Your correspondence theory form of relativism doesn't work as it would be objectively true that if you carve out the world a specific way, a certain state of affairs are objectively the case. Also with the example regarding flatness, you can argue that one object is only flat relative to some other object but this objection fails when taking into account something that is truly flat or relative relations such as "Object X is flatter than Object Y". I would also say that things that are not said are implied in sentences such as "This table is flat" depending on context which makes it the case that it is objectively true that the table is flat depending on what I mean.
Imho relativistes MUST identify all conjoined assumptions. The sky is blue is true relative to the colour palette of specific wavelengths of light, relative to time of day, or overcast, or from which point on earth or altitude. The reason it's important for relativists to specify is because relativists only argue truth from all others based on those very assumptions others have. It's their whole schtick to find holes in assertions. That's their defining feature. Objective truths exist but they're all dependent on language and interpretation. It doesn't mean objective truth doesn't exist, it means objective truths exist within languages which are capable of being very well designed and defined. The truth that there are words is objectively true based on every and all definitions, and definitions are ipso facto evidence of words, thus I've presented you with an objective truth confined to language. It is not the case that physics directly caused words, words are emergent properties of life forms which emerged from physical laws. But words exist is only true after words are produced and defined, not at the big bang but some time necessarily afterwards. This to me is the common sense distinctions of real truths, and the point of being so pedantic is an exercise of thought, not a practise for debate but rather a tool to analyze assumptions which may seem trivial but wind up being pivotal to the context in which communication is occurring. Often we don't even consider other interpretations unless we intentionally and deliberately stop to consider every little dependency our truth (or another's) can be dependent upon. Sometimes that matters and most times it's overlooked without practise using the tool. It's not useful to use it to argue unless one finds that context is broken to a supposedly absolute truth being presented.
I agree with relativism in conjunction with the 'worldmaking' idea but I don't think our choice of context changes the nature of external reality. I see it more like adjusting the focus and aperture on an optical device like a camera. Each perspective makes certain propositions true and precise while making others vague or even inexpressible altogether. Changing perspective won't change any true propositions into a false proposition with the same meaning (but it may make previously true propositions into ill-defined sequences of symbols).
I'm not really familiar with the anti-realism vs realism debate in the philosophy of mathematics but I've always intuitively been against some kind of mathematical realism on similar grounds to your "drawing a circle around the table's atoms" argument. If you have a group of x number of trees, you could 'draw a circle' around any number of trees and create a lot of different combinations describing all sorts of formations. And behind each of these formations, there would be a corresponding number (eg: there are 8 trees in this 'drawn circle'). What's more is that we don't have to limit this set to integers. We could reasonably imagine drawing this circle and getting half a tree, or two and three quarters of a tree. This seems to go against mathematical realism for me. It seems more reasonable that rather than mathematical entities being independent of our minds and ready for us to discover, these formations are constructed by us. I just find the latter causal explanation more intuitive. But maybe I've misunderstood what mathematical realism entails, or there might be various forms (I imagine there are).
Neurath's objection to correspondence is that we're only ever comparing statements to statements. What corresponds to what? Some statement of fact to some statement of experience. Correspondence theorists say we correspond our descriptions to "reality" but reality is just another linguistic representation. What do you mean by reality? Well, I mean some set of statements which includes the claim I'm saying corresponds to reality!
William James' understanding of the pragmatic theory of truth quite clearly fits with relativism as you say. I still dont understand Dewey's or Pierce's understanding of the pragmatic theory of truth. The concept of the end of enquiry or even his occasional claim that it is fated to be agreed upon seem very mysterious to me. A group can be fated to agree upon something while it is wrong. Think of the inculcation of values or the creation of substantive similarities; people can share the same background beliefs or practices and thus be fated to arrive at the same conclusion to something even if it isn't true. This occurs in political arguments all the time; on social issues it is extremely common and pronounced. This is why republicanism and political perfectionism are good and necessary; one needs to shape the citizens to arrive at certain conclusions to ensure stability of the regime.
A pet peeve is the conflating of epistemological relativity and ontological relativity. The relativity of simultanaity in physics makes this conflation for instance, but I figure that's cos Bridgeman and the operationalists insisted on it. How we perceive the world may well be warped without the world itself being warped haha
My own pragmatic theory is that; truth in general as a schema for navigating the world, is useful (for humans at least). It is very plausible that truth is simply a byproduct of language, as well as the development of our various predictive capacities. In this sense, our (i.e., all humans) pragmatics are all the same (e.g., we must identify objects in relation to other objects in the world, we must communicate with each other, deduce possibilities, perform arithmetic etc.) and so, all humans should, in theory, have the same solution space for "true things". Scientific epistemology is seemingly the most pragmatic epistemology, so it should thus be the "best" epistemology. So, then it would seem that the appropriate criteria for evaluating truth claims would be to evaluate its pragmatic content? To me this presents a bit of an issue now as it could be very difficult to evaluate pragmatic content in some cases.
@@nkoppa5332 maybe... Maybe not. If I knew all the pragmatic content I would be able to give you a definitive answer. At the moment... just due to how robotic my brain is becoming by thinking like this... Probably not. Ignorance is often very pragmatic in my view.
@@mrpickle6290 pragmatism seems to be a sterilization project. Come on brother. Let us relinquish these deadening philosophies. What is the point of believing in such obtuse and depressive things, especially when truth itself becomes impossible? There is no higher ground of truthfulness that these ideologies can even support, so if it’s all based on utility, then why believe in the most nonpragmatic ideologies ever? None of these thoughts or ideologies are pragmatic to basic human wants such as children family belonging etc. Pragmatism kills any real meaning and you constantly need to remind yourself that it’s just your little monkey brain producing dopamine when traditionally “good” things happen to you. This is utter death philosophy, hence why the majority turn to Buddhism in order to cope with this mental western poison produced by America.
@@nkoppa5332 I definitely agree with a lot of this. Yet there is something about knowing these "deadening truths" which I find some saddening pride in. "Not being a sheep" is what you would call it. Alas... I am starting to think that I would rather be a sheep now. (I guess I understand why people like Jordan Peterson a little better now). But even if I wanted to, pragmatism seems to just be the most plausible theory from a rational standpoint. I can't just simply relinquish a belief that I know to likely be true. And ironically, I would be relinquishing the belief on the basis of pragmatic grounds, which further supports the theory.
@@mrpickle6290 except they aren’t even truths that are deadening anymore. Accepting this is criteria for truth is to make truth altogether irrelevant. Then at that point there is nothing like this romantic notion of clinging to truth at all costs and not being a sheep. With this criteria, everyone is just a sheep. There is nothing above pragmatic utility on this view, so even this romantic notion you have in your head that you’ve discovered sometjing “truthful” is itself a fiction.
Thanks for the content Kane! Personally, I would be glad if Kane made one or a series of videos about pragmatism in epistemology and philosophy of science. In my opinion, this approach largely correlates with relativism, constructivism, etc. At the same time, there are not so many videos on this topic in good quality on TH-cam. Support with likes if you also want a video about pragmatism!
