YAYAYAYAYAYAYYA WHAOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO! Kane you are one of the most philosophically informative people I have ever watched. Your videos help me greatly, THANKS MATE!!!!!
And it seems that everything when thought about through this meta skeptical approach ends up in a paradox. I want to say there isn't an objective truth but I can't since that would make me claim that I have a truth. Sometimes I get lost for hours into this. The only thing that seems to keep me sane is Pyrrhonism. Great video btw.
It seems yes. When you consider self duality the paradox dissolves upon itself. If reality contains everything , then it also contains non-reality as a self balancing concept. Thematas - which are fundamental dualities at the base of every axiom - only apply on the conceptual scale. I can say that I don’t exist, though I do, which seems paradoxal. A equals non A is impossible through Aristotle’s logic. In Lupasco’s logic it is non paradoxal, as every proposition contains its opposite by essence in a self dual chunk.
@@ceryx6849 These word games drive me up the wall. Reality does not contain "everything". Conceptualizing reality requires very strict wordage, with only but a little bit of wiggle room. In the sense of reality containing "everything", you have the constraints of all plausible things that CAN exist. It's not everything, because everything is loose wordage arising in epistemic word-salad-sophistry. "But how do you know this..." is what I assume can be asked here. It's quite a simple extrapolation of every event that has ever happened leading up to the here and now. I assume that there can be quite a bit more questions asked, and my hope is that it there is more.
@@Youshallbeeatenbyme Ok. Reality in the meaning i'm using here includes but does not reduce to : Any actual "discovered" or "invented" stuff, interaction, potential, any fiction, concept, undiscovered material relationship or phenomenon human had (not) the chance to experience yet, even things that concept do not allow us to express in a discussion. So unity, perfection, god, uni-multi-meta-verse, everything. Considering this signifiant-non exhaustive signified relationship have you got any example of what Reality does not include ? Also, it does include what cannot exist, considering "existing" has a circular definition. Things that exist are real. What is reality ? Things that exist. Not very interesting definition here. Things that don't exist are potential but not actual. So here, when i say reality, i mean everything entangled (and apparently not) through causality relationships. Even fictional unicorns, fictional family, love, democracy and myself, yes. So yes, everything, even nothing. Self exclusive, self dual. There is no way to prove there are actual different things around and inside us, even the illusion of ourselves only survives though phenomenology. Further than that, we can point out cognitive functions that scotomize things into the illusion they are different/similar, and thanks to heuristics we also developped evolutive, thermodynamic and maybe physical (i can't give examples because i'm not an expert in physics) reasons behind the fact we function like this : electrochemical distribution and survival are about efficiency and cognitive conservation. It creates apparent paradoxes caused by our very architecture. There are ways to dissolve them with complex experience of phenomenology, systemics and holistic approaches, and I tend to think logos is not enough due to the simple fact that is subbordinate to our experience of being among "apparently other" things. The map is not the territory. If it is, then the map is not useful to convey information anymore as it becomes the territory. If i draw a computer to someone who's never seen a computer before, there are good chances one mistakes it for something similar to a less complex and more familiar thing one knows. >>>>>>In the same way, if i were able to define Reality, then it would be exactly reality. I can try to define. For example if i say that Reality is that which has no duplicate. Tadam ! Not convincing isn't it ? This process works for objects you can delineate, which is not the case with Reality. We can't work with any definition, and that is the whole point of my previous comment. I you were to remember only one thing through this text, remember that.
