Yes, this is the video where I come out as a social constructivist, radical relativist, feels-over-reals gender-neutral postmodern neomarxist libtard. A number of ideas raised in this video are discussed in more detail in previous videos: Introduction to the realism/antirealism debate: th-cam.com/video/a0UxFhKOiFg/w-d-xo.html I provide a general defence of antirealism here: th-cam.com/video/TuNFBDrKaIA/w-d-xo.html Essentialism about natural kinds: th-cam.com/video/BYcfPAvZjPE/w-d-xo.html Ron Giere's perspectivism: th-cam.com/video/60eyS0jnPZU/w-d-xo.html Models and idealization in science: th-cam.com/video/0lXhNdtGcpw/w-d-xo.html Biological individuality: (1) th-cam.com/video/8pZ2cZdUA3o/w-d-xo.html (2) th-cam.com/video/x0KO2VDeVKU/w-d-xo.html The extended mind: th-cam.com/video/VuNgjo-pdeU/w-d-xo.html The species problem: (1) th-cam.com/video/0yKIUwUpuDU/w-d-xo.html (2) th-cam.com/video/6m6VohamMP4/w-d-xo.html On scales of reality, my video on levels of reality may be of interest: th-cam.com/video/UitCVVoUiOc/w-d-xo.html Some of the general points in my discussion of the elements are elaborated in the "water is not H2O" video: th-cam.com/video/kQb7QBradfI/w-d-xo.html The data/phenomena video also contains points that are pertinent to this part (see in particular McAllister's objection): th-cam.com/video/ynoBpUJq72M/w-d-xo.html
This is a really helpful video, thanks. Our lab (human computer interaction, psychology) has been thinking about how to navigate social constructivist attitudes which support a more pluralist-scale appropriate approach to multiscale/multi context human-tech problems, with principled constraints. The idea of volitional inpenetrability at the end feels v helpful. Are you aware of any papers/books which develop these ideas in a behavioural sciences context, or develop them in more concrete (meta)methodological directions?
You say that elements are probably the best bet for a realist about natural kinds. However, what about the particles of the standard model? It seems unlikely that any of the arguments you pose against the idea of gold being a natural kind would really work if applied to the difference between an electron and a muon, for example.
Also, what do you think of classification in artificially created environments, like in a computer program? We could look at the computer memory as just a bunch of bits, however a programmer has defined a set of distinct classes that govern how this memory evolves over time. On one hand, those classes are "made up" by us, but on the other hand, they have a very real effect on the world and are clearly defined with no blurry edges. And btw, I enjoy your content a lot :D
In our analog reality as humans we are coded as such. Pure science, pure math can only chop up our analog reality and then some transistor somewhere is coded (by humans at present) to switch on and draw a boundary where in reality there is none.
@@StationGarageSt You could argue that universe just "exists" and there are no "inbuilt kinds", but what I find interesting in my example is that here we actually do have "real" boundaries unlike what you suggest. Yes, they are defined by "us" but they apply to everyone or everything regardless of how they interpret it. If for example I write some code that activates a light bulb, you can invite an alien who can try and observe the memory from micro and macro perspective, interpret it any way it likes but it won't change the fact that the lamp will be on regardless. It may not perceive it as a "light bulb" but still, a piece of matter will change it's state. And at that point, I think the alien would have to admit that, indeed, this piece of memory (along with the hardware it runs on) is a "thing", and if we have multiple instances in memory of this "light bulb" class then they are of the same "kind".
I'm uncomfortable commenting on this example since I don't know shit about computer programming! But I'm not sure how this introduces anything fundamentally different to classification in other contexts. After all, there are plenty of classes of natural things that have various causal effects, and that have no blurry edges - if we're examining ecosystems in Europe, you'll find two discontinuous, reproductively isolated populations of gulls, both of which have effects on the world. I would say that in general, artificial environments are useful because we can control conditions precisely enough that we can construct (literally construct!) what Nancy Cartwright calls "nomological machines" - things with a fixed enough arrangement of components, and stable enough capacities, that they give rise to regular behaviour with repeated operations: essentially, things that behave in a lawlike way. Most idealized models are purely imaginary. But we can build real, concrete things that very closely approximate an idealized model, at least in particular respects.
