If the British had gone in for a night carrier strike against Nagumo’s force, how devastating would the Japanese losses be and would the Japanese have enough carrier strike power left for a counterattack come daylight?
Given the problems with conning towers (weight, stability implications, limited ability to protect occupants, etc.), would a better solution to the problem of needing to protect command crew have been to place the bridge below the armored deck with several redundant sets of periscopic optics (rotatable and with fish-eye objective lenses for wide fields of view) extending up to provide visibility without exposing the bridge crew?
The Japanese towards the end of the war had a decent amount of converted escort carriers of various sizes how did their various models compare to the British merchant carriers and US escort carriers on a per ship basis? Are there any that are exceptionally good or exceptionally bad?
@@brendonbewersdorf986 As a side note, the Japanese at the end of the war even had a fully operational purpose-built fleet carrier (Katsuragi, an Unryu-class), just no pilots to fly off of her.
Met an elderly, British gentleman at church about 2001. He had been on the HMS Hermes while she was being sunk by all those dive bombers. He got so choked up, he couldn't finish the story while his cheeks were getting wet with tears.
He had a dapper coat and tie, with an anchor pin and a red poppy in his lapels. I recognized the signals of a British veteran and was already a longtime military history hobbyist, so i inquired. By now I expect he is with his shipmates once again.
Successful TH-camrs & social influencers often inspire a level of jealousy and envy amongst wannabe peers. Drach’s one of those good guys whose prosperity is absolutely earned. He’s brilliant, diligent, gifted and entertaining. It’s a genuine pleasure watching him build livelihood doing what he loves so much and does so well.
I was fortunate enough to learn part of this story from Squadron Leader Leonard Birchall himself, one of the men on the PBY that reported the force/'Saviour of Ceylon', packed in with everyone in my Ontario elementary school gym to listen to his story in the early 2000s prior to his passing.
I met Air Commodore Birchall a couple of times in the nineties. Most impressive was how he was able to protect fellow POWs (to some extent) from abuse in Japanese camps.
Admire our ancestors for their dedication & bravery. A far cry from the pathetic gender confused youth of the interwebs. Not all youth are useless leftist cry babies so the burden of freedom will fall on them while the weird hide & type their bile hating on their country.
In 1950, U.S. President Harry Truman appointed Birchall an Officer of the Legion of Merit, saying: "His exploits became legendary throughout Japan and brought renewed faith and strength to many hundreds of ill and disheartened prisoners."
This is an action which hits close to home. My mother was engaged to AB John Quinn who was reported as missing presumed killed on HMS Hermes in April 1942. So I became quite familiar with the story of Hermes. She went on to marry my father, a USAAF P-38 pilot in 1947. My father died on 24 December at 100 after a long life lived well.
Interesting to think about when you owe who you are to the death of someone good, right? My grandmother's boyfriend was killed on HMS Hood. Sobering to think that that butterfly effect on my life was repeated in the millions across the war - so many things that could have been.
@@alisilcox6036 Yeah, but maybe that guy was a turd and she just never got to find out. Some people, who appear like really good people are jerks. I remember when my Italian GF's father died. The whole village came to his funeral! You'd have thought that tge f***ing pope died, there were so many people there. Later that evening my GF's brother came to me and I could see that he was psychologically/emotionally wiped out. He said to me, "I feel like shit. All day people, who I hardly know, have been coming up to me and telling me how great my father was. How he generously helped them with this and that or did this or that for them, how he was there for them, in their hour of need. Yet, all he ever did was beat and abuse us." You see, their father had been a terribly abusive mf-er with them all their lives. He had beaten them and tormented them psychologically all their lives and they were actually happy that he was dead. To then have everyone in the village come and tell them what a wonderful man their father had been just did them in. He was everything to everyone, except his family. In my time on this rock I have developed what I call "the theory of assh*les." It is probably nothing new Emmanuel Kant or Nietzsche probably have it in their side notes somewhere ormaybe it is already out there somewhere? I don't know I am not that educated, but I reckon there is probably not an original thought in the whole universe. Anyway, my theory of assh*les goes like this: Everyone is an assh*le whether they know it or not. Being an assh*le comes to some people naturally, and like you "cannot blame a tiger for being a tiger", you cannot blame a natural assh*le for being an assh*le. There are other people, who actually work at being assh*les. They are not natural assh*les by birth, but for whatever reasom believe that they have to be an assh*le for a myriad of possible reasons. They might think it is the only way to achieve their goals or some "greater" goal. They might think that they are actually going society a favor or accomplishing something great by being an assh*le. Then, there are the rest of us. We do not really want to be assh*les. We try to be considerate to others, be polite, do "good deeds", bush our teeth for the whole recommended two minutes and all that jazz, you get the picture? Yet, no matter how hard we try fate conspires against us, and we are, somewhere, at some time, to someone, inadvertantly an assh*le! Maybe we notice it and feel guilty about it, maybe we don't, but either way, at that point in time, for that person, we are "the assh*le!" It is unavoidable. Example, You are in traffic and you dodge right to let somebody in, but you didn't see that one guy coming up and you cut him off. To him you're the assh*le! The road to hell is paved with assh*les. There is just no avoiding it. This doesn't mean that you should say "F*** it!" and just be an assh*le yourself all the time. It means, you should consider, that maybe that guy that you think is an assh*le, like a willful assh*le or a natural assh*le, was really just an inadvertant assh*le. Anyway, I hope this was fun.
@@alisilcox6036when the HMS HOOD WAS Attacked and sank there was only 3 survivors. so back Then as well as today if you survive a sinking it is not in the cards for you to die. I seen a video on YT that Was an interview with the last man Still alive shortly before he passed and I remember the funeral for him by the Royal Navy, with his Flag dropped coffin borne by members of the British Military. It was a sad day bc it made you realize that he was the last in line
I remember reading the memoirs of a Japanese dive-bomber pilot, I believe his name was Zenji Abe, who described the raid as “using a sword to kill a chicken.”
I remember reading this many years ago. After the declaration of war by Britain, it was not standing alone. All its Dominions ( South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, India and Canada), and its colonies, and territories contributed their men, leading to men of all sorts of colours, with all sorts of unfamiliar shoulder patches to puzzle British civilians, e.g. ANZAC - Australia and New Zealand Army Corp, SA - South Africa, and so on. It was especially surprising for British civilians to see dark skinned subjects of the Empire. The story I read, decades ago, was of an Australian officer who was in London, on leave, with a friend of his, a dark-skinned Fijian officer. They were in the City of London, the middle of London, just walking down the street, attracting many curious glances. Eventually, a British civil servant in a bowler hat, suit, tie and with a briefcase, approached the pair and started a conversation with the Australian officer, but was clearly very curious about the Melanesian Fijian officer and spent a lot of time looking at him and his shoulder patch "Fiji". He eventually asked the Australian officer what his companion's shoulder patch signified. The Australian decided to take the piss, and told the curious Brit, that it was an acronym for "First Imperial Japanese Infantry" to the great amusement of the Fijian.
OMG I really wanted a video about the Indian Ocean Raid, since it caught my attention a few days ago, now here it is! You are great Drach, keep it up with your amazing work!
My uncle Bill was a PBY5-A crew chief and gunner for the USN during the liberation of the Philippines, and was sent on "Black Cat" missions like bombing the Japanese in Indochina. During the liberation of the Philippines my uncle's aircraft was shot down twice, the second time, badly injuring him for for life, and getting to see his best friend die.
One could definitely criticize Somerville's decision to send Hermes and the two cruisers back to Ceylon, given that his two top theories about the Japanese were either that their attack had been delayed, or else that they were waiting for the Brits to return. Otherwise I agree that he did the best he could under the circumstances.
I cannot even imagine how you manage to have such an output of high-quality, long-duration videos on such niche topics. However, I am immensely thankful. Cheers Drach!
Long have I waited for this video and you did not disappoint. (as you never do) The Indian Ocean Raid is so fascinating to me, because it could quite easily have turned into the first carrier battle in history and just barely didn't, thanks to the usual difficulties that are present in all carrier battles. Somerville strikes me personally as a very capable but rather unlucky admiral. It's difficult to get into an engagement with the enemy force and even more difficult to pull a victory out of it. Especially if you have the weaker force. You can see this both with the battle of Cape Spartivento and with the Indian Ocean Raid. Both times Somerville had inferior forces and tried to make the best out of it, but didn't succeed in inflicting lasting damage to the enemy. And in case of the Indian Ocean Raid, he was very lucky to remain undetected, as his fleet would have otherwise almost certainly gotten annihilated.
Thank you Drach for this banger! The Indian Ocean Raid is a subject I’ve long wanted an extensive treatment of, and you brought all guns to bear, as always.
Considering his overall lack of air cover, Sommerville was lucky to not suffer bigger losses. On the other hand, destruction of Soryu and Hiryu would be probably worth losing entire Eastern Fleet. Allies could replace losses, IJN not.
Or, had he held course on evening of April 5th, a combination of 15 inch salvos, working destroyer\cruiser torpedoes, and albacore-swaordfish torpedoes inflict losses equal or greater to Midway. British casualties would likely have equaled or surpased those sustained at Trinco\Colombo, but the moral and strategic windfall would be to quash any consideration of the Cripps offer, and to enable an amphibious counter attack at Rangoon instead of the Madagascar scenario. And a British midway would easily wipe out the specter of Force Z and Singapore
Imperial Japan successfully managed to build, commission and field 3 Unryu-class Fleet Carriers and Taiho by the end of WWII in Asia. Replacing Aircraft Carriers was never a problem for Imperial Japan. It was the completely irreplaceable losses in carrier-borne aircraft, pilots, flight crews, maintenance teams, damage-control teams, armorers, mechanics, engineers, technicians, etc., etc. that ultimately brought about the final demise of the Kido Butai as well as both the overall Imperial Japanese Navy as a whole and the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service. A demise that required more than just one debacle (no matter how calamitous or how massive) to make into reality.
@@razgriz9146 80-90k tonnes of carrier tonnage in 4 years isn't exactly anything to right home about, especially considering losses and the production of their enemies. A lack of everything, carrier production inlcuded, was an issue
@@silverhost9782 this is, of course, completely ignoring all of the other Unryu-class Fleet Carriers that were in various stages of completion prior to the end of the Pacific War. In any event, the overall point that I'm making is that Imperial Japan was fully-capable of more than making good its losses at Midway with the titanic American triumph there ultimately accomplishing very little when considered in isolation from the rest of the Pacific War.
