Lambert is one of my favorite historians. His lectures are strait up, full of info, and easy to listen to. His take on the crimea war is extremely interesting.
@@martinlee5818when he talks, I listen. From someone across the pond, he has definitely effected and molded my understanding of navel warfare. I am not formally educated like yourself. It's been a lifelong interest and passion. To me, when he speaks, its like having a good captain. That is something I do know about after 40 years at sea. He is clear, very precise, not very long winded, with a tone of voice that commands respect.
Me too. Andrew Lambert is for sure a far better historian than the usual crowd talking about seapower, the Royal Navy and World War One. His comments on Churchill and Antwerp, and Keyes and Zeebrugge are spot on. What a missed opportunity and a mad operation, and yes, such a waste of life in the end result. I like the prospect of doing some research on the plans of French and Fisher together myself now, and thus having a peek on what could have been instead of Passchendaele and the Somme. I wish many more great insights from Andrew Lambert. Including his view on the wrongness of a total war to save France. It could have done with much more care and far less loss indeed. Going to war to defend Belgium, sure, but then using much more sense.
@@gandydancer9710 One was then also fighting the previous war. Antwerp was still a bastion but couldn't be hold because of the better German artillery. Still before the siege the Belgians gave an idea of the way to go in the Battle of Halen. Highly mobile groups armed with machine guns. But then Max Hastings argued that even the officer corps wouldn't be up to the task
@@johnomirth I sent him a message about 3 years ago asking him his opinion on the Fisher Baltic Plan and his answer was: "I think the Germans would have mined all approaches heavily and made it very difficult for the British forces to move freely. The Russian Navy would have helped where they could but overall I think the Germans would have defended Kiel and their coastline with all they had"
@@RussBeatle63 they could of defended the coastline but would have to to sacrifice men from either the western front or eastern front and come up with alternatives as they had now lost their steel, ball bearings, tin, copper, the rest of their food imports and horses for transport and logistics. Had this plan been implemented the war would of actually been over by Christmas.
Outstanding! Thank you very much for this. So much great information. Good to finally understand why the Courageous class had such shallow drafts - I knew they were the "Baltic Plan", but did not understand how or why. Superb presentation, thank you Professor Lambert and the Western Front Association.
It was not for nothing that one of Churchill´s more memorial sayings was ´´The definition of success is the ability to go from failure to failure with no loss of enthusiasm.´´ What an utter bungler!
Thank you for a very interesting lecture! I am a bit of a Battle of Jutland nerd so this was a very interesting extension to hear about the British naval strategy thinking. Being Swedish I was very surprised to hear that Germany was so dependent on trading with Sweden for more than our famous iron ore. I felt so sorry for the horses shipped to the German front. I am also amazed Sweden actually shipped food to Germany as I know there were food riots in Sweden during the First World war. I suppose greed had much to do with that, sending food to a starved Germany payed much more than feeding ones own population...
Excellent lecture, throws light on a little known part of British politics. When we actually take the time to study Winston Churchill the picture painted is not a pretty one.
That was an excellent talk that elucidated an aspect of the First World War (Fisher's Baltic plans) that I had always found impractical and even nonsensical. I would only push back on Mr Lambert's characterization of the Entente as short-term and easily traded for another alliance. It reminds me of a question I proposed as a debate topic many years ago: "Resolved: Britain should have allied *with* Germany *against* France and Russia in World War I." And the answer is definitely no, because Britain must always ally against the strongest continental European power, and in 1914 that was Germany. So the Entente, though deliberately made nonbinding by British diplomats, was made binding by circumstances.
Interesting point however, while in ww2 sweden tacitly supported Germany it has to be remembered that they also provided a lot of information to the Allies about German Naval operations in and around swedish waters and they were fully aware that Germany had the potential to invade them and even had some plans drawn up and so not only took preparations if the event came but also took actions that did not involve military operations to avoid this possibility of being invaded. The main difference of course being in WW1 Denmark is unlikley to capitulate in 6 hours like they did in ww2. So the much lower chance of a direct invasion of sweden might be enough to allow the swedes to hold the position of neutrality but leaning towards the entente
@@R1J3H The support provided by Sweden to Germany in both WW was material, not "tacit". Not that Sweden had much choice. And, no, Denmark's resistance was never going to amount to much in WWI either. But the most obvious problem with Fisher's plan is that the Germans might not oblige him by invading Denmark until after the Brits invaded. But that might be dispensable. Lambert's blather about the "moral high ground" and such is weirdly ancient propaganda. (He gets the order of the Brits violating the rules against non-close blockades and Germans sinking merchant ships without inspection backwards, I believe.) No one cares that the Brits violated Greek neutrality in WW1 (or Iceland's in WW2), so why worry about their violating Denmark's?
In 1940 Sweden could do nothing at all to defend Denmark and everyone knew it- our army was weak- Sweden was lucky enough ( and I am sure many allied flight crews were lucky too) that it wasn´t occupied but managed to provide a refuge to many during the war years by walking a tightrope between the Allied and the Germans. I know my father thought it rather shameful that Sweden allowed German troops to pass by train through Sweden, ( he was a teenager and saw the trains)but indeed what option had the government? It had to give in or risk us being occupied. Staying unoccupied made it for example possible for Sweden to accept the Danish jews who were rescued by heroic Danes over Öresund during some nights in 1943. My parents closest friend was one of them who managed to flee from Germany over Öresund to Sweden and as a child that story had an enormous impact on me. My parish vicar was a German soldier who managed to desert the German army in Norway and flee over the mountains to Sweden- that would not have been possible if Sweden had been occupied. Swedes love to self-hate ourselves and there has been so many books and documentaries produced that want to make us feel ashamed of how Sweden acted during WWII. But a governments first duty is to take care of its own people and keep it safe- in my view the Swedish government did just that, they were not heroes but they kept their people safe and in doing so also provided a safe haven for many who fled occupied countries, like the jews and those who fled the nazis, and also provided shelter for allied airmen who managed to take their damaged bomb planed to Sweden instead of being captured by the enemy or perish. I know many Swedes felt with the Danes and the Norwegians. My own grandfather was Danish ( he died long before the war and my grandmother moved back to her native Sweden) so my father had many Danish close relatives who then came to live under the German occupation, one uncle even came to be interred in a German prison camp, and my father talked often on how close the war and the reality hit him on the 9th of April 1940. But he also talked about how generous the Danes had been to him after the war and didn´t seem to hold any grudge against Sweden.
Sweden was mainly anti-Russian. Also the allure for Dnemark to fight Germnay was very liited. At teh start of WW1 Germnay pressuard Denamrk to mine the straits and got a guarantee form Sweden not to join Russia in this war vs Germany (fight Germany then). After russia collapsed and Gremany helpd Finland become independant Sweden did NOT mind at all.
Very great lecture and I wish 1:30:00 had start by stating his position a little differently, I am American so maybe that isn't as rude as I think it sounded but I felt the speaker deserved a little more respect than what his words implied.
I stopped watching at 1:30:10 when I decided "Ross" was there mostly to air his opinions telling speaker that he was all wrong. I'm American too; perhaps we misunderstand the culture.
The tension between the Army and Navy is found in many countries, but the dysfunction that results can be devastating as the Japanese experienced in WWII. Does this tension get resolved later in the war?
In many of the books I have Fishers Baltic strategy is portrayed as "Fishers folly", the light battlecruisers being the height of stupidity. Thank you for explaining the why's and hows. I am not a Churchill fan, he was an arrogant idiot in my view,and like a broken clock was right a few times and wrong most of the time. Great lecture.Thank you.
The decision to fight a major land war was a political decision, with which Churchill agreed, but which he could not have changed were he inclined to do so. It is difficult to see how France could have survived 1916 had without a large army in the field.
@@gandydancer9710being on defense wouldn’t have helped, half the line was held by Briton by 1916, France couldn’t have held that. (Not that it would have mattered, those first 6 divisions were what saved France in 1914)
Regarding the “illegal” German submarine campaign better not to forget that the British quickly introduced armed ships disguised as merchants but manned by the navy. The idea was that any German sub stopping them and telling them to abandon ship before it's sunk, would itself been shot at and sunk. Doing this, the Admiralty itself had made impossible for the Germans to distinguish between a civilian and a Royal Navy warship, and hence impossible to stop merchant ships before sinking them because of the risk of been sunk themselves. The blockade of Germany on the other hand included foodstuffs that under international law were illegal to blockade because it would affect civilians. In fact it's estimated that half a million Germans died because of this blockade. British civilian casualties for all causes, not only u-boats, pale in comparison.
Superbly educational and thought provoking. We are where we are today. Would it have been better or worse for the strategy suggested by Andrew? We shall never know.
@@Nate-uf4xk "Anything" would have been better? What if the French army had cracked in 1914? The Germans would have been able to send an immense force to the east, probably defeating Russia in 1915. Belgium would have been in German hands and Great Britain would have had no allies. It's the worst moments of the Napoleonic Wars writ even larger.
A "strategy" that relies on Germany obliging you by invading Denmark first is a (hash)pipe-dream. In other major part it relies on the French obliging Britain by staying on the defensive and not bleeding themselves so dry that they collapse in the absence of a large British army to share the attrition. Maybe they would be sensible in that way, but if not then Germany wins the war.
That the Battle of Doggerbank gave Britain undisputed command of the North Sea is an interesting opinion. The battle is usually regarded as a missed opportunity for the british with the germans just loosing the less important Blücher but escaping with their battlecruisers. After the battle the british appeared to have no more control of the North Sea than they had before the battle. Or did the germans stop trying to contesting it for a while because they had to do repairs?
On the surface it does look that way but you have to remember than after the battle when as few more ships from the RN had repaired and worked up the RN actually had more ships after the battle and the loses of the battlecruisers than they started with, if Germany could not beat the Grand Fleet when it has less ships than it does after the battle then how would it be able to challenge them after many of the german ships were either sank or in drydock for months. The main point of the battle generally tends to be tactical loss for the RN but a strategic victory as the bloackade was held and HSF had left the field of battle to the RN
The only thing I would disagree on is the use of unrestricted Submarine Warfare. Whilst the argument that it is a crime is definitely valid, the allied blockade caused many more German civilian deaths than the U-boats. A major reason USW was re-implemented was that the US and UK were using neutral merchant ships to transport military supplies thus making them (in my eyes at least) valid military targets. It is similar to using the civilians on the ships as human shields which is certainly a war crime.
