Would LOVE a series going over definitions, would be incredibly helpful for someone like me who often feels like theyre in over their head reading this stuff
I think it can be safely said that the two subjects where the definition of "hypostasis" is the most foundational to would be 1) Triadology contra Sabellius and 2) Christology (one composite nature vs two enduring natures, and how "hypostasis" fits into here). That being said, what would the Chalcedonian apologetic be to the following questions?: 1) If "an essence with [particularizing] properties" is a hypostasis, then how does that avoid saying that the Trinity is "three essences with [particularizing] properties"? 2) If Christ is composed of parts (essences with properties [born of a Virgin, brown hair, begotten of the Father, second of the Trinity]), and the "parts" are distinct in reality, then how would Christ not then be composed of hypostases (which is what the Cyrillian/Severian tradition speaks of unceasingly)? Further, what can make the hypostasis "one hypostasis" if it remains two of this same metaphysical category? This sounds reminiscent to the Theodorean concept of one-subject-but-also-dual-subject Christology which the Cyrillian tradition held to be contradictory and therefore unable to be orthodox. From a Severian viewpoint, the solution to the first question would be "it's not 'essence with properties,' but instead 'particularization of essence' wherein the properties accede from the essential." In this view, we could maintain a oneness of "essence" while a threefold of "particularizations of that essence" is also true. But, when it comes to the second question, I don't see how the modified definition of hypostasis can suffice, since Christ would still have to be "one hypostasis composed of two hypostases," when the Chalcedonian framework necessitates that the whole and parts are different metaphysical categories (since the parts endure in their twoness while being one in some other way).
This is in fact not very complicated. [1] Every human person is human nature + distinguishing properties. This does not necessitate that we are not distinct human natures. The Persons of the Trinity are The Divinity + hypostatic property. [2] The 'parts' that compose Christ are the 2 natures, divine and human. Nature & properties are not "parts," ie that the Logos is the divine nature + begotten does not necessitate those are both "parts."
@@jonathanhill2737 thank you. So for 1, you're basically equating "essence with properties" to "particularization of essence," you'd then basically be saying that the reader isn't therefore numbering essences when he numbers hypostases, did I get that right? For 2, if the Logos is not one of the two "parts," and the other "part" does not include being of a Virgin, having brown hair etc., then how can the whole (the incarnate Christ) account for being "Only begotten" and also "a Nazarene" if not from the parts which compose the whole?
@@thomascomerford9683 [1] No I did not say it would be "particularization of essence." That is a misunderstanding. [2] The parts are the natures which compose the whole.
@@jonathanhill2737 okay thank you for the correction on 1. For 2, the general substances of humanity and divinity composing the whole Christ doesn't answer for the whole having particularizing properties such as "only-begotten" and "Nazarene," hence the focus of what I'm asking is how the whole accounts for having these properties, if the parts do not in fact contain said properties. My understanding is that when we speak of "the whole" and "the parts," we are saying the whole is able to account for everything it has from the parts.
The distiguishing properties *are* Christ's. So the reason there are not 2x hypostases is that He only assumes human nature: He does not assume human nature + properties b/c that would be to assume another hypostasis. Natural properties are natural. Natural properties are not some "part" other than the nature. Obviously no one thinks that being begotten from the Father is a "part" of the Logos, lest the Logos be made of parts.
So its a mode of nature. That an intelligent creator can take to act and interact within in a certain way? That sometimes seem to have its own independent intelligence? I think that could have been stated more plainly.
@@jonathanhill2737 Yes I suppose It's a mode of nature only if your'e a pantheist. I mean nature as in something that exists in the universe. As opposed to something that exists in some kind of metaphysical non temporal sense outside of it. If god is transcendent and outside of existence than a hypostasis would be like a hand extending into creation and acting in a seemingly independent way as an agent of this intelligence. Or am I misunderstanding?
Would LOVE a series going over definitions, would be incredibly helpful for someone like me who often feels like theyre in over their head reading this stuff
In case you weren’t aware, I put out a new video this morning on the brief dialogue we had on the Trinity.
