Modal Realities and Possible Worlds with Prof. Jonathan Tallant

There could be a world where fluorescent blue chickens exist. It’s possible…
In this intriguing exploration, we dive into the realm of possible worlds and modal claims. Professor Jonathan Tallant explores why such possibilities matter and how they are grounded in philosophy.
Philosophical literature often uses modal claims-statements about what is possible or necessary. To tackle the complexity of these ideas, Tallant introduces us to David Lewis's theory of possible worlds. Lewis posits that for every conceivable way the world could be, there is a corresponding possible world. These worlds are concrete collections of spatiotemporally connected objects, providing a robust framework for understanding possibilities.
Prof. Tallant also discusses alternative views like linguistic ersatzism, which constructs possible worlds from properties, and propositionalism, which uses propositions to define possibilities. Finally, he touches on combinatorialism, which suggests that possible worlds are combinations of elements from the actual world.
Join Prof. Tallant as he unravels these fascinating theories, weighing their advantages and disadvantages, to better understand the nature of possibilities and the worlds they inhabit.
Prof. Tallant is the Subject Editor for Metaphsyics for the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy and an Associate Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Nottingham.
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy: www.rep.routledge.com
Metaphysics: www.rep.routledge.com/article...
Possible worlds: www.rep.routledge.com/article...
Twentieth-century philosophy: www.rep.routledge.com/article...

[@guardedacumen]

When Dr. Jonathan Tallant asks: "what makes [some modal proposition] true?," at 1:23, he maintains that "what makes it true can't be the actual chickens. [It] can't be the actual chickens because the actual chickens are not in fact fluorescent blue." This seems to beg the question against an Aristotelian account of metaphysical modality, according to which: modal truths are "grounded" in causal capabilities of actually existing substances.
It seems to me, and to many others, that for any account of metaphysical modality to be considered adequate, it must solve two problems: the first being the "grounding" problem: 'what ontological features of reality make the right modal assertion be true?'; and, the second being the "worlds" problem: 'what are possible worlds?'
Why can't the Aristotelian answer the first question, effectively Dr. Tallant's question, by maintaining that a non-actual state of affairs, e.g. some state of affair where there exists fluorescent blue chickens, is made possible by something capable of initiating a chain of causes leading up to that state of affair? On this Aristotelian account, all metaphysical possibilities must branch off causally from the actual world at some point. This is handwaved away (Admittedly, however, I do not think that the Aristotelian account of metaphysical modality can account for the second question, but only so much can be said in one TH-cam comment!)

[@shark9767]

Deseo una traducción en español.

[@eml9147]

Why does the truth or falsity of modal claims have to be grounded in anything, concrete or abstract? Could we not just explain modality in modal terms? The possibility of a blue chicken is determined by aspects of the actual world. Forget it, ill study continental philosophy

[@kadirturkoglu8974]

Didn't Parmenides state that anything imaginable (thinkable) leading no contradiction exists ?

[@Reddles37]

The idea that modal realism somehow grounds these claims seems completely ridiculous. Since they aren't causally related to the real world, there's no way you can know if the world with fluorescent blue chickens exists or not. You're just pushing the problem back, the question of whether the chickens could exist becomes a question of whether the possible world with chickens does exist, which you then assert is true with no evidence.
The truth of the statement that fluorescent blue chickens could exist is entirely grounded in the properties of the real chickens and real 'blueness' that exist in our world. You just need to determine whether a chicken can be genetically modified such that it is fluorescent blue, and whether such a modified chicken would be normal enough to still count as a chicken. There is no reason to invoke the existence of an alternate reality where the chickens literally exist. Also, I like how thinking about hypothetical chickens is somehow weird and spooky, but invoking entire hypothetical worlds is apparently completely fine and reasonable...

[@vittoriobeghelli3561]

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