1- A practical identity with which an individual goes is just his prefered want ( e.g: I want preferedly to be a respectable psychaitrist ( one who doesn't reveal patients secrets)); 2- individuals are rational (individual i is rational iff individual i acts according to his prefered want ); 3- individual; 4- reasons- internalism: (an individual has a reason to act only if that individual wants preferedly to act ); C- an individual will act according to his prefered want. So, the individual will act on an obligation only if he wants preferedly to stick to the obligation, so it seems that kantian constructivism collapses into humean constructivism. - also, if john is rational and rationality necessarily implies thinking when one considers p then john will think when he considers p, Here even if john doesn't value being rational he will act as rational individuals do.
When i woke up this morning, i was responding to reasons to desire, to grab a cup of coffee before i went to work. I wasn’t really reflecting, or thinking, “should I really drink that cup of cofee”. It was reason-responsiveness, the ability to respond to reasons. To degrees, humans often have the highest capacity, with most of that capacity making a more gradient lessening when we look at other animals, from the most capacity under humans, to the least. This ability is practiced by any human who hasn’t had some massive, serious brain injury, or who hasn’t started with a seriously, and sadly, lack capacity to respond to reasons to desire, care or act, although that is rare. In order to act, one must desire to act in that way, and to desire to act or to have, one must see that desire as outweighing any other reason to desire something else. No reflection required. Reflection, i Presume, is deliberation. Deliberation is, as i might say, weighing reasons, accessing any other reasons, an attempting, ultimately, to draw i conclusion of what is the most sufficient or decisive reason to desire, act, or to something else. It’s usually used in areas, at least for me, like managing insurance or deciding which food is to be on my grocery list. These also applies to our solving some difficult mathematical equation, we deliberate in the sense of accessing, at least trying to, the strongest reason to believe some part of this equation follows some number in the next part of the calculation. “There aren’t any private reasons”, that’s a whole load of bullshit. I believe there are impartial reasons, like to not inflict cancer on a future woman that’s barely like me now, by not smoking, since she her agony matters. Or by, if it were to happen, see a young, unable child drowning, I’ll save this child, even if the consequences for me would be worse. Pain can be detached from the fact that it is mine without losing any of its dreadfulness. And the reason i desire to avoid pain is it’s dreadful features, not that it is mine. But something like love cannot be detached from the fact that it is mine without losing its loveliness. Only i have access to these partial, ‘private’ reasons to love my older sister, or my stupid brother who wont stop embarrassing me. I also believe in these these partial reasons. Also, just a bit of a side note, Verity is strange. One moment she’s homesick and just wants a glass of milk, and the next moment she’s making poor Sydney slowly bleed to death in her basement.
>> But something like love cannot be detached from the fact that it is mine without losing its loveliness. Only i have access to these partial, ‘private’ reasons to love my older sister, or my stupid brother who wont stop embarrassing me. I take it that Korsgaard would want to say that these kinds of reasons are public, but it isn't at all clear to me why that is. I'm not sure what the difference is between Verity's reason for tormenting Sydney and my reason for giving special consideration to my family members, with respect to the normative force that these reasons would have for others. In both cases, it seems like the reasons arise from the desires and circumstances of a specific agent.
In the objetion to the Korsgaard view on publicity of reasons i think that we have to distinguish between motivating reasons (motives that explain why people do what they do) and normative reasons (reasons that explain why people should do certain things, the distinction is in Huemer (2005)). Of course we can understand what are the motivating reasons of a killer or a thief, for example, but when publicity is applied to normative reasons we get this: the normative reasons ought to be public in the sense that everyone have to justify their action to other people not merely saying why they did something, but saying why they should do something.
This is an interesting point. However, if I've interpreted Korsgaard correctly, I don't think she would accept this distinction. The whole point of introducing reasons is to explain how we are able to act at all, given the gap between desire and action. In that case, we seem to be attempting to offer an explanation of behaviour, so we're talking about motivating reasons. But she's giving this as an account of normativity. Bear in mind that Huemer is a non-naturalist realist. Korsgaard rejects robust realism and is proposing an alternative, less metaphysically inflationary way to ground moral facts.