I think it can be safely said that the two subjects where the definition of "hypostasis" is the most foundational to would be 1) Triadology contra Sabellius and 2) Christology (one composite nature vs two enduring natures, and how "hypostasis" fits into here).
That being said, what would the Chalcedonian apologetic be to the following questions?:
1) If "an essence with [particularizing] properties" is a hypostasis, then how does that avoid saying that the Trinity is "three essences with [particularizing] properties"?
2) If Christ is composed of parts (essences with properties [born of a Virgin, brown hair, begotten of the Father, second of the Trinity]), and the "parts" are distinct in reality, then how would Christ not then be composed of hypostases (which is what the Cyrillian/Severian tradition speaks of unceasingly)? Further, what can make the hypostasis "one hypostasis" if it remains two of this same metaphysical category? This sounds reminiscent to the Theodorean concept of one-subject-but-also-dual-subject Christology which the Cyrillian tradition held to be contradictory and therefore unable to be orthodox.
From a Severian viewpoint, the solution to the first question would be "it's not 'essence with properties,' but instead 'particularization of essence' wherein the properties accede from the essential."
In this view, we could maintain a oneness of "essence" while a threefold of "particularizations of that essence" is also true. But, when it comes to the second question, I don't see how the modified definition of hypostasis can suffice, since Christ would still have to be "one hypostasis composed of two hypostases," when the Chalcedonian framework necessitates that the whole and parts are different metaphysical categories (since the parts endure in their twoness while being one in some other way).
This is in fact not very complicated.
[1] Every human person is human nature + distinguishing properties. This does not necessitate that we are not distinct human natures. The Persons of the Trinity are The Divinity + hypostatic property.
[2] The 'parts' that compose Christ are the 2 natures, divine and human. Nature & properties are not "parts," ie that the Logos is the divine nature + begotten does not necessitate those are both "parts."
@@jonathanhill2737 thank you.
So for 1, you're basically equating "essence with properties" to "particularization of essence," you'd then basically be saying that the reader isn't therefore numbering essences when he numbers hypostases, did I get that right?
For 2, if the Logos is not one of the two "parts," and the other "part" does not include being of a Virgin, having brown hair etc., then how can the whole (the incarnate Christ) account for being "Only begotten" and also "a Nazarene" if not from the parts which compose the whole?
@@thomascomerford9683
[1] No I did not say it would be "particularization of essence." That is a misunderstanding.
[2] The parts are the natures which compose the whole.
@@jonathanhill2737 okay thank you for the correction on 1. For 2, the general substances of humanity and divinity composing the whole Christ doesn't answer for the whole having particularizing properties such as "only-begotten" and "Nazarene," hence the focus of what I'm asking is how the whole accounts for having these properties, if the parts do not in fact contain said properties. My understanding is that when we speak of "the whole" and "the parts," we are saying the whole is able to account for everything it has from the parts.
The distiguishing properties *are* Christ's. So the reason there are not 2x hypostases is that He only assumes human nature: He does not assume human nature + properties b/c that would be to assume another hypostasis.
Natural properties are natural. Natural properties are not some "part" other than the nature.
Obviously no one thinks that being begotten from the Father is a "part" of the Logos, lest the Logos be made of parts.
5:14 bookmark
Hey. He's back.
So its a mode of nature. That an intelligent creator can take to act and interact within in a certain way? That sometimes seem to have its own independent intelligence? I think that could have been stated more plainly.
It isn't just a mode of a nature
@@jonathanhill2737 Yes I suppose It's a mode of nature only if your'e a pantheist. I mean nature as in something that exists in the universe. As opposed to something that exists in some kind of metaphysical non temporal sense outside of it. If god is transcendent and outside of existence than a hypostasis would be like a hand extending into creation and acting in a seemingly independent way as an
agent of this intelligence. Or am I misunderstanding?
monohypostasitism (divine alone) vs miahypostasitism (both divine & human)
Interesting