@@ceryx6849 Man, I don't quite know what you're on about. I've had discussions like this for a very long time now, and at some point it all just seems like pussyfooting. The level of distinction that we operate on isn't even contrary or contradictory. You're bringing up things that exist as either a consequence of predetermined physical laws, or you're describing the predetermined physical laws. And yes, "existing" is used here to describe the necessary outcome of the consequences of there being "something" rather than nothing. Existing doesn't equate to "real". "Real" is a value judgement based on epistemic preferences. The dreams I have are just as "real" to me as every waking moment. But they're not "real" to you. Hence why I don't use "real" in this context. What I can do instead is opt in to describing the phenomenon and its meta-phenomenon. It is the case that I have dreams that feel almost indistinguishable from the waking world. It is the case that it is due to my dreams being phenomenological, I cannot sufficiently convey the experience to you. It is the case that humans can conceptualize. It is the case that the conceptualization brings about phenomenological outcomes. It is the case that these outcomes cannot be measured sufficiently outside of individual experience. And I can go on forever and ever explaining the phenomenon, the meta-phenomenon, and the intra-meta-phenomenon in the way of "it is the case" because reality entails its consequences. As such you can define reality by all of its consequences (despite the fact that we cannot know all of them), but its consequences cannot entail anything that isn able to be contradictory to reality's existence since "everything" follows reality. This follows the exact same pattern as casual modes of rational, and tracking the rational backwards you reach the beginning of the 3rd dimensions "time".
@@Youshallbeeatenbyme « at some point it all just seems like pussyfooting » yes. To the extent we don’t both feel comfortable with the ontological limits of logos, there’s a point from which it is reassuring to throw everything into a feeling of pointlessness. I can understand that. « The level of dinstinction that we operate on isn’t even contrary » I’m reassured that you point it out. « You’re bringing up things that exist as either a consequence or predetermined physical laws, or […] the predetermined physical laws. » Yes, and I’m also bringing the fact that existing is a recursive concept when you’re digging into it. By that I mean that it isn’t very interesting per say because it is empty when it doesn’t equal to reality, and useless when it does. « Real is a value judgement based on epistemic preferences. » (then you bring up a couple examples of phenomenon based definition of reality) Here stands a bit of comprehensive confusion. In French there are two distinct words to speak about reality : ‘La Réalité’ answers to the individual psychic experience of reality, in which our experience results from the sum of our perceptions into a whole ‘painting’ which is knowable from the person who experiences and can be partially communicated to the external world. It is the one you use when you talk about the dream example. ‘Le Réel’ is a quite different thing, as it includes the other side of the equation, the things there, independent from our made up useful and usable reality. There comes an issue with the concepts themselves, because from the point you conceptualise you are constrained into thematas (holton, 1973, 1981, 1982) which are primordial dichotomies like true/false, existing/delusional, love/hatred, and such. Understand these are dependent on our cognition and can’t honestly hold up when you try and talk about reality in the second sense, because that one doesn’t critically rely on our cognition. To get back to the point, a paradox always sets up on those thematas which are subordinate to local cognition, especially human cognition here. So your dreams can be very real in the second sense of reality (le réel) anyways, because my experience is not a critical factor in their production. When you dig a little bit, our apparently shared experience of reality (réalité) is but a common dream. There’s no such things as trees, birds, cars, democracy and black holes, because these are just scotomized expressions of not-so-different things to say the least, in order to fit our cognitive and biological needs. A car can be an artificial zombie mule, or even a bunch of refined metal pieces stuck together for no apparent purpose from the perspective of someone who’s never seen any car. Don’t confuse me for a Lacanian, but here is an interesting try from him about reality : « le Réel, c’est ce contre quoi on se cogne » Reality is that which one bumps against. This take is almost opposite to the delusional definition of reality.
I was waiting to see if you'd offer a free trial of KNOWLEDGE+ but I guess they just don't have a good marketing team. Don't worry Kane, I believe you'll get them as sponsor someday!
Great video; kinda reminded me superficially of relativistic treatments of the skepticism x anti-skepticism debate, like Rescher's (1978) or Unger's (1984).
Kind of off topic I know. Grue could be useful as a reference to things that used to be green but are now blue after a certain date, because that date was when the species edited their eyes or brains in a way that changed their experience of the particular wavelength that used to be seen as green but is now see as blue. It references the same wavelength, so it could carve nature at it's joints, but it has the pragmatic bonus of helping them adapt to their new experiences.
Thanks for this I now have a word my belief I believe in the draw between skepticism and anti skepticism. I'm happy to have knowledge* where knowledge* looks like anti-skeptic knowledge but I'm glad to be skeptic and have belifs*.