There is no such thing as a war crime because no one gets prosecuted unless they are captured. and there are no police doing it. But, yes, I caught that bit where Lambert risibly said that the Germans were killing civilians and the Brits were only interfering with commerce. I believe, too, that he was lying about the order in which the two "Laws of War"/"cruiser rules" violations occurred -- my impression is that the "illegal" blockade came first. (No one was put on trial for THAT.) And the bit about how it was OK that Corbett didn't mention submarine war in his book on "Maritime Strategy" b/c such submarine warfare was "illegal" (1:38:30) was particularly laughable.
Very interesting. I still wonder about mines and u-boats defending the Skagerack and the Danish straits. Also, wouldn´t building an entirely new fleet for "12-18 months" and Germany refuses to declare war or invade Denmark be a waste? Couldnt Germany as well prepare to defend its Danish-German border, and just sit tight? How would it help them defend the Baltic to invade Själland? It makes sense UK wouldn´t invade a European neutral minor nation, to defend another one, esp. in lieu of US relations? But the situation in Norway during WWII comes to mind. I would be very interested to learn more about facts surrounding these talks. Also appreciate the enlightening information regarding British offensive plans, or lack thereof, on the coast of Belgium, with naval support, which I have wondered about.
@@matth4352 I'll pass on the question-begging distinction between "strategic thinking" and "army plans" and simply observe that you've refuted Henrik's points not at all.
Upon reflection, I keep coming back to France. Britain’s traditional maritime war relied upon Continental allies to do the fighting on land. I the Great War, that meant France. France barely held on with, by 1916, a massive British army at her side. Had France made a separate peace, that would have ended the war in the west. Moreover, during the Napoleonic wars and the Seven Years War, Britain applied great pressure by taking the war to French colonies. In the Great War, all the German colonies were lost, but with little apparent impact on the Western Front. I don’t doubt that adherence to Fisher’s maritime strategy would have reduced British casualties. But would it have won the war? And could it have brought victory before the collapse of France. I am not so sure.
If you by "barely held on" mean were on the offensive for almost two years, then sure... Britain was not an important player on the Western Front untill late 1916, early 1917. The Somme offensive had a big French contingent, and were more costly for the British because they weren't ready. Now there is an argument that France might not have been able to launch all those offensives that they did in 1915, and they might have had to give more ground at Verdun, had the British not been there to hold more of the front, but had the British army been free to attack up the Belgium coast, and later get Denmark involved, that would have taken up large sections of the German army as well, so in the end letting the British army raid and attack key positions, might have done more good. As for the German colonies... You seem to have forgotten that Germany was late to the colony-party. Germany simply didn't rely on its colonies, nor was there any particular wealth to be had from them, unlike the French colonies in the seven years war, the economic impact was not the same. "would it have won the war"... By the economic statistics we have (mostly based of the Swedish numbers), had the British raided the sea-trade in the Baltic, and blockeded the German ports, the German war economy would only have materials for 9 months, since much of the high quality steel, much of the food, and much of the chemicals that German industry relied on would have been cut off. Say that the British did this instead of Galipoli, and the war would effectively have been over in 1916, well before the moral crisis in the French army in 1917 (that btw has been somewhat overstated in later years). A final note on the French army... It sounds like you are thinking that the French was a second tier army, they were infact the primere army of the Western Front, they had the most divisions, when the allies combined their leadership, it was a French general (Foch) that was made overall commander, and it was the French that really created doctrines that the other allies (including Britain) took up. France would have had to fight a different war, had the British taken their strategy from Corbet and Fisher, they might not have fought as many offensives in 1915, but that also means that some of their offensives would have been fought in different ways than was the case.
@@MrBandholm The French may have had the most divisions but by end the British possessed the best, most effective army on the planet. (Some such as Charles Carrington think earlier, after 1916) In the final 100 days of the Great War the BEF engaged, and defeated, 99 of the 197 German Divisions in the West, capturing the most territory. Between July 18 and the end of the war, the French, American and Belgian armies combined captured 196,700 prisoners-of-war and 3,775 guns, *while British forces, with a smaller army than the French, engaged the main mass of the German Army and captured 188,700 prisoners and 2,840 guns.* Let me repeat that: the French, American and Belgian armies combined captured 196,700 prisoners-of-war and 3,775 guns, *while British forces captured 188,700 prisoners and 2,840 guns.* *British forces captured only 8,000 fewer prisoners and 935 less guns than the other allies combined* In other words *the British Army took just under 50% of the prisoners and just over 40% of the guns.* Historian John Terraine: _The toughest assignment in modern British military history (i.e. since the creation of our first real Regular Army, the New Model) has been high command in war against the main body of a main continental enemy. Three British officers have undertaken such a task and brought it to a successful conclusion: the Duke of Marlborough, the Duke of Wellington and Field-Marshal Lord Haig._ _And in that Final Offensive, which ended with a German delegation crossing the lines with a white flag to ask for an armistice, the British Armies under Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig captured 188,700 prisoners and 2840 guns. All the other Allies together, French, Americans, Belgians, captured 196,500 prisoners and 3775 guns. In other words, the British took just under 50% of all the prisoners and just over 40% of all the guns._ _That was the achievement of the British Citizen Army; I have called it, more than once, the 'finest hour' of the British Army. There has never been anything like that '100 Days' Campaign' of continuous victory in the whole of our military history. In the words of one who served from 1916 to 1918 and died only recently, Professor C. E. Carrington:_ _In our thousand years of national history there has been one short period (1916-1918) when Britain possessed the most effective army in the world, and used it to win decisive victory._ _The most sinister of all the delusions within the trauma was to lose sight of that._ _What was the position of Haig's army on that day? It amounted to nearly two million men of the British Empire - the largest land force in the Empire's history. And they had just reached the end of a 'Hundred Days' Campaign' as glorious and decisive as that of 1815 which concluded the Battle of Waterloo - but infinitely less known._ _It was, in fact an unparalleled achievement in the history of the British Army, revealed by the stark statistics. And this was done in nine successive victories which were largely instrumental in bringing the war to an end in 1918 - and a consummation that Haig was determined to bring about._ _These victories should be as famous as Blenheim, Ramillies, Oudenarde, and Malplaquet or Talavera, Salamanca, Vittoria and Waterloo. Instead, they are forgotten and unknown, so I will list them now:_ ♦The Battle of Amiens, 8 August 1918 ('the black day of the German Army'); ♦The Battle of Albert, 21 August (the day on which Haig told Churchill 'we ought to do our utmost to get a decision this autumn'); ♦The Battle of the Scarpe, 26 August; ♦ The Battles of Havrincourt and Epehy, 12 September (the approaches to the HindenburgLine); ♦ The Breaking of the Hindenburg Line, 27 September - 5 October (35,000 prisoners & 380 guns taken, the British Army's greatest feat of arms in all its history); ♦The Battle of Flanders, 28 September; ♦ Second Battle of Le Cateau, 6 October; ♦The Battle of the Selle, 17 October; ♦ Battle of the Sambre, 1-11 November. _These were Haig's victories, handsomely acknowledged by Marshal Foch:_ _Never at any time in history has the British Army achieved greater results in attack than in this unbroken offensive .... The victory was indeed complete, thanks to the Commanders of Armies, Corps and Divisions, thanks above all to the unselfishness, to the wise, loyal and energetic policy of their Commander-in-Chief, who made easy a great combination and sanctioned a prolonged and gigantic effort.’_ General of the Armies John J Pershing, born in Missouri, commander of the American Expeditionary Force during the First World War, referred to Haig as _the man who won the war”_
@@johnpeate4544 One item to bring up, if not for the BEF would the French have collapsed in the opening weeks of the war rather than their historically successful stand on the Marne?
@@johnpeate4544 Repeating garbage three times is a bad look. The German army was kaput after the failure of the Ludendorf offensives and what happened to it thereafter tells no one anything important about anything.
@@joshwhite3339 The BEF had been of no substantial consequence and even if French had retreated behind Paris as he intended, or evacuated France as he proposed, von Kluck was exposed at the end of his tether and the French not as weak as he imagined. The Schlieffen plan required more troops than von Moltke had, particularly given that the Germans didn't fully appreciate defensive firepower either and bled out badly as a result.
Fascinating (and for me, new) take on Britain's role in WW1. I wonder if anyone can answer: Without British support, could the French have stopped the Germans from taking Paris, thus perhaps knocking the French out of the war? I think subs, aircraft and mines would have kept the Royal Navy out of the Baltic, but I'm hardly a naval expert.
Aircraft interdiction in WWI? No way. But the plausibility of a British force in the Baltic superior to the High Seas Fleet while simultaneously retaining uncontested control of the North Sea is, given the Kiel canal, not obviously credible. The 21.5'-draft battlecruisers alone sure wouldn't cut it. Maybe I missed something. The BEF of 1914 had virtually no effect on whether the Germans took Paris. Whether the French could have survived the attrition of 1915 on without a large British army to share it is a different question.
Andrew Lambert's point of view is an interesting one and was entertainingly delivered but I have come to the more orthodox conclusion that the western Front was the only realistic place to fight the Germans. Firstly, Danish neutrality could not have been guaranteed. As it was they mined areas around the Danish Baltic coast when pressured by the Germans to do so. I imagine if Britain made free with the straits between Denmark and Sweden it would result in a short lived Northern Front and German occupation. Secondly, the German naval strategy was based around dividing Britain's Grand fleet and destroying it in detail. Sending squadrons into the Baltic, with no guarantee of safe passage would be doing that job for them. True, greater resources may have allowed 2 grand fleets but even with the Archangel route supply of 28+ battleships, their fleet screen and supply ships, all through the Russian ports would have been impossible. Lastly, no one can guess what public opinion and the British press would have made of the British Army's inactivity over the invasion of Belgium and consequent atrocities. Much would have been made, most importantly by the opposition Tories, of the lack of action over this and to how seriously Britain (the Liberal government) took it's international responsibilities, especially from the countries of the Empire. After all "Scraps of Paper" bound Britain to them. My opinion is that British policy makers had only one reasonable course of action, and that is the one that played out in actuality.
@Hiker Joe: You’re not properly factoring in the menacing presence & potential efforts of the then substantial Russian Baltic Fleet here, then being raised now by Andrew Lambert, as being an important part of the nub of Fisher & Corbett’s main plan, because of its likely counter measures (Also combined with those done in-unison with the Royal Navy) to any German Army & Navy move on Denmark then; or its (The Russian Navy) constant ability to threaten to potentially being able to blockade Swedish ports & thus then to either deny or else seriously curtail 90% of Imperial Germany’s industrial iron ore & steel imports, as well as its access to timber products too, thus likely bringing German war production to an almost immediate halt!! On the face of it, it was a much cheaper & practical strategy for the British Empire to follow for in material & manpower terms so smaller outlay & cost in resources & lives lost, especially, when compared with what actually happened on the Western Front & elsewhere & the subsequent & inevitable future ramifications & its demise for the British Empire & its then Global Hegemony!! The Herbert Asquith Government should have at least been more willing & prepared to have listened more attentively to Fisher, Corbett’s & the Admiralty’s (It was the Executive -Directorship of the Nation’s & Empire’s Senior Service, after all?!!) well-regarded & valid viewpoints here with this particular & also similar ‘Maritime Strategic Operations & Solutions’ from the Admiralty in 1914-15 &/or perhaps later on in the war too!
