I'm curious to know why three very able Christians think that neurobiology adds much, if anything, to our existing historical and socio-cultural way of self-understanding? The discussion is saturated with fallacies: the mereological fallacy of attributing psychological verbs to the activity of the brain as opposed to the human being - brains don’t think, etc., only persons do that; the fallacy that the locus of mind is in the brain as opposed to the embodied person who is embedded in a social, cultural and historical community; the fallacy that we have both minds and souls as opposed to embodied and embedded minds; the idea that neuroscience provides a better understanding of our minds rather than the variety of philosophers who have reflected on what it means to be a human being. In this regard, Aristotle thought we ‘become what we repeatedly do’, not what our brains do as it is the human being that is the agent, not their brain. He also identified that to become virtuous requires two components: 1. an internal motivational component; b. an external model of virtue. It is such interactions with others that shape our embodied, communal minds, not ‘shape our brains’, and, by extension, embed us in an appropriate social, historical and cultural setting. What Wittgenstein described as his 100% Hebraic thinking is the elephant in the middle of this discussion: 'the best picture of the soul is the human body'. The biblical account of Christ’s resurrection as both embodied but transformed should caution everyone against mind-in-brain and soul and body dualisms. See: Bennett, M & Hacker, P. (2003) (2022 -2nd edition) Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Wiley Blackwell, Oxford.
I think this response deserves more replies than it's getting. I'm eager to learn more about Wittgenstein's Hebraic thinking, and about the distinction between a brain and a person. Oh, and the relation between a word and the Word.
@@henrymchenryjr6870 What is the difference between personal presence (to another) and perception/thinking? Being with another affords the possibility of dialogue and other forms of inter-personal communication, which shouldn’t be dichotomized with individual thoughts and perceptions. To paraphrase Vygotsky (1973): “Art (thinking - perception less so - see next paragraph) is the social within us, and even if its action is performed by a single individual, it does not mean that its essence is individual” (p. 249). Vygotsky’s social view of mind complements Wittgenstein’s, who is famous, amongst other things, for demolishing the private language argument. Perception, unlike other types of thinking, is not socially constructed. Wittgenstein draws a distinction between the grammar of “seeing” and “seeing-as”. A person who sees a pair of shoes on a floor does not say ‘I see the things on the floor as a pair of shoes’. In the life-world a person never describes what they see in terms of something else, unless when using metaphors or dealing with ambiguous stimuli. Wittgenstein distinguished language for describing phenomena from more conceptual thinking in this way: “I should like to say: there are aspects which are mainly determined by thoughts and associations, and others which are ‘purely optical’ ”. (Wittgenstein,1980, #970). ‘Thinking’, a widely ramified concept. A concept that comprises many manifestations of life. The phenomena of thinking are widely scattered. ( Wittgenstein, Zettel, # 110) Like other dispositions and faculties, our natural history (biologically given capacities) then gets polished by social and cultural processes. A corollary is J.J. Gibson's (1979) The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, which undermines 'seeing' as a socially constructed process. In this regard, the famous art and cultural historian, Ernst Gombrich once ridiculed Rudolf Arnheim for writing that visual representation was relative, by adding 'in that case, this year's edition of the Sears Roebuck mail-order catalogue will probably be produced in the cubist style'. Like other dispositions and capacities, our natural history gets polished through social and cultural processes. Seeing that man who has a sword in Durer’s painting as St. Paul requires seeing-as.