Good video, however, some objections: Correspondence: Given an object x that is a set where each member is some fundamental substance (like atoms, or pixels of perception e.t.c depending on materialism or idealism respectively) then one can construct a new object x* by adding or removing one member of this set. This just creates two objects where the proposition "x is F" is true (corresponds to reality) but " x* is F" is false (does not correspond to reality), making it "relative", but only insofar as two actors A and B have a language problem that makes them think they're talking about the same thing but are actually talking about different objects. Clearing this confusion shows that the correspondence is objective. Coherence: "I can create two sets of beliefs that are coherent, explanatory and simple", has this actually been done? Has this been demonstrated or is it an asumption? As a constructivist (in the philosophy of mathematics) I believe this needs to be demonstrated. Pragmatist: What's not to say that rational actors converge on a single set of propositions? There are reasons to believe this can be the case Consider a set of n subjects that update their beliefs in a rational way(like for example, Bayesian updating). If all actors do this, then Aumann's agreement theorem indicate that their beliefs converge.
Very late to the game here, but I think Pierce's view can be reconciled with relativism if we incorporate the factor of human interest. The end of inquiry is not a determinate point, like an abstract future physics ala Hempel. Instead, the end of inquiry is a negotiation between (present) human capabilities and (present) human interest. I can't draw a curve here, but you could imagine some maxima for capability and interest where the current end of inquiry resides. At our time in history, that might look like the scientific consensus of the academy or whatever. Most people just won't have the interest or capabilities to further the inquiry beyond what the relevant experts have already accomplished. So truth in the Piercian view could be reconciled with a theory of truth contingent on the utility of truth to the knowers. Not that there aren't weaknesses here, i.e., once an expert has determined a career track, it generates an interest in "producing" truth (to differentially establish a reputation within the field or something). I think this theory fares better using ordinary examples. If I see a black and white striped, horse-like animal at the circus, but then it disappears from sight, I will probably be satisfied to end the inquiry with my impression that it was a zebra. Going out of my way to gather more information would require interest I probably don't have. So, I saw a zebra. It works at the level of individuals and institutions (even societies). This brings power into the equation, which I don't want to touch here. But you could intuit the influence on truth that Catholic authority had in the 13th century or whatever.
How does this relativism of truth play out in actual life? Does it feel different to argue about global warming (for example) depending on whether you subscribe to relative truth vs. absolute truth? How does it interact with uncertainty and humility? Can relativity of truth allow for such concepts, or are they just rewordings of "I acknowledge a larger-than-usual possibility that some future version of me will have a different truth"? Can a relativist believe things that are untrue? If truth is relative, and I hold that truth is not relative, am I right or am I wrong?
It seems to me like it doesn't make any difference in real life. I can imagine that what is "true" for humans could vary with the evolution of cultural norms and the evolution of scientific practices if truth is relative, though.
This feels more like a linguistic argument. I think it is a weakness of natural language that correspondence theory breaks down but I don’t think that actually addresses the core philosophical proposition. I will grant you that what we call a table or how we define its flatness is subjective and somewhat arbitrary but I disagree that the truth of its existence or truth about its qualities are relative.
If truth is correspondence to a proposition about the world, then truth is relative. If truth is that which actually is, does and does not in the world, then truth cannot be relative. The actual is absolute, perspective must needs be relative. Without perspective can there be such a thing as falsity? With perspective and the knowledge that there are others that may or may not perceive as you do, then truth and untruth come into existence.
Re: Correspondence theory. Context-sensitive definitions do not translate to relative truths... By whichever context you choose to define a table, whether as a solid object or simples arranged table-wise you must translate the proposition to the appropriate context. Only if you insist on remaining within your context will the truth seem relative. The table being flat is not a 'relative' truth...it is true in a colloquial sense and false in an engineering sense. This does not make it a relative truth! In a colloquial context, it is absolutely true and in an engineering context, it is absolutely false. If you know nothing about engineering and flatness standards you effectively cannot change context and the conversation seems to imply a relativeness to truth...If you can at least acknowledge that you don't know about engineering standards then you can simply say I do not understand how you are using the word 'flat', but according to my use of the 'flat' the table corresponds to being 'flat'. Needless to say 'being able to put some stuff on a table without it falling off. Is absolutely true in some context of 'table' and 'stuff' even if you have no language to express different contexts of the word 'flat'. I challenge you to find one case where 'relativism' is not mearly a refusal or ignorance to accept the words of the person in the context in which they intend them.
your definition of relativism is optional. Kane and many others define it differently. the choice of excluding context-sensitive definitions from the definition of "relativism about truth" is exactly why it makes sense to say truth is relative: is the claim "Context-sensitive definitions do not translate to relative truths" true or false? it's obviously true relative to your beliefs/choice of definition, and it's false relative to Kane's or others' who include "context-sensitive definitions" in their definition of relativism about truth.
I take it that your suggestion is that we can take the following propositions as absolutely true: (1) In context C1, the table is flat. (2) In context C2, the table is not flat. I think there's a fairly obvious response for the relativist, which is just to deny that there are objective distinctions between different contexts. That is, what counts as a "context", and how that context sets particular standards for reference and truth, will be dependent on our perspectives. (1) and (2) will only be true relative to a particular perspective on human inquiry.
Please stop saying relativism has anything to do with “human” inquiry. It doesn’t require humans, just perspectives. Humans come out of the perspectives the perspectives don’t belong to humans.
Is relativism circular? Isn't saying proposition A is true relative to some perspective logically the same as saying A is is true, insofar it is said by a perspective which grants it true?
I love this video btw as a fellow Global Relativist I have explained this view at length to many people that are "Non Relativist" and what I have noticed is that a large majority of these people seem to get it but constantly want to pin equal validity to me even when I explain that it doesn't entail equal validity and when they finally get it, then they try to pretend as if they don't understand it and then try to misrepresent it. I'll tell you one individual I was talking to after I explained it entirely, and they signed off on it saying they understood they then messaged me again pretending not to know what my view was then came back to ask me what I meant by Truth is Relative, I didn't realize it was the same account, because I forgot the user then he tried to ask me the same questions before on what it meant for "Truth to be Relative"however he already knew and understood the view but then misrepresented my view "oh you're saying the meaning of statements can be different" This is the same person who had signed off that he understood the view which he did but was simply here to straw man the view and argue with me my point is that a vast amount of non relativist I've e interacted with do understand the view however when it is explained to them, they then seem to straw man it another non relativist I spoke to after explaining the view "oh maybe you're not an epistemic relativist" I'm telling you I have spoken to maybe a hundred non relativist and most of them seem to have the same misconceptions, and it seems to me they deliberately try to misconstrue the view I'm not sure if it's just the people I've spoken to, but it's very irritating when someone tells you "i'm not sure you'd be a relativist more like a realist" it's not just that but a lot of them too will say/ imply that truth being relative means there is no truth whatsoever just saying I'm just wondering if you had the same experience with the non relativists you have interacted with. Watch out for this, I'm telling you
I don't think I'm a relativist but I'm not sure what you mean here by relativist either. If you have your views somewhere ready to like copy paste a few paragraphs it could make for an interesting discussion.
I think the problem of philosophy is one of veracity. We have information and data but we cannot truly verify anything as fact. We may stumble upon truths, and we may know truths, but we cannot know a truth is true. I think the only judgement we can make of something being true is a matter of how well it holds up to explaining or justifying g something, and, possibly, how well it fits within a logical framework of information (I e. Information about my cat does not really have relevancy to a math problem, unless somehow whether my cat is orange or grey results in a different answer, in which case I have another avenue to explore). This isn't to say something is true, though in common parlance we may say it's true, but rather than the statement simply works, or does the best job at explaining things, though the possibility of it being wrong is totally correct. This isn't leading me towards relativism where in many truths may coexist, but that whatever information seems most accurate can still be subject to change or revision. I'm just as blind as everyone else, and I may have my own theories just as they do, but they do not have equal value just because I cannot know for certain. My ideas may prove more or less effective, and I should adjust what I'm working with accordingly.
