Corrections: to be clear, the phrase is أهل الدجن, with a د; when I mention Wahrani's point about looking at stones and trees etc, this is a reference to tayammum; muftis number 4 and 6 in chapter three whose names escaped me are al-Bija'i and Ibn Zakri; Musfir dies in 1521-2, not 1522-3; the first of two Granadan muftis is al-Haffar, not Ibn Miqlash, whom I had mentioned previously as active in Oran (those three muftis in that part of my discussion are featured in chapter five, not chapter three); the Algerian mufti who served as secretary and adviser to al-Jaza'iri is Ibn Ruwila, not Rawila; Genghis Khan died in 1227; 48-49 soldiers are reported to have been killed by the Mahdist forces in Omdurman in 1898; aljamiado the term for Romance languages written in the Arabic script, and finally, the title of the book is al-Bahth 'an adillat, not Bayan.
What were the main reasons for the collapse of Andalus in your opinion? Here are a few of my own: 1. Lack of an Atlantic navy For some reason, the invasion of Tariq was not accompanied by a naval invasion, despite Musa ibn Nusayr significantly building up the Maghrebi navy and attacking Balerics, Sardinia and Sicily since 704. A navy would provide a much stronger hold on Asturias, particularly Gijon and thereby Oviedo preventing Kingdom of Asturias. Also strengthening Muslim Septimania/Provence. Finally a large navy in Gijon would allow naval raids on western Frankia, perhaps Bordeaux becoming a Muslim port after ghafiqi's conquest. Beyond the initial invasion, a naval attack on Asturias/Galicia would be efficacious until the Crusader period, when the Atlantic becomes definitely Christian. But even after Andalus made a proper navy in mid 800s due to Vikings, they never used it in the Atlantic, even during alMansur's campaigns. It would've also allowed earlier and stronger control of the Maghrebi coast 2. Internal divisions. From the very beginning, with Tariq and Musa's dismissal infighting was constant. Increasing greatly with the Berber revolt and Syrian army. The Umayyad emirate established some authority, but huge revolts like that of Ibn Hafsun or Banu Qasi were present even in the early 10th century. Only under Abdurahman iii was central control established. But alMansur weakened the prestige of the Umayyads and his successors were weak, resulting in the Taifa period. Part of this is the Choice of Cordoba as capital. While it is the economic heartland, it seems too southerly to control the Thughur like Zaragoza or Douro valley. Whereas a more central capital like Toledo or Madrid is much more able to extert control over the entire peninsula, which is why it was such an existential threat when lost in 1085. Another aspect was ethnic. The Berbers far outnumbered the Arabs, but we're treated much worse. Later on, muwallads outnumbered both Berbers and Arabs, but were discriminated against, resulting in a very divided society. 3. Demilitarisation. Initially every Muslim in Iberia was a fighter. In the period of Abdurahmaan iii this changed, with Arabs being actively demilitarised, replaced by Cordoba's new Berber-Slavic army. But the Taifas were much poorer, and couldn't afford such an army. But due to demilitarisation could field large armies. With average Taifa armies being only in the hundreds, with Seville having only 1000. Compared to the completely militarised societies of the Iberian Christians or the AlMoravids who could field tens of thousands.
What were the main reasons for the collapse of Andalus in your opinion? Here are a few of my own: 1. Lack of an Atlantic navy For some reason, the invasion of Tariq was not accompanied by a naval invasion, despite Musa ibn Nusayr significantly building up the Maghrebi navy and attacking Balerics, Sardinia and Sicily since 704. A navy would provide a much stronger hold on Asturias, particularly Gijon and thereby Oviedo preventing Kingdom of Asturias. Also strengthening Muslim Septimania/Provence. Finally a large navy in Gijon would allow naval raids on western Frankia, perhaps Bordeaux becoming a Muslim port after ghafiqi's conquest. Beyond the initial invasion, a naval attack on Asturias/Galicia would be efficacious until the Crusader period, when the Atlantic becomes definitely Christian. But even after Andalus made a proper navy in mid 800s due to Vikings, they never used it in the Atlantic, even during alMansur's campaigns. It would've also allowed earlier and stronger control of the Maghrebi coast 2. Internal divisions. From the very beginning, with Tariq and Musa's dismissal infighting was constant. Increasing greatly with the Berber revolt and Syrian army. The Umayyad emirate established some authority, but huge revolts like that of Ibn Hafsun or Banu Qasi were present even in the early 10th century. Only under Abdurahman iii was central control established. But alMansur weakened the prestige of the Umayyads and his successors were weak, resulting in the Taifa period. Part of this is the Choice of Cordoba as capital. While it is the economic heartland, it seems too southerly to control the Thughur like Zaragoza or Douro valley. Whereas a more central capital like Toledo or Madrid is much more able to extert control over the entire peninsula, which is why it was such an existential threat when lost in 1085. Another aspect was ethnic. The Berbers far outnumbered the Arabs, but we're treated much worse. Later on, muwallads outnumbered both Berbers and Arabs, but were discriminated against, resulting in a very divided society. 3. Demilitarisation. Initially every Muslim in Iberia was a fighter. In the period of Abdurahmaan iii this changed, with Arabs being actively demilitarised, replaced by Cordoba's new Berber-Slavic army. But the Taifas were much poorer, and couldn't afford such an army. But due to demilitarisation could field large armies. With average Taifa armies being only in the hundreds, with Seville having only 1000. Compared to the completely militarised societies of the Iberian Christians or the AlMoravids who could field tens of thousands.
