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Irregular Warfare Initiative
United States
เข้าร่วมเมื่อ 31 ต.ค. 2021
Bridging the gap between scholars, practitioners, and policymakers to support the community of irregular warfare professionals.
A joint venture between the Modern War Institute at West Point and the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project at Princeton University.
Disclaimers:
The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD endorsement.
A joint venture between the Modern War Institute at West Point and the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project at Princeton University.
Disclaimers:
The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD endorsement.
Dynamite to Drones: The Diffusion of Lethal Technology to Terrorists & Insurgents | IW Podcast EP#50
Originally aired April 8, 2022.
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From dynamite in the early twentieth century to drones, bioweapons, and private-sector satellite constellations today, lethal technologies are increasingly available to nonstate actors and individuals. At a time when states are focused on competition and potential conflict between great powers, the decentralization of today’s low-end technologies could equip nonstate actors, private companies, and terrorists with unprecedented irregular and asymmetric capabilities.
In Episode 50 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast, our guests discuss the history of technological innovation, examples of current and burgeoning technologies that will impact future warfare, and how governments can (and sometimes cannot) regulate the development and distribution of potentially dangerous technologies to malign actors.
Professor Audrey Kurth Cronin is distinguished professor of international security and founding director of the Center for Security, Innovation, and New Technology at American University in Washington, DC. She is author of the book How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns (Princeton, 2009), which the New Yorker called a “landmark study.” Her latest book, Power to the People: How Open Technological Innovation is Arming Tomorrow’s Terrorists (Oxford, 2020), analyzes emerging technologies and devises a new framework for analyzing twenty-first-century military innovation. It was short-listed for the Lionel Gelber prize and won the 2020 Neave prize, and is the driver for this episode.
Major General Patrick B. Roberson is the current commander and commandant of the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Major General Roberson graduated from the University of Minnesota in 1990 and has since served at multiple levels in the Special Forces Regiment. Some of his past assignments include serving as a detachment commander, company commander, and battalion commander in 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne). He assumed command of 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) in July 2012 and most recently was assigned as commander, Special Operations joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, responsible for the special operations forces fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria from 2018 to 2019. Major General Roberson has deployed and commanded special operations units in combat at multiple echelons in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom, and Inherent Resolve.
Kyle Atwell and Benjamin Jebb are the hosts for Episode 50. Please reach out to with any questions about this episode or the Irregular Warfare Podcast.
The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners in the field of irregular warfare. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the irregular warfare community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI Fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, TH-cam, or LinkedIn.
Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources.
Twitter: IrregWarfare
Facebook: IrregWarfare
Newsletter: www.irregularwarfare.org
Instagram: irregwarfare
LinkedIn: www.linkedin.com/company/irregular-warfare-initiative/
From dynamite in the early twentieth century to drones, bioweapons, and private-sector satellite constellations today, lethal technologies are increasingly available to nonstate actors and individuals. At a time when states are focused on competition and potential conflict between great powers, the decentralization of today’s low-end technologies could equip nonstate actors, private companies, and terrorists with unprecedented irregular and asymmetric capabilities.
In Episode 50 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast, our guests discuss the history of technological innovation, examples of current and burgeoning technologies that will impact future warfare, and how governments can (and sometimes cannot) regulate the development and distribution of potentially dangerous technologies to malign actors.
Professor Audrey Kurth Cronin is distinguished professor of international security and founding director of the Center for Security, Innovation, and New Technology at American University in Washington, DC. She is author of the book How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns (Princeton, 2009), which the New Yorker called a “landmark study.” Her latest book, Power to the People: How Open Technological Innovation is Arming Tomorrow’s Terrorists (Oxford, 2020), analyzes emerging technologies and devises a new framework for analyzing twenty-first-century military innovation. It was short-listed for the Lionel Gelber prize and won the 2020 Neave prize, and is the driver for this episode.
Major General Patrick B. Roberson is the current commander and commandant of the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Major General Roberson graduated from the University of Minnesota in 1990 and has since served at multiple levels in the Special Forces Regiment. Some of his past assignments include serving as a detachment commander, company commander, and battalion commander in 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne). He assumed command of 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) in July 2012 and most recently was assigned as commander, Special Operations joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, responsible for the special operations forces fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria from 2018 to 2019. Major General Roberson has deployed and commanded special operations units in combat at multiple echelons in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom, and Inherent Resolve.
