How do you desing ships? I mean, who decide what kind of engines to use, if it will have radar/sonar or other type of electronic/electric systems. Who design screws, firefightning systems, air condition, backup generators, refueling systems etc. Is there someone who reads other ships log books for evaluation on mounted systems? How do designer decide what is reliable enough to mount on battleships?
I understand that various U.S. capital ships had random battle plans tucked away in their files. Is there anything to that and if so what are some examples of really outlandish plans?
You're quite correct- heading up to the Aleutian islands in winter is no fun. We did that in a fleet exercise in January of '89 during a blizzard. An Adams Class destroyer in freezing high seas becomes a tumbling ice cube. Our guns, missiles and radars froze, requiring us to go topside and carefully chip off the ice. And I do mean carefully, especially on the radars. If in ice removal we accidentally dent a waveguide it would disable the radars and was not a fun thing to repair.
Which Adams Class were you on? I was on USS Semmes DDG 18 1983-84. Went TAD to USS Henry B Wilson in 1985 for a week and USS Towers for 4 days in 1986...
@@RetiredSailor60 You do realize that the underlying meaning of, 'Hammerin' Hank' had much to do with the Seagram's 7 logo meticulously painted and maintained on the Tartar launcher...
It becomes increasingly obvious as these precede that King was a genuinely talented admiral - he had a cunning grasp of opportunities when they presented themselves and he exploited them ruthlessly and efficiently.
King was also very notably a near savant when it came to understanding new things in the Navy. He was a supreme trainer of men designing many of the courses of the Naval Postgraduate School, served first assistant chief of staff which shows just how good a logistician he was, got in early on the US Submarine Fleet and the US Naval Aviation Fleet - which should highlight just how in the forefront of new tech the man was. Full spectrum doesn't even begin to describe it.
I wonder if WWII might have gone better for the U.S. Navy if King had been closer to the front lines while someone who was better at cooperation and accepting advice from the British was Secretary of the Navy. Maybe swap Nimitz and King or something.
@@NovemberOrWhatever The success or failure of the U.S. Navy in WWII was neither driven by or dependent on the Royal Navy, so what you're suggesting wouldn't have made a bit of difference. Anyway, all this "non-cooperation" or refusing advise is a lot of fiction.
I agree on the whole with your statement, but I'd also like to point out that King's success during FP XVIII with Ranger was dependent on the ship's commander Capt. Patrick N.L. Bellinger telling RADM King TWICE that the weather did not warrant launching her aircraft until it improved. I think this underscores Drach's comment in Admiral King's biopic video that King thought himself an expert on subjects based on a somewhat limited experience. His success would sometimes depend on subordinates being confident enough in their own expertise to contradict him, which wasn't a pleasant experience, to say the least.
Logistics is so important, and ignored entirely too often. The US perfecting unrep (underway replentishment) meant that the ships could stay in action longer. Something they practice to this day. It's a thing that is so important, they do unreps which aren't even necessary, to ensure that the sailors stay in practice. That and very good damage control training and practice ensures that the ships stay in action, and can continue to fight even if damaged. In the coming fight with China, these two factors will again come into play, as the Chinese navy has no idea how to do any of this.
Interesting that the Fleet Problems were realistic enough to highlight operational issues that USN would face in WWII and give a some ideas about their solutions. Also, the air-mindedness of these problems also highlights that USN admirals were not some sort of battleship worshiping Luddites but the USN was thinking about how to effectively use air power at sea. Too many popular histories paint the USN pre war admirals as bungling Luddites when these exercises showed they were trying to figure out how to use air power correctly. Even if they didn't fully grasp every nuance they were actually trying some ideas that were implemented in WWII.
I get the sense the USN still had a mixed bag of leadership types when the war broke out. They were immediately stretched thin and forced to rely on officers who weren't perfectly suited for the situations they had to deal with. But they were senior in rank and tenure, so in they went.
I think the big problem with air power was the difficulty in gauging just how effective air power would be. Billy Mitchell had carried out his demonstration attacks in 1921, but those had been a bit of a mixed bag as far as results. Naval aviation technology had come a long way since then, which meant that capabilities were better. But how much better? At the same time, anti-aircraft technology had advanced as well, and there was no real way to judge just how effective anti-aircraft fire would be at keeping the bombers away from the capitol ships (an argument made by Mitchell's opponents even back in 1921, iirc). It's all well and good to talk on paper about how effective the bombs and/or anti-aircraft guns will be. But you never really know until the weapons are used in combat, and results under combat conditions can be properly evaluated. The ur example of that, of course, being the infamous US torpedoes... I think it is important to note that the USN had bigger aircraft complements on their carriers than everyone else. That by itself indicated the presence of offensively-oriented thinking by Navy brass.
@washingtonradio it seems there were still different groups at work and the almost prescient analysis behind the fleet problems had by far not sunk into all heads of those in charge... Posessing SOME awareness of the problems and getting the one tasked with actually taking care it doesn't turn from problem to disaster to actually understand it are obviously not the same. As getting surprised at Pearl, Wake taken, several night engagements lost and the Aleutians attacked with two islands invaded shows they had some preparations but the lessons hadn't been truly translated into actual battle plans. this sound like the "Simpsons predict everything happening int he future" meme, just with US Navy and 50 years earlier...
This is why it’s so hard to write accurate wars or history The stuff that happens is sometimes too ridiculous/requires a specific set of circumstances to artificially create
Every time I learn more actual-info about Admiral King, the more I think he was a GREAT admiral. The claims against him seem to usually fall apart when investigated... But, kudos to the US for actually practicing this stuff. Seems an honest attempt to be ready for war. Even if you have or can have the most against the enemy... using them smartly and adapting as needed is an unstoppable force.
King was a terrible human being. But he was a magnificent admiral, supremely good at his job. There's a reason he rose so high despite his shitty personality.
Agreed, my opinion of Admiral King has improved the more I've learned about him. Yes, he made a mistake right after the American entry into the war, ignoring British advice and sending cargo vessels across the Atlantic without sufficient escort. In fairness, didn't take him too long to recognize his mistake and try something different. Also that was possibly his only major mistake during WW2.
@@therealuncleowen2588 Sounds like the US didn't actually have the vessels to escort them at the time. Drach mentioned something about that, or one of the Airchair Admiral episodes he was in, and then it was mentioned by another. One of those. And for the 'King didn't do blackouts on the east coast'... I'm sure a military leader would love to use the more 'total war' option if able. Clearly the politicians made that decision.
@@cavscout888 The US didn't need to black out the ocean coastlines. The U-boats weren't that big of a problem at night and the IJN didn't bother merchant shipping.
So during fleet problem nineteen, King managed to pull of a near identical attack on Pearl Harbor. Did any of the sailors involved in fleet problem nineteen get a sense of deja vu during the attack on Pearl Harbor?
