Nice video,my grandfather was a WW2 glider pilot,316th troop carrier group.was awarded orange lanyard for market garden.he went in on the third day in the Nijmegen sector carried in the 82nd airborne.
Hi good presentation. Some of the 7,377 troops of 82nd Division landed on day one landed just two to three miles from the bridge, yet only a single company made a weak attempt that night on Nijmegen Bridge, perhaps 100 men. Gavin blamed Lindquist for miscommunication. So the distance factor was not really an adequate factor at Nijmegen. In my opinion. At Arnhem just over 5000 British troops landed on day one seven miles away but at least 740 troops got to Arnhem Bridge and controlled the critical northern end of the bridge for four nights and three days. Frost chose initially not to fragment his force between both ends as he felt he had adequate cover from that end to fire upon any approaching Germans. This held much water as Germans tried twice to detonate the southern end but could not lay charges under fire. So effectively it might be argued they fulfilled their part of the deal despite distances. The RAF actually wanted to do a second drop on day one with fixed wing planes only, that would have provided an additional 2000 troops in each sector.
Thank you for your feedback! In the Nijmegen area the Allies expected that the Germans were building up forces in the nearby forest. That's why they were keen on securing the heights first. This was not a purely American decision. The failure to capture the bridge remains however a grave oversight. Regarding the British, I think that the Navy and Airforce were not very keen on Market Garden. The Navy wanted to clear out the Scheldt estuary and the Airforce wanted to focus on strategic bombing and not to waste pilots and planes on an airborne operation. Airborne operations had a lot of sceptics back then.
@@ArmiesAndBattles hi mate, agree with your general points, both the British and Americans had concerns about the Groesbeek Heights but remember Gavin received up to date intelligence by 6pm on 17th, and between 17-19th September the Americans were only attacked by Corps Feldt who were reservists. The 82nd only suffered 11 casualties. On the 20th stronger units attacked - but that is on the 4th day. In terms of airdrops, hollinghurst begged Brereton to allow the RAF alone to provide a 2nd drop at Arnhem, but this was declined. Also Brereton dictated that no air sorties in support of ground forces could take place whilst any troop or supply aircraft were airborne, which was most of the time. This meant that 1st Airborne only first received any support on the 24th, when it was too late, and 30 Corps at ‘The Island’ on the 21st were denied any Typhoon support to help them proceed. But yes, the RAF more than likely wanted to preserve their pilots, but they knew, as did Montgomery from North Africa, just how important cooperation between army and air force was. Especially as Allied tanks were so inferior to Panzer 4s and Tigers.
Good video! Adds an important section to the discussion. However I would say that you should be cautious at 6:50 when you say 'only one battalion [of the 82nd] could be sent to Nijmegen bridge' - this was, in hindsight, over caution from the division's commander Gavin. The DZ was under no immediate threat, and when it was attacked later in the week it was by a very weak force.
so very very true! Competent commanders perhaps.... But even they can make mistakes.... I would consider their mistake however INEXCUSABLE at Nijmegen, because they themselves had said that taking the bridges as soon as possible was the HIGHEST PRIORITY ..... They ignored their own orders.
@@ronaldpatterson1177 it has always struck me as odd that the entire reason for being dropped into battle in the first place was to take their bridges but somehow, the protection of the Groesbeek Heights was given a higher priority in the planning and execution. Browning is accused of ordering Gavin to do it that way, but the words of Gavin, himself, say otherwise - that it was Gavin's plan that was accepted by Browning who subsequently "ordered" it to be done. In the post-op interview with Captain Westover, Gavin clearly stated it was his decision and agreed to by Browning.
Good video! Adding however to Arctic Temper> Gavin should have sent a larger force to the bridge, and also IMMEDIATELY, completing the element of surprise. Gavin insisted on bombarding a small forest nearby first... And Browning complied with that idea. A forest virtually empty of enemy forces at that time. .... If gavin had commited a larger force immediately to the bridge, it would have been seized * And defending a bridge is always easier that capturing one! In hindsight, this would have resulted in XXX Corps reaching the north end of Arnhem bridge, BEFORE 2nd battalion British 1st Airborne would have been annihilated. Possibly even winning the Campaign! Browning produced a self-fulfilling prophecy when he said> We may be going a bridge too far > ..... by allowing Gavin to indulge himself in bombarding a little forest.... Also watch video from TIK BATTLEFIELD concerning this issue.
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Nice video,my grandfather was a WW2 glider pilot,316th troop carrier group.was awarded orange lanyard for market garden.he went in on the third day in the Nijmegen sector carried in the 82nd airborne.