Kyle Atwell and Benjamin Jebb are the hosts for Episode 50. Please reach out to with any questions about this episode or the Irregular Warfare Podcast.
The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners in the field of irregular warfare. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the irregular warfare community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI Fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, TH-cam, or LinkedIn.
Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources.
มุมมอง: 659
วีดีโอ
Coin and Culture: How Important Is Cultural Intelligence in COIN? | Irregular Warfare Podcast EP #49
มุมมอง 409ปีที่แล้ว
Originally aired March 25, 2022. Twitter: IrregWarfare Facebook: IrregWarfare Newsletter: www.irregularwarfare.org Instagram: irregwarfare LinkedIn: www.linkedin.com/company/irregular-warfare-initiative/ It has become axiomatic that cultural intelligence is key to success in counterinsurgency operations. But is it? This episode examines this assumption-is...
The Motivations and Methods Behind Russian Hybrid Warfare | Irregular Warfare Podcast EP #48
มุมมอง 578ปีที่แล้ว
Originally aired March 11, 2022. Twitter: IrregWarfare Facebook: IrregWarfare Newsletter: www.irregularwarfare.org Instagram: irregwarfare LinkedIn: www.linkedin.com/company/irregular-warfare-initiative/ In Episode 48 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast, we discuss the historical motivations and modern methods behind Russia’s use of hybrid warfare on the int...
Russia, China, and Iran: The Face of Competition in the Middle East | Irregular Warfare Podcast EP47
มุมมอง 723ปีที่แล้ว
Originally aired February 25, 2022. Twitter: IrregWarfare Facebook: IrregWarfare Newsletter: www.irregularwarfare.org Instagram: irregwarfare LinkedIn: www.linkedin.com/company/irregular-warfare-initiative/ Russia, China, and Iran have all been learning how to conduct irregular warfare from the United States. They model their current irregular warfare app...
The Kill Chain: Why America Faces the Prospect of Defeat | Irregular Warfare Podcast EP #46
มุมมอง 1.5Kปีที่แล้ว
Originally aired February 12, 2022. Twitter: IrregWarfare Facebook: IrregWarfare Newsletter: www.irregularwarfare.org Instagram: irregwarfare LinkedIn: www.linkedin.com/company/irregular-warfare-initiative/ In Episode 46 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast, we discuss a fundamental change that has occurred in the nature of war-and what this means for the Uni...
Looking Back, Looking Forward: The Enduring Lessons of SFA | Irregular Warfare Podcast EP #45
มุมมอง 216ปีที่แล้ว
Looking Back, Looking Forward: The Enduring Lessons of SFA | Irregular Warfare Podcast EP #45
Anytime, Anyplace: AF Special Operations Command in Future IW | Irregular Warfare Podcast EP #44
มุมมอง 336ปีที่แล้ว
Anytime, Anyplace: AF Special Operations Command in Future IW | Irregular Warfare Podcast EP #44
Two Sides of the Coin: Good Governance vs. Compellence | Irregular Warfare Podcast EP #43
มุมมอง 189ปีที่แล้ว
Two Sides of the Coin: Good Governance vs. Compellence | Irregular Warfare Podcast EP #43
Strength in Numbers: The Future of Coalition Building and IW | Irregular Warfare Podcast | EP 42
มุมมอง 1272 ปีที่แล้ว
Strength in Numbers: The Future of Coalition Building and IW | Irregular Warfare Podcast | EP 42
Learning From the Past, Anticipating the Future: Organizational Change in IW | EP #41
มุมมอง 1602 ปีที่แล้ว
Learning From the Past, Anticipating the Future: Organizational Change in IW | EP #41
Cyberspace as a Battlespace: IW Through Bits and Bytes | Irregular Warfare Podcast #40
มุมมอง 2422 ปีที่แล้ว
Cyberspace as a Battlespace: IW Through Bits and Bytes | Irregular Warfare Podcast #40
Special Operations Forces and Great Power Competition | Irregular Warfare Podcast #39
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Special Operations Forces and Great Power Competition | Irregular Warfare Podcast #39
What Have We Learned from Twenty Years of War? | Irregular Warfare Podcast #38