@@KaneB I'm not sure, but I think Korsgaard would say that all normative reasons are motivating, but not all motivating "reasons" are normative. I think the key is that normativity for her is the result of deliberation. Deliberation is what makes someone an agent. Motivations that aren't the result of deliberation are really violations of your agency, analogous to a reflex--something that happens without your decision or approval. So an explanation of agency and action isn't an explanation of all behavior, just agential behavior. She could endorse a version of what Nicolas suggested above, by saying that we could explain the behavior of killers and thieves in terms of such non-agential motivations. But an act of deliberation, resulting in a normative reason, will be on public terms. When I attempt to persuade you in a moral discussion, if we are both rational agents, we will literally just be deliberating out loud.
I'm not sure that there is a difference -- I'd be inclined to class Humean constructivism as a type of subjectivism. However, the Humean constructivist need not hold that moral statements are synonymous with reports of one's own attitudes. Earlier forms of subjectivism tended to be stated in terms of meanings, so that e.g. "abortion is wrong" just means "I disapprove of abortion" or something along those lines. I don't think contemporary Humean constructivists want to be committed to that, even though the truth conditions of moral statements are our evaluative attitudes. Compare: we might say that "grass is green" is true partly in virtue of facts about the human visual system, but we need not suppose that "grass is green" is always intended to report facts about the human visual system. Most of the time, people are probably just trying to describe the properties of grass.
fantastic video! It seems to me like the only way forward is to give us a desire everyone should value, and then hope everyone does.. what else is there in axiology? and it saves us all some extra steps..
No, it's coincidental. I have a series on metaethics that I've been doing on and off for several years. I've been planning on covering constructivism for a while, and only just got around to it.
It depends on how you want to define "subjectivism". But generally yes, constructivism is viewed as a type of subjectivism, since it holds that there are moral truths, but these truths are in some way determined or constituted by our attitudes. The snag here is that Kantian constructivists think that at least some moral truths follow just from practical reason alone, no matter what your desires happen to be. So there are moral truths that hold universally. We might view that as a kind of objectivism. Again, it's just a matter of how you're defining the subjective/objective distinction.
We can stop mentally reflecting, Korsgaard never learned to meditate so doesn't know reflection can be totally halted and this lack of reflection can become one's normal everyday mode. This is shown over and over in studies related to the default mode network of the brain which if deactivated entirely halts the appearance or any sense of "reflecting"
I suppose Korsgaard would say that you still have to make a choice about whether or not to stop reflecting -- whether or not to pursue meditation practice -- so this is still an expression of a practical identity. Though perhaps some people get to a point where they no longer even seem to be presented with choices. That kind of transformation of consciousness would presumably pose a challenge to Korsgaard's view.
Interestingly, Korsgaard specifically denies that this is possible in the beginning of Self Constitution. So she would probably agree that it's a problem for her theory if it is possible.
@@davidfoley8546 The neuroscience seems very clear, if you turn off the default mode network in the brain conscious reflection stops. I can attest to this as a subject in studies related to extreme long term meditators that there is no felt sene of "reflection" or thinking, not even accompanying this typing (all thoughtless flow states, zero reflection or thinking it through). There are various degrees to this but it goes all the way off. And there is zero felt sense of making any choices. Oddly I notice this seems to be accompanied by a more productive and much more compassion and generous life. But there is no sense of thinking it through, it just automatically happens.
Synthetic protocal moral relativism they don't help - intentional. That created the 4 point Dsm-1 of autistic behavior reflected through schizophrenic.
@@Voivode.of.Hirsir Thanks! Unfortunately, I don't use that discord server anymore, because I didn't know what to do with it. I'm not sure if it's even still working properly.
One other reason why the third step is bothersome is because it implies that someone isolated from others has essentially no moral characteristics to their decisions whatsoever when just on a pragmatic basis we feel that it must certainly be the case that we make moral deliberations independent of others all the time.