Truths can be both objective and relative, how?. well suppose there are truths and they are in the external world but you don't have direct access to these truths, you percieve truths in your own way and you draw conclusions about these truths based on your own subjective point of view.
What would you say to someone who throws at you the Hegelian idea that "Truth" involves all these permutations? "[Truth?] thus appears in an endless wealth of forms, figures and phenomena. It wraps its kernel round with a robe of many colours, in which consciousness finds itself at home.” Is this acceptable to you? Basically, I'm fascinated with your channel because I tend to agree with a lot of the ways in which you deconstruct perhaps "positivisms" of all sorts. I tend to do so as well, but I really do think such epoché as sometimes telling for me that the proper philosophic response is something like an Idealism or Theory that encapsulates such plurality that is beyond this deconstruction, and even beyond the encapsulation of such one-sidedness (In a specific positivism and it's refutation). In short, I tend to suspect that if there is the availability of "Global Relativism" there is something like a Rational process that enables even this negative connection of concepts. Global availability of explication upon the Notion. I tend to suspect we have arrived at philosophy through very different educations, typified by maybe the Analytic-Continental trope. I'm curious if yet you still sometimes have this impulse to posit that which explains!! the possibility of such relativism. In a more emotionally charged restatement: I this perspective (ha) on Truth is limited by an understanding of philosophy that tries to still occur in the fanciful speculation of a subject that treats "Truth" (its object of inquiry) with real disinterest. Question: In your relativism video you argue against Regress by questioning the "infinite" quality of possible perspectives. So, if I have you at least here arguing with the finite, countable amount of perspectives: Would you accept that Truth/Being/Actuality is the complete sum of these perspectives? Is this consistent with your Global Relativism? Here of course, we'd have the perspective from Totality, which, even granting the "impossibility" of a single individual's access to that, does it not stand as in some sense an entirely non-relativistic heuristic towards what truth might entail i.e., the complete explanation of all the facts, even within the polysemy of these facts as they're made determinate within different explanatory models. An overarching telos to this dumb thing we do called philosophy?
Maybe in short I'm just reacting aesthetically: Calling it relativism is boring. Instead: call it the Absolute Spirit unfolding itself in actuality. Set up some antimonial divide a la Kant. Because even resigning to relativism would involve all sorts of daring metaphysical explanations as to the impossibility of objectivism in my opinion.
I'm having difficulty grasping this. Apply relativism to this and work it out so I can see what a relativistic answer to it would be.... gravity exists. I can see relativistic truths in a lot but some things I just cant make a connection
I suppose the relativity would be more obvious if you were more specific on the term "gravity". Like, the original theory of gravity was Newtonian gravity, which was a useful description of objects attracting each other, but flawed in that it failed to explain certain phenomena, like the orbit of mercury or the photoelectric effect. Under the correspondence theory of truth, we might say Newtonian gravity has a loose correspondence with the observed facts, and so is *roughly* true, but is not true on closer examination. The truth of the theory is relative to our epistemic standards. The same could be said about modern theories of gravity like general relativity, which work for the aforementioned problems, but can't explain the role of gravity on the quantum level.
@@donanderson3653 but then I still hit a mental dead end because you can slice it different ways but the force is still gravity whether it's one theory of gravity or another. So does it boil down to specificity?
@@Locreai the simple relativistic answer is "that depends on how you define gravity, i.e. where you draw the conceptual line." the question then becomes "is the definition you chose necessary in an absolute sense?" if you say no, you concede to relativism. if you say yes, the relativist will simply give you a different definition and thus disprove the claim to necessity. the same game can be played with the concept of "existence". language and thoughts/ideas/concepts are not the same as the independent world out there, so even if there is a phenomenon which we call gravity, it is only our differentiation of this phenomenon from any other phenomenon (i.e. the process of individuation) that generates concepts such as "gravity"; the individuation process could conceivably be different or even altogether absent though.
@@oOneszaOo see I'm still in the woods on this one because it all seems to break down to an argument over semantics in this instance. Whether gravity is quantum or relative, or springs only from god, gravity still does the same thing in the end. Gravity hasn't changed in nature no matter how we have redefined its cause and effect. So that gravity exists surely seems like a must, but why and how does it function seem to be the only points for debate. I dunno man this one is sooo beyond me
@@Locreai the question is not what does or does not change in nature but what changes about our way of carving up / categorizing / conceptualizing nature. it is an argument over semantics, yes, but only insofar as semantics plays an important role in meaning and reference and conceptualizing/understanding the world. what is included in the concept of "gravity" has to be established first in order to be able to judge whether some proposition x about gravity it is true or false, but the establishment process of inclusion+exclusion (i.e. individuation) is obviously not necessary and that's where relativism comes in. if i come up with a different definition for gravity or with a whole new concept because I decide to carve up nature/the world out there differently for my own purposes, the truth or falsity of my proposition remains relative to my definitions and concepts. e.g. if invent the concept "tair" and explain that tair corresponds to the mind-indepenent fact in the world of "matter shaped like a table and a chair connected on the bottom by standing on the same ground" we could all make judgements of whether "there is a tair" is true in any given situation or not.
The biggest problem with correspondence theory is math-do math sentences correspond to reality? The biggest problem with coherence theory is that math does not cohere with physical statements. The biggest problem with pragmatism is that it allows a sentence to be true that is morally abhorrent but useful to believe. The biggest problem with deflationism is mathematical realism-if propositions are fictional then math sentences that seem objectively true Cannot be true on the way that we represent them. Something may be objectively true in them -like consistently or something may be tracked that is objectively there-but we will run into an epistemological problem of how to match them in this scenario. Is the sentence “relativism is true” relatively true? If so, then is it true in all possible worlds or just this one? Is it true in just the closest possible world or the world that is physically the same as ours except one small detail? Theories of truth lead from correspondence theories to coherence to pragmatist and eventually to deflationary. Fictional theories of truth-such as nietzsche’s are under the deflationary theories. “Snow is white” is true iff snow is white. This sentence is a prop in a game of make believe that is highly as elaborate as the game of math. Children use props in their games of make believe and propositions are just abstract props-unless they are sentences-in which case they are concrete. Kendal Walton’s book “mimesis as make believe” is great for this. Kane b -can you make a video about fictionalization theories of truth?
"Is the sentence 'relativism is true' relatively true?" obviously, yes. the truth of the sentence is relative to one's definition of "truth" and "relativism", at the very least. "If so, then is it true in all possible worlds or just this one?" depends on whether you believe there are possible worlds. but only believing in this world is enough to be a relativist about truth. if it is true in all possible worlds, it's necessarily true that truth is relative, which seems hard to prove in any way but is not problematic in regards to relativity since the "is necessarily true" claim is true only relative to a specific modal framework in epistemology (i.e. the framework of possible worlds).
@@oOneszaOo what I mean to ask in that part you responded to is this-is the sentence “relativism is true” true in some objective and not relativistic sense? Is relativism true absolutely? If so, there is a contradiction there from the point of view of classical logic. I know that every statement is true inside the system it is in-but outside that framework is where problems arise. I could be wrong though
@@caylynmillard "is the sentence 'relativism is true' true in some objective and not relativistic sense? Is relativism true absolutely?" no, because then it would be contradictory as you say. the real question is why do you think relativism would have to be true absolutely? what you are talking about with the meta-level (i.e. "outside" the system/framework) does not entail that truth becomes absolute at a higher level. you can say that truth is relative at every level ad infinitum.