@@razgriz9146The issue wasn't carriers or exprienced crew loss at Midway. It was aircraft. Japanese industry had insanely low production rates of carrier aircraft. The Unryu class and Taihou you mentioned? They barely had any aircraft because the aircraft they were supposed to use: B7A2/B6N2 torpedo bombers, D4Y dive bombers, and A7 Reppu fighters all had constantly delayed development and production rates. The Kido Butai in fact barely replaced any of their losses over their 6-month reign before Midway which is why their airwings were significantly reduced during the battle. For example, Japanese naval aircraft production in 1942 was horrendously low for a nation at war (will get the exact figures from Shattered Sword which I have at home). As for crew, it turns out that an averagr "ONLY" 25% of all experienced pilots and crew were lost among the carriers (Kaga having the most losses by far among the carriers at over 35%). 25% may seem a lot....until you compare Midway to the massive slog that was the Guadalcanal campaign which saw losses of over FIFTY PERCENT for the Japanese. This was the reason why after Guadalcanal there were no large scale carrier battles until the showdown at Phillipine Sea in 1944.
Very informative. I had not realised the Japanese naval air forces were not trained in night fighting. Somerville was reputed to have said on his first sight of the Eastern Fleet "Well there's many a good tune played in an old fiddle."
Excellent recap on Operation C, Drach. You did more in 54 minutes to explain the background for the operation, forces employed, intel information and combat actions than John Clancy in his 200 page-long book. And for that, I thank you.
Erebus and Terror are two ships dear to my heart. They have the legacy of the originals, who famously went missing searching for the northwest passage (recently discovered I believe). And I just love the idea of putting a full on battleship turret on a small(ish) hull. Dedicated shore bombardment ships that are way too overpowered, because the British could afford it. And in a bad situation, you have a mini battleship at your disposal.
Great video on an oft under-appreciated (/dismissed as embarassing British loss) battle, which well shows the fogs of war and has lots of interesting what if scenarios. I do like the idea that the humble Blenheim could nearly have sunk the pride of the Japanese fleet Akagi - as much like at Midway she was caught in the middle of re-arming her planes. Also the funny thing is shortly after this a Blenheim would shoot down one of the IJA's top pilots over the Bay of Bengal, not bad for a supposedly obsolete plane.
I love your channel and have been a long time subscriber! I've also been watching the unauthorized history of the war in the Pacific and have thoroughly enjoyed you as a guest host on that presentation! Great job
I think Somerville made a lot of correct decisions in regards to the main fleets. As drach says. He just got unlucky, especially with the typical british intel being wrong at the worst of times and then correcting itself at the worst of times. The 2 cruisers and hermes are a different matter. With or without hindsight. Hermes shouldve sailed north around ceylon. Yes ryujo was there but compared to the presumed 2 full fleet carriers to the south east (which was actually 6), sailing north was the better of the gambles and i dont understand why they risked the southern run. The loss of the 2 counties was a symptom of a different issue. The royal navy had for so long been used to being the dominant fleet in the atlantic and med. It was much easier to send a few ships on a "milk run" in those theatres as the air attacks came from land and they had some deterrants for the submarines. With the surface fleets being bottled up in axis ports. But sending 2 heavy cruisers back to ceylon alone with an active battle fleet presumed to be in the area (again, even with just the presumed numbers of 2 CVs) was a foolish gamble given how differently the japanese fought as a full fledged navy compared to the glorified coastal defence that was the regia marina or the somewhat dangerous kreigsmarine. The japanese had free reign of the south china sea and a good portion of the pacific. And you know they have intentions of attacking into the indian ocean even if theyre delayed. The royal navy kept sending off small dispatches of ships only for them to get destroyed by a full battle fleet or by a swarm of japanese ground based aircraft. And its a lesson the royal navy kept refusing to learn. But i do find Erebus being the sole defender of trincomalee quite amusing. Just some splinters? Is that all youve got kido butai? just a small monitor shouting "BRING IT ON!"
Spot on bruv. The lessons on carrier aircraft and aircraft in general again surface ships was a lesson that had already been shown, with severe consequences to the Allies. The Great War recalcitrance is almost criminal. I don’t really blame Somerville for this either. This being said though……. Hindsight has little to do with the real assessment that leaving surface vessels without air cover before late in 43 was guaranteed suicide for those vessels, and even in 44 and 45 aircraft were clearly shown to have a massive edge, when proper trained (or determined to die)
@@arkadikharovscabinetofcuri3465 even ignoring the carriers. You dont send 2 heavy cruisers alone to a base that is under threat of being attacked with enemy fleets in the area. At the very least those carriers would have been escorted by heavy cruisers and potentially the kongos too (depending on intelligence report perception at the time). The allies had multiple lessons in the form of 1.pearl harbour, 2. force Z, 3. java sea (with multiple battles) i.e. loss of houstons group and loss of exeter later. All of these attacks consisted of the japanese working as a large surface fleet or with large air capability. And never sending small detachments off when in an active combat environment waiting for enemy engagement. Why the 2 cruisers were sent off i dont know. But id argue it was possibly an even worse decision than likes of Force Z. Because they shouldve learned this lesson by now.
@@joelmontgomery4837 exactly. It was not until the American late war planning that AA was even remotely effective against committed carrier strikes, and to be fair I’m not sure this wasn’t due more to the losses at midway and Japanese battle doctrine (ie surviving without completing objectives was dishonorable). Had the IJN not lost so many of their skilled aircrews, without effectively trained replacements, I’m not sure how the latter battle of the war would have rolled out
@@arkadikharovscabinetofcuri3465 Actually the American AA showed up later in 1942, Saving Enterprise from more damaging hits. The combination of 20MM and 40MM AA was deadly by the end of 1942
As Drach mentioned in the video, the British actually weren’t expecting the Japanese to be in the area, when they split their fleet up and sent the two cruisers and Hermes+Vampire to Ceylon. They weren’t expecting an attack at that point, as they hadn’t discovered the Kido Butai before the report on April 4th. Intel said they would be there by the 1st, and that turned out to be wrong. The discovery on the 4th came as somewhat of a surprise to the British, catching the Eastern Fleet off guard as they were replenishing after the sortie on the 1st~2nd. I do have the same question about why Hermes and other ships from Trincomalee were sent south though. Even with the presence of Ryujo to the north, it was clear by that point that the main Japanese fleet to the south was much more threatening. North should have been the obvious escape route, even without hindsight.
Drach, I just love these in-detail recountings of fleet actions! Just so riveting to listen to with all the operational details you give, even when the general history of the action is already known. 43:40 Can we apreciate for a moment the fact that three rather unimpressive Hurricanes bagged three A6M Zeros, one piloted by a high-ranking and experienced officer? Quite a nice little feat of professional airmanship in my opinion.
I agree with your assessment of Somerville. At the time, while he knew that a Japanese carrier unit of *some* kind was out there and headed to attack Ceylon, he was also getting incomplete and sometimes also conflicting information so all he knew for sure was that they were out there *somewhere* and the ocean is vast. In an additional similarity to Jellicoe, he also had a lot of pressure to not make any fatal mistakes. A couple things going different could have gotten his entire fleet destroyed and cede control of the Indian Ocean to the IJN.
I mean, he basically ceded control of the Indian Ocean to the IJN anyway. Even if his entire fleet had been sunk, the IJN would have been too busy dealing with the Americans and Australians to bother doing anything that far west. Somerville had one golden opportunity to deal major damage to the IJN, and he completely fumbled it despite losing so much to just give him such a golden opportunity. By contrast, the Americans would put their carriers at risk again and again to take every opportunity to weaken the IJN, and that was without a decisive advantage for all night operations.
Surely one of the last survivors of the Pinafore-class armored cruiser, the darling of First Lord of the Admiralty Sir Joseph Porter. I suspect Susan was one of his sisters...or his cousins... or his aunts.
The two fleets passing near each other (close enough to make a gunnery engagement possible) have often been argued (including on this channel) to show how carriers are potentially vulnerable to surface attack at night, but to me they highlight another issue that actually makes it harder to attack carriers using surface ships at night; the fact it’s surprisingly hard to even FIND an enemy fleet on the move at night, even at such close distances, unless you already know exactly where it is and are actively looking for it. As for what would have happened if the British had engaged using gunnery? I expect that the Japanese escorts around the carriers would be the first to take damage and the carriers would be alerted and start working up steam to run for it. In that time one of the carriers might be badly damaged or even sunk, but that’s a big if, and come daylight the rest of the Kido Butai will be out for payback (especially since CarDiv1 and the Shokakus would almost certainly be intact). What I’d really want to see is if the British actually pull off that planned night carrier strike against the Kido Butai, which the Japanese have basically no counter for; we might get an Illustriouses vs. Shokakus battle to go with all the Shokakus vs. Yorktowns battles.
The main reason for that argument is Cape Matapan. It's fanciful that it coild've happened again here, but interesting all the same. Warspite being present on both occasions makes it even more fascinating.
@@Cailus3542 At Cape Matapan Formidable was only that close to the Italian fleet by her own volition: she could easily have just left if she’d wanted to, as the Italians never found her.
Props to Somerville being aggressive, but a night action with the Kido Butai would be disastrous for the RN. At night, Somerville gets hit in the face with all the long lances. The next morning, Zeros, Kates, and Vals dominate.
@@treyhelms5282that assumes the Japanese can launch torpedoes first. RN doctrine of a night carrier strike means the first hits are RN torpedoes, and then at some point later, RN surface fire and torpedoes. If the Japanese are being hit first, do they get the chance to launch torpedoes at all?
@@juicysushi The Japanese REGULARLY launched torpedoes first in surface actions. The RN couldn't find the KB historically, and the idea they would accurately launch Swordfish torpedoes at the KB task force at night is laughable. If the RN closes, they do start eating Long Lances. And whatever happens at night, in the morning the RN experiences what the USS Lexington and USS Yorktown did at Coral Sea.
Great video, aside from everything else I learned about something that's not really well know this side of the pond it really gave an insight into just how much strain the two groups Commanders must have been under. So many variables could lead to success yet the equal number could lead to disaster and they had to sort thru and do their level-headed best.
Thanks. I'd been aware for some time of the general nature of the battle but this very much added to my understanding of more of the details of what had gone on. As with the Japanese scouting bad luck at Midway - that kind of thing does happen. And yes - there is a vast difference between people trying to recreate a battle where they know what is going on and people in the real battle NOT really knowing what is going on. History is replete with examples of people making decisions based on what they _thought_ was going on - rather than what was - much to their misfortune. What would have happened at Waterloo - if Grouchy had ridden to the sound of the guns? .
Great episode. I remember the story of the Fulmar with the shot up radio preventing the timely report of the Japanese position, course, and speed. If not for that, the Royal Navy might have had a night action that would have rivaled Taranto. I agree that Admiral Somerville was aggressive enough given his forces, but was simply unlucky.
