US Navy Fleet Problems - Taking the ships out for exercise (I-VII)
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- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 17 ก.ย. 2024
- Today we take a look at the background and thinking behind the inter-war USN Fleet Problems, with summaries of the first 7 such exercises.
Sources:
To Train the Fleet For War: The U.S. Navy Fleet Problems, 1923-1940 - Albert A. Nofi
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Pinned post for Q&A :)
Hi drach,
I was recently reading about ww2 and Korean war carrier operations and strategy concepts and one of the ideas mentioned was for "Fleet Interceptors" using high speed aircraft with Rockets fitted to aid take offs and then boost climb rates to get into position to support a CAP or engage another enemy attack wave. To me it seems like an early version of Alert Aircraft using catapults so an apparently sound concept. Were rocket assisted aircraft ever used/tried in this or did jet aircraft come along too quickly?
If you had to recommend a weird naval weapon for Matt Easton and Tod Workshop's Weird Weapons series, which would you recommend for them to build and test. Extra points if you talk to them about it.
Hiii Drach, speak of the devil I was wondering, at midway, the Japanese were undoubtedly as smart as other aircraft carrier maintenance people and ship maintenance people, better seeing as how the Kido Butai was such a polished instrument. Why did their carriers go up like Roman candles on the 4th of july? I understand the standard explanations of Lucky hits by Lucky airman and the Japanese not having as good of a strategic damage control I guess you'd call it, but the ships seem as if they must have been just, I don't know crap to have just gone up like that, and they were battleships, the two Akagi n Kaga
@@thehandoftheking3314 Sorry not Drach answering but I sure would have hated to be the test pilot on that one LOL
@@tinafoster8665 the IJN CVs were re-arming,
Avg gas, bombs and planes tightly packed in the hanger.
No wonder they burn up like that when hit.
28:41 "The army and navy units defending the island refused to cooperate"
Wow, they REALLY nailed that aspect of the Japanese military at the time. ;)
Not so much, they tried to sabotage themselves and officers order the murder of members of the other branch. But they were getting there
Some army ammunition didn't fit navy weapon's !
@@jerrycottrell302 No Army Ammunition over 50 cal fit Navy weapons. The Navy had 6 inch (152mm) guns, the Army had 155 guns (caliber inherited from the M1917 GPF's bought from France as the US ad nothing comparable. Retained post-war as funding was unavailable. When funds became available there was such a huge stock of 155mm shells left over from the Great War that the new gun had to be able to fire it. ). But this was no different than any other nation in regard to Army vs Navy ammunition.
@@colbeausabre8842 And then we go and put two 155mm guns on the stealthy Zumwalt class but cannot agree on what ammo to shoot from it...
@@gregorywright4918 yeah, I've been flabbergasted at the notion of 155 mm rounds costing $800,000-1,000,000 when we could just pay $50/round (or whatever) for a NATO standard shell and screw a $10,000 precision guidance fuse into the nose.
I love the Orange on Blue fleet exercise where the US Navy simulated a carrier attack on Pearl Harbor and did pretty much what the IJN would do on December 7th. They looked at the result and said "Nah, it'll be fine."
IJN: Interesting.
USN: Were you taking notes?
IJN:.........No.
@@ph89787 to be fair the USN didn't either, and someone had to
@@arionerron4273 *Angry King noises.
@@ph89787 *God-Emperor of the Navy is displeased....
@@thehandoftheking3314 The patron saint of the Navy is John Paul Jones. I have no problem also referring to him as the God-Emperor.
"We need Lexington and Saratoga. Please build faster."
-The USN after every Fleet Exercise
Also, "more Cruisers and a true fleet sub too, pretty pullleeez."
"Can we also do a live fire of our Torpedo's? To make sure that A. they work and B. how well the work?"
-Bureau of Ordinance ".... They work its fine"
@@MikeJones-qn1gz - they did have dummy torps...which eventually became the early war Mk14... :-/
@@coachtom1729 I was thinking the same thing.
@@coachtom1729 And were equally effective.
6:55 Drach somehow finds a way to bash Beatty in a video that isn’t even about the Royal Navy or Jutland.
I mean his name is Beaty is it.
@@vHindenburg let's just start calling him Admiral Beat-me. Drach's piñata
Beatty was a stuffed shirt, womanizing narcissist! Drach’s apparent “dislike” of this arrogant a-hole is well founded!
The US Navy is a perfectly balanced game with no cheats or exploits.
What a Spiffing thing to say
*Wargambling proceeds to nerf USN AA and reworked the CVs to nobody's satisfaction.
Just wait until "let's game it out" gets a hold of it. Release the conveyor tornado
@@hawkeye5955 USA, spends billions developing some of the best AA of the war if not the best.
War gaming: yea bro it’s just not fun to be realistic
@@michaelsoland3293
To be fair, Wargaming also nerfed Long Lances.
One thing which is often much under appreciated, especially with basic understanding of naval warfare, is how hard it is to actually do the simplest of things, like the amount of training, leadership and cohesion required just to change a fleet’s direction.
As it was demonstrated a few times in real time, people should remembered that port and starboard are left and right or how much distance it takes to 1 ship of the line need to turn 😂
This is one reason I chuckle whenever people talk about China challenging the US Navy. They can build all the ships they want, but they have no blue water experience, while the USN and its allies have been doing fleet ops with carriers for 100 years. Good luck with that!
@@bluemarlin8138 This is not the flex that you think it is...
@@bluemarlin8138 yeah but nowadays, you have better navigation, communication and usually you can receive the orders, pinpoint your location excatly and do electric, computerised moving... And a lot of is based on technology like quality and location of the radars and the air-power... Back then, it was harder to command such a fleet where your communication was based on flag and you had runners delivering orders to everyone... While often, no way to tell the commander what's happening with your ship.