Corrections: to be clear, the phrase is أهل الدجن, with a د; when I mention Wahrani's point about looking at stones and trees etc, this is a reference to tayammum; muftis number 4 and 6 in chapter three whose names escaped me are al-Bija'i and Ibn Zakri; Musfir dies in 1521-2, not 1522-3; the first of two Granadan muftis is al-Haffar, not Ibn Miqlash, whom I had mentioned previously as active in Oran (those three muftis in that part of my discussion are featured in chapter five, not chapter three); the Algerian mufti who served as secretary and adviser to al-Jaza'iri is Ibn Ruwila, not Rawila; Genghis Khan died in 1227; 48-49 soldiers are reported to have been killed by the Mahdist forces in Omdurman in 1898; aljamiado the term for Romance languages written in the Arabic script, and finally, the title of the book is al-Bahth 'an adillat, not Bayan.
What were the main reasons for the collapse of Andalus in your opinion?
Here are a few of my own:
1. Lack of an Atlantic navy
For some reason, the invasion of Tariq was not accompanied by a naval invasion, despite Musa ibn Nusayr significantly building up the Maghrebi navy and attacking Balerics, Sardinia and Sicily since 704.
A navy would provide a much stronger hold on Asturias, particularly Gijon and thereby Oviedo preventing Kingdom of Asturias.
Also strengthening Muslim Septimania/Provence. Finally a large navy in Gijon would allow naval raids on western Frankia, perhaps Bordeaux becoming a Muslim port after ghafiqi's conquest.
Beyond the initial invasion, a naval attack on Asturias/Galicia would be efficacious until the Crusader period, when the Atlantic becomes definitely Christian. But even after Andalus made a proper navy in mid 800s due to Vikings, they never used it in the Atlantic, even during alMansur's campaigns.
It would've also allowed earlier and stronger control of the Maghrebi coast
2. Internal divisions.
From the very beginning, with Tariq and Musa's dismissal infighting was constant. Increasing greatly with the Berber revolt and Syrian army. The Umayyad emirate established some authority, but huge revolts like that of Ibn Hafsun or Banu Qasi were present even in the early 10th century.
Only under Abdurahman iii was central control established. But alMansur weakened the prestige of the Umayyads and his successors were weak, resulting in the Taifa period.
Part of this is the Choice of Cordoba as capital. While it is the economic heartland, it seems too southerly to control the Thughur like Zaragoza or Douro valley. Whereas a more central capital like Toledo or Madrid is much more able to extert control over the entire peninsula, which is why it was such an existential threat when lost in 1085.
Another aspect was ethnic. The Berbers far outnumbered the Arabs, but we're treated much worse. Later on, muwallads outnumbered both Berbers and Arabs, but were discriminated against, resulting in a very divided society.
3. Demilitarisation.
Initially every Muslim in Iberia was a fighter. In the period of Abdurahmaan iii this changed, with Arabs being actively demilitarised, replaced by Cordoba's new Berber-Slavic army. But the Taifas were much poorer, and couldn't afford such an army. But due to demilitarisation could field large armies. With average Taifa armies being only in the hundreds, with Seville having only 1000.
Compared to the completely militarised societies of the Iberian Christians or the AlMoravids who could field tens of thousands.
Great
What were the main reasons for the collapse of Andalus in your opinion?
Here are a few of my own:
1. Lack of an Atlantic navy
For some reason, the invasion of Tariq was not accompanied by a naval invasion, despite Musa ibn Nusayr significantly building up the Maghrebi navy and attacking Balerics, Sardinia and Sicily since 704.
A navy would provide a much stronger hold on Asturias, particularly Gijon and thereby Oviedo preventing Kingdom of Asturias.
Also strengthening Muslim Septimania/Provence. Finally a large navy in Gijon would allow naval raids on western Frankia, perhaps Bordeaux becoming a Muslim port after ghafiqi's conquest.
Beyond the initial invasion, a naval attack on Asturias/Galicia would be efficacious until the Crusader period, when the Atlantic becomes definitely Christian. But even after Andalus made a proper navy in mid 800s due to Vikings, they never used it in the Atlantic, even during alMansur's campaigns.
It would've also allowed earlier and stronger control of the Maghrebi coast
2. Internal divisions.
From the very beginning, with Tariq and Musa's dismissal infighting was constant. Increasing greatly with the Berber revolt and Syrian army. The Umayyad emirate established some authority, but huge revolts like that of Ibn Hafsun or Banu Qasi were present even in the early 10th century.
Only under Abdurahman iii was central control established. But alMansur weakened the prestige of the Umayyads and his successors were weak, resulting in the Taifa period.
Part of this is the Choice of Cordoba as capital. While it is the economic heartland, it seems too southerly to control the Thughur like Zaragoza or Douro valley. Whereas a more central capital like Toledo or Madrid is much more able to extert control over the entire peninsula, which is why it was such an existential threat when lost in 1085.
Another aspect was ethnic. The Berbers far outnumbered the Arabs, but we're treated much worse. Later on, muwallads outnumbered both Berbers and Arabs, but were discriminated against, resulting in a very divided society.
3. Demilitarisation.
Initially every Muslim in Iberia was a fighter. In the period of Abdurahmaan iii this changed, with Arabs being actively demilitarised, replaced by Cordoba's new Berber-Slavic army. But the Taifas were much poorer, and couldn't afford such an army. But due to demilitarisation could field large armies. With average Taifa armies being only in the hundreds, with Seville having only 1000.
Compared to the completely militarised societies of the Iberian Christians or the AlMoravids who could field tens of thousands.