"Firstly, Danish neutrality could not have been guaranteed"... That is missing the a key part of the plan. The plan did not talk about Danish neutrality, but of provoking the Germans into invading Denmark, to prevent the British from sailing through the straits. At the time, this is pretty likely as Danes still felt threaten by Germany after the war of 1864, and while the Danes lay out minefields, they also had a close talk with the British about it. As it happens the way Germany invaded Denmark in 1940, was based on plans made in 1915, so there is some reasonable assumptions that it would have worked as Fisher intended. "Sending squadrons into the Baltic, with no guarantee of safe passage would be doing that job for them." Again, the plan is that Denmark open its ports to the British (and again a pretty likely scenario), but you also miss the important part of German trade/import from Sweden being absolutely decimated in the process (the entire goal of the campaign). Germany would have been starved of key warmaterial in 9 months after the Baltic had been closed, meaning the German fleet had to engage the British... But the Home fleet would have destroyed the Germans in a "all out assault". The British fleet meant for this campaign in the Baltic were the same fleet used at Galipoli, so the British already had the extra ships to spare. "the British press would have made of the British Army's inactivity over the invasion of Belgium and consequent atrocities" Part of the overall strategic wareffort by the British, if Fisher had been allowed to go though with it, would have had the British army hold Antwerp, and clear the Belgium coast (limiting German submarines), so the army would be involved on the continent... What the British would have been spared was to fight in Northern France and keep the line there (something the French had plenty of troops to do anyway). Had the war been fought like Fisher and Corbett talked about, the war would likely have been at least 2 years shorter, Russia would likely not have fallen to Communisme (and if it did, the outcome would have been very different). The number of casualties would have been very different, because the war would have developed in a very different way, but it is very unlikely that Germany would have been able to change the outcome in those 9 months, and after that it is effectively over, because German industry would no longer be able to deliver big guns or shells in any number, and both food and horses would no longer be comming into Germany (by 1916 most of the horses used by the Germans were actually Swedish imports).
@@MrBandholm When Hiker Joe wrote "Firstly, Danish neutrality could not have been guaranteed" he plainly meant that a German invasion of Denmark as a result of Fisher's mere feint could not be guaranteed. A plan based on assuming the cooperation of your enemy isn't much of a plan. All the wonderful results of the blockade of the Baltic that you imagine utterly fails to deal with HJ's objection that the Germans could either sink the British contingent sent there or defeat the depleted Grand Fleet in the North Sea, or both. The 1914 BEF was utterly inadequate to hold Antwerp, and as I understand it Fisher was opposed to a massive BEF, so whatever you're imagining happening there has strayed far from what Fisher was, according to Lambert, proposing, as I understand it.
Having read through aĺl of your comments and your replies to the comments of others... it appears that clearly you do not "understand it" you seem to have missed several key aspects mentioned by lambert and even the point made in the last comment here regarding the German intentions to take Denmark that were in fact written into their war planning and are a matter of historical record. You have some parts lacking in your research and certainly at the very least you should consider carefully watching the lecture again before so being so quick to disagree with someone that has spent decades in research on this subject and has given only a short overview of their conclusions. That is if you are actually open to considering evidence and perhaps thinking differently than you do now. I think not.
@@franoisdansonwhat plans? Germany only had plans to attack Denmark if it joined Britain, something Denmark knew full well and is why there main defensive plans were against Britain trying to break its neutrality.
T. E. Lawrence, in the period before Gallipoli, recommended that the British invade what is now Lebanon. There were no serious Turkish forces there, and the operation would have allowed the British Army to cut off the only rail line south into Palestine and the Saudi Peninsula. As we well know, his advice was not heeded at the time. After all, what would a mere academic know or understand about grand strategy....
But... so what? So what if they had cut that rail line? How could that have brought about or even significantly furthered victory for the Entente? In criticizing the decision to attack at Gallipoli, a British general remarked, "It was as if a prizefighter had left the ring to trounce his opponent's seconds." If anything, conquering Palestine and the Saudi peninsula would be the same fighter leaving the building to beat up his opponent's fans in the parking lot...
Driving through the Dardanelles would have opened a connection to Russia, which is touted as a great benefit of the Baltic strategy. In addition, it would, hopefully, knock one of the Central Powers completely out of the fight in a lightning blow.
Interesting. Lawrence and the admirals may have agreed that the desert way(the navy way) was the right way. And that continental forces being the focus was wrong, but the germans weren't storming through the levant either lol. The army was the focus because the navy couldnt effect the sitch or wouldn't take attrition it would require to do it(I. E. Close blockade/coastal invasion) I appreciate the inputs but seems to me everyone was playing CYA before and after. And no I don't think France survives without the BEF.
At 1:30:10: Professor Lambert has been speaking and answering questions for an hour and a half laying out a clear, coherent, well thought out, well researched big picture of the British military situation circa WWI to include debunking the WWI name now used instead of the Great War. Then we get "Ross" invited to ask a question. Ross: spends the first minute or so berating the professor for -essentially- not agreeing with Winston Churchill's version of events and saying, "I hardly know where to begin." A minute later, Moderator (perhaps): Ross, if you'll pardon me, do you have a question or are you simply abusing the privilege of being here to air your opinions? Ross (perhaps): Well as I said, I hardly know where to begin. I'm trying to formulate my question. Moderator (perhaps): Everyone else was able to formulate a coherent question already. Here you are going last with all the extra time afforded, and you don't have your question sorted out? Ross (perhaps): Well,... Moderator (perhaps): [CLICK] My, my, that went quickly! It seems we do have time for one more question after all!
I read your comment before “Ross” came on and I think you’re being a little unfair on him particularly as you quote him inaccurately. He made some perfectly reasonable points, which actually remain mainstream historical orthodoxy, that Andrew Lambert was happy to address these points. I don’t know if the video has been edited since your comments but the moderater does not intervene in the way you say. People should be free to discuss and disagree on matters of history as that helps test ideas and determine what makes sense.
Very illuminating. Our inability to help Imperial or Social Democratic Russia either through the Baltic or the Dardanelles still has consequences today. Just to show off I have had tea many times with Oleg Kerensky and was taught at Harrow by Bruce Lockhart's nephew.
If there wasn't enough army to take the Dardanelles, and not enough transport to supply even that army, then there wasn't enough army and transport to do anything in the Baltic. France had to be supported on land. And Germany wasn't "pushed into invading Denmark." Didn't happen. Don't know how it could have.
@@harrym7544 "...Germany certainly would have won at Verdun without the BEF to take the pressure off. " Not certain at all. If the Germans had enlarged the Verdun salient, so what? The logistical problem of turning an advance into a breakout was never solved in WWI. How about this: No BEF, no Nivelle offensive, France sticks around until the blockade works.
@@harrym7544not at all simbolic, France had all its units cometed by the time the counter attack started , without the bef the attack wouldn’t have worked because there weren’t enough unites, not that it would have even gotten to that point considering the 5th French army would probably have been out flanked and destroyed in Belgium.
Don't put a cavalry officer in charge of the navy. Unfortunately for Britain, they didn't figure that out the first time around. So they went and lost Norway and Singapore.
Few things being ignored here when considering whether British troops should have been deployed in France the way they were. First, technological, the technology was not there to fight large scale maritime actions in the way suggested. That was succinctly proven at Gallipoli where even with the relatively limited number of troops on the ground it was a nightmare to supply them, let alone build them up to the strength of numbers and materiel required to defeat the Turkish forces. A working Port would have helped significantly, but as Dieppe proved years later trying to capture a working Port from the sea is essentially suicidal if it is defended, and lets face it, most of them were. In WWI few of the advancements the Allies used in their maritime invasions in the latter years of WWII did not exist. A Lighter for all that they were great improvements over previous methods of landing troops were not Landing Craft, they were slow and vulnerable. There were no LSI's, while it can be argued probably quite successfully that LCT's or something like them re not required in 1915 such ships would have still been useful due to their ability to beach and roll supplies directly onto the beaches. But in 1915 neither LSI's or LST's existed, and without them sustaining British troops ashore without a working port is impossible. Second, Britain managed in WWII without France not because it wanted to, but because it HAD to. These were both Coalition wars, and that means the other members of the Coalition do in fact get a say when it comes to the Strategy. Had the French lost on the Western Front, and that was a very real risk in 1916 - 1917 without British troops present, then quite frankly the war would be lost. Period. Keeping France in the fight was one of the most vital Strategic Concerns the British had in WWI because had the Western Front been lost then it was all over. Sure, Germany is not able to invade Britain, but Britain is certainly not going to be able to invade German dominated Europe, and without France tying up the bulk of her Army Germany can fully concentrate on removing Russia from the war. Given what we know of the turmoil politically and socially in Russia in 1916 - 1917 I think thats pretty much garuanteed to occur, and then what? The Western Front first Strategy was the right one not because it was the best place for the British to fight their preferred method of war, but because France had to be kept in the war at all cost. Had british troops stayed out of the Western Front and we adopted a Maritime Strategy we would have lost, because, like it or not, France was the linchpin not Britain.....
@@Splodge542 I think it is beyond doubt Germany would have eventually broken the French army without the assistance of the British. The the war would have been lost.
Hi alganhar1 - Couple of points based on my understanding of Andrew Lambert's presentation: - Respectfully suggest you're assuming the Germans would have ignored any British landing on the Danish / German Baltic coast. I think it's more likely that such a landing would've pulled far more German troops from the Western Front and elsewhere, than were tied up fighting five British divisions in France. That's before considering the German troops that would have been tied up occupying Denmark as well as Belgium etc. - Don't forget German pre-WWI strategy was based on beating the Russians first and then France because they didn't have the force to do both simultaneously. Opening a third front on their Baltic doorstep would've been a nightmare for them. - Agree the amphib technology didn't exist: however, it wouldn't have been necessary if the British had access to friendly Danish ports (noting the Prussian war with Denmark in 1864 was still within living memory). Even if they didn't, Dieppe happened two years after the French occupation began, which gave the Germans plenty of time to fortify the place. Don't also forget air power in 1914-15 didn't pose anything like the same threat in 1942. - Corbett explained how the British didn't win their pre-1914 wars by sending mass armies into Europe, but by bankrupting their opponents. Cutting German trade with Scandinavia would have done more to cripple their ability to make war than any other Allied action. Conversely, putting a mass army into France played to the German's strengths rather than weaknesses, ruined Britain's postwar economy, and cost a million lives. - Losing France would have led to a completely different war, but wouldn't have ended it - any more than what had happened in all the Anglo-French wars since 1689, and what followed in 1939. WWI would have been another version of "the whale confronting the elephant" - the only question would be whether Kaiser Bill would have been any more successful invading Britain than Napoleon or Hitler. At the end of the day, Britain's economy could still survive via its worldwide trade even without mainland Europe - the same couldn't be said for France before 1815, or Germany before 1918 (or 1945).