The thoughts of his ships and a carrier pouring broadside after broadside into the 2 IJN carriers and escorts is hilarious to me. Would have made a hell of a story
Great stuff! Carrier battles which missed or nearly missed tended to come off as very confused affairs, with some poor sod getting caught flatfooted in the middle of it. This whole affair seems eerily reminiscent of the opening phases of the Battle of the Coral Sea, but with no payoff other than medium-sized units taking a full dive-bomber attack. Arguably, the Eastern Fleet comes off worse in this case than did the American units prior to the big clash of carriers at Coral Sea. It was all rather unfortunate and unlucky. But then, even the best commanders can't have all the luck all of the time, I suppose. - As far as the surprising performance of the Blenheim MkIV is concerned in air-to-air combat with Zeroes, this was of course 1942. While that didn't make the Blenheim any faster, at least it did make it more likely that these aircraft were rather better-defended than the earlier version of the MkIV and the MkI. Early-war Blenheims just had the single drum-fed and manually-reloaded Vickers 'K' gun in the dorsal turret. This was totally inadequate in 1939 & 40 - being quickly modified to a still-weak twinned 'K' mounting - and certainly contributed to the aircraft's dire performance against interceptors. This changed for the better with the replacement of the Vickers K mounting with the new twin Browning installation, which had ammo track paths sorted out and two nice big bins of belted ammo. FN-54 chin blister or not (it's hard to tell in the photo of the Colombo-based 11Sqdn bomber), they likely had the Browning dorsal turret by this time. If they did, then they had a much better chance against fighters and this *maaay* go towards their very respectable performance in self-defence here.
They had a pretty big tendency to ignore the realities of logistics when it came to try conquering places. They didn't have the logistics to occupy Midway, and were contemplating Hawaii? Australia was at least closer, but not really more realistic.
@@thomasbaker6563 Logically, it would have, but conquering Australia did not really align with the concentric rings of defense strategic plan the Japanese had for whittling down the American fleet before it could reach Japan. Taking Australia might have made sense if Britain and America were both dedicating similar resources to coming through the Pacific to reach Japan. Realistically, the US Navy and US Army were dedicating far more resources, which only made Australia one large base on Japan's southern flank.
@@amerigo88 Don't underestimate the Australian war in the Pacific. They fought everywhere the US Marines didn't. Knocking Australia out of the war or driving the population to the South would have been a great blow to the Allied war effort.
@@nowthenzen Every Allied military that fought alongside the Aussies and Kiwis admired them. With the war coming to Darwin and Port Moresby, I totally understand why Australia would have been so committed to the war. I just think the argument that Australians were facing an existential threat has been exaggerated. The Japanese MIGHT have been able to take Hawaii through an enormous effort at the end of a tenuous supply line. If they could barely take the island of Oahu, much less the continent of Australia. It's a bit like pretending the Japanese were going to conquer China and then India too.
I love how IJN is completely failing in secrecy and all their plans are know to the allies before they even set sail, but they still manage to achieve an effect of surprise because of them failing to follow their own schedule due to absolutely stupid reasons 😂 It’s just a drunken master style
I agree. I always wanted to know where the Japanese would have scored the most strafing planes on the ground "episode" .. their planning during the war doesn't look that good.. They fought and lost the Russians in Mongolia ... That's an interesting fight.... 🤙
I like the terpsichorean reference in the title of the video, Drach, as I have a keen interest in this particular encounter via the related medium of song. It was a fair few years ago when I first delved into the details of the Indian Ocean Raid, after having been only vaguely aware of it beforehand. Then, by pure happenstance, (a) I developed an interest in the strange, lost world of female Pop music of the satellite nations of the former Soviet Bloc around the middle of the last decade, to such an extent I started blogging about it at 'Girls Of The Golden East' and (b) I picked out a particular favourite, Valérie Čižmárová, so started a blog specially for her at 'Bananas For Breakfast', in the course of which I stumbled across all her major recording anniversaries. As it just so happens, 5th April is one of those said recording anniversaries and wouldn't you know that the main title of the song recorded on that date in 1971 - it has an alternate title of 'Borůvek pár' ('A Few Blueberries') - is 'Za sluncem, za vodou', which I primarily translate from the Czech as 'In Sunshine, In Water', but literally means 'Under Sunshine, Under Water'. Given that the HMSs Cornwall and Dorsetshire were 'under water' as a result of the actions of aircraft 'named after' Valérie twenty-nine years to the day before 'Za sluncem, za vodou' was recorded one can see how things connect around to each other in this instance, so thanks for such a detailed look at this battle, Drach. One final thing that is yet another link to things naval is that the song was later performed at the Děčínská Kotva Festival, the name of the Festival meaning 'Děčín Anchor', where songs, of course, had to have an aquatic theme.
Add this to your "what if" episode. Had Ceylon and Trincomalee been re-enforced by a couple of crack Spitfire squadrons, as was done with Malta not long after,what a cracking series of air battles might have taken place. With a functioning radar warning net for both bases the experienced RAF lads would have put on a good show in their 1942 model Spitfires. Great episode, thanks for posting,Drach.
First, why would experienced RAF pilots be sent out of Europe? Second, these are Japanese carrier air pilots of the kido butai. They are literally the most experienced fighter pilots on the planet at this time. Most have been flying and fighting for 5 years at this point. Third, the Spitfire has a fatal flaw. It is is super short ranged and the advantages that it had against Italian and German fighters were flipped when fighting Japanese ones. The Allies had to learn the hard way how to fight Japanese air power and the experience in Britain fighting the Germans was a very different context from Asia. It took a long time for British pilots, even with Spitfires, to be able to fight Japanese aviators on equal terms.
First of all, RAF pilots WERE sent "out of Europe" to many war zones. Secondly the Spitfire was an ideal point defense fighter which is exactly what was needed to defend airbases and ports. You are clueless.@@porksterbob
@@GM-fh5jpNotice I said "Experienced" RAF pilots. When the Indian Ocean Raid happened, the British are still in a knife fight in Burma. The British had already sent pilots to Southeast Asia in Malaya... Those guys are dead by April of 1941. Read about the problems that the British had in the air in the Malayan campaign. There is not a pool of Battle of Britain veteran airmen free to be sent to Ceylon when the British are in active ground combat over North Africa and Burma.
Drach mentions the the Hurricanes that got up to altitude and could dive down to attack the Japanese aircraft were more successful than the aircraft that were scrambled late. This is the key. Spitfires or any aircraft are vulnerable when at a height disadvantage. A working radar system is the difference between the first and second attacks on Ceylon. They give the defender time to get to altitude. Even a Gladiator or a Buffalo can make one good diving pass if given time.
The spitfire was a better aircraft than the Hurricane.But Spitfire pilots over Darwin learned that the Japanese navy pilots and the Zero was not to be underestimated because they took some hard knocks till they learned the proper tactics to fight the Zero.
That little thingy about the British fleet able to deliver a night attack against the Kido Butai has always stirred my fantasy...can't wait for your friday vid! Thank you Drach, this is great stuff!!
@@treyhelms5282 Agreed, of course...but...who knows? A lucky strike at night, with a somewhat superior radar technology and doctrine...who knows? Stimulating what-if scenario, indeed😄!
@@Riccardo_Silva It is an interesting scenario. It's worth noting the rader would help find the Kido Butai, not aim torpedoes. The RN night doctrine was better than the Italians, the Japanese better than the Americans. It's hard to see a night Swordfish foray being effective, but the typical Long Lances not, if the RN gets too close. It's not so hard to see what happens to Somerville's force in the morning.
Just remembered swordfish had had a bit of operational success at night, a little known raid in Italy that sunk there battleships comes to mind. And Japanese night air defence is not exactly good.
@@treyhelms5282but the plan was aerial torps by night with surface action to follow. A feasible plan but I agree that long lances and four Kongos would be a tough nut for Warspite in the morning.
"The first carrier vs carrier kill could have been a surface gunfight." You know formidable would want that honour after Cape Matapan. I give the RN BBs like Warspite stick for being aggressive but I think the fact that 2 of the RN CV have on purpose gotten close enough to the enemy to fire on them speaks volumes for the general aggressiveness within the fleet.
@shootme Indeed. To one up Illustrious. To the uninitiated, Illustrious fired some 4.5 inch broadsides in Cape Matapan against Italian surface vessels, till Adm Cunningham saw it happening and ordered her to beam herself somewhere far away, immediately.
Well, HMS unicorn used her guns for shore bombardment in Korea. I swear there must be something in their tea because royal navy captains (and sailors) are a different breed.
I mean, if you give guns to any warship, and their planes are busy. Why wouldn't you use them? Certainly is the thought I imagine would go through many a carrier captain's head.
@@Destroyer_V0 😳 Illustrious class carrier is way too vulnerable and way too valuable asset to have any place being within gun range of enemy surface vessels.
Very impressive production. My father was a sailor with the Eastern fleet. But much later in the war. Joining HMS Redoubt - an R class destroyer in South Africa in 1944 and then sailling around this area of operations from SA to Addu Atol and Trincomalee then back again. He finished out the war in England flying Tiger Moths training to be a Fleet Air arm pilot.
Wow, what a story. That lone Albacore's survival and diligent return to deliver her report-well done lads, but unfortunately, their brave and correct action caused the opportunity for an advantageous night action to slip away. The crew of that aircraft bravely did their duty, but if they could have known, they'd have served their nation better by ditching in the sea or at least, briefly developing amnesia. I can't help but think of the parallel to Arashi at Midway, chasing off the Nautalis, then dutifully racing back to retake her escort station with Akito Butai. Had it been possible for Arashi's officers and crew to have possessed complete information, they'd have better served their nation by opening the valves and scuttling their vessel rather than providing the long wake which McCluskey and his bombers spotted, pointing like the finger of Almighty God towards the very carriers Arashi was dutifully racing to protect. Fate is a fickle mistress. All we tiny humans can do is give our best efforts and hope that we don't someday realize that doing our best one fine morning in our youth turned out to have cost more than we could imagine.
Props to Somerville being aggressive, but a night action with the Kido Butai would be disastrous for the RN. At night, Somerville gets hit in the face with all the long lances. The next morning, Zeros, Kates, and Vals dominate.
@@treyhelms5282Jap BBS have a terrible night action record and there carriers don't even operate at night. A night battle with both sides being trained, one having radar, combat experience of night engagements with radar, night time aviation is gona be a stomp so hard the Japs are going to wish that Hiroshima got pasted instead.
Thoroughly enjoyed this episode, packed full of information I didn't know. Personally I have always viewed the Royal Navy as aggressive and ready for any fight, even when odds were against them. To me it seems that Somerville did what he could with his orders and the "fog of war.". I would have loved to have seen Warspite take a crack at the IJN.
Hypothetically, if Somerville had successfully taken out (temporarily or permanently) Soryu and Hiryu. What does that leave the IJN in terms of their carrier ops. They would still have Akagi, Kaga, Shokaku and Zuikaku. But do they still send two carriers to Coral Sea? Do they send all 4 to Coral Sea? Is Coral Sea scrapped and all 4 deployed to Midway?