Hello, Kane. I just want to say that I think this may be your best video and even one of the best philosophical videos on YT. You may find it interesting that I say that as a conservative theist that holds to an institutional religion. I'm curious what you think about this: 1+1 obviously does not always equal 2, because, for example, stores often have buy 2 get one free sales. If you buy one, you only get one, but under the condition of adding a second you end up with 3. I can't see how this isn't a straightforward example of 1+1=3. What do you think?
Would you say that anti-realism would be a dead end ? Sorry if this sounds really amateurish but with the conclusions of instrumentalism and anti-realists alike, you end up with Kant's conclusion that we are limited by our senses and reason hence any understanding of the world is a partial understanding of the world and not the world in-itself. PS : Im not really sure how to word this properly, im not saying anti-realism is futile or whatever but that the conclusion of anti-realism has been thought of since Kant
I hope it meets your expectations! I actually think the content of the video is rather moderate, although perhaps that's just because I've lived with this position for long enough that the novelty has worn off.
While discussing the elements it seems like you have moved the goal post a bit :D. I don't really see how differing interaction of various quantities of gold undermine it's classification. We talk about properties of "gold" on different scale out of practicality because we don't have enough capacity to comprehend all the nuances of "gold". Idealisation enters the picture because we hold it's plausible to classify things properly with enough effort (even if it's out of our reach).
A few points: (1) I'm honestly not sure what you mean by "undermine its classification". The goal of this video is not to undermine any classification scheme. (2) Would you say that, when I grant that focusing on a specific ecosystem at a specific time reveals strict boundaries, I am moving the goalposts with respect to biological classifications? (3) Your point about practicality seems to be exactly in line with my position. All systems in the world are hopelessly complex, so we have to idealize. We might avoid this by restricting our domain of analysis: so if we think about individual atoms, then sure, there are clear boundaries, but that's not the only context in which we talk about gold. We have to link the microstructure to macroscopic properties.
@@KaneB Sorry, English is not my first language so I'll try to clarify. (a) As I understand it, realists accept that their theories are approximations, but they do hold that there are "joints" to be carved. (b) You as an Antirealist accept that theories, models and classifications are useful, but ultimately depend on ones position and aren't inherent property of the world (there are no "joints" of nature to be carved)? (c) For point (1) by "undermine its classification" I was referring to your conclusion that "gold" hardly ever instantiate and thus is not "useful" in any meaningful way. This is not true. This "idealized" model of gold does instantiate for every single atom of gold observed. We also know how they interact with other atoms and we can build simulations of impure lumps of gold with e.g. led mixed in and get a model of such impure lump. We can do this exactly because we understand this "idealized" model of gold and led atoms. (d) For (2) I'm not really sure, if anything I'd say you are being too generous (e) Point (3) seems a bit messy. I don't think "we" idealize, "we" approximate and claim that there's an ideal to approximate to. Also, my point about the practicality is that "class" "gold" includes both micro, macro or what ever properties, we just don't think about the macro when we are working on the micro level, although we could if we wanted to, but in most cases it wouldn't pay off.