@@neilwestphalen2994 "Respectfully suggest you're assuming the Germans would have ignored any British landing on the Danish / German Baltic coast." I expect he assumes Germany would have exterminated it, as do I. Or in Schleswig-Holstein, as you also suggest would take place, if I understand you correctly.. Are you imagining the entire Grand Fleet based on some Danish island? Else the Germans wouldn't have local superiority in the Baltic (or North Sea!), why? Never mind that gunboats holding Turks off the Gallipoli landings would not remotely be a task comparable to protecting a landing on the Baltic coast or a BEF in S-H from the German army. "Don't forget German pre-WWI strategy was based on beating the Russians first and then France because they didn't have the force to do both simultaneously." This is backasswards. "Losing France would have led to a completely different war, but wouldn't have ended it... At the end of the day, Britain's economy could still survive via its worldwide trade even without mainland Europe." Lotsa luck with that. WWII had an Eastern Front to chew up the Wehrmacht, and a Pearl Harbor to better engage the USA. The situation would not be remotely similar to any of "the Anglo-French wars since 1689."
@@laurentdrozin812no the war wouldn’t have been lost, and we didn’t lose the napelonic wars when France controlled large swaths of Europe, or when the Nazis controlled all of mainland Europe.
No way to defeat Germany without putting a large British army on the continent. Can't get that army on the continent without France and Russia fighting Germany. Just don't see an alternative to what Britain did other than allowing the Kaiser's Empire to become totally dominant over Britain by first defeating France and Russia.
Alternative: French stay on defense and let the blockade do its work. And I don't particularly care for Lambert's Belgium/Baltic alternative, but you certainly haven't debunked it.
I thought it brilliant but one thing was ignore I though. The consequences pfa french defeat on land without the British army’s commitment amd presemce
Why would you do naval operations when you can run 300k newly raised troupes straight into the teeth of the German defense at the Somme? Much better to take on the best army in the world offensively. If you are going to argue for a continental commitment, at least make it defensive one. Why would Britain care about selling French soil expensively to the Germans. If Germans want to bash their head against pre-built defences over and over and over again, let them.
But the French kept attacking, which in the absence of a large BEF might have given the Germans the opportunity to kill enough Frenchmen (see the Nivelle offensive) to result in a French collapse.
@@gandydancer9710the French kept attacking due to the belief that the BEF would be supporting them and they could waste lives, because the British are here too.
Eventually I think the entente cordialle will be seen as an error that dragged the UK into the cauldron of the Western Front. We need to know why Helligoland Island was sold to the Germans before the Great War. I've never understood why the allies thought the war would be over in 6 months. It seems a baseless thought. Fisher also wanted to 'Copenhagen' the German Fleet prior to the war.
>We need to know why Helligoland Island was sold to the Germans before the Great War. It wasnt for starters, it was ceased in the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty in exchange for Wituland and parts of East Africa that were vital to build the railway to Lake Victoria, Germany also gained parts in Namibia that became the German East Africa. Also Helligoland annex by the British in the Treaty of Paris to restrict any future *FRENCH* naval aggression against German and Scandinavian states, they never really made use of it because it costed money and the Royal Navy thought it was too exposed as a forward base, not they were wrong as if they stayed there it wouldnt work as a forward base anyway in case of a German naval build up. Another things, this was 1890 and the Germans given the choice would not mind at all a alliance with the British, the Entente Cordiale would only be in 1904 and the Crimean War was 1853-1856, to the British they traded what was a island they couldnt really defend for Zanzibar as the Germans traded something that really didnt had value for then for a island that had much strategic importance to then, if you are just looking at on the Anglo-French alliance context there is a reason why maybe they shouldnt (even if there was no chance to defend it) but considering alliances are very ... fluid, the whole thing was a very good trade for both sides as they gained something they wanted in exchange for something they had no real use, there were Germans that thought they traded away their African Empire for a island.
Regardless of what some think, Britain did not "win" WW1. It was a combined effort of Britain, France and the Americans. But, it's quite possible or probable that WW1 would have been lost if Britain were not on the continent in 1914. Think of 1st Ypres. So it's possible that Churchill may have been right about the continental strategy but for all the wrong reasons.
No I don’t think Churchill was right about his strategy as his strategy played into the hands of the Germans and cost the British and French millions of their people, economies and empires.
So another policy Churchill may have been wrong about. Churchill was wrong about Dardanelles, Norway, Greece, Singapore, Italy. And that's just what I can think about off the top of my head. Churchill must be one of the most overrated leaders in history. Good at speeches, rubbish at strategy.
If one accepts your view that Churchill was wrong on all the points you make and more, his role in defeating Hitler in WW2 outweighs any of his faults.
It's very sad to see a historian rubbishing the British army so badly: unlike what he stated in this video, every other historian seems to agree that the 120,000 soldiers of the only professional army in Europe did make a big part in stopping the German army defeating France in the first few weeks of the war. And without France, I don't think Britain would have been much safer from a Germany now dominating the whole continent. Besides, it seems selective memory to say that the British way of doing war was not sending an army but using the navy instead. So India or Afghanistan or South Africa for that matter (Boer war anyone?) didn't need the use of a British army? And better to forget about Wellington and the British armies fighting all over Europe too, I guess... It's just pure nonsense to validate against all evidence an alternative naval agenda. And of course Fisher's Baltic project was suicidal: First invading some islands of neutral Denmark (which would doom the rest of that country to be invaded then by the Germans) to then land an army in Pomerania??? If the Dardanelos adventure was crazy this is pure madness: a small sea full of German subs, destroyers and even Torpedo boats planes and airships. You cannot maintain a fleet on sea in these conditions. The navy, like Fisher, thinks that the army is a projectile: once they shoot is job done. But of course that's not the case. If the army needs to retreat it's going to be bloody.
every other (english speaking) historian... Also no, the leading historian of WW1 on the imperial war museum, a few years ago, actually have a similar point of view, basically the British army was too small in the opening stages of the war, to really make a difference on the strategic scale. And while the British army did play an important role at the first battle of the Marne, they did so alongside a French army of some 300.000 troops. The British army was first at a size in the fall, where it really could take on part of the front itself, due to troops from the colonies, and by that time, a very large size of those professional troops, were already casualties. It doesn't take from them, the importance of their fight, nor does it deminish their bravery... But the first world war on the western front, is much better understod, particular in the first few years, from the point of view of the French (and ofc the Germans), it is really only in 1916 and then particular 1917 that the British army does its big lifting, and even then, the French still holds most of the front (as they should, it is their country after all). But Britains side of the story gets much more recognission than the french today (in the english speaking world), because the english sources are easier to go to, than the French.
Here's a zinger for y'all. What's the name of the only Royal Navy ship that never Traveled in any direction? Btw, don't be a poon and look it up. Lets see if I'm as clever as I think. I found out through hours of random naval warfare lectures. If you Google it, I'll know.
I'm not anti-British, but I must point out that the British made it impossible for the Germans to use submarines in accordance with cruiser rules. They issued orders for merchant ships to ram submarines, they armed merchant ships, etc. I'm glad that we Americans entered the war on the Allied side, and I agree that taking "illegal" actions against submarines is not on the same moral plane as sinking merchant ships, including ocean liners, killing civilians, including those of non-belligerent nations.
If the Germans used cruisers instead of submarines in the North Atlantic would that have affected your opinion of British retaliatory action? I think subterfuge has always been a part of war and always will.
@@hikerjoe3773 If it had been retaliatory action by the British, that would have been one thing. But, under the laws of war that the British held up as holy, they took the first step to violate them. The German actions were strictly retaliatory. It's a bit like saying, how dare that police office shoot that man! All he did was open fire on the police officer. Perhaps it's more accurate to have a gang that always opens fire on the police officers, and the police institute a policy of always shooting first. In this case, however, the constitution (the laws of naval war) allow the police to institute exactly this policy.
The "illegal" British blockade killed far more civilians than unrestricted submarine warfare. The Lusitania was carrying munitions. Your list of British actions making "cruiser rules" impracticable omitted Q-ships. But I don't take any of this "rules of war" crap seriously. War isn't golf. President Woodrow "He kept us out of War" Wilson deserved to be shot.
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Lambert is one of my favorite historians. His lectures are strait up, full of info, and easy to listen to. His take on the crimea war is extremely interesting.
He was my personal tutor in my last year @ KCL. Terrific teacher, lecturer, candid and wonderfully dry sense of humour.
@@martinlee5818when he talks, I listen. From someone across the pond, he has definitely effected and molded my understanding of navel warfare. I am not formally educated like yourself. It's been a lifelong interest and passion. To me, when he speaks, its like having a good captain. That is something I do know about after 40 years at sea. He is clear, very precise, not very long winded, with a tone of voice that commands respect.
Enthralling lecture, on a topic that has not had enough exposure. Bravo Andrew Lambert
Lambert wields his knowledge with great verve and, at times, brutal gusto. A great listen.
Me too. Andrew Lambert is for sure a far better historian than the usual crowd talking about seapower, the Royal Navy and World War One. His comments on Churchill and Antwerp, and Keyes and Zeebrugge are spot on. What a missed opportunity and a mad operation, and yes, such a waste of life in the end result. I like the prospect of doing some research on the plans of French and Fisher together myself now, and thus having a peek on what could have been instead of Passchendaele and the Somme. I wish many more great insights from Andrew Lambert. Including his view on the wrongness of a total war to save France. It could have done with much more care and far less loss indeed. Going to war to defend Belgium, sure, but then using much more sense.
Not seeing any defense of Belgium in your suggestions. Nor any missed opportunities.
@@gandydancer9710 One was then also fighting the previous war. Antwerp was still a bastion but couldn't be hold because of the better German artillery. Still before the siege the Belgians gave an idea of the way to go in the Battle of Halen. Highly mobile groups armed with machine guns. But then Max Hastings argued that even the officer corps wouldn't be up to the task
I bet Drachinifel watched this...
