The importance of having a good order of communications and how taking your focus somewhere else can lead to a disaster (both for ATC and pilots too). Situational awareness is vital. Having Delta fly the base at an altitude at which they would intersect with the glideslope for the other runway was a big nono - or if you do, don't forget to turn them in in time.
All valid points, but in this case I don't think being distracted by the other aircraft requesting a runway change was actually significant. Even if she had swapped those communications, she would have cleared them for the approach too late for them to avoid going through final and there would still have been an RA. Even if she had timed everything correctly, she had aircraft on parallel approaches and hadn't passed traffic information to either aircraft. That doesn't seem right. She seems to have completely messed this up on many levels.
@@thomasdalton1508 if at 1:58 she would have told DAL to turn in and intercept the visual, that was more than enough time (approximately 2.5 mles before their localizer) to turn and stagger the approach with UAL. Even if she thought that wouldn't work, she could tell DAL to continue descending to a lower altitude to get them more vertical separation from UAL. However at 1:58 she checks in with UPS but UPS has more things to say than just a readback, that catches her attention and forgets about DAL.
@VASAviation Is that 2.5 miles? Ok, they could have made that. Still a little close for comfort, though, especially with no traffic information having been passed. And they wouldn't have ended up staggered by much. I think they should have been cleared onto the approach significantly sooner than that. Descending them below the traffic on final wouldn't be ideal, since that traffic was descending itself on a visual approach, so there is no way to know exactly what altitude they are going to be at.
The controller was behind the situation for quite a while, and wasn't able to pick out the priority well. This controller seemed overloaded to be honest.
@@thomasdalton1508 agree with the traffic information. To both of them would be ideal but at least to one of them so they know what's coming in the next few minutes or seconds. I wonder how fast TCAS TA and RA appeared here and how scary it felt inside.
“What would you like us to do?” is not exactly what I would have said. You tell the controller if you will continue the approach or redo the approach. I’m an airline Captain.
Is it customary for the same controller to be handling the parallel approaches on same frequency with aircraft coming in from all directions as well as the low priority UPS9872 traffic which is pretty far away while trying to juggle many aircraft transitioning from base to final some turning right others left... why not one frequency for the 08 approaches and another for the 07 sitting near each other and working their sequencing plan off mic?
Juan as you fly into Sydney a fair bit, they have on the ATIS there “do not fly through assigned runway centerline” I.e if you don’t get an instruction to turn to finals due to omission by ATC or radio congestion you are expected to make the turn to finals due to avoid separation issues. Do they have this sort of instruction at this airport or are normally at this airport the runway are widely enough separated for this not to be an issue?
@@p50atc The prior hour had been pretty busy with a very steady stream of inbounds coming in from all points, with >50% coming in on the same track from the NE so this relative lull was the tail end of a busy prior period...so fatigue and repetition is a factor
Say what you will about automation. But you can't convince me that a system that exists just to tell pilots "ignore the idiot humans on the ground, do what I tell you and I will save all of your lives," isn't one of the best inventions ever.
"Automation" is a much greater topic than what a single blanket statement can cover. TCAS works exactly because it's uncomplicated. There's no AI, or machine learning, or machine vision. It's the exact opposite of what the snake oil salesmen are trying to sell with "self-driving" cars.
I flew for 50 plus years. I wondered why we needed this piece of kit. I found out one day going into KSEA. Really great device. I'm retired and enjoying it. Blue side up.
Sad it took you that long to realize it. Every crusty old captain I fly with has the same sh1tty attitude when they give us some sort of new tech. The 'ole reliable "wE DoN'T NeEd ThAt"... until you do. Ya'll never learn.
@ WOW quite the attitude young fellow. Us old farts were flying when there was none of the fancy shit. Doing things like mountain approaches at night, IFR on compass headings and timing. I am from the era of range approaches. They were just being decommissioned when I got an IFR rating.. Yes all us old farts say that shit, we earned the right to say that shit. My attitude is not shitty, it pessimism speaking, from never having the tech available and whatever the tech was, we are pessimistic, until it demonstrates its worth. Which TCAS did for me at KSEA. Us old farts have to put up with "smart" F/O's. You know the ones that know all the stuff the aviation colleges taught them or they read in a book somewhere. They are the type that wants to get in the left seat ASAP. I have seen F/O's do all kinds of stuff, playing with our modern auto pilots and the programmed approach disarmed while descending on the approach, in the mountains. Or getting way too high, because they wanted to save fuel? There's more, not going there. Yes, us old guys have experienced a lot of stuff, made our share of mistakes too, that's why you are an F/O, I hope long enough to make mistakes with an experience captain, that teaches you how to correct your mistakes. You have a piss poor, condescending attitude, it will not serve you well. If you make captain one day, you will not be a good one, your ego at the moment is far too large. Remember you are not perfect, we are all imperfect and we do make errors. Two people working in unison are less likely to make errors, unfortunately some crews make mistakes. If you make the left seat and are the way you are, nicknames like "The Dentist" will be given to you. (because you are painful to work with.) Good luck Smasher.
@ ah yes typical, looking down on F/Os. You were one at one point too. I'm sure you gave plenty of CAs trouble at some point. We all do. And what's going to really blow your mind not only have I spent most of my career on the left seat, I was also a check airman. The horror, I know. But that was a previous 121 life. Anyways, don't fret, you'll never have to share the cockpit with my "young entitled/condescending know-it-all " self
It's damned impressive, and a bit scary, to see the amount of 3-dimensional situational awareness that ATC is required to manage, the number of lives depending on them, day after day... TCAS seems like a good backup..
@@0101-s7v The OP did not provide an example of something "impressive" they were expressing what they thought about all of the information that ATC has to compile mentally all of the time. They feel that it is an impressive quantity of information. Unless you don't think it is an impressive quantity of information because that is what you are saying if that is the case then you should use an "is".
another good day for TCAS. the controller did not expect the UPS crew to ask for a preferred runway and it at to much of her time. At these moments you can easily realise how much seconds matter and i'm grateful to all those pilots and ATC's making split second decisions in an effort to try and keep everybody safe and the inventors of those systems that can act quick when for others it takes a little too much time to react.
This is where her priorities were screwed-up. UPS can wait, she had DAL & UAL on a collision course, creating a situation she had to watch. Rule #1 in the TRACON is DO NOT create a situation you have to watch ( rule #1 in the tower is don’t load the runway unless you can launch them). Just because someone calls you, doesn’t mean you have to answer them.
Damn, as soon as she told Delta to turn to 170 I knew something bad was going to happen. Turning a plane inbound for a base on a parallel runway directly ahead of another plane assuming they wouldn't go wide is one thing, but flat-out leaving them on a base and forgetting to turn them final (leaving them on a perfect collision course) is even worse. Why not just continue the Delta downwind till they're abreast and perform a gradual base-to-final turn behind them? There wasn't THAT much traffic. I will ABSOLUTELY give her credit for realizing what she did and immediately conceding to the pilots and TCAS RA's and not adding any last-second confusing instructions. That's fairly new training and has to really be drilled-in, as your instincts are to immediately issue commands to avoid a collision, however at that point it's out of your hands. Don't say anything and trust TCAS, or you've got a situation like the Überlingen mid-air where the controller literally directed one plane into another (which was TRYING to follow the TCAS RA.) Everything in aviation has redundancies, this time one failed and the secondary worked perfectly (as did the training for both crews AND the controller, as least once the situation became critical).
@@L123Alpha UA was high. So perhaps no visual. And while it was certainly on the TCAS display, they must've missed it for some reason. E.g. checklists, etc.
فَليسقُط دونالد ترامب (Donald Trump) أشَرُّ الدَّواب بإذن اللهِ العَزيزِ الوَهَّاب؛ إنّ الله غالِبٌ على أمرِه ولَكِنَّ أكثَر النَّاس لا يَعلَمون .. اقتباس: "ونعلم أنك عَدوٌّ مُبينٌ لكافَّة المُستَنكِرين جرائم حَرْب قَتْل الأطفال والنِّساء والمُستَضعَفين في غزَّة المُكرمة مِن أصحاب الضَّمير والرَّحمة الإنسانيَّة في العالَمين؛ كونك زعيم النِّمس الشِّرير (بن غفير) مُدلَّل المُجرِم (بنيامين نتن ياهو)، ولكن بن غفير هو رأس الفِتنة المُعتَدي على مُقَدَّسات المُسلِمين، ونعلم أنَّك زعيم شياطين البشر من الذين ينهون عن المَعروف ويأمرون بالمُنكَر، ونعلم أنك عَدوٌّ مُبينٌ لكافَّة المُسالِمين مع المُسلِمين من النَّصارى واليهود وعَدوٌ للمُسالِمين مع المُسلمين في الشَّعْب الأمريكيّ، ونعلَم أنَّك عَدوٌّ لَدودٌ لكافَّة الشعوب العربيَّة والإسلاميَّة أجمَعين. ونعلَم أنَّك عَدوٌّ لَدودٌ حَقودٌ على الشَّعْب اليَمانيّ الأبيّ العَرَبيّ، ولكنّي خَليفة الله على العالَم بأسرِه أُعلِنُ مِن وَسط عاصمة الخلافة الإسلامية العالميَّة (صنعاء) عن اقتراب نهاية ترامب (Trump) بأمرٍ من عند الله بِغض النَّظر عن ما سوف يُهلِكُكَ الله به؛ إنَّ الله على كُلِّ شَيءٍ قَديرٍ، مهما حرصت على أمْن نفسك فسوف تعلمُ ويعلَمُ العالَمُ بأسرِه أنّ الله بالغُ أمرهِ وأنَّ عَدوّ الله دونالد ترامب (Donald Trump) لن يُعجِز الله في الأرض ولَن يُعجزه هَرَبًا، ولسوف يعلَمُ العالمُ بأسرِه حقيقةَ قول الله تعالى: {قُلِ ٱللَّهُمَّ مَٰلِكَ ٱلْمُلْكِ تُؤْتِى ٱلْمُلْكَ مَن تَشَآءُ وَتَنزِعُ ٱلْمُلْكَ مِمَّن تَشَآءُ وَتُعِزُّ مَن تَشَآءُ وَتُذِلُّ مَن تَشَآءُ بِيَدِكَ ٱلْخَيْرُ إِنَّكَ عَلَىٰ كُلِّ شَىْءٍ قَدِيرٌ ﴿٢٦﴾} صدق الله العظيم [سورة آل عمران]. وسلامٌ على المُرسَلين والحَمدُ لله رَبِّ العالَمين.. خليفةُ الله على العَالَمين الإمام المهديّ؛ ناصِر مُحَمَّد اليَمانيّ." ______________ 03 - رجب - 1446 هـ | 03 - 01 - 2025 مـ الموقع لقراءة البيان كاملا: البشرى الإسلامية والنبأ العظيم
Delta has a lot of great pilots. Just this week they've had three guys each saving souls with quick decisive correct decisions. Unfortunately the root problem is getting obscured by competence. The ATC system as-is, net of humans and reality of congestion and overly aggressive scheduling seems degenerately unsafe. It shouldn't be this fraught, and vulnerable to human error and task saturation. It should be routine and inherently safe. This video is alarming.