@@lukahadziegric5982 Bear in mind that "joints" are a metaphor here. But in some cases there are no joints (divisions, etc.), in some cases there are, where this depends on what perspective we take on a system, e.g. I can create "joints" by focusing only on O-type and M-type stars, since there are significant mass differences between these. I wouldn't say that gold is hardly ever instantiated; there is plenty of gold. Or at least, there is as much gold as folks tend to assume there is. I also think that classifying things as gold is extremely useful. "This "idealized" model of gold does instantiate for every single atom of gold observed" I pretty much say this at around 59:44... well, not quite; I wouldn't describe a claim like "atoms of gold contain 79 protons" as an idealized model, since it's correct, or so we assume. But what we clearly do have is a scheme that meets the realist's three desiderata. At the end of the day, if you want to say that I'm really just a realist about the classification of the elements, well, fine**. But: (a) I would still insist that there is a much more significant role for constructive processes on our part than has traditionally been assumed. Scales of analysis are not objective. (b) Granting that realism holds for atoms on a given scale of analysis does not obviate the need for idealization when we take other perspectives on a system - and we shouldn't underestimate just how often we take those other perspectives: if we want to talk about, say, "the melting point of gold", clearly we are not just taking gold as individual atoms! (c) More generally, the ubiquity of theoretical kinds does show that the success of a theory/model is not what justifies the belief that its classification tracks natural kinds. ** I'm putting aside the point that I'm an antirealist about unobservables. In fact, I'm agnostic about whether there are any atoms. So I suppose really I should say: Assuming that our theories are broadly true, then the three desiderata hold for atoms.
@@KaneB I've realized we mean different things by "ideal" and "idealization" (my mistake). When I say ideal, I talk about the model that perfectly reflects reality, and by approximation I refer to what you call (or is formally called) "idealization". I think you missed my point because we speak a "different language" :). In regards to (a), scales of analysis exist simply because they allow us to get adequate precision at acceptable cost, however we are perfectly capable (and in fact, we do this quite often in modern chemistry) of building a model of a lump of gold with impurities by simulating every single atom. And that model can then be looked at from what ever scale you want (bottom line being the atom). In (b) I may be misinterpreting, but I essentially understand your arguments as "we use approximations to make our life easier, therefore realism doesn't hold". We don't always talk about "the melting pot of gold" as individual atoms, but we sure can if we want to (it would be a system of individual atoms though). Sure, we would have to "rasterize" our much more accurate atomic model in order to compare it with what our natural pattern recognition system sees. But, from what I understand, realist are perfectly fine with the existence of "practical" models / kinds, along with the natural kinds. (c) sure, no problems with that
Where are you getting the claim that we wouldn’t be able to interbreed with humans from 100 years ago? I can’t find that claim being made anywhere, and it seems shocking for that to be true.
The best you'll be able to do is a counterfactual claim such as, "If we were to build a time machine, then we could interbreed with humans from 100 years ago." But if you can help yourself to that counterfactual, something which may not even be physically possible, then why not also, "If we were to make changes x, y, z... then we could interbreed with chimpanzees"?
Anyway, there are a bunch of other limitations to the BSC. See my video on the species problem; I discuss the BSC at around 11 minutes: th-cam.com/video/0yKIUwUpuDU/w-d-xo.html
@@KaneB oh ok, I think I misunderstood what you were saying. I thought you were saying we wouldn’t be genetically similar enough, not that we would be separated by time. Oddly, this is theoretically possible even if time travel isn’t. A human going sufficiently fast would age slower.
@@KaneB I wasn’t really disagreeing with your conclusion, I just didn’t understand what you were saying and thought wrongly that your claim was about how humans have changed too much genetically for us to be able to breed with humans from 100 years ago.
1-Suppose john is an anthropologist and he is trying to discover the colors of human beings and all individuals in this universe are human beings,and by individuals we mean persons (single in contrast to groups); 2- suppose that there are three planets a,b,and c; 3- pinky individuals live in a,blue individuals live in b,and orange individuals live in c; 4-john lives and has grown up in b and he can travel to a,and for now he concluded that the colors of individuals are pinky and blue; 5- matt is an inventor and succeded in inventing a machine f that will allow an individual to travel to c and f is accessible to john,so john used and went to c,so now john concluded that the colors of individuals are pinky and blue and orange; C- it doesn't seem that the new technology (f) had carved up nature.
Um ... 19:00 minute mark and on ... how does anything you've said so far amount to an actual, i.e., proper, anti-realist position?? ... Still waiting for the punchline ...