It’s still difficult today, because you do the practice with one set of watch standers and then by the time of exercise, a different set is standing watch. Modern technology is helpful, but mostly it is the team working together, using the same terminology. This also extends to the each of the ships working together
Imagine how happy Oklahoma's seaplane pilots were when they were told to roleplay as 15 attack aircraft..must've been pretty fun for them
Honestly yeah would have been a fun day
Had a PH survivor from the Utah tell me(1986) tell me how much fun the crew had being the 'Enemy' in those EX's. Then joked about the Japanese using them for target practice for the last time. IKR?
I think of today where a pilot in a fighter is expected to push the envelope and optimize the limits of their plane versus a guy pushing a float plane 30 years after powered flight was invented.🤣
*nods in Oklahoma*
“Immediately execute attack without formal declaration of war.”
It’s like someone was paying attention when Japan did that exact thing to Russia.
I swear, the best part of this channel isn’t the naval history, its the constant dry humor used to deliver it.
I'm a bit surprised he missed out on the aphorism "He who radiates is lost" while commenting on the lack of EMCON and the signals intercepts on both sides.
His humor is a garnish not the main dish so calm down bro
Scoring Judges: “There’s no way that a single ship would be pummeled by that many aircraft in such short order successfully….that sort of situation would never really happen in a battle….we’re only going to count 2 of those hits.”
Kaga at Midway: *laughs nervously* “I’m in danger”
Luckily we made a lot of those mistakes during interwar exercises instead of when the real thing happened. A lot of the Japanese wargaming (both tabletop and at sea) was just meant to reaffirm their existing plans, whereas the USN's wargames did a better job of actually testing plans and seeing what did and didn't work.
Obviously there were still plenty of mistakes left for us to make when things started for real, but at least we could avoid some big ones and had a head start on learning from the ones we did make.
@@Wolfeson28 Japanese wargaming of Midway did have two carriers knocked out at one point, but they were reinstated by the judges for the follow-on phases.
@@gregorywright4918 Right, I think they had one scenario where two carriers got knocked out, but the Vice Admiral Ugaki (Yamamoto's Chief of Staff) overruled the umpire and downgraded the damage. Like I said, Japanese wargames often fell into the trap of simply reaffirming the plan that had already been decided on rather than genuinely trying to look for problems and adjust plans accordingly. The pre-Midway games are a perfect example of that.
Yorktown at Midway: hehehe SBDs go BRRRR
@@sgtsnake13B “Knowing that the Zero’s had a pre-determined kill limit….I sent wave after wave of torpedo bombers at them to consume their energy and ammunition. Then the SBD’s dropped the hammer.”
It's so interesting watching so many pieces of what would ultimately become the Pacific Campaign show up in these problems. As some people have pointed out elsewhere, the value of these fleet problems wasn't in building THE plan that would win a war with Japan - it was in familiarizing the navy in general (including nearly all of the key future leaders) with the general sorts of problems that a war across the Pacific would entail. It gave people like Nimitz and King the pieces of solutions that they could apply to the actual problems of the war, and some of the key tools they would need to implement those solutions.
As is said, plans are nothing, but planning is everything.
"We face two enemies in the Pacific: distance, and the Japanese" -King
Great points. Also keep in mind that, unlike today's USN which has enormous operational commitments, the interwar Navy was able to gather for real each year. Thus, more important than the really big exercises was the fact that almost all the officers and men of the Fleet participated. The learning curve must have been extraordinary and widespread. The institution as a whole learned from each of the Fleet Problems.
Nimitz latter opined that the Fleet Problems has so thoroughly examined Japan as the enemy in a Pacific war that nothing they did in the real war was truly unexpected. (Although, Japanese hurt feelings aside at always being the enemy in the Fleet Problems, who ELSE could be the enemy in a Pacific war? The Japanese had removed the Russians as a Pacific naval power in 1905, and all the other meaningful naval powers had Atlantic home fleets except Italy, which could only reasonably access the Atlantic ocean. Unless the British were unexpectedly on their side, the Italian navy wouldn't have been able to use the Suez, and in that case the British would have been the principle enemy anyway and the main naval theater would have been the Atlantic.)
And that's what i'd call "a realistic wargame": intelligence, scouting, and communications on the strategic side; scouting, locating the enemy, communications, weather, light and wind conditions on a more tactical level. And only then we can start with our beloved die throwing/gunfire. No big surprise: obviously US Navy brass knew their business. Hugely interesting video Drach, can't wait for the next one, now that Lex and Sara have finally arrived!
The USN has always been the crown jewel of our Armed Forces, and correspondingly attracted the best and brightest.
And it pains me to say this, as a careerist in the Army.
@@jamesharding3459 The Navy leadership right now is absolute trash who continue to fail their sailors and this nation on a daily basis.
@@jamesharding3459 Ouch!
Ah, but if you look at the USN's early WWII performance, it was not great. Even by the end of the war their carrier airstrikes weren't great at hitting the ships they were supposed to.
Allow me to strongly recommend Learning War, by Trent Hone, which discusses the US Navy's learning process from 1899 to 1945. Absolutely fascinating, and explains a lot of what the Navy did in both World Wars.
Japan: _complains about all of the US Navy's fleet problems being against them_
US Navy: "Alright, we will stop targeting you."
Japan: "Thank you."
US Navy five minutes later: "Alright folks, our next exercise will be against a country called Nippon."
“Team Orange will now represent the forces of the Imperial Shmapanese Navy.”