@@mustyHead6why though? Do morals stem from society or the psyche? If you adopt a non-cognitivist view, then ethical deliberation begins with our non-cognitive feelings which may be instinctual or imposed by society. You seem to be making the Hegelian point that self consciousness arises from the desire for recognition from others but we shouldnt accept this view uncritically
Korsgaard's Kantian constructivism is interesting and seems persuasive, but it doesn't seem to me to be a convincing reason for moral realism, but rather a realism about the normativity of social facts (if Korsgaard is really believing there are no private reasons, which is BS), some of which could have moral properties. That's the part that is uncontroversial. On the other hand, to me, the fact that something of a moral nature is grounded on something else cannot be any reason to assert that there are moral facts. Rather there are facts which allow people to say and reason that something is moral. Doesn't make morality real, given how variegated that can get. Totally different. She's conflating the value of practical identity with its ostensibly moral properties, it seems. To be human does not have to entail respecting other humans, in fact being human entails both respect and disrespect of other humans, if Nietzsche's Human All Too Human is correct (which I think it is). Valuing one's own humanity does not have to mean valuing others, even if said humanity is fundamentally the same, barring any skin-deep differences. The scientific evidence that IQ differences between individuals vary more than between groups, which would be useful information against racist policymaking on the basis of IQ, is irrelevant to the assertion that one ought to be good to other people of some other practical identity. It does not mean that I should or should not be ethical (in this case, racially prejudiced) either because morals are not real, it could just mean my ethics is not based on any moral facts at all. Personally, it would be due to a personal desire to create equality on the basis of my (always changing) readings of the scientific facts. There could be a consensus in that regard, but that cannot be a satisfactory reason to say that there is a moral consensus, just a practical one.
Korsgaard is not moral realist and does not argue for the existence of moral facts. She is an anti-realist and the value of humanity is an argument about what we necessarily value in order to value anything at all. With Korsgaard’s later view, this has become a radical constructivism, in which the value of humanity is itself a construct as well.
@@berkeaydogan6717yeah thats a key point to make that shes not trying to convince us of moral realism in the traditional sense, but what she is doing is an attempt to ward off total moral skepticism. The problem is, i find her argument about the universal value of agents being the source of all value to be unpersuasive. Even if its true that the value of agents is the source of all other values, there’s no reason for me to care about this unless i desire to be consistent and fair minded. Kosgaard argues that no one individual is special so we have an obligation to care about all agents equally but again this only has bearing on an individual if they care about being fair minded to begin with. The argument ive seen essentially posits that valuing is only possible via agency and agents ideally recognize this as constitutive of agency, and so they should recognize that value originates in agency. Im willing to concede this, but it doesnt follow that I care about others values equally to my own unless we presuppose fairness as a virtue, but then we’ve made a huge assumption about virtue when the whole endeavour is to provide ethics with a presuppositionless justification and articulation that is immediately authoritative to all agents. This just pounds the desk “you are equal and you should recognize this” but again, no rationale provided besides “youre not special” and implicitly “selfishness is bad.” Just like Kant, Kosgaard has a conception of morality that they already believe to be true and all argumentation is in service of that view
@@YassinBannari-pc8ky I just wanted to point out that realism is not equal to objectivism in ethics. Korsgaard tries to save the latter without the former. For this reason, it is also wrong to say that for Korsgaard, the value of humanity is "recognized as constitutive of agency". Humanity is not recognized to be valuable as such, but rather is valued for its own sake. And the argument from constitutive features of agency is a distinct argument in her own theory of self-constitution, while the argument for the value of humanity is more of a Kant scholarship/reading. The rationale behind your being not special follows the publicity of reasons. If something is a reason for me to do something, it should be (at least potentially) one for you as well. The idea is the very justification that we have reasons for actions is one that involves the universalization of maxims in question. And I think it is plausible because we expect the promotion of or at least non-interference with all the reasons that we have for ourselves insofar as we see them as legitimate in the public space.
isn't a more Kantian way of solving the problem of public and private reasons rather the following? when we act, we do not only in fact affirm and value ourselves as rational beings, but we value the transcendental noumenal subject that all human beings share, because the noumenal subject is in fact the transcendental condition for acting in the first place. We value the noumenal self full stop and this noumenal self is inhering in all rational beings. Therefore, we value humanity as such.