@@oOneszaOo thank you for putting up with me in this conversation but I still am confused. I’ll ask it simpler-isn’t relativism a flat out contradiction? Does the theory even get off the ground? I mean, saying that relativism is true is logically equivalent to saying “that our theory of truth is only true to us.” Or is that subjectivism? It seems like we can’t even say that relativism is true- if truth in general is relative, then why should we care that relativsm is true? Doesn’t it just mean that relativism is true for me? Isn’t that approaching solipsism or the doctrine of flux? -to use a reductio. Because the doctrine of flux is absurd and relativism leads to it. However, it just seems like we are saying that “every sentence or proposition is true relative to some framework” but that includes our sentence of “relativism is true”-which seems like a tautological or trivial truth within the system. Are we saying relativsim is true globally? In every system? If that’s the case then the truth about relativism will be absolute-ie true in every logical system except the ones where truth is relative? Am I confusing myself? Lol sorry!
@@caylynmillard "Or is that subjectivism?" yes, that's something else (and exactly the misunderstanding Kane was talking about). relativism is opposed to absolutism in this particular context. "It seems like we can’t even say that relativism is true- if truth in general is relative, then why should we care that relativism is true?" whether we care or what we care about is a different question altogether and has nothing to do with the relativity of truth. i care whether truth is relative because i care about the nature of truth, but of course your mileage may vary. as Kane already said, we can always say that something is true even if we are relativists about the nature of truth because the nature of truth and judgements regarding truth/falsity of propositions are two distinct things. the former problem is captured in the relativism vs absolutism debate, while the latter is handled by theories of truth (e.g. correspondence theory). to give an analogy, if truth is a ball, the nature of truth is the ball's color while the judgements of the truth of propositions is whether the ball fits into the hole. the ball fits or doesn't fit into the hole regardless of its color, but when you're talking about the ball itself, it can be right or wrong to say that it's red. "Are we saying relativism is true globally? In every system?" no, relativism is emergent in this context. relativism is true because truth is relative to each system. in fact, relativism is true even if you ask about the system of relativism itself because not only is the term "relativism" differently defined depending on the context, but in the narrow context of truth there is the system of relativism and the system of absolutism, each of which defines truth differently. "If that’s the case then the truth about relativism will be absolute" that's not how it works. truth is not absolute in the system of relativism so "the truth about relativism" is also not absolute. you can tell because the statement "the proposition 'truth is relative' is only true relative to your beliefs about the nature of truth. a relativist judges the proposition to be true, while an absolutist judges it to be false" is a meta-level proposition that retains its commitment to the relativity of truth. the fact that higher order / meta-level propositions continue to be compliant with relativity does not make the truth of relativism absolute, however. for it to be absolute, it would have to be impossible for absolutism to be a way of defining truth, which is just to say there would be no relativity of truth because absolutism would be true. in other words, you cannot make relativism absolute without turning it into absolutism.
In the previous video on relativism, you mentioned you were going to make a video on the arguments for relativism, since that video was only on the objections. Do you still have this in mind? Meanwhile, I have two questions: 1) you didn't make a distinction in this current video between relativism about truth and relativism about justification, you just mentioned you are a relativist about truth. So, does that mean you think relativism about truth has some advantage over relativism about justification? 2) concerning the pragmatic view that "the truth is whatever is agreed upon by the investigators at the end of the inquiry", can't the relativist say that truth is still relative, in this case to the investigators? Or is that missing the pragmatic's point?
For arguments in favour of relativism, see my videos "The Language of Nature" and "Classification and Kinds: An Antirealist View". th-cam.com/video/CGMOJh3z3N4/w-d-xo.html th-cam.com/video/arDbrM27s4s/w-d-xo.html (1) It's not so much that relativism about truth has an advantage over relativism about justification, but rather that truth relativism is much more controversial. It's more common for people to doubt that truth relativism is even comprehensible. So that's why I focused on truth relativism in this video. (2) I take it that a crucial claim of relativism is that there are multiple truths or multiple perspectives (or something along those lines), so not all rational agents will be compelled to converge on a single theory. Prima facie, this is hard to square with Peirce's slogan. For Peirce, I suppose there's some sense in which truth is relative to the investigators, but these are idealized investigators who all come to the same conclusion.
It seems like the idea of truth itself is describing something ontological, but the theories of truth are about our epistemic access to it. Wouldn't it be better to describe them as theories of knowledge, rather than theories of truth?
@@uninspired3583 If by solipsism you mean the notion that only one’s mind exists, this is also an ontological claim. It seems like epistemic solipsism also is an ontological claim, as it makes the claim that one’s mind exists.
@@pandawandas that's one solipsistic model, yes. I'm not implying it isn't an ontological claim, im just saying it's necessarily true to make some claim about reality to move past it.
The real challenge to relativism comes from the narcissist theory of truth (a.k.a. the Donald Trump theory of truth: what is true at any point in time is what benefits Donald Trump). It is perfectly compatible with relativism, but I'm not sure, as a society, we can afford entertaining it for much longer.
What do you mean by "absolute" there? I think that relativism is true; I don't think that relativism is true absolutely. Relativism is true relative to particular perspectives.
If absolutism was the case you’d just get a brute assumption or an appeal to circular reasoning or an infinite regress of responses. With relativism you get the same, relativism does no worse than absolutism.
@@petrospetroupetrou9653 I take it that this is the infinite regress that you're referring to: (1) Relativism is true (2) (1) is true relative to P (3) (2) is true relative to P* (4) (3) is true relative to P** ... But absolutism generates an analogous regress: (1) Absolutism is true (2) (1) is true absolutely (3) (2) is true absolutely (4) (3) is true absolutely ... In fact, truth in general generates a regress, regardless of whether you analyze truth in relativist or absolutist terms: (1) The sky is blue (2) (1) is true (3) (2) is true (4) (3) is true ...
@@KaneB Yes. It is one of the "problems" related to relativism. I think the inf. regress of absolutism is invalid since (2) simply repeats (1). Its not semantically relevant.
Correspondence is bunk, pragmatism is relativistic and nonsense/sophistic. Coherence is good, but only if it’s the right paradigm. Christianity is the only correct paradigm.
Relativism:
th-cam.com/video/cAWqJeGt9HU/w-d-xo.html
Nelson Goodman's worldmaking:
th-cam.com/video/y2ZdneJfG_o/w-d-xo.html
th-cam.com/video/FoxQ_71dzo0/w-d-xo.html
Your chosen topics are getting more and more interesting.
Facts
Fr was thinkin the same thing.
Your correspondence theory form of relativism doesn't work as it would be objectively true that if you carve out the world a specific way, a certain state of affairs are objectively the case. Also with the example regarding flatness, you can argue that one object is only flat relative to some other object but this objection fails when taking into account something that is truly flat or relative relations such as "Object X is flatter than Object Y". I would also say that things that are not said are implied in sentences such as "This table is flat" depending on context which makes it the case that it is objectively true that the table is flat depending on what I mean.
Imho relativistes MUST identify all conjoined assumptions. The sky is blue is true relative to the colour palette of specific wavelengths of light, relative to time of day, or overcast, or from which point on earth or altitude.
The reason it's important for relativists to specify is because relativists only argue truth from all others based on those very assumptions others have. It's their whole schtick to find holes in assertions. That's their defining feature.