@@HitandRyan "their flagship is the Jamato"
@@andrewzheng4038 and it is shielding the kido yutai
Guess who all the Japanese exercises were designed against?
Japan: its a bit offensive that you always make us out as the enemy.
US navy: it's just hypothetical, but okay we'll change it.
Japan: thank you. By the way, do you have any weather reports for Hawaii in December?
US Navy: what?
Japan: what?
This all reminds me so much of the big REFORGER and CARAVAN GUARD exercises in Germany during the 1980s! Hundreds of thousands of US and Allied military roaming the countryside playing out the Fulda Gap scenario while additional hundreds of thousands worked to move forces from the US into Europe and on to the battle area...Every time we conducted these exercises lessons were learned "the hard way" that led to the Army that deployed to Desert Storm--which was far easier than the exercises. Also, post Viet Nam war, the US implemented several battle labs and combat training centers (Fort Irwin, Top Gun, Red Flag at Nellis come to mind) that have made learning and evolving a routine cycle.
Also, we routinely "fought" Orange forces in large and small scale exercises, to the point that we had mythical nations like Orangestan and Atropia...LOL
After REFORGER 1990, which I spent in Weingarten, West Germany on a Bundeswehr base, we held a Command Post Exercise at Grafenwoer, West Germany that our XO duubed "Operation Just Because." That was canceled halfway through so we could return to Wertheim for Operation Desert Shield in November 1990. I well remember watching MLRS rockets flying over us at night while we sat on an old Hawk anti-aircraft missile site at Grafenwoer.
One evening at Graf, I was in the second row of a tactical Chevy Blazer (M1009 CUCV), dozing off. We were on a tank trail, following an M1 Abrams tank at slow speed with our driver having blackout drive lights engaged and being careful to avoid the exhaust from the turbine engine. Half awake at some point, I glanced through the rear windscreen of our M1009 and saw what appeared to be the muzzle of another M1 nearly touching our truck. The thought of being crushed by 68 tons of steel jolted me to a terrified state of being wide awake. After recovering my wits, I realized the M1 driver was using night vision equipment and we were perfectly safe, even with blackout drive lights barely illuminating us. Training can be pretty frightening. I'm not sure I have ever been more frightened than I was at that moment, including the time an ammunition truck blew up nearby during Operation Desert Storm. Another time...
@@CB-vt3mx Atropia and Ariana are still a thing, at least as of May 2022.
@@CB-vt3mx Attached linguists were expected to have been cross-trained and qualified in 'Citrussian.'
Oh God No...not Ft. Irwin! Where armchair officers die.
15:22 Dummy torpedoes? Didn't know they were live-firing the Mk. 14 torpedoes
No one told the Bureau of Ordnance then?
You know it was the best torpedoes. Nobody could make it better.
- BOURD
Nah, the dummy torpedoes actually ran at the correct depth. Then BuOrd installed a 750-lb warhead without modifying the depth keeping system and insisted that everything would be fine.
Fleet problem report: the dummy torpedos worked great!!
BuORD: wait... "dummy" what now?
An ex-Navy friend of mine was assigned to the intelligence section on a US Carrier during one of these exercises in I think about the 1970's. He and his associates succeeded in constructing and transmitting a false set of information which completely deceived the opposing force regarding his fleet's location, resulting in the opposing fleet sending off of its strike force into a big blue empty section of the ocean, while his fleet's strike force merrily located, engaged and destroyed the other force. This was against the rules of the game, so at the end of the exercise he and his mates were called in and formally dressed down by their commanding officer, followed on the side with a smiling and unofficial "Well done." All's fair in love and fleet exercises.
Ironic indeed considering that a Japanese junior officer got dressed down for suggesting that the Americans would have a carrier task force NE of Midway.
So, a RL Captain Kirk moment. :)
@@carlcramer9269 Yes! And my friend walks around with that same "I just ate the canary" smile as Captain Kirk did. Great guy.
Great video on a topic that is only mentioned in every WW2 history and commander's biography, but not directly studied. THANKS!
Small correction: CNO = Chief of Naval Operations.
Its so weird to see the golden gate bridge not completed when the warships float on by, seeing the bridge everyday feel like its always been there and not built in the 30s. haha
What's a "golden gate bridge" haha?
Ah yeah back in the day when the US actually built things. Now they can't even ensure that there's baby formula for children. My how the mighty have fallen eh? Sorry the cynic in me couldn't resist an don't worry my country's even worse I know
@@olgagaming5544 en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golden_Gate_Bridge
@@olgagaming5544 It's the bridge in California that connects San Francisco to Marin. It's famously orange-red and very pretty. You can see it under construction at 6:49
@@SonorianBnS Haha I understood its the one from the movies
09:02 - The US Navy would pioneer "Choose Your Own Adventure (TM)" 50 years before the concept became a best seller.
I'm always amazed when I think about how quickly the USN became so dominant, but then I remembered we have all of the dockyards and our dad *did* Rule the Waves for quite a time.
Americans: We're good at war. We know a thing or two because we've seen and done a thing or two.
Our Germanic heritage helps us on the land, and our British heritage helps us on the sea.
But nowadays America is becoming a shithole because of south american, african, and israeli "heritage" seeping in...
Still do in spirit, dear boy ;) 🇬🇧👍🏻🇺🇸
What I took from this video is the knowledge that a first level wizard can take no less than three 14-inch shells to the face before going down.
Ha
Drach was stationed in Hawaii and married one. It is La-hi-na, save you the grief of future A-holes. Keep up the good work!