Yeah the whole argument doesn't seem to be very Kantian at all. We do not act because we necessarily have reasons to act, we are justified in what we do if we have reasons to do what we're doing. The motivation (which is rational/logical and not causal) for an action is a normative incentive for carrying out that action. Reflection is merely the means by which one asks and justifies the conditions by which one considers an act to be feasible in a given framework (seemingly like Sellars' space of reasons). An act can be justified only from the internal perspective of a conscious agent and then these justifications can be made publicly available by expressing to other rational agents the very judgements that lead one to act in a certain way. Otherwise any act would be indistiguishable from any empirical event - which it is in a certain sense. The noumenal subject/transcendental self is merely the apperceptive witness from which both theoretical and practical reason(s) [i.e. judgement] stem.
@@scriabinismydog2439 can you elaborate where you see the non Kantian elements to Korsgaard‘s theory? And, for Kant, acting is something you do for a reason/motive/intention, otherwise it wouldn’t be an action, but an event (like a reflex or so). When we act on desire we make the decision to act on a desire.
It's like when philosophers of science debate "Humeanism" about laws. None of them are talking about Hume. It's just a name for a position that was inspired by Hume. See also e.g. "Platonism" in philosophy of mathematics.
Man, you're an excellent person! Thanks for posting contents like that and helping people like us! Looking foward to Streets constructivism as well
Ok TH-cam. This is something you can just casually put in my recommended knowing I'll probably watch. Thanks.
Thank you for this! I would love it if you covered the ideas of big philosophers like Kant more often.
As a fellow Whovian, I really enjoy your occasional use of Sidney and Verity as names for agents.
1- A practical identity with which an individual goes is just his prefered want ( e.g: I want preferedly to be a respectable psychaitrist ( one who doesn't reveal patients secrets));
2- individuals are rational (individual i is rational iff individual i acts according to his prefered want );
3- individual;
4- reasons- internalism: (an individual has a reason to act only if that individual wants preferedly to act );
C- an individual will act according to his prefered want.
So, the individual will act on an obligation only if he wants preferedly to stick to the obligation, so it seems that kantian constructivism collapses into humean constructivism.
- also, if john is rational and rationality necessarily implies thinking when one considers p then john will think when he considers p,
Here even if john doesn't value being rational he will act as rational individuals do.
Anything on Humean constructivism?
Incase you don't plan on doing any videos on Humean constructivism, can you recommend some books?
When i woke up this morning, i was responding to reasons to desire, to grab a cup of coffee before i went to work. I wasn’t really reflecting, or thinking, “should I really drink that cup of cofee”.
It was reason-responsiveness, the ability to respond to reasons. To degrees, humans often have the highest capacity, with most of that capacity making a more gradient lessening when we look at other animals, from the most capacity under humans, to the least.
This ability is practiced by any human who hasn’t had some massive, serious brain injury, or who hasn’t started with a seriously, and sadly, lack capacity to respond to reasons to desire, care or act, although that is rare. In order to act, one must desire to act in that way, and to desire to act or to have, one must see that desire as outweighing any other reason to desire something else. No reflection required.
Reflection, i Presume, is deliberation. Deliberation is, as i might say, weighing reasons, accessing any other reasons, an attempting, ultimately, to draw i conclusion of what is the most sufficient or decisive reason to desire, act, or to something else. It’s usually used in areas, at least for me, like managing insurance or deciding which food is to be on my grocery list. These also applies to our solving some difficult mathematical equation, we deliberate in the sense of accessing, at least trying to, the strongest reason to believe some part of this equation follows some number in the next part of the calculation.
“There aren’t any private reasons”, that’s a whole load of bullshit. I believe there are impartial reasons, like to not inflict cancer on a future woman that’s barely like me now, by not smoking, since she her agony matters. Or by, if it were to happen, see a young, unable child drowning, I’ll save this child, even if the consequences for me would be worse. Pain can be detached from the fact that it is mine without losing any of its dreadfulness. And the reason i desire to avoid pain is it’s dreadful features, not that it is mine.
But something like love cannot be detached from the fact that it is mine without losing its loveliness. Only i have access to these partial, ‘private’ reasons to love my older sister, or my stupid brother who wont stop embarrassing me. I also believe in these these partial reasons.
Also, just a bit of a side note, Verity is strange. One moment she’s homesick and just wants a glass of milk, and the next moment she’s making poor Sydney slowly bleed to death in her basement.
>> But something like love cannot be detached from the fact that it is mine without losing its loveliness. Only i have access to these partial, ‘private’ reasons to love my older sister, or my stupid brother who wont stop embarrassing me.