I like how the pilot of #1724 just before going to tower frequency tells the controller "take care", which I interperet to have meant: "it's OK, close call but we're all OK and I know you know you screwed up, so I'm not piling on.....just, take care". The controller seems to sense that in the moment and responds "you too, thank you." Not to minimize at all the seriousness of a TCAS incident, but nice ending
Holy close call, Batman! This is why we have TCAS. That was just a little too close for comfort. I am grateful to the person who invented TCAS. It keeps the skies a lot safer for all of us.
And grateful to the passengers who gave their lives to perfect its use. You do what TCAS tells you to do. Humans are a lot more fallible than computers.
@ true, but I would still rather have human pilots in charge of my plane. Things would be better, though, if they got rid of the DEI crap and hired based on merit, like they used to.
Classic example of why you don't have aircraft on a 90 degree base leg with parallel runway operations, especially when the aircraft is turning inside another going to another runway. Closure speed was so great that even the minor delay of talking to the UPS arrival ate up so much distance. That must have rattled her to the core.
It's OK to vector bases but everywhere I fly in Europe the opposite bases - for the same runway or independent parallels - are always 1000ft apart so if they cross to the other side for whatever reason (ATC forgets, distracted pilots, radio failures...) , the vertical separation is safe. Parallel locs are always intercepted 1000ft apart. EVEN with that, some airports I've visited tell you in their airport charts to turn in and INTERCEPT ON YOUR OWN if a final vector from ATC is not received (unless the explicitly tell you to cross the localizer or to expect to cross for sequencing reasons).
@@VASAviation Make no mistake, I'm not saying vectors onto the base leg are inappropriate or should be limited, I'm suggesting that the hard 90 degree base that United was on inside the final of the aircraft going to the other parallel creates a greater risk and should be considered only when workload permits. This controller allowed herself to get distracted by issuing instructions to other arrivals and I believe she underestimated the closure speeds between the two.
@@VASAviation Different altitudes for bases wouldn't really help here. The other aircraft was on a visual approach, so could have been at any altitude they wanted.
@@thomasdalton1508 well, but you know they 99% are going to be on the glideslope or near it. It's a crowded airspace. You better not deviate too much from the assigned altitudes by ATC or procedures.
Only requires a quick look back on this page to find out that this happens in PHX way too much. I remember last year, it happened 3 times in two weeks (base vectors with no instruction to intercept, resulting in unintended vectors through final). PHX ATC is great in every way (I'd almost say best in the country), except for this godforsaken turn to intercept final which seems to be a recurring issue.
yeah, it looks more like the ATC has too much to do. There should be two controllors and they should be at different heights and different distances for the turn.
2:34 the moment that you can even hear 'descend descend' in the background you know you have gone into severe incident territory... TCAS usually already advises 'traffic' about 30 seconds before that. Even just the traffic advisory is bad enough but if it gets to resolution advisory (RA) the report will be a black mark against at least one person involved.
@@CinemaDemocratica Was the new voice on the frequency at the end of the recording directing Delta to contact Tower a result of the incident or was there a second controller on the frequency already?
I couldn't do this job. Even with the automation I'd be a one armed paperhanger. It would be awesome to have the RADAR screen in 3d for the people on the ground. Probably isn't that far away.
It'd be even more awesome if the entirety of ATC could be automated. Computers rarely forget things or lose their train of thought because they got distracted by something else. This is a job that can and should be entirely automated in 2024 already. Computers already handle much more complicated tasks than this. Easy for a computer and sometimes difficult for a human.
Impressive error management from the controller. Stayed calm and professional to not compound the error with panic. Very professional from the pilots, too, who no doubt will make many errors mitigated by technology in their careers and just got on with what they needed to do without a hint of anything blamey in their voice. Everyone will learn from this as long as fingers of blame aren't pointer and we acknowledge that we're all human (something beyond some commenters on here, inevitably).
Impressive calm and professionalism from all involved, for sure -- and you're right, the blame game doesn't help anyone. But determining the cause and taking accountability for any errors -- retraining, termination or whatever is appropriate depending on the severity of the incident, experience, history etc. -- is key to the culture of safety. The controller erred and it's important for that to be acknowledged and remedied at the appropriate time.
Was her voice calm because she was professional or because she didn't realize she ran two airliners together? Her placidity reminded me of the controller in Austin a while back who almost put FedEx on top of Southwest.
This is the last video on youtube I'd expect to see someone writing a comment like "impressive" anything from the ATC. She not only fucked up majorly, three times by my count, but then failed to handle the situation afterwards. Even a simple request from the 1070 asking her what she wanted them to do now, she explicitly said she didn't understand what they asked. Not. Good. Enough. This is not a job you can be just ok at, or impressive at error management but not of actual flight path co-ordination. You need to be both, and you need to be more than impressive, certainly if this is what you call impressive.
Special thanks to fellow spotter Justin for sharing that photo though! What are the odds of catching something like that, right? It was helpful to see how that distance looks to the naked eye. I'm just glad both the planes responded to the TA/RA well in time 👍Anybody want to explain to me how did this happen in the first place - I mean did the ATC give them a miscalculated heading or something?
Yea, I happened to be at the right place at the right time. I go for a lot of walks and always watch the planes on their final approach. The Delta A330 definitely caught my eye since it was mid-turn to final (wrong runway of course) And then moments later saw the other plane come into view and knew right away they were way too close and quickly got out my phone. I definitely freaked out as it was all happening 😂 knew I had to submit to VASA immediately
Delta was given a do not exceed speed and (I think) interpreted that as a maintain speed so they ended closer than planned, still didn't seem right and the UPS distraction may have contributed.
I fly into Scottsdale on a weekly basis. Crazy busy airspace with a huge amount of student traffic. We get a either a TA (traffic alert) or RA (resolution advisory) at least every 10th entry into PHX approach airspace.
Delta 1070 was assigned a heading and should have been cleared for the visual or localizer intercept after the controller assigned them that initial heading. By the time they did clear them for the approach, they were already through loc interception.
UPS standby.. would’ve helped her. She forgot to vector the Delta for the base or clear them for the visual while UPS carried on a with a long transmission…
This is why they invented TCAS in the place. The 1978 PSA crash near San Diego and the 1985 Aeromexico crash east of LAX forced the rapid deployment of TCAS. Today, TCAS has saved a lot of airplanes (except one collision in 2001, and that may have been a combination of poor ATC in southern Germany and (maybe) language issues with the Russian flight crew).
The ATCO lived near me in Kloten. He was murdered by a father who lost his family that night. Still shocking to this day. If only the Tupolev had followed TCAS. They and the DHL were diving to the same tiny contact point in time and space...
Was the 2001 the one where TCAS told plane A to descend and B to climb and ATC told the exact opposite? Both valid solutions until one pilot listened to TCAS and the other to ATC so a rule was written that TCAS overrides ATC instructions always? That was a good ACI episode
@@repatch43 Yes, that does seem odd. She made a completely routine transmission to Delta just seconds before they got an RA. She should have already known it was too late for that.
I'm a London TMA ATCO (work side by side with Approach controllers, though I'm not one) I can only assume that their short term conflict alert is suppressed for radar returns on final. Our kit (London TC) would be going apeshit with that conflict 😅
@@StringyPete That assumption is the only one that makes sense, I think, but it seems unwise for them to be suppressed before ATC is no longer required to ensure separation... For runways more than 4,300 ft apart (which these are, just barely), they are required to ensure separation until the second aircraft is assigned a heading to intersect the runway centreline at less than 30 degrees. That only happened when they were assigned a heading of 100 seconds before the RA.
She was calm because she had not yet realized that she was about to put two aircraft together plus all she has to do is file an ATSAP report and return to duty.