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What Have We Learned from Twenty Years of War? | Irregular Warfare Podcast #38
On the Road to Jihad: The Role of Foreign Fighters in IW | Irregular Warfare Podcast #37
มุมมอง 1962 ปีที่แล้ว
On the Road to Jihad: The Role of Foreign Fighters in IW | Irregular Warfare Podcast #37
Information Operations for the Information Age: IO in IW | Irregular Warfare Podcast #36
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Information Operations for the Information Age: IO in IW | Irregular Warfare Podcast #36
Lessons from the Hardest Place: Twenty Years of War in Afghanistan | Irregular Warfare Podcast #35
มุมมอง 2842 ปีที่แล้ว
Lessons from the Hardest Place: Twenty Years of War in Afghanistan | Irregular Warfare Podcast #35
China's Strategically Irregular Approach: The Art of the Gray Zone | Irregular Warfare Podcast #34
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China's Strategically Irregular Approach: The Art of the Gray Zone | Irregular Warfare Podcast #34
An Un-American Way of War: Why the US Fails at Irregular Warfare | Irregular Warfare Podcast #33
มุมมอง 3852 ปีที่แล้ว
An Un-American Way of War: Why the US Fails at Irregular Warfare | Irregular Warfare Podcast #33
Land Forces, Irregular Warfare, and a New Strategic Landscape | Irregular Warfare Podcast #32
มุมมอง 1352 ปีที่แล้ว
Land Forces, Irregular Warfare, and a New Strategic Landscape | Irregular Warfare Podcast #32
Closing the Chapter: Ending Afghanistan for US Army Special Forces | Irregular Warfare Podcast #31
มุมมอง 1782 ปีที่แล้ว
Closing the Chapter: Ending Afghanistan for US Army Special Forces | Irregular Warfare Podcast #31
Back to the Future: Resetting SOF for Great Power Compeitition | Irregular Warfare Podcast #30
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Back to the Future: Resetting SOF for Great Power Compeitition | Irregular Warfare Podcast #30
American Decline: Losing the Campaign for Influence | Irregular Warfare Podcast #29
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American Decline: Losing the Campaign for Influence | Irregular Warfare Podcast #29
The Daughters of Kobani: How a Group of Women Fought ISIS | Irregular Warfare Podcast #28
มุมมอง 6972 ปีที่แล้ว
The Daughters of Kobani: How a Group of Women Fought ISIS | Irregular Warfare Podcast #28
Irregular Warfare in the Next World War | Irregular Warfare Podcast #27
มุมมอง 3662 ปีที่แล้ว
Irregular Warfare in the Next World War | Irregular Warfare Podcast #27
The Harsh Lessons of Anbar: Insurgency/Awakening and rise of ISIS | Irregular Warfare Podcast #26
มุมมอง 2872 ปีที่แล้ว
The Harsh Lessons of Anbar: Insurgency/Awakening and rise of ISIS | Irregular Warfare Podcast #26
From SAR to GFA: The ABCs of Conflict Prevention and Stabilization | Irregular Warfare Podcast #25
มุมมอง 1082 ปีที่แล้ว
From SAR to GFA: The ABCs of Conflict Prevention and Stabilization | Irregular Warfare Podcast #25
Armed Overwatch: Airpower in Irregular Warfare | Irregular Warfare Podcast #24
มุมมอง 4032 ปีที่แล้ว
Armed Overwatch: Airpower in Irregular Warfare | Irregular Warfare Podcast #24
How Small Wars Fit Into Big Ones: Masters of Irregular Warfare | Irregular Warfare Podcast #23
มุมมอง 3652 ปีที่แล้ว
How Small Wars Fit Into Big Ones: Masters of Irregular Warfare | Irregular Warfare Podcast #23
The View from Washington: Civilian Oversight of SOF | Irregular Warfare Podcast #22
มุมมอง 2892 ปีที่แล้ว
The View from Washington: Civilian Oversight of SOF | Irregular Warfare Podcast #22
WAR ENTREPRENEURS: ECONOMIC DRIVERS OF INSURGENCY/TERRORISM/CRIME | Irregular Warfare Podcast #21
มุมมอง 3292 ปีที่แล้ว
WAR ENTREPRENEURS: ECONOMIC DRIVERS OF INSURGENCY/TERRORISM/CRIME | Irregular Warfare Podcast #21
It gets under my skin when people say "Russian aggression" "Chinese aggression" but never "US aggression" like we don't park an aircraft carrier outside of any country that challenges the western liberal order. That mindset is going to get us in some serious trouble long term. It's new age double speak. The US liberates while everyone else aggresses.