One question i had to you/people in general is by what basis should we fairly generalizatize claims? For an example ill use rule utilitarianism (which ik you dont subscribe to but i think it illustrates my question better": S1- killing is wrong because it tends to hurt people. S2-killing people named Jeremy is wrong because killing people named Jeremy tends to hurt people. S3-pulling a trigger is right because pulling on one metal part of a device tends to increase utility. My three different examples try and illustrate different ways of framing a moral dilemma, but to me makes me think is why would/could one framing be "right" given that there may be different ways to structure the moral dilemma, including ones that are less silly than mine (perhaps equally reasonable).
Is the idea that our judgment of the utility of an action is dependent on how the action is described? This is a really interesting point, and I assume that ethicists must have considered it, but offhand I can't think of any work on this.
@@KaneB yes exactly. Like ontop of framing biases (e.g. using the term kill vs take the life of) it doesnt seem clear to me how moral realists especially can "objectively" or fairly frame a moral dilemma given that different framings might lead to different conclusions
Conceptual pluralism strikes me as another linguistic trap. I get that linguistics are necessarily broad, especially so for the purpose of verbosity, but whenever I think about frameworks I always get the sense that a framework, such as conceptual pluralism, doesn't take into account that itself is also its own subject. I might have genuinely driven myself into a corner with this mentality of pinning a framework against itself using its own tools, but since I have done this I have been unable to really accept most frameworks anymore. Which makes it more interesting to me when a framework uses its own tools on itself--I assume meta-skepticism does since I'm about halfway through the video. Time to wait to see. In "what we care about" you and I have the same initial thought about grue. I think that a lot of times philosophy doesn't step outside of sapio-centric reasoning, and it's interesting to see this version of meta-skepticism taking a step out of it even if just briefly so far. Damn, you hit my problem of using framework tools on themselves. If knowledge and knowledge* are contingent of agency and shmagency, what's stopping me from going one step above both and saying that knowledge and knowledge* are both underneath knowledge*+; which states that knowledge and knowledge* are both important (insert important reason here). And then you pin knowledge* and knowledge with another set of knowledges that equal knowledge*- in whatever claim they have. And the framework extrapolates ad infinitum/absurdum. Honestly I could be missing the point somewhere, and maybe it doesn't work like that.
This makes me say that if there are concepts within concepts as to what a concept is within knowledge of our universe and world. Then there is a regress in what we understand within a concept. Because without referimg to let's say what an apple is we then look at the concepts for an apple and that even when we do so we refer to other concepts. It is like a never ending set of branches. There is a regress.
Great exposition on the shmagency objection! You should look into Closely related problems… MattiEklund’s ‘Choosing Normative Concepts’ Shamik Dasgupta’s ‘The truth fetish: The normative path to pragmatism’
I'll do more than just consider it: th-cam.com/video/r6pk0rdsAE4/w-d-xo.html th-cam.com/video/2uR_bVYrd4w/w-d-xo.html th-cam.com/video/wKwVxI9F_Ig/w-d-xo.html th-cam.com/video/lYr-Nrlwbjs/w-d-xo.html th-cam.com/video/QKmLVWb2Cxw/w-d-xo.html th-cam.com/video/WuyfqlAds4I/w-d-xo.html
Yes, I would consider certainty a doxastic attitude. To be certain of a proposition is to hold that the proposition cannot be doubted, or to assign a subjective probability of 1 to the proposition, or something along those lines.
Sounds like plain epistemology to me. How do you define knowledge not justified without belief though ? Belief is the same cognitive objet as knowledge, but I’m curious to learn how you do otherwise. Nice video thank you.
It is possible you might be a brain in a vat, but the knowledge you have hands is justified by reason and evidence. Certainty is just a feeling. If certainty was required for knowledge, then only an omniscient being would have any knowledge. And since omniscience is self contradictory, there would be no knowledge. Thus, the skeptic unfriendly definition of knowledge is the preferred definition. All that is required for knowledge is belief justified by reason and evidence. And belief justified by reason and evidence. Certainty is not needed.
As I understand them, most skeptical arguments threaten to show not just that we cannot be certain of our beliefs, but that we have no justification whatsoever for our beliefs. For example, we have no justification whatsoever for ruling out the BIV hypothesis and taking the external world to exist -- all the attempts to justify this fail. So I don't think that retreating to the claim that belief is merely justified by reason and evidence can in itself undermine the skeptical challenge.
