1. (I think) Aristotle describes the soul as that which enlivens things, so animals have souls but not minerals, yet they both have essence. How do these various essences differ? - Are they essences with varying degrees of potencies? And if so, is potency a reflection of an essence's relation to existence itself? 2. It's clear that we can know the essence of a Phoenix even though it materially doesn't exist ~ but doesn't it exist immaterially, as that essence that we are knowing? If this essence didn't also exist as essence, we could not know it. Would this make the term "existence" contingent on domains (whether material, immaterial, or transcendent) whereas "essence" seems to stay consistent across all / most domains. 3. Anyhow, could you shed light on these via response, essay, or video? thanks.
You caught me on a morning when I don't have a lot of Aristotle's metaphysics in my head! But I'll see what I can recall. 1. The soul is that which enlivens things. Animals and plants have souls. Their souls have varying degrees of potencies, which is to say that their souls have different powers or can do different things. All souls have the power of taking in nutrients and growing; animal and human souls also have the power of motion; human souls also have the power of reason. I believe the _essence_ of a thing is that without which it would not be what it is. I can't recall Aristotle clearly enough at the moment to say confidently that the soul _is_ the human essence in Aristotle, but it's probably ok to say that; at any rate, the human essence would seem to include _having_ a soul. 2. I think the essence of a phoenix exists and is an immaterial thing. But the phoenix itself does not exist. A phoenix does not exist because that essence is never instantiated anywhere; there is no thing anywhere that has that essence. A phoenix would have to have a body, so in that sense its existence is contingent on the physical domain. But that's not true of all things. An angel does not have a body, and does exist. The only thing we could say about existence in general is that it's contingent on whether something exists!
Also, what is my soul/essence? Is it that which reflects my general humanity or the specificity of my individuality? Or are there two terms that covers each?
In Aristotle, if I recall correctly, the human essence is not an individual thing. Only the body makes us individuals. In some later thinkers the human essence is an individual thing; we each have our own essences. Aquinas' view on the subject is subtle, but I can't recall enough of it just now to feel comfortable saying more.
Good question. I'll answer the easy way: No. That is to say--based on how I understand those words to be used in English, and based on how I understand Aquinas, there is probably no difference. However, if we tracked down the corresponding words in Aquinas' Latin we might find that they are technical terms with some difference.
If Divine Ousia is Good Itself, Beauty itself, ,Omnipotence Itself tradition and self contradictionetc.. then God or Divine Essence is Plural, but this plural is not of Hyposetases, but that of Con
Let me ask you, so you, as a living being, participates on "being" and "existence" at same time? If you're and you "exist", so you are a composite of them two. So all things are composites of them. And god is not simple, he is a mixture of the form of being and the form of existence, no?
The doctrine of divine simplicity is usually pretty important in these Christian medieval philosophers. God is _not_ a composite. God’s essence is his existence; he exists necessarily. Everything else is a composite of existence and essence.
Thanks. I have being studying the Greeks, and reading a bit about the "divine simplicity". But saying something is and it exists... sounds like a bit a sophism. See, if in god existence and essence are one, youve got two things that result in one. see, you are a mixture of matter and form, but you are a one, a single person. But both you and god, you're a whole with parts. So i cant say that you both are a example of simplicity. But very good video.
Thanks! Only God is simple. I am a composite. I am one thing made of parts. With us, because we can _not_ exist, being and essence are different things. When it comes to God, "being" and "essence" are just two names for the same thing. God is not made of parts. Well, anyway, that's me trying to clarify Aquinas, if it's a matter of not understanding him. (If you just disagree with him, I suppose that's another matter entirely.)
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Much needed clarification to a difficult book, thank you!
Many thanks!
Great video from France ! You really helped my to solve so many of the contradictions which had blown my mind up when I first read the book !
Glad to hear it. (France! Très bien. I'm in Hong Kong now, and this video was filmed in Pakistan!)
1. (I think) Aristotle describes the soul as that which enlivens things, so animals have souls but not minerals, yet they both have essence. How do these various essences differ? - Are they essences with varying degrees of potencies? And if so, is potency a reflection of an essence's relation to existence itself?