A young historian once asked an elderly African American man when [had he] joined the civil rights movement." He had assumed that significant opposition to Jim Crow racism only emerged in the 1960s. "I've been in the civil rights movement all my life," the man replied. Indeed, Jim Crow era blacks used various means to resist segregation and racism. Such means included creating advocacy organizations such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and waging their own private battles in their relationships with whites. In the South, overt rebelliousness could provoke a lynching, so many blacks found subtle ways to resist humiliation and economic hardship imposed by Jim Crow. Examples include a maid refusing to respond to an insulting nickname or Rosa Parks sitting in the white section of a city bus. Occasionally, resistance meant using fists and guns. Adapted from Publicradio.org, 2018. CCIR #1: In terms of Hamas's ATSO (ability to survive and operate), What relevance does Operation 'Swords of Iron' have to MLK's non-violent Birmingham Campaign of Jim Crow resistance (April 3-6, 1963? Like 1-in-5 teenagers whose ability to survive the racially-motivated explosion of Sixteenth Street Baptist Church on September 15, 1963 in Birmingham, Alabama; underscored doctrinally, in terms of maneuver warfare, is the byeman engineering capabilities of Hamas-turned-underground (subsurface) superiority versus Israel's air superiority. CCIR #2: What relevance has Hamas's resistance via Operation Al Aqsa Flood to MLK's non-violent Birmingham Campaign of Jim Crow resistance (April 3-6, 1963? In terms of Hamas's ATSO (ability to survive and operate), like 1-in-5 teenagers who survived the racially-motivated explosion of Sixteenth Street Baptist Church on September 15, 1963 in Birmingham, Alabama; underscored doctrinally is Hamas's byeman engineering capabilities-turned-underground (subsurface) superiority versus Israel's air superiority. You said: CCIR #3: Per Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, Competition Continuum, why does there appear to be, at least metaphorically, an underground resistance continuum between American Civil War Union intelligence operative Harriett Tubman's 'Underground Railroad, Hamas's Al Aqsa Flood fighting underground and New Jim Crow activist Tupac Shakur's Digital Underground? ChatGPT said: The metaphorical connection between these seemingly disparate movements might lie in their shared use of "underground" [capabilities] as a symbol for resistance, covert operations, and movements aimed at subverting or challenging an established order. 1. Harriet Tubman's Underground Railroad: During the American Civil War era, the Underground Railroad was a covert network of safe houses and routes used to help enslaved individuals escape to freedom. It epitomized clandestine operations aimed at undermining the institution of slavery. 2. Hamas's Use of Underground Tactics: In contemporary asymmetric warfare, underground tunnels and operations (as seen in Hamas's strategies like Al Aqsa Flood) symbolize both physical and metaphorical resistance against superior military forces, leveraging secrecy and subversion. 3. Tupac Shakur and the Digital Underground: While Tupac Shakur's involvement with the music group Digital Underground was primarily artistic, his subsequent work and activism critiqued systemic racism and "New Jim Crow" policies. The term "underground" here reflects a countercultural and resistant stance against societal inequities. Wrap Up: The "Competition Continuum" described in Joint Doctrine Note 1-19 emphasizes that strategic interactions occur across a spectrum of cooperation, competition, and conflict. Each of these examples demonstrates how "underground" resistance operates within different phases of this continuum: - Tubman’s Underground Railroad aligns with resistance within cooperation and conflict. - Hamas's underground tactics represent competition and conflict. - Tupac's activism and Digital Underground connect to competition and resistance within societal norms. Metaphorically, "underground" becomes a unifying symbol for subverting dominant paradigms across different contexts.
Excellent speeches but I am concerned that you say that you have learned only from the last 22 years of irregular warfare how to behave for it to be successful. You should have learned since the Second World War how important the support of the local population is in irregular warfare. You should also have learned something about irregular warfare from the war in Vietnam. In third world countries, to be successful, you have to rely on those of Christian derivation, especially where the church operates with missionaries. there Western culture can contrast China and the communist countries. To raise young people culturally first, to help economic development and finally religious development, only in this way in the future can you count on the help of these populations who in this way will accept the culture and way of life of the West.
"podcast" no thank you.