20:05 "... it's simply similar to various systems in the world." But you've already conceded that greater and lesser degrees of similarity - in other words, greater and lesser levels of "correspondence" - between "models" and (in your own words) "wordly systems" are possible. Indeed, the very notion of scientific models can and do correspond to, or are "similar" to, or represent, the world with either greater or lesser accuracy ... this very way of putting things ... presumes realism! For, we can always ask: what is it that makes any given model more or less "accurate" or more or less "similar" to that which it models in the world? And the answer, naturally, is the world itself. In other words, if it is indeed possible to construct some mechanical instrument, based on certain idealized representations of the world, (i.e., "models"), to varying degrees of accuracy and/or efficacy; and if indeed there can be very wide variations in accuracy, such that the instrument could either be merely a child's toy or something used to send people to the moon; then this is only possible if the model that the instrument is built on more or less accurately represents or corresponds to something that is Real, namely "The World" (or "wordly systems" or whatever you want to call it)!
31:04 "... treat the world as if it contained discrete categories, when it does not." ... But you just said that the world absolutely does exhibit "continuous variation" (or "smooth variation", etc.) - your entire exposition depends on this fact about the world. But if you think about it, this fact is really all that matters; and if you've accepted it, you've conceded realism in its most elementary form. ... It may well be true that perfectly sharp distinctions, demarcations or gradations (etc.) are impossible to make. But, again, as we've just emphasized, this does not mean the world does not exhibit variation. And so, this does not mean that distinctions, demarcations or gradations *as such* are impossible to make. More importantly, it does not mean that the various "discrete categories" we come up with do not and cannot ever track reality. In other words, no one here is denying - as actual antirealism would seem to require - that, when scientists make certain distinctions, demarcations or gradations, they are making reference to something real. No one is denying that such distinctions, demarcations or gradations correspond to something real, "in the world" (or however you want to put it), namely, to "continuous variation". Further, it is the very fact of "continuous variation" that makes distinction-, demarcation- or gradation-making possible in the first place. And so, while it may be true that no schema of distinction-, demarcation- or gradation-making (whether "idealized", or otherwise) will ever "perfectly" represent the, as it were, "full-spectrum" reality of "continuous variation", this in no way justifies any sort of claim that such schemas do not capture reality - or that our various schemas are incapable of capturing reality, or whatever. ... The antirealist position, in this context, is just plain absurd. ... It's like saying that, because our senses do not capture the full range of the electromagnetic spectrum, humans are actually incapable of navigating the world. That's just patently absurd. .... Of course, it would be accurate to say that we are, indeed, incapable of navigating the world, in some sense, in its "entirety" - for example, we lack the innate apparatus to detect, and hence avoid, x-rays, etc. But it does not follow that we are incapable of navigating the world, period ... and/or that we're all functionally and effectively "blind" because our sense apparatuses do not actually represent anything "real". Because, not only are we not functionally blind (we are perfectly capable of navigating a certain portion of the world), but, with the aid of science, we're actually also cognizant of realities beyond those furnished by our senses, such as the existence of the full electromagnetic spectrum, etc.
If you want to call my position on kinds "realist", fine. I don't really care what we call it. I call it "antirealist", and the majority of other philosophers would call it "antirealist", to distinguish it from the type of position outlined at the beginning of the video. But nothing important hangs on a name. Having said that, I wonder if you have misunderstood the goal of this video. My intention here was to outline an antirealist view of *kinds* specifically. This is entirely compatible with realism in other respects. Everything I say here is compatible with certain forms of structural realism; indeed, the arguments for antirealism about kinds might help support the structural realist position. Furthermore, I grant for the sake of argument that we have knowledge of various unobservables. So this is not an argument for any general antirealism, it's an argument for antirealism about classification and kinds.
