they were lions led by people that could not adapt to modern warfare it took miillions of lives before they changed their tactic trying to perform manuever tactics when there was no way to manuever. it was attrition warfare and it is a bloody way to fight a war.
Mike Taylor All very glib. Where do you get that they were attempting manoeuvre warfare? Continuous trenches = siege warfare, no manoeuvring here, ghastly as it was attritional warfare was the only way to destroy the German Army. And they did.
@@miketaylor5212 you should watch some of John's other lectures about officership and adoption of new tactics to try and defeat their enemy...whatever they did learning lessons, people died... It was unavoidable.
@@gl2773 Yes, casualties are unavoidable, but wasting those sacrifices for nothing is avoidable. Getting your men stuck in no man's land in front of barbed wire is avoidable. Compare the Kaiserschlacht and the Somme, 100km of advance barely any headway at all. The german army consistently did more with less.
Fighting 3 then 4 world powers on 2 fronts is what lead to Germany’s defeat. The British starvation blockade played a key role too. It’s actually very impressive how Germany lasted 4 years against these odds and inflicted a 3:1 casualty ratio overall
The blockade, more than any other factor, led to the conditions that forced the German armed forces to seek an armistice; and not to dismiss or diminish the blood and effort the Entente and co-belligerent Americans poured into fighting the German armed forces in the field, but even as late as the end of May of 1918 Germany had the capacity to defeat the Entente in France. My problem with this lecture is that it seems to assume British and French victory in the field in 1918 was inevitable and it only makes a minor concession to the American Expeditionary Force, which frankly represented fresh troops that by June 1918 had arrived in such numbers that the forces arrayed against Germany in France once again outnumbered those that Germany could field; and would have eventually led to an American army in France a quarter the size of all of the forces France and Britain could muster globally. As I said above, the blockade this knowledge combine with the knowledge of what American troops arriving in France represented (and the success of the 100 days offensive) communicated quite decisively to Ludendorff that Germany could no longer hope to achieve any sort of peace other than the one that involved the capitulation of Imperial Germany.
The last 100 days of WW1 were probably the most intensive of the whole war. Nothing, I think, illustrates thescale of the British contribution to victory more significantly than the losses suffered: British & Commonwealth 300,000 French 279,000 American 130,000 The British/Com breakthrough at Amiens on 8 August 1918 started the process of beating down the capabilities of the German army & it was the skills, lmagination & execution of the attacks of the 46th N. Midland division in crossing the St Quentin canal that led to their breaking through the Hindenburg Line - the first formation to do so.
If by British Dr Bourne means the whole British Empire then I can agree with him. However, apart from a side reference to the Australian contribution to the Middle Eastern theatre, he never mentions the Canadians, Indians, South Africans, Newfoundlanders, and New Zealanders. Surely they deserve a mention. For example In the period March to October 1918 the Australian Army Corps of five heavily depleted divisions under General Sir John Monash represented less than 10% of the whole of the British forces on the Western Front, but its presence was far greater even in the cold light of statistics. The Australians captured 23% of all prisoners, 23.5% of all enemy guns and 21.5% of the ground wrested from the Germans.
Simon Hattrell “......a closer examination of the situation tends to indicate that while the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand Divisions fought well in the Hundred Days, so did as many - or more British Divisions, in spite of their manpower handicaps and the mailings they had suffered in the earlier 1918 fighting. All but seven of the fifty British divisions involved in the Hundred Days had been heavily engaged in the Michael offensive or the Georgette attack on the Lys; seventeen had been involved in both, and five had been involved in the Blucher offensive on the Aisne. This level of commitment to battle continued until the very end of the war; fourteen British divisions each suffered casualties of over 2,500 men in the last six weeks of the war alone....and yet the British offensive did not grind t a halt. It should also be remembered that the Canadian Corps had hardly been engaged at all in the great battles in the spring of 1918, and its divisions were therefore intact and relatively fresh when the great Allied began on 8 August. Peter Simkins Senior Historian at the Imperial War Museum In London, said as much in a paper presented at a History Conference held at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, in September 1993, and parts of his address lay out the situation clearly. ‘Many Australian soldiers were critical of the quality of British troops on the Western Front in 1918 and derogatory comments about the morale, the fighting ability or the command of the ‘Tommies’ are by no means difficult to find....even so, y the splendid tactical achievements by Australian soldiers have become somewhat distorted , helping to create the myth of the ‘colonial superman’. As a consequence the contribution of the British soldier to the ultimate victory has been overshadowed. Simkins goes on to analyze the fighting during the Hundred Days and compares the performance of Australian, British, Canadian and (the single) New Zealand Divisions In opposed attacks; his detailed investigations throw up some interesting statistics. For example, the successful opposed-attack record of the nine British divisions in Rawlinson’s Fourth Army during the Hundred Days was 70.7 per cent - exactly the same as in the five Australian Divisions, and only slightly lower than that of the four, much larger Canadian divisions (72.5 per cent) and well above that of the New Zealand Division (64.5 per cent). Moreover two British divisions - the 19th (Western) and 66th - had success rates of 100 per cent and the 9th (Scottish) Division had a success rate of 93 per cent, this last averaged out over fourteen separate attacks. The 24th Division racked up an 85 per cent success rate and the 16th (Irish) Division 80 per cent. The evidence hardly accords with the popular Dominion opinion that all the British divisions were useless. There is more, however. Simkins points out that six Dominion divisions (1st, 2nd and 5th Australian and 1st, 2nd and 3rd Canadian) achieved a success rate of between 70 and 80 per cent in opposed attacks, but so, quite apart, from the divisions mentioned above, did five more British Divisions (Guards, 18th [Eastern], 24th, 34, and 38th [Welsh]). From this it is possible to infer that ten British divisions did as well, or better, than the six crack Dominion divisions. Simkins gives many more examples, and continues. ‘If one then considers the number of attacks carried out by British and Dominion divisions and also the “ battle days” on which each division saw meaningful action, the British units again stand up well in comparison with the Dominion divisions’. In fact, a comparison of successful attacks and ‘battle days’ reveals that during the Hundred Days, most British divisions, ‘in spite of the crisis they experienced earlier in the year, actually made a very weighty contribution to the Allied victory.’ This conclusion would seem to be both accurate and fair, and is reached, not in any attempt to downgrade the reputation of the Dominion divisions, but to point out, yet again, the often-overlooked fact that the British divisions also played a decisive part, whatever is now maintained in Ottawa, Canberra or Wellington. This view is certain to be challenged and all statistical evidence is subject to the accusation that ‘there are lies, damned lies and statistics.’ Before tat old canard is trotted out to refute Peter Simkin’s arguments, it should be pointed out yet again that he presented them, not in the UK, but in a speech to an audience of Australian soldiers and historians In Canberra, where it was received with tolerance and respect.” Robin Neillands - Great War Generals on the Western Front
Between July 18 and the end of the war, the French, American and Belgian armies combined captured 196,700 prisoners-of-war and 3,775 guns, while British forces, with a smaller army than the French, engaged the main mass of the German Army and captured 188,700 prisoners and 2,840 guns. Let me repeat that: the French, American and Belgian armies combined captured 196,700 prisoners-of-war and 3,775 guns, while British forces captured 188,700 prisoners and 2,840 guns. British forces captured only 8,000 fewer prisoners and 935 less guns than the other allies combined In other words the British Army took just under 50% of the prisoners and just over 40% of the guns.
??? It’s quite obvious why Germany went to war in 1914. 1. They honoured their (silly and short sighted but also not unique) agreement with Austria - Hungary to back them up after Russia intervened in a local conflict with Serbia. The Germans asked Russia to demobilise before they declared war. 2. The French mobilisation orders went out 2 days before Germany’s did. France wanted revenge for 1870 and was treaty bound to support Russia. Their ‘plan 17’ to retake Alsace Lorraine then march in Berlin was obviously going to be put into affect. Thus, Germany not being naive saw a preemptive strike as the best way to deal with this situation. British foreign secretary Edward gray committed Britain to frances aid in war regardless of Belgium neutrality. So essentially from a German perspective, you have a net of rival scheming powers around you making alliances that are clearly aimed against you. I thought this was clear to understand. Now I’m not saying this perspective is necessarily correct (it is tho) but that’s how Germany felt.
@@blueband8114 Thanks young man. I think that was a fair description of Germany’s point of view. It’s a better assessment than the usual ‘they wanted to take over europe’ nonsense
German demanded Russia cease mobilization, but did not do anything to hold back Austria from attacking Serbia. So the German demand was that Russia allow Austria to attack Serbia. I have never seen any French plans to "march on Berlin". The distance from Franco-German border to Berlin is about three times greater than the distance to Paris. British Foreign Secretary Gray was committed to aid France, but not the British Government was not, until German invaded Belgium. Gray was not the head of the British government. Yes, Germany leaders saw Germany as surrounded. But whose fault was that, and was World War One a reasonable response?
The German chancellor was on that line, but the German general staff wanted war and intervened behind the scene to encourage the Austrian bellicists. And the Schlieffen plan predates 1914. Now every country believes it's the good guy.
Pershing always annoyed me with his policy of waiting form an American Army before committing to combat. In the meantime Britain and France did all the work and took all the casualties.
You're right there Maria. Sorry. I was glibly trying to quash another pointless squabble where people get agitated and defensive about how brave, competent or conniving their ancestors were. Forgetting these men were allies and generally doing their best in very difficult circumstances.
Rather than make silly accusations, look at the figures. The US build-up has the same profile as the British. They simply started later and bankrolled Britain until then.
Human reality was shattered by WW1. In many ways human existence today is trapped in those trenches for eternity. All of our energy is put into avoiding hell on earth, yet we still end up back in the freezing mud. Our continued lack of comprehension of the horror and despair of the trenches, is a metaphor for our inability to choose civilisation, and wilfully accept violence and chaos as inevitable and even at time beneficial to the human equation.
@@rpm1796 That's not what is meant by the Imperial Presidency. It refers more to the use of executive authority. "A presidency becomes imperial when it relies on powers beyond those allowed by the Constitution of the United States. ... As the United States became a great world power and then a superpower, the presidency acquired more war powers despite the Constitution."
Is there anyone who could historicly debate these self satisfied Brits as they gush proudly about how they defeated the German boogy man all by themselves.
Many good points, especially about the great victories of 1918. However, the lack of enthusiasm for the victory must been seen in the context of the huge losses and relative paucity of justification for those losses. A vast war for hegemony, for empire and for markets. Millions dead. Yes, I think Trotsky had it about right.
The United States tried in vain to stay out of this war. The United States was not prepared for war of any type, in 1917. The United States had no military, to speak of, in 1917, so naturally it took some time to build up an army, equip them, and train them. All wars should be, and most could be, averted, and avoided, if the leaders of the many countries in our world paused for a moment and gave any serious thought, about the consequences. World War l was the most ridiculous of all the wars, as a result of a bunch of mindless inbred leaders, that were direct decendants of Queen Victoria, who treated the approach to war, as a bunch of spoiled children would, when fighting over their toys, which is basically what Europe's leaders treated their Armies as. It is quite possible, that if the European family trees branched out, instead of growing straight up, with an occasional branch here, and there, this war could have been avoided. But then hindsight is 20-20, now isn't it?