I wouldn't be surprised if, in a couple of years, we learn that King had a shirt stating "I told you this would happen!" under his uniform when he took command. And that he used every opportunity to get his uniform jacket off to show everyone his cool shirt.
From what I've been able to gather: 1) The Japanese would be crazy to attack us(USA). 2) If they did, they would declare war first. 3) The Japanese would attack the Philippines and Malaya. And sabotage the Canal Zone. Short answer is no they didn't.
This would be the third time King’s successfully attacked Perl by air during FPs in the 1930s. During this decade he spent lot of time touring American dependant islands in the Pacific, improving their air defences. Sadly Oahu wasn’t one of them. It still took the US Battleship force’s sinking for the carrier to become pre-eminent even after Taranto.
This has been a superb series of videos, I have learned a huge amount. Your research, and use of archive materials are consistently of the highest standard. Really outstanding, many thanks Drach!
After watching the whole video, I went back and rewatched, sound off, just see the great extensive '30s US fleet photos and footage I've not seen before. (40:26, USS Hammann, sunk at Midway in same attack that sank Yorktown.)
@@spikespa5208 The one criticism of Drach's videos that I have is that he does not add captions to identify the ships. I know in many shots it will not be possible, but for some it would probably be straightforward for him, and informative for us.
I'm impressed with the pragmatism and professionalism in the folks that designed these fleet problems. You could completely imagine them being unrealistic, self-serving and ridden with confirmation bias. You know your armed forces truly want to win wars when they plan for unpleasant contingencies.
Hearing 'Ranger and Admiral King out of nowhere with a steel chair'... my mind began picturing Azur Lanes Ranger holding Admiral King who holding a steel chair while riding on one of Rangers planes... Not sure if that a funny image to picture but got a chuckle from me.
I'm really enjoying all of the footage of the ships and aircraft in motion at full speed; it brings them to life in a way that all the still photographs in the world can't. Thanks, Drach! :)
19:32 The surprise sporting commentator announcement from Drach about King and Ranger with a steel chair both startled me and made me laugh out loud! Brilliant stuff!
But he was aggressive, which far too many were not! Overall, in the early part of the war, he did quite well. While he made mistakes, he also had great successes.
Halsey (and Kurita by extension) gets far too much flak for Leyte Gulf IMO. By the time he took off after the Japanese bait, the outcome of the American landings was already secure due to the troops and the majority of the supplies being ashore (not to mention Kinkaid was still down south and could have, and indeed historically attempted to, cut off Centre Force once he’d been alerted to the plight of Taffy 3). The great irony of the Battle of Leyte Gulf is that all three of the the Japanese forces sortied days too late to actually achieve its objective of foiling the American landings; they certainly could have inflicted more American naval losses had Kurita been more aggressive, but they were never going to catch the landing forces on their transports due to the fact they showed up too late to actually destroy anything save the transport vessels themselves. So Halsey didn’t actually risk all that much by chasing after the Japanese bait (because by that point there wasn’t much at risk to begin with), and likewise Kurita didn’t throw away a golden opportunity for victory (because he never had that opportunity in the first place).
@@Strelnikov403 the task force commander should be very aggressive. For the US, once strong force numerical (and technical) superiority was achieved, the strategic mission was more important as a decisive tactical victory had less value. in the Marianna campaign, Mitscher was task force commander while Spruance was fleet commander and it was Spruance's responsibility was the mission. Hasley as South Pacific commander in late 42 took the bold decision to send battleships into Guadalcanal which finally cause the Japanese to admit defeat. The main failing of Halsey in 44 was to not realize from the Battle of Philippine Sea that Japanese naval airpower was not what it once was, both in loss of skilled aviators, while the US now had superior aircraft and plenty of experience aviators. Also, defensive power against aircraft had vastly improved and ships were no longer as vulnerable to air attack. Halsey was present during a demonstration of VT, with the target destroyed on the first shot. Arleigh Burke was confident in the 45 Okinawa campaign that a destroyer division could withstand an air attack, but Turner had destroyers stationed individually in an outer ring.
I wonder if there's a naval variation of a joke I once heard, a soldier simulating being a tank by walking around in an exercise shouting "tank!, tank!".... "Battleship! Battleship!", while rowing a small boat.
There is a film of pre-WWII US Army maneuvers where there are trucks labelled as 'tanks,' and broomsticks used as fake machine guns, and flour is used as a marker for a 'hit' on the enemy. I've read an account where the Japanese saw these films around 1941, after they had been fighting an actual war in China since 1937, and thought that the US would be a pushover if they couldn't even give their troops real weapons during training. Whenever I see some 'woke' officer making today's men do something totally unrelated to actual military training, such as making male ROTC students wear high heels to 'celebrate' feminism, I wonder if a Chinese army officer is carefully taking notes and telling his superiors that a sneak attack on Taiwan would be easy and the USA will be a pushover.
@@Ensign_Nemo I mean, yeah, maybe the nonsenical fantasies the far right puts out will make the chinese underestimate america? Probably not in the way you think though...
@@Ensign_Nemo If anything, following that train of thought shows that a) a surprise attack towards Taiwan likely results in full retribution and a transition to full scale warfare, b) "training like REAL MEN" rarely is equivalent to or even comparable to what drives effective warfighting, which is a mixture of clear orders, unity of command, and excellent logistics. The US pre-WWII Army Maneuvers (and even circa-WWII Army Maneuvers) didn't need guns to be efficient because their purpose was to train the officers to manage things like the logistical aspects or the maneuver aspects or the communications aspect. Consider that the problems you are hearing were similarly not waged with real weapons, for instance. A dropped bomb might be a flare, a smoke bomb substitutes for an actual real shot. To wage war against "wokism", to paraphrase from the French... that's waging war against an imagined enemy. I don't think you have any particular complaints about, say, the sheer number of calls to prayer that occur within the US Army, do you? You can also point to other things that ROTC did that weren't Army-related at all during the Great Depression - a number of them were closely involved with the Civilian Conservation Corps, and that's where a lot of the Army brass for WW2 really got a handle on commanding men from a logistical and engineering point of view, and not just a tactical one. That had very little to do with direct warfare. Or you can point to say, the R&R and morale and additional studies that the armed forces provided; the men got plenty of rest and got to partake in very non-armed forces behavior. Fundamentally, if you wish to look at "the sneaky Chinese planning a surprise attack on Taiwan!", they've certainly acquired great commercial power in the Indian Ocean, have been matching the US blow for blow in the trade war, and haven't exactly been subtle about dialing the local border conflicts in and out spanning the Himalayas and up to and through the islands near Japan and South Korea in order to gather reactions (and to maintain control of the PLA, the same way that the Sino-Vietnamese War was essentially a giant live fire exercise) - and not like the US hasn't been preparing for that possibility either.