I have been a life-long sky-watcher since 1973. I lived in Phoenix for the last nine years in an area that provided excellent visual contact with approaching and departing aircraft. Too many times I witnessed poor aircraft separation in the Sky Harbor airspace. Pilots, please keep vigilant.
I spent over 18 years of my 22 year career as an air traffic controller, working both tower and radar at several really busy bases. This controller dug a hole for herself and was throwing the dirt right back onto her head. That was a huge separation error that should have never happened.
Exactly. She was being way too cute with her loooong drawn out communications. Short and concise is the way to control. Otherwise, you encourage pilots to do the same and the frequency gets clogged up. She needs to be reprimanded for that performance. I'd have got a number on that one and called on the ground.
I'm a 30 year retired air traffic controller (ZDC, ZTL ARTCCs) and after retirement was hired by MITRE who developed TCAS and the manager who hired me was the actual TCAS original concept developer.
Worked at P50 TRACON for 30 years, always had one final controller until the mid 2000’s and they split the finals. She was working 5 airplanes-that’’s considered light traffic, thus only 1 final. Always worked and always taught my trainees-you ALWAYS WORK RUNWAY OUT. You. Never put a guy on base leg with a straight in and get distracted. UPS was 20 miles from the airport-he is last priority in your thinking and verbalizing. Why she didn’t descend Delta to 3000 on the downwind knowing she was turning him in prior to GEU is baffling or at the very least when she turned his base. Once she talked to SWA she lost the separation and the fact she responded to UPS after that shows she never even saw the incident happening until her scope lit up and bells sounded with the CA going off. We lost 2 controllers back in the day for the exact same thing--prior to TCAS-and base leg traffic flew under straight in traffic by just a few hundred feet.
As a pilot, I don’t understand Delta continuing the 170 heading, a 90 deg turn from final for runway 8, but barreling straight on towards traffic lined for the 7R. They have a nav display. That United target would have become from a blue to a yellow dot with an aural “traffic, traffic.” That would be enough for me to use emergency authority and start turning towards my final, to break away the trajectory, and line up for 8. Then tell ATC afterwards. One time going into EWR, we were setup to a 30 deg intercept leg for the LOC 22L. Then it got super busy on the radio with no way to get any wording in. I still remember telling the CA to just turn, turn inbound, intercept the LOC/GS now, otherwise we will shoot through final and encroach towards LGA airspace and traffic. And so we did. Never were able to get a word in. Switched to tower, checked in, they didn’t care. Filed our report, never heard anything back. No way would I continue perpendicular towards traffic I know is lined to 7R.
Totally agree. Will have to watch the video again, but I'm assuming the controller assumed they would turn onto final...too much assuming going on, clearly.
You sure your experience isn’t just flight sim? We don’t declare emergencies or use “emergency authority” for traffic avoidance during parallel visual approaches. And we definitely don’t start turning on our own because we think there may be a conflict. That’s a good way to get violated when you then cause an event with other traffic you didn’t see. And why would you ever be shooting a LOC 22L into EWR? If the glideslope is out, you shoot the RNAV or GLS.
Agreed this is not that common except in New York you would not get violated turning on to final to avoid a traffic conflict. Even under IFR we are all supposed to see and AVOID, and avoiding by turning is clearly needed here. It's common sense.
Ethernet packets collided and re-sequenced literally thousands of times just in the course of watching this video, but it happens just ONCE to airplanes in this video and everyone makes such a big fuss about it. (This is humor)
Thank you for using Day/Month/Year as the ICAO timestamp. Personally I try to remember to put the month in letters, for International viewers, just like you have on this video intro 🙂 (the scientific version being Year/Month/Day/Hour/Minute/Second...etc etc]
Boy, I sure could hear the tone change in those pilot's voices after they responded to their tcas alerts. And then all communication became absolutely professional.
If you listen to the point the TCAS kicked on while one of the pilots was hot mike, you can instantly here the ATC tell them to do what they need to do and get back to her when done. Nicely done.
I'm starting to think that the only reason that aviation has a better safety record than railways, is that aircraft can perform evasive action. In the air, with a go-around, et cetera. Conflicts seem to occur all the time, but luckily, disaster is almost always avoided. With a train, if you see another one coming on your track, you're doomed.
Super interesting. Are there any weekly/monthly/yearly charts and or statistical breakdown relating to how many and what type of incidents are dealt with and by which airports?
I hope someone relieved her from her seat asap to give her time to catch her breath and help her composure. I assume a near miss will get properly analysed to improve training/give feedback where needed. 😅
Why not just issue the star as published, everyone conga lines to the runway. That way there are no altitude or speed surprises. The ATC freq should be quiet except when the controller needs to get involved. Too many instances of over control and then too many balls in the air. Something is gonna get missed.
I don’t understand why nearly all instrument flight movements are not exactly what is published in the approach plates. Why all the last minute armchair piloting from ATC?
I'm pretty sure we had a TCAS RA on our flight 2 days ago, we took off from FLL, and I saw from my 8A seat traffic at our 10 o clock, and then we started to expedite our climb, and about 30 seconds later we reduced our climb rate back to what it was.
Im impressed at thr professionalism of all involved. A mistake happend but instead of panic from atc or alpha male whine from the pilots, everyone worked through the issue. There is always time after everyone is safely on the ground to do whatever. Great show if how to handel pressure and remain professional.
Clear and a million, I'm thinking I'm looking at the runway, localizer and tcas. I might have asked for a turn or mentioned the traffic before an RA. That's a "might"
ABSOLUTELY need to do a thorough investigation of this incident. Since these kind of incidents (TCAS avoidance) could easily be tracked systemwide and forecast using ADSB data I'm surprised that they still happen. TCAS should just be a backup for anything that might leak through.
When seeing situations like this, I wonder if over reliance on ATC providing manual vectors for visual approaches is a problem? If everyone tracks a published approached, then both the airplanes and ATC already know where everyone is going and you don't need to manually vector everyone (especially in congested airspace when people are already stepping on each other on frequency)
Nah, generally it's 10x safer than any alternative, as ATC is (supposed to) have much better SA of the entire traffic pattern and area. Fast jets in congested airspace flying with VFR-ish rules would be a disaster. Sequencing becomes a huge problem that only ATC can handle - if you have multiple inbound aircraft from different directions, how can you get them spaced and sequenced for the same runway? They can't sequence each other - has to be a 3rd party to tell SOMEONE to get behind the other, slow down, speed up, etc. I believe pilots almost ALWAYS feel safer getting vectors by ATC, and would actually prefer it 100% of the time, however it's demanding on ATC and only really used for final vectoring or emergencies (or if specifically requested.)
That would not have been funny after directing two planes at each other. Glad she didn't loose it and take out her phone to record.. That problem exists frequently elsewhere..
That made me laugh, considering that I once had the dreaded "Call this number after landing" transmission from North Tower at Sky Harbor. We're all human, and we're all prone to making mistakes.
Could’ve used less casual language to increase instruction speed. Keep it short and sweet. Additionally, priorities were a little mixed. You can always say standby for less priority transmissions.
As flight crews perform a periodic primary instrument scan, are controllers so trained? Perhaps if she had paused between those longer transmissions, scanned, and noted the conflict, the situation would have been far different. Aren't these radar systems smart enough to predict potential conflicts and give controllers a warning?
I’m afraid it’s gonna take a disaster before ATC stops multi tasking. The last near miss that was caught by TCAS, the NTSB report noted controller multitasking in the main reason why they stopped maintaining visual on the aircraft (JFK incident; ground controller was looking down at their desk doing a “lesser task”
This is a good example of "Why ATC's have to speak with short sentences". When every response took 10 secs, you will lose your awareness and become hard to understand what you mean.
Yep. It’s hard to beat a straight in. DAL1070 is traveling ZERO knots towards the airport while on that base leg while UAL1724 is chewing his a$$ up at 240 knots on the straight in.
What was delta doing just driving right on thru the localizer for their expected approach ? ATC probably thought she had already cleared them. It's one thing to follow orders but another to question them when they don't pass the common sense test. Delta should have been more proactive here.
Is it me, or do I hear pilots enunciate a lot more clearly after "an event", probably knowing that the tapes are going to be reviewed (and posted here 🙂 ). Perhaps a dash of adrenaline too...I sure that TCAS going off is quite the wake-up call.
I know it’s easy for me to say, but as an armchair pilot I could see what was going to happen at 1:55 when the controller first started speaking to UPS instead of turning Delta to final. Big and scary brain fart from the controller.