@@KaneB Any and all evidence rejects the biv hypothesis. Everything you see, hear, smell, touch, or taste. You can see your hands. When you mold clay, you can predict how it will bend depending on the amount of pressure your hands put on it. When your hand gets cut, you feel pain. Am I certain I am not a biv? Of course not. Is the belief that I am not a biv justified? Yes. All evidence points to that.
@@InventiveHarvest I don't see how. Nothing in my experience distinguishes the external world hypothesis from the BIV hypothesis. When I look at what I take to be my hands, I would have the same experience regardless of whether I'm observing material objects or I'm a BIV being stimulated to produce the hallucination of hands. All my evidence is compatible with BIV (and countless other skeptical hypotheses).
@@KaneB yes. It would look exactly the same. But that doesnt change the fact that seeing my hands, moving my hands, etc is all evidence that I have hands. Seeing my hands is not evidence that I do not have hands.
@@KaneB like if everyday as I was going home, I passed a stop sign on the corner. If someone asked me "is there a stop sign on the corner" I could respond "I know there is a stop sign on the corner." If the person went and looked, and there was no stop sign on the corner, my knowledge would be wrong, but it is still knowledge until there is enough counter evidence to discount the previous evidence. If knowledge required certainty, then there could be no knowledge. The only way to he certain is to know with certainty that there is not anything outside of your knowledge. If there are unknowns, then one of those unknowns could make false something that you thought you knew. Therefore, the only way that certainty is possible is through omniscience. When we say "knowledge" we dont mean something that is synonimous with or logically equivalent to omniscience. Hence, a skeptic unfriendly definition of knowledge is preferable. So, I can know that there is a stop sign on the corner, even if it turns out that there isnt a stop sign on the corner.
YAYAYAYAYAYAYYA WHAOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO! Kane you are one of the most philosophically informative people I have ever watched. Your videos help me greatly, THANKS MATE!!!!!
Thanks dawg, that's great to hear! ❤️
And it seems that everything when thought about through this meta skeptical approach ends up in a paradox. I want to say there isn't an objective truth but I can't since that would make me claim that I have a truth. Sometimes I get lost for hours into this. The only thing that seems to keep me sane is Pyrrhonism. Great video btw.
It seems yes. When you consider self duality the paradox dissolves upon itself.
If reality contains everything , then it also contains non-reality as a self balancing concept. Thematas - which are fundamental dualities at the base of every axiom - only apply on the conceptual scale. I can say that I don’t exist, though I do, which seems paradoxal. A equals non A is impossible through Aristotle’s logic. In Lupasco’s logic it is non paradoxal, as every proposition contains its opposite by essence in a self dual chunk.
@@ceryx6849 These word games drive me up the wall. Reality does not contain "everything". Conceptualizing reality requires very strict wordage, with only but a little bit of wiggle room. In the sense of reality containing "everything", you have the constraints of all plausible things that CAN exist. It's not everything, because everything is loose wordage arising in epistemic word-salad-sophistry.
"But how do you know this..." is what I assume can be asked here. It's quite a simple extrapolation of every event that has ever happened leading up to the here and now. I assume that there can be quite a bit more questions asked, and my hope is that it there is more.
@@Youshallbeeatenbyme Ok.
Reality in the meaning i'm using here includes but does not reduce to :
Any actual "discovered" or "invented" stuff, interaction, potential, any fiction, concept, undiscovered material relationship or phenomenon human had (not) the chance to experience yet, even things that concept do not allow us to express in a discussion. So unity, perfection, god, uni-multi-meta-verse, everything. Considering this signifiant-non exhaustive signified relationship have you got any example of what Reality does not include ?
Also, it does include what cannot exist, considering "existing" has a circular definition. Things that exist are real. What is reality ? Things that exist. Not very interesting definition here.
Things that don't exist are potential but not actual. So here, when i say reality, i mean everything entangled (and apparently not) through causality relationships. Even fictional unicorns, fictional family, love, democracy and myself, yes. So yes, everything, even nothing. Self exclusive, self dual.