@@henrymchenryjr6870 Oh, and the relation between a word and the Word. Wittgenstein has nothing much to say on this topic. A more general response (derived from W's thinking about language having overlapping features or intermediate cases rather than an essence) might be to see a word and the Word as belonging on a spectrum with a word at one end and the Word at the other and intermediate cases in between. Jesus is both the Word of God who speaks creation and truth into being and an incarnated human being, that is, someone who uses specific culturally derived words as a way of manifesting truth and meaning. However, the idea, as found in certain Protestant churches, that propositional knowing is sovereign, from a Christian perspective is misplaced, which brings me back to Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein undermined the sovereign status of propositional knowledge by drawing attention to the four ways we have of condensing meaning: meaning as use, meaning as rule-following, meaning as custom, meaning as physiognomy. Language plays a part in all four aspects of meaning, but each aspect also transcends language. For example, meaning as physiognomy deals with the way the visual engages with meaning, which not only has its biology in the need to read faces but, by extension, our ability to read the 'face of the world'. Reading the face of the world has been known as reading the book of nature, in contrast to the book of scripture
Distinction between a brain and a person Read the books listed below, especially Bennett and Hacker. Max Bennett is a world-rated neuroscientist and Peter Hacker is a leading expert on and exegete of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. (Warning - their book is over 400 pages long and quite demanding for anyone unfamiliar with, say, philosophy of mind, but fortune always favours the brave.) Ray Monk’s biography of W. is a brilliant introduction to both him and his key ideas. Finch’s book is probably the best short introduction to Wittgenstein’s thinking and why it really, really matters that I know about. It should be compulsory reading for all Christians. Monk, R. (1991) Ludwig Wittgenstein: the Duty of Genius, Vintage, London. Finch, H, L. (1995) Wittgenstein, Element, Shaftesbury. Bennett, M. & Hacker, P. (2003) Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Blackwell, Oxford (2ndedition, 2022)
@@henrymchenryjr6870 Wittgenstein's Hebraic thinking This is manifested in an implicit way throughout his dispersed writing, notably his rejection of Platonism and the Cartesian dualism of the disembodied mind and the body, which isn’t biblical. By extension, the Christian’s destiny is not to be a disembodied soul but an embodied transformed person. I tend to agree with N.T. Wright’s view that when creation is renewed we will be resurrected and located on this earth, not floating around in a disembodied place called heaven. Labron’s (2006) book is a good place to start an exploration of W.’s Hebraic thought. Fergus Kerr’s (1986) book introduces the reader to Wittgenstein’s demolition job on many of the misconceptions of our time concerning mind, persons, and meaning. Kerr’s (2008) book is an excellent introduction to W.’s philosophical psychology. Kerr, F. (1986) Theology after Wittgenstein, Blackwell, Oxford . Kerr, F. (2008) Work on Oneself: Wittgenstein's Philosophical Psychology, Catholic University Press, Washington. Labron, T. (2006) Wittgenstein's Religious Point of View, Bloomsbury, London. Labron, T. (2009) Wittgenstein and Theology, T & T Clark, London. Malcolm, N. (1986) Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View, Routledge, London.
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I'm curious to know why three very able Christians think that neurobiology adds much, if anything, to our existing historical and socio-cultural way of self-understanding? The discussion is saturated with fallacies: the mereological fallacy of attributing psychological verbs to the activity of the brain as opposed to the human being - brains don’t think, etc., only persons do that; the fallacy that the locus of mind is in the brain as opposed to the embodied person who is embedded in a social, cultural and historical community; the fallacy that we have both minds and souls as opposed to embodied and embedded minds; the idea that neuroscience provides a better understanding of our minds rather than the variety of philosophers who have reflected on what it means to be a human being. In this regard, Aristotle thought we ‘become what we repeatedly do’, not what our brains do as it is the human being that is the agent, not their brain. He also identified that to become virtuous requires two components: 1. an internal motivational component; b. an external model of virtue. It is such interactions with others that shape our embodied, communal minds, not ‘shape our brains’, and, by extension, embed us in an appropriate social, historical and cultural setting. What Wittgenstein described as his 100% Hebraic thinking is the elephant in the middle of this discussion: 'the best picture of the soul is the human body'. The biblical account of Christ’s resurrection as both embodied but transformed should caution everyone against mind-in-brain and soul and body dualisms.
See: Bennett, M & Hacker, P. (2003) (2022 -2nd edition) Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Wiley Blackwell, Oxford.
I think this response deserves more replies than it's getting. I'm eager to learn more about Wittgenstein's Hebraic thinking, and about the distinction between a brain and a person. Oh, and the relation between a word and the Word.
And: what is the difference between personal presence (to another) and perception/thinking?
@@henrymchenryjr6870 What is the difference between personal presence (to another) and perception/thinking?
Being with another affords the possibility of dialogue and other forms of inter-personal communication, which shouldn’t be dichotomized with individual thoughts and perceptions. To paraphrase Vygotsky (1973): “Art (thinking - perception less so - see next paragraph) is the social within us, and even if its action is performed by a single individual, it does not mean that its essence is individual” (p. 249). Vygotsky’s social view of mind complements Wittgenstein’s, who is famous, amongst other things, for demolishing the private language argument.
