 had been badly damaged or even lost a significant portion of its striking power in April...doesn't that mean that midway and maybe even MO are delayed or never happen?
One major difference if they do happen is that Nagumo would almost certainly not be in command. In almost any of the Scenario 2s (except maybe the version of 2c where his counterattack wipes Somerville out), losing an entire carrier division or more to a force that just merrily snuck up on him means Nagumo's head will almost certainly roll (figuratively, if not also literally) the moment he gets back to Japan.
Good point...but if Hiryu was badly damaged Yamaguchi might not be alive to replace him
@@Wolfeson28 Yeah, losing an entire CarDiv almost certainly means Kidou Butai gets a new CinC.
@@paulkluegel317 True, I didn't really think of that. I was thinking maybe Ozawa gets the job a year early.
Fascinating possibilities.
This is great and Zeros getting kicked by Blenheims is bloody hilarious. Can you do this for Leyte Gulf as well, pls.
Keep up the good work, hopefully I’ll get to see you on the High Seas.
A friend at my club surveyed all the actions of WW1 and almost all navel actions ended almost before they started when one side worked out that they were outnumbered and 'turned away'.
Great video, would love to see a video of the hypothetical night action done. Similarly to the video on the 1918 death ride of the high seas fleet
Top notch, and the details you present are a revelation to me here in the US about Operation C/the Indian Ocean Raid. Your follow on "What If" is just as informative and intriguing. My coments here relate specifically to those speculative scenarios you posit.
1. For #1. Given the unescorted Vals are roughly handled, that would cull some of the really experienced and skilled pilots. Dive bombing was extremely difficult to master.
2. For #2A. Given the successful night strike on Hiryu & Soryu, I would rate the result as more than 1/2 of a Midway. Both IJN carriers were veteran with veteran pilots and ships aircrew. Much more veteran than Shokaku & Zuikaku. I think tne carrier division commander was a firebrand as well, not sympatico with Nagumo. Thus, the loss of the 2 is a nearly total wipeout: ships, aircraft, commanders, pilots, ship crews and more - truly devistating.
3. For 2B. I give Nagumo a fair chance of investigating, ye😅s. He has to get some sense about what just occurred. This has to be shocking. So he would tread lightly, maybe even more so than you posit. If so, or even if he does as you think, then the 1/2+ Midway goes to near 2/3's. IMHO Nagumo woud not ever send 4 Kongo's.
3. Conclusion. If this happened, and after looking & thinking on this, I believe it missed happening by a cats whisker, Then the naval Pacific conflict changes dramatically. I won't guess in detail for that's too speculative. What I will say is that the IJN would then face more even or longer odds in any carrier clash if they initiated one. They woud face 2 fronts as well. I do not see a shorter Pacific War, as the IJN/IJA wold not yield an inch, no matter the endgame situation. The end would be signalled by the same fireballs.
pr after say w
I suppose the question then becomes, if Somerville gained the victory in a night clash, with the Japanese losing two carriers, does Coral Sea happen at all? Midway was a planned battle & I imagine would still occur….but with the US Navy not having suffered the Coral Sea loses, does Midway’s outcome change? Could the IJN lose that battle harder than they already did?
The question I'm really interested in is what happens if the Japanese aren't delayed (or Somerville hears they are delayed and waits another night) and Somerville catches them all the night before they launch their strikes on Colombo. All five carriers would be together in the one place along with all four Kongos. If they are caught unawares like Carrier division 2 was in your scenario. How much damage can all those torpedo slinging Albacores do. Could they sink or cripple all 5 carriers in one attack? Or does that require something like 90% accuracy?
Presuming the torpedoes are aimed only at the carriers, and he manages a max strike or two close waves, say 6-10 hits would probably put down one or two Soryus and damage but not cripple the other three. Nagumo would be forced to pull back if he lost air superiority, but he might have enough left to be able to launch a small strike in the morning. He would probably be able to get a CAP up, frustrating any morning follow-up attack.
I don't think R-Class & Warpsite/Kongo brawl is that likely. I'd say Furious and Indomitable gunning Soryu and Hiryu is more likely (Especially as Furious has form in wanting to cosplay as a battleship...). Nagumo was a conservative commander (Not unreasonably I would add) and having learned two of his carriers have been destroyed by surface ships, he is (To my amateur mind at least) not going to risk sending the majority of his escorts, especially if any reports suggest that only one or two (A cruiser being mistaken for a battleship is not unknown) capital ship is present. That would mean he'd have to worry about where the rest of the RN force is. If his carriers get jumped while the Kongo's are chasing Warspite, he would know it would be game over.