It's a matter of form following function. You look into attacking a location like PH and the logical approaches to doing so quickly lay themselves out.
Scrolling through comments from the Samar video an hour ago, and was laughing at the steel chair postings. And Drach works in an Admiral King / Ranger with a steel chair line in this video. Kismet. And quite hilarious. Well played, sir. Thank you for the superb channel.
The issue of fighter numbers is an important one. They would rise from 18 per fleet carrier at Coral Sea to 27-30 at Midway and Eastern Solomons, then to 36 at Santa Cruz, and on into the 40s a couple years later at Phillipine Sea in addition to the practice of pairing fleet carriers with light carriers having another two dozen or so fighters and a few TBFs.
Great series - I’m a little sad that we’re out of fleet problems now. Did any other navies leave behind the documentation of exercises that the USN did?
@@Drachinifel If you can compile enough information about UK fleet exercises to be coherent, it would be really interesting to hear about those as well.
Drach, Outstanding video! It’s obvious the amount of research you put into this video, and the archival footage/photos I’d never seen before. In particular, the Hawaiian pictures and the video of the BB going past Pt. Lomb in San Diego. Views I personally witnessed in my own Naval service.
Thanks. I was aware that it had occurred to the Navy that Carrier Attacks on Pearl Harbor might take place - but - not to the extent that they had taken place in practice. Attacking Hawaii seems to have been common place. These exercises did not however prepare the American Military for the fact that - yes - it could really be attacked. You look at the frequent reaction of individuals at Hawaii and it was disbelief that they were being attacked. Time and again reports of Enemy Forces were discounted as them being Friendly Forces or a mistake. There was no urgency to our response and no coordination between combat elements. The Transition between a Peace Time Military and a War Time one was brutal. .
I can't word how much I appreciate how well you keep on top of your play lists. Especially once you finish a whole series, then I can watch it 4 more time's with out faffing around 😅
Especially appreciated because youtube is so hostile to anything but the latest content on a channel's videos page. They hate making creators with large archives easily digestible
Always loved those old pieces of footage that showed Lexington going flank speed past the camera ship, kicking up waves, and making one hell of a wake. “The size. The power.” ~Chancellor Palpatine
Thanks for the stories and pix. Love the RA King character, as if he's a sending from the god of war, tormenting us with his black belt cunning ruthlessness.
nice to see some reels of ships that dont exist no more either being sunk at pearl, sunk during the War or being Scrapped after the War. Good Stuff Drach
I've enjoyed all of the archival footage during this series. This one was particularly good for playing "name that battleship." But those Kodachrome photos during Problem XX were absolutely stunning. TBD's never looked better.
So the US Navy many, many times wargamed the Pacific Fleet getting a massive kicking at Pearl Harbour and subsequently being on the back foot... but they still had no idea the Japanese were watching over their shoulders with notepads, whispering "Quick! Write that down!" to each other....? I know Yamamoto got the idea for the attack on Pearl Harbour by studying the Royal Navy attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto, but methinks he had another source to study here...
That's actually a problem the US Navy identified post-war; they had a tendency to only focus on the positive results of exercises. For example, for FP XIX, instead of "wow, we're really unprepared for any kind of carrier ambush," the general takeaway was "wow, we're really good at pulling off carrier ambushes!" Hell, half the reason we borrowed a Swedish submarine and crew in the early 2000's was to guarantee that kind of thing didn't happen again with regards to anti-submarine warfare.
Pearl Harbor Taranto was due much more to luck than brilliance on the part of the RN and FAA. 1939 Battleship Royal Oak sunk at anchor in Scotland. Fleet carrier Courageous sunk by U boat whilst on anti-submarine patrol. 1940 Fleet carrier Glorious sunk by battleship despite warnings from Bletchley Park. 1941 Channel Dash. Fleet carrier Ark Royal sunk by one defective torpedo. . 1942 Convoy PQ17. Force Z.
Really great footage you put together! It’s sad to think of how many of those ships and men didn’t survive the war. The USS Lexington is such a sharp looking carrier.
Loved this series. Really interesting to here just how accurate most of the excercises were in setting up future scenarios and what the outcomes would be. Obviously hindsight makes the mistakes and lessons clear but it hurts just how many times they predicted pearl harbor and still failed. We can also guess how an attack on Panama would have gone had it been done for real.
Probably much like the auxiliary vessels at 30:15 wearing hats saying "I'm a battleship", Pensacola had a hat on saying "I'm an ocean liner" or "I'm an ocean liner on fire, send help."
I took it has the Penacola was scripted to be a civilian vessel that accidentally wandered into a combat zone. The Destroyer had to then either Escort it out of the combat zone or establish communication to inform them that they are in a combat zone.
One minor nitpick: Lahaina = luh HAI nah. Great series of videos, especially the footage! Lay people often overemphasize platform and weapon capabilities and fail to understand that the underlying strategic and operation doctrine and working out tactics to employ your platforms and weapons is just as important.
What strikes me is that, despite it being brought up as a serious deficiency, the USN still had nothing resembling an effective night fighting doctrine for some time once the war had started.
It seems to be a theme that when a particularly effective tactic emerged in the Fleet Problems a lot would be done to try and refine this offensively or if it already worked they'd just nod and reckon they'd use that. But there seems to be a consistent issue of not addressing what happens if someone uses it on them.
Hated those types of exercises when I was in the Navy. Officers got lots of flying maintainers got lot's of broken aircraft and a ton of General Quarters drills!
A tip for watching: Lexington (CV-2) had the horizontal stipe on her stack. Saratoga (CV-3) had the vertical stripe. I always have to look then up to remember which is which. (Ranger, CV-4, needed no special marking because she was the only ship of her class, and she was a strange little duck)
Fantastic job on this Drach, every bit of it from research to script to presentation to production. BTW I'm the guy that sends you The History Guy videos when he drops something navel.
I'd love to see a video about just the practical aspects of simulating battles. You've mentioned things like sacks of flour used by dive bombers to simulate bombs. Can you imagine being the deck crew guy who's inches away from the strike of a flour sack that froze at high altitude and turned into a brick, and ended up smashing through the flight deck? At any rate, I'm sure there must have been all sorts of weird issues that came up for all sorts of unexpected reasons, and no shortage of rule refugees arguing back and force about whether or not such and such a thing counted as an ammo magazine detonation or a near miss. I'd think there'd be all sorts of wonderful material there, presuming it's survived.
It must have been amazingly complicated to shake down lots a new carriers, planes, pilots and crews. Organising the rest of the support fleet and tankers etc, all very impressive.