I take it that Korsgaard would want to say that these kinds of reasons are public, but it isn't at all clear to me why that is. I'm not sure what the difference is between Verity's reason for tormenting Sydney and my reason for giving special consideration to my family members, with respect to the normative force that these reasons would have for others. In both cases, it seems like the reasons arise from the desires and circumstances of a specific agent.
In the objetion to the Korsgaard view on publicity of reasons i think that we have to distinguish between motivating reasons (motives that explain why people do what they do) and normative reasons (reasons that explain why people should do certain things, the distinction is in Huemer (2005)). Of course we can understand what are the motivating reasons of a killer or a thief, for example, but when publicity is applied to normative reasons we get this: the normative reasons ought to be public in the sense that everyone have to justify their action to other people not merely saying why they did something, but saying why they should do something.
This is an interesting point. However, if I've interpreted Korsgaard correctly, I don't think she would accept this distinction. The whole point of introducing reasons is to explain how we are able to act at all, given the gap between desire and action. In that case, we seem to be attempting to offer an explanation of behaviour, so we're talking about motivating reasons. But she's giving this as an account of normativity. Bear in mind that Huemer is a non-naturalist realist. Korsgaard rejects robust realism and is proposing an alternative, less metaphysically inflationary way to ground moral facts.
@@KaneB I'm not sure, but I think Korsgaard would say that all normative reasons are motivating, but not all motivating "reasons" are normative. I think the key is that normativity for her is the result of deliberation. Deliberation is what makes someone an agent. Motivations that aren't the result of deliberation are really violations of your agency, analogous to a reflex--something that happens without your decision or approval. So an explanation of agency and action isn't an explanation of all behavior, just agential behavior. She could endorse a version of what Nicolas suggested above, by saying that we could explain the behavior of killers and thieves in terms of such non-agential motivations. But an act of deliberation, resulting in a normative reason, will be on public terms. When I attempt to persuade you in a moral discussion, if we are both rational agents, we will literally just be deliberating out loud.
@@davidfoley8546 Ah yes, that makes sense!
(kicks feet in excitement)
What is the difference between Humean Constructivist and individualistic subjetisvism?
I'm not sure that there is a difference -- I'd be inclined to class Humean constructivism as a type of subjectivism. However, the Humean constructivist need not hold that moral statements are synonymous with reports of one's own attitudes. Earlier forms of subjectivism tended to be stated in terms of meanings, so that e.g. "abortion is wrong" just means "I disapprove of abortion" or something along those lines. I don't think contemporary Humean constructivists want to be committed to that, even though the truth conditions of moral statements are our evaluative attitudes. Compare: we might say that "grass is green" is true partly in virtue of facts about the human visual system, but we need not suppose that "grass is green" is always intended to report facts about the human visual system. Most of the time, people are probably just trying to describe the properties of grass.
fantastic video!
It seems to me like the only way forward is to give us a desire everyone should value, and then hope everyone does.. what else is there in axiology? and it saves us all some extra steps..
I think the best way forward is to stop trying to make concessions to realists and just accept that there are no stance-independent moral facts.
@@KaneB Don't know why, but the two approaches made me think of your 'what the point in argument' video. Maybe i should rewatch that again.
Forst, R: Right to Justification: Elements of a Constructivist Theory of Justice (New Directions in Critical Theory, Band 46)
When I see two trees outside, that presents a moral reason to me to build a hammock!
Was this topic inspired by the conversation between Richard Brown and Lance Bush?
No, it's coincidental. I have a series on metaethics that I've been doing on and off for several years. I've been planning on covering constructivism for a while, and only just got around to it.
I love Verity.
Is constructivism just subjectivism? Sorry, I don't know the precise terms.
It depends on how you want to define "subjectivism". But generally yes, constructivism is viewed as a type of subjectivism, since it holds that there are moral truths, but these truths are in some way determined or constituted by our attitudes. The snag here is that Kantian constructivists think that at least some moral truths follow just from practical reason alone, no matter what your desires happen to be. So there are moral truths that hold universally. We might view that as a kind of objectivism. Again, it's just a matter of how you're defining the subjective/objective distinction.
Verity just needs to adequately compensate Sidney, and then they both would benefit.