La High Na but who cares? Nice place to visit Front Street and especially for the very adult Halloween party
It's really crazy just how accurate to real life that Army-Navy squabbling making the Japanese lose an Island (Guadalcanal) turned out to be in FP.4....
The exercises did a decent job in simulating actual scenarios the U.S. navy would later face in WW2
I am retired US Navy civilian engineer. During the 80/90s I supported numerous exercises. After which there was an immediate lessons learned document issued. There was the normal paragraph that would state "we learned a lot and comm sucked". The thing I find amazing is that from teh 20's till now not much has changed and that lessons learned ar rarely followed. Thanks for the most excellent lesson.
That's probably the most footage I've seen of the USN from the 1920's & 1930's. Thanks.
I hadn't seen a lot of this footage of the standard BBs maneuvering...thanks for this, Drach!
There was one exercise where the enemy fleet had both the Saratoga and the Lexington while the American fleet had no carrier. The American fleet was wiped out and the US Navy decided they needed more carriers and even better planes! It's interesting to note that many of the Navy boards recommendations were taken seriously such as faster oilers and auxiliaries, longer range submarines, more cruisers and the usual complaint of better communications. But most of the exercises assumed that the battleships would be the premier component of any fleet, while many officers were starting to doubt this, and not just in the US Navy. While improvements in ship design can take years, aircraft can be modified or replaced within months.
It was evolutionary, and took years rather than months. But aircraft were improving much faster than ships or AA defenses.
Was the USS enterprise resurrecting itself multiple times even during fleet exercises?
i assume so
Actually, Enterprise only participated in one exercise where she got sunk by Ranger.
@@Eboreg2 Go RANGER!
It's usual for "sunk" ships to be resurrected in an exercise. If the "sunk" ships just return to port, the crew gets no further training, and training is the point of the exercise.
@@christopherrowe7460 RANGER LEADS THE WAY!
I love the footage you put in, there’s feels so much more alive when it’s more than just a static image!
A really terrific insight into an aspect of the conduct of the US Navy that has always fascinated me. Excellent video, and great use of archive film.
I have been listening to your videos for over a year when I go to sleep. Please NEVER change the intro.
This was an awesome video, thanks Drach. I had heard about these fleet exercises but didn’t know a lot about them. Great historic footage and photos! Loved them, especially the battleships by the incomplete Golden Gate Bridge.
As I am sure this will end up buried in the comments, oh well...
I greatly appreciate the subtle inclusions of funny bits: "Objectives included scouting, air defense, ... , and the locations of Partridges in Pear trees."
Well done sir, thank you
Woohoo! Happy Wednesday!
I have been waiting for ages for this one. Keep up the good work Drach
I literally searched last night to see if you had a video on the Fleet Problems and was disappointed that you didn't. Now you do!
Pretending to be a different ship still goes on. My worst month in the Navy was when my SSN pretended to be a destroyer because the yearly budget for destroyer fuel had run out.
The DDG I was stationed on was part of a training exercise in the Mediterranean late 1960s. The arguments over the radio over who had sunk who were likely rather similar to the exercises mentioned in the video.
Currently reading "To train the Fleet for War" by Nofi. Pretty amusing anecdotes so far.
Minor correction for 5:28: As someone who does live in Hawaii (Oahu specifically, where Pearl Harbor is) it is pronounced La-HAI-na, not La-ha-ina. Maui is however pronounced correctly.
Love your work btw. Keep it up.
th-cam.com/video/4jaq0si2cOY/w-d-xo.html
I sat here way to long pronouncing the two. 😂😂
Drach...as usual a quality presentation that educates and entertains...recently I requested more moving pictures and as seems a particular feature of the channel you delivered...HUZZAH!
Drach, great episode. Glad to see you digging into the Fleet Problems. You did a super job of highlighting the lessons learned from each of the first 7. One can see from your summary how the USN tested various aspects of naval combat and (apparently) incorporated many insights into future doctrine, training, and systems. All that being said, what I liked most about this video was the many film clips of the old battle line steaming around. Very nostalgic and symbolic. Bravo Zulu!!
Near 7:00 to 7:25 - is that the Golden Gate Bridge under construction? Drach, you're an awesome footage hunter!
Yeah - but that was in the '30s...
@@gregorywright4918 So?
@@scocon8658 The Fleet Problems in this part are all '20s.
@@gregorywright4918 Ah, heck. What bridge was it, then?
This series is so cool!
You almost never hear of the development of military forces and strategy in teh inter war period, at least compared to the coverage WW1 and WW2 usually get.
Extremely insightful!
(CNO)Admiral Michael M. Gilday is the chief of naval operations, NOT chief naval officer, which is the professional head of the United States Navy. The position is a statutory office (10 U.S.C.)
I have many friends who were army vets. They fondly remember all the war games they took part in. Their favorite was the million dollar moments. Everyone fires everything at the same time.
NOBODY comes close to this depth of detail about history. Lovin it brother
For aditional realism the sealed envelope, should have been acompanied by a binocular (to be thrown over board)
That would only apply if one of the ships was supposed to be the Kamchatka.
What a joy to see footage of these beautiful ships!!!
I love these long videos, so much new information I never knew I needed
This and the Louisiana Maneuvres were the most brilliant things the US did pre-war.
Thanks for this series, Drach. From a US perspective, the fleet problems were hugely important to US Navy strategy and planning (even if some questionable conclusions were drawn from them!) I'll be curious to learn what other navies around the world engaged in similar large-scale exercises, and who they saw as potential future threats. It's interesting that the US saw Japan as the main future adversary all the way back into the 1920s.