My thought too. Has he mentioned it since? He produces so much content, it’s hard to keep up!
@@johnomirth I sent him a message about 3 years ago asking him his opinion on the Fisher Baltic Plan and his answer was: "I think the Germans would have mined all approaches heavily and made it very difficult for the British forces to move freely. The Russian Navy would have helped where they could but overall I think the Germans would have defended Kiel and their coastline with all they had"
Yeah, Drach would have certainly watched it, and analysed it, researched it some more, hypothesised it and made more than one conclusion too lol
@@RussBeatle63 they could of defended the coastline but would have to to sacrifice men from either the western front or eastern front and come up with alternatives as they had now lost their steel, ball bearings, tin, copper, the rest of their food imports and horses for transport and logistics. Had this plan been implemented the war would of actually been over by Christmas.
Don't know how he'd find the time but I am sure he does 👍
Outstanding! Thank you very much for this. So much great information. Good to finally understand why the Courageous class had such shallow drafts - I knew they were the "Baltic Plan", but did not understand how or why. Superb presentation, thank you Professor Lambert and the Western Front Association.
What a fantastic lecture! Thank you very much, we are very lucky to be able to access these lectures.
Dr. Lambert, been a fan for years. Love your work, your honesty. Yes, the truth does matter.
It was not for nothing that one of Churchill´s more memorial sayings was ´´The definition of success is the ability to go from failure to failure with no loss of enthusiasm.´´ What an utter bungler!
Kind of sums of Churchill himself...
Excellent and insightful. Thank you!
A brilliant lecture shining light on events touched on in the professors Jutland lecture held in the Rifles museum 2016.
Thank you for a very interesting lecture! I am a bit of a Battle of Jutland nerd so this was a very interesting extension to hear about the British naval strategy thinking. Being Swedish I was very surprised to hear that Germany was so dependent on trading with Sweden for more than our famous iron ore. I felt so sorry for the horses shipped to the German front. I am also amazed Sweden actually shipped food to Germany as I know there were food riots in Sweden during the First World war. I suppose greed had much to do with that, sending food to a starved Germany payed much more than feeding ones own population...
Definitely one of my favourite historians…. Brilliant lecture
A fine lecture that will undermine many long held opinions.
An amazing lecture, It has certainly affected my WW1 thinking.
Excellent lecture, throws light on a little known part of British politics. When we actually take the time to study Winston Churchill the picture painted is not a pretty one.
Generally the more you know the worse it gets.
That was an excellent talk that elucidated an aspect of the First World War (Fisher's Baltic plans) that I had always found impractical and even nonsensical. I would only push back on Mr Lambert's characterization of the Entente as short-term and easily traded for another alliance. It reminds me of a question I proposed as a debate topic many years ago: "Resolved: Britain should have allied *with* Germany *against* France and Russia in World War I." And the answer is definitely no, because Britain must always ally against the strongest continental European power, and in 1914 that was Germany. So the Entente, though deliberately made nonbinding by British diplomats, was made binding by circumstances.
Dr. Lambert's is an archetype of the philosopher of war.
A great listen ,think I will watch it again.
There was a flaw in Fisher's thinking - 1940 showed that if Denmark is invaded Sweden won't necessarily back it against Germany as Fisher believed.
Interesting point however, while in ww2 sweden tacitly supported Germany it has to be remembered that they also provided a lot of information to the Allies about German Naval operations in and around swedish waters and they were fully aware that Germany had the potential to invade them and even had some plans drawn up and so not only took preparations if the event came but also took actions that did not involve military operations to avoid this possibility of being invaded. The main difference of course being in WW1 Denmark is unlikley to capitulate in 6 hours like they did in ww2. So the much lower chance of a direct invasion of sweden might be enough to allow the swedes to hold the position of neutrality but leaning towards the entente
@@R1J3H The support provided by Sweden to Germany in both WW was material, not "tacit".
Not that Sweden had much choice. And, no, Denmark's resistance was never going to amount to much in WWI either. But the most obvious problem with Fisher's plan is that the Germans might not oblige him by invading Denmark until after the Brits invaded. But that might be dispensable. Lambert's blather about the "moral high ground" and such is weirdly ancient propaganda. (He gets the order of the Brits violating the rules against non-close blockades and Germans sinking merchant ships without inspection backwards, I believe.) No one cares that the Brits violated Greek neutrality in WW1 (or Iceland's in WW2), so why worry about their violating Denmark's?
In 1940 Sweden could do nothing at all to defend Denmark and everyone knew it- our army was weak- Sweden was lucky enough ( and I am sure many allied flight crews were lucky too) that it wasn´t occupied but managed to provide a refuge to many during the war years by walking a tightrope between the Allied and the Germans. I know my father thought it rather shameful that Sweden allowed German troops to pass by train through Sweden, ( he was a teenager and saw the trains)but indeed what option had the government? It had to give in or risk us being occupied. Staying unoccupied made it for example possible for Sweden to accept the Danish jews who were rescued by heroic Danes over Öresund during some nights in 1943. My parents closest friend was one of them who managed to flee from Germany over Öresund to Sweden and as a child that story had an enormous impact on me. My parish vicar was a German soldier who managed to desert the German army in Norway and flee over the mountains to Sweden- that would not have been possible if Sweden had been occupied. Swedes love to self-hate ourselves and there has been so many books and documentaries produced that want to make us feel ashamed of how Sweden acted during WWII. But a governments first duty is to take care of its own people and keep it safe- in my view the Swedish government did just that, they were not heroes but they kept their people safe and in doing so also provided a safe haven for many who fled occupied countries, like the jews and those who fled the nazis, and also provided shelter for allied airmen who managed to take their damaged bomb planed to Sweden instead of being captured by the enemy or perish. I know many Swedes felt with the Danes and the Norwegians. My own grandfather was Danish ( he died long before the war and my grandmother moved back to her native Sweden) so my father had many Danish close relatives who then came to live under the German occupation, one uncle even came to be interred in a German prison camp, and my father talked often on how close the war and the reality hit him on the 9th of April 1940. But he also talked about how generous the Danes had been to him after the war and didn´t seem to hold any grudge against Sweden.
Sweden was mainly anti-Russian. Also the allure for Dnemark to fight Germnay was very liited. At teh start of WW1 Germnay pressuard Denamrk to mine the straits and got a guarantee form Sweden not to join Russia in this war vs Germany (fight Germany then). After russia collapsed and Gremany helpd Finland become independant Sweden did NOT mind at all.
Very great lecture and I wish 1:30:00 had start by stating his position a little differently, I am American so maybe that isn't as rude as I think it sounded but I felt the speaker deserved a little more respect than what his words implied.
I stopped watching at 1:30:10 when I decided "Ross" was there mostly to air his opinions telling speaker that he was all wrong. I'm American too; perhaps we misunderstand the culture.
Excellent lecture...and excellent, intelligent questions too. Thanks WFA
The tension between the Army and Navy is found in many countries, but the dysfunction that results can be devastating as the Japanese experienced in WWII. Does this tension get resolved later in the war?
Great lecture, and great questions too
In many of the books I have Fishers Baltic strategy is portrayed as "Fishers folly", the light battlecruisers being the height of stupidity. Thank you for explaining the why's and hows. I am not a Churchill fan, he was an arrogant idiot in my view,and like a broken clock was right a few times and wrong most of the time. Great lecture.Thank you.
The decision to fight a major land war was a political decision, with which Churchill agreed, but which he could not have changed were he inclined to do so. It is difficult to see how France could have survived 1916 had without a large army in the field.
"...large *BRITISH* army..." FIFY
But maybe that absence would have forced the French to stay on the defensive, saving scads of French lives?
@@gandydancer9710being on defense wouldn’t have helped, half the line was held by Briton by 1916, France couldn’t have held that. (Not that it would have mattered, those first 6 divisions were what saved France in 1914)
Regarding the “illegal” German submarine campaign better not to forget that the British quickly introduced armed ships disguised as merchants but manned by the navy. The idea was that any German sub stopping them and telling them to abandon ship before it's sunk, would itself been shot at and sunk. Doing this, the Admiralty itself had made impossible for the Germans to distinguish between a civilian and a Royal Navy warship, and hence impossible to stop merchant ships before sinking them because of the risk of been sunk themselves.
The blockade of Germany on the other hand included foodstuffs that under international law were illegal to blockade because it would affect civilians. In fact it's estimated that half a million Germans died because of this blockade. British civilian casualties for all causes, not only u-boats, pale in comparison.
Britain has always had a strategic doctrine, it's called muddling through.
Brilliant , provocative and really interesting. A Brain and a Half!
Superbly educational and thought provoking. We are where we are today. Would it have been better or worse for the strategy suggested by Andrew? We shall never know.
@@Nate-uf4xk "Anything" would have been better? What if the French army had cracked in 1914? The Germans would have been able to send an immense force to the east, probably defeating Russia in 1915.
Belgium would have been in German hands and Great Britain would have had no allies. It's the worst moments of the Napoleonic Wars writ even larger.
A "strategy" that relies on Germany obliging you by invading Denmark first is a (hash)pipe-dream.
In other major part it relies on the French obliging Britain by staying on the defensive and not bleeding themselves so dry that they collapse in the absence of a large British army to share the attrition. Maybe they would be sensible in that way, but if not then Germany wins the war.
That the Battle of Doggerbank gave Britain undisputed command of the North Sea is an interesting opinion. The battle is usually regarded as a missed opportunity for the british with the germans just loosing the less important Blücher but escaping with their battlecruisers. After the battle the british appeared to have no more control of the North Sea than they had before the battle. Or did the germans stop trying to contesting it for a while because they had to do repairs?
On the surface it does look that way but you have to remember than after the battle when as few more ships from the RN had repaired and worked up the RN actually had more ships after the battle and the loses of the battlecruisers than they started with, if Germany could not beat the Grand Fleet when it has less ships than it does after the battle then how would it be able to challenge them after many of the german ships were either sank or in drydock for months. The main point of the battle generally tends to be tactical loss for the RN but a strategic victory as the bloackade was held and HSF had left the field of battle to the RN
@@R1J3H That the blockade would hold was not at issue.
Gildor is correct and Lambert was blowing smoke.
Great lecture thanks v much
Fascinating stuff, but what happens if the Germans don't invade Denmark?
Why is this knowledge suppressed? Several theories that have been held for many years are dissolved with facts.
Jackie knew.
The only thing I would disagree on is the use of unrestricted Submarine Warfare. Whilst the argument that it is a crime is definitely valid, the allied blockade caused many more German civilian deaths than the U-boats. A major reason USW was re-implemented was that the US and UK were using neutral merchant ships to transport military supplies thus making them (in my eyes at least) valid military targets. It is similar to using the civilians on the ships as human shields which is certainly a war crime.