There is no way to prove there are actual different things around and inside us, even the illusion of ourselves only survives though phenomenology. Further than that, we can point out cognitive functions that scotomize things into the illusion they are different/similar, and thanks to heuristics we also developped evolutive, thermodynamic and maybe physical (i can't give examples because i'm not an expert in physics) reasons behind the fact we function like this : electrochemical distribution and survival are about efficiency and cognitive conservation.
It creates apparent paradoxes caused by our very architecture. There are ways to dissolve them with complex experience of phenomenology, systemics and holistic approaches, and I tend to think logos is not enough due to the simple fact that is subbordinate to our experience of being among "apparently other" things. The map is not the territory. If it is, then the map is not useful to convey information anymore as it becomes the territory. If i draw a computer to someone who's never seen a computer before, there are good chances one mistakes it for something similar to a less complex and more familiar thing one knows.
>>>>>>In the same way, if i were able to define Reality, then it would be exactly reality. I can try to define. For example if i say that Reality is that which has no duplicate. Tadam ! Not convincing isn't it ? This process works for objects you can delineate, which is not the case with Reality. We can't work with any definition, and that is the whole point of my previous comment. I you were to remember only one thing through this text, remember that.
@@ceryx6849 Man, I don't quite know what you're on about.
I've had discussions like this for a very long time now, and at some point it all just seems like pussyfooting.
The level of distinction that we operate on isn't even contrary or contradictory. You're bringing up things that exist as either a consequence of predetermined physical laws, or you're describing the predetermined physical laws. And yes, "existing" is used here to describe the necessary outcome of the consequences of there being "something" rather than nothing. Existing doesn't equate to "real". "Real" is a value judgement based on epistemic preferences. The dreams I have are just as "real" to me as every waking moment. But they're not "real" to you. Hence why I don't use "real" in this context. What I can do instead is opt in to describing the phenomenon and its meta-phenomenon.
It is the case that I have dreams that feel almost indistinguishable from the waking world.
It is the case that it is due to my dreams being phenomenological, I cannot sufficiently convey the experience to you.
It is the case that humans can conceptualize.
It is the case that the conceptualization brings about phenomenological outcomes.
It is the case that these outcomes cannot be measured sufficiently outside of individual experience.
And I can go on forever and ever explaining the phenomenon, the meta-phenomenon, and the intra-meta-phenomenon in the way of "it is the case" because reality entails its consequences. As such you can define reality by all of its consequences (despite the fact that we cannot know all of them), but its consequences cannot entail anything that isn able to be contradictory to reality's existence since "everything" follows reality. This follows the exact same pattern as casual modes of rational, and tracking the rational backwards you reach the beginning of the 3rd dimensions "time".
@@Youshallbeeatenbyme « at some point it all just seems like pussyfooting » yes. To the extent we don’t both feel comfortable with the ontological limits of logos, there’s a point from which it is reassuring to throw everything into a feeling of pointlessness. I can understand that.
« The level of dinstinction that we operate on isn’t even contrary » I’m reassured that you point it out.
« You’re bringing up things that exist as either a consequence or predetermined physical laws, or […] the predetermined physical laws. » Yes, and I’m also bringing the fact that existing is a recursive concept when you’re digging into it. By that I mean that it isn’t very interesting per say because it is empty when it doesn’t equal to reality, and useless when it does.
« Real is a value judgement based on epistemic preferences. » (then you bring up a couple examples of phenomenon based definition of reality)
Here stands a bit of comprehensive confusion. In French there are two distinct words to speak about reality : ‘La Réalité’ answers to the individual psychic experience of reality, in which our experience results from the sum of our perceptions into a whole ‘painting’ which is knowable from the person who experiences and can be partially communicated to the external world. It is the one you use when you talk about the dream example. ‘Le Réel’ is a quite different thing, as it includes the other side of the equation, the things there, independent from our made up useful and usable reality. There comes an issue with the concepts themselves, because from the point you conceptualise you are constrained into thematas (holton, 1973, 1981, 1982) which are primordial dichotomies like true/false, existing/delusional, love/hatred, and such. Understand these are dependent on our cognition and can’t honestly hold up when you try and talk about reality in the second sense, because that one doesn’t critically rely on our cognition. To get back to the point, a paradox always sets up on those thematas which are subordinate to local cognition, especially human cognition here.