And Sommerville than running away would probably only convince Nagumo that another force is stalking his remaining carriers and probably see him recall the Kongo's before they catch Warspite.
Thanks Drach. Very interesting what ifs. None of it happened but very entertaining.
Awesome video, thanks! What do you think the longer-term impact would be on the war in the Pacific were a) Carrier Div 2 destroyed or b) The Great Big Shitfight In The Dark took place, destroying the British Navy in the Indian Ocean but sinking or crippling a few of the Kongos and leaving a lot of Japan's capitals ships damaged in the Indian Ocean?
Welcome to counterfactual Friday!
Scenario 1: Given the time that Force A would have been discovered Nagumo had plenty of time to recover his aircraft and get off one big strike late in the day. Nagumo was cautious, and that is his most likely course of action.
You presume that Somerville does not turn tail or launch a strike of his own in the interim? That was the conundrum at Midway, and it shows up again here.
@@gregorywright4918 A strike during the day would be suicide. The Swordfish and Albacore would be unescorted and the CAP would have a field day. Think Midway with only TBDs. My understanding of Scenario 1 is that Somerville only knows about Soryu and Hiryu and would not know a big strike was on the away until he picked it up on radar. There would not be time to do more than launch a few aircraft before the Japanese strike arrived.
There is another possibility. We know Nagumo is cautious. Instead of an immediate strike he could get East for the night with the intention of going after the Eastern Fleet in the morning.
@@johnshepherd9676Somerville knows about the IJN strike on Columbo, so there is obviously more than two carriers around. You were positing that Nagumo could wait and launch a big strike "later in the day", but then you say "There would not be time to do more than launch a few aircraft before the Japanese strike arrived". That is contradictory. Either he sends the Val-only strike against Force A immediately or he waits to land and rearm the Colombo strike later in the day, which Somerville will be expecting and have all his fighters up to disrupt.
As to the "other possibility", if Nagumo goes "East for the night", Somerville will be going west and the two forces will be hundreds of miles apart. Somerville will clear out the Addu Atoll base and head for East Africa knowing he cannot face 4+ carriers. If he gets some decent scouting reports he MIGHT try to slip back and do a night strike, but he will have to time that carefully so he can slip westward again the rest of the night.
They are Kongos too.... scenarios similar to Jutland battlecuriers are not that improbable.
You know if a scenario where Nagumo losses two carriers but heavily damages the British Fleet it actually ends up with a much changed situation following which might actually saves 4 Japanese Carriers. Midway and possibly Coral Sea, would be cancelled as the IJN lick their wounds. and Yamamoto has to plan a much more reduced plan or even going on the defensive for the rest of 1942 while trying to replace two fleet carriers. Even a loss here would also be just as beneficial as its still unlikely that the Royal Navy are going to sortie into the Pacific anyway (and could be dealt better by land based planes anyway). It will still probably halt both Coral Sea and Midway campaigns meaning they actually save 2 carriers sunk and 2 damaged later. The IJN will still loose long term but they might actually be in better state in 1942 in CVs and trained pilots than they actually were. Love What ifs.
Awesome scenario!
I wonder if you could set up the game "war on the sea" as a custom battle to play your grand slam night battle scenario and see how it pans out.
Superb show Mr. Drach. Here's another scenario I was pondering. How about both fleets are armed with 1942 era American torpedoes? Ships would be dented and eventually skippers would realize they will have to use guns.
As far as the "carrier v. carrier" gun duel at the end, just think if Furious had been moved over from the Mediterranean as well. She could have been detailed to finish off cripples of all sorts, and had a lot of fun while doing it!
Fascinating video, I'd love you to do a video on ABDA command and the Battle of Java Sea as I feel it often gets overlooked.
I like the R class against the Kongos. The R are slow by modern standards at the time but they were tough battleships and an improvement in many ways over the unmodified Queen Elizabeth class, except in speed. I suspect that if it came down to a night melee between the Warspite and the Rs against the Kongos, the Warspite and Rs could defeat the Kongos. That said, those long lance torpedoes are the wild card and could easily give Japan the win if they were well used.
Potentially a carrier vs. carrier night surface action might have involved all seven carriers. At Midway, after three of his carriers were set on fire, Nagumo attempted to close the American fleet and seek out a surface action. The authors of Shattered Sword criticise him for having Hiryu tag along, rather than opening the range to the American carriers, so there is precedent for him bringing Akagi, Shokaku and Zuikaku along with the Kongos in the scenario where he decides on all-out retaliation for having Carrier Division 2 trashed (I'm not suggesting that this is a sensible course of action, merely that there is evidence that Nagumo might do this). It raises the interesting question of whether the British carriers' armoured box was capable of protecting them against Akagi's 8" main battery.