Excellent contribution, Ruud
Love your FJR 6 videos, is there any chance there will be more in the future?
There will be a new one this week!
@@ArmiesAndBattles Amazing!
Hi good presentation. Some of the 7,377 troops of 82nd Division landed on day one landed just two to three miles from the bridge, yet only a single company made a weak attempt that night on Nijmegen Bridge, perhaps 100 men. Gavin blamed Lindquist for miscommunication. So the distance factor was not really an adequate factor at Nijmegen. In my opinion.
At Arnhem just over 5000 British troops landed on day one seven miles away but at least 740 troops got to Arnhem Bridge and controlled the critical northern end of the bridge for four nights and three days. Frost chose initially not to fragment his force between both ends as he felt he had adequate cover from that end to fire upon any approaching Germans. This held much water as Germans tried twice to detonate the southern end but could not lay charges under fire. So effectively it might be argued they fulfilled their part of the deal despite distances.
The RAF actually wanted to do a second drop on day one with fixed wing planes only, that would have provided an additional 2000 troops in each sector.
Thank you for your feedback! In the Nijmegen area the Allies expected that the Germans were building up forces in the nearby forest. That's why they were keen on securing the heights first. This was not a purely American decision. The failure to capture the bridge remains however a grave oversight.
Regarding the British, I think that the Navy and Airforce were not very keen on Market Garden. The Navy wanted to clear out the Scheldt estuary and the Airforce wanted to focus on strategic bombing and not to waste pilots and planes on an airborne operation. Airborne operations had a lot of sceptics back then.
@@ArmiesAndBattles hi mate, agree with your general points, both the British and Americans had concerns about the Groesbeek Heights but remember Gavin received up to date intelligence by 6pm on 17th, and between 17-19th September the Americans were only attacked by Corps Feldt who were reservists. The 82nd only suffered 11 casualties. On the 20th stronger units attacked - but that is on the 4th day.
In terms of airdrops, hollinghurst begged Brereton to allow the RAF alone to provide a 2nd drop at Arnhem, but this was declined.
Also Brereton dictated that no air sorties in support of ground forces could take place whilst any troop or supply aircraft were airborne, which was most of the time. This meant that 1st Airborne only first received any support on the 24th, when it was too late, and 30 Corps at ‘The Island’ on the 21st were denied any Typhoon support to help them proceed.
But yes, the RAF more than likely wanted to preserve their pilots, but they knew, as did Montgomery from North Africa, just how important cooperation between army and air force was. Especially as Allied tanks were so inferior to Panzer 4s and Tigers.
Good video! Adds an important section to the discussion. However I would say that you should be cautious at 6:50 when you say 'only one battalion [of the 82nd] could be sent to Nijmegen bridge' - this was, in hindsight, over caution from the division's commander Gavin. The DZ was under no immediate threat, and when it was attacked later in the week it was by a very weak force.
so very very true! Competent commanders perhaps.... But even they can make mistakes.... I would consider their mistake however INEXCUSABLE at Nijmegen, because they themselves had said that taking the bridges as soon as possible was the HIGHEST PRIORITY ..... They ignored their own orders.
@@ronaldpatterson1177 it has always struck me as odd that the entire reason for being dropped into battle in the first place was to take their bridges but somehow, the protection of the Groesbeek Heights was given a higher priority in the planning and execution.
Browning is accused of ordering Gavin to do it that way, but the words of Gavin, himself, say otherwise - that it was Gavin's plan that was accepted by Browning who subsequently "ordered" it to be done. In the post-op interview with Captain Westover, Gavin clearly stated it was his decision and agreed to by Browning.
Good video! Adding however to Arctic Temper> Gavin should have sent a larger force to the bridge, and also IMMEDIATELY, completing the element of surprise.
Gavin insisted on bombarding a small forest nearby first... And Browning complied with that idea. A forest virtually empty of enemy forces at that time. ....
If gavin had commited a larger force immediately to the bridge, it would have been seized * And defending a bridge is always easier that capturing one! In hindsight, this would have resulted in XXX Corps reaching the north end of Arnhem bridge, BEFORE 2nd battalion British 1st Airborne would have been annihilated. Possibly even winning the Campaign! Browning produced a self-fulfilling prophecy when he said> We may be going a bridge too far >
..... by allowing Gavin to indulge himself in bombarding a little forest....
Also watch video from TIK BATTLEFIELD concerning this issue.
That’s garbage and TIK is a hack
Why do you think so?
@@ArmiesAndBattlesI'm fairly sure he's clinically insane, he thinks democracy is an lie and all governments are fascist.