It might depend on British losses. If the British fleet escaped largely unscathed, then the sudden vulnerability of the Kido Butai and the likelihood of Britain and the USN defending the area around Australia probably would have led them to call off, or at least delay, the Coral Sea operation. If the British fleet lost a couple of fleet carriers as well, then Japan would be much less concerned about the RN’s ability to interfere, and probably would have continued to see the USN as unlikely to correctly time an attack to stop the operation with the RN unable to assist. If Japan proceeded with the operation, it’s likely that some sort of Anglo-American pincer attack could have been successfully performed, and the Kido Butai could have been crippled even earlier. If Japan still pulled off Coral Sea with their historical losses, but minus two other carriers, they may have still attempted Midway. However, they might have scaled back or eliminated the Aleutian Island diversionary attack, or rushed Shinano into service, or hurriedly concerted a cruiser or two into light carriers, or hurriedly finished the Ise class conversion into full (but awful) carriers. Either way, the outcome would be worse for Japan.
@@bluemarlin8138 I think you are greatly overestimating Japan capabilities, Shinano conversion did start because of Midway but they still rushed it, the Ise battleships conversions were rush jobs and they couldnt convert then in full carriers as they were, Shinano itself ended up as that repair hybrid carrier because construction was too advanced so the barbettes for the forward main guns was installed along other armor that mean they were further limited to what internal changes they could do with then, the Ise would have the exact same problems being completed battleships were you would be better off building new carriers from the ground up that attempting to turn those into even light carriers, the Ise conversion was just a rush job on ships that were obsolete and wouldnt take as long as building new carriers (that they did) or making conversions, very much "slap a flight deck on the back and done". And as for cruisers ... also, no. Japan didnt have many cruisers, their light cruisers development stopped with the Sendai class in the mid 20's being picked up again in the 42 with the Agano class but we talking about ships that had about 6,000 tons displacement as the Independence class that was based on the Cleveland hull had a displacement of 15,000 tons ... they were far too light, Ibuki that was the lead of her class of heavy cruisers was converted into a light carrier also due to Midway loses and the fact she wasnt completed is another example of the difference of industrial capacity of the US and Japan, heck even the UK struggled with new ships as we seen with the Lion and Malta class. Also they had merchant ships that could be converted, such as Scharnhorst ... **SS** Scharnhorst, a German Ocean Liner that was seized by Japan in 39 and then sold in 42, she became the carrier Shin'you, the Taiyou class escort carrier were all Japanese Cargo Liners that were converted, this was kinda of a trick as the Japanese military help funded the construction of ships with the specification they would be build in a way so they could be converted if needed, the reason we dont hard much about then is because in the Taiyou class case they were used to ferry planes and cargo, Japan had a few carriers at the end of the war, the Unryuu class for example as Katsuragi that we dont hard about because at that time Japan lacked not only aircraft but also pilots to make use of then, Katsuragi that survived the war never had her group embarked as it was diverted to Iwo Jima, same with Amagi except that in her case she was found and attacked (well Katsuragi was also attacked but survived) and she capsized in harbor. In the end Japan had one shoot, that was to deliver a knockout punch during the first rounds, the longer the fight gone the higher the chances of defeat increased, even if Japan won Midway ... it would be irrelevant, the British participation on the Pacific naval was also irrelevant, it only matters if for national pride you want good old Britain to teach then a lesson but the reality was, Britain had a war at their doorstep and Japan was secondary, even if all gone right in this operation, they would be recalled home because they couldnt afford to play Empire in the Pacific as the home islands were starving, priority was the Atlantic, then the Med and everything else after, if the Argentinians took the Falklands at that time, the British response would likely be a strong worded letter and dropping the issue for the time.
In my opinion Somerville very well followed British tradition in contesting any challenge to their control of the seas, and he did so the best he could with the means he had at hand, mainly hoping for a successful night attack on the enemy forces. But the hard true was that he was very lucky not to have his fleet sunk, and the RN was not a match for the Japanese navy at the time. And so it was quickly decided to retreat from the area and send the fleet thousand of miles to Africa, safer from Japanese attacks. The Japanese conquests in Asia were bad, as they heralded the end of the British Empire giving more strength to the independent movements, but I think sending the main fleet to Africa was even worse, as there were still British and Commonwealth troops fighting in the area and for the first time in modern times, the fleet was not there to protect them. Those troops could count only on minor units from the RN for the time being and, a great turning point, the USN, much more active and that never stopped challenging the Japanese for the control of the seas.
Wow, that was great. As always. I thought the Hurricane would have made a huge difference to Force Z; however, it could have gotten there. The failure to spread spitfires has always annoyed me, especially in Malta early on. No fan of Leigh Mallory but as a Kiwi I'm a Keith Park man . But anyway, how the Brits understood early warning and the Dowding system and couldn't do it around the empire has always shocked me. Great vid .
Warspite seriously looks good on film! Idk what it is exactly, but she is one of the few ships I can identify no matter what viewpoint, composition, refit level etc the picture presents! Just really love her...
WaDrach, sir? Many moons ago, i came across a (possible) alternative history of the japanese navy taking celon, and the naval strategy of the allies to retake it? Was this you? If not ,? Have you seen it? If you have how feasible was it?
Australia's E-M-U Defense Line, as you pointed out in earlier videos, was likely a contributing factor in the IJA refusing to supply troops to the IJN.
I should recommend this video to my professor of Archaeology of South Asia course as a optional video for students to watch. Since the course also briefly touches archaeology of near past in the region.
What I want to know is what future plans for the Indian Ocean did the IJN have before the Doolittle Raid? My latest theory about WW2 is that the Doolittle Raid was way more influential than anyone at the time suspected. The Soviet offensive outside Moscow at the end of 1941 put an end to Hitler's plan to quickly drive the Soviets out of the war. But then the entry of Japan threw Hitler a life line. If Japan could weaken the UK enough, then that could under-cut the Soviets and possibly let the Germans win. On the other side, Japan's only hope of winning was if Germany could knock the UK out of the war and make the US divert most of their forces to the Atlantic. IJN control of the Indian Ocean could accomplish all of these goals. But after the IJN had been embarrassed by the Doolittle Raid, there was no chance of them diverting forces from the Pacific. This doomed Germany which doomed Japan.
Japan did not have ambitions in the Indian ocean beyond strictly military objectives. The purpose of the wide scale attack on southeast Asia in December 1941 was three fold. 1. Destroy all possible enemy opposition near the western pacific. 2. Secure oil from the Dutch East Indies. 3. Complete the blockade of China. As a result of the Indian ocean raid, the Japanese did gain control of the eastern half of the Indian ocean. The British don't send a warship to Burma until the end of 1944. China is successfully isolated through the conquest of Burma. Had Japan occupied Ceylon, it would have made life a little more difficult for the UK, but the Japanese were not going to be able to accomplish many further objectives. They didn't have the troops to attack India. The entire Pacific campaign and the Southeast Asia campaign was conducted with only 30% of the Japanese Army. The rest had to stay in China.
How dare that Catalina crew send a sighting report with info on the ships, their location and other useful data. Didn't they know that tradition required ambiguous data and absolutely no location data.
@Drachinifel approx. 53:00 mark. "In (your) personal opinion...". Really!? I think we can all agree that your opinions on these matters carry the weight of a doctoral level of education, research, and, dare I say, the experience gained through so many in-depth studies of various engagements, battles and the like, as well as the commanders involved in them, so much so that you can safely state: "in my professional & educated opinion...", from here on out.
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Pinned post for Q&A :)
I love you Drach
If the British had gone in for a night carrier strike against Nagumo’s force, how devastating would the Japanese losses be and would the Japanese have enough carrier strike power left for a counterattack come daylight?
Given the problems with conning towers (weight, stability implications, limited ability to protect occupants, etc.), would a better solution to the problem of needing to protect command crew have been to place the bridge below the armored deck with several redundant sets of periscopic optics (rotatable and with fish-eye objective lenses for wide fields of view) extending up to provide visibility without exposing the bridge crew?
The Japanese towards the end of the war had a decent amount of converted escort carriers of various sizes how did their various models compare to the British merchant carriers and US escort carriers on a per ship basis? Are there any that are exceptionally good or exceptionally bad?
@@brendonbewersdorf986
As a side note, the Japanese at the end of the war even had a fully operational purpose-built fleet carrier (Katsuragi, an Unryu-class), just no pilots to fly off of her.
Met an elderly, British gentleman at church about 2001. He had been on the HMS Hermes while she was being sunk by all those dive bombers. He got so choked up, he couldn't finish the story while his cheeks were getting wet with tears.
stop pestering the elderly, give them some cheer!
He had a dapper coat and tie, with an anchor pin and a red poppy in his lapels. I recognized the signals of a British veteran and was already a longtime military history hobbyist, so i inquired.
By now I expect he is with his shipmates once again.
Lest we forget.
Honour the Brave.🫡
@@Pilvenuga wtf does this even mean
Been a fan for years - I absolutely adore the fact you’re able to make this a profession for yourself. You do great work!
I agree, to much continued success with his endeavors.
Successful TH-camrs & social influencers often inspire a level of jealousy and envy amongst wannabe peers. Drach’s one of those good guys whose prosperity is absolutely earned. He’s brilliant, diligent, gifted and entertaining. It’s a genuine pleasure watching him build livelihood doing what he loves so much and does so well.
@@grahamstrouse1165 exactly so, I wished I could have put it so well.
I remember the ep when he announced his position had been made redundant! I remember the whole arc!
He sure is good at it, no?
I was fortunate enough to learn part of this story from Squadron Leader Leonard Birchall himself, one of the men on the PBY that reported the force/'Saviour of Ceylon', packed in with everyone in my Ontario elementary school gym to listen to his story in the early 2000s prior to his passing.
I met Air Commodore Birchall a couple of times in the nineties. Most impressive was how he was able to protect fellow POWs (to some extent) from abuse in Japanese camps.
Admire our ancestors for their dedication & bravery. A far cry from the pathetic gender confused youth of the interwebs. Not all youth are useless leftist cry babies so the burden of freedom will fall on them while the weird hide & type their bile hating on their country.
In 1950, U.S. President Harry Truman appointed Birchall an Officer of the Legion of Merit, saying: "His exploits became legendary throughout Japan and brought renewed faith and strength to many hundreds of ill and disheartened prisoners."
How many of those PBY guys picked up by the Isokaze made it through to the end of the war, do you know?
This is an action which hits close to home. My mother was engaged to AB John Quinn who was reported as missing presumed killed on HMS Hermes in April 1942. So I became quite familiar with the story of Hermes. She went on to marry my father, a USAAF P-38 pilot in 1947. My father died on 24 December at 100 after a long life lived well.
Wow. Interesting to think how this impacted her life and yours.
Interesting to think about when you owe who you are to the death of someone good, right? My grandmother's boyfriend was killed on HMS Hood. Sobering to think that that butterfly effect on my life was repeated in the millions across the war - so many things that could have been.