I have a few questions and will be very happy about any explanation so I may learn something new about aviation: At 0:16, SWA2657 says (according to the transcript) "descending via to 7" - what do they mean by "via to" here? At 1:12 LYM3101 expects "8": Do they refer to Runway 8 and if they do, did someone tell them (before) to expect that particular runway or is it a preference/request by the pilots? At 1:46 UPS9872 is leveled at 8000' with DELTA - what does Delta refer to in this context? DAL1070? Or ATIS? At 2:10 UPS9872 just changed something/"it" to runway 8 - what is "it"? Seems like something they may chose/select/change on their own? Thanks in advance
"descend via" is a newer arrival route into metro airports such as phoenix. it has prescribed altitudes and speeds at specified points along the route. atc either assigns an altitude such as "descend and maintain 9,000" and the plane will just descend at a normal rate to 9000, at whichever speed the pilot wishes, or as assigned by atc. Descend via on the other hand will sound more like "swa2657 descend via the XXXXX arrival" and the plane will do exactly what is prescribed in the arrival. Descend vias are built with efficiency in mind, like what is efficient to get more planes into an airport, what is efficient for the airline to save fuel, etc. expect 8 is referring to the runway. some arrivals are to more than 1 runway, or the airport atis is broadcasting more than 1 available landing runway, and "expect 8" is shorthand for "expect runway 8" ups should be referring to atis D in this case, if they meant that they had dal1070 in sight, for example the previous controller called that traffic and told them to report in sight, they should have said something like "we have delta in sight" or something similar to alleviate any confusion. ups was likely referring to their FMS, flight management system, basically their planes main computer, which they will rely on for navigation, landing info, instrument approaches, etc
The ATC system has some odd things, this is one of them. You would think that turning to intercept final automatically, rather then blow through final. It is not. Another one which should be standard is land, unless you are explicitly told to go around. But again, that is not the case. Often on short final, tower is busy in some long winded discussion with someone about something and on occasion, barely gets out the landing clearance call at the last moment. And from the tone of this guys voice, it may be that he was assigned 7R (which works better for Delta at Sky Harbor since the new gates are on the south side) on his initial checkin. The way the PM answered the call, with a bit of surprise that he was cleared the visual to the north runway, might indicate that they were originally assigned 7R and were planning on 7R. This does happen. Often on checkin you are assigned a runway, but get, unexpectedly, cleared a visual to a different one. Usually they ask if you have the visual, and I am sure that is the rule, but... I have had some TA/RAs and it is a handy tool. Its weakness is that it is two dimensional. It does not consider lateral offset. So, you can get RAs that are bogus. Regardless, since you do not know, you respond to the RA and figure out what happened later.
In some airports that I fly at in Europe, they literally tell you in charts to turn in and intercept on your own during final vectors if no instruction from ATC is received unless they have previously told you to cross the localizer or to expect it due sequencing. That would have saved this one. "Hey, ATC is talking to someone else, we're almost there, loc is alive or I see the runway... let's turn in." No harm with UAL. Done.
I'm almost positive that DAL1070 was not assigned 7R. The EAGUL arrival isn't assigned 7R unless special conditions exist, like runway closures during the overnight shift or emergencies. Since UPS was on a descend via for runway 8, and LYM3101 was there (they always show up in the middle of the day), I'm almost positive that nobody on the north side of the airport had been assigned 7R until the approach controller attempted to help UPS with their request for 7R. Same with the BRUSR arrival that UPS was on, which is why he said something about, "... it was taking too long, can we just do 8 now." Pilots will ask Albuquerque Center about landing on the south runway from the north arrivals and are always told, "You'll have to make that request with Approach."
You are wrong about tcas being two-dimensional 🤡🤡🤡 tcas absolutely takes altitude into consideration and tells you whether to go up or down. If you are a pilot you should have known the system better than this
@ 2:14 Instead of (responding the UPS request) + (UPS call back) (total 15 sec) ,,, she should have said: break break , DAL1070 turn left IMIDIATELY to intercept 8 ... when she finally did it , DAL was already overshooting the intersction .... (of course, its easyer from my sofa) ,,,, feel for her ,,, right in the end she was released 😒
Considering that there are always two aircraft involved in an RA, a shortened reply as "TCAS RA acknowledged by tower" might make sense unless with caveat that this could create confusion between multiple RAs going on at the same time
In EASA/ICAO land the standard phraseology is “Delta 1070 TCAS RA” and the only response from ATC should be “Roger”. That’s it. Until the aircraft calls again with “Delta 1070 Clear of Conflict”. Only then should ATC start asking questions/reissuing clearances. But this is the US so standard phraseology just doesn’t translate somehow.
controller forgot to clear the DAL1070 in time but I know parallel ops are standard and work here but shouldn't they both be assigned hard altittudes and be established on the localizer prior to being cleared to descend on the approach? feel like having that out would eliminate this situation no?
Automation being always being a center of discussion, today saved two more planes. Dont know Airline procedures, but TCAS RA should be never overriden by controller indications.
She was just a bit slow on calling that intercept heading. I’ve had it happen to me and it always drives me crazy when it happens, but you got to be aware of it with parallel approaches like that.
Those pilots were very professional. They could tell she was getting behind and losing the scope. She’ll watch the tape of that one over and over and never understand how she could have missed it.
apparently my opinion is controversional but 1) i don't think the day needed saving by tcas, they were closer than comfortable but had a *bit* of margin remaining. what they really needed were earlier traffic alerts from the controller. 2) the controller didn't completely screw the pooch, altho it was below average perf. below average, but not much below average. 3) honestly i think this is being overblown. worth sharing? yes, all the comments on point? not really, imo.
The importance of having a good order of communications and how taking your focus somewhere else can lead to a disaster (both for ATC and pilots too). Situational awareness is vital. Having Delta fly the base at an altitude at which they would intersect with the glideslope for the other runway was a big nono - or if you do, don't forget to turn them in in time.
All valid points, but in this case I don't think being distracted by the other aircraft requesting a runway change was actually significant. Even if she had swapped those communications, she would have cleared them for the approach too late for them to avoid going through final and there would still have been an RA.
Even if she had timed everything correctly, she had aircraft on parallel approaches and hadn't passed traffic information to either aircraft. That doesn't seem right. She seems to have completely messed this up on many levels.
@@thomasdalton1508 if at 1:58 she would have told DAL to turn in and intercept the visual, that was more than enough time (approximately 2.5 mles before their localizer) to turn and stagger the approach with UAL. Even if she thought that wouldn't work, she could tell DAL to continue descending to a lower altitude to get them more vertical separation from UAL.
However at 1:58 she checks in with UPS but UPS has more things to say than just a readback, that catches her attention and forgets about DAL.
@VASAviation Is that 2.5 miles? Ok, they could have made that. Still a little close for comfort, though, especially with no traffic information having been passed. And they wouldn't have ended up staggered by much. I think they should have been cleared onto the approach significantly sooner than that.
Descending them below the traffic on final wouldn't be ideal, since that traffic was descending itself on a visual approach, so there is no way to know exactly what altitude they are going to be at.
The controller was behind the situation for quite a while, and wasn't able to pick out the priority well. This controller seemed overloaded to be honest.
@@thomasdalton1508 agree with the traffic information. To both of them would be ideal but at least to one of them so they know what's coming in the next few minutes or seconds. I wonder how fast TCAS TA and RA appeared here and how scary it felt inside.
I really appreciate the Delta pilot‘s "Let’s resequence.“, too ;)
Same! When he said that I thought “I want him to be flying the planes I’m on”.
A variety of reasons for that. sometimes the view out front makes the right answer too obvious.
He needed some extra time to put on a new pair of Depends.
“What would you like us to do?” is not exactly what I would have said. You tell the controller if you will continue the approach or redo the approach. I’m an airline Captain.
Yep, not pressing on, getting sorted out.
Great Catch Victor! Reviewing now...
Luckily we didn't have to reach to @pilotdebrief. Will be waiting for @blancolirio report. Once it hit @pilotdefrief fatalities are involved.
Is it customary for the same controller to be handling the parallel approaches on same frequency with aircraft coming in from all directions as well as the low priority UPS9872 traffic which is pretty far away while trying to juggle many aircraft transitioning from base to final some turning right others left... why not one frequency for the 08 approaches and another for the 07 sitting near each other and working their sequencing plan off mic?
@@BBbrewer13they normally do since the early 2000’s. But she was working 5 airplanes, that is considered very light and manageable for 1 person.
Juan as you fly into Sydney a fair bit, they have on the ATIS there “do not fly through assigned runway centerline” I.e if you don’t get an instruction to turn to finals due to omission by ATC or radio congestion you are expected to make the turn to finals due to avoid separation issues. Do they have this sort of instruction at this airport or are normally at this airport the runway are widely enough separated for this not to be an issue?
@@p50atc The prior hour had been pretty busy with a very steady stream of inbounds coming in from all points, with >50% coming in on the same track from the NE so this relative lull was the tail end of a busy prior period...so fatigue and repetition is a factor
Nice save by TCAS and no one lost their minds on frequency. Another good outcome. That's why TCAS is there.
What would happen if three aircraft had an RA simultaneously in the same conflict
Say what you will about automation. But you can't convince me that a system that exists just to tell pilots "ignore the idiot humans on the ground, do what I tell you and I will save all of your lives," isn't one of the best inventions ever.
We need TCAS for motor vehicles! Make driving safe again (MDSA)
Is someone trying to convince you it isn't?
@@courgettee TCAS specifically? No. Automation in general? Absolutely.
So is the EGPWS: there's a big mountain coming up, I suggest you move
"Automation" is a much greater topic than what a single blanket statement can cover. TCAS works exactly because it's uncomplicated. There's no AI, or machine learning, or machine vision. It's the exact opposite of what the snake oil salesmen are trying to sell with "self-driving" cars.
I flew for 50 plus years. I wondered why we needed this piece of kit. I found out one day going into KSEA. Really great device. I'm retired and enjoying it. Blue side up.
Sad it took you that long to realize it. Every crusty old captain I fly with has the same sh1tty attitude when they give us some sort of new tech. The 'ole reliable "wE DoN'T NeEd ThAt"... until you do. Ya'll never learn.
I'm happy that you're retired! Enjoy, Captain!
@ WOW quite the attitude young fellow. Us old farts were flying when there was none of the fancy shit. Doing things like mountain approaches at night, IFR on compass headings and timing. I am from the era of range approaches. They were just being decommissioned when I got an IFR rating..
Yes all us old farts say that shit, we earned the right to say that shit. My attitude is not shitty, it pessimism speaking, from never having the tech available and whatever the tech was, we are pessimistic, until it demonstrates its worth. Which TCAS did for me at KSEA.