Objective truths exist but they're all dependent on language and interpretation. It doesn't mean objective truth doesn't exist, it means objective truths exist within languages which are capable of being very well designed and defined. The truth that there are words is objectively true based on every and all definitions, and definitions are ipso facto evidence of words, thus I've presented you with an objective truth confined to language. It is not the case that physics directly caused words, words are emergent properties of life forms which emerged from physical laws. But words exist is only true after words are produced and defined, not at the big bang but some time necessarily afterwards.
This to me is the common sense distinctions of real truths, and the point of being so pedantic is an exercise of thought, not a practise for debate but rather a tool to analyze assumptions which may seem trivial but wind up being pivotal to the context in which communication is occurring. Often we don't even consider other interpretations unless we intentionally and deliberately stop to consider every little dependency our truth (or another's) can be dependent upon. Sometimes that matters and most times it's overlooked without practise using the tool. It's not useful to use it to argue unless one finds that context is broken to a supposedly absolute truth being presented.
I am also watching this video while lying in bed.
Gives ya a real 4D experience!
Im watching while sitting on the toilet, pants down.
Same
I agree with relativism in conjunction with the 'worldmaking' idea but I don't think our choice of context changes the nature of external reality. I see it more like adjusting the focus and aperture on an optical device like a camera. Each perspective makes certain propositions true and precise while making others vague or even inexpressible altogether. Changing perspective won't change any true propositions into a false proposition with the same meaning (but it may make previously true propositions into ill-defined sequences of symbols).
I'm not really familiar with the anti-realism vs realism debate in the philosophy of mathematics but I've always intuitively been against some kind of mathematical realism on similar grounds to your "drawing a circle around the table's atoms" argument.
If you have a group of x number of trees, you could 'draw a circle' around any number of trees and create a lot of different combinations describing all sorts of formations. And behind each of these formations, there would be a corresponding number (eg: there are 8 trees in this 'drawn circle'). What's more is that we don't have to limit this set to integers. We could reasonably imagine drawing this circle and getting half a tree, or two and three quarters of a tree.
This seems to go against mathematical realism for me. It seems more reasonable that rather than mathematical entities being independent of our minds and ready for us to discover, these formations are constructed by us. I just find the latter causal explanation more intuitive. But maybe I've misunderstood what mathematical realism entails, or there might be various forms (I imagine there are).
what if the mathematics itself is constructed
Neurath's objection to correspondence is that we're only ever comparing statements to statements. What corresponds to what? Some statement of fact to some statement of experience. Correspondence theorists say we correspond our descriptions to "reality" but reality is just another linguistic representation. What do you mean by reality? Well, I mean some set of statements which includes the claim I'm saying corresponds to reality!
William James' understanding of the pragmatic theory of truth quite clearly fits with relativism as you say. I still dont understand Dewey's or Pierce's understanding of the pragmatic theory of truth. The concept of the end of enquiry or even his occasional claim that it is fated to be agreed upon seem very mysterious to me. A group can be fated to agree upon something while it is wrong. Think of the inculcation of values or the creation of substantive similarities; people can share the same background beliefs or practices and thus be fated to arrive at the same conclusion to something even if it isn't true. This occurs in political arguments all the time; on social issues it is extremely common and pronounced. This is why republicanism and political perfectionism are good and necessary; one needs to shape the citizens to arrive at certain conclusions to ensure stability of the regime.
A little Rortian birdy told me that truth is what your contemporaries let you get away with saying :D
A pet peeve is the conflating of epistemological relativity and ontological relativity. The relativity of simultanaity in physics makes this conflation for instance, but I figure that's cos Bridgeman and the operationalists insisted on it. How we perceive the world may well be warped without the world itself being warped haha
My own pragmatic theory is that; truth in general as a schema for navigating the world, is useful (for humans at least). It is very plausible that truth is simply a byproduct of language, as well as the development of our various predictive capacities. In this sense, our (i.e., all humans) pragmatics are all the same (e.g., we must identify objects in relation to other objects in the world, we must communicate with each other, deduce possibilities, perform arithmetic etc.) and so, all humans should, in theory, have the same solution space for "true things". Scientific epistemology is seemingly the most pragmatic epistemology, so it should thus be the "best" epistemology. So, then it would seem that the appropriate criteria for evaluating truth claims would be to evaluate its pragmatic content? To me this presents a bit of an issue now as it could be very difficult to evaluate pragmatic content in some cases.
Is that a useful way to view truth?
@@nkoppa5332 maybe... Maybe not. If I knew all the pragmatic content I would be able to give you a definitive answer. At the moment... just due to how robotic my brain is becoming by thinking like this... Probably not. Ignorance is often very pragmatic in my view.
@@mrpickle6290 pragmatism seems to be a sterilization project. Come on brother. Let us relinquish these deadening philosophies. What is the point of believing in such obtuse and depressive things, especially when truth itself becomes impossible? There is no higher ground of truthfulness that these ideologies can even support, so if it’s all based on utility, then why believe in the most nonpragmatic ideologies ever? None of these thoughts or ideologies are pragmatic to basic human wants such as children family belonging etc. Pragmatism kills any real meaning and you constantly need to remind yourself that it’s just your little monkey brain producing dopamine when traditionally “good” things happen to you. This is utter death philosophy, hence why the majority turn to Buddhism in order to cope with this mental western poison produced by America.
@@nkoppa5332 I definitely agree with a lot of this. Yet there is something about knowing these "deadening truths" which I find some saddening pride in. "Not being a sheep" is what you would call it. Alas... I am starting to think that I would rather be a sheep now. (I guess I understand why people like Jordan Peterson a little better now). But even if I wanted to, pragmatism seems to just be the most plausible theory from a rational standpoint. I can't just simply relinquish a belief that I know to likely be true. And ironically, I would be relinquishing the belief on the basis of pragmatic grounds, which further supports the theory.
@@mrpickle6290 except they aren’t even truths that are deadening anymore. Accepting this is criteria for truth is to make truth altogether irrelevant. Then at that point there is nothing like this romantic notion of clinging to truth at all costs and not being a sheep. With this criteria, everyone is just a sheep. There is nothing above pragmatic utility on this view, so even this romantic notion you have in your head that you’ve discovered sometjing “truthful” is itself a fiction.
Thanks for the content Kane! Personally, I would be glad if Kane made one or a series of videos about pragmatism in epistemology and philosophy of science. In my opinion, this approach largely correlates with relativism, constructivism, etc. At the same time, there are not so many videos on this topic in good quality on TH-cam. Support with likes if you also want a video about pragmatism!
Good video, however, some objections:
Correspondence:
Given an object x that is a set where each member is some fundamental substance (like atoms, or pixels of perception e.t.c depending on materialism or idealism respectively) then one can construct a new object x* by adding or removing one member of this set. This just creates two objects where the proposition "x is F" is true (corresponds to reality) but " x* is F" is false (does not correspond to reality), making it "relative", but only insofar as two actors A and B have a language problem that makes them think they're talking about the same thing but are actually talking about different objects. Clearing this confusion shows that the correspondence is objective.
Coherence:
"I can create two sets of beliefs that are coherent, explanatory and simple", has this actually been done? Has this been demonstrated or is it an asumption? As a constructivist (in the philosophy of mathematics) I believe this needs to be demonstrated.
Pragmatist:
What's not to say that rational actors converge on a single set of propositions? There are reasons to believe this can be the case Consider a set of n subjects that update their beliefs in a rational way(like for example, Bayesian updating). If all actors do this, then Aumann's agreement theorem indicate that their beliefs converge.