In June of 1930 Captain Ernest King assumed command of the USS Lexington in time for the 1930 Fleet problem attacking Pearl Harbor. Plenty of professional naval officers recognized the danger represented but the upper echelons of Naval command was still understandably dominated by the so called ‘Gun Club’ so the dangers were minimized. In the USN the division between surface fleet and aviation is defined strangely by their foot ware…black shoe as opposed to aviation brown shoe.
The naval aviators knew of the vulnerability - but it was the Army aviators who were responsible for air defense...
In the aftermath of the attack on Pearl Harbor there was a lot of finger pointing between the Army and the Navy about responsibility. While it is true the Army was responsible for the islands air defense the Navy did have a war warning yet were caught flat footed.
@@tomdolan9761 The Navy was at normal in-port readiness level, with 25% AA defenses manned (well, people were nearby...). It was depending on the Army to protect the port, with their radar, patrols, AA guns and multiple fighter squadrons on alert (well, the planes were on the field...). The Navy was aggressively defending the harbor entrance, and even fired on a suspicious sub attempting entry. Their planes were not tasked with base defense, but a few PBYs were up looking around (Kimmel was keeping most of them down for maintenance because he expected to push them forward to the outposts as soon as the flag went up). There had been a serious alert the previous weekend that had been stood down. There was a real expectation that "this is too far for the Japs to reach", and that the Philippines would get it first.
Well in the aftermath there were. of course. multiple recriminations of the many mistakes made that morning. Certainly General Short was relieved for the Army mistakes but the fleet was Admiral Kimmel's responsibility regardless of who was responsible for the air defense of the island. USS Ward spotted. attacked and is thought to have sunk a Japanese mini sub attempting to enter the harbor several hours before the air attack and they quickly reported it to the OOD at Kimmel’s command but the fleet wasn’t put on alert and Kimmel couldn’t be reached because he was going golfing that day, There was, as you point out, a woeful under appreciation for Japanese capabilities.
The principal error Kimmel made was his failure to give subordinate officers the authority to bring his fleet to full alert at the first sign of an attack. The time wasted first confirming the Ward incident and then trying to locate Kimmel was critical and it cost lives.
Thanks for the pictures of the nearly Golden Gate Bridge!
Enjoy seeing the Navy learn so much and do so little with.
I've always wanted to know more about these. Thanks!
Damn Drach, I revere you with the utmost respect and your video Taffy 3/battle off Samar should be used as an official US Navy training video. Everytime it starts playing I have to listen to the whole thing. CNO stands for Chief of Naval Operations though.
The idea of the leaders being wiped out was pretty common in the British Army, virtually every exercise in the late '60's early '70's led to divisional and Bde HQ's being wiped out. One exercise led to two inf Bn's being led by young captains as the umpires were brutal. One Bde Commander had to be forcibly ordered to go home as command passed to the Bde Major and there were no regimental colonels to step in. At 20 Bde, every exercise ended up with us being hit by a battlefield Nuke, which always led to a huge cheer going up, a bit bizarre looking back.
I remember my Dad saying the same...release of tactical nukes approved...Endex...
my dad was in the Staffs in the 80s near Fallingbostel. He told me the plan was to blow the bridges and railways, dig in to choke points, and stall the 3rd Shock Army for 24 hours. Any less and they'd be killed. Any more and they'd be tactical nuked and bypassed.
Grim stuff
@@judyhopps9380 Mind you...after what we saw in Desert Storm and Ukraine...they may have been over-estimating them...
@@dogsnads5634 oh without a doubt. In the 1980s Russia was planning a defensive war. But 60s and 70s? I think both sides would have murdered each other
@@dogsnads5634 Peak USSR had something like 2x the current Russian population and they had a lot more money to spend on their military back then. Plus the development of new Russian equipment stagnated massively after the collapse of the USSR. Much of the "new" technology they have gotten more recently, especially warships/submarines, has been the completion of projects originally begun in the 1980s and late 1990s.
I agree the USSR was probably less scary than Western nations had predicted (at least in a conventional war) but Russia's current strength is a fraction of that of the whole USSR's and their performance in Ukraine now is not necessarily indicative of how it would've gone down 30+ years ago.
I got to be part of RIMPAC 2004. They sure learn alot during these exercises.
I'm so glad I found this channel! Off to USN fleet problems #2 video.
06:28 - The clip with the battle line standing out of the Golden Gate is fascinating - note that the Golden Gate Bridge is still under construction.
just watched this for the second time and wow it is awesome. I always prided myself on my knowlage and man Drach keeps me on my toes and keeps teaching me more and more..Lovin every minute of it. Thank you so much for your hard work.
Fascinating stuff as usual, and always a pleasure to learn with your carefully researched and perfectly presented productions! All the best from Canada.
This was an outstanding production.
Yes, as good as always Drach.
love that golden gate-during -construction footage
Awesome subject, engrossingly presented.
Thanks D man
Gotta love the footage of the Standards being all battlewagon-y.
Been waiting a long time for this topic, and as usual, Drach doesn't disappoint. Well done!
This was an amazingly cool video. I've known about the fleet problems for years but I had no idea they were so interesting. Waiting on the other videos in the series is going to be rough. Keep it up!
The US military, not just the navy, is really big on succession of command. I was in the Army and most exercises, big and small, usually involved having the leadership decapitated (or all communications lost) and the survivors had to carry on with the mission.
Same here (ex British Army). We used to joke that it so the brass could bugger off early. I have known a few senior NCO's get 'Killed' then bugger off down the pub.
@@Davey-Boyd
Unfortunately for the US Army, we have a massive country and all most all of our army bases with large training areas are in deserts or swamps. Several (sometimes dozens of) miles to a pubs.