I always thought it was operation sea, keep up the great work Drach!
It finally dawned on me a year or so ago that Operation Torch must have meant different things to the Americans and the British. To the Americans, a Torch is dramatic, what the Statue of Liberty holds, a beacon to the world, freedom.
The Brits, on the other hand, must have looked at each other quite bemused: Operation Flashlight? 🔦
Very interesting situation
Thanks Drach.
I found this hypothetical scenario interesting. However IMHO you underestimated the IJN night fighting capabilities. Don't forget they had been doing fleet exercises practicing night fighting techniques for almost 15 years. Their abilities were shown in the battles in the Solomon's and like the RN they also used scout planes to drop flares and their ships were equipped with powerful search lights. Also while it is true they did not have radar, they had some of the best optics in the world and their lookouts were men who were specifically pick based upon their night vision. In some cases they were able to detect enemy vessels at far ranges and their torpedo crews were so well discipline they could launch a spread at extreme distances with their long lance torpedoes. In addition, their destroyers and cruisers carried twice the load of torpedoes than their RN counterparts.
Finally, while it was true in the 1945 kamikaze attacks that IJA and IJN did not do significant damage to RN Armored carriers this may not have been true in 1942 when the IJN ordnance for Dive Bombers would have probably have included more armor piercing bombs which could have significantly damage the flight decks. In fact the Aichi dive bomber main weapon was a 250 kg, 550 lb bomb, which was the same ordnance that the Ju-87 carried when they damaged the Formidable flight deck and elevator in the eastern Mediterranean.
This is just my critique and input. I do find the videos and discussion very interesting and informative.
If you look at the battles of the Solomons early on it basically comes down to who has surprise, plus the US not using radar effectively - that's unlikely to happen about an RN force, it's true that it might well not have been one sided but it's also true that the Japanese could well have ended up in alot of trouble. It's important to note that the RN spent alot of the interwar years preparing for night actions and had a good deal of battle experience doing just that.
@@tomriley5790 You make valid points. However, I respectfully disagree with you about some key points. First, if you study IJN carrier tactics, at that they were probably the best in the world in deploying a large Carrier strike force in a quick amount of time, as two Carriers air groups would be deployed. So even if the RN carriers noted their arrival, their superb A6M Zero fighters which had the longer range would probably have overwhelmed their defense. Also their B5N5 Torpedo bombers were better than the Sword fish planes. Also IJN destroyers were trained to react quickly and with their reload capabilities which neither the RN or USN destroyers had, they could launch a 2-1 amount of torpedoes.
Heyo let's go!!!
Armored Carriers cites an author that only about 21 British fighters were operational so even a partial IJN air strike could have been effective. Armored Carrier also reported that Somerville thought the Japanese were not very good at night fighting.
The longer we discuss more scenarios, the more the fundamental tenet of doctrine holds true: Whomever puts the first ordinance on target has a HIGH probability of winning.
my uncle Chareles "Red" Peterson was a Marine SeeBee on Bataan. He survived.
Thanks Drach
I knew that armament swap was a long and involved process, but I have to imagine that with better fleet training and efficiency they could reduce that turnaround. 2.5 hours explains quite a bit in the context of some famous carrier issues.
Anyone wanting to referee any of Drach's scenarios here, I am willing to command a force!
Unrelated but I'd love to see a mini-video on the Japanese Submarine attack on coastal Oregon during WW2
5 vs 4 line of battle with Warspite and Rs vs Kongos sounds like a British victory, numbers and tech advantage plus warspite plot armour vs some warmed over WWI battle cruisers with no radar and less armour than Queen Mary.
Sounds like the Kongos may go down like HMS invincible had at Jutland
You’re assuming that the British can actually catch the Kongos in the first place. The British have a lot of advantages in that duel, but one that they don’t is speed, and in this scenario the Kongos don’t need to actually engage the British-they only need to buy time for the carriers and can thus run away and act as a bait.
@@bkjeong4302 true
@@bkjeong4302 British don't need to "catch" the Kongos when Japanese are the ones doing the attacking. You are right of course that the RN BBs can't chase the Kongos but they don't need to if battle is joined.
@@gokbay3057
The Kongos don’t have to stick around, though. They only need to draw British attention.