Very late to the game here, but I think Pierce's view can be reconciled with relativism if we incorporate the factor of human interest. The end of inquiry is not a determinate point, like an abstract future physics ala Hempel. Instead, the end of inquiry is a negotiation between (present) human capabilities and (present) human interest. I can't draw a curve here, but you could imagine some maxima for capability and interest where the current end of inquiry resides. At our time in history, that might look like the scientific consensus of the academy or whatever. Most people just won't have the interest or capabilities to further the inquiry beyond what the relevant experts have already accomplished. So truth in the Piercian view could be reconciled with a theory of truth contingent on the utility of truth to the knowers. Not that there aren't weaknesses here, i.e., once an expert has determined a career track, it generates an interest in "producing" truth (to differentially establish a reputation within the field or something). I think this theory fares better using ordinary examples. If I see a black and white striped, horse-like animal at the circus, but then it disappears from sight, I will probably be satisfied to end the inquiry with my impression that it was a zebra. Going out of my way to gather more information would require interest I probably don't have. So, I saw a zebra. It works at the level of individuals and institutions (even societies). This brings power into the equation, which I don't want to touch here. But you could intuit the influence on truth that Catholic authority had in the 13th century or whatever.
How does this relativism of truth play out in actual life? Does it feel different to argue about global warming (for example) depending on whether you subscribe to relative truth vs. absolute truth? How does it interact with uncertainty and humility? Can relativity of truth allow for such concepts, or are they just rewordings of "I acknowledge a larger-than-usual possibility that some future version of me will have a different truth"? Can a relativist believe things that are untrue? If truth is relative, and I hold that truth is not relative, am I right or am I wrong?
It seems to me like it doesn't make any difference in real life. I can imagine that what is "true" for humans could vary with the evolution of cultural norms and the evolution of scientific practices if truth is relative, though.
Hi,what is it if you try this way “sounds true because of the beauty of the rimes “?
This feels more like a linguistic argument. I think it is a weakness of natural language that correspondence theory breaks down but I don’t think that actually addresses the core philosophical proposition. I will grant you that what we call a table or how we define its flatness is subjective and somewhat arbitrary but I disagree that the truth of its existence or truth about its qualities are relative.
Very on topic to my thoughts lately thanks. And see you in a few hours on the Pangburn thingy
If truth is correspondence to a proposition about the world, then truth is relative. If truth is that which actually is, does and does not in the world, then truth cannot be relative. The actual is absolute, perspective must needs be relative.
Without perspective can there be such a thing as falsity?
With perspective and the knowledge that there are others that may or may not perceive as you do,
then truth and untruth come into existence.
Re: Correspondence theory.
Context-sensitive definitions do not translate to relative truths... By whichever context you choose to define a table, whether as a solid object or simples arranged table-wise you must translate the proposition to the appropriate context. Only if you insist on remaining within your context will the truth seem relative.
The table being flat is not a 'relative' truth...it is true in a colloquial sense and false in an engineering sense. This does not make it a relative truth! In a colloquial context, it is absolutely true and in an engineering context, it is absolutely false.
If you know nothing about engineering and flatness standards you effectively cannot change context and the conversation seems to imply a relativeness to truth...If you can at least acknowledge that you don't know about engineering standards then you can simply say I do not understand how you are using the word 'flat', but according to my use of the 'flat' the table corresponds to being 'flat'.
Needless to say 'being able to put some stuff on a table without it falling off. Is absolutely true in some context of 'table' and 'stuff' even if you have no language to express different contexts of the word 'flat'.
I challenge you to find one case where 'relativism' is not mearly a refusal or ignorance to accept the words of the person in the context in which they intend them.
Im not sure if this is even a answer but i would say electricboom and verutasium discussing how electrons flow idk
your definition of relativism is optional. Kane and many others define it differently. the choice of excluding context-sensitive definitions from the definition of "relativism about truth" is exactly why it makes sense to say truth is relative: is the claim "Context-sensitive definitions do not translate to relative truths" true or false? it's obviously true relative to your beliefs/choice of definition, and it's false relative to Kane's or others' who include "context-sensitive definitions" in their definition of relativism about truth.
I take it that your suggestion is that we can take the following propositions as absolutely true:
(1) In context C1, the table is flat.
(2) In context C2, the table is not flat.
I think there's a fairly obvious response for the relativist, which is just to deny that there are objective distinctions between different contexts. That is, what counts as a "context", and how that context sets particular standards for reference and truth, will be dependent on our perspectives. (1) and (2) will only be true relative to a particular perspective on human inquiry.
Please stop saying relativism has anything to do with “human” inquiry. It doesn’t require humans, just perspectives. Humans come out of the perspectives the perspectives don’t belong to humans.
@@unknownknownsphilosophy7888 In general, sure, but the contexts that Truth Seeker was talking about were contexts of human inquiry.
Is relativism circular? Isn't saying proposition A is true relative to some perspective logically the same as saying A is is true, insofar it is said by a perspective which grants it true?
I love this video btw as a fellow Global Relativist I have explained this view at length to many people that are "Non Relativist" and what I have noticed is that a large majority of these people seem to get it but constantly want to pin equal validity to me even when I explain that it doesn't entail equal validity and when they finally get it, then they try to pretend as if they don't understand it and then try to misrepresent it. I'll tell you one individual I was talking to after I explained it entirely, and they signed off on it saying they understood they then messaged me again pretending not to know what my view was then came back to ask me what I meant by Truth is Relative, I didn't realize it was the same account, because I forgot the user
then he tried to ask me the same questions before on what it meant for "Truth to be Relative"however he already knew and understood the view but then misrepresented my view "oh you're saying the meaning of statements can be different" This is the same person who had signed off that he understood the view which he did but was simply here to straw man the view and argue with me my point is that a vast amount of non relativist I've e interacted with do understand the view however when it is explained to them, they then seem to straw man it another non relativist I spoke to after explaining the view "oh maybe you're not an epistemic relativist" I'm telling you I have spoken to maybe a hundred non relativist and most of them seem to have the same misconceptions, and it seems to me they deliberately try to misconstrue the view I'm not sure if it's just the people I've spoken to, but it's very irritating when someone tells you "i'm not sure you'd be a relativist more like a realist" it's not just that but a lot of them too will say/ imply that truth being relative means there is no truth whatsoever just saying I'm just wondering if you had the same experience with the non relativists you have interacted with. Watch out for this, I'm telling you
I don't think I'm a relativist but I'm not sure what you mean here by relativist either. If you have your views somewhere ready to like copy paste a few paragraphs it could make for an interesting discussion.
@@kkounal974 yeah I'm not interested in doing that
@@leonmills3104 That is perfectly fine
10:04
Moore
Great video
truth deflationism sometimes feels like the philosophical equivalent of a thought-stopping cliche but ya
I think the problem of philosophy is one of veracity.
We have information and data but we cannot truly verify anything as fact. We may stumble upon truths, and we may know truths, but we cannot know a truth is true.
I think the only judgement we can make of something being true is a matter of how well it holds up to explaining or justifying g something, and, possibly, how well it fits within a logical framework of information (I e. Information about my cat does not really have relevancy to a math problem, unless somehow whether my cat is orange or grey results in a different answer, in which case I have another avenue to explore).
This isn't to say something is true, though in common parlance we may say it's true, but rather than the statement simply works, or does the best job at explaining things, though the possibility of it being wrong is totally correct.