Excellent, Drach! I really like the varied subjects of these videos, and of course subscribe.
One correction: CNO is Chief of Naval Operations, not Chief Naval Officer
I hope you saw my note on your trip in the last video about your visit to the States.
Garfield Farkle: Good eye! After WW2 started CNO and CINCUS got merged.
@@johndittmer8488 and Admiral King changed it from CINCUS to COMINCH
For anyone wondering why early dreadnoughts had torpedo tubes (especially broadside tubes), check out the photos at 3:30 and 4:30. Note how close together the battleships are. If one side were to fire their torpedoes at the other, they don't even need to aim to have about a 50% hit chance simply because of how close together the ships are. Until gunnery ranges rose beyond those of torpedoes they were a worthwhile weapon for a battleship.
Defenses of the Canal Zone
(Battery Name/Number/Caliber/M = Mortar RY = Railway DC=Disappearing Carriage PM = "Panama Mount" P = Pedestal Mount BCLR = Barbette Carriage Long Range CBC = Casemented Barbette Carriage AMTB = Anti Motor Torpedo Boat)
Panama Mount
"The term Panama Mount describes a gun mount developed by the U.S. Army in Panama during the 1920s for fixed coastal artillery positions. Panama mounts were widely used during the buildup to and during World War II by the United States military.
The mounts could be constructed as either full, 3/4 or half circles of steel rail set in concrete with a diameter of approximately 36 feet (11 m). A concrete column with a diameter of ten feet (3.0 m) was constructed in the center of the circle to support the gun and carriage. The concrete column was connected to the outer concrete ring by concrete beams for alignment/stability. Originally traverse was accomplished with several men and prybars to move the trailing arms around the steel ring. Later installations included a geared steel ring just inside of the outer steel rail for improved traverse. The Canon de 155mm GPF, designated 155 mm gun M1917 (French-made) or M1918 (US-made) in U.S. service, was often married with Panama mounts; these were the primary weapons of the United States Army Coast Artillery Corps' tractor-drawn mobile units 1920-1945."
The Harbor Defenses of Cristobal, Panama (Panama Canal Zone, Atlantic side )
FORT RANDOLPH / Margarita Island / 1911 to Panama, 1979; commercial development / KK
Webb /2/14″/ DC /1912-1948
#1/2/14″/ RY / 1928-1948 / 2 guns for Panama, 4 empl. (#1 & #8) 1 empl. destroyed
Tidball /4/12″ / M /1912-1943
Zalinski /4/12″/ M /1912-1943
Weed /2/ 6″/ DC /1912-1946
X(4A) /4/155 mm / PM /1940
2C / 4 /155 mm / PM
5A / 4 /155 mm / PM
FORT DeLESSEPS /Colon / 1911 /to Panama, 1950s /KK
Morgan/2/ 6″/P /1913-1944/modified casemate mounts M1910
AMTB #3b/4/90 mm/F/1943-1948/Cristobal mole, built over
FORT SHERMAN / Toro Point / 1911 / MD, MC /to Panama 1999/KK
#151/2/16″/CBC/NB
Mower/1/14″/DC/1912-1948
Stanley/1/14″/DC/1912-1948
Howard/4/12″/M/1912-1943
Baird/4/12″/M/1912-1943
Pratt/2/12″/BCLR/1924-1948/Iglesia Pt., casemated-WWII
MacKenzie/2/12″/BCLR/1924-1948/Iglesia Pt., not rebuilt
Kilpatrick/2/ 6″/DC/1913-1946
W/4/155 mm/PM/1940
Other sites / ?
U/4/155 mm/PM/1918/Tortuguilla Point
V/4/155 mm/PM/1940/Naranjitos Point
Y/4/155 mm/PM/1940/Palma Media Island
Z(1A)/4/155 mm/PM/1940/Galetta Is.
1B/4/155 mm/PM//Galetta Is.
The Harbor Defenses of Balboa, Panama (Panama Canal Zone, Pacific Side)
FORT KOBBE (ex-Ft. Bruja)/ Bruja Point /Howard AFB to Panama 1999/ KK
Murray/2/16″ /BCLRN/1926-1948/Bruja Pt., casemated-WWII
Haan/2/16″ /BCLRN/1926-1948/Batele Pt., not casemated, empl. buried
AMTB #6/4/90 mm/F/1943-1948
Z (3A)
FORT AMADOR / Balboa / to Panama, 1997; commercial development /K
Birney/2/ 6″/DC/1913-1943/buried
Smith/2/ 6″/DC/1913-1943/buried
FORT GRANT /Balboa /to Panama, 1979 private development /MD, MC /KK
Newton/1/16″/DC/1914-1943/Perico Is., filled to loading platform level
Buell/2/14″/DC/1912-1948/Naos Is.
Burnside/2/14″/DC/1912-1948/Naos Is./
Warren/2/14″/DC/1912-1948/Flaminco Is., empls. filled to parapit edge
Prince/4/12″/M/1912-1943/Flaminco Is.
Merritt/4/12″/M/1912-1943/Flaminco Is.
Carr/4/12″/M/1912-1943/Flaminco Is.
Parke/2/ 6″/DC/1912-1948/Naos Is.
#8/2/14″/RY/1928-1948/Culebra Is., empl (see #1, Randolph), covered
T/2/155 mm/PM//Flamenco Is.
U (10A)/2/155 mm/PM//Flamenco Is.
V(10B)/2/155 mm/PM//Culebra Is.
Other sites /?
W (1B)/4/155 mm/PM//Taboquilla Is.
2B/2/155 mm/PM//Taboquilla Is.
unnamed/4/155 mm/PM//Paitilla Pt.