@@KaneB I may well have misunderstood your presentation. Or at least, I may be looking at it from a more general perspective, with your presentation being more granular - i.e., making a narrower point, as you say, about "kinds", etc. But, though I don't have time for a full elaboration, I would say that my general point/observation would, ultimately, apply to your particular area of concern as well. The very basic distinction to be made, here, is between, on the one hand, saying that nature itself (ultimately) determines our classificatory schemes; or, on the other hand, saying that it is our "purposes" that determine how our schemes end up carving up nature. The former view is essentially realist, and the latter "anti-realist". .... My reaction to this particular presentation - and I'll have to watch more of your others - is that, because of the many concessions made in the direction of realism (some concessions are implicit and other explicit; some intentional and some perhaps unintentional), the antirealist case is not persuasively made. For more specifics, see my comments above, particularly re "smooth" or "perpetual" variation, etc. But here's another: take, for example, the point about how it's difficult to precisely map the boundary between forests and wetlands, and that the boundaries are constantly shifting, and that we, therefore, map the boundaries in a somewhat arbitrarily manner, and/or make the demarcation of the boundary dependent on our purposes (or our tolerance levels for in/accuracy) etc. ... All of that is true. Yet, the basic distinction between forest and wetland, as such, is not entirely arbitrary; and that distinction - as imprecise as it may be at any given point - is ultimately given to us by nature itself. In other words, it is ultimately "reality itself" (as quaint as that may sound) that drives/determines our scheme- or model-making. For: if nature itself did not exhibit a variation or a transition from wetlands over to forests, or vice versa, then we would not have that basic distinction at all. ... So, either way, the basic realist position reasserts itself.
@@AHM-to6gs None of these are concessions to realist accounts of classification and kinds. Basically, what this amounts to, it seems to me, is that you are defining "realism" so broadly as to be almost trivial in this context -- so that anybody who isn't a radical skeptic, who grants that we know things about the world, will count as a realist about kinds. Okay, fine. Then I'm a realist about kinds. I don't see this as an objection to my position.
Are chemical elements real? Are species real? Are natural kinds real? What is it to be real? What is it to be? No one that I know of has said it better than W. V. Quine: To be is to be the value of a bound variable. If your theory has Xs as bound variables, then Xs exist, are real. Chemistry seems to require elements, so elements are real. Biology seems to require species, so species are real. Framing operational definitions that pick out these things unambiguously is a dodgy enterprise, dodgier in some some disciplines than in others. Will there ever be a single theory that will solve for any X, whether Xs are real or not. Maybe, although I doubt it. Are natural kinds real? Is there any going theory which requires them? Not that I know of. Sure, my recollection is that on some readings of Aristotle, natural kinds are required. But is Aristotle still a going theory, except amongst historians?
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Yes, this is the video where I come out as a social constructivist, radical relativist, feels-over-reals gender-neutral postmodern neomarxist libtard.
A number of ideas raised in this video are discussed in more detail in previous videos:
Introduction to the realism/antirealism debate:
th-cam.com/video/a0UxFhKOiFg/w-d-xo.html
I provide a general defence of antirealism here:
th-cam.com/video/TuNFBDrKaIA/w-d-xo.html
Essentialism about natural kinds:
th-cam.com/video/BYcfPAvZjPE/w-d-xo.html
Ron Giere's perspectivism:
th-cam.com/video/60eyS0jnPZU/w-d-xo.html
Models and idealization in science:
th-cam.com/video/0lXhNdtGcpw/w-d-xo.html
Biological individuality:
(1) th-cam.com/video/8pZ2cZdUA3o/w-d-xo.html
(2) th-cam.com/video/x0KO2VDeVKU/w-d-xo.html
The extended mind:
th-cam.com/video/VuNgjo-pdeU/w-d-xo.html
The species problem:
(1) th-cam.com/video/0yKIUwUpuDU/w-d-xo.html
(2) th-cam.com/video/6m6VohamMP4/w-d-xo.html
On scales of reality, my video on levels of reality may be of interest:
th-cam.com/video/UitCVVoUiOc/w-d-xo.html
Some of the general points in my discussion of the elements are elaborated in the "water is not H2O" video:
th-cam.com/video/kQb7QBradfI/w-d-xo.html
The data/phenomena video also contains points that are pertinent to this part (see in particular McAllister's objection):
th-cam.com/video/ynoBpUJq72M/w-d-xo.html
i knew you were a postmodernist libtard like me 🖤❤️🤡
B A S E D
based
That’s one way of neutering the nutjob. Anticipate their nonsense.