2. It's clear that we can know the essence of a Phoenix even though it materially doesn't exist ~ but doesn't it exist immaterially, as that essence that we are knowing? If this essence didn't also exist as essence, we could not know it. Would this make the term "existence" contingent on domains (whether material, immaterial, or transcendent) whereas "essence" seems to stay consistent across all / most domains.
3. Anyhow, could you shed light on these via response, essay, or video? thanks.
You caught me on a morning when I don't have a lot of Aristotle's metaphysics in my head! But I'll see what I can recall.
1.
The soul is that which enlivens things. Animals and plants have souls. Their souls have varying degrees of potencies, which is to say that their souls have different powers or can do different things. All souls have the power of taking in nutrients and growing; animal and human souls also have the power of motion; human souls also have the power of reason.
I believe the _essence_ of a thing is that without which it would not be what it is. I can't recall Aristotle clearly enough at the moment to say confidently that the soul _is_ the human essence in Aristotle, but it's probably ok to say that; at any rate, the human essence would seem to include _having_ a soul.
2.
I think the essence of a phoenix exists and is an immaterial thing. But the phoenix itself does not exist. A phoenix does not exist because that essence is never instantiated anywhere; there is no thing anywhere that has that essence. A phoenix would have to have a body, so in that sense its existence is contingent on the physical domain. But that's not true of all things. An angel does not have a body, and does exist. The only thing we could say about existence in general is that it's contingent on whether something exists!
I have days trying to write a paper about Thomas metaphysics being qua being but i dont even know where to start
This book is a great place to start if you ask me. But somewhere in the _Summa Theologica_ I'm sure there is much more!
Thank you for this video, my friend.
Thanks for watching, Sam!
Just saved my semester. Love you!
Help
Can I get that book in soft copy?
There are cheap used hard copies on Amazon at least. If that is an option for you.
Also, what is my soul/essence? Is it that which reflects my general humanity or the specificity of my individuality? Or are there two terms that covers each?
In Aristotle, if I recall correctly, the human essence is not an individual thing. Only the body makes us individuals. In some later thinkers the human essence is an individual thing; we each have our own essences.
Aquinas' view on the subject is subtle, but I can't recall enough of it just now to feel comfortable saying more.
Is there any difference(s) between being and existence?
Good question. I'll answer the easy way:
No.
That is to say--based on how I understand those words to be used in English, and based on how I understand Aquinas, there is probably no difference.
However, if we tracked down the corresponding words in Aquinas' Latin we might find that they are technical terms with some difference.
very good arguments.
Thank you. Just one point: 'Rushd' is pronounced 'rooshd' (not 'rushda').
Oh, very good. Thanks.
Not the only pronunciation I've gotten wrong around here!
So helpful thank you
Thank You man
Thank _you_.
woow thanks
If Divine Ousia is Good Itself, Beauty itself, ,Omnipotence Itself tradition and self contradictionetc.. then God or Divine Essence is Plural, but this plural is not of Hyposetases, but that of Con
Also unity itself! Where's the self-contradiction supposed to come in?
I think the traditional concept is the goodness and beatude aren't necessarily different things.
Let me ask you, so you, as a living being, participates on "being" and "existence" at same time? If you're and you "exist", so you are a composite of them two. So all things are composites of them. And god is not simple, he is a mixture of the form of being and the form of existence, no?
The doctrine of divine simplicity is usually pretty important in these Christian medieval philosophers. God is _not_ a composite. God’s essence is his existence; he exists necessarily. Everything else is a composite of existence and essence.
Thanks. I have being studying the Greeks, and reading a bit about the "divine simplicity". But saying something is and it exists... sounds like a bit a sophism. See, if in god existence and essence are one, youve got two things that result in one. see, you are a mixture of matter and form, but you are a one, a single person. But both you and god, you're a whole with parts. So i cant say that you both are a example of simplicity.
But very good video.
Thanks!
Only God is simple. I am a composite. I am one thing made of parts. With us, because we can _not_ exist, being and essence are different things. When it comes to God, "being" and "essence" are just two names for the same thing. God is not made of parts.
Well, anyway, that's me trying to clarify Aquinas, if it's a matter of not understanding him. (If you just disagree with him, I suppose that's another matter entirely.)
Ah, thanks for your replay. I just disagree, i m not a troll. I m just very curious about ancient metaphysics.
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