Perception, unlike other types of thinking, is not socially constructed. Wittgenstein draws a distinction between the grammar of “seeing” and “seeing-as”. A person who sees a pair of shoes on a floor does not say ‘I see the things on the floor as a pair of shoes’. In the life-world a person never describes what they see in terms of something else, unless when using metaphors or dealing with ambiguous stimuli. Wittgenstein distinguished language for describing phenomena from more conceptual thinking in this way: “I should like to say: there are aspects which are mainly determined by thoughts and associations, and others which are ‘purely optical’ ”. (Wittgenstein,1980, #970). ‘Thinking’, a widely ramified concept. A concept that comprises many manifestations of life. The phenomena of thinking are widely scattered. ( Wittgenstein, Zettel, # 110) Like other dispositions and faculties, our natural history (biologically given capacities) then gets polished by social and cultural processes.
A corollary is J.J. Gibson's (1979) The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, which undermines 'seeing' as a socially constructed process. In this regard, the famous art and cultural historian, Ernst Gombrich once ridiculed Rudolf Arnheim for writing that visual representation was relative, by adding 'in that case, this year's edition of the Sears Roebuck mail-order catalogue will probably be produced in the cubist style'. Like other dispositions and capacities, our natural history gets polished through social and cultural processes. Seeing that man who has a sword in Durer’s painting as St. Paul requires seeing-as.
@@henrymchenryjr6870 Oh, and the relation between a word and the Word.
Wittgenstein has nothing much to say on this topic. A more general response (derived from W's thinking about language having overlapping features or intermediate cases rather than an essence) might be to see a word and the Word as belonging on a spectrum with a word at one end and the Word at the other and intermediate cases in between. Jesus is both the Word of God who speaks creation and truth into being and an incarnated human being, that is, someone who uses specific culturally derived words as a way of manifesting truth and meaning. However, the idea, as found in certain Protestant churches, that propositional knowing is sovereign, from a Christian perspective is misplaced, which brings me back to Wittgenstein.
Wittgenstein undermined the sovereign status of propositional knowledge by drawing attention to the four ways we have of condensing meaning: meaning as use, meaning as rule-following, meaning as custom, meaning as physiognomy. Language plays a part in all four aspects of meaning, but each aspect also transcends language. For example, meaning as physiognomy deals with the way the visual engages with meaning, which not only has its biology in the need to read faces but, by extension, our ability to read the 'face of the world'. Reading the face of the world has been known as reading the book of nature, in contrast to the book of scripture
Distinction between a brain and a person
Read the books listed below, especially Bennett and Hacker. Max Bennett is a world-rated neuroscientist and Peter Hacker is a leading expert on and exegete of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. (Warning - their book is over 400 pages long and quite demanding for anyone unfamiliar with, say, philosophy of mind, but fortune always favours the brave.) Ray Monk’s biography of W. is a brilliant introduction to both him and his key ideas. Finch’s book is probably the best short introduction to Wittgenstein’s thinking and why it really, really matters that I know about. It should be compulsory reading for all Christians.
Monk, R. (1991) Ludwig Wittgenstein: the Duty of Genius, Vintage, London.
Finch, H, L. (1995) Wittgenstein, Element, Shaftesbury.
Bennett, M. & Hacker, P. (2003) Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Blackwell, Oxford (2ndedition, 2022)
@@henrymchenryjr6870 Wittgenstein's Hebraic thinking
This is manifested in an implicit way throughout his dispersed writing, notably his rejection of Platonism and the Cartesian dualism of the disembodied mind and the body, which isn’t biblical. By extension, the Christian’s destiny is not to be a disembodied soul but an embodied transformed person. I tend to agree with N.T. Wright’s view that when creation is renewed we will be resurrected and located on this earth, not floating around in a disembodied place called heaven.
Labron’s (2006) book is a good place to start an exploration of W.’s Hebraic thought. Fergus Kerr’s (1986) book introduces the reader to Wittgenstein’s demolition job on many of the misconceptions of our time concerning mind, persons, and meaning. Kerr’s (2008) book is an excellent introduction to W.’s philosophical psychology.
Kerr, F. (1986) Theology after Wittgenstein, Blackwell, Oxford
.
Kerr, F. (2008) Work on Oneself: Wittgenstein's Philosophical Psychology, Catholic University Press, Washington.
Labron, T. (2006) Wittgenstein's Religious Point of View, Bloomsbury, London.
Labron, T. (2009) Wittgenstein and Theology, T & T Clark, London.
Malcolm, N. (1986) Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View, Routledge, London.