As an American, Not to discredit the contribution of our soldiers who did go and fight and take part in the major campaigns late in the war, but I think our main contribution in the war was simply our presence. A huge country with a big industrial and agricultural base untouched by fighting, and the ability to send a whole new army of fresh troops to the front, even if not immediately. The entry of the US pretty much destroyed any illusion the central powers had that eventual victory was still possible, even if the actual contribution to the front in the form of soldiers was relatively small by the time it ended.
First thing the world has a lot to thank Trotsky for, and second while we Americans are often accused of acting like our military and political successes are inevitable, your lecture seems to completely ignore how close run a thing the Spring Offensive was, and how a few bad operational decisions by Ludendorff in April and May of 1918 are all that stood between German victory over the Entente and co-belligerents Americans in France. Instead you seem to be saying that "British and French victory was inevitable in the face of the materially and morally superior British and French soldier." You also laude the fighting spirit of the French and British, despite the French army mutinies and the pacifist movement, which led to the fall of the French government in 1917 and despite many people in Britain close to both Haig and Lloyd George who at the beginning of 1918 openly talked about how Britain was on the verge of collapse and could probably not sustain the war effort if it went into 1919. You also ignore how close the French government came to seeking an armistice itself during the initial phase of the Spring Offensive, and the *literal* serious planning by Haig to evacuate the BEF from France. I also have a problem with your commentary on American fetishization of German operational doctrine. I'm absolutely *not* someone who fetishizes the Germany or its armed forces in either World War, but your premises seems to be "Germany lost both World Wars" to support your conclusion that "the German armed forces and its doctrines are inferior to those of Britain and France in both World Wars." This seems like a rather weak premise given how close a thing the First World War was, and the effects of the Entente and later the co-belligerent American naval blockade of Germany on Germany's ability to sustain the war; and in the Second World War, there was no operational doctrine that would have allowed a German victory when Germany and the Axis powers were at war with 2/3rds of the industrial capacity then present on the Earth. In total wars that are existential affairs, it is ultimately the industrial and logistical capacity of the belligerents that is going to win or lose the war and NOT operational and tactical doctrine, though I will point out the successes of the Wehrmacht during the years 1939-1941 seems to indicate that their operational doctrine was highly successful and superior to what France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union had to offer. Later adaptations by these powers to the "German way of war" *combined* with the effects of the full force of the industrial capacity arrayed against the Axis powers proved the deciding factor in that war. AND FINALLY, I question why ANY country went to war in 1914. It was almost an accidental war that *DID NOT* need to happen; however, I am sick of Germany getting the full blame for the war by many Western First World War historians. The French government advocated and lobbied for the war with the Russian government in the hopes of taking back Alsace-Lorraine and overtly lied to the Russians and purposefully obfuscated the truth about German intentions and mobilization plans to achieve that goal. Once Russia had mobilized and would not pause its mobilization when asked by the German government to facilitate diplomatic negotiations to the Serbian crisis (primarily because of the lies being told by the French), and it was clear that the French were going to mobilize, Germany had a choice--mobilize or not. If Germany failed to mobilize and the French and Russians declared war anyway, Germany could not defend itself, and if it DID mobilize--since Germany only had a single mobilization plan--it meant there must be war as Luxemburg and a small part of Belgium would have to be occupied to ensure access to the rail lines Germany needed for mobilization. Then there is Great Britain. Great Britain is not innocent. While we can absolutely fault Germany for only having a mobilization plan, and then a plan to conduct a war, that required the violation of the sovereignty of its neutral neighbors, Great Britain used a 100 year old treaty (the Treaty of Guarantee) as a convenient way to justify the policy goals of the British government--entering the war on the side of France--to the British people. The British government did this because of what a German victory in Europe would have represented to British business interests AND because a German victory in Europe would have enabled the Kaiser to pursue his pet project--the Kaiserliche Marine--unchecked. The ultimate fear being that unchecked German naval building while being the dominating power in continental Europe would lead to the point that the German navy could be a true threat to the British Royal Navy AND, by extension, Britain's colonial empire. So in a very, very REAL way Britain chose to go to war with Germany to preserve the colonial exploitation of the huge swaths of the world that Great Britain had occupied, and consistently used forced to maintain its control over, to the detriment of the human beings who lived under the British yoke. In my opinion, the only "good guys" in the First World War were the neutral countries that had to suffer because of the machinations of the "great" European powers, absolute monarchs, and colonial empires--and this applies Great Britain, France, and Russia just as much as it does Germany and Austria-Hungary. This makes the Entente *slightly* more palatable as the victors since it was the Central Powers who were the first to violate neutral countries, but when I say slightly I mean slightly. The goals and war aims of Britain, France, and Russia were as disgusting as those of the Central Powers and the Treaty of Versailles is a testament to that fact.
The whole point of the German spring offensives, as Ludendorff said, was to strike before the Americans arrived. Bourne's comments are snide about the U.S., Yet he quotes the French who were--and still are--grateful and recognize the U.S. contribution. I think the French were qualified to comment, seeing it was their land they fighting on... Were the initial American contributions small and not the best managed of the war? Yes! But the German troops who faced the Americans at Belleau Wood and were stopped by them at Chateau-Thierry realized that they were an element to reckon with. Call those "psychological" victories if you will, but it was not some voodoo mind game. The German military realized that the U.S. was not just cannon fodder, but hard-fighting, fast-learning soldiers.