For some reason this reminds me of when in the 80s I was a Marine on the Dubuque off of Korea during a really bad storm. I was one of the few people that was immune to sea sickness so I had second and third helpings in the galley because there was no one there but me! 👍 I tell ya, eating chow on a ship during a really bad storm is an art form in itself. You have to wrap a leg around the table leg, and have your arms around the cup of bug juice and your tray at all times! I remember people calling the ship the "Du Puke" LOL!!!!!!!!
Too late to let you in on the secret. I used to laugh my ass off watching people (sailors & Marines) that didn't know how to eat during heavy seas! You take a piece of bread and put it under your tray, it won't go anywhere. My first ship was a destroyer, ya learn quick!
Admiral Kalbfus seemed to be familiar with the results of previous exercises but think that the problems with keeping the carriers close was the results of mistakes he wouldn't make. But responded well to the pin to his ego.
Excellent film footage. Dying to know where you got your hands on some of it, which I have never seen before. I'm an avid naval history fan, and have been all of my life. Some of fleet footage is brand new to me. BTW, thanks for your efforts and the sharing of your research on a free basis. Anyone studying history would do well to watch all of your videos.
Having watched the whole series, I've found them all very interesting and informative. What I found most interesting in the last one was your mention of the presence of various officers who would be key in WWII. Given that so many ships of the fleet were involved in these exercises, I would think most of the senior officers during the war would have had a role in one or more exercises as junior officers. This makes me wonder how widely the reports of the exercises were circulated for reading by the officer corps as a whole. Was Adm. Kimmel in on any of the surprise attacks on Pearl that were successful as exercises? The world wonders ,,,,, This highlights the importance of training and the human factor; if people were more aware of past exercises one hopes they would be more alert for similar scenarios in actuality
While I have not listened to any of the other 'US Navy Fleet Problems' videos, this one was terrific. It had so many lessons that were or that should have been learned that were needed during the Pacific War. It is just amazing how much Drach knows AND understands or is willing to jump into an discover. He is a very remarkable person. Also, what I like about his overall interest in naval warfare and technology, I find that passing on such information, especially about WW II, to be immensely significant, and that new generations have a chance to really learn what happened, and what it took to overcome the world madness that happened in the 1920's and 1930's. This calamity should never be forgotten. And with that said, it seems that possibly today we are seeing a great resurgence in Right Wing mentality, in how they want to control you and tell you what to do and what you should believe, which is DEFINITELY not the American way, but they think they know better, and do it anyway. This is happening here in the US, first with the Supreme Court that is completely out of control, causing much more harm than anything good, and then the right wing states jumping on the bandwagon, trying to pass laws to prevent voting rights, and to make their own believes everyone else's (like the abortion issue), and a lot more. This sort of attitude, similar to the early 20th Century, is spreading world wide as well, into many parts of the world.
Pinned post for Q&A :)
Does other navies have similar exercises on the scale of USN fleet problems?
If you can make your own fleet problem. What would it be
How do you desing ships? I mean, who decide what kind of engines to use, if it will have radar/sonar or other type of electronic/electric systems. Who design screws, firefightning systems, air condition, backup generators, refueling systems etc. Is there someone who reads other ships log books for evaluation on mounted systems? How do designer decide what is reliable enough to mount on battleships?
I understand that various U.S. capital ships had random battle plans tucked away in their files. Is there anything to that and if so what are some examples of really outlandish plans?
Did any Navy around the world ever consider using the "whaleback" design? Even if only for a supply ship.
Watching fleet problems while having sleep problems. Rather fitting.
I am just glad that these videos pop up first thing for me or else I'd be up half the night.
Take melatonin. Works great. Half hour to hour before bed time.
Drach plays all the time automatically when I sleep. His content is perfect to just chill and listen too
Have you tried counting ship?
And the sun's comming up too now...
IJN Admiral: "But, Sir, the US had a fleet exercise for exactly that."
Yamamoto: "And that is precisely why they won't expect it."
Ironically, they could have conducted the exercise with live Mark XIV torpedoes without adding too much danger to the exercise.
The Mark 14 was known to circle back increasing risk for the ship that fired them. USS Tang sunk itself with a circular run torpedo.
😂😂😂
@@haldorasgirson9463 The torpedo detonators were similarly reliable...
😀😀😀
if they had every singele one woudl have worked just to casue extra trouble.
IJN: interesting.
USN: Are you taking notes again?
IJN: No.
USN (pulls out spray bottle): Get out of here.
IJN: Hisss
Ranger strikes out of nowhere, confusing the enemy fleet
Enterprise: Noted
Enterprise: pulls off the same move on Akagi and Kaga at Midway.
@@Dynasty0612 Enterprise: Hey guys wanna see a magic trick?
Enterprise whilst damaged comes from knowwhere and turns the entire guadalcanal campaign on its head.
"I'm back"
@@Caktusdud. That's why in Azur Lane, she's often compared to Exodia.
@@ph89787 I'm guessing that's another anime
You're quite correct- heading up to the Aleutian islands in winter is no fun. We did that in a fleet exercise in January of '89 during a blizzard. An Adams Class destroyer in freezing high seas becomes a tumbling ice cube. Our guns, missiles and radars froze, requiring us to go topside and carefully chip off the ice. And I do mean carefully, especially on the radars. If in ice removal we accidentally dent a waveguide it would disable the radars and was not a fun thing to repair.
Which Adams Class were you on? I was on USS Semmes DDG 18 1983-84. Went TAD to USS Henry B Wilson in 1985 for a week and USS Towers for 4 days in 1986...
@@RetiredSailor60 USS Henry B Wilson, DDG7. Hammerin' Hank!!!!
I rode Hammerin Hank from San Diego to Vancouver in late July 1985. I was on USS Cape Cod AD 43 at the time...
@@RetiredSailor60 I was ship's crew from mid '88 to decom.
@@RetiredSailor60 You do realize that the underlying meaning of, 'Hammerin' Hank' had much to do with the Seagram's 7 logo meticulously painted and maintained on the Tartar launcher...
It becomes increasingly obvious as these precede that King was a genuinely talented admiral - he had a cunning grasp of opportunities when they presented themselves and he exploited them ruthlessly and efficiently.
And very modern-minded and air-minded, too, exactly the right man for a navy which would be based on carrier air power.
King was also very notably a near savant when it came to understanding new things in the Navy. He was a supreme trainer of men designing many of the courses of the Naval Postgraduate School, served first assistant chief of staff which shows just how good a logistician he was, got in early on the US Submarine Fleet and the US Naval Aviation Fleet - which should highlight just how in the forefront of new tech the man was. Full spectrum doesn't even begin to describe it.
I wonder if WWII might have gone better for the U.S. Navy if King had been closer to the front lines while someone who was better at cooperation and accepting advice from the British was Secretary of the Navy. Maybe swap Nimitz and King or something.
