Hello Amanda! I came across this video being shared online today and was immediately interested. I would love to ask a question, but regrettably the google form appears to be closed. If by chance you are inclined to consider including another question at this time, I'd like to present it here. The first two paragraphs provides relevant context, and the question itself follows afterward: For context, often we hear proponents of Antinatalism label it as a philosophy of compassion with its underlying motive intending to "reduce suffering" in the biosphere. I see a potential dilemma in this precise phrasing that I would appreciate some clarification on from members of the panel. Given that Antinatalism (as I understand and personally relate to it) is based on the premise that procreation is _unconditionally_ a negative phenomenon, all people regardless of class or demographic are encouraged to cease bringing new sentient beings into existence. A world in which everyone shares/adopts this view and chooses not to reproduce on their own volition would therefore be a positive, desirable phenomenon. If the human species one day collectively and consensually decides to cease procreating entirely, the natural outcome would of course be that humanity goes extinct. In other words, the inevitable hardships that would come from our cooperative extinction outweigh the negative of enabling humanity to continue to propagate new beings indefinitely into the future. For many self-identifying antinatalists like myself, we label our objective as _sentiocentric_ - the conscious experiences of nonhuman sentient animals are not inherently less important than humans, and thus should not logically be prioritized below humans. This often takes on the form of embracing veganism as a logical outgrowth of antinatalism, along with perhaps some other adjacent movements like encouraging pet adoption rather than supporting pet breeders, etc. The bottom line is that sentiocentric antinatalists (as opposed to anthropocentric) demonstrate compassion consistently towards all sentient creatures as it relates to our negative perception of propagating new beings into existence. *Herein lies the dilemma...* If we accept the two premises as explored above that: a.) humanity collectively and consensually deciding to cease procreation would be a positive, desirable phenomenon according to AN b.) the conscious experiences of nonhuman sentient animals are not inherently less important than humans (sentiocentrism) ...how can we be certain that there will be a _net decrease_ in sentient suffering on planet earth after we have voluntarily gone extinct as a species? How do we know whether or not, on a geological timescale, a new dominant species will emerge that experiences and causes significantly more suffering compared to humans? And going back to solely human interests, how do we know that a voluntary extinction event within the next 50 years would be better aligned with the interests of antinatalism than if it occurred 200 years from now instead? I've heard some antinatalists suggest that it may be in our best interest to rather focus our attention on developing advanced technological capabilities that can assist us in carrying out as peaceful of an extinction process as possible, as well as increasing the chance that no sentient species will emerge after our extinction. This, however, would *require* allowing the human species to continue propagating new beings to work on developing such technologies. *Premise A* is fundamentally counter intuitive with this perspective - humanity collectively deciding to voluntarily stop procreating as early as tomorrow is at odds with the perspective that a voluntary extinction at this time may involve significantly more suffering compared to if we carried it out in the future when greater technology is available to assist in a peaceful exit with a better plan to prevent the emergence of new sentient beings in a post-human extinction earth. This is why I take some issue with specifically labeling antinatalism as a suffering reduction philosophy. The two premises above open the door to the rational perspective that prolonging the human species may be better aligned with reducing negative qualia experienced by sentient beings. Anyway, if you read all of this, thank you very much for your patience. I hope I communicated it well enough to interpret and that you consider presenting it to the panel.