+MJ Milano Germany's spring offensive failed to defeat the Allies before American armies could arrive on mass. All four German operations failed and British BEF forces started a counter attack at Amiens. Germany's armies collapsed in what became known as the Hundred day offensive. The arrival of the American armies gave the Allies too much influence at negotiations resulting in a harsh treaty. The blockade of Europe defeated Germany. Its home front and armies slowly collapsed. Kaisers regime collapsed!
@@cyclingnerddelux698 ; America has many of Irish ☘️ descent who left Ireland because of British persecution. Additionally it is well known that Cecil Rhodes lifelong goal was to put the American Colonies (he talked like that) back under British rule. Bare in mind this was in the late 19th Century. We had no axe 🪓 to grind against Russia 🇷🇺, in fact we were allies all throughout the 19th Century until the rabid Anglophile and brown-noser Theodore Roosevelt came along, following the suspicious assassination of President William F. McKinley. Got it? Good!
Enjoyed hearing him run down the despicable racist Woodrow Wilson. It was luck of circumstance more than any remarkable character or attribute that grants the man acclaim very much unearned.
Niall Ferguson was right, Britain’s intervention in World War I was a tragic mistake that drove a regional conflict into a long term world war. The French were doomed from day one without the help of the British, we adjusted the balance of power and created a massive muddy slaughterhouse.
Racial and Ethnic hatred is a massive part of why the 1st and 2nd world wars happened. People can go on about economies and strategic resource, dominance and 'sphere's of influence' but in Europe there's a lot of long-standing and in some places, very old ethnic hatreds that go back a long way. Some historians may touch on this a bit here and there in thier books, papers and articles but none of them will ascribe ethnic hatred, with all the energy of vendetta and revenge et al as the main engergy driving it the urge for violence with 'neighbours'.
+Nounismisation There is no doubt that he is well informed on the subject and is a capable public speaker but his British chauvinism and snide anti American comments undermine his presentation imo.
Yes - we inch nearer to it. There's something complacent in it too. I don't know that it's chauvinism and I'll watch out for the anti-American strain next time I listen (if I can summon up the enthusiasm). I think it may be egotism. Thoughts?
You might have hit the nail on the head there. He does exude a sort of complacent smugness that i find irritating especially when you consider it was the French army that did most of the heavy lifting on the western front. I wonder if the French and British historical establishments will ever be able to cooperate to produce an accurate and cohesive narrative of what really happened.
Oh God, that's a whole new bag of snakes right there but well worth asking. One would like to think and ought to expect academic discourse to transcend petty nationalisms and other prejudices, and yet... Is this John Bourne one of the Sandhurst lot? I can imagine it's all too easy to forget your academic roots in a place like that. Margaret MacMillan is an historian that I'd recommend to anyone interested in this period of history and with none of the stuff that has annoyed us both. There are some of her lectures here on TH-cam. I could link you if you'd like.
Seems this bloke has never heard of Teddy Roosevelt, the physical embodiment of “The American Century”. Just goes to show that anybody, no matter how knowledgeable can make themselves look foolish when they expound on a subject they don’t know much about.
31:31 "If getting your troops killed in savage numbers..." Amm, yes you've obviously missed the Somme, Ypres etc. as well, where allied troops were sacrificed on a large scale without any breakthrough at all. It's rather disingenious to diss Germany's spring offensive in 1918, against better supplied and numerically greater foe. And yes, the German army was overally better in tactical and operational terms than the Entente's. It's very telling that the combined forces of France, Italy and UK with their correspondent colonial resources were only able to win, after US involvement in the war.
No, that's not correct. The Western Front was stalemate till 1918. British BEF forces broke that stalemate at Amiens using tanks on mass supported by infantry and aircraft.
"It's very telling that the combined forces of France, Italy and UK with their correspondent colonial resources were only able to win, after US involvement in the war." Do you transatlantics actually believe this total arse gravy? If so, you are to be pitied and despised.
He questions the German 1918 offensives as questionable objects of praise, because of the casualties. No where does he hold up Somme or Ypres for emulation, either.
An excellent lecture-I for one am sick of the portrayal of the British soldier in WW1 as a pathetic sheep rather than an educated,motivated brave man.
they were lions led by people that could not adapt to modern warfare it took miillions of lives before they changed their tactic trying to perform manuever tactics when there was no way to manuever. it was attrition warfare and it is a bloody way to fight a war.
Mike Taylor All very glib. Where do you get that they were attempting manoeuvre warfare? Continuous trenches = siege warfare, no manoeuvring here, ghastly as it was attritional warfare was the only way to destroy the German Army. And they did.
@@miketaylor5212 you should watch some of John's other lectures about officership and adoption of new tactics to try and defeat their enemy...whatever they did learning lessons, people died... It was unavoidable.
@@gl2773 Yes, casualties are unavoidable, but wasting those sacrifices for nothing is avoidable. Getting your men stuck in no man's land in front of barbed wire is avoidable. Compare the Kaiserschlacht and the Somme, 100km of advance barely any headway at all. The german army consistently did more with less.
Example of a historian who has questioned the bravery of the British soldier?
This is the best video of the series so far
A very entertaining speaker
Fighting 3 then 4 world powers on 2 fronts is what lead to Germany’s defeat. The British starvation blockade played a key role too. It’s actually very impressive how Germany lasted 4 years against these odds and inflicted a 3:1 casualty ratio overall
The blockade, more than any other factor, led to the conditions that forced the German armed forces to seek an armistice; and not to dismiss or diminish the blood and effort the Entente and co-belligerent Americans poured into fighting the German armed forces in the field, but even as late as the end of May of 1918 Germany had the capacity to defeat the Entente in France.