@@NovemberOrWhatever The success or failure of the U.S. Navy in WWII was neither driven by or dependent on the Royal Navy, so what you're suggesting wouldn't have made a bit of difference. Anyway, all this "non-cooperation" or refusing advise is a lot of fiction.
I agree on the whole with your statement, but I'd also like to point out that King's success during FP XVIII with Ranger was dependent on the ship's commander Capt. Patrick N.L. Bellinger telling RADM King TWICE that the weather did not warrant launching her aircraft until it improved. I think this underscores Drach's comment in Admiral King's biopic video that King thought himself an expert on subjects based on a somewhat limited experience. His success would sometimes depend on subordinates being confident enough in their own expertise to contradict him, which wasn't a pleasant experience, to say the least.
I find it very informative that in most fleet problems the US navy made sure to slate full scale logistics practice into the schedule.
Unlike the Japanese who would magically have ships refueled from non-existent tankers.
That is 2/3 of the point.
Logistics is so important, and ignored entirely too often. The US perfecting unrep (underway replentishment) meant that the ships could stay in action longer. Something they practice to this day. It's a thing that is so important, they do unreps which aren't even necessary, to ensure that the sailors stay in practice.
That and very good damage control training and practice ensures that the ships stay in action, and can continue to fight even if damaged.
In the coming fight with China, these two factors will again come into play, as the Chinese navy has no idea how to do any of this.
Always train your crew.
Interesting that the Fleet Problems were realistic enough to highlight operational issues that USN would face in WWII and give a some ideas about their solutions. Also, the air-mindedness of these problems also highlights that USN admirals were not some sort of battleship worshiping Luddites but the USN was thinking about how to effectively use air power at sea. Too many popular histories paint the USN pre war admirals as bungling Luddites when these exercises showed they were trying to figure out how to use air power correctly. Even if they didn't fully grasp every nuance they were actually trying some ideas that were implemented in WWII.
I get the sense the USN still had a mixed bag of leadership types when the war broke out. They were immediately stretched thin and forced to rely on officers who weren't perfectly suited for the situations they had to deal with. But they were senior in rank and tenure, so in they went.
I think the big problem with air power was the difficulty in gauging just how effective air power would be. Billy Mitchell had carried out his demonstration attacks in 1921, but those had been a bit of a mixed bag as far as results. Naval aviation technology had come a long way since then, which meant that capabilities were better. But how much better? At the same time, anti-aircraft technology had advanced as well, and there was no real way to judge just how effective anti-aircraft fire would be at keeping the bombers away from the capitol ships (an argument made by Mitchell's opponents even back in 1921, iirc). It's all well and good to talk on paper about how effective the bombs and/or anti-aircraft guns will be. But you never really know until the weapons are used in combat, and results under combat conditions can be properly evaluated. The ur example of that, of course, being the infamous US torpedoes...
I think it is important to note that the USN had bigger aircraft complements on their carriers than everyone else. That by itself indicated the presence of offensively-oriented thinking by Navy brass.
@washingtonradio it seems there were still different groups at work and the almost prescient analysis behind the fleet problems had by far not sunk into all heads of those in charge... Posessing SOME awareness of the problems and getting the one tasked with actually taking care it doesn't turn from problem to disaster to actually understand it are obviously not the same. As getting surprised at Pearl, Wake taken, several night engagements lost and the Aleutians attacked with two islands invaded shows they had some preparations but the lessons hadn't been truly translated into actual battle plans.
this sound like the "Simpsons predict everything happening int he future" meme, just with US Navy and 50 years earlier...
This is why it’s so hard to write accurate wars or history
The stuff that happens is sometimes too ridiculous/requires a specific set of circumstances to artificially create
34:12 In retrospect, inviting the Kamchatka to participate in the fleet exercise was considered a mistake.
Every time I learn more actual-info about Admiral King, the more I think he was a GREAT admiral. The claims against him seem to usually fall apart when investigated...
But, kudos to the US for actually practicing this stuff. Seems an honest attempt to be ready for war. Even if you have or can have the most against the enemy... using them smartly and adapting as needed is an unstoppable force.
King was a terrible human being. But he was a magnificent admiral, supremely good at his job. There's a reason he rose so high despite his shitty personality.
Agreed, my opinion of Admiral King has improved the more I've learned about him. Yes, he made a mistake right after the American entry into the war, ignoring British advice and sending cargo vessels across the Atlantic without sufficient escort. In fairness, didn't take him too long to recognize his mistake and try something different. Also that was possibly his only major mistake during WW2.
@@therealuncleowen2588 Sounds like the US didn't actually have the vessels to escort them at the time. Drach mentioned something about that, or one of the Airchair Admiral episodes he was in, and then it was mentioned by another. One of those. And for the 'King didn't do blackouts on the east coast'... I'm sure a military leader would love to use the more 'total war' option if able. Clearly the politicians made that decision.
@@therealuncleowen2588 We weren't sending cargo ships across the Atlantic unescorted. The issue was unescorted coastal shipping.
@@cavscout888 The US didn't need to black out the ocean coastlines. The U-boats weren't that big of a problem at night and the IJN didn't bother merchant shipping.
So during fleet problem nineteen, King managed to pull of a near identical attack on Pearl Harbor.
Did any of the sailors involved in fleet problem nineteen get a sense of deja vu during the attack on Pearl Harbor?
I wouldn't be surprised if, in a couple of years, we learn that King had a shirt stating "I told you this would happen!" under his uniform when he took command. And that he used every opportunity to get his uniform jacket off to show everyone his cool shirt.
From what I've been able to gather:
1) The Japanese would be crazy to attack us(USA).
2) If they did, they would declare war first.
3) The Japanese would attack the Philippines and Malaya. And sabotage the Canal Zone.
Short answer is no they didn't.
This would be the third time King’s successfully attacked Perl by air during FPs in the 1930s. During this decade he spent lot of time touring American dependant islands in the Pacific, improving their air defences. Sadly Oahu wasn’t one of them. It still took the US Battleship force’s sinking for the carrier to become pre-eminent even after Taranto.
@@noral9111 His reaction to the Raid on Pearl Habor was also full on shouting "CALLED IT! FUCKING KNEW IT!"
This has been a superb series of videos, I have learned a huge amount. Your research, and use of archive materials are consistently of the highest standard. Really outstanding, many thanks Drach!
After watching the whole video, I went back and rewatched, sound off, just see the great extensive '30s US fleet photos and footage I've not seen before. (40:26, USS Hammann, sunk at Midway in same attack that sank Yorktown.)
@@spikespa5208 The one criticism of Drach's videos that I have is that he does not add captions to identify the ships. I know in many shots it will not be possible, but for some it would probably be straightforward for him, and informative for us.