So your dreams can be very real in the second sense of reality (le réel) anyways, because my experience is not a critical factor in their production. When you dig a little bit, our apparently shared experience of reality (réalité) is but a common dream. There’s no such things as trees, birds, cars, democracy and black holes, because these are just scotomized expressions of not-so-different things to say the least, in order to fit our cognitive and biological needs. A car can be an artificial zombie mule, or even a bunch of refined metal pieces stuck together for no apparent purpose from the perspective of someone who’s never seen any car.
Don’t confuse me for a Lacanian, but here is an interesting try from him about reality : « le Réel, c’est ce contre quoi on se cogne » Reality is that which one bumps against. This take is almost opposite to the delusional definition of reality.
I was waiting to see if you'd offer a free trial of KNOWLEDGE+ but I guess they just don't have a good marketing team. Don't worry Kane, I believe you'll get them as sponsor someday!
nice comment😀
Great video; kinda reminded me superficially of relativistic treatments of the skepticism x anti-skepticism debate, like Rescher's (1978) or Unger's (1984).
Kind of off topic I know. Grue could be useful as a reference to things that used to be green but are now blue after a certain date, because that date was when the species edited their eyes or brains in a way that changed their experience of the particular wavelength that used to be seen as green but is now see as blue. It references the same wavelength, so it could carve nature at it's joints, but it has the pragmatic bonus of helping them adapt to their new experiences.
Another great video, thanks 👍
Glad you liked it!
Thanks for this I now have a word my belief I believe in the draw between skepticism and anti skepticism. I'm happy to have knowledge* where knowledge* looks like anti-skeptic knowledge but I'm glad to be skeptic and have belifs*.
One question i had to you/people in general is by what basis should we fairly generalizatize claims? For an example ill use rule utilitarianism (which ik you dont subscribe to but i think it illustrates my question better":
S1- killing is wrong because it tends to hurt people.
S2-killing people named Jeremy is wrong because killing people named Jeremy tends to hurt people.
S3-pulling a trigger is right because pulling on one metal part of a device tends to increase utility.
My three different examples try and illustrate different ways of framing a moral dilemma, but to me makes me think is why would/could one framing be "right" given that there may be different ways to structure the moral dilemma, including ones that are less silly than mine (perhaps equally reasonable).
For moral anti realists this might not matter? Or maybe it does? Just a question
Is the idea that our judgment of the utility of an action is dependent on how the action is described? This is a really interesting point, and I assume that ethicists must have considered it, but offhand I can't think of any work on this.
@@KaneB yes exactly. Like ontop of framing biases (e.g. using the term kill vs take the life of) it doesnt seem clear to me how moral realists especially can "objectively" or fairly frame a moral dilemma given that different framings might lead to different conclusions
This was in my feed randomly 12 hours from this guy's post. Use this post for future statistical relevance In regard to its growth in his Chanel. 👋
Conceptual pluralism strikes me as another linguistic trap. I get that linguistics are necessarily broad, especially so for the purpose of verbosity, but whenever I think about frameworks I always get the sense that a framework, such as conceptual pluralism, doesn't take into account that itself is also its own subject.
I might have genuinely driven myself into a corner with this mentality of pinning a framework against itself using its own tools, but since I have done this I have been unable to really accept most frameworks anymore. Which makes it more interesting to me when a framework uses its own tools on itself--I assume meta-skepticism does since I'm about halfway through the video. Time to wait to see.
In "what we care about" you and I have the same initial thought about grue. I think that a lot of times philosophy doesn't step outside of sapio-centric reasoning, and it's interesting to see this version of meta-skepticism taking a step out of it even if just briefly so far.
Damn, you hit my problem of using framework tools on themselves. If knowledge and knowledge* are contingent of agency and shmagency, what's stopping me from going one step above both and saying that knowledge and knowledge* are both underneath knowledge*+; which states that knowledge and knowledge* are both important (insert important reason here). And then you pin knowledge* and knowledge with another set of knowledges that equal knowledge*- in whatever claim they have. And the framework extrapolates ad infinitum/absurdum.