X/2/155 m/PM//Urara Is.
Y (1A)/4/155 mm/PM//Taboga Is.
Aircraft in clip:
14:16 = Curtiss N-9 1917 (model before the JN Jenny) U.S. Navy retired the N-9s in 1927
14:33 = Martin T4M torpedo bomber. Absolute delight to these in flight. 155 built, 1928 to 1938. 2nd torpedo bombers of the Saratoga and Lexington.
18:41 = Martin T3M on floats. 124 built, 1926 to 1932. Was first real torpedo bombers on the Saratoga and Lexington but was also used as a float plane.
Nice job. I imagine reading Fleet exercises reports could be dry but you did a great job of making them sound thrilling.
Wonderful videos.!The Battleships steaming underneath the incomplete Golden Gate Bridge was one of my favorites.
IJN: "Noooooo, you cant just destroy our carriers by using textbook attacks!"
USN: "I am 5 parallel universes ahead oh you"
Really enjoyed the narration and footage drach,interwar period is a great topic to cover and just as if not more interesting than the war periods themselves,cheers.
The Fleet Exercises were only part of an integrated development process which started with the Joint Board building the operational plans, such as War Plan Orange, the plans then being tested on the game floor of the Naval War College and parts of the plan chosen by the Chief, Naval Operations (CNO) and Commander in Chief, US Fleet after reviewing the NWC game then being executed as a Fleet Exercise, which then informed the next iteration of operational planning and the decisions of the General Board on future warship characteristics intended to meet the requirements for executing the plan. This closed loop process informed the USN's placing carriers as priority one in the building programs for FY1920 and FY1921 and then led to the conversion clause that resulted in USS Saratoga and Lexington and the maximum characteristics of the "auxiliary" warships in the Washington Treaty which met the General Board's demands for large 8" gun cruisers needed to execute the cross-Pacific campaign in Plan Orange and then the development of "fleet" submarines.
Also the '20s and '30s evolution of Marine amphibious assault techniques...
"The Army and Navy refused to cooperate"
Accurate fleet problem characteristic. But I assume the US Army/Navy at least sent communications.
well, at least they just refused to cooperate and didn't actively try to sabotage each other.
And then started arguing about who cooperated least...
Well they were roleplaying the Japanse so it only makes sense
Which gave the Marine Corps more of a superiority complex than their innate extant superiority already warranted.
Yes but would you want to read those "communications"?
Love the old videos, majestic ships of days of passed.
Pure Drach gold.
You asked for suggestions for videos :
I recently read something on major fleet actions of the American war of independence. While some actions I could easily follow the fleet motions, there were some, when the wind shifted frequently, that I Got somewhat lost. You do an excellent job getting the important ideas across.
Videos of major fleet actions from 18th century navel battles could be a source for future videos if you find yourself I. Need of ideas
Great piece
That thumbnail is amazing!
Nice footage of the Golden Gate Bridge when it was being constructed.
Brilliantly presented, and with moving pictures! Thanks Drach. Good stuff.
Awesome topic Drach! The historical irony of some of the fleet problems make you wonder why the USN didn't listen to their own exercises.
well, something I told myself while watching this (excellent) video was: they did listen! It's just that the fleet in being had no chance to apply everything learned. Rather, the applications were made when Stimson (inter alia) got the Two Ocean Navy going, and starting in 1943 all the lessons WERE put into action. From fleet subs, to communication, to landing craft, to circle defense and on
Great video, I learned more here than in many videos combined.
@drach: is there a good single volume summary of the between wars fleet problems?
Which lessons do you claim the USN failed to learn?
@@michaelsommers2356 Well, in WWII the USN was surprised by how much faster they went through fuel than they expected. This was partly because of all the extra power requirements for AA weapons, radar, etc., and partly because they were cruising at higher speeds than had been planned. However, it was also because in the interwar period a huge emphasis on fuel economy had been in place, and it resulted in an unrealistic assessment of what wartime fuel consumption would be like.
The fleet problems should have picked that up, and that they didn't suggests that either it happened and was ignored, or the ships weren't actually running at a realistic wartime level of readiness, etc., which they should have been.
@@rupertboleyn3885 That's it? The need for underway replenishment was not ignored.
@@mjjoseph1853 Nofi's book is the treasure trove: To Train The Fleet For War. Try the GPO online.
Thank you for making a dry, but important topic, entertaining. A great video.
I've been hoping to see this for a while now, and this exceeded all of my expectations. Thanks so much for this, Drach! It really fills in a knowledge gap for the interwar USN.
Hopefully part 2 of this series won't take as long as part 3 of the Admiral Nelson series (which we've been waiting almost two years for). I really loved this one. It was one of your most interesting videos so far, and that's saying a LOT.
Loved seeing "new" pictures and movies!
Love this + excited for ep2!! My favorite part was the random chap strolling into a BB powder room.
There was some debate as to whether that was "not quite cricket", since he used his USN credentials and uniform to get aboard.
Good video, Drach. Interseting facts and a few giggles. Looking forward to next part!
The Fleet Problems were only one of the stands on which the interwar USN planning and doctrine rested. The other two were the General Board and the Naval War College. It the Board that represented the collective wisdom of the Navy and which was responsible for developing ship characteristics and the structure of the Fleet.
The NWC, on the other hand, used gaming to test the Board's characteristics and test the Navy's doctrine at strategic, operational and tactical levels. Until the early thirties, the NWC games informed the Navy's senior leadership while grooming the next generations. There were usually three or four tactical and/or operational games and then the "big" game, which tested the parts of War Plan Orange or Red or the entire plan.