Great podcast
Amazing work guys
🔎 I was initially concerned with the title of the Irregular Warfare Initiative's latest discussion, but was pleased to discover that they did not downplay the effects of authoritarian influence. Bravo! The title certainly reeled me in. 😅 J.D. Maddox made an interesting case, arguing that the West is like a conditioned "baby elephant," unwilling to confront Putin's seemingly never-ending stream of unethical influence operations. This may be true for policymakers, but I make the case in my recent article, below, that the bigger issue is that many of their constituents are convinced that the spread of authoritarianism is not a concern at all. At the end of my article, I concur with his call for education but push back on increased regulation. Instead, I emphasize the importance of military options that leverage the Clausewitzian concept of "economy of force." This was almost entirely absent from the discussion. Surprising, given the initiative's namesake. 🤔 www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/July-August-2024/Marketing-Authoritarianism/ The opinions expressed here are the author's alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense nor its subordinate commands.
We can deal with Russian misinformation campaigns the same way we dealt with the Islamic State's: through cyberwarfare. Operation Glowing Symphony (JTF-Ares) transitioned us from a defensive posture to an offensive posture. Russian campaigns may not seem like an immediate threat, but Yuri Bezemenov of the KGB said they're playing the long game. Their goal is gradual subversion over time, slowly demoralizing the US so that by the time we notice the crisis, it'll be too late. China has adopted this same long-term strategy, along with drug warfare. We can't be too complacent about this.
As someone who loves AI and CounterTerrorism ,I absolutley love this discussion.
13:52 "You cannot excel at democracy and disinformation at the same time." The motto of the Army's 7th Psychological Operations Group is "Support by Truth". The 2nd Psychological Operations Group has a similar motto: "Veritas" (truth). We need to keep this in mind when conducting influence operations. The truth is our greatest weapon of influence. The key is to tell the truth in a manner that would make the enemy misinterpret it. That's how we maintain our integrity and honesty. If we lose the moral high ground, we lose the battle and we lose the war.
Strategic influence for conflict is different from strategic influence competition. In conflict, the goal is to change actions immediately. In competition, the goal is to change minds gradually. Changed actions are immediately quantifiable but changed minds are not. It's like trying to compare Gulf War leaflets to social media videos of Zelensky in high heels. We can count exactly how many enemies surrender after a leaflet drop but we can't count how many civilians stop supporting Ukraine because of a viral video.
Very well explained. Educating. Thank you
I might have missed it but why osent anyone take into consideration that no matter the planning and execution, politics will always throw a monkey wrench into the mix.
AI is dangerous its appeal is that it’s lucrative and the capacity for innovation by threats it’s already being imagined not just by U.S. has to be considered
i have all kinds of reasons why this fails. JSOU needs to up their game.
Speaking of going before a Congress that is absolutely and thoroughly weaponized performing as CCP proxies, conducting irregular, modern Warfare against the lawful American citizenry? Makes total sense.
The general lost credibility when he referred to current/former military officers as "Trumpers." Only a partisan person would use that terminology. It's unfortunate because he's clearly smart on this topic. I stopped listening at that point because Trump will be on the ticket and half of Americans will vote for him. The general just alienated nearly half of the country. So much easier to stay non-partisan and stick to the facts.
Big Intel, National Association of Scholars' interview with J. Michael Waller th-cam.com/video/czOM_5mFiIM/w-d-xo.html Mason Goad interviews J. Michael Waller, author of the recently released book "Big Intel. How the CIA and FBI Went from Cold War Heroes to Deep State Villains". Waller outlines how intelligence agencies have strayed from the missions of protecting Americans from enemies, foreign and domestic to make enemies of the people they are supposed to serve.
General Hodges made some new points in this discussion, and points repeated are worth hearing again. I need to hear more political will from President Biden and NSA Jake Sullivan.
Dear me. I found myself skipping that one. Poor. 3 out of 10, if I'm being nice. What is the opposite of a meaningful minority? aHR0cHM6Ly9maWxlcy5jYXRib3gubW9lL29nNXlzaS5tcDQ=
The question is, why don't you speak of the irregular, proxy, asymmetric, fourth and fifth generation, fifth column warfare against the American white family? How about the societal warfare tactics taking place on your very platform?
Don't make me tap the sign.