This isn't leading me towards relativism where in many truths may coexist, but that whatever information seems most accurate can still be subject to change or revision. I'm just as blind as everyone else, and I may have my own theories just as they do, but they do not have equal value just because I cannot know for certain. My ideas may prove more or less effective, and I should adjust what I'm working with accordingly.
Ive been checking up on the channel to see if you’re okay! I hope everything is going alright, and the reason youre lying in bed isnt too serious.
Truths can be both objective and relative, how?. well suppose there are truths and they are in the external world but you don't have direct access to these truths, you percieve truths in your own way and you draw conclusions about these truths based on your own subjective point of view.
It's wild to stumble upon someone who holds the same unpopular epistemic position haha but it makes sense since we both seem to be big Stirner stans
What would you say to someone who throws at you the Hegelian idea that "Truth" involves all these permutations? "[Truth?] thus appears in an endless wealth of forms, figures
and phenomena. It wraps its kernel round with a robe of many colours, in which
consciousness finds itself at home.”
Is this acceptable to you? Basically, I'm fascinated with your channel because I tend to agree with a lot of the ways in which you deconstruct perhaps "positivisms" of all sorts. I tend to do so as well, but I really do think such epoché as sometimes telling for me that the proper philosophic response is something like an Idealism or Theory that encapsulates such plurality that is beyond this deconstruction, and even beyond the encapsulation of such one-sidedness (In a specific positivism and it's refutation).
In short, I tend to suspect that if there is the availability of "Global Relativism" there is something like a Rational process that enables even this negative connection of concepts. Global availability of explication upon the Notion.
I tend to suspect we have arrived at philosophy through very different educations, typified by maybe the Analytic-Continental trope. I'm curious if yet you still sometimes have this impulse to posit that which explains!! the possibility of such relativism.
In a more emotionally charged restatement: I this perspective (ha) on Truth is limited by an understanding of philosophy that tries to still occur in the fanciful speculation of a subject that treats "Truth" (its object of inquiry) with real disinterest.
Question: In your relativism video you argue against Regress by questioning the "infinite" quality of possible perspectives.
So, if I have you at least here arguing with the finite, countable amount of perspectives: Would you accept that Truth/Being/Actuality is the complete sum of these perspectives? Is this consistent with your Global Relativism?
Here of course, we'd have the perspective from Totality, which, even granting the "impossibility" of a single individual's access to that, does it not stand as in some sense an entirely non-relativistic heuristic towards what truth might entail i.e., the complete explanation of all the facts, even within the polysemy of these facts as they're made determinate within different explanatory models. An overarching telos to this dumb thing we do called philosophy?
Maybe in short I'm just reacting aesthetically: Calling it relativism is boring. Instead: call it the Absolute Spirit unfolding itself in actuality. Set up some antimonial divide a la Kant. Because even resigning to relativism would involve all sorts of daring metaphysical explanations as to the impossibility of objectivism in my opinion.
I'm having difficulty grasping this. Apply relativism to this and work it out so I can see what a relativistic answer to it would be.... gravity exists. I can see relativistic truths in a lot but some things I just cant make a connection
I suppose the relativity would be more obvious if you were more specific on the term "gravity". Like, the original theory of gravity was Newtonian gravity, which was a useful description of objects attracting each other, but flawed in that it failed to explain certain phenomena, like the orbit of mercury or the photoelectric effect. Under the correspondence theory of truth, we might say Newtonian gravity has a loose correspondence with the observed facts, and so is *roughly* true, but is not true on closer examination. The truth of the theory is relative to our epistemic standards.
The same could be said about modern theories of gravity like general relativity, which work for the aforementioned problems, but can't explain the role of gravity on the quantum level.
@@donanderson3653 but then I still hit a mental dead end because you can slice it different ways but the force is still gravity whether it's one theory of gravity or another. So does it boil down to specificity?
@@Locreai the simple relativistic answer is "that depends on how you define gravity, i.e. where you draw the conceptual line." the question then becomes "is the definition you chose necessary in an absolute sense?" if you say no, you concede to relativism. if you say yes, the relativist will simply give you a different definition and thus disprove the claim to necessity. the same game can be played with the concept of "existence". language and thoughts/ideas/concepts are not the same as the independent world out there, so even if there is a phenomenon which we call gravity, it is only our differentiation of this phenomenon from any other phenomenon (i.e. the process of individuation) that generates concepts such as "gravity"; the individuation process could conceivably be different or even altogether absent though.
@@oOneszaOo see I'm still in the woods on this one because it all seems to break down to an argument over semantics in this instance. Whether gravity is quantum or relative, or springs only from god, gravity still does the same thing in the end. Gravity hasn't changed in nature no matter how we have redefined its cause and effect. So that gravity exists surely seems like a must, but why and how does it function seem to be the only points for debate. I dunno man this one is sooo beyond me
@@Locreai the question is not what does or does not change in nature but what changes about our way of carving up / categorizing / conceptualizing nature. it is an argument over semantics, yes, but only insofar as semantics plays an important role in meaning and reference and conceptualizing/understanding the world. what is included in the concept of "gravity" has to be established first in order to be able to judge whether some proposition x about gravity it is true or false, but the establishment process of inclusion+exclusion (i.e. individuation) is obviously not necessary and that's where relativism comes in. if i come up with a different definition for gravity or with a whole new concept because I decide to carve up nature/the world out there differently for my own purposes, the truth or falsity of my proposition remains relative to my definitions and concepts. e.g. if invent the concept "tair" and explain that tair corresponds to the mind-indepenent fact in the world of "matter shaped like a table and a chair connected on the bottom by standing on the same ground" we could all make judgements of whether "there is a tair" is true in any given situation or not.
Good video
The biggest problem with correspondence theory is math-do math sentences correspond to reality? The biggest problem with coherence theory is that math does not cohere with physical statements. The biggest problem with pragmatism is that it allows a sentence to be true that is morally abhorrent but useful to believe. The biggest problem with deflationism is mathematical realism-if propositions are fictional then math sentences that seem objectively true Cannot be true on the way that we represent them. Something may be objectively true in them -like consistently or something may be tracked that is objectively there-but we will run into an epistemological problem of how to match them in this scenario. Is the sentence “relativism is true” relatively true? If so, then is it true in all possible worlds or just this one? Is it true in just the closest possible world or the world that is physically the same as ours except one small detail? Theories of truth lead from correspondence theories to coherence to pragmatist and eventually to deflationary. Fictional theories of truth-such as nietzsche’s are under the deflationary theories. “Snow is white” is true iff snow is white. This sentence is a prop in a game of make believe that is highly as elaborate as the game of math. Children use props in their games of make believe and propositions are just abstract props-unless they are sentences-in which case they are concrete. Kendal Walton’s book “mimesis as make believe” is great for this. Kane b -can you make a video about fictionalization theories of truth?
"Is the sentence 'relativism is true' relatively true?" obviously, yes. the truth of the sentence is relative to one's definition of "truth" and "relativism", at the very least.
"If so, then is it true in all possible worlds or just this one?" depends on whether you believe there are possible worlds. but only believing in this world is enough to be a relativist about truth. if it is true in all possible worlds, it's necessarily true that truth is relative, which seems hard to prove in any way but is not problematic in regards to relativity since the "is necessarily true" claim is true only relative to a specific modal framework in epistemology (i.e. the framework of possible worlds).