@@alisilcox6036 Yeah, but maybe that guy was a turd and she just never got to find out.
Some people, who appear like really good people are jerks. I remember when my Italian GF's father died. The whole village came to his funeral! You'd have thought that tge f***ing pope died, there were so many people there. Later that evening my GF's brother came to me and I could see that he was psychologically/emotionally wiped out.
He said to me, "I feel like shit. All day people, who I hardly know, have been coming up to me and telling me how great my father was. How he generously helped them with this and that or did this or that for them, how he was there for them, in their hour of need. Yet, all he ever did was beat and abuse us." You see, their father had been a terribly abusive mf-er with them all their lives. He had beaten them and tormented them psychologically all their lives and they were actually happy that he was dead. To then have everyone in the village come and tell them what a wonderful man their father had been just did them in. He was everything to everyone, except his family.
In my time on this rock I have developed what I call "the theory of assh*les." It is probably nothing new Emmanuel Kant or Nietzsche probably have it in their side notes somewhere ormaybe it is already out there somewhere? I don't know I am not that educated, but I reckon there is probably not an original thought in the whole universe.
Anyway, my theory of assh*les goes like this: Everyone is an assh*le whether they know it or not. Being an assh*le comes to some people naturally, and like you "cannot blame a tiger for being a tiger", you cannot blame a natural assh*le for being an assh*le. There are other people, who actually work at being assh*les. They are not natural assh*les by birth, but for whatever reasom believe that they have to be an assh*le for a myriad of possible reasons. They might think it is the only way to achieve their goals or some "greater" goal. They might think that they are actually going society a favor or accomplishing something great by being an assh*le.
Then, there are the rest of us. We do not really want to be assh*les. We try to be considerate to others, be polite, do "good deeds", bush our teeth for the whole recommended two minutes and all that jazz, you get the picture? Yet, no matter how hard we try fate conspires against us, and we are, somewhere, at some time, to someone, inadvertantly an assh*le!
Maybe we notice it and feel guilty about it, maybe we don't, but either way, at that point in time, for that person, we are "the assh*le!"
It is unavoidable. Example, You are in traffic and you dodge right to let somebody in, but you didn't see that one guy coming up and you cut him off. To him you're the assh*le!
The road to hell is paved with assh*les. There is just no avoiding it. This doesn't mean that you should say "F*** it!" and just be an assh*le yourself all the time. It means, you should consider, that maybe that guy that you think is an assh*le, like a willful assh*le or a natural assh*le, was really just an inadvertant assh*le.
Anyway, I hope this was fun.
@@alisilcox6036when the HMS HOOD WAS Attacked and sank there was only 3 survivors. so back
Then as well as today if you survive a sinking it is not in the cards for you to die. I seen a video on YT that
Was an interview with the last man
Still alive shortly before he passed and I remember the funeral for him by the Royal Navy, with his Flag dropped coffin borne by members of the British Military. It was a sad day bc it made you realize that he was the last in line
@@BrucePerkins-mc3hpTed Briggs was his name. I think he passed away in the mid/late 2000s.
I remember reading the memoirs of a Japanese dive-bomber pilot, I believe his name was Zenji Abe, who described the raid as “using a sword to kill a chicken.”
them sailors lived on water; thnk yu for mentioning the name
I remember reading this many years ago. After the declaration of war by Britain, it was not standing alone. All its Dominions ( South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, India and Canada), and its colonies, and territories contributed their men, leading to men of all sorts of colours, with all sorts of unfamiliar shoulder patches to puzzle British civilians, e.g. ANZAC - Australia and New Zealand Army Corp, SA - South Africa, and so on. It was especially surprising for British civilians to see dark skinned subjects of the Empire.
The story I read, decades ago, was of an Australian officer who was in London, on leave, with a friend of his, a dark-skinned Fijian officer. They were in the City of London, the middle of London, just walking down the street, attracting many curious glances. Eventually, a British civil servant in a bowler hat, suit, tie and with a briefcase, approached the pair and started a conversation with the Australian officer, but was clearly very curious about the Melanesian Fijian officer and spent a lot of time looking at him and his shoulder patch "Fiji". He eventually asked the Australian officer what his companion's shoulder patch signified. The Australian decided to take the piss, and told the curious Brit, that it was an acronym for "First Imperial Japanese Infantry" to the great amusement of the Fijian.
OMG I really wanted a video about the Indian Ocean Raid, since it caught my attention a few days ago, now here it is! You are great Drach, keep it up with your amazing work!
I really like your style of delivery of the narrative! Kudos!
This one was information packed, and immensely enjoyable. A great story so well told.
Being a Catalina pilot when enemy carriers are around sounds like it was a brutal existence.
Yeah, it was almost suicidal to be a member of a Catalina crew.
At that time being a crew on any Allied AC was brutal due to the superiority of the Zeros......
My uncle Bill was a PBY5-A crew chief and gunner for the USN during the liberation of the Philippines, and was sent on "Black Cat" missions like bombing the Japanese in Indochina. During the liberation of the Philippines my uncle's aircraft was shot down twice, the second time, badly injuring him for for life, and getting to see his best friend die.
Hero!❤⚓️🇺🇲🙏
@@paulholbrook7315Wildcats did far better against Zeroes than most people give them credit for
One could definitely criticize Somerville's decision to send Hermes and the two cruisers back to Ceylon, given that his two top theories about the Japanese were either that their attack had been delayed, or else that they were waiting for the Brits to return. Otherwise I agree that he did the best he could under the circumstances.
I cannot even imagine how you manage to have such an output of high-quality, long-duration videos on such niche topics. However, I am immensely thankful. Cheers Drach!
Long have I waited for this video and you did not disappoint. (as you never do) The Indian Ocean Raid is so fascinating to me, because it could quite easily have turned into the first carrier battle in history and just barely didn't, thanks to the usual difficulties that are present in all carrier battles.
Somerville strikes me personally as a very capable but rather unlucky admiral. It's difficult to get into an engagement with the enemy force and even more difficult to pull a victory out of it. Especially if you have the weaker force. You can see this both with the battle of Cape Spartivento and with the Indian Ocean Raid. Both times Somerville had inferior forces and tried to make the best out of it, but didn't succeed in inflicting lasting damage to the enemy. And in case of the Indian Ocean Raid, he was very lucky to remain undetected, as his fleet would have otherwise almost certainly gotten annihilated.
Somerville was also in command of Force H(which included Ark Royal) during the Bismarck chase. At least that was a pretty successful endeavour.
You make the history come alive, Drach. Thank you for another enjoyable Wednesday morning!
Thank you Drach for this banger! The Indian Ocean Raid is a subject I’ve long wanted an extensive treatment of, and you brought all guns to bear, as always.
Somerville was dealing with a new type of warfare. They were still trying to figure out how to use it. Both sides experienced that issue.
Considering his overall lack of air cover, Sommerville was lucky to not suffer bigger losses. On the other hand, destruction of Soryu and Hiryu would be probably worth losing entire Eastern Fleet. Allies could replace losses, IJN not.
Or, had he held course on evening of April 5th, a combination of 15 inch salvos, working destroyer\cruiser torpedoes, and albacore-swaordfish torpedoes inflict losses equal or greater to Midway. British casualties would likely have equaled or surpased those sustained at Trinco\Colombo, but the moral and strategic windfall would be to quash any consideration of the Cripps offer, and to enable an amphibious counter attack at Rangoon instead of the Madagascar scenario. And a British midway would easily wipe out the specter of Force Z and Singapore
Imperial Japan successfully managed to build, commission and field 3 Unryu-class Fleet Carriers and Taiho by the end of WWII in Asia.
Replacing Aircraft Carriers was never a problem for Imperial Japan. It was the completely irreplaceable losses in carrier-borne aircraft, pilots, flight crews, maintenance teams, damage-control teams, armorers, mechanics, engineers, technicians, etc., etc. that ultimately brought about the final demise of the Kido Butai as well as both the overall Imperial Japanese Navy as a whole and the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service.
A demise that required more than just one debacle (no matter how calamitous or how massive) to make into reality.
@@razgriz9146 80-90k tonnes of carrier tonnage in 4 years isn't exactly anything to right home about, especially considering losses and the production of their enemies. A lack of everything, carrier production inlcuded, was an issue
@@silverhost9782 this is, of course, completely ignoring all of the other Unryu-class Fleet Carriers that were in various stages of completion prior to the end of the Pacific War.
In any event, the overall point that I'm making is that Imperial Japan was fully-capable of more than making good its losses at Midway with the titanic American triumph there ultimately accomplishing very little when considered in isolation from the rest of the Pacific War.
@@razgriz9146The issue wasn't carriers or exprienced crew loss at Midway. It was aircraft. Japanese industry had insanely low production rates of carrier aircraft. The Unryu class and Taihou you mentioned? They barely had any aircraft because the aircraft they were supposed to use: B7A2/B6N2 torpedo bombers, D4Y dive bombers, and A7 Reppu fighters all had constantly delayed development and production rates. The Kido Butai in fact barely replaced any of their losses over their 6-month reign before Midway which is why their airwings were significantly reduced during the battle. For example, Japanese naval aircraft production in 1942 was horrendously low for a nation at war (will get the exact figures from Shattered Sword which I have at home).
As for crew, it turns out that an averagr "ONLY" 25% of all experienced pilots and crew were lost among the carriers (Kaga having the most losses by far among the carriers at over 35%). 25% may seem a lot....until you compare Midway to the massive slog that was the Guadalcanal campaign which saw losses of over FIFTY PERCENT for the Japanese. This was the reason why after Guadalcanal there were no large scale carrier battles until the showdown at Phillipine Sea in 1944.
Very informative. I had not realised the Japanese naval air forces were not trained in night fighting.
Somerville was reputed to have said on his first sight of the Eastern Fleet "Well there's many a good tune played in an old fiddle."
Getting closer and closer to 500k, much deserved 👍
Excellent recap on Operation C, Drach. You did more in 54 minutes to explain the background for the operation, forces employed, intel information and combat actions than John Clancy in his 200 page-long book. And for that, I thank you.
The south Pacific war in1942 and 1943 is the most fascinating part of WWII
Great as per usual Drach. Your work is unsurpassed. Thank you for what you do for us.
Erebus and Terror are two ships dear to my heart. They have the legacy of the originals, who famously went missing searching for the northwest passage (recently discovered I believe). And I just love the idea of putting a full on battleship turret on a small(ish) hull. Dedicated shore bombardment ships that are way too overpowered, because the British could afford it. And in a bad situation, you have a mini battleship at your disposal.
Great video on an oft under-appreciated (/dismissed as embarassing British loss) battle, which well shows the fogs of war and has lots of interesting what if scenarios.