Us old farts have to put up with "smart" F/O's. You know the ones that know all the stuff the aviation colleges taught them or they read in a book somewhere. They are the type that wants to get in the left seat ASAP. I have seen F/O's do all kinds of stuff, playing with our modern auto pilots and the programmed approach disarmed while descending on the approach, in the mountains. Or getting way too high, because they wanted to save fuel? There's more, not going there.
Yes, us old guys have experienced a lot of stuff, made our share of mistakes too, that's why you are an F/O, I hope long enough to make mistakes with an experience captain, that teaches you how to correct your mistakes.
You have a piss poor, condescending attitude, it will not serve you well. If you make captain one day, you will not be a good one, your ego at the moment is far too large. Remember you are not perfect, we are all imperfect and we do make errors. Two people working in unison are less likely to make errors, unfortunately some crews make mistakes. If you make the left seat and are the way you are, nicknames like "The Dentist" will be given to you. (because you are painful to work with.)
Good luck Smasher.
@ Thank you I am!
@ ah yes typical, looking down on F/Os. You were one at one point too. I'm sure you gave plenty of CAs trouble at some point. We all do. And what's going to really blow your mind not only have I spent most of my career on the left seat, I was also a check airman. The horror, I know. But that was a previous 121 life. Anyways, don't fret, you'll never have to share the cockpit with my "young entitled/condescending know-it-all " self
It's damned impressive, and a bit scary, to see the amount of 3-dimensional situational awareness that ATC is required to manage, the number of lives depending on them, day after day... TCAS seems like a good backup..
this was not an example of "impressive" in my opinion.
@@0101-s7v The OP did not provide an example of something "impressive" they were expressing what they thought about all of the information that ATC has to compile mentally all of the time. They feel that it is an impressive quantity of information. Unless you don't think it is an impressive quantity of information because that is what you are saying if that is the case then you should use an "is".
seems like TCAS was primary today
@ TCAS saved the mistake of the controller. Therefore, the TCAS system is impressive. That better? Or are your undies still in a roll?
@ and I said the equivalent of, yeah, but this wasn't an example of it
An excellent demonstration of just how one conversation, one long check on can make you totally lose the sight picture
another good day for TCAS. the controller did not expect the UPS crew to ask for a preferred runway and it at to much of her time. At these moments you can easily realise how much seconds matter and i'm grateful to all those pilots and ATC's making split second decisions in an effort to try and keep everybody safe and the inventors of those systems that can act quick when for others it takes a little too much time to react.
This is where her priorities were screwed-up. UPS can wait, she had DAL & UAL on a collision course, creating a situation she had to watch. Rule #1 in the TRACON is DO NOT create a situation you have to watch ( rule #1 in the tower is don’t load the runway unless you can launch them). Just because someone calls you, doesn’t mean you have to answer them.
Damn, as soon as she told Delta to turn to 170 I knew something bad was going to happen. Turning a plane inbound for a base on a parallel runway directly ahead of another plane assuming they wouldn't go wide is one thing, but flat-out leaving them on a base and forgetting to turn them final (leaving them on a perfect collision course) is even worse. Why not just continue the Delta downwind till they're abreast and perform a gradual base-to-final turn behind them? There wasn't THAT much traffic.
I will ABSOLUTELY give her credit for realizing what she did and immediately conceding to the pilots and TCAS RA's and not adding any last-second confusing instructions. That's fairly new training and has to really be drilled-in, as your instincts are to immediately issue commands to avoid a collision, however at that point it's out of your hands. Don't say anything and trust TCAS, or you've got a situation like the Überlingen mid-air where the controller literally directed one plane into another (which was TRYING to follow the TCAS RA.)
Everything in aviation has redundancies, this time one failed and the secondary worked perfectly (as did the training for both crews AND the controller, as least once the situation became critical).
Keylime back there watching remembering someone going wide on base to final at Centennial. :(
TH-camrs can see ATC screwed the pooch on this one.
100%. Odd that UA didn’t speak up as soon as Delta turned base, certainly when they were cleared.
@@L123Alpha UA was high. So perhaps no visual. And while it was certainly on the TCAS display, they must've missed it for some reason. E.g. checklists, etc.
فَليسقُط دونالد ترامب (Donald Trump) أشَرُّ الدَّواب بإذن اللهِ العَزيزِ الوَهَّاب؛ إنّ الله غالِبٌ على أمرِه ولَكِنَّ أكثَر النَّاس لا يَعلَمون ..
اقتباس: "ونعلم أنك عَدوٌّ مُبينٌ لكافَّة المُستَنكِرين جرائم حَرْب قَتْل الأطفال والنِّساء والمُستَضعَفين في غزَّة المُكرمة مِن أصحاب الضَّمير والرَّحمة الإنسانيَّة في العالَمين؛ كونك زعيم النِّمس الشِّرير (بن غفير) مُدلَّل المُجرِم (بنيامين نتن ياهو)، ولكن بن غفير هو رأس الفِتنة المُعتَدي على مُقَدَّسات المُسلِمين، ونعلم أنَّك زعيم شياطين البشر من الذين ينهون عن المَعروف ويأمرون بالمُنكَر، ونعلم أنك عَدوٌّ مُبينٌ لكافَّة المُسالِمين مع المُسلِمين من النَّصارى واليهود وعَدوٌ للمُسالِمين مع المُسلمين في الشَّعْب الأمريكيّ، ونعلَم أنَّك عَدوٌّ لَدودٌ لكافَّة الشعوب العربيَّة والإسلاميَّة أجمَعين.
ونعلَم أنَّك عَدوٌّ لَدودٌ حَقودٌ على الشَّعْب اليَمانيّ الأبيّ العَرَبيّ، ولكنّي خَليفة الله على العالَم بأسرِه أُعلِنُ مِن وَسط عاصمة الخلافة الإسلامية العالميَّة (صنعاء) عن اقتراب نهاية ترامب (Trump) بأمرٍ من عند الله بِغض النَّظر عن ما سوف يُهلِكُكَ الله به؛ إنَّ الله على كُلِّ شَيءٍ قَديرٍ، مهما حرصت على أمْن نفسك فسوف تعلمُ ويعلَمُ العالَمُ بأسرِه أنّ الله بالغُ أمرهِ وأنَّ عَدوّ الله دونالد ترامب (Donald Trump) لن يُعجِز الله في الأرض ولَن يُعجزه هَرَبًا، ولسوف يعلَمُ العالمُ بأسرِه حقيقةَ قول الله تعالى: {قُلِ ٱللَّهُمَّ مَٰلِكَ ٱلْمُلْكِ تُؤْتِى ٱلْمُلْكَ مَن تَشَآءُ وَتَنزِعُ ٱلْمُلْكَ مِمَّن تَشَآءُ وَتُعِزُّ مَن تَشَآءُ وَتُذِلُّ مَن تَشَآءُ بِيَدِكَ ٱلْخَيْرُ إِنَّكَ عَلَىٰ كُلِّ شَىْءٍ قَدِيرٌ ﴿٢٦﴾} صدق الله العظيم [سورة آل عمران].
وسلامٌ على المُرسَلين والحَمدُ لله رَبِّ العالَمين..
خليفةُ الله على العَالَمين الإمام المهديّ؛ ناصِر مُحَمَّد اليَمانيّ."
______________
03 - رجب - 1446 هـ | 03 - 01 - 2025 مـ
الموقع لقراءة البيان كاملا: البشرى الإسلامية والنبأ العظيم
That Delta pilot. I love his clear, calm communication and decision making.
Delta has a lot of great pilots. Just this week they've had three guys each saving souls with quick decisive correct decisions.
Unfortunately the root problem is getting obscured by competence. The ATC system as-is, net of humans and reality of congestion and overly aggressive scheduling seems degenerately unsafe. It shouldn't be this fraught, and vulnerable to human error and task saturation. It should be routine and inherently safe.
This video is alarming.
I like how the pilot of #1724 just before going to tower frequency tells the controller "take care", which I interperet to have meant: "it's OK, close call but we're all OK and I know you know you screwed up, so I'm not piling on.....just, take care". The controller seems to sense that in the moment and responds "you too, thank you." Not to minimize at all the seriousness of a TCAS incident, but nice ending
I agree with that assessment. Aircrew and ATC are good at saying (non-operational) things without saying them, Ive learned. It's interesting to me.
Everybody involved was as cool and calm and professional as can reasonably be even *imagined* in that situation.
You've read into that a lot... "take care" is one of the most common sign-off's when leaving frequency.
@ck867 are you an aviator or ATC?
@@ck867, took away the same . I'm guessing ESL automaton with no feel for nuance?
Holy close call, Batman! This is why we have TCAS. That was just a little too close for comfort. I am grateful to the person who invented TCAS. It keeps the skies a lot safer for all of us.
Pretty sure TCAS was tested and proven at Langley AFB in Virginia.
And grateful to the passengers who gave their lives to perfect its use. You do what TCAS tells you to do. Humans are a lot more fallible than computers.
@ I grew up in the Hampton Roads area, which is where Langley is.
@ true, but I would still rather have human pilots in charge of my plane. Things would be better, though, if they got rid of the DEI crap and hired based on merit, like they used to.
@@ecclestonsangelyep. They could get rid of TCAS if they got back to only hiring men.
Classic example of why you don't have aircraft on a 90 degree base leg with parallel runway operations, especially when the aircraft is turning inside another going to another runway. Closure speed was so great that even the minor delay of talking to the UPS arrival ate up so much distance. That must have rattled her to the core.