There is no such thing as a war crime because no one gets prosecuted unless they are captured. and there are no police doing it. But, yes, I caught that bit where Lambert risibly said that the Germans were killing civilians and the Brits were only interfering with commerce. I believe, too, that he was lying about the order in which the two "Laws of War"/"cruiser rules" violations occurred -- my impression is that the "illegal" blockade came first. (No one was put on trial for THAT.) And the bit about how it was OK that Corbett didn't mention submarine war in his book on "Maritime Strategy" b/c such submarine warfare was "illegal" (1:38:30) was particularly laughable.
Fantastic talk.
The continental option was the political option: French alliance
Very interesting. I still wonder about mines and u-boats defending the Skagerack and the Danish straits. Also, wouldn´t building an entirely new fleet for "12-18 months" and Germany refuses to declare war or invade Denmark be a waste? Couldnt Germany as well prepare to defend its Danish-German border, and just sit tight? How would it help them defend the Baltic to invade Själland? It makes sense UK wouldn´t invade a European neutral minor nation, to defend another one, esp. in lieu of US relations? But the situation in Norway during WWII comes to mind. I would be very interested to learn more about facts surrounding these talks. Also appreciate the enlightening information regarding British offensive plans, or lack thereof, on the coast of Belgium, with naval support, which I have wondered about.
Listen to the last question & in particular, the Prof's answer, which explains the difference between strategic thinking & army plans very clearly.
@@matth4352 I'll pass on the question-begging distinction between "strategic thinking" and "army plans" and simply observe that you've refuted Henrik's points not at all.
Upon reflection, I keep coming back to France. Britain’s traditional maritime war relied upon Continental allies to do the fighting on land. I the Great War, that meant France. France barely held on with, by 1916, a massive British army at her side. Had France made a separate peace, that would have ended the war in the west.
Moreover, during the Napoleonic wars and the Seven Years War, Britain applied great pressure by taking the war to French colonies. In the Great War, all the German colonies were lost, but with little apparent impact on the Western Front.
I don’t doubt that adherence to Fisher’s maritime strategy would have reduced British casualties. But would it have won the war? And could it have brought victory before the collapse of France. I am not so sure.
If you by "barely held on" mean were on the offensive for almost two years, then sure...
Britain was not an important player on the Western Front untill late 1916, early 1917. The Somme offensive had a big French contingent, and were more costly for the British because they weren't ready.
Now there is an argument that France might not have been able to launch all those offensives that they did in 1915, and they might have had to give more ground at Verdun, had the British not been there to hold more of the front, but had the British army been free to attack up the Belgium coast, and later get Denmark involved, that would have taken up large sections of the German army as well, so in the end letting the British army raid and attack key positions, might have done more good.
As for the German colonies... You seem to have forgotten that Germany was late to the colony-party. Germany simply didn't rely on its colonies, nor was there any particular wealth to be had from them, unlike the French colonies in the seven years war, the economic impact was not the same.
"would it have won the war"... By the economic statistics we have (mostly based of the Swedish numbers), had the British raided the sea-trade in the Baltic, and blockeded the German ports, the German war economy would only have materials for 9 months, since much of the high quality steel, much of the food, and much of the chemicals that German industry relied on would have been cut off. Say that the British did this instead of Galipoli, and the war would effectively have been over in 1916, well before the moral crisis in the French army in 1917 (that btw has been somewhat overstated in later years).
A final note on the French army... It sounds like you are thinking that the French was a second tier army, they were infact the primere army of the Western Front, they had the most divisions, when the allies combined their leadership, it was a French general (Foch) that was made overall commander, and it was the French that really created doctrines that the other allies (including Britain) took up. France would have had to fight a different war, had the British taken their strategy from Corbet and Fisher, they might not have fought as many offensives in 1915, but that also means that some of their offensives would have been fought in different ways than was the case.
@@MrBandholm
The French may have had the most divisions but by end the British possessed the best, most effective army on the planet. (Some such as Charles Carrington think earlier, after 1916)
In the final 100 days of the Great War the BEF engaged, and defeated, 99 of the 197 German Divisions in the West, capturing the most territory.
Between July 18 and the end of the war, the French, American and Belgian armies combined captured 196,700 prisoners-of-war and 3,775 guns, *while British forces, with a smaller army than the French, engaged the main mass of the German Army and captured 188,700 prisoners and 2,840 guns.*
Let me repeat that:
the French, American and Belgian armies combined captured 196,700 prisoners-of-war and 3,775 guns, *while British forces captured 188,700 prisoners and 2,840 guns.*
*British forces captured only 8,000 fewer prisoners and 935 less guns than the other allies combined*
In other words *the British Army took just under 50% of the prisoners and just over 40% of the guns.*
Historian John Terraine:
_The toughest assignment in modern British military history (i.e. since the creation of our first real Regular Army, the New Model) has been high command in war against the main body of a main continental enemy. Three British officers have undertaken such a task and brought it to a successful conclusion: the Duke of Marlborough, the Duke of Wellington and Field-Marshal Lord Haig._
_And in that Final Offensive, which ended with a German delegation crossing the lines with a white flag to ask for an armistice, the British Armies under Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig captured 188,700 prisoners and 2840 guns. All the other Allies together, French, Americans, Belgians, captured 196,500 prisoners and 3775 guns. In other words, the British took just under 50% of all the prisoners and just over 40% of all the guns._
_That was the achievement of the British Citizen Army; I have called it, more than once, the 'finest hour' of the British Army. There has never been anything like that '100 Days' Campaign' of continuous victory in the whole of our military history. In the words of one who served from 1916 to 1918 and died only recently, Professor C. E. Carrington:_
_In our thousand years of national history there has been one short period (1916-1918) when Britain possessed the most effective army in the world, and used it to win decisive victory._
_The most sinister of all the delusions within the trauma was to lose sight of that._
_What was the position of Haig's army on that day? It amounted to nearly two million men of the British Empire - the largest land force in the Empire's history. And they had just reached the end of a 'Hundred Days' Campaign' as glorious and decisive as that of 1815 which concluded the Battle of Waterloo - but infinitely less known._
_It was, in fact an unparalleled achievement in the history of the British Army, revealed by the stark statistics. And this was done in nine successive victories which were largely instrumental in bringing the war to an end in 1918 - and a consummation that Haig was determined to bring about._
_These victories should be as famous as Blenheim, Ramillies, Oudenarde, and Malplaquet or Talavera, Salamanca, Vittoria and Waterloo. Instead, they are forgotten and unknown, so I will list them now:_
♦The Battle of Amiens, 8 August 1918 ('the black day of the German Army');
♦The Battle of Albert, 21 August (the day on which Haig told Churchill 'we ought to do our utmost to get a decision this autumn');
♦The Battle of the Scarpe, 26 August;
♦ The Battles of Havrincourt and Epehy, 12 September (the approaches to the HindenburgLine);
♦ The Breaking of the Hindenburg Line, 27 September - 5 October (35,000 prisoners & 380 guns taken, the British Army's greatest feat of arms in all its history);
♦The Battle of Flanders, 28 September;
♦ Second Battle of Le Cateau, 6 October;
♦The Battle of the Selle, 17 October;
♦ Battle of the Sambre, 1-11 November.
_These were Haig's victories, handsomely acknowledged by Marshal Foch:_
_Never at any time in history has the British Army achieved greater results in attack than in this unbroken offensive .... The victory was indeed complete, thanks to the Commanders of Armies, Corps and Divisions, thanks above all to the unselfishness, to the wise, loyal and energetic policy of their Commander-in-Chief, who made easy a great combination and sanctioned a prolonged and gigantic effort.’_
General of the Armies John J Pershing, born in Missouri, commander of the American Expeditionary Force during the First World War, referred to Haig as _the man who won the war”_
@@johnpeate4544 One item to bring up, if not for the BEF would the French have collapsed in the opening weeks of the war rather than their historically successful stand on the Marne?
@@johnpeate4544 Repeating garbage three times is a bad look. The German army was kaput after the failure of the Ludendorf offensives and what happened to it thereafter tells no one anything important about anything.
@@joshwhite3339 The BEF had been of no substantial consequence and even if French had retreated behind Paris as he intended, or evacuated France as he proposed, von Kluck was exposed at the end of his tether and the French not as weak as he imagined. The Schlieffen plan required more troops than von Moltke had, particularly given that the Germans didn't fully appreciate defensive firepower either and bled out badly as a result.
Fascinating (and for me, new) take on Britain's role in WW1. I wonder if anyone can answer: Without British support, could the French have stopped the Germans from taking Paris, thus perhaps knocking the French out of the war? I think subs, aircraft and mines would have kept the Royal Navy out of the Baltic, but I'm hardly a naval expert.
Aircraft interdiction in WWI? No way. But the plausibility of a British force in the Baltic superior to the High Seas Fleet while simultaneously retaining uncontested control of the North Sea is, given the Kiel canal, not obviously credible. The 21.5'-draft battlecruisers alone sure wouldn't cut it. Maybe I missed something.
The BEF of 1914 had virtually no effect on whether the Germans took Paris. Whether the French could have survived the attrition of 1915 on without a large British army to share it is a different question.
Andrew Lambert's point of view is an interesting one and was entertainingly delivered but I have come to the more orthodox conclusion that the western Front was the only realistic place to fight the Germans.
Firstly, Danish neutrality could not have been guaranteed. As it was they mined areas around the Danish Baltic coast when pressured by the Germans to do so. I imagine if Britain made free with the straits between Denmark and Sweden it would result in a short lived Northern Front and German occupation.
Secondly, the German naval strategy was based around dividing Britain's Grand fleet and destroying it in detail. Sending squadrons into the Baltic, with no guarantee of safe passage would be doing that job for them. True, greater resources may have allowed 2 grand fleets but even with the Archangel route supply of 28+ battleships, their fleet screen and supply ships, all through the Russian ports would have been impossible.
Lastly, no one can guess what public opinion and the British press would have made of the British Army's inactivity over the invasion of Belgium and consequent atrocities. Much would have been made, most importantly by the opposition Tories, of the lack of action over this and to how seriously Britain (the Liberal government) took it's international responsibilities, especially from the countries of the Empire. After all "Scraps of Paper" bound Britain to them.
My opinion is that British policy makers had only one reasonable course of action, and that is the one that played out in actuality.