My problem with this lecture is that it seems to assume British and French victory in the field in 1918 was inevitable and it only makes a minor concession to the American Expeditionary Force, which frankly represented fresh troops that by June 1918 had arrived in such numbers that the forces arrayed against Germany in France once again outnumbered those that Germany could field; and would have eventually led to an American army in France a quarter the size of all of the forces France and Britain could muster globally.
As I said above, the blockade this knowledge combine with the knowledge of what American troops arriving in France represented (and the success of the 100 days offensive) communicated quite decisively to Ludendorff that Germany could no longer hope to achieve any sort of peace other than the one that involved the capitulation of Imperial Germany.
@@RevolutionarythoughtI disagree with your assessment, by 1918 the Germans were running out of men and materials, even if they had 😊enough food.
Absolutely love this, such an amazing historian.
The last 100 days of WW1 were probably the most intensive of the whole war.
Nothing, I think, illustrates thescale of the British contribution to victory more significantly than the losses suffered:
British & Commonwealth 300,000
French 279,000
American 130,000
The British/Com breakthrough at Amiens on 8 August 1918 started the process of beating down the capabilities of the German army & it was the skills, lmagination & execution of the attacks of the 46th N. Midland division in crossing the St Quentin canal that led to their breaking through the Hindenburg Line - the first formation to do so.
Superb .... I do so enjoy these presentations
If by British Dr Bourne means the whole British Empire then I can agree with him. However, apart from a side reference to the Australian contribution to the Middle Eastern theatre, he never mentions the Canadians, Indians, South Africans, Newfoundlanders, and New Zealanders. Surely they deserve a mention. For example In the period March to October 1918 the Australian Army Corps of five heavily depleted divisions under General Sir John Monash represented less than 10% of the whole of the British forces on the Western Front, but its presence was far greater even in the cold light of statistics. The Australians captured 23% of all prisoners, 23.5% of all enemy guns and 21.5% of the ground wrested from the Germans.
Simon Hattrell
“......a closer examination of the situation tends to indicate that while the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand Divisions fought well in the Hundred Days, so did as many - or more British Divisions, in spite of their manpower handicaps and the mailings they had suffered in the earlier 1918 fighting.
All but seven of the fifty British divisions involved in the Hundred Days had been heavily engaged in the Michael offensive or the Georgette attack on the Lys; seventeen had been involved in both, and five had been involved in the Blucher offensive on the Aisne. This level of commitment to battle continued until the very end of the war; fourteen British divisions each suffered casualties of over 2,500 men in the last six weeks of the war alone....and yet the British offensive did not grind t a halt. It should also be remembered that the Canadian Corps had hardly been engaged at all in the great battles in the spring of 1918, and its divisions were therefore intact and relatively fresh when the great Allied began on 8 August.
Peter Simkins Senior Historian at the Imperial War Museum In London, said as much in a paper presented at a History Conference held at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, in September 1993, and parts of his address lay out the situation clearly.
‘Many Australian soldiers were critical of the quality of British troops on the Western Front in 1918 and derogatory comments about the morale, the fighting ability or the command of the ‘Tommies’ are by no means difficult to find....even so, y the splendid tactical achievements by Australian soldiers have become somewhat distorted , helping to create the myth of the ‘colonial superman’. As a consequence the contribution of the British soldier to the ultimate victory has been overshadowed.
Simkins goes on to analyze the fighting during the Hundred Days and compares the performance of Australian, British, Canadian and (the single) New Zealand Divisions In opposed attacks; his detailed investigations throw up some interesting statistics. For example, the successful opposed-attack record of the nine British divisions in Rawlinson’s Fourth Army during the Hundred Days was 70.7 per cent - exactly the same as in the five Australian Divisions, and only slightly lower than that of the four, much larger Canadian divisions (72.5 per cent) and well above that of the New Zealand Division (64.5 per cent). Moreover two British divisions - the 19th (Western) and 66th - had success rates of 100 per cent and the 9th (Scottish) Division had a success rate of 93 per cent, this last averaged out over fourteen separate attacks. The 24th Division racked up an 85 per cent success rate and the 16th (Irish) Division 80 per cent. The evidence hardly accords with the popular Dominion opinion that all the British divisions were useless.
There is more, however. Simkins points out that six Dominion divisions (1st, 2nd and 5th Australian and 1st, 2nd and 3rd Canadian) achieved a success rate of between 70 and 80 per cent in opposed attacks, but so, quite apart, from the divisions mentioned above, did five more British Divisions (Guards, 18th [Eastern], 24th, 34, and 38th [Welsh]). From this it is possible to infer that ten British divisions did as well, or better, than the six crack Dominion divisions.
Simkins gives many more examples, and continues. ‘If one then considers the number of attacks carried out by British and Dominion divisions and also the “ battle days” on which each division saw meaningful action, the British units again stand up well in comparison with the Dominion divisions’. In fact, a comparison of successful attacks and ‘battle days’ reveals that during the Hundred Days, most British divisions, ‘in spite of the crisis they experienced earlier in the year, actually made a very weighty contribution to the Allied victory.’ This conclusion would seem to be both accurate and fair, and is reached, not in any attempt to downgrade the reputation of the Dominion divisions, but to point out, yet again, the often-overlooked fact that the British divisions also played a decisive part, whatever is now maintained in Ottawa, Canberra or Wellington.
This view is certain to be challenged and all statistical evidence is subject to the accusation that ‘there are lies, damned lies and statistics.’ Before tat old canard is trotted out to refute Peter Simkin’s arguments, it should be pointed out yet again that he presented them, not in the UK, but in a speech to an audience of Australian soldiers and historians In Canberra, where it was received with tolerance and respect.”