Even without that delay there is no way they would have been able to turn sharply enough to not cross final.
It's OK to vector bases but everywhere I fly in Europe the opposite bases - for the same runway or independent parallels - are always 1000ft apart so if they cross to the other side for whatever reason (ATC forgets, distracted pilots, radio failures...) , the vertical separation is safe. Parallel locs are always intercepted 1000ft apart. EVEN with that, some airports I've visited tell you in their airport charts to turn in and INTERCEPT ON YOUR OWN if a final vector from ATC is not received (unless the explicitly tell you to cross the localizer or to expect to cross for sequencing reasons).
@@VASAviation Make no mistake, I'm not saying vectors onto the base leg are inappropriate or should be limited, I'm suggesting that the hard 90 degree base that United was on inside the final of the aircraft going to the other parallel creates a greater risk and should be considered only when workload permits. This controller allowed herself to get distracted by issuing instructions to other arrivals and I believe she underestimated the closure speeds between the two.
@@VASAviation Different altitudes for bases wouldn't really help here. The other aircraft was on a visual approach, so could have been at any altitude they wanted.
@@thomasdalton1508 well, but you know they 99% are going to be on the glideslope or near it. It's a crowded airspace. You better not deviate too much from the assigned altitudes by ATC or procedures.
Only requires a quick look back on this page to find out that this happens in PHX way too much. I remember last year, it happened 3 times in two weeks (base vectors with no instruction to intercept, resulting in unintended vectors through final). PHX ATC is great in every way (I'd almost say best in the country), except for this godforsaken turn to intercept final which seems to be a recurring issue.
they really need to fix that base vectoring and the altitudes they give during that base.
@@VASAviationit’s hard out there because of all the other airports in the area then you also got all the flight schools. Phx airspace is too crowded
@@Dont_Think_Do_Films indeed, that's true. It's a difficult airspace.
Did you only tell us? Or did you tell THEM as well?
yeah, it looks more like the ATC has too much to do. There should be two controllors and they should be at different heights and different distances for the turn.
2:34 the moment that you can even hear 'descend descend' in the background you know you have gone into severe incident territory... TCAS usually already advises 'traffic' about 30 seconds before that.
Even just the traffic advisory is bad enough but if it gets to resolution advisory (RA) the report will be a black mark against at least one person involved.
Exactly one, in this case, me'thinks. You can't turn someone on a base that crosses a glideslope and then pretend they aren't there.
@@CinemaDemocratica Was the new voice on the frequency at the end of the recording directing Delta to contact Tower a result of the incident or was there a second controller on the frequency already?
Hearing the Delta pilot get cut off mid sentence by that voice was harrowing
Delta's "...Let’s re-sequence..." was EXCELLENT!
Captain, B757 (not Delta)
I couldn't do this job. Even with the automation I'd be a one armed paperhanger. It would be awesome to have the RADAR screen in 3d for the people on the ground. Probably isn't that far away.
It'd be even more awesome if the entirety of ATC could be automated. Computers rarely forget things or lose their train of thought because they got distracted by something else. This is a job that can and should be entirely automated in 2024 already. Computers already handle much more complicated tasks than this. Easy for a computer and sometimes difficult for a human.
Thanks for sharing. I enjoy all of your content.
Impressive error management from the controller. Stayed calm and professional to not compound the error with panic. Very professional from the pilots, too, who no doubt will make many errors mitigated by technology in their careers and just got on with what they needed to do without a hint of anything blamey in their voice. Everyone will learn from this as long as fingers of blame aren't pointer and we acknowledge that we're all human (something beyond some commenters on here, inevitably).
No, the controller made a bad decision, showed bad technique and needs to be retrained (and probably was).
@@kewkabe No what? You just stated "no" but failed to negate anything the OP stated.
Impressive calm and professionalism from all involved, for sure -- and you're right, the blame game doesn't help anyone. But determining the cause and taking accountability for any errors -- retraining, termination or whatever is appropriate depending on the severity of the incident, experience, history etc. -- is key to the culture of safety. The controller erred and it's important for that to be acknowledged and remedied at the appropriate time.
Was her voice calm because she was professional or because she didn't realize she ran two airliners together? Her placidity reminded me of the controller in Austin a while back who almost put FedEx on top of Southwest.
This is the last video on youtube I'd expect to see someone writing a comment like "impressive" anything from the ATC. She not only fucked up majorly, three times by my count, but then failed to handle the situation afterwards. Even a simple request from the 1070 asking her what she wanted them to do now, she explicitly said she didn't understand what they asked.
Not. Good. Enough.
This is not a job you can be just ok at, or impressive at error management but not of actual flight path co-ordination. You need to be both, and you need to be more than impressive, certainly if this is what you call impressive.
Special thanks to fellow spotter Justin for sharing that photo though! What are the odds of catching something like that, right? It was helpful to see how that distance looks to the naked eye. I'm just glad both the planes responded to the TA/RA well in time 👍Anybody want to explain to me how did this happen in the first place - I mean did the ATC give them a miscalculated heading or something?
Yea, I happened to be at the right place at the right time. I go for a lot of walks and always watch the planes on their final approach. The Delta A330 definitely caught my eye since it was mid-turn to final (wrong runway of course) And then moments later saw the other plane come into view and knew right away they were way too close and quickly got out my phone. I definitely freaked out as it was all happening 😂 knew I had to submit to VASA immediately
@@jdawgg92 Haha, good catch. Cheers!
@@jdawgg92 thank you for that!! Wow! 🙀 Good eye!
@@jdawgg92 I agree amazing eye!
Delta was given a do not exceed speed and (I think) interpreted that as a maintain speed so they ended closer than planned, still didn't seem right and the UPS distraction may have contributed.
I fly into Scottsdale on a weekly basis. Crazy busy airspace with a huge amount of student traffic. We get a either a TA (traffic alert) or RA (resolution advisory) at least every 10th entry into PHX approach airspace.
Delta 1070 was assigned a heading and should have been cleared for the visual or localizer intercept after the controller assigned them that initial heading. By the time they did clear them for the approach, they were already through loc interception.
UPS standby.. would’ve helped her. She forgot to vector the Delta for the base or clear them for the visual while UPS carried on a with a long transmission…
@@Brahmlullies I think it was already too late by the time UPS requested a runway change.
"Tower, I have a number for you to call" moment
For as close as that was, everyone remained relatively calm, but still 🤯
These are the mistakes you learn from, she'll never do that again but she will remember this day forever.
This is why they invented TCAS in the place. The 1978 PSA crash near San Diego and the 1985 Aeromexico crash east of LAX forced the rapid deployment of TCAS. Today, TCAS has saved a lot of airplanes (except one collision in 2001, and that may have been a combination of poor ATC in southern Germany and (maybe) language issues with the Russian flight crew).
Sacto1654, just for the record. The accident happened under Swiss ATC
Russian crews had old soviet docs to follow ATC instructions only. after this crash they changed it.
The ATCO lived near me in Kloten. He was murdered by a father who lost his family that night. Still shocking to this day.
If only the Tupolev had followed TCAS. They and the DHL were diving to the same tiny contact point in time and space...
Was the 2001 the one where TCAS told plane A to descend and B to climb and ATC told the exact opposite? Both valid solutions until one pilot listened to TCAS and the other to ATC so a rule was written that TCAS overrides ATC instructions always? That was a good ACI episode
I'm kinda surprised the controllers automated warning didn't light up like a christmas tree before TCAS did?
@@repatch43 Yes, that does seem odd. She made a completely routine transmission to Delta just seconds before they got an RA. She should have already known it was too late for that.
I'm a London TMA ATCO (work side by side with Approach controllers, though I'm not one) I can only assume that their short term conflict alert is suppressed for radar returns on final. Our kit (London TC) would be going apeshit with that conflict 😅
@@StringyPete That assumption is the only one that makes sense, I think, but it seems unwise for them to be suppressed before ATC is no longer required to ensure separation... For runways more than 4,300 ft apart (which these are, just barely), they are required to ensure separation until the second aircraft is assigned a heading to intersect the runway centreline at less than 30 degrees. That only happened when they were assigned a heading of 100 seconds before the RA.
@@StringyPete Your colleague here at Amsterdam Radar too 😅
There are a lot of false alarms when running parallels so the controller can tend to tune them out.
I like ATC calm and professional. Pilots not throwing a fit, resequenced and land. I like her! 👍
She was calm because she had not yet realized that she was about to put two aircraft together plus all she has to do is file an ATSAP report and return to duty.
I like my ATC not directing two planes to occupy the same space, but agree, good on-air presence.
ATC calmly and professionally basically tried to kill them, what are you smoking.
she literally didn't know these two aircraft were about to collide in her airspace
Controller’s annunciation, cadence and voice is perfect for the job. As a non-pilot, I didn't miss a word.
Except for all the corrections she kept making
Plus. It was too slow. That's what caused this issue
I have been a life-long sky-watcher since 1973. I lived in Phoenix for the last nine years in an area that provided excellent visual contact with approaching and departing aircraft. Too many times I witnessed poor aircraft separation in the Sky Harbor airspace. Pilots, please keep vigilant.
I spent over 18 years of my 22 year career as an air traffic controller, working both tower and radar at several really busy bases. This controller dug a hole for herself and was throwing the dirt right back onto her head. That was a huge separation error that should have never happened.