@Hiker Joe: You’re not properly factoring in the menacing presence & potential efforts of the then substantial Russian Baltic Fleet here, then being raised now by Andrew Lambert, as being an important part of the nub of Fisher & Corbett’s main plan, because of its likely counter measures (Also combined with those done in-unison with the Royal Navy) to any German Army & Navy move on Denmark then; or its (The Russian Navy) constant ability to threaten to potentially being able to blockade Swedish ports & thus then to either deny or else seriously curtail 90% of Imperial Germany’s industrial iron ore & steel imports, as well as its access to timber products too, thus likely bringing German war production to an almost immediate halt!!
On the face of it, it was a much cheaper & practical strategy for the British Empire to follow for in material & manpower terms so smaller outlay & cost in resources & lives lost, especially, when compared with what actually happened on the Western Front & elsewhere & the subsequent & inevitable future ramifications & its demise for the British Empire & its then Global Hegemony!!
The Herbert Asquith Government should have at least been more willing & prepared to have listened more attentively to Fisher, Corbett’s & the Admiralty’s (It was the Executive -Directorship of the Nation’s & Empire’s Senior Service, after all?!!) well-regarded & valid viewpoints here with this particular & also similar ‘Maritime Strategic Operations & Solutions’ from the Admiralty in 1914-15 &/or perhaps later on in the war too!
"Firstly, Danish neutrality could not have been guaranteed"... That is missing the a key part of the plan. The plan did not talk about Danish neutrality, but of provoking the Germans into invading Denmark, to prevent the British from sailing through the straits. At the time, this is pretty likely as Danes still felt threaten by Germany after the war of 1864, and while the Danes lay out minefields, they also had a close talk with the British about it.
As it happens the way Germany invaded Denmark in 1940, was based on plans made in 1915, so there is some reasonable assumptions that it would have worked as Fisher intended.
"Sending squadrons into the Baltic, with no guarantee of safe passage would be doing that job for them."
Again, the plan is that Denmark open its ports to the British (and again a pretty likely scenario), but you also miss the important part of German trade/import from Sweden being absolutely decimated in the process (the entire goal of the campaign). Germany would have been starved of key warmaterial in 9 months after the Baltic had been closed, meaning the German fleet had to engage the British... But the Home fleet would have destroyed the Germans in a "all out assault". The British fleet meant for this campaign in the Baltic were the same fleet used at Galipoli, so the British already had the extra ships to spare.
"the British press would have made of the British Army's inactivity over the invasion of Belgium and consequent atrocities"
Part of the overall strategic wareffort by the British, if Fisher had been allowed to go though with it, would have had the British army hold Antwerp, and clear the Belgium coast (limiting German submarines), so the army would be involved on the continent... What the British would have been spared was to fight in Northern France and keep the line there (something the French had plenty of troops to do anyway).
Had the war been fought like Fisher and Corbett talked about, the war would likely have been at least 2 years shorter, Russia would likely not have fallen to Communisme (and if it did, the outcome would have been very different). The number of casualties would have been very different, because the war would have developed in a very different way, but it is very unlikely that Germany would have been able to change the outcome in those 9 months, and after that it is effectively over, because German industry would no longer be able to deliver big guns or shells in any number, and both food and horses would no longer be comming into Germany (by 1916 most of the horses used by the Germans were actually Swedish imports).
@@MrBandholm When Hiker Joe wrote "Firstly, Danish neutrality could not have been guaranteed" he plainly meant that a German invasion of Denmark as a result of Fisher's mere feint could not be guaranteed. A plan based on assuming the cooperation of your enemy isn't much of a plan.
All the wonderful results of the blockade of the Baltic that you imagine utterly fails to deal with HJ's objection that the Germans could either sink the British contingent sent there or defeat the depleted Grand Fleet in the North Sea, or both.
The 1914 BEF was utterly inadequate to hold Antwerp, and as I understand it Fisher was opposed to a massive BEF, so whatever you're imagining happening there has strayed far from what Fisher was, according to Lambert, proposing, as I understand it.
Having read through aĺl of your comments and your replies to the comments of others... it appears that clearly you do not "understand it" you seem to have missed several key aspects mentioned by lambert and even the point made in the last comment here regarding the German intentions to take Denmark that were in fact written into their war planning and are a matter of historical record. You have some parts lacking in your research and certainly at the very least you should consider carefully watching the lecture again before so being so quick to disagree with someone that has spent decades in research on this subject and has given only a short overview of their conclusions. That is if you are actually open to considering evidence and perhaps thinking differently than you do now. I think not.
@@franoisdansonwhat plans? Germany only had plans to attack Denmark if it joined Britain, something Denmark knew full well and is why there main defensive plans were against Britain trying to break its neutrality.
Ah, Winnie...chasing after war all his life. Well, he certainly got his wish thus time around
Good stuff!
T. E. Lawrence, in the period before Gallipoli, recommended that the British invade what is now Lebanon. There were no serious Turkish forces there, and the operation would have allowed the British Army to cut off the only rail line south into Palestine and the Saudi Peninsula. As we well know, his advice was not heeded at the time. After all, what would a mere academic know or understand about grand strategy....
But... so what? So what if they had cut that rail line? How could that have brought about or even significantly furthered victory for the Entente?
In criticizing the decision to attack at Gallipoli, a British general remarked, "It was as if a prizefighter had left the ring to trounce his opponent's seconds." If anything, conquering Palestine and the Saudi peninsula would be the same fighter leaving the building to beat up his opponent's fans in the parking lot...
Driving through the Dardanelles would have opened a connection to Russia, which is touted as a great benefit of the Baltic strategy. In addition, it would, hopefully, knock one of the Central Powers completely out of the fight in a lightning blow.
Interesting. Lawrence and the admirals may have agreed that the desert way(the navy way) was the right way. And that continental forces being the focus was wrong, but the germans weren't storming through the levant either lol. The army was the focus because the navy couldnt effect the sitch or wouldn't take attrition it would require to do it(I. E. Close blockade/coastal invasion)
I appreciate the inputs but seems to me everyone was playing CYA before and after. And no I don't think France survives without the BEF.
At 1:30:10: Professor Lambert has been speaking and answering questions for an hour and a half laying out a clear, coherent, well thought out, well researched big picture of the British military situation circa WWI to include debunking the WWI name now used instead of the Great War. Then we get "Ross" invited to ask a question.
Ross: spends the first minute or so berating the professor for -essentially- not agreeing with Winston Churchill's version of events and saying, "I hardly know where to begin."
A minute later, Moderator (perhaps): Ross, if you'll pardon me, do you have a question or are you simply abusing the privilege of being here to air your opinions?
Ross (perhaps): Well as I said, I hardly know where to begin. I'm trying to formulate my question.
Moderator (perhaps): Everyone else was able to formulate a coherent question already. Here you are going last with all the extra time afforded, and you don't have your question sorted out?
Ross (perhaps): Well,...
Moderator (perhaps): [CLICK] My, my, that went quickly! It seems we do have time for one more question after all!
I read your comment before “Ross” came on and I think you’re being a little unfair on him particularly as you quote him inaccurately. He made some perfectly reasonable points, which actually remain mainstream historical orthodoxy, that Andrew Lambert was happy to address these points. I don’t know if the video has been edited since your comments but the moderater does not intervene in the way you say. People should be free to discuss and disagree on matters of history as that helps test ideas and determine what makes sense.
Very illuminating. Our inability to help Imperial or Social Democratic Russia either through the Baltic or the Dardanelles still has consequences today. Just to show off I have had tea many times with Oleg Kerensky and was taught at Harrow by Bruce Lockhart's nephew.
If there wasn't enough army to take the Dardanelles, and not enough transport to supply even that army, then there wasn't enough army and transport to do anything in the Baltic. France had to be supported on land. And Germany wasn't "pushed into invading Denmark." Didn't happen. Don't know how it could have.
@@harrym7544 "...Germany certainly would have won at Verdun without the BEF to take the pressure off. "
Not certain at all. If the Germans had enlarged the Verdun salient, so what? The logistical problem of turning an advance into a breakout was never solved in WWI.
How about this: No BEF, no Nivelle offensive, France sticks around until the blockade works.
@@harrym7544not at all simbolic, France had all its units cometed by the time the counter attack started , without the bef the attack wouldn’t have worked because there weren’t enough unites, not that it would have even gotten to that point considering the 5th French army would probably have been out flanked and destroyed in Belgium.
Churchill revived this idea in 1939 as Operation Catherine.
Why weren't the UBoat captains and their commanders not held accountable for war crimes?
They were. The post-war German government tried them.
You do realize that WWI didn't end in unconditional surrender?
The opportunity for bogus "war crime" "trials" was more limited than after WWII.
Don't put a cavalry officer in charge of the navy.
Unfortunately for Britain, they didn't figure that out the first time around. So they went and lost Norway and Singapore.
The Brit navy wouldn't have lost Norway or Singapore if Admirals had been "in charge"?
Interesting talk but I can't say I find it all convincing unfortunately
Few things being ignored here when considering whether British troops should have been deployed in France the way they were.
First, technological, the technology was not there to fight large scale maritime actions in the way suggested. That was succinctly proven at Gallipoli where even with the relatively limited number of troops on the ground it was a nightmare to supply them, let alone build them up to the strength of numbers and materiel required to defeat the Turkish forces. A working Port would have helped significantly, but as Dieppe proved years later trying to capture a working Port from the sea is essentially suicidal if it is defended, and lets face it, most of them were.
In WWI few of the advancements the Allies used in their maritime invasions in the latter years of WWII did not exist. A Lighter for all that they were great improvements over previous methods of landing troops were not Landing Craft, they were slow and vulnerable. There were no LSI's, while it can be argued probably quite successfully that LCT's or something like them re not required in 1915 such ships would have still been useful due to their ability to beach and roll supplies directly onto the beaches. But in 1915 neither LSI's or LST's existed, and without them sustaining British troops ashore without a working port is impossible.
Second, Britain managed in WWII without France not because it wanted to, but because it HAD to. These were both Coalition wars, and that means the other members of the Coalition do in fact get a say when it comes to the Strategy. Had the French lost on the Western Front, and that was a very real risk in 1916 - 1917 without British troops present, then quite frankly the war would be lost. Period. Keeping France in the fight was one of the most vital Strategic Concerns the British had in WWI because had the Western Front been lost then it was all over. Sure, Germany is not able to invade Britain, but Britain is certainly not going to be able to invade German dominated Europe, and without France tying up the bulk of her Army Germany can fully concentrate on removing Russia from the war. Given what we know of the turmoil politically and socially in Russia in 1916 - 1917 I think thats pretty much garuanteed to occur, and then what?
The Western Front first Strategy was the right one not because it was the best place for the British to fight their preferred method of war, but because France had to be kept in the war at all cost. Had british troops stayed out of the Western Front and we adopted a Maritime Strategy we would have lost, because, like it or not, France was the linchpin not Britain.....