This is an especially useful topic to explore given the current year narratives we are seeing.
oh YES looking forward to this one!
This is a really helpful video, thanks. Our lab (human computer interaction, psychology) has been thinking about how to navigate social constructivist attitudes which support a more pluralist-scale appropriate approach to multiscale/multi context human-tech problems, with principled constraints. The idea of volitional inpenetrability at the end feels v helpful. Are you aware of any papers/books which develop these ideas in a behavioural sciences context, or develop them in more concrete (meta)methodological directions?
You say that elements are probably the best bet for a realist about natural kinds. However, what about the particles of the standard model? It seems unlikely that any of the arguments you pose against the idea of gold being a natural kind would really work if applied to the difference between an electron and a muon, for example.
This was great -- thank you!
Also, what do you think of classification in artificially created environments, like in a computer program? We could look at the computer memory as just a bunch of bits, however a programmer has defined a set of distinct classes that govern how this memory evolves over time. On one hand, those classes are "made up" by us, but on the other hand, they have a very real effect on the world and are clearly defined with no blurry edges. And btw, I enjoy your content a lot :D
In our analog reality as humans we are coded as such. Pure science, pure math can only chop up our analog reality and then some transistor somewhere is coded (by humans at present) to switch on and draw a boundary where in reality there is none.
@@StationGarageSt You could argue that universe just "exists" and there are no "inbuilt kinds", but what I find interesting in my example is that here we actually do have "real" boundaries unlike what you suggest. Yes, they are defined by "us" but they apply to everyone or everything regardless of how they interpret it.
If for example I write some code that activates a light bulb, you can invite an alien who can try and observe the memory from micro and macro perspective, interpret it any way it likes but it won't change the fact that the lamp will be on regardless. It may not perceive it as a "light bulb" but still, a piece of matter will change it's state.
And at that point, I think the alien would have to admit that, indeed, this piece of memory (along with the hardware it runs on) is a "thing", and if we have multiple instances in memory of this "light bulb" class then they are of the same "kind".
I'm uncomfortable commenting on this example since I don't know shit about computer programming! But I'm not sure how this introduces anything fundamentally different to classification in other contexts. After all, there are plenty of classes of natural things that have various causal effects, and that have no blurry edges - if we're examining ecosystems in Europe, you'll find two discontinuous, reproductively isolated populations of gulls, both of which have effects on the world. I would say that in general, artificial environments are useful because we can control conditions precisely enough that we can construct (literally construct!) what Nancy Cartwright calls "nomological machines" - things with a fixed enough arrangement of components, and stable enough capacities, that they give rise to regular behaviour with repeated operations: essentially, things that behave in a lawlike way. Most idealized models are purely imaginary. But we can build real, concrete things that very closely approximate an idealized model, at least in particular respects.
great work, as usual
How would you criticize Giere's position?
Hello, Kane. I just want to say that I think this may be your best video and even one of the best philosophical videos on YT. You may find it interesting that I say that as a conservative theist that holds to an institutional religion.
I'm curious what you think about this: 1+1 obviously does not always equal 2, because, for example, stores often have buy 2 get one free sales. If you buy one, you only get one, but under the condition of adding a second you end up with 3. I can't see how this isn't a straightforward example of 1+1=3. What do you think?
Would you ever make a video on mathematical constructivism?
No current plans to do that.
33:33
Would you say that anti-realism would be a dead end ? Sorry if this sounds really amateurish but with the conclusions of instrumentalism and anti-realists alike, you end up with Kant's conclusion that we are limited by our senses and reason hence any understanding of the world is a partial understanding of the world and not the world in-itself.
