1. If the a's are the same (constant) for both firms and c1 = c2 as you said, then how is [(a -c1)/b] above [(a -c2)/b] on the q2 axis? 2. If, however, [(a-c1)/b] is indeed larger than [(a-c2)/b], then how is the half of [(a-c2)/b] bigger than the half of [(a-c1)/b]?
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The y-intercept for Firm 2's best response function should be (a-c2/2b) rather than (a-c2/b)!
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1. If the a's are the same (constant) for both firms and c1 = c2 as you said, then how is [(a -c1)/b] above [(a -c2)/b] on the q2 axis?
2. If, however, [(a-c1)/b] is indeed larger than [(a-c2)/b], then how is the half of [(a-c2)/b] bigger than the half of [(a-c1)/b]?
It is a-c2/2b on q2 axis, which is what I say, but I wrote a-c2/b (by mistake).
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In the final equation why is that you are solving for 3qi when you only moved one qi over from the right to the left?
q1 = 4/4q1 at the left side, then minus 1/4q1 (after moving it to the left). so it become 3/4q1
would this be true if there were three firms instead of two?
Is the process for finding pure strategy Nash equilibrium same as pure strategy equilibrium?