Verity doesn't want to do that though. We're imagining somebody completely sadistic.
@@KaneB if we wanted to be moral, we wouldnt need morality
We can stop mentally reflecting, Korsgaard never learned to meditate so doesn't know reflection can be totally halted and this lack of reflection can become one's normal everyday mode. This is shown over and over in studies related to the default mode network of the brain which if deactivated entirely halts the appearance or any sense of "reflecting"
I suppose Korsgaard would say that you still have to make a choice about whether or not to stop reflecting -- whether or not to pursue meditation practice -- so this is still an expression of a practical identity. Though perhaps some people get to a point where they no longer even seem to be presented with choices. That kind of transformation of consciousness would presumably pose a challenge to Korsgaard's view.
@@KaneB Yeah I was talking about the latter more extreme transformation of consciousness.
Interestingly, Korsgaard specifically denies that this is possible in the beginning of Self Constitution. So she would probably agree that it's a problem for her theory if it is possible.
@@davidfoley8546 The neuroscience seems very clear, if you turn off the default mode network in the brain conscious reflection stops. I can attest to this as a subject in studies related to extreme long term meditators that there is no felt sene of "reflection" or thinking, not even accompanying this typing (all thoughtless flow states, zero reflection or thinking it through). There are various degrees to this but it goes all the way off. And there is zero felt sense of making any choices. Oddly I notice this seems to be accompanied by a more productive and much more compassion and generous life. But there is no sense of thinking it through, it just automatically happens.
Synthetic protocal moral relativism they don't help - intentional. That created the 4 point Dsm-1 of autistic behavior reflected through schizophrenic.
Hi
what's up dawg
@@KaneB Love your vids btw recently joined the discord server 💯💯 keep doing what you're doing dawg
@@Voivode.of.Hirsir Thanks! Unfortunately, I don't use that discord server anymore, because I didn't know what to do with it. I'm not sure if it's even still working properly.
@@KaneB It's still active and works 👍🏻
Hi
One other reason why the third step is bothersome is because it implies that someone isolated from others has essentially no moral characteristics to their decisions whatsoever when just on a pragmatic basis we feel that it must certainly be the case that we make moral deliberations independent of others all the time.
I don't think so. I think ethics necessarily implies a community, I even think self consciousness in general requires a community
@@mustyHead6why though? Do morals stem from society or the psyche? If you adopt a non-cognitivist view, then ethical deliberation begins with our non-cognitive feelings which may be instinctual or imposed by society. You seem to be making the Hegelian point that self consciousness arises from the desire for recognition from others but we shouldnt accept this view uncritically
Korsgaard's Kantian constructivism is interesting and seems persuasive, but it doesn't seem to me to be a convincing reason for moral realism, but rather a realism about the normativity of social facts (if Korsgaard is really believing there are no private reasons, which is BS), some of which could have moral properties. That's the part that is uncontroversial. On the other hand, to me, the fact that something of a moral nature is grounded on something else cannot be any reason to assert that there are moral facts. Rather there are facts which allow people to say and reason that something is moral. Doesn't make morality real, given how variegated that can get. Totally different. She's conflating the value of practical identity with its ostensibly moral properties, it seems. To be human does not have to entail respecting other humans, in fact being human entails both respect and disrespect of other humans, if Nietzsche's Human All Too Human is correct (which I think it is).
Valuing one's own humanity does not have to mean valuing others, even if said humanity is fundamentally the same, barring any skin-deep differences. The scientific evidence that IQ differences between individuals vary more than between groups, which would be useful information against racist policymaking on the basis of IQ, is irrelevant to the assertion that one ought to be good to other people of some other practical identity. It does not mean that I should or should not be ethical (in this case, racially prejudiced) either because morals are not real, it could just mean my ethics is not based on any moral facts at all. Personally, it would be due to a personal desire to create equality on the basis of my (always changing) readings of the scientific facts. There could be a consensus in that regard, but that cannot be a satisfactory reason to say that there is a moral consensus, just a practical one.
What would Hegel say that somehow changes what he said?
Captured my thoughts exactly
Korsgaard is not moral realist and does not argue for the existence of moral facts. She is an anti-realist and the value of humanity is an argument about what we necessarily value in order to value anything at all. With Korsgaard’s later view, this has become a radical constructivism, in which the value of humanity is itself a construct as well.