@@oOneszaOo what I mean to ask in that part you responded to is this-is the sentence “relativism is true” true in some objective and not relativistic sense? Is relativism true absolutely? If so, there is a contradiction there from the point of view of classical logic. I know that every statement is true inside the system it is in-but outside that framework is where problems arise. I could be wrong though
@@caylynmillard "is the sentence 'relativism is true' true in some objective and not relativistic sense? Is relativism true absolutely?" no, because then it would be contradictory as you say. the real question is why do you think relativism would have to be true absolutely? what you are talking about with the meta-level (i.e. "outside" the system/framework) does not entail that truth becomes absolute at a higher level. you can say that truth is relative at every level ad infinitum.
@@oOneszaOo thank you for putting up with me in this conversation but I still am confused. I’ll ask it simpler-isn’t relativism a flat out contradiction? Does the theory even get off the ground? I mean, saying that relativism is true is logically equivalent to saying “that our theory of truth is only true to us.” Or is that subjectivism? It seems like we can’t even say that relativism is true- if truth in general is relative, then why should we care that relativsm is true? Doesn’t it just mean that relativism is true for me? Isn’t that approaching solipsism or the doctrine of flux? -to use a reductio. Because the doctrine of flux is absurd and relativism leads to it. However, it just seems like we are saying that “every sentence or proposition is true relative to some framework” but that includes our sentence of “relativism is true”-which seems like a tautological or trivial truth within the system. Are we saying relativsim is true globally? In every system? If that’s the case then the truth about relativism will be absolute-ie true in every logical system except the ones where truth is relative? Am I confusing myself? Lol sorry!
@@caylynmillard "Or is that subjectivism?" yes, that's something else (and exactly the misunderstanding Kane was talking about). relativism is opposed to absolutism in this particular context.
"It seems like we can’t even say that relativism is true- if truth in general is relative, then why should we care that relativism is true?" whether we care or what we care about is a different question altogether and has nothing to do with the relativity of truth. i care whether truth is relative because i care about the nature of truth, but of course your mileage may vary. as Kane already said, we can always say that something is true even if we are relativists about the nature of truth because the nature of truth and judgements regarding truth/falsity of propositions are two distinct things. the former problem is captured in the relativism vs absolutism debate, while the latter is handled by theories of truth (e.g. correspondence theory). to give an analogy, if truth is a ball, the nature of truth is the ball's color while the judgements of the truth of propositions is whether the ball fits into the hole. the ball fits or doesn't fit into the hole regardless of its color, but when you're talking about the ball itself, it can be right or wrong to say that it's red.
"Are we saying relativism is true globally? In every system?" no, relativism is emergent in this context. relativism is true because truth is relative to each system. in fact, relativism is true even if you ask about the system of relativism itself because not only is the term "relativism" differently defined depending on the context, but in the narrow context of truth there is the system of relativism and the system of absolutism, each of which defines truth differently.
"If that’s the case then the truth about relativism will be absolute" that's not how it works. truth is not absolute in the system of relativism so "the truth about relativism" is also not absolute. you can tell because the statement "the proposition 'truth is relative' is only true relative to your beliefs about the nature of truth. a relativist judges the proposition to be true, while an absolutist judges it to be false" is a meta-level proposition that retains its commitment to the relativity of truth. the fact that higher order / meta-level propositions continue to be compliant with relativity does not make the truth of relativism absolute, however. for it to be absolute, it would have to be impossible for absolutism to be a way of defining truth, which is just to say there would be no relativity of truth because absolutism would be true. in other words, you cannot make relativism absolute without turning it into absolutism.
In the previous video on relativism, you mentioned you were going to make a video on the arguments for relativism, since that video was only on the objections. Do you still have this in mind? Meanwhile, I have two questions:
1) you didn't make a distinction in this current video between relativism about truth and relativism about justification, you just mentioned you are a relativist about truth. So, does that mean you think relativism about truth has some advantage over relativism about justification?
2) concerning the pragmatic view that "the truth is whatever is agreed upon by the investigators at the end of the inquiry", can't the relativist say that truth is still relative, in this case to the investigators? Or is that missing the pragmatic's point?
I asked him the first 1 question he is relativist about both
@@leonmills3104 thanks for letting me know
For arguments in favour of relativism, see my videos "The Language of Nature" and "Classification and Kinds: An Antirealist View".
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(1) It's not so much that relativism about truth has an advantage over relativism about justification, but rather that truth relativism is much more controversial. It's more common for people to doubt that truth relativism is even comprehensible. So that's why I focused on truth relativism in this video.
(2) I take it that a crucial claim of relativism is that there are multiple truths or multiple perspectives (or something along those lines), so not all rational agents will be compelled to converge on a single theory. Prima facie, this is hard to square with Peirce's slogan. For Peirce, I suppose there's some sense in which truth is relative to the investigators, but these are idealized investigators who all come to the same conclusion.
By relativism truth, that isn't a bed, it is just a really big and heavily padded chair.
green is not a creative color
Kenneth brown
You should chat with Joel davis
that is simply brilliant
🔴
I too am watching this video while lying in bed
It seems like the idea of truth itself is describing something ontological, but the theories of truth are about our epistemic access to it.
Wouldn't it be better to describe them as theories of knowledge, rather than theories of truth?
That there is any ontology at all is an epistemic claim. The distinction between knowledge and truth gets blurred together depending on the theory.
@@unknownknownsphilosophy7888 true. A claim necessary to move past solipsism. And yes some theories have more defined entailments than others.
@@uninspired3583 If by solipsism you mean the notion that only one’s mind exists, this is also an ontological claim. It seems like epistemic solipsism also is an ontological claim, as it makes the claim that one’s mind exists.
@@pandawandas that's one solipsistic model, yes. I'm not implying it isn't an ontological claim, im just saying it's necessarily true to make some claim about reality to move past it.
Watching this in bed rn ngl
Kane your looking particularly imperial today
The real challenge to relativism comes from the narcissist theory of truth (a.k.a. the Donald Trump theory of truth: what is true at any point in time is what benefits Donald Trump). It is perfectly compatible with relativism, but I'm not sure, as a society, we can afford entertaining it for much longer.
Facts are devious bastards ..if you know what I mean
presups might not like this video
Relativism is plausible with subjective preferences and likes. So are you absolute about your global relativist position.?
What do you mean by "absolute" there? I think that relativism is true; I don't think that relativism is true absolutely. Relativism is true relative to particular perspectives.
@@KaneB therefore infinite regress
If absolutism was the case you’d just get a brute assumption or an appeal to circular reasoning or an infinite regress of responses. With relativism you get the same, relativism does no worse than absolutism.
@@petrospetroupetrou9653 I take it that this is the infinite regress that you're referring to:
(1) Relativism is true
(2) (1) is true relative to P
(3) (2) is true relative to P*
(4) (3) is true relative to P**
...
But absolutism generates an analogous regress:
(1) Absolutism is true
(2) (1) is true absolutely
(3) (2) is true absolutely
(4) (3) is true absolutely
...
In fact, truth in general generates a regress, regardless of whether you analyze truth in relativist or absolutist terms:
(1) The sky is blue
(2) (1) is true
(3) (2) is true
(4) (3) is true
...
@@KaneB Yes. It is one of the "problems" related to relativism. I think the inf. regress of absolutism is invalid since (2) simply repeats (1). Its not semantically relevant.
you look funny
truth is out of style
Correspondence is bunk, pragmatism is relativistic and nonsense/sophistic. Coherence is good, but only if it’s the right paradigm. Christianity is the only correct paradigm.
It is incoherent