Outstanding, as a career, USN officer, I had occasion to study these fleet problems and wish I had had this video program instead
I'm impressed with the pragmatism and professionalism in the folks that designed these fleet problems. You could completely imagine them being unrealistic, self-serving and ridden with confirmation bias. You know your armed forces truly want to win wars when they plan for unpleasant contingencies.
Hearing 'Ranger and Admiral King out of nowhere with a steel chair'... my mind began picturing Azur Lanes Ranger holding Admiral King who holding a steel chair while riding on one of Rangers planes... Not sure if that a funny image to picture but got a chuckle from me.
The fact that your comment got a heart from drachinifel might be saying something. Did that collab he did with Animarchy leave a deep mark on him?
And instead of dropping its ordnance, the King just swings the chair.
Someone call Yo-Star, Yongshi, and Manjuu. This _needs_ to become a thing.
"A messy night action". All the Guadalcanal naval surface fights summed up in a single phrase.
Surprisingly, I have found your fleet problem mini-series to be one of the most interesting videos on your channel. Great work Drach
I'm really enjoying all of the footage of the ships and aircraft in motion at full speed; it brings them to life in a way that all the still photographs in the world can't. Thanks, Drach! :)
19:32 The surprise sporting commentator announcement from Drach about King and Ranger with a steel chair both startled me and made me laugh out loud! Brilliant stuff!
Good Lord...Fleet Problem 17's scenario is eerie..
Halsey making massive mistakes because he didn't think things through and rushed to action...what a surprising and not at all foreshadowing event.
Agreed - Halsey was a terrific captain, but terrible admiral.
But he was aggressive, which far too many were not!
Overall, in the early part of the war, he did quite well. While he made mistakes, he also had great successes.
Halsey (and Kurita by extension) gets far too much flak for Leyte Gulf IMO. By the time he took off after the Japanese bait, the outcome of the American landings was already secure due to the troops and the majority of the supplies being ashore (not to mention Kinkaid was still down south and could have, and indeed historically attempted to, cut off Centre Force once he’d been alerted to the plight of Taffy 3). The great irony of the Battle of Leyte Gulf is that all three of the the Japanese forces sortied days too late to actually achieve its objective of foiling the American landings; they certainly could have inflicted more American naval losses had Kurita been more aggressive, but they were never going to catch the landing forces on their transports due to the fact they showed up too late to actually destroy anything save the transport vessels themselves.
So Halsey didn’t actually risk all that much by chasing after the Japanese bait (because by that point there wasn’t much at risk to begin with), and likewise Kurita didn’t throw away a golden opportunity for victory (because he never had that opportunity in the first place).
@@mahbriggs Even in the end days he won the Formosa Air Battle and the successful raid on Kure.
@@Strelnikov403 the task force commander should be very aggressive. For the US, once strong force numerical (and technical) superiority was achieved, the strategic mission was more important as a decisive tactical victory had less value. in the Marianna campaign, Mitscher was task force commander while Spruance was fleet commander and it was Spruance's responsibility was the mission.
Hasley as South Pacific commander in late 42 took the bold decision to send battleships into Guadalcanal which finally cause the Japanese to admit defeat. The main failing of Halsey in 44 was to not realize from the Battle of Philippine Sea that Japanese naval airpower was not what it once was, both in loss of skilled aviators, while the US now had superior aircraft and plenty of experience aviators. Also, defensive power against aircraft had vastly improved and ships were no longer as vulnerable to air attack. Halsey was present during a demonstration of VT, with the target destroyed on the first shot.
Arleigh Burke was confident in the 45 Okinawa campaign that a destroyer division could withstand an air attack, but Turner had destroyers stationed individually in an outer ring.
I wonder if there's a naval variation of a joke I once heard, a soldier simulating being a tank by walking around in an exercise shouting "tank!, tank!".... "Battleship! Battleship!", while rowing a small boat.
There is a film of pre-WWII US Army maneuvers where there are trucks labelled as 'tanks,' and broomsticks used as fake machine guns, and flour is used as a marker for a 'hit' on the enemy. I've read an account where the Japanese saw these films around 1941, after they had been fighting an actual war in China since 1937, and thought that the US would be a pushover if they couldn't even give their troops real weapons during training.
Whenever I see some 'woke' officer making today's men do something totally unrelated to actual military training, such as making male ROTC students wear high heels to 'celebrate' feminism, I wonder if a Chinese army officer is carefully taking notes and telling his superiors that a sneak attack on Taiwan would be easy and the USA will be a pushover.
@@Ensign_Nemo I mean, yeah, maybe the nonsenical fantasies the far right puts out will make the chinese underestimate america? Probably not in the way you think though...
@@Ensign_Nemo If anything, following that train of thought shows that a) a surprise attack towards Taiwan likely results in full retribution and a transition to full scale warfare, b) "training like REAL MEN" rarely is equivalent to or even comparable to what drives effective warfighting, which is a mixture of clear orders, unity of command, and excellent logistics. The US pre-WWII Army Maneuvers (and even circa-WWII Army Maneuvers) didn't need guns to be efficient because their purpose was to train the officers to manage things like the logistical aspects or the maneuver aspects or the communications aspect. Consider that the problems you are hearing were similarly not waged with real weapons, for instance. A dropped bomb might be a flare, a smoke bomb substitutes for an actual real shot. To wage war against "wokism", to paraphrase from the French... that's waging war against an imagined enemy. I don't think you have any particular complaints about, say, the sheer number of calls to prayer that occur within the US Army, do you? You can also point to other things that ROTC did that weren't Army-related at all during the Great Depression - a number of them were closely involved with the Civilian Conservation Corps, and that's where a lot of the Army brass for WW2 really got a handle on commanding men from a logistical and engineering point of view, and not just a tactical one. That had very little to do with direct warfare. Or you can point to say, the R&R and morale and additional studies that the armed forces provided; the men got plenty of rest and got to partake in very non-armed forces behavior.
Fundamentally, if you wish to look at "the sneaky Chinese planning a surprise attack on Taiwan!", they've certainly acquired great commercial power in the Indian Ocean, have been matching the US blow for blow in the trade war, and haven't exactly been subtle about dialing the local border conflicts in and out spanning the Himalayas and up to and through the islands near Japan and South Korea in order to gather reactions (and to maintain control of the PLA, the same way that the Sino-Vietnamese War was essentially a giant live fire exercise) - and not like the US hasn't been preparing for that possibility either.
I like to imagine Honestly Not Japan Gov is a nation in the universe of Kiwiland, Emutopia, and Elbonia.
the amount of times they foreshadowed pearl harbor is surprising. wonder if Japan was taking notes from these "attacks" on Hawaii
It's a matter of form following function. You look into attacking a location like PH and the logical approaches to doing so quickly lay themselves out.