I actually have a question for David Benatar: If not existing didn't stop this life from being imposed, why would have not existing (had I never been born) had the power to stop some *other* life from being the one to do the imposition? All lives on Earth didn't exist at a point in time, yet a life was still imposed. This is true for each life alive today, and has ever lived. Not existing didn't stop a life from being imposed. Therefore it's empirically true that not existing is incapable of stopping a life from being imposed. So, it becomes clear that *if it isn't one life it's another*. If you imagine a universe completely devoid of all life, but then you come to exist, then that's the life that's "imposed". That life does the imposition of a life. So had some other life come to exist, in this thought experiment, then that would be the life responsible for "the Imposition". So had you never been born, then instead of *this* life being "the life", then some other life would have been "the life"... There was simply no escape, because there was no you to escape the imposition of one life or another. And the same will be true after death: your lack of existing will not be able to stop yet another individual life from doing yet another "imposition", and so there will be a succession of lives. After one ends, another is imposed. So if the human race goes extinct, then the succession will consist of only animal lives... Considering the amount of suffering animal lives endure, this is a horrifying prospect. And who knows what other sorts of lives exist throughout the universe. You might think peace will come after the heat death of the universe, but there'd be no one to appreciate that lack of experience, and so that lack of life has no value and so becomes a moot point. Then it gets into whether or not the universe will repeat, are there other universes? Will the heat death be the forever end, or will another universe come to exist? There are serious philosophers and scientists that believe the continuation of the universe in some way, or other universes, or something like a "big bounce"... Without there being some kind of peaceful metaphysical safety bubble we were in or go into after death, there's nothing worth mentioning about not existing or implying, in any way, that it could be preferable, since it's incapable of stopping one life or another from doing "the Imposition" of a life. This makes your idea that not existing is better, a logically flawed idea. Sure, it might be good for particular lives to not exist, but since there's no escaping one life or another, your Asymmetry Argument which is applied to life in general , all lives in the generic sense) becomes an exercise in futility. The best we can do is make the universe a better place. (I also submitted this on the form)
@@connorgarcia2213 The actual question is only the first sentence of my comment. The rest is the context, and explains the logic behind my question, etc.
@connorgarcia2213 If you think @@naturalisted1714's question is long, take a look at mine xD. I suppose my question is somewhat related to yours in a way @natural, insofar as you speculate what the world may look like for other sentient beings after a human extinction. Anyway, I just hope Amanda reads our comments and gives it some consideration. Sadly I didn't know about this video until today ;3
For me AN is to minimize suffering by not intentionally creating entities that are able to suffer.
Why do antinatalists continue to rely on the existence of created entities that are able to suffer?
Hello Amanda! I came across this video being shared online today and was immediately interested. I would love to ask a question, but regrettably the google form appears to be closed. If by chance you are inclined to consider including another question at this time, I'd like to present it here. The first two paragraphs provides relevant context, and the question itself follows afterward:
For context, often we hear proponents of Antinatalism label it as a philosophy of compassion with its underlying motive intending to "reduce suffering" in the biosphere. I see a potential dilemma in this precise phrasing that I would appreciate some clarification on from members of the panel. Given that Antinatalism (as I understand and personally relate to it) is based on the premise that procreation is _unconditionally_ a negative phenomenon, all people regardless of class or demographic are encouraged to cease bringing new sentient beings into existence. A world in which everyone shares/adopts this view and chooses not to reproduce on their own volition would therefore be a positive, desirable phenomenon. If the human species one day collectively and consensually decides to cease procreating entirely, the natural outcome would of course be that humanity goes extinct. In other words, the inevitable hardships that would come from our cooperative extinction outweigh the negative of enabling humanity to continue to propagate new beings indefinitely into the future.