Except that the Germans weren't that good at fighting a mass continental war either. They were short of everything.
@@Splodge542 I think it is beyond doubt Germany would have eventually broken the French army without the assistance of the British. The the war would have been lost.
Hi alganhar1 - Couple of points based on my understanding of Andrew Lambert's presentation:
- Respectfully suggest you're assuming the Germans would have ignored any British landing on the Danish / German Baltic coast. I think it's more likely that such a landing would've pulled far more German troops from the Western Front and elsewhere, than were tied up fighting five British divisions in France. That's before considering the German troops that would have been tied up occupying Denmark as well as Belgium etc.
- Don't forget German pre-WWI strategy was based on beating the Russians first and then France because they didn't have the force to do both simultaneously. Opening a third front on their Baltic doorstep would've been a nightmare for them.
- Agree the amphib technology didn't exist: however, it wouldn't have been necessary if the British had access to friendly Danish ports (noting the Prussian war with Denmark in 1864 was still within living memory). Even if they didn't, Dieppe happened two years after the French occupation began, which gave the Germans plenty of time to fortify the place. Don't also forget air power in 1914-15 didn't pose anything like the same threat in 1942.
- Corbett explained how the British didn't win their pre-1914 wars by sending mass armies into Europe, but by bankrupting their opponents. Cutting German trade with Scandinavia would have done more to cripple their ability to make war than any other Allied action. Conversely, putting a mass army into France played to the German's strengths rather than weaknesses, ruined Britain's postwar economy, and cost a million lives.
- Losing France would have led to a completely different war, but wouldn't have ended it - any more than what had happened in all the Anglo-French wars since 1689, and what followed in 1939. WWI would have been another version of "the whale confronting the elephant" - the only question would be whether Kaiser Bill would have been any more successful invading Britain than Napoleon or Hitler. At the end of the day, Britain's economy could still survive via its worldwide trade even without mainland Europe - the same couldn't be said for France before 1815, or Germany before 1918 (or 1945).
@@neilwestphalen2994 "Respectfully suggest you're assuming the Germans would have ignored any British landing on the Danish / German Baltic coast."
I expect he assumes Germany would have exterminated it, as do I. Or in Schleswig-Holstein, as you also suggest would take place, if I understand you correctly..
Are you imagining the entire Grand Fleet based on some Danish island?
Else the Germans wouldn't have local superiority in the Baltic (or North Sea!), why?
Never mind that gunboats holding Turks off the Gallipoli landings would not remotely be a task comparable to protecting a landing on the Baltic coast or a BEF in S-H from the German army.
"Don't forget German pre-WWI strategy was based on beating the Russians first and then France because they didn't have the force to do both simultaneously."
This is backasswards.
"Losing France would have led to a completely different war, but wouldn't have ended it... At the end of the day, Britain's economy could still survive via its worldwide trade even without mainland Europe."
Lotsa luck with that. WWII had an Eastern Front to chew up the Wehrmacht, and a Pearl Harbor to better engage the USA. The situation would not be remotely similar to any of "the Anglo-French wars since 1689."
@@laurentdrozin812no the war wouldn’t have been lost, and we didn’t lose the napelonic wars when France controlled large swaths of Europe, or when the Nazis controlled all of mainland Europe.
No way to defeat Germany without putting a large British army on the continent. Can't get that army on the continent without France and Russia fighting Germany. Just don't see an alternative to what Britain did other than allowing the Kaiser's Empire to become totally dominant over Britain by first defeating France and Russia.
Alternative: French stay on defense and let the blockade do its work.
And I don't particularly care for Lambert's Belgium/Baltic alternative, but you certainly haven't debunked it.
british strategy can't account for Germanys illegal use of UBoat warfare because it was illegal? Sounds insanely naive to me.
I thought it brilliant but one thing was ignore I though. The consequences pfa french defeat on land without the British army’s commitment amd presemce
Why would you do naval operations when you can run 300k newly raised troupes straight into the teeth of the German defense at the Somme? Much better to take on the best army in the world offensively. If you are going to argue for a continental commitment, at least make it defensive one. Why would Britain care about selling French soil expensively to the Germans. If Germans want to bash their head against pre-built defences over and over and over again, let them.
But the French kept attacking, which in the absence of a large BEF might have given the Germans the opportunity to kill enough Frenchmen (see the Nivelle offensive) to result in a French collapse.
@@gandydancer9710the French kept attacking due to the belief that the BEF would be supporting them and they could waste lives, because the British are here too.
Eventually I think the entente cordialle will be seen as an error that dragged the UK into the cauldron of the Western Front. We need to know why Helligoland Island was sold to the Germans before the Great War. I've never understood why the allies thought the war would be over in 6 months. It seems a baseless thought. Fisher also wanted to 'Copenhagen' the German Fleet prior to the war.
>We need to know why Helligoland Island was sold to the Germans before the Great War.
It wasnt for starters, it was ceased in the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty in exchange for Wituland and parts of East Africa that were vital to build the railway to Lake Victoria, Germany also gained parts in Namibia that became the German East Africa.
Also Helligoland annex by the British in the Treaty of Paris to restrict any future *FRENCH* naval aggression against German and Scandinavian states, they never really made use of it because it costed money and the Royal Navy thought it was too exposed as a forward base, not they were wrong as if they stayed there it wouldnt work as a forward base anyway in case of a German naval build up.
Another things, this was 1890 and the Germans given the choice would not mind at all a alliance with the British, the Entente Cordiale would only be in 1904 and the Crimean War was 1853-1856, to the British they traded what was a island they couldnt really defend for Zanzibar as the Germans traded something that really didnt had value for then for a island that had much strategic importance to then, if you are just looking at on the Anglo-French alliance context there is a reason why maybe they shouldnt (even if there was no chance to defend it) but considering alliances are very ... fluid, the whole thing was a very good trade for both sides as they gained something they wanted in exchange for something they had no real use, there were Germans that thought they traded away their African Empire for a island.
Explosives were made from bird poo at the time. Germany didn't have a sufficient supply until Haber invented a way.
Regardless of what some think, Britain did not "win" WW1. It was a combined effort of Britain, France and the Americans. But, it's quite possible or probable that WW1 would have been lost if Britain were not on the continent in 1914. Think of 1st Ypres. So it's possible that Churchill may have been right about the continental strategy but for all the wrong reasons.
What "wrong reasons"?
No I don’t think Churchill was right about his strategy as his strategy played into the hands of the Germans and cost the British and French millions of their people, economies and empires.
So another policy Churchill may have been wrong about. Churchill was wrong about Dardanelles, Norway, Greece, Singapore, Italy. And that's just what I can think about off the top of my head. Churchill must be one of the most overrated leaders in history. Good at speeches, rubbish at strategy.
Nothing wrong with Italy. Knocked Italy out of the war and drew German forces from the Eastern Front in a way that Yanks parked in Britain didn't.
If one accepts your view that Churchill was wrong on all the points you make and more, his role in defeating Hitler in WW2 outweighs any of his faults.
It's very sad to see a historian rubbishing the British army so badly: unlike what he stated in this video, every other historian seems to agree that the 120,000 soldiers of the only professional army in Europe did make a big part in stopping the German army defeating France in the first few weeks of the war. And without France, I don't think Britain would have been much safer from a Germany now dominating the whole continent. Besides, it seems selective memory to say that the British way of doing war was not sending an army but using the navy instead. So India or Afghanistan or South Africa for that matter (Boer war anyone?) didn't need the use of a British army? And better to forget about Wellington and the British armies fighting all over Europe too, I guess... It's just pure nonsense to validate against all evidence an alternative naval agenda. And of course Fisher's Baltic project was suicidal: First invading some islands of neutral Denmark (which would doom the rest of that country to be invaded then by the Germans) to then land an army in Pomerania??? If the Dardanelos adventure was crazy this is pure madness: a small sea full of German subs, destroyers and even Torpedo boats planes and airships. You cannot maintain a fleet on sea in these conditions. The navy, like Fisher, thinks that the army is a projectile: once they shoot is job done. But of course that's not the case. If the army needs to retreat it's going to be bloody.
every other (english speaking) historian... Also no, the leading historian of WW1 on the imperial war museum, a few years ago, actually have a similar point of view, basically the British army was too small in the opening stages of the war, to really make a difference on the strategic scale. And while the British army did play an important role at the first battle of the Marne, they did so alongside a French army of some 300.000 troops.
The British army was first at a size in the fall, where it really could take on part of the front itself, due to troops from the colonies, and by that time, a very large size of those professional troops, were already casualties.
It doesn't take from them, the importance of their fight, nor does it deminish their bravery... But the first world war on the western front, is much better understod, particular in the first few years, from the point of view of the French (and ofc the Germans), it is really only in 1916 and then particular 1917 that the British army does its big lifting, and even then, the French still holds most of the front (as they should, it is their country after all). But Britains side of the story gets much more recognission than the french today (in the english speaking world), because the english sources are easier to go to, than the French.
Here's a zinger for y'all.
What's the name of the only Royal Navy ship that never Traveled in any direction?
Btw, don't be a poon and look it up. Lets see if I'm as clever as I think.
I found out through hours of random naval warfare lectures. If you Google it, I'll know.
Broke international law like an illegal blockade?
According to Lambert that didn't affect "the moral high ground".
I'm not anti-British, but I must point out that the British made it impossible for the Germans to use submarines in accordance with cruiser rules. They issued orders for merchant ships to ram submarines, they armed merchant ships, etc. I'm glad that we Americans entered the war on the Allied side, and I agree that taking "illegal" actions against submarines is not on the same moral plane as sinking merchant ships, including ocean liners, killing civilians, including those of non-belligerent nations.
If the Germans used cruisers instead of submarines in the North Atlantic would that have affected your opinion of British retaliatory action? I think subterfuge has always been a part of war and always will.
@@hikerjoe3773 If it had been retaliatory action by the British, that would have been one thing. But, under the laws of war that the British held up as holy, they took the first step to violate them. The German actions were strictly retaliatory.
It's a bit like saying, how dare that police office shoot that man! All he did was open fire on the police officer. Perhaps it's more accurate to have a gang that always opens fire on the police officers, and the police institute a policy of always shooting first. In this case, however, the constitution (the laws of naval war) allow the police to institute exactly this policy.
The "illegal" British blockade killed far more civilians than unrestricted submarine warfare.
The Lusitania was carrying munitions.
Your list of British actions making "cruiser rules" impracticable omitted Q-ships.
But I don't take any of this "rules of war" crap seriously. War isn't golf.
President Woodrow "He kept us out of War" Wilson deserved to be shot.