Thank you to the Modern War Institute and Irregular Warfare Initiative for putting this together. There are a lot of great takeaways for military leaders, but we are still missing the West’s key lesson from Afghanistan. That lesson is that an insurgency cannot be countered by an occupying force. John Steinbeck and the Office of Strategic Services illustrated this simple fact in The Moon is Down. Western irregular warfare against the Taliban fell apart when troop levels jumped to about 20,0000 in 2005 and the COIN strategy was adopted. Only a Maoist insurgency stood a chance of delegitimizing the Taliban. Largescale western occupation did the opposite.
Thank you to the Modern War Institute and Irregular Warfare Initiative for putting this together. There are a lot of great takeaways for military leaders, but we are still missing the West’s key lesson from Afghanistan. That lesson is that an insurgency cannot be countered by an occupying force.
John Steinbeck and the Office of Strategic Services illustrated this simple fact in The Moon is Down.
Western irregular warfare against the Taliban fell apart when troop levels jumped to about 20,0000 in 2005 and the COIN strategy was adopted. Only a Maoist insurgency stood a chance of delegitimizing the Taliban. Largescale western occupation did the opposite.
That sounds like an interesting book. Thanks. I'll read it with Mike Flynns "digital soldiers" comments in mind.
Of course 'dark information', of which selective shadow banning is a type, also makes its way back into those groups, and emphasises my point.
Is cognitive warfare irregular warfare?