Exactly. She was being way too cute with her loooong drawn out communications. Short and concise is the way to control. Otherwise, you encourage pilots to do the same and the frequency gets clogged up. She needs to be reprimanded for that performance. I'd have got a number on that one and called on the ground.
Very well done, composed, focused, no swearing whatsoever!
I'm a 30 year retired air traffic controller (ZDC, ZTL ARTCCs) and after retirement was hired by MITRE who developed TCAS and the manager who hired me was the actual TCAS original concept developer.
Why are you telling us this?
@@thomasdalton1508because it’s cool
TCAS saves lives! Such an important invention.
@@caiolinnertel8777 and what’s your opinion on this situation?
And?
Worked at P50 TRACON for 30 years, always had one final controller until the mid 2000’s and they split the finals. She was working 5 airplanes-that’’s considered light traffic, thus only 1 final. Always worked and always taught my trainees-you ALWAYS WORK RUNWAY OUT. You. Never put a guy on base leg with a straight in and get distracted. UPS was 20 miles from the airport-he is last priority in your thinking and verbalizing.
Why she didn’t descend Delta to 3000 on the downwind knowing she was turning him in prior to GEU is baffling or at the very least when she turned his base. Once she talked to SWA she lost the separation and the fact she responded to UPS after that shows she never even saw the incident happening until her scope lit up and bells sounded with the CA going off.
We lost 2 controllers back in the day for the exact same thing--prior to TCAS-and base leg traffic flew under straight in traffic by just a few hundred feet.
As a pilot, I don’t understand Delta continuing the 170 heading, a 90 deg turn from final for runway 8, but barreling straight on towards traffic lined for the 7R. They have a nav display. That United target would have become from a blue to a yellow dot with an aural “traffic, traffic.” That would be enough for me to use emergency authority and start turning towards my final, to break away the trajectory, and line up for 8. Then tell ATC afterwards.
One time going into EWR, we were setup to a 30 deg intercept leg for the LOC 22L. Then it got super busy on the radio with no way to get any wording in. I still remember telling the CA to just turn, turn inbound, intercept the LOC/GS now, otherwise we will shoot through final and encroach towards LGA airspace and traffic. And so we did. Never were able to get a word in. Switched to tower, checked in, they didn’t care. Filed our report, never heard anything back.
No way would I continue perpendicular towards traffic I know is lined to 7R.
Totally agree. Will have to watch the video again, but I'm assuming the controller assumed they would turn onto final...too much assuming going on, clearly.
You sure your experience isn’t just flight sim? We don’t declare emergencies or use “emergency authority” for traffic avoidance during parallel visual approaches. And we definitely don’t start turning on our own because we think there may be a conflict. That’s a good way to get violated when you then cause an event with other traffic you didn’t see.
And why would you ever be shooting a LOC 22L into EWR? If the glideslope is out, you shoot the RNAV or GLS.
@@prorobo Flown in and out of EWR since 1994. Plenty of times did Localizer only.
Agreed this is not that common except in New York you would not get violated turning on to final to avoid a traffic conflict. Even under IFR we are all supposed to see and AVOID, and avoiding by turning is clearly needed here. It's common sense.
Totally agree ! Why didn't delta speak up as he was about to go thru the 8 localizer ???? HELLO ???
Thank you TCAS
Ethernet packets collided and re-sequenced literally thousands of times just in the course of watching this video, but it happens just ONCE to airplanes in this video and everyone makes such a big fuss about it. (This is humor)
😂😂😂
Thank you for using Day/Month/Year as the ICAO timestamp. Personally I try to remember to put the month in letters, for International viewers, just like you have on this video intro 🙂
(the scientific version being Year/Month/Day/Hour/Minute/Second...etc etc]
I always do
@@VASAviation 🙂
Boy, I sure could hear the tone change in those pilot's voices after they responded to their tcas alerts. And then all communication became absolutely professional.
If you listen to the point the TCAS kicked on while one of the pilots was hot mike, you can instantly here the ATC tell them to do what they need to do and get back to her when done. Nicely done.
I'm starting to think that the only reason that aviation has a better safety record than railways, is that aircraft can perform evasive action. In the air, with a go-around, et cetera. Conflicts seem to occur all the time, but luckily, disaster is almost always avoided. With a train, if you see another one coming on your track, you're doomed.
Super interesting. Are there any weekly/monthly/yearly charts and or statistical breakdown relating to how many and what type of incidents are dealt with and by which airports?
Yes. The FAA has that info for internal use.
I hope someone relieved her from her seat asap to give her time to catch her breath and help her composure.
I assume a near miss will get properly analysed to improve training/give feedback where needed.
😅
if you watch the video entirely, you'll see when
Why not just issue the star as published, everyone conga lines to the runway. That way there are no altitude or speed surprises. The ATC freq should be quiet except when the controller needs to get involved. Too many instances of over control and then too many balls in the air. Something is gonna get missed.
Me picturing planes doing the conga...
Da da da da da DA
✈️🛩️✈️🛩️✈️🛩️✈️
I don’t understand why nearly all instrument flight movements are not exactly what is published in the approach plates. Why all the last minute armchair piloting from ATC?
That's wild, we get pictures too!
crazy, do you think this was just a coincidence someone taking that picture just at the right moment?
You can hear the moment the controller realizes how badly she screwed up.....
2:42
@@AndrewFremantle I didn't hear the controller realise that at all. She seemed completely unconcerned about it.
Phoenix Approach, Possible Controller Error, contact FAA for immediate evaluation.
@@dayeightfloyd5495 What's that's supposed to me?
Realizing or not, she continued to control planes in calm manner.
Between EGPWS and TCAS IV - hundreds if not thousands ,of lives have been no doubt saved around the world in the last 30 years.
I'm pretty sure we had a TCAS RA on our flight 2 days ago, we took off from FLL, and I saw from my 8A seat traffic at our 10 o clock, and then we started to expedite our climb, and about 30 seconds later we reduced our climb rate back to what it was.
Im impressed at thr professionalism of all involved. A mistake happend but instead of panic from atc or alpha male whine from the pilots, everyone worked through the issue. There is always time after everyone is safely on the ground to do whatever. Great show if how to handel pressure and remain professional.
thats her fu*** job
Clear and a million, I'm thinking I'm looking at the runway, localizer and tcas. I might have asked for a turn or mentioned the traffic before an RA. That's a "might"
Am I the only one disappointed the "170" wasn't headed 170?
ABSOLUTELY need to do a thorough investigation of this incident. Since these kind of incidents (TCAS avoidance) could easily be tracked systemwide and forecast using ADSB data I'm surprised that they still happen. TCAS should just be a backup for anything that might leak through.
what they need is another controller for the other runway, and differnt distances and heights for the turns in. Too much for one person.
When seeing situations like this, I wonder if over reliance on ATC providing manual vectors for visual approaches is a problem? If everyone tracks a published approached, then both the airplanes and ATC already know where everyone is going and you don't need to manually vector everyone (especially in congested airspace when people are already stepping on each other on frequency)
Nah, generally it's 10x safer than any alternative, as ATC is (supposed to) have much better SA of the entire traffic pattern and area. Fast jets in congested airspace flying with VFR-ish rules would be a disaster. Sequencing becomes a huge problem that only ATC can handle - if you have multiple inbound aircraft from different directions, how can you get them spaced and sequenced for the same runway? They can't sequence each other - has to be a 3rd party to tell SOMEONE to get behind the other, slow down, speed up, etc. I believe pilots almost ALWAYS feel safer getting vectors by ATC, and would actually prefer it 100% of the time, however it's demanding on ATC and only really used for final vectoring or emergencies (or if specifically requested.)
I don't think the capacity is high enough is most of the problem.
Surprised the pilots didn't ask the controller to take down a number... ;-)
im sure one of them did, when talking to departure controller
That would not have been funny after directing two planes at each other. Glad she didn't loose it and take out her phone to record.. That problem exists frequently elsewhere..
That made me laugh, considering that I once had the dreaded "Call this number after landing" transmission from North Tower at Sky Harbor. We're all human, and we're all prone to making mistakes.
idk man if you know there's going to be all kinds of investigators and maybe press going over the tapes you probably want to keep it all business
Why do I see so many comments slamming TCAS and automation? It probably just saved hundreds of lives in this video
I only see TCAS and automation being elevated, not put down...
Could’ve used less casual language to increase instruction speed. Keep it short and sweet. Additionally, priorities were a little mixed. You can always say standby for less priority transmissions.
Was it me or was UPS pretty sure he was more important than everyone else so he took valuable attention away?
Wondering if this will be reviewed by FAA/NTSB ?
As flight crews perform a periodic primary instrument scan, are controllers so trained? Perhaps if she had paused between those longer transmissions, scanned, and noted the conflict, the situation would have been far different.
Aren't these radar systems smart enough to predict potential conflicts and give controllers a warning?
These are not near-misses. They are near-hits!
George Carlin.
Heh. “Near” in this context means nearby, not nearly. Proximity rather than probability. Much as I love Carlin, he got that one wrong.
"And Tower, we have a telephone number for you. Let me know when ready to copy."
it's not Tower😅
I’m afraid it’s gonna take a disaster before ATC stops multi tasking. The last near miss that was caught by TCAS, the NTSB report noted controller multitasking in the main reason why they stopped maintaining visual on the aircraft (JFK incident; ground controller was looking down at their desk doing a “lesser task”
This is a good example of "Why ATC's have to speak with short sentences". When every response took 10 secs, you will lose your awareness and become hard to understand what you mean.
Distractions happen, we're all human. Hope this controller learns from this situation. Thank goodness for TCAS and the pilots' swift resolution.