@@berkeaydogan6717yeah thats a key point to make that shes not trying to convince us of moral realism in the traditional sense, but what she is doing is an attempt to ward off total moral skepticism. The problem is, i find her argument about the universal value of agents being the source of all value to be unpersuasive. Even if its true that the value of agents is the source of all other values, there’s no reason for me to care about this unless i desire to be consistent and fair minded. Kosgaard argues that no one individual is special so we have an obligation to care about all agents equally but again this only has bearing on an individual if they care about being fair minded to begin with. The argument ive seen essentially posits that valuing is only possible via agency and agents ideally recognize this as constitutive of agency, and so they should recognize that value originates in agency. Im willing to concede this, but it doesnt follow that I care about others values equally to my own unless we presuppose fairness as a virtue, but then we’ve made a huge assumption about virtue when the whole endeavour is to provide ethics with a presuppositionless justification and articulation that is immediately authoritative to all agents. This just pounds the desk “you are equal and you should recognize this” but again, no rationale provided besides “youre not special” and implicitly “selfishness is bad.” Just like Kant, Kosgaard has a conception of morality that they already believe to be true and all argumentation is in service of that view
@@YassinBannari-pc8ky I just wanted to point out that realism is not equal to objectivism in ethics. Korsgaard tries to save the latter without the former. For this reason, it is also wrong to say that for Korsgaard, the value of humanity is "recognized as constitutive of agency". Humanity is not recognized to be valuable as such, but rather is valued for its own sake. And the argument from constitutive features of agency is a distinct argument in her own theory of self-constitution, while the argument for the value of humanity is more of a Kant scholarship/reading. The rationale behind your being not special follows the publicity of reasons. If something is a reason for me to do something, it should be (at least potentially) one for you as well. The idea is the very justification that we have reasons for actions is one that involves the universalization of maxims in question. And I think it is plausible because we expect the promotion of or at least non-interference with all the reasons that we have for ourselves insofar as we see them as legitimate in the public space.
isn't a more Kantian way of solving the problem of public and private reasons rather the following? when we act, we do not only in fact affirm and value ourselves as rational beings, but we value the transcendental noumenal subject that all human beings share, because the noumenal subject is in fact the transcendental condition for acting in the first place. We value the noumenal self full stop and this noumenal self is inhering in all rational beings. Therefore, we value humanity as such.
It sounds good to me. At least It wouldn't sound as wrong as bringing wittgenstein's meanings into it
Yeah the whole argument doesn't seem to be very Kantian at all. We do not act because we necessarily have reasons to act, we are justified in what we do if we have reasons to do what we're doing. The motivation (which is rational/logical and not causal) for an action is a normative incentive for carrying out that action. Reflection is merely the means by which one asks and justifies the conditions by which one considers an act to be feasible in a given framework (seemingly like Sellars' space of reasons). An act can be justified only from the internal perspective of a conscious agent and then these justifications can be made publicly available by expressing to other rational agents the very judgements that lead one to act in a certain way. Otherwise any act would be indistiguishable from any empirical event - which it is in a certain sense. The noumenal subject/transcendental self is merely the apperceptive witness from which both theoretical and practical reason(s) [i.e. judgement] stem.
@@scriabinismydog2439 can you elaborate where you see the non Kantian elements to Korsgaard‘s theory? And, for Kant, acting is something you do for a reason/motive/intention, otherwise it wouldn’t be an action, but an event (like a reflex or so). When we act on desire we make the decision to act on a desire.
Utilitarian in the sheets, Deontologist in the streets. 😁
This doesn't really apply to anything, I just thought it was funny.
Korsgaard’s argument sucks
Ok, so you wonna talk about Kant
But I'm afraid you Kant do that!
(Sorry😅)
I don't actually talk about Kant at all in this video lol
It's like when philosophers of science debate "Humeanism" about laws. None of them are talking about Hume. It's just a name for a position that was inspired by Hume. See also e.g. "Platonism" in philosophy of mathematics.
@@KaneB
I was just trying to make joke 😢
Yo, still waiting for that Humean constructivism vid. Kantian constructivism is laughably bad