For many self-identifying antinatalists like myself, we label our objective as _sentiocentric_ - the conscious experiences of nonhuman sentient animals are not inherently less important than humans, and thus should not logically be prioritized below humans. This often takes on the form of embracing veganism as a logical outgrowth of antinatalism, along with perhaps some other adjacent movements like encouraging pet adoption rather than supporting pet breeders, etc. The bottom line is that sentiocentric antinatalists (as opposed to anthropocentric) demonstrate compassion consistently towards all sentient creatures as it relates to our negative perception of propagating new beings into existence. *Herein lies the dilemma...*
If we accept the two premises as explored above that:
a.) humanity collectively and consensually deciding to cease procreation would be a positive, desirable phenomenon according to AN
b.) the conscious experiences of nonhuman sentient animals are not inherently less important than humans (sentiocentrism)
...how can we be certain that there will be a _net decrease_ in sentient suffering on planet earth after we have voluntarily gone extinct as a species? How do we know whether or not, on a geological timescale, a new dominant species will emerge that experiences and causes significantly more suffering compared to humans? And going back to solely human interests, how do we know that a voluntary extinction event within the next 50 years would be better aligned with the interests of antinatalism than if it occurred 200 years from now instead? I've heard some antinatalists suggest that it may be in our best interest to rather focus our attention on developing advanced technological capabilities that can assist us in carrying out as peaceful of an extinction process as possible, as well as increasing the chance that no sentient species will emerge after our extinction. This, however, would *require* allowing the human species to continue propagating new beings to work on developing such technologies. *Premise A* is fundamentally counter intuitive with this perspective - humanity collectively deciding to voluntarily stop procreating as early as tomorrow is at odds with the perspective that a voluntary extinction at this time may involve significantly more suffering compared to if we carried it out in the future when greater technology is available to assist in a peaceful exit with a better plan to prevent the emergence of new sentient beings in a post-human extinction earth.
This is why I take some issue with specifically labeling antinatalism as a suffering reduction philosophy. The two premises above open the door to the rational perspective that prolonging the human species may be better aligned with reducing negative qualia experienced by sentient beings. Anyway, if you read all of this, thank you very much for your patience. I hope I communicated it well enough to interpret and that you consider presenting it to the panel.
Great line up! Looking forward to the discussion. 🙂
Look forward to it, you fabulous people 😊.
I actually have a question for David Benatar: If not existing didn't stop this life from being imposed, why would have not existing (had I never been born) had the power to stop some *other* life from being the one to do the imposition? All lives on Earth didn't exist at a point in time, yet a life was still imposed. This is true for each life alive today, and has ever lived. Not existing didn't stop a life from being imposed. Therefore it's empirically true that not existing is incapable of stopping a life from being imposed. So, it becomes clear that *if it isn't one life it's another*. If you imagine a universe completely devoid of all life, but then you come to exist, then that's the life that's "imposed". That life does the imposition of a life. So had some other life come to exist, in this thought experiment, then that would be the life responsible for "the Imposition". So had you never been born, then instead of *this* life being "the life", then some other life would have been "the life"... There was simply no escape, because there was no you to escape the imposition of one life or another. And the same will be true after death: your lack of existing will not be able to stop yet another individual life from doing yet another "imposition", and so there will be a succession of lives. After one ends, another is imposed. So if the human race goes extinct, then the succession will consist of only animal lives... Considering the amount of suffering animal lives endure, this is a horrifying prospect. And who knows what other sorts of lives exist throughout the universe. You might think peace will come after the heat death of the universe, but there'd be no one to appreciate that lack of experience, and so that lack of life has no value and so becomes a moot point. Then it gets into whether or not the universe will repeat, are there other universes? Will the heat death be the forever end, or will another universe come to exist? There are serious philosophers and scientists that believe the continuation of the universe in some way, or other universes, or something like a "big bounce"... Without there being some kind of peaceful metaphysical safety bubble we were in or go into after death, there's nothing worth mentioning about not existing or implying, in any way, that it could be preferable, since it's incapable of stopping one life or another from doing "the Imposition" of a life. This makes your idea that not existing is better, a logically flawed idea. Sure, it might be good for particular lives to not exist, but since there's no escaping one life or another, your Asymmetry Argument which is applied to life in general , all lives in the generic sense) becomes an exercise in futility. The best we can do is make the universe a better place.
(I also submitted this on the form)
Could you make your question shorter?
@@connorgarcia2213 The actual question is only the first sentence of my comment. The rest is the context, and explains the logic behind my question, etc.
@connorgarcia2213 If you think @@naturalisted1714's question is long, take a look at mine xD. I suppose my question is somewhat related to yours in a way @natural, insofar as you speculate what the world may look like for other sentient beings after a human extinction. Anyway, I just hope Amanda reads our comments and gives it some consideration. Sadly I didn't know about this video until today ;3