I do like the idea that the humble Blenheim could nearly have sunk the pride of the Japanese fleet Akagi - as much like at Midway she was caught in the middle of re-arming her planes. Also the funny thing is shortly after this a Blenheim would shoot down one of the IJA's top pilots over the Bay of Bengal, not bad for a supposedly obsolete plane.
Brilliant as always Drach. Much obliged.
I love your channel and have been a long time subscriber! I've also been watching the unauthorized history of the war in the Pacific and have thoroughly enjoyed you as a guest host on that presentation! Great job
One of the rare great 'what if's' to play around with for both sides, given the opportunity.
I think Somerville made a lot of correct decisions in regards to the main fleets. As drach says. He just got unlucky, especially with the typical british intel being wrong at the worst of times and then correcting itself at the worst of times.
The 2 cruisers and hermes are a different matter. With or without hindsight. Hermes shouldve sailed north around ceylon. Yes ryujo was there but compared to the presumed 2 full fleet carriers to the south east (which was actually 6), sailing north was the better of the gambles and i dont understand why they risked the southern run.
The loss of the 2 counties was a symptom of a different issue. The royal navy had for so long been used to being the dominant fleet in the atlantic and med. It was much easier to send a few ships on a "milk run" in those theatres as the air attacks came from land and they had some deterrants for the submarines. With the surface fleets being bottled up in axis ports.
But sending 2 heavy cruisers back to ceylon alone with an active battle fleet presumed to be in the area (again, even with just the presumed numbers of 2 CVs) was a foolish gamble given how differently the japanese fought as a full fledged navy compared to the glorified coastal defence that was the regia marina or the somewhat dangerous kreigsmarine.
The japanese had free reign of the south china sea and a good portion of the pacific. And you know they have intentions of attacking into the indian ocean even if theyre delayed.
The royal navy kept sending off small dispatches of ships only for them to get destroyed by a full battle fleet or by a swarm of japanese ground based aircraft. And its a lesson the royal navy kept refusing to learn.
But i do find Erebus being the sole defender of trincomalee quite amusing. Just some splinters? Is that all youve got kido butai? just a small monitor shouting "BRING IT ON!"
Spot on bruv. The lessons on carrier aircraft and aircraft in general again surface ships was a lesson that had already been shown, with severe consequences to the Allies. The Great War recalcitrance is almost criminal. I don’t really blame Somerville for this either. This being said though……. Hindsight has little to do with the real assessment that leaving surface vessels without air cover before late in 43 was guaranteed suicide for those vessels, and even in 44 and 45 aircraft were clearly shown to have a massive edge, when proper trained (or determined to die)
@@arkadikharovscabinetofcuri3465 even ignoring the carriers.
You dont send 2 heavy cruisers alone to a base that is under threat of being attacked with enemy fleets in the area.
At the very least those carriers would have been escorted by heavy cruisers and potentially the kongos too (depending on intelligence report perception at the time).
The allies had multiple lessons in the form of
1.pearl harbour,
2. force Z,
3. java sea (with multiple battles) i.e. loss of houstons group and loss of exeter later.
All of these attacks consisted of the japanese working as a large surface fleet or with large air capability. And never sending small detachments off when in an active combat environment waiting for enemy engagement.
Why the 2 cruisers were sent off i dont know. But id argue it was possibly an even worse decision than likes of Force Z. Because they shouldve learned this lesson by now.
@@joelmontgomery4837 exactly. It was not until the American late war planning that AA was even remotely effective against committed carrier strikes, and to be fair I’m not sure this wasn’t due more to the losses at midway and Japanese battle doctrine (ie surviving without completing objectives was dishonorable). Had the IJN not lost so many of their skilled aircrews, without effectively trained replacements, I’m not sure how the latter battle of the war would have rolled out
@@arkadikharovscabinetofcuri3465 Actually the American AA showed up later in 1942, Saving Enterprise from more damaging hits.
The combination of 20MM and 40MM AA was deadly by the end of 1942
As Drach mentioned in the video, the British actually weren’t expecting the Japanese to be in the area, when they split their fleet up and sent the two cruisers and Hermes+Vampire to Ceylon. They weren’t expecting an attack at that point, as they hadn’t discovered the Kido Butai before the report on April 4th. Intel said they would be there by the 1st, and that turned out to be wrong. The discovery on the 4th came as somewhat of a surprise to the British, catching the Eastern Fleet off guard as they were replenishing after the sortie on the 1st~2nd.
I do have the same question about why Hermes and other ships from Trincomalee were sent south though. Even with the presence of Ryujo to the north, it was clear by that point that the main Japanese fleet to the south was much more threatening. North should have been the obvious escape route, even without hindsight.
Drach, I just love these in-detail recountings of fleet actions! Just so riveting to listen to with all the operational details you give, even when the general history of the action is already known.
43:40 Can we apreciate for a moment the fact that three rather unimpressive Hurricanes bagged three A6M Zeros, one piloted by a high-ranking and experienced officer?
Quite a nice little feat of professional airmanship in my opinion.
I agree with your assessment of Somerville. At the time, while he knew that a Japanese carrier unit of *some* kind was out there and headed to attack Ceylon, he was also getting incomplete and sometimes also conflicting information so all he knew for sure was that they were out there *somewhere* and the ocean is vast.
In an additional similarity to Jellicoe, he also had a lot of pressure to not make any fatal mistakes. A couple things going different could have gotten his entire fleet destroyed and cede control of the Indian Ocean to the IJN.
I mean, he basically ceded control of the Indian Ocean to the IJN anyway. Even if his entire fleet had been sunk, the IJN would have been too busy dealing with the Americans and Australians to bother doing anything that far west.
Somerville had one golden opportunity to deal major damage to the IJN, and he completely fumbled it despite losing so much to just give him such a golden opportunity. By contrast, the Americans would put their carriers at risk again and again to take every opportunity to weaken the IJN, and that was without a decisive advantage for all night operations.
Hi, Drachinifel! Been a subscriber for a few years now. Thank you for bringing to light this relatively unknown part of WW2.
I just read the Osprey Book on this Operation earlier this week, what are the odds! Thanks for the great video as always!
Oh yes, I've been waiting for Drach to cover this one for ages! This is going to be a very enjoyable hour.
HMS Susan gives off the vibe of a grandma carrier launching a strike of cookie dough and saucers at some unruly young boy...
The IJN could have fared much worse...there could have been the HMS Hyacinth about, captained by one H. Bucket!
Now that you mention it, there was a Flower-class corvette named HMS Hyacinth (K84).
Surely one of the last survivors of the Pinafore-class armored cruiser, the darling of First Lord of the Admiralty Sir Joseph Porter. I suspect Susan was one of his sisters...or his cousins... or his aunts.
The two fleets passing near each other (close enough to make a gunnery engagement possible) have often been argued (including on this channel) to show how carriers are potentially vulnerable to surface attack at night, but to me they highlight another issue that actually makes it harder to attack carriers using surface ships at night; the fact it’s surprisingly hard to even FIND an enemy fleet on the move at night, even at such close distances, unless you already know exactly where it is and are actively looking for it.
As for what would have happened if the British had engaged using gunnery? I expect that the Japanese escorts around the carriers would be the first to take damage and the carriers would be alerted and start working up steam to run for it. In that time one of the carriers might be badly damaged or even sunk, but that’s a big if, and come daylight the rest of the Kido Butai will be out for payback (especially since CarDiv1 and the Shokakus would almost certainly be intact).
What I’d really want to see is if the British actually pull off that planned night carrier strike against the Kido Butai, which the Japanese have basically no counter for; we might get an Illustriouses vs. Shokakus battle to go with all the Shokakus vs. Yorktowns battles.
The main reason for that argument is Cape Matapan. It's fanciful that it coild've happened again here, but interesting all the same. Warspite being present on both occasions makes it even more fascinating.
@@Cailus3542
At Cape Matapan Formidable was only that close to the Italian fleet by her own volition: she could easily have just left if she’d wanted to, as the Italians never found her.
Props to Somerville being aggressive, but a night action with the Kido Butai would be disastrous for the RN. At night, Somerville gets hit in the face with all the long lances. The next morning, Zeros, Kates, and Vals dominate.
@@treyhelms5282that assumes the Japanese can launch torpedoes first. RN doctrine of a night carrier strike means the first hits are RN torpedoes, and then at some point later, RN surface fire and torpedoes. If the Japanese are being hit first, do they get the chance to launch torpedoes at all?
@@juicysushi The Japanese REGULARLY launched torpedoes first in surface actions. The RN couldn't find the KB historically, and the idea they would accurately launch Swordfish torpedoes at the KB task force at night is laughable.
If the RN closes, they do start eating Long Lances. And whatever happens at night, in the morning the RN experiences what the USS Lexington and USS Yorktown did at Coral Sea.
Great video, aside from everything else I learned about something that's not really well know this side of the pond it really gave an insight into just how much strain the two groups Commanders must have been under. So many variables could lead to success yet the equal number could lead to disaster and they had to sort thru and do their level-headed best.
Thanks. I'd been aware for some time of the general nature of the battle but this very much added to my understanding of more of the details of what had gone on.
As with the Japanese scouting bad luck at Midway - that kind of thing does happen.
And yes - there is a vast difference between people trying to recreate a battle where they know what is going on and people in the real battle NOT really knowing what is going on. History is replete with examples of people making decisions based on what they _thought_ was going on - rather than what was - much to their misfortune.
What would have happened at Waterloo - if Grouchy had ridden to the sound of the guns?
.
Great episode. I remember the story of the Fulmar with the shot up radio preventing the timely report of the Japanese position, course, and speed. If not for that, the Royal Navy might have had a night action that would have rivaled Taranto. I agree that Admiral Somerville was aggressive enough given his forces, but was simply unlucky.
The thoughts of his ships and a carrier pouring broadside after broadside into the 2 IJN carriers and escorts is hilarious to me. Would have made a hell of a story
Great stuff!
Carrier battles which missed or nearly missed tended to come off as very confused affairs, with some poor sod getting caught flatfooted in the middle of it. This whole affair seems eerily reminiscent of the opening phases of the Battle of the Coral Sea, but with no payoff other than medium-sized units taking a full dive-bomber attack.
Arguably, the Eastern Fleet comes off worse in this case than did the American units prior to the big clash of carriers at Coral Sea. It was all rather unfortunate and unlucky. But then, even the best commanders can't have all the luck all of the time, I suppose.
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As far as the surprising performance of the Blenheim MkIV is concerned in air-to-air combat with Zeroes, this was of course 1942. While that didn't make the Blenheim any faster, at least it did make it more likely that these aircraft were rather better-defended than the earlier version of the MkIV and the MkI.
Early-war Blenheims just had the single drum-fed and manually-reloaded Vickers 'K' gun in the dorsal turret. This was totally inadequate in 1939 & 40 - being quickly modified to a still-weak twinned 'K' mounting - and certainly contributed to the aircraft's dire performance against interceptors.