Scrolling through comments from the Samar video an hour ago, and was laughing at the steel chair postings.
And Drach works in an Admiral King / Ranger with a steel chair line in this video. Kismet. And quite hilarious.
Well played, sir. Thank you for the superb channel.
Need to link a Ryan Symanski BB New Jersey video about aluminum chairs, too.
The issue of fighter numbers is an important one. They would rise from 18 per fleet carrier at Coral Sea to 27-30 at Midway and Eastern Solomons, then to 36 at Santa Cruz, and on into the 40s a couple years later at Phillipine Sea in addition to the practice of pairing fleet carriers with light carriers having another two dozen or so fighters and a few TBFs.
Those exercises really were almost prophetic... 7 Battleships sunk... Mostly with torps...
Terrific having use of all this footage of live operations.
Great series - I’m a little sad that we’re out of fleet problems now. Did any other navies leave behind the documentation of exercises that the USN did?
There is some stuff scattered about for the Royal Navy :)
@@Drachinifelamazing, thanks for the great content, if you do more maybe release each exercise as an individual video
@@benwatson4040 I concur, that could be an excellent series on Royal Navy exercises!
@@Drachinifel If you can compile enough information about UK fleet exercises to be coherent, it would be really interesting to hear about those as well.
Utterly fantastic period films of the pre-war US Navy. I've never seen such superb documentation.
Thanks!
One of your most interesting posts. I appreciate the subtle humor.
Drach, Outstanding video! It’s obvious the amount of research you put into this video, and the archival footage/photos I’d never seen before. In particular, the Hawaiian pictures and the video of the BB going past Pt. Lomb in San Diego. Views I personally witnessed in my own Naval service.
Close to an hour long. Brilliant replacement Wednesday viewing for Mandalorian Wednesdays.
Listening to drachinifel with my new born after feeding and then nap should be a prescription for bliss 😊
Thanks.
I was aware that it had occurred to the Navy that Carrier Attacks on Pearl Harbor might take place - but - not to the extent that they had taken place in practice. Attacking Hawaii seems to have been common place.
These exercises did not however prepare the American Military for the fact that - yes - it could really be attacked. You look at the frequent reaction of individuals at Hawaii and it was disbelief that they were being attacked. Time and again reports of Enemy Forces were discounted as them being Friendly Forces or a mistake. There was no urgency to our response and no coordination between combat elements.
The Transition between a Peace Time Military and a War Time one was brutal.
.
I can't word how much I appreciate how well you keep on top of your play lists.
Especially once you finish a whole series, then I can watch it 4 more time's with out faffing around 😅
Especially appreciated because youtube is so hostile to anything but the latest content on a channel's videos page. They hate making creators with large archives easily digestible
This has to be one of the best mini series of its style on youtube and a personal favourite
This has gotta be the best naval history channel out there, bar none. Blessings to your lessons
It's a bit sobering to realize that if any of the sailors shown in the photos are still alive, they're over a hundred years old.
Cool! Just been rewatching the previous eps, so this is timely :)
And thank you for those fantastic Life Magazine colour photo's - they're excellent.
Probably one of my favorite of your series. I’d look forward to other navies equivalents some far time in the future.
Always loved those old pieces of footage that showed Lexington going flank speed past the camera ship, kicking up waves, and making one hell of a wake.
“The size. The power.” ~Chancellor Palpatine
These Fleet Problems are so damned interesting. Thank you Drach
23 mins in and already over 1k views? Jeez drach? You getting big😅 keep up the great work
Those colour photographs of the Enterprise aircraft are just gorgeous!
This series and the Jutland videos are by far my favorite of your works so far
For those who obsess on such things at 16:36 we have the SS Edgar F. Luckenbach, launch 3/29/1916 at Newport News Shipyard.
Thanks for the stories and pix. Love the RA King character, as if he's a sending from the god of war, tormenting us with his black belt cunning ruthlessness.
nice to see some reels of ships that dont exist no more either being sunk at pearl, sunk during the War or being Scrapped after the War. Good Stuff Drach
I've enjoyed all of the archival footage during this series. This one was particularly good for playing "name that battleship." But those Kodachrome photos during Problem XX were absolutely stunning. TBD's never looked better.
Same.
Thanks for this series on the US Navies Fleet Problems. It is a good list of wargames scenario’s
ie for miniatures
So the US Navy many, many times wargamed the Pacific Fleet getting a massive kicking at Pearl Harbour and subsequently being on the back foot... but they still had no idea the Japanese were watching over their shoulders with notepads, whispering "Quick! Write that down!" to each other....?
I know Yamamoto got the idea for the attack on Pearl Harbour by studying the Royal Navy attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto, but methinks he had another source to study here...
That's actually a problem the US Navy identified post-war; they had a tendency to only focus on the positive results of exercises. For example, for FP XIX, instead of "wow, we're really unprepared for any kind of carrier ambush," the general takeaway was "wow, we're really good at pulling off carrier ambushes!" Hell, half the reason we borrowed a Swedish submarine and crew in the early 2000's was to guarantee that kind of thing didn't happen again with regards to anti-submarine warfare.
Pearl Harbor
Taranto was due much more to luck than brilliance on the part of the RN and FAA.
1939 Battleship Royal Oak sunk at anchor in Scotland. Fleet carrier Courageous sunk by U boat whilst on anti-submarine patrol.
1940 Fleet carrier Glorious sunk by battleship despite warnings from Bletchley Park. 1941 Channel Dash. Fleet carrier Ark Royal sunk by one defective torpedo.
. 1942 Convoy PQ17. Force Z.
I do so enjoy your podcasts. They are inevitably quite informative and as a narrator you are one of the best.
Really great footage you put together! It’s sad to think of how many of those ships and men didn’t survive the war. The USS Lexington is such a sharp looking carrier.
Loved this series. Really interesting to here just how accurate most of the excercises were in setting up future scenarios and what the outcomes would be. Obviously hindsight makes the mistakes and lessons clear but it hurts just how many times they predicted pearl harbor and still failed. We can also guess how an attack on Panama would have gone had it been done for real.
Drach, giving another magnificent lecture with "motion picture". World is about to end.😂
I loved this series, thank you for producing it!
Fleet Problems are always interesting to hear about!
Yes! The finale. I've been waiting this!
USS Ranger with a steel chair 😂😂😂 I about died laughing.
30:55 wait, how exactly was the destroyer got distracted by Pensacola pretending to be an ocean liner?
Probably much like the auxiliary vessels at 30:15 wearing hats saying "I'm a battleship", Pensacola had a hat on saying "I'm an ocean liner" or "I'm an ocean liner on fire, send help."