PS : Im not really sure how to word this properly, im not saying anti-realism is futile or whatever but that the conclusion of anti-realism has been thought of since Kant
i can already tell this is one i'll 90% agree with, and will shock other people. really excited!
I hope it meets your expectations! I actually think the content of the video is rather moderate, although perhaps that's just because I've lived with this position for long enough that the novelty has worn off.
While discussing the elements it seems like you have moved the goal post a bit :D. I don't really see how differing interaction of various quantities of gold undermine it's classification. We talk about properties of "gold" on different scale out of practicality because we don't have enough capacity to comprehend all the nuances of "gold". Idealisation enters the picture because we hold it's plausible to classify things properly with enough effort (even if it's out of our reach).
A few points: (1) I'm honestly not sure what you mean by "undermine its classification". The goal of this video is not to undermine any classification scheme. (2) Would you say that, when I grant that focusing on a specific ecosystem at a specific time reveals strict boundaries, I am moving the goalposts with respect to biological classifications? (3) Your point about practicality seems to be exactly in line with my position. All systems in the world are hopelessly complex, so we have to idealize. We might avoid this by restricting our domain of analysis: so if we think about individual atoms, then sure, there are clear boundaries, but that's not the only context in which we talk about gold. We have to link the microstructure to macroscopic properties.
@@KaneB Sorry, English is not my first language so I'll try to clarify.
(a) As I understand it, realists accept that their theories are approximations, but they do hold that there are "joints" to be carved.
(b) You as an Antirealist accept that theories, models and classifications are useful, but ultimately depend on ones position and aren't inherent property of the world (there are no "joints" of nature to be carved)?
(c) For point (1) by "undermine its classification" I was referring to your conclusion that "gold" hardly ever instantiate and thus is not "useful" in any meaningful way. This is not true. This "idealized" model of gold does instantiate for every single atom of gold observed. We also know how they interact with other atoms and we can build simulations of impure lumps of gold with e.g. led mixed in and get a model of such impure lump. We can do this exactly because we understand this "idealized" model of gold and led atoms.
(d) For (2) I'm not really sure, if anything I'd say you are being too generous
(e) Point (3) seems a bit messy. I don't think "we" idealize, "we" approximate and claim that there's an ideal to approximate to. Also, my point about the practicality is that "class" "gold" includes both micro, macro or what ever properties, we just don't think about the macro when we are working on the micro level, although we could if we wanted to, but in most cases it wouldn't pay off.
@@lukahadziegric5982 Bear in mind that "joints" are a metaphor here. But in some cases there are no joints (divisions, etc.), in some cases there are, where this depends on what perspective we take on a system, e.g. I can create "joints" by focusing only on O-type and M-type stars, since there are significant mass differences between these.
I wouldn't say that gold is hardly ever instantiated; there is plenty of gold. Or at least, there is as much gold as folks tend to assume there is. I also think that classifying things as gold is extremely useful.
"This "idealized" model of gold does instantiate for every single atom of gold observed"
I pretty much say this at around 59:44... well, not quite; I wouldn't describe a claim like "atoms of gold contain 79 protons" as an idealized model, since it's correct, or so we assume. But what we clearly do have is a scheme that meets the realist's three desiderata. At the end of the day, if you want to say that I'm really just a realist about the classification of the elements, well, fine**. But: (a) I would still insist that there is a much more significant role for constructive processes on our part than has traditionally been assumed. Scales of analysis are not objective. (b) Granting that realism holds for atoms on a given scale of analysis does not obviate the need for idealization when we take other perspectives on a system - and we shouldn't underestimate just how often we take those other perspectives: if we want to talk about, say, "the melting point of gold", clearly we are not just taking gold as individual atoms! (c) More generally, the ubiquity of theoretical kinds does show that the success of a theory/model is not what justifies the belief that its classification tracks natural kinds.
** I'm putting aside the point that I'm an antirealist about unobservables. In fact, I'm agnostic about whether there are any atoms. So I suppose really I should say: Assuming that our theories are broadly true, then the three desiderata hold for atoms.