Honestly I could be missing the point somewhere, and maybe it doesn't work like that.
This makes me say that if there are concepts within concepts as to what a concept is within knowledge of our universe and world. Then there is a regress in what we understand within a concept. Because without referimg to let's say what an apple is we then look at the concepts for an apple and that even when we do so we refer to other concepts. It is like a never ending set of branches. There is a regress.
Great exposition on the shmagency objection!
You should look into Closely related problems…
MattiEklund’s ‘Choosing Normative Concepts’
Shamik Dasgupta’s ‘The truth fetish: The normative path to pragmatism’
Hey Kane 👋🏼! Would u consider making a video on the problem of personal identity?
I'll do more than just consider it:
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th-cam.com/video/wKwVxI9F_Ig/w-d-xo.html
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th-cam.com/video/QKmLVWb2Cxw/w-d-xo.html
th-cam.com/video/WuyfqlAds4I/w-d-xo.html
If people listened to Bartley in the 60s we wouldn’t still be in this mess.
Wdym
Is rationality relevant to knowledge?
Is certainty something that can reasonably defined as a type of doxastic attitude?
Yes, I would consider certainty a doxastic attitude. To be certain of a proposition is to hold that the proposition cannot be doubted, or to assign a subjective probability of 1 to the proposition, or something along those lines.
Sounds like plain epistemology to me.
How do you define knowledge not justified without belief though ? Belief is the same cognitive objet as knowledge, but I’m curious to learn how you do otherwise.
Nice video thank you.
👌
🤘
what does it meta?
Are you in any social network, other than discord?
I also use twitter a little
It is possible you might be a brain in a vat, but the knowledge you have hands is justified by reason and evidence. Certainty is just a feeling. If certainty was required for knowledge, then only an omniscient being would have any knowledge. And since omniscience is self contradictory, there would be no knowledge. Thus, the skeptic unfriendly definition of knowledge is the preferred definition. All that is required for knowledge is belief justified by reason and evidence. And belief justified by reason and evidence. Certainty is not needed.
As I understand them, most skeptical arguments threaten to show not just that we cannot be certain of our beliefs, but that we have no justification whatsoever for our beliefs. For example, we have no justification whatsoever for ruling out the BIV hypothesis and taking the external world to exist -- all the attempts to justify this fail. So I don't think that retreating to the claim that belief is merely justified by reason and evidence can in itself undermine the skeptical challenge.
@@KaneB Any and all evidence rejects the biv hypothesis. Everything you see, hear, smell, touch, or taste. You can see your hands. When you mold clay, you can predict how it will bend depending on the amount of pressure your hands put on it. When your hand gets cut, you feel pain.
Am I certain I am not a biv? Of course not. Is the belief that I am not a biv justified? Yes. All evidence points to that.
@@InventiveHarvest I don't see how. Nothing in my experience distinguishes the external world hypothesis from the BIV hypothesis. When I look at what I take to be my hands, I would have the same experience regardless of whether I'm observing material objects or I'm a BIV being stimulated to produce the hallucination of hands. All my evidence is compatible with BIV (and countless other skeptical hypotheses).
@@KaneB yes. It would look exactly the same. But that doesnt change the fact that seeing my hands, moving my hands, etc is all evidence that I have hands. Seeing my hands is not evidence that I do not have hands.
@@KaneB like if everyday as I was going home, I passed a stop sign on the corner. If someone asked me "is there a stop sign on the corner" I could respond "I know there is a stop sign on the corner." If the person went and looked, and there was no stop sign on the corner, my knowledge would be wrong, but it is still knowledge until there is enough counter evidence to discount the previous evidence.
If knowledge required certainty, then there could be no knowledge. The only way to he certain is to know with certainty that there is not anything outside of your knowledge. If there are unknowns, then one of those unknowns could make false something that you thought you knew. Therefore, the only way that certainty is possible is through omniscience. When we say "knowledge" we dont mean something that is synonimous with or logically equivalent to omniscience. Hence, a skeptic unfriendly definition of knowledge is preferable.
So, I can know that there is a stop sign on the corner, even if it turns out that there isnt a stop sign on the corner.
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