Robin Neillands - Great War Generals on the Western Front
He mentions the Indians on the Mesopotamian front
Dr John Bourne, legend
Another interesting slant on the GW but I was under the mistaken impression it was going to be about the RFC.
Between July 18 and the end of the war, the French, American and Belgian armies combined captured 196,700 prisoners-of-war and 3,775 guns, while British forces, with a smaller army than the French, engaged the main mass of the German Army and captured 188,700 prisoners and 2,840 guns.
Let me repeat that: the French, American and Belgian armies combined captured 196,700 prisoners-of-war and 3,775 guns, while British forces captured 188,700 prisoners and 2,840 guns.
British forces captured only 8,000 fewer prisoners and 935 less guns than the other allies combined
In other words the British Army took just under 50% of the prisoners and just over 40% of the guns.
I'd like to see those figures for just the French. My guess is the Belgian and American armies didn't account for much of those numbers.
Great Vid!!
Does that old timey music really need to be twice as loud as the rest of the thin?, It's really annoying to have the volume spike at the end.
And waste another three minutes introducing a speaker that the audience had come especially to hear.
@@wuffothewonderdog 🐭💦
??? It’s quite obvious why Germany went to war in 1914.
1. They honoured their (silly and short sighted but also not unique) agreement with Austria - Hungary to back them up after Russia intervened in a local conflict with Serbia. The Germans asked Russia to demobilise before they declared war.
2. The French mobilisation orders went out 2 days before Germany’s did. France wanted revenge for 1870 and was treaty bound to support Russia. Their ‘plan 17’ to retake Alsace Lorraine then march in Berlin was obviously going to be put into affect. Thus, Germany not being naive saw a preemptive strike as the best way to deal with this situation.
British foreign secretary Edward gray committed Britain to frances aid in war regardless of Belgium neutrality.
So essentially from a German perspective, you have a net of rival scheming powers around you making alliances that are clearly aimed against you.
I thought this was clear to understand. Now I’m not saying this perspective is necessarily correct (it is tho) but that’s how Germany felt.
Rhys a perfect description of what Germany faced.
@@blueband8114
Thanks young man. I think that was a fair description of Germany’s point of view. It’s a better assessment than the usual ‘they wanted to take over europe’ nonsense
German demanded Russia cease mobilization, but did not do anything to hold back Austria from attacking Serbia. So the German demand was that Russia allow Austria to attack Serbia.
I have never seen any French plans to "march on Berlin". The distance from Franco-German border to Berlin is about three times greater than the distance to Paris.
British Foreign Secretary Gray was committed to aid France, but not the British Government was not, until German invaded Belgium. Gray was not the head of the British government.
Yes, Germany leaders saw Germany as surrounded. But whose fault was that, and was World War One a reasonable response?
The German chancellor was on that line, but the German general staff wanted war and intervened behind the scene to encourage the Austrian bellicists. And the Schlieffen plan predates 1914. Now every country believes it's the good guy.
Pershing always annoyed me with his policy of waiting form an American Army before committing to combat. In the meantime Britain and France did all the work and took all the casualties.
You tell 'im Bob Americana. How can anybody be annoyed by Pershing?
ask the families of the dead soldiers Pershing was responsible for on the last day of the war...... then re-visit your question
You're right there Maria. Sorry. I was glibly trying to quash another pointless squabble where people get agitated and defensive about how brave, competent or conniving their ancestors were. Forgetting these men were allies and generally doing their best in very difficult circumstances.
Yes indeed Dermot.. and well said in your reply sir.
Rather than make silly accusations, look at the figures. The US build-up has the same profile as the British. They simply started later and bankrolled Britain until then.
Great talk - but the wrong title
Human reality was shattered by WW1. In many ways human existence today is trapped in those trenches for eternity. All of our energy is put into avoiding hell on earth, yet we still end up back in the freezing mud.
Our continued lack of comprehension of the horror and despair of the trenches, is a metaphor for our inability to choose civilisation, and wilfully accept violence and chaos as inevitable and even at time beneficial to the human equation.
Keren banget film nya👍
Im on this guy's side... Wilson started the Imperial Presidency. He was not a good person either.
What about the annexation of the Mexican States, then Hawaii, and the occupation of the Philippines?
@@rpm1796 That's not what is meant by the Imperial Presidency. It refers more to the use of executive authority.
"A presidency becomes imperial when it relies on powers beyond those allowed by the Constitution of the United States. ... As the United States became a great world power and then a superpower, the presidency acquired more war powers despite the Constitution."
it would be handy to known what armor mechanized or tow'ed howitzer's the Australian diggers had with them when this battle started?
Is there anyone who could historicly debate these self satisfied Brits as they gush proudly about how they defeated the German boogy man all by themselves.
You need to brush up a bit on your comprehension.... he made no such claim. But hardly surprising.
Nobody is claiming Britain defeated Germany all by themselves. So what are you talking about?
Oh, the sheer irony of an american accusing others of "gushing proudly about how they defeated the German bogey man"... :-D
No Dwight. He doesn't say that. Stick to watching Mel Gibson films.
Wow, you really lost any legitimacy you had after that unintelligible rant.
Many good points, especially about the great victories of 1918. However, the lack of enthusiasm for the victory must been seen in the context of the huge losses and relative paucity of justification for those losses. A vast war for hegemony, for empire and for markets. Millions dead. Yes, I think Trotsky had it about right.