This changed for the better with the replacement of the Vickers K mounting with the new twin Browning installation, which had ammo track paths sorted out and two nice big bins of belted ammo. FN-54 chin blister or not (it's hard to tell in the photo of the Colombo-based 11Sqdn bomber), they likely had the Browning dorsal turret by this time.
If they did, then they had a much better chance against fighters and this *maaay* go towards their very respectable performance in self-defence here.
It is a little surprising to me that this action was so nearly very different. All I have read about the "dance" was the losses of the British ships.
Given Japanese supply problems, the conquest of Australia or even an effective blockade of it was never realistic.
They had a pretty big tendency to ignore the realities of logistics when it came to try conquering places. They didn't have the logistics to occupy Midway, and were contemplating Hawaii? Australia was at least closer, but not really more realistic.
@@boobah5643 so an attack on Australia may have stretched them out more than happend historically. Would this have hacened there collapse
@@thomasbaker6563 Logically, it would have, but conquering Australia did not really align with the concentric rings of defense strategic plan the Japanese had for whittling down the American fleet before it could reach Japan. Taking Australia might have made sense if Britain and America were both dedicating similar resources to coming through the Pacific to reach Japan. Realistically, the US Navy and US Army were dedicating far more resources, which only made Australia one large base on Japan's southern flank.
@@amerigo88 Don't underestimate the Australian war in the Pacific. They fought everywhere the US Marines didn't. Knocking Australia out of the war or driving the population to the South would have been a great blow to the Allied war effort.
@@nowthenzen Every Allied military that fought alongside the Aussies and Kiwis admired them. With the war coming to Darwin and Port Moresby, I totally understand why Australia would have been so committed to the war. I just think the argument that Australians were facing an existential threat has been exaggerated. The Japanese MIGHT have been able to take Hawaii through an enormous effort at the end of a tenuous supply line. If they could barely take the island of Oahu, much less the continent of Australia. It's a bit like pretending the Japanese were going to conquer China and then India too.
I love how IJN is completely failing in secrecy and all their plans are know to the allies before they even set sail, but they still manage to achieve an effect of surprise because of them failing to follow their own schedule due to absolutely stupid reasons 😂
It’s just a drunken master style
If I don't know what I'm doing then neither do they!
HMS Hermes, aircraft carrier, was without airplaines when sunk. Crazy
It could only operate a dozen swordfish. Her facilities couldn’t handle anything else.
This was explained in a way more granular way than any book I ever read. Had no idea so much happened during that operation.
Thanks.
One of least known "encounters" early on. Excellent presentation.
I agree. I always wanted to know where the Japanese would have scored the most strafing planes on the ground "episode" .. their planning during the war doesn't look that good.. They fought and lost the Russians in Mongolia ... That's an interesting fight.... 🤙
Great work Drachinifel!
Dammit, Drach. I’m now imagining a Johnny Cash song about a carrier named Sue. lol
Love that song
I've really been looking forward to this video. Thank you!!
My great uncle was serving on the Vampire when it was sunk, luckily surviving. Thanks for the great video as usual!
Fantastic video. Sightly exhausting, reeling from the many bad calls and mistakes. It seems the more the RN knew, the more they failed to achieve.
Always amazing content as usual sir. I've been a fan since you had robo voiced videos.
Same here. They were a bit hard to get through, but I'm so very glad I stuck it out too!
Naval Battle of Ceylon video on Friday? YESSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS!!!!!!!!!
I like the terpsichorean reference in the title of the video, Drach, as I have a keen interest in this particular encounter via the related medium of song. It was a fair few years ago when I first delved into the details of the Indian Ocean Raid, after having been only vaguely aware of it beforehand. Then, by pure happenstance, (a) I developed an interest in the strange, lost world of female Pop music of the satellite nations of the former Soviet Bloc around the middle of the last decade, to such an extent I started blogging about it at 'Girls Of The Golden East' and (b) I picked out a particular favourite, Valérie Čižmárová, so started a blog specially for her at 'Bananas For Breakfast', in the course of which I stumbled across all her major recording anniversaries.
As it just so happens, 5th April is one of those said recording anniversaries and wouldn't you know that the main title of the song recorded on that date in 1971 - it has an alternate title of 'Borůvek pár' ('A Few Blueberries') - is 'Za sluncem, za vodou', which I primarily translate from the Czech as 'In Sunshine, In Water', but literally means 'Under Sunshine, Under Water'. Given that the HMSs Cornwall and Dorsetshire were 'under water' as a result of the actions of aircraft 'named after' Valérie twenty-nine years to the day before 'Za sluncem, za vodou' was recorded one can see how things connect around to each other in this instance, so thanks for such a detailed look at this battle, Drach.
One final thing that is yet another link to things naval is that the song was later performed at the Děčínská Kotva Festival, the name of the Festival meaning 'Děčín Anchor', where songs, of course, had to have an aquatic theme.
Thank you so much for everything I have learned from you. I thought I knew it all, but I learned more from you. Arigatou gozaimasu Sensei. 🌸
Thank you. Great job. I have been waiting for your presentation on Operation C.
Nice work Drach, great to see attention from this forgotten theatre of the war.
I've been waiting for you to cover this topic. Great video as always!
Add this to your "what if" episode. Had Ceylon and Trincomalee been re-enforced by a couple of crack Spitfire squadrons, as was done with Malta not long after,what a cracking series of air battles might have taken place. With a functioning radar warning net for both bases the experienced RAF lads would have put on a good show in their 1942 model Spitfires.
Great episode, thanks for posting,Drach.
First, why would experienced RAF pilots be sent out of Europe?
Second, these are Japanese carrier air pilots of the kido butai. They are literally the most experienced fighter pilots on the planet at this time. Most have been flying and fighting for 5 years at this point.
Third, the Spitfire has a fatal flaw. It is is super short ranged and the advantages that it had against Italian and German fighters were flipped when fighting Japanese ones.
The Allies had to learn the hard way how to fight Japanese air power and the experience in Britain fighting the Germans was a very different context from Asia. It took a long time for British pilots, even with Spitfires, to be able to fight Japanese aviators on equal terms.
First of all, RAF pilots WERE sent "out of Europe" to many war zones. Secondly the Spitfire was an ideal point defense fighter which is exactly what was needed to defend airbases and ports.
You are clueless.@@porksterbob
@@GM-fh5jpNotice I said "Experienced" RAF pilots.
When the Indian Ocean Raid happened, the British are still in a knife fight in Burma.
The British had already sent pilots to Southeast Asia in Malaya... Those guys are dead by April of 1941. Read about the problems that the British had in the air in the Malayan campaign.
There is not a pool of Battle of Britain veteran airmen free to be sent to Ceylon when the British are in active ground combat over North Africa and Burma.
Drach mentions the the Hurricanes that got up to altitude and could dive down to attack the Japanese aircraft were more successful than the aircraft that were scrambled late. This is the key. Spitfires or any aircraft are vulnerable when at a height disadvantage. A working radar system is the difference between the first and second attacks on Ceylon. They give the defender time to get to altitude. Even a Gladiator or a Buffalo can make one good diving pass if given time.
The spitfire was a better aircraft than the Hurricane.But Spitfire pilots over Darwin learned that the Japanese navy pilots and the Zero was not to be underestimated because they took some hard knocks till they learned the proper tactics to fight the Zero.
That little thingy about the British fleet able to deliver a night attack against the Kido Butai has always stirred my fantasy...can't wait for your friday vid! Thank you Drach, this is great stuff!!
Somerville's force is lucky they didn't find the Kido Butai in this situation. Long Lances at night. Zeros, Kates, and Vals in the morning.
@@treyhelms5282 Agreed, of course...but...who knows? A lucky strike at night, with a somewhat superior radar technology and doctrine...who knows? Stimulating what-if scenario, indeed😄!
@@Riccardo_Silva It is an interesting scenario. It's worth noting the rader would help find the Kido Butai, not aim torpedoes. The RN night doctrine was better than the Italians, the Japanese better than the Americans. It's hard to see a night Swordfish foray being effective, but the typical Long Lances not, if the RN gets too close. It's not so hard to see what happens to Somerville's force in the morning.
Just remembered swordfish had had a bit of operational success at night, a little known raid in Italy that sunk there battleships comes to mind. And Japanese night air defence is not exactly good.
@@treyhelms5282but the plan was aerial torps by night with surface action to follow. A feasible plan but I agree that long lances and four Kongos would be a tough nut for Warspite in the morning.
Thank you- great overview! Looking forward to tomorrow's what if's :)
Honestly, Warspite would probably luck their way out of a 4v1 with the Kongos
Oooooh, wargames of hypothetical battles! Looking forward to that Friday video.
"The first carrier vs carrier kill could have been a surface gunfight." You know formidable would want that honour after Cape Matapan. I give the RN BBs like Warspite stick for being aggressive but I think the fact that 2 of the RN CV have on purpose gotten close enough to the enemy to fire on them speaks volumes for the general aggressiveness within the fleet.
@shootme Indeed. To one up Illustrious. To the uninitiated, Illustrious fired some 4.5 inch broadsides in Cape Matapan against Italian surface vessels, till Adm Cunningham saw it happening and ordered her to beam herself somewhere far away, immediately.
Well, HMS unicorn used her guns for shore bombardment in Korea. I swear there must be something in their tea because royal navy captains (and sailors) are a different breed.
@@cameronnewton7053 then there was the pirates she shot up.
I mean, if you give guns to any warship, and their planes are busy. Why wouldn't you use them?
Certainly is the thought I imagine would go through many a carrier captain's head.
@@Destroyer_V0 😳 Illustrious class carrier is way too vulnerable and way too valuable asset to have any place being within gun range of enemy surface vessels.
I no longer hear the intro and think "that's not the right intro". Time heals. 👍
What a fantastic picture of The Grand Old Lady! Nice! ❤
Thanks!
Very impressive production. My father was a sailor with the Eastern fleet. But much later in the war. Joining HMS Redoubt - an R class destroyer in South Africa in 1944 and then sailling around this area of operations from SA to Addu Atol and Trincomalee then back again. He finished out the war in England flying Tiger Moths training to be a Fleet Air arm pilot.
I'll be honest, I'm kind of amazed I've never heard of this engagement before now.
Thanks Drach.
I’ve never been this early to a video. I can’t wait to hear the Drachisms that come from this episode.
Wow, what a story. That lone Albacore's survival and diligent return to deliver her report-well done lads, but unfortunately, their brave and correct action caused the opportunity for an advantageous night action to slip away. The crew of that aircraft bravely did their duty, but if they could have known, they'd have served their nation better by ditching in the sea or at least, briefly developing amnesia.