BS. she should be fired. unacceptable .
Yep. It’s hard to beat a straight in. DAL1070 is traveling ZERO knots towards the airport while on that base leg while UAL1724 is chewing his a$$ up at 240 knots on the straight in.
What was delta doing just driving right on thru the localizer for their expected approach ? ATC probably thought she had already cleared them. It's one thing to follow orders but another to question them when they don't pass the common sense test. Delta should have been more proactive here.
I think they probably did want to question it but since the radio was so busy they hesitated…
Pushing Tin on overly chatty COMMS.
Whatever happened to brevity?
2:33 TCAS & B737 Autopilot disengage sound...
Phoenix Sky Harbor Intl. Airport
11th day, 1751 Zulu
Wind 120 at 4, Visibility 10 (statute miles)
Clear Skies (automated)
Temperature 12, dewpoint minus 8
Altimeter 3007 (inches mercury)
Remarks:
Automated Precipitation Discrimination in effect
Sea Level Pressure 1017.8 hectopascals (QNH)
Exact temperature 11.7, exact dewpoint minus 8.3
6-hour max temperature, 11.7
6-hour min temperature, 4.4
Previous 3-hour pressure tendency= stable (none), difference 1.1 hectopascals
No maintenance check
Is it me, or do I hear pilots enunciate a lot more clearly after "an event", probably knowing that the tapes are going to be reviewed (and posted here 🙂 ). Perhaps a dash of adrenaline too...I sure that TCAS going off is quite the wake-up call.
And it was on this day the internet learned how a 40 year old aircraft system design saved the lives of 300 ~ people.
I know it’s easy for me to say, but as an armchair pilot I could see what was going to happen at 1:55 when the controller first started speaking to UPS instead of turning Delta to final. Big and scary brain fart from the controller.
I have learned more from this comment section than I have from almost any other TH-cam channel.
The system worked.
The “backup” system worked….the “system”..being her…did not work
It sounds like the left turn to 100 degrees was just a little late. Controlling parallel approaches always looks difficult!
I have a few questions and will be very happy about any explanation so I may learn something new about aviation:
At 0:16, SWA2657 says (according to the transcript) "descending via to 7" - what do they mean by "via to" here?
At 1:12 LYM3101 expects "8": Do they refer to Runway 8 and if they do, did someone tell them (before) to expect that particular runway or is it a preference/request by the pilots?
At 1:46 UPS9872 is leveled at 8000' with DELTA - what does Delta refer to in this context? DAL1070? Or ATIS?
At 2:10 UPS9872 just changed something/"it" to runway 8 - what is "it"? Seems like something they may chose/select/change on their own?
Thanks in advance
"descend via" is a newer arrival route into metro airports such as phoenix. it has prescribed altitudes and speeds at specified points along the route. atc either assigns an altitude such as "descend and maintain 9,000" and the plane will just descend at a normal rate to 9000, at whichever speed the pilot wishes, or as assigned by atc. Descend via on the other hand will sound more like "swa2657 descend via the XXXXX arrival" and the plane will do exactly what is prescribed in the arrival. Descend vias are built with efficiency in mind, like what is efficient to get more planes into an airport, what is efficient for the airline to save fuel, etc.
expect 8 is referring to the runway. some arrivals are to more than 1 runway, or the airport atis is broadcasting more than 1 available landing runway, and "expect 8" is shorthand for "expect runway 8"
ups should be referring to atis D in this case, if they meant that they had dal1070 in sight, for example the previous controller called that traffic and told them to report in sight, they should have said something like "we have delta in sight" or something similar to alleviate any confusion.
ups was likely referring to their FMS, flight management system, basically their planes main computer, which they will rely on for navigation, landing info, instrument approaches, etc
@nap1zzle thank you for taking your time, great answer
The ATC system has some odd things, this is one of them. You would think that turning to intercept final automatically, rather then blow through final. It is not. Another one which should be standard is land, unless you are explicitly told to go around. But again, that is not the case. Often on short final, tower is busy in some long winded discussion with someone about something and on occasion, barely gets out the landing clearance call at the last moment.
And from the tone of this guys voice, it may be that he was assigned 7R (which works better for Delta at Sky Harbor since the new gates are on the south side) on his initial checkin. The way the PM answered the call, with a bit of surprise that he was cleared the visual to the north runway, might indicate that they were originally assigned 7R and were planning on 7R. This does happen. Often on checkin you are assigned a runway, but get, unexpectedly, cleared a visual to a different one. Usually they ask if you have the visual, and I am sure that is the rule, but...
I have had some TA/RAs and it is a handy tool. Its weakness is that it is two dimensional. It does not consider lateral offset. So, you can get RAs that are bogus. Regardless, since you do not know, you respond to the RA and figure out what happened later.
In some airports that I fly at in Europe, they literally tell you in charts to turn in and intercept on your own during final vectors if no instruction from ATC is received unless they have previously told you to cross the localizer or to expect it due sequencing. That would have saved this one.
"Hey, ATC is talking to someone else, we're almost there, loc is alive or I see the runway... let's turn in." No harm with UAL. Done.
I'm almost positive that DAL1070 was not assigned 7R. The EAGUL arrival isn't assigned 7R unless special conditions exist, like runway closures during the overnight shift or emergencies. Since UPS was on a descend via for runway 8, and LYM3101 was there (they always show up in the middle of the day), I'm almost positive that nobody on the north side of the airport had been assigned 7R until the approach controller attempted to help UPS with their request for 7R.
Same with the BRUSR arrival that UPS was on, which is why he said something about, "... it was taking too long, can we just do 8 now." Pilots will ask Albuquerque Center about landing on the south runway from the north arrivals and are always told, "You'll have to make that request with Approach."
Disagree with the standard to land part. That's how equipment on the runway and/or traffic crossing the runway gets hit.
@@afd33 The chart has you turn on final, not cleared to land. That has to come from the controller.
You are wrong about tcas being two-dimensional 🤡🤡🤡 tcas absolutely takes altitude into consideration and tells you whether to go up or down. If you are a pilot you should have known the system better than this
followed the TCAS... well done...
Is that controller a Metal Welder in her spare time!? Not even a damn apology.
@ 2:14 Instead of (responding the UPS request) + (UPS call back) (total 15 sec) ,,, she should have said: break break , DAL1070 turn left IMIDIATELY to intercept 8 ... when she finally did it , DAL was already overshooting the intersction .... (of course, its easyer from my sofa) ,,,, feel for her ,,, right in the end she was released 😒
I often wonder why these incidents are called "near misses". Yes, they missed, but "near collision" would be a more appropriate term.
One more time: ‘Visual Approaches are the Wild West of IFR Arrivals’
Thank God for TCAS
Looks like Delta overshot the extended centerline for 8
That was a close shave.
I love TCAS
I flew over Phoenix on the 10th lol. Interesting.
Considering that there are always two aircraft involved in an RA, a shortened reply as "TCAS RA acknowledged by tower" might make sense unless with caveat that this could create confusion between multiple RAs going on at the same time
In EASA/ICAO land the standard phraseology is “Delta 1070 TCAS RA” and the only response from ATC should be “Roger”. That’s it. Until the aircraft calls again with “Delta 1070 Clear of Conflict”. Only then should ATC start asking questions/reissuing clearances.
But this is the US so standard phraseology just doesn’t translate somehow.
Standard phraseology is just "roger" and wait for the "clear of conflict" from any of them.
...so it's again icao phrasology adherence problem
@@jamesbartholomew1481we use the same standard phraseology in the US. At least, we are supposed to.
I'm guessing a Juan Brown upload is near.
reviewing now...yikes!
@@blancolirio When do you have time to do your day job or your laundry or cook dinner or anything else?
Hi guys.
How are you doing?
How's the weather?
Anyone mind if I change to runway 8?
controller forgot to clear the DAL1070 in time but I know parallel ops are standard and work here but shouldn't they both be assigned hard altittudes and be established on the localizer prior to being cleared to descend on the approach? feel like having that out would eliminate this situation no?
Automation being always being a center of discussion, today saved two more planes. Dont know Airline procedures, but TCAS RA should be never overriden by controller indications.
At least she did that properly.
She was just a bit slow on calling that intercept heading. I’ve had it happen to me and it always drives me crazy when it happens, but you got to be aware of it with parallel approaches like that.
When TCAS needs to separate planes are there any repercussions to the controller?
Holy cats ATC didn't seem to know WTF was happening.
Those pilots were very professional. They could tell she was getting behind and losing the scope. She’ll watch the tape of that one over and over and never understand how she could have missed it.
She should be fired.
If we fired everyone who made a mistake they could learn from, everyone would be out of a job
@ there’s a difference between bagging groceries and air traffic control. She almost killed hundreds of people due to sheer incompetence
I blame UPS asking for a change in runway! LOL
Good job on the ATC supervisor for replacing the affected controller quickly after the RA, mistakes happen, she was obviously shaken.
where is the change? sounds like the same woman the whole time
I noticed that also. I was about to ask why wasn’t she relieved from her position when I saw your comment.
I never hear correct phraseology when I listen to American atc convo’s
apparently my opinion is controversional but 1) i don't think the day needed saving by tcas, they were closer than comfortable but had a *bit* of margin remaining. what they really needed were earlier traffic alerts from the controller. 2) the controller didn't completely screw the pooch, altho it was below average perf. below average, but not much below average. 3) honestly i think this is being overblown. worth sharing? yes, all the comments on point? not really, imo.