A Proxy is a group who gets paid to Do a specific action by a State or Government.. (same but on a bigger scale & at 1 billion a year). A HITMAN (sicario) is someone who gets paid to kill a specific person. A member of a criminal organization, like the mafia, might be arrested after hiring a hitman to kill an enemy. If a person's job involves professional murder for pay, that person is a hitman. IN CRIME THERE IS NO TYPE OF CONTROL OR MANAGEMENT THE NATURE OF CRIME IS CHAOS. Same as cheating on your wife, no guarantees.Evil will never stop is part of nature, that is what God tells us. Also give us EACH free will.
I appreciate that the Irregular Warfare Initiative hosted the discussions with GEN Petraeus and LTG (R) Tovo back-to-back, the comparison is important. These two leaders have dramatically different opinions considering U.S. irregular warfare capabilities. I would argue that they have differing opinions about what irregular warfare is entirely. I hope future strategists and policymakers look to LTG (R) Tovo’s experience for guidance. Had Western involvement in Afghanistan followed a Maoist inspired irregular warfare strategy, the outcome would have been dramatically different.
If I could just understand why you did what I saw you do I would probably do that less.
To be fair, I already understood that, but a deals a deal.
Thank you to the Modern War Institute and Irregular Warfare Initiative for putting this together. There are a lot of great takeaways for military leaders, but we are still missing the West’s key lesson from Afghanistan. That lesson is that an insurgency cannot be countered by an occupying force. John Steinbeck and the Office of Strategic Services illustrated this simple fact in The Moon is Down. Western irregular warfare against the Taliban fell apart when troop levels jumped to about 20,0000 in 2005 and the COIN strategy was adopted. Only a Maoist insurgency stood a chance of delegitimizing the Taliban. Largescale western occupation did the opposite.
That sounds like an interesting book. Thanks. I'll read it with Mike Flynns "digital soldiers" comments in mind.
Of course 'dark information', of which selective shadow banning is a type, also makes its way back into those groups, and emphasises my point.
The other comment left here demonstrates that you can, at least to some extent and indirectly, 'get into' those "other" closed encrypted groups. Maybe the problem is choosing to inject, if you'll excuse my parlance, 'obfuscating word salads'? I listen very closely, and have done for years, to 'people of your calibre', yet i have little with which to address Mr Carlsons recent claims of naivety as a result of doing so. There's a fine line between scepticism and distrust. Respect and confidence will only carry you so far.
Is cognitive warfare irregular warfare?
Interesting moments/key takeaways: 4:20 Why Russia is not finished 5:44 On the Russian national psyche was to shaped the fall of the USSR and 1990s, and how it shaped Putin’s thought. 9:47 George Kennan’s take on Russia and what it tells us about Putin. 11:48 Structural foundations of Russian foreign policy and Putin’s stamp on it. 15:42 Russia’s approach to policy in IR theory and why is it so different to America’s. 25:26 Elements and sources of external insecurity to Russia and its historical implications to its internal insecurity (links between Russia’s cyclical domestic collapse with foreign conflicts). 29:03 “Corruption is the system in Russia.” 30:29 Russia’s use of (un)conventional policy tools. 31:33 On issues with abusing the term “hybrid warfare.” 32:01 “Rules” of operations of Russian actors and their willingness to incur in risks. 33:20 The “information chaos,” as a hybrid tactic and its repercussions to the West. 34:36 Russia’s economic woes and what it tells about its strategic goals. 37:11 focus on the conventional attack on Ukraine vs. how have irregular means been used. (Also 37:38) 37:18 Biden’s pivotal role in showing the world the Russian invasion plans of Ukraine. 39:37 Options of Western democracies to answer to Russia in the long term. - [ ] 39:52: Recalling American and Russian “active measures” in the Cold War. 41:11 On the Hybrid Center of Excellence in Finland, on how Nordic and Baltic/near Russian societies have more knowledge and resilience on Russian operations and what can we learn from them. 43:10 Overall implications to (and debates concerning) freedom of speech and democratic values. 45:10 Implications for field practitioners. 45:37 More on George Kennan’s 1947 article and what it teaches us today. 46:40 On “Cold War 2.0” and what it implies today.
zero chance Uy think otherwise you do not know the subject.