The United States tried in vain to stay out of this war. The United States was not prepared for war of any type, in 1917. The United States had no military, to speak of, in 1917, so naturally it took some time to build up an army, equip them, and train them. All wars should be, and most could be, averted, and avoided, if the leaders of the many countries in our world paused for a moment and gave any serious thought, about the consequences. World War l was the most ridiculous of all the wars, as a result of a bunch of mindless inbred leaders, that were direct decendants of Queen Victoria, who treated the approach to war, as a bunch of spoiled children would, when fighting over their toys, which is basically what Europe's leaders treated their Armies as. It is quite possible, that if the European family trees branched out, instead of growing straight up, with an occasional branch here, and there, this war could have been avoided. But then hindsight is 20-20, now isn't it?
As an American, Not to discredit the contribution of our soldiers who did go and fight and take part in the major campaigns late in the war, but I think our main contribution in the war was simply our presence. A huge country with a big industrial and agricultural base untouched by fighting, and the ability to send a whole new army of fresh troops to the front, even if not immediately. The entry of the US pretty much destroyed any illusion the central powers had that eventual victory was still possible, even if the actual contribution to the front in the form of soldiers was relatively small by the time it ended.
First thing the world has a lot to thank Trotsky for, and second while we Americans are often accused of acting like our military and political successes are inevitable, your lecture seems to completely ignore how close run a thing the Spring Offensive was, and how a few bad operational decisions by Ludendorff in April and May of 1918 are all that stood between German victory over the Entente and co-belligerents Americans in France. Instead you seem to be saying that "British and French victory was inevitable in the face of the materially and morally superior British and French soldier."
You also laude the fighting spirit of the French and British, despite the French army mutinies and the pacifist movement, which led to the fall of the French government in 1917 and despite many people in Britain close to both Haig and Lloyd George who at the beginning of 1918 openly talked about how Britain was on the verge of collapse and could probably not sustain the war effort if it went into 1919. You also ignore how close the French government came to seeking an armistice itself during the initial phase of the Spring Offensive, and the *literal* serious planning by Haig to evacuate the BEF from France.
I also have a problem with your commentary on American fetishization of German operational doctrine. I'm absolutely *not* someone who fetishizes the Germany or its armed forces in either World War, but your premises seems to be "Germany lost both World Wars" to support your conclusion that "the German armed forces and its doctrines are inferior to those of Britain and France in both World Wars." This seems like a rather weak premise given how close a thing the First World War was, and the effects of the Entente and later the co-belligerent American naval blockade of Germany on Germany's ability to sustain the war; and in the Second World War, there was no operational doctrine that would have allowed a German victory when Germany and the Axis powers were at war with 2/3rds of the industrial capacity then present on the Earth.
In total wars that are existential affairs, it is ultimately the industrial and logistical capacity of the belligerents that is going to win or lose the war and NOT operational and tactical doctrine, though I will point out the successes of the Wehrmacht during the years 1939-1941 seems to indicate that their operational doctrine was highly successful and superior to what France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union had to offer. Later adaptations by these powers to the "German way of war" *combined* with the effects of the full force of the industrial capacity arrayed against the Axis powers proved the deciding factor in that war.
AND FINALLY, I question why ANY country went to war in 1914. It was almost an accidental war that *DID NOT* need to happen; however, I am sick of Germany getting the full blame for the war by many Western First World War historians. The French government advocated and lobbied for the war with the Russian government in the hopes of taking back Alsace-Lorraine and overtly lied to the Russians and purposefully obfuscated the truth about German intentions and mobilization plans to achieve that goal.
Once Russia had mobilized and would not pause its mobilization when asked by the German government to facilitate diplomatic negotiations to the Serbian crisis (primarily because of the lies being told by the French), and it was clear that the French were going to mobilize, Germany had a choice--mobilize or not. If Germany failed to mobilize and the French and Russians declared war anyway, Germany could not defend itself, and if it DID mobilize--since Germany only had a single mobilization plan--it meant there must be war as Luxemburg and a small part of Belgium would have to be occupied to ensure access to the rail lines Germany needed for mobilization.
Then there is Great Britain. Great Britain is not innocent. While we can absolutely fault Germany for only having a mobilization plan, and then a plan to conduct a war, that required the violation of the sovereignty of its neutral neighbors, Great Britain used a 100 year old treaty (the Treaty of Guarantee) as a convenient way to justify the policy goals of the British government--entering the war on the side of France--to the British people. The British government did this because of what a German victory in Europe would have represented to British business interests AND because a German victory in Europe would have enabled the Kaiser to pursue his pet project--the Kaiserliche Marine--unchecked. The ultimate fear being that unchecked German naval building while being the dominating power in continental Europe would lead to the point that the German navy could be a true threat to the British Royal Navy AND, by extension, Britain's colonial empire.
So in a very, very REAL way Britain chose to go to war with Germany to preserve the colonial exploitation of the huge swaths of the world that Great Britain had occupied, and consistently used forced to maintain its control over, to the detriment of the human beings who lived under the British yoke.
In my opinion, the only "good guys" in the First World War were the neutral countries that had to suffer because of the machinations of the "great" European powers, absolute monarchs, and colonial empires--and this applies Great Britain, France, and Russia just as much as it does Germany and Austria-Hungary. This makes the Entente *slightly* more palatable as the victors since it was the Central Powers who were the first to violate neutral countries, but when I say slightly I mean slightly. The goals and war aims of Britain, France, and Russia were as disgusting as those of the Central Powers and the Treaty of Versailles is a testament to that fact.
Holy bananas: Bravo!
Trotsky? No thanks Karl.
The whole point of the German spring offensives, as Ludendorff said, was to strike before the Americans arrived. Bourne's comments are snide about the U.S., Yet he quotes the French who were--and still are--grateful and recognize the U.S. contribution. I think the French were qualified to comment, seeing it was their land they fighting on...