The NWC reopened in 1919 and immediately began gaming and evaluating the lessons of WW1. The priority subject was naval aviation, current and future. The USN had developed ship catapults and used a significant number of flying boats for reconnaissance and ASW. But its exposure to the aircraft carrier was both theoretical and based on the information provided by the RN. The USN and RN maintained a close relationship until 1919, exchanging officers and even ship designers. Even during the 1920s when a small group of Anglophobe admirals dominated the senior leadership positions, the two navies exchanged information through back channels.
The NWC developed rules for integrating aviation into the games, both land and sea based and both flying boats and floatplanes and aircraft carriers. In the games of 1919, it became obvious that the battle line that used aerial spotting had improved accuracy and range to an order of magnitude which meant defeat for the navy not using aerial spotting. This resulted in observation floatplanes aboard the battle line. From that, it naturally flowed that aircraft were needed to find the enemy battle line in the first place. Scouts were added to cruisers and the large scout cruisers which were intended to execute operational recon were replaced by aircraft carriers. In order to achieve both tasks, the Navy needed air superiority to deny the enemy's ability to scout and spot. Since fighters were getting too heavy for flying off platforms on capital ship turrets, they would have to be carried by carriers. Of course, the best way to ensure air superiority was to deny the enemy's ability to bring it to the fight in the first place, which meant the enemy carriers needed to be found and destroyed by scouts working with torpedo and level bombers. Such bombers could only be flown off aircraft carriers. Finally, there was the threat of land-based aircraft from the islands Japan had acquired as a mandate. This meant that carrier aircraft had to be at least equal in performance to land-based aircraft. Finally, the games demonstrated the massive numbers of aircraft needed not only to execute the drive across the Pacific but absorb operational losses that might be as high as 100%. All of this came out of the games of 1919, 1920 and 1921. The result was that the priority warship in the FY1920 building program was a carrier. Because Congress did not authorize and appropriate funds for a carrier in FY1920, the Navy asked for two in 1921. Because the games were conducted by faculty and students which rotated from and to the Fleet, the experience of the Fleet helped inform the games. Among the major innovations for the USN's carriers was Reeve's invention of the barrier, allowing the use of deck parks and doubling the number of aircraft a USN carrier could operate per ton of displacement compared to the British and Japanese. The games helped to distribute the appreciation of the Navy's need for aviation across the officer corps such that men like Jack Fletcher and Raymond Spruance, non-aviators, were able to command forces made up of carriers.
The Fleet problems often reflected the NWC's games so that real world experience could inform and/or reinforce the outcomes of the games. The rules were repeatedly change to better reflect the reality of naval warfare. Another area where the NWC's war games could have helped and did later in the late 1920s and early 1930s, was cruiser characteristics. The games tested light cruisers armed with 6" guns from 5,000 to 10,000 tons against the new 8" gun cruisers, both the new "New Orleans" armored heavy cruisers and the earlier lightly protected classes. Then the "Flight deck" cruiser was tested against the other cruisers and destroyers and in operational games. The large light cruisers were acceptable because their armor allowed them to close to effective range where they smothered the 8" cruiser even using the slower firing bag guns. The smaller 6" gun cruisers didn't meet the needs of the US Navy as they were quickly defeated by long range 8" fire. The games were also the basis of removing the torpedoes from US heavy cruisers. When the games from 1929 to 1935 were analyzed, it found that most heavy cruisers rarely used their torpedoes because they neither had the opportunity, especially when tasked as scouts and escorts to the carriers or the optimum situation for using torpedoes didn't arise. So, the torpedoes were removed, replaced by doubling the number of 5" Mk.11 guns and the torpedoes were carried instead by the destroyers, one of the reasons for the classes with 16 tubes.
Another study recommended not completing the last three authorized 8" gun cruisers and instead use the additional tonnage allowed under the 1930 London Treaty and the allowed transfer of destroyer tonnage versus building 1,850 ton leaders. This would have allowed four 10,000 ton CLVs and four 9,600 ton large light cruisers in their place, better meeting the USN's need for cruisers to scout and protect the battle line. Additional support for the battle line would come from the 2,000 ton armored 6" gun "gunboats" or "sloops".
The CLV did very well in the games both as a light scout carrier and as a cruiser, especially as it was protected against 8" gun fire like the "Brooklyn" class. Keep in mind that cruiser protection was at 45 degree angle from the target versus 90 degree angle for capital ships. The problem was that it was seen as an experimental type and as long as funding was constrained by Congress, it wouldn't get built. It is always interesting to compare the CLV to the emergency program CVLs.
For some reason, the NWC lost its function as an agency of the CNO and got transferred to the Navy's education system. Some senior leaders saw the link between gaming and ADM Pratt's support of the 1930 London Treaty as a "betrayal". But there was also the increase in the officers authorized to the Office of the CNO. The same thing happened to the Army staff, but the Army War College still ran a major wargame each year, actually studying coalition warfare in Europe from 1936 to 1939.
The way he started out slow and then sped up as if he realized that this list might take a while 😂
Thank you for this video. The Fleet Problems were incredibly useful and unique, and also expensive. It is good that you are sharing the history, which seems to repeat. My opinion is that these should be annual to this day.
Between the wars the USN expected their main opponent would be Japan. Today we face many others - China, Iran, North Korea, Russia...
@@gregorywright4918 Agreed. Just a thought/opinion; the more "moving parts" that are present, it would seem that fleet-wide exercises would become more valuable. I know they wargame every possible scenario; but actually oving the pieces once in a while (like in the Fleet Exercises) can help uncover some problems and some insights.
@@paramounttechnicalconsulti5219 Today we have multi-player games like Command: Modern Operations...