Key highlights (in my opinion) for anyone interested: 7:55 On how these adversaries view IW vis-à-vis US conception 12:45 Russian conceptions of Colour Revolutions as US IW 18:44 Examples from Russia and Iran in Syria 20:25 China example 21:14 Iran modus operandi 22:10 The China-Iran strategic relationship (22:58 China on creating dilemmas in the Middle East). 26:36 American US weapons insufficiencies vis a vis new systems and innovations by these actors. 31:50 Reflections on how to proceed vis a vis these strategies 32:20 On the National Defense Strategy; beyond strategic and conventional deterrence and “using regular means in irregular ways”. 33:58 On what the Cold War taught us about irregular competition. 37:50 Bradley “cognitive denial” or “denial by illumination” by affecting the cognitive space. Also called “counter-predation” by Kyle Atwell. 38:48 On the need to build societal resilience as denial of benefit. 39:25 On “financial denial.” 39:58 On physical support to resistance. 44:18 On the skills to integratedeterrence 44:47 On “modernizing” human capital: train as well as educating. 51:33 On the US/West’s advantage vis a vis its opponents. 55:32 Concluding reflections
If you shoot right handed your gay
Great video keep it up guys from vn
Insane asylum group meeting. But a couple interesting points were made. Russians do have a consistent view of history. And yes there is a lot of “framing” and “self sensoring” by the western thinkers. A shame really.
Dr Elias has never been punched in the face. It’s a shame
Is the targeting of protestors from the jan 6th riots considered left wing extremism as well as ignored the riots in Kenosha Wisconsin? Both of the acts of ignoring and acting upon those protests could be considered left wing extremism
It is too naive to believe that drone strike doesn't rise popular anger
I was in habbaniyah in 2005, was wild
At 33.55 there is a reference to a previously mentioned report that analysis the cases of success and failure of the Chinese gray zone activities, but I haven't been able to find the actual report's name. I am currently trying to write a thesis on this matter so it would be of great help if anyone could tell me what report he is
btw amazing podcast and episode
love listening to these, but your audio mixing needs some serious work. this one was unlistenable.
Really liked this episode! Seems that tech in and on itself may not be the defining factor of the IW’s future, but how they’re employed and, most crucially, who’s able to access them. The great tech innovations of our time have become a double-edged sword that, while allowing for civilian applications and benefits, have somewhat “democratized” various kinetic and non-kinetic warfare tools to a plethora of actors. These actors, as was noted, can’t be reduced any more to non-state groups (as it is usually done). However single individuals can, through a (not-necessarily-coordinated) swarming effect, become agents of chaos and violence that erode (and can severely jeopardize) the state’s monopoly on violence, rendering high-tech military developments useless. Weaponized drones, IEDs, disinfo via social media, as well as 3D gun printings are, in this line, the most relevant and dangerous tools that states ought to more efficiently counter so as to deal with irregular actors and threats.
Drone warfare seems to have been more of a double edged anti-terrorism sword: useful to kill from a distance and with little actual footprint or involvement in the ground, but at the same time, and due to its widely reported intelligence failures, seemingly had added fuel to the fire of Islamic and anti-US/anti-Western extremism by how it has alienated populations.
Interesting how small wars are closely related to IWF and (counter-)insurgencies. The Cold War era-small wars were at par with the casualty aversion and the reluctance to boots on the ground by both sides, themselves driven by the fear of nuclear escalation in an era of great power competion (GPC). Overall, these elements drove these small wars and their irregular/proxy/information components. It is also relevant to see how small wars (and either them IWF) need to take new prominence vis-a-vis renewed GPC.
I liked the idea of getting NCOs to Graduate program. Education indeed is the best insurance against OE that have no scripts. Prepare well & fail to adapt; you are persuing tactics without strategies. The GO is able to making the changes to match is visions. I was very excited listening to the entire podcast.
Promo SM 🎉
How can a fine tuned military 🎖️🪖 that has been quite active run into defeat while more than likely facing off versus an adversary that hasn't participated in regular or irregular warfare in ages, if at ALL!???
You can see the growth 💹📈 and development of such an introspective, intense and impactful podcast. With each conversation, 🆕 possibilities begin to take formation, 🆕 💡 ideas are brought to the forefront, which can only mean that direct change is happening in 'REAL TIME' & we're ALL patiently awaiting and bear witness. Thank you IWI TEAM!!!👍🏾💯
Russian interference in the 2016 election has been proven to have been completely cooked up by members of the democrat party and their associates in various branches of government. Why does this speaker still speak about it as if it is a fact when “Russian collusion” has been disproven?
This segment was particularly interesting. Well done.
It’s really an honor to be given access to the thoughts of this panel and audience.