I can't help but think of the parallel to Arashi at Midway, chasing off the Nautalis, then dutifully racing back to retake her escort station with Akito Butai. Had it been possible for Arashi's officers and crew to have possessed complete information, they'd have better served their nation by opening the valves and scuttling their vessel rather than providing the long wake which McCluskey and his bombers spotted, pointing like the finger of Almighty God towards the very carriers Arashi was dutifully racing to protect.
Fate is a fickle mistress. All we tiny humans can do is give our best efforts and hope that we don't someday realize that doing our best one fine morning in our youth turned out to have cost more than we could imagine.
Props to Somerville being aggressive, but a night action with the Kido Butai would be disastrous for the RN. At night, Somerville gets hit in the face with all the long lances. The next morning, Zeros, Kates, and Vals dominate.
@@treyhelms5282 Savo Island has entered the chat.
@@treyhelms5282Jap BBS have a terrible night action record and there carriers don't even operate at night. A night battle with both sides being trained, one having radar, combat experience of night engagements with radar, night time aviation is gona be a stomp so hard the Japs are going to wish that Hiroshima got pasted instead.
I have been waiting 4 years for this video, can’t wait to watch 🎉
Thoroughly enjoyed this episode, packed full of information I didn't know. Personally I have always viewed the Royal Navy as aggressive and ready for any fight, even when odds were against them. To me it seems that Somerville did what he could with his orders and the "fog of war.". I would have loved to have seen Warspite take a crack at the IJN.
I wouldn't. It would have been sunk within minutes.
I like the "Tough Challenge for Warspite" instead of "Impossible"
Hypothetically, if Somerville had successfully taken out (temporarily or permanently) Soryu and Hiryu. What does that leave the IJN in terms of their carrier ops. They would still have Akagi, Kaga, Shokaku and Zuikaku. But do they still send two carriers to Coral Sea? Do they send all 4 to Coral Sea? Is Coral Sea scrapped and all 4 deployed to Midway?
It might depend on British losses. If the British fleet escaped largely unscathed, then the sudden vulnerability of the Kido Butai and the likelihood of Britain and the USN defending the area around Australia probably would have led them to call off, or at least delay, the Coral Sea operation. If the British fleet lost a couple of fleet carriers as well, then Japan would be much less concerned about the RN’s ability to interfere, and probably would have continued to see the USN as unlikely to correctly time an attack to stop the operation with the RN unable to assist. If Japan proceeded with the operation, it’s likely that some sort of Anglo-American pincer attack could have been successfully performed, and the Kido Butai could have been crippled even earlier. If Japan still pulled off Coral Sea with their historical losses, but minus two other carriers, they may have still attempted Midway. However, they might have scaled back or eliminated the Aleutian Island diversionary attack, or rushed Shinano into service, or hurriedly concerted a cruiser or two into light carriers, or hurriedly finished the Ise class conversion into full (but awful) carriers. Either way, the outcome would be worse for Japan.
@@bluemarlin8138 I think you are greatly overestimating Japan capabilities, Shinano conversion did start because of Midway but they still rushed it, the Ise battleships conversions were rush jobs and they couldnt convert then in full carriers as they were, Shinano itself ended up as that repair hybrid carrier because construction was too advanced so the barbettes for the forward main guns was installed along other armor that mean they were further limited to what internal changes they could do with then, the Ise would have the exact same problems being completed battleships were you would be better off building new carriers from the ground up that attempting to turn those into even light carriers, the Ise conversion was just a rush job on ships that were obsolete and wouldnt take as long as building new carriers (that they did) or making conversions, very much "slap a flight deck on the back and done".
And as for cruisers ... also, no. Japan didnt have many cruisers, their light cruisers development stopped with the Sendai class in the mid 20's being picked up again in the 42 with the Agano class but we talking about ships that had about 6,000 tons displacement as the Independence class that was based on the Cleveland hull had a displacement of 15,000 tons ... they were far too light, Ibuki that was the lead of her class of heavy cruisers was converted into a light carrier also due to Midway loses and the fact she wasnt completed is another example of the difference of industrial capacity of the US and Japan, heck even the UK struggled with new ships as we seen with the Lion and Malta class.
Also they had merchant ships that could be converted, such as Scharnhorst ... **SS** Scharnhorst, a German Ocean Liner that was seized by Japan in 39 and then sold in 42, she became the carrier Shin'you, the Taiyou class escort carrier were all Japanese Cargo Liners that were converted, this was kinda of a trick as the Japanese military help funded the construction of ships with the specification they would be build in a way so they could be converted if needed, the reason we dont hard much about then is because in the Taiyou class case they were used to ferry planes and cargo, Japan had a few carriers at the end of the war, the Unryuu class for example as Katsuragi that we dont hard about because at that time Japan lacked not only aircraft but also pilots to make use of then, Katsuragi that survived the war never had her group embarked as it was diverted to Iwo Jima, same with Amagi except that in her case she was found and attacked (well Katsuragi was also attacked but survived) and she capsized in harbor.
In the end Japan had one shoot, that was to deliver a knockout punch during the first rounds, the longer the fight gone the higher the chances of defeat increased, even if Japan won Midway ... it would be irrelevant, the British participation on the Pacific naval was also irrelevant, it only matters if for national pride you want good old Britain to teach then a lesson but the reality was, Britain had a war at their doorstep and Japan was secondary, even if all gone right in this operation, they would be recalled home because they couldnt afford to play Empire in the Pacific as the home islands were starving, priority was the Atlantic, then the Med and everything else after, if the Argentinians took the Falklands at that time, the British response would likely be a strong worded letter and dropping the issue for the time.
Great job drachif!! BTW That intro music grows on you!
Quality content, Drac. Rock on.
In my opinion Somerville very well followed British tradition in contesting any challenge to their control of the seas, and he did so the best he could with the means he had at hand, mainly hoping for a successful night attack on the enemy forces. But the hard true was that he was very lucky not to have his fleet sunk, and the RN was not a match for the Japanese navy at the time. And so it was quickly decided to retreat from the area and send the fleet thousand of miles to Africa, safer from Japanese attacks. The Japanese conquests in Asia were bad, as they heralded the end of the British Empire giving more strength to the independent movements, but I think sending the main fleet to Africa was even worse, as there were still British and Commonwealth troops fighting in the area and for the first time in modern times, the fleet was not there to protect them. Those troops could count only on minor units from the RN for the time being and, a great turning point, the USN, much more active and that never stopped challenging the Japanese for the control of the seas.
I don't know if other commenters noted it, but Osprey just came out with a book in its Campaign series on the raid.
Wow, that was great. As always. I thought the Hurricane would have made a huge difference to Force Z; however, it could have gotten there. The failure to spread spitfires has always annoyed me, especially in Malta early on. No fan of Leigh Mallory but as a Kiwi I'm a Keith Park man . But anyway, how the Brits understood early warning and the Dowding system and couldn't do it around the empire has always shocked me. Great vid .
Fascinating video... thanks Drach.
Well, my pinned post was going to be what might have happened if the fleets met, and its already in the works, cannot wait. Thanks Drach.
Spot-on topic! Rare detail of this battle!
IJA: BUT MUH SUPPLY LINES
IJN: Why don't YOU make your own ships?
IJA: aight bet
The new opening music is amazing! I wish I could download it for my ringtone!
Warspite seriously looks good on film! Idk what it is exactly, but she is one of the few ships I can identify no matter what viewpoint, composition, refit level etc the picture presents! Just really love her...
WaDrach, sir? Many moons ago, i came across a (possible) alternative history of the japanese navy taking celon, and the naval strategy of the allies to retake it? Was this you? If not ,? Have you seen it? If you have how feasible was it?
Oooh looking forward to Friday. Sounds like Fun!
HMS Susan is the most terrifying name any warship has ever held.
HMS Fifi, Mimi and Toutou would like a word please.
I believe HMS Karen would contest that 😆
Well Susan is the name of DEATH's granddaughter in the Discworld novels. She is quite a formidable woman.
They should build a third Queen Elizabeth carrier and name it hms Susan
I very much enjoy the whining Japanese Army, complaining about their supplylines
Yamamoto: And this is my problem because?
Yes! We might admire the IJN but the Japanese Army, not so much.
"Heeeelp, the Allies are attacking our traaaade routes."
@@Wolfeson28 "Your problem not mine, and also don't bother me ever again."
been waiting for this subject for a long time
Australia's E-M-U Defense Line, as you pointed out in earlier videos, was likely a contributing factor in the IJA refusing to supply troops to the IJN.
I mean... those Emus are _terrifying!_ Even the Aussies lost against them!
the IJA and IJN have a level of military branch rivalries that go to insane levels
@@okram2k Everyone knows that.
I should recommend this video to my professor of Archaeology of South Asia course as a optional video for students
to watch. Since the course also briefly touches archaeology of near past in the region.
What I want to know is what future plans for the Indian Ocean did the IJN have before the Doolittle Raid? My latest theory about WW2 is that the Doolittle Raid was way more influential than anyone at the time suspected.
The Soviet offensive outside Moscow at the end of 1941 put an end to Hitler's plan to quickly drive the Soviets out of the war. But then the entry of Japan threw Hitler a life line. If Japan could weaken the UK enough, then that could under-cut the Soviets and possibly let the Germans win. On the other side, Japan's only hope of winning was if Germany could knock the UK out of the war and make the US divert most of their forces to the Atlantic. IJN control of the Indian Ocean could accomplish all of these goals.
But after the IJN had been embarrassed by the Doolittle Raid, there was no chance of them diverting forces from the Pacific. This doomed Germany which doomed Japan.
Japan did not have ambitions in the Indian ocean beyond strictly military objectives.
The purpose of the wide scale attack on southeast Asia in December 1941 was three fold.
1. Destroy all possible enemy opposition near the western pacific.
2. Secure oil from the Dutch East Indies.
3. Complete the blockade of China.
As a result of the Indian ocean raid, the Japanese did gain control of the eastern half of the Indian ocean. The British don't send a warship to Burma until the end of 1944. China is successfully isolated through the conquest of Burma.
Had Japan occupied Ceylon, it would have made life a little more difficult for the UK, but the Japanese were not going to be able to accomplish many further objectives. They didn't have the troops to attack India. The entire Pacific campaign and the Southeast Asia campaign was conducted with only 30% of the Japanese Army. The rest had to stay in China.
How dare that Catalina crew send a sighting report with info on the ships, their location and other useful data. Didn't they know that tradition required ambiguous data and absolutely no location data.
In the circumstances it is pretty safe to say that Sommerwille performed about as well as anyone could have.
Thank you men...thank you for bringing this to life
Learned something new!
@Drachinifel approx. 53:00 mark. "In (your) personal opinion...". Really!? I think we can all agree that your opinions on these matters carry the weight of a doctoral level of education, research, and, dare I say, the experience gained through so many in-depth studies of various engagements, battles and the like, as well as the commanders involved in them, so much so that you can safely state: "in my professional & educated opinion...", from here on out.