Were the initial American contributions small and not the best managed of the war? Yes! But the German troops who faced the Americans at Belleau Wood and were stopped by them at Chateau-Thierry realized that they were an element to reckon with. Call those "psychological" victories if you will, but it was not some voodoo mind game. The German military realized that the U.S. was not just cannon fodder, but hard-fighting, fast-learning soldiers.
+MJ Milano
Germany's spring offensive failed to defeat the Allies before American armies could arrive on mass. All four German operations failed and British BEF forces started a counter attack at Amiens. Germany's armies collapsed in what became known as the Hundred day offensive. The arrival of the American armies gave the Allies too much influence at negotiations resulting in a harsh treaty. The blockade of Europe defeated Germany. Its home front and armies slowly collapsed. Kaisers regime collapsed!
Americans didn't hate the Russian in 1914.
However, Americans still hated England, especially Catholics.
What? Where did you get this data from?
What are you babbling about?
@@cyclingnerddelux698 ; America has many of Irish ☘️ descent who left Ireland because of British persecution.
Additionally it is well known that Cecil Rhodes lifelong goal was to put the American Colonies (he talked like that) back under British rule.
Bare in mind this was in the late 19th Century.
We had no axe 🪓 to grind against Russia 🇷🇺, in fact we were allies all throughout the 19th Century until the rabid Anglophile and brown-noser Theodore Roosevelt came along, following the suspicious assassination of President William F. McKinley.
Got it?
Good!
Germany lost the war at the (first) Marne. This is a given. The rest of the awful morass was, effectively, aftermath.
The opening battle of the frontiers was the beginning of the end.
Tipperary is in Ireland
Enjoyed hearing him run down the despicable racist Woodrow Wilson. It was luck of circumstance more than any remarkable character or attribute that grants the man acclaim very much unearned.
Being less condecending would help.
Niall Ferguson was right, Britain’s intervention in World War I was a tragic mistake that drove a regional conflict into a long term world war. The French were doomed from day one without the help of the British, we adjusted the balance of power and created a massive muddy slaughterhouse.
Never met a man i didnt like will rodgers
Racial and Ethnic hatred is a massive part of why the 1st and 2nd world wars happened.
People can go on about economies and strategic resource, dominance and 'sphere's of influence' but in Europe there's a lot of long-standing and in some places, very old ethnic hatreds that go back a long way.
Some historians may touch on this a bit here and there in thier books, papers and articles but none of them will ascribe ethnic hatred, with all the energy of vendetta and revenge et al as the main engergy driving it the urge for violence with 'neighbours'.
D D Jay The world over, it is the same. Unfortunately. But we try to rise above it. Sometimes, we succeed.
Oh look, it's the in-house Marxist disinfo agent. F*** off with your race baiting BS.
@casadelshed9128 So, you're enjoying the works of Karl Marx I see. Do one!
It's strange how he manages to be both very interesting and very annoying at the same time. Quite a feat. Wish I could put my finger on it.
+Nounismisation There is no doubt that he is well informed on the subject and is a capable public speaker but his British chauvinism and snide anti American comments undermine his presentation imo.
Yes - we inch nearer to it.
There's something complacent in it too. I don't know that it's chauvinism and I'll watch out for the anti-American strain next time I listen (if I can summon up the enthusiasm).
I think it may be egotism.
Thoughts?
You might have hit the nail on the head there. He does exude a sort of complacent smugness that i find irritating especially when you consider it was the French army that did most of the heavy lifting on the western front. I wonder if the French and British historical establishments will ever be able to cooperate to produce an accurate and cohesive narrative of what really happened.
Oh God, that's a whole new bag of snakes right there but well worth asking. One would like to think and ought to expect academic discourse to transcend petty nationalisms and other prejudices, and yet... Is this John Bourne one of the Sandhurst lot? I can imagine it's all too easy to forget your academic roots in a place like that.
Margaret MacMillan is an historian that I'd recommend to anyone interested in this period of history and with none of the stuff that has annoyed us both. There are some of her lectures here on TH-cam. I could link you if you'd like.
From his attitude I would guess he is British Landed Gentry. Their attitudes go back hundreds of years.
Seems this bloke has never heard of Teddy Roosevelt, the physical embodiment of “The American Century”. Just goes to show that anybody, no matter how knowledgeable can make themselves look foolish when they expound on a subject they don’t know much about.
1918 English men 5% beta
1945 50% beta
2020 95% beta
31:31 "If getting your troops killed in savage numbers..."
Amm, yes you've obviously missed the Somme, Ypres etc. as well, where allied troops were sacrificed on a large scale without any breakthrough at all.
It's rather disingenious to diss Germany's spring offensive in 1918, against better supplied and numerically greater foe. And yes, the German army was overally better in tactical and operational terms than the Entente's. It's very telling that the combined forces of France, Italy and UK with their correspondent colonial resources were only able to win, after US involvement in the war.
No, that's not correct. The Western Front was stalemate till 1918. British BEF forces broke that stalemate at Amiens using tanks on mass supported by infantry and aircraft.
why did you miss out Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire.
"It's very telling that the combined forces of France, Italy and UK with their correspondent colonial resources were only able to win, after US involvement in the war."
Do you transatlantics actually believe this total arse gravy? If so, you are to be pitied and despised.
@@bnipmnaa they are taught it as school when saluting their flag every morning, part of the indoctrination schemes at school.
He questions the German 1918 offensives as questionable objects of praise, because of the casualties. No where does he hold up Somme or Ypres for emulation, either.