I took it has the Penacola was scripted to be a civilian vessel that accidentally wandered into a combat zone. The Destroyer had to then either Escort it out of the combat zone or establish communication to inform them that they are in a combat zone.
Pensacola was playing the Love Boat theme.
@@alexandercaires5921 now I'm just imagining the AL shipgirl pretending to be an ocean liner.
USN: Fleet Problem 19
IJN: "Write that down!"
Thank you Drach! One of your better ones. Along with with second night battle of GC and what if Lee had his way with Yamato
Its seems America had many opportunities to learn how vulnerable Hawaii was to carrier strike
Thanks so much for this series. It's this kind of thing that makes your channel so great.
It would be very nice if the British Fleet exercises were covered next. Closing off the Med, for the fleets to have at it, sounds great.
A succulent meal this was, my compliments to the chef.
Ranger punching above its weight for a change
One minor nitpick: Lahaina = luh HAI nah. Great series of videos, especially the footage! Lay people often overemphasize platform and weapon capabilities and fail to understand that the underlying strategic and operation doctrine and working out tactics to employ your platforms and weapons is just as important.
What strikes me is that, despite it being brought up as a serious deficiency, the USN still had nothing resembling an effective night fighting doctrine for some time once the war had started.
It seems to be a theme that when a particularly effective tactic emerged in the Fleet Problems a lot would be done to try and refine this offensively or if it already worked they'd just nod and reckon they'd use that. But there seems to be a consistent issue of not addressing what happens if someone uses it on them.
Hated those types of exercises when I was in the Navy. Officers got lots of flying maintainers got lot's of broken aircraft and a ton of General Quarters drills!
19:31 Stuff like this is why I love your stuff Drach! 😂
Loved the live footage.
Ah, the ghost of camchatka at 34:11.... "Do you see torpedo boats?"
herbert V. Wiley commanded USS Macon on a few Pacific fleet problems. Would be great to get your report on that, Drach.
Love your work laughed so hard it hurt... I have flu
This has been a great series.
Fascinating as always, thank you!
A tip for watching: Lexington (CV-2) had the horizontal stipe on her stack. Saratoga (CV-3) had the vertical stripe. I always have to look then up to remember which is which. (Ranger, CV-4, needed no special marking because she was the only ship of her class, and she was a strange little duck)
My day instantly got better seeing the notification
Fantastic job on this Drach, every bit of it from research to script to presentation to production.
BTW I'm the guy that sends you The History Guy videos when he drops something navel.
The unarmed training torpedoes did a lot more damage than the real mark 14s would have if they had fired live torpedoes in the exercise...
I'd love to see a video about just the practical aspects of simulating battles. You've mentioned things like sacks of flour used by dive bombers to simulate bombs.
Can you imagine being the deck crew guy who's inches away from the strike of a flour sack that froze at high altitude and turned into a brick, and ended up smashing through the flight deck?
At any rate, I'm sure there must have been all sorts of weird issues that came up for all sorts of unexpected reasons, and no shortage of rule refugees arguing back and force about whether or not such and such a thing counted as an ammo magazine detonation or a near miss. I'd think there'd be all sorts of wonderful material there, presuming it's survived.
Fleet problem 1942. Your fleet has been sunk and the enemy has now enacted all the attacks previously identified, what do you do?
Ranger and admiral King out of nowhere with a steel chair... i dont know Dranch is a wrestling fan 😂
It must have been amazingly complicated to shake down lots a new carriers, planes, pilots and crews. Organising the rest of the support fleet and tankers etc, all very impressive.
Its interesting to see the use of smoke screens.....radar wasnt yet conceived. An example of how fast technology can alter tactics.
Yay Luchenbach!
Good shot of DD412 Hammann pre Midway. Salute
Excellent! Thank you
For some reason this reminds me of when in the 80s I was a Marine on the Dubuque off of Korea during a really bad storm. I was one of the few people that was immune to sea sickness so I had second and third helpings in the galley because there was no one there but me! 👍
I tell ya, eating chow on a ship during a really bad storm is an art form in itself. You have to wrap a leg around the table leg, and have your arms around the cup of bug juice and your tray at all times!
I remember people calling the ship the "Du Puke" LOL!!!!!!!!
Too late to let you in on the secret. I used to laugh my ass off watching people (sailors & Marines) that didn't know how to eat during heavy seas!
You take a piece of bread and put it under your tray, it won't go anywhere.
My first ship was a destroyer, ya learn quick!
These are great. Does Drac have any "fleet problem" videos for the Royal Navy in the interwar years? If not I'd like to see some.
Admiral Kalbfus seemed to be familiar with the results of previous exercises but think that the problems with keeping the carriers close was the results of mistakes he wouldn't make. But responded well to the pin to his ego.
Good morning!
Excellent film footage. Dying to know where you got your hands on some of it, which I have never seen before. I'm an avid naval history fan, and have been all of my life. Some of fleet footage is brand new to me. BTW, thanks for your efforts and the sharing of your research on a free basis. Anyone studying history would do well to watch all of your videos.
I've included all the National Archives ID numbers in the video description :)
Having watched the whole series, I've found them all very interesting and informative. What I found most interesting in the last one was your mention of the presence of various officers who would be key in WWII. Given that so many ships of the fleet were involved in these exercises, I would think most of the senior officers during the war would have had a role in one or more exercises as junior officers. This makes me wonder how widely the reports of the exercises were circulated for reading by the officer corps as a whole. Was Adm. Kimmel in on any of the surprise attacks on Pearl that were successful as exercises? The world wonders ,,,,, This highlights the importance of training and the human factor; if people were more aware of past exercises one hopes they would be more alert for similar scenarios in actuality
While I have not listened to any of the other 'US Navy Fleet Problems' videos, this one was terrific. It had so many lessons that were or that should have been learned that were needed during the Pacific War. It is just amazing how much Drach knows AND understands or is willing to jump into an discover. He is a very remarkable person. Also, what I like about his overall interest in naval warfare and technology, I find that passing on such information, especially about WW II, to be immensely significant, and that new generations have a chance to really learn what happened, and what it took to overcome the world madness that happened in the 1920's and 1930's. This calamity should never be forgotten. And with that said, it seems that possibly today we are seeing a great resurgence in Right Wing mentality, in how they want to control you and tell you what to do and what you should believe, which is DEFINITELY not the American way, but they think they know better, and do it anyway. This is happening here in the US, first with the Supreme Court that is completely out of control, causing much more harm than anything good, and then the right wing states jumping on the bandwagon, trying to pass laws to prevent voting rights, and to make their own believes everyone else's (like the abortion issue), and a lot more. This sort of attitude, similar to the early 20th Century, is spreading world wide as well, into many parts of the world.
Thanks Drach