@@KaneB I've realized we mean different things by "ideal" and "idealization" (my mistake). When I say ideal, I talk about the model that perfectly reflects reality, and by approximation I refer to what you call (or is formally called) "idealization". I think you missed my point because we speak a "different language" :).
In regards to (a), scales of analysis exist simply because they allow us to get adequate precision at acceptable cost, however we are perfectly capable (and in fact, we do this quite often in modern chemistry) of building a model of a lump of gold with impurities by simulating every single atom. And that model can then be looked at from what ever scale you want (bottom line being the atom).
In (b) I may be misinterpreting, but I essentially understand your arguments as "we use approximations to make our life easier, therefore realism doesn't hold". We don't always talk about "the melting pot of gold" as individual atoms, but we sure can if we want to (it would be a system of individual atoms though). Sure, we would have to "rasterize" our much more accurate atomic model in order to compare it with what our natural pattern recognition system sees. But, from what I understand, realist are perfectly fine with the existence of "practical" models / kinds, along with the natural kinds.
(c) sure, no problems with that
Where are you getting the claim that we wouldn’t be able to interbreed with humans from 100 years ago? I can’t find that claim being made anywhere, and it seems shocking for that to be true.
The best you'll be able to do is a counterfactual claim such as, "If we were to build a time machine, then we could interbreed with humans from 100 years ago." But if you can help yourself to that counterfactual, something which may not even be physically possible, then why not also, "If we were to make changes x, y, z... then we could interbreed with chimpanzees"?
Anyway, there are a bunch of other limitations to the BSC. See my video on the species problem; I discuss the BSC at around 11 minutes: th-cam.com/video/0yKIUwUpuDU/w-d-xo.html
@@KaneB oh ok, I think I misunderstood what you were saying. I thought you were saying we wouldn’t be genetically similar enough, not that we would be separated by time.
Oddly, this is theoretically possible even if time travel isn’t. A human going sufficiently fast would age slower.
@@KaneB I wasn’t really disagreeing with your conclusion, I just didn’t understand what you were saying and thought wrongly that your claim was about how humans have changed too much genetically for us to be able to breed with humans from 100 years ago.
I understood this statement exactly the same way😅
1-Suppose john is an anthropologist and he is trying to discover the colors of human beings and all individuals in this universe are human beings,and by individuals we mean persons (single in contrast to groups);
2- suppose that there are three planets a,b,and c;
3- pinky individuals live in a,blue individuals live in b,and orange individuals live in c;
4-john lives and has grown up in b and he can travel to a,and for now he concluded that the colors of individuals are pinky and blue;
5- matt is an inventor and succeded in inventing a machine f that will allow an individual to travel to c and f is accessible to john,so john used and went to c,so now john concluded that the colors of individuals are pinky and blue and orange;
C- it doesn't seem that the new technology (f) had carved up nature.
Um ... 19:00 minute mark and on ... how does anything you've said so far amount to an actual, i.e., proper, anti-realist position?? ... Still waiting for the punchline ...
20:05 "... it's simply similar to various systems in the world." But you've already conceded that greater and lesser degrees of similarity - in other words, greater and lesser levels of "correspondence" - between "models" and (in your own words) "wordly systems" are possible. Indeed, the very notion of scientific models can and do correspond to, or are "similar" to, or represent, the world with either greater or lesser accuracy ... this very way of putting things ... presumes realism! For, we can always ask: what is it that makes any given model more or less "accurate" or more or less "similar" to that which it models in the world? And the answer, naturally, is the world itself.
In other words, if it is indeed possible to construct some mechanical instrument, based on certain idealized representations of the world, (i.e., "models"), to varying degrees of accuracy and/or efficacy; and if indeed there can be very wide variations in accuracy, such that the instrument could either be merely a child's toy or something used to send people to the moon; then this is only possible if the model that the instrument is built on more or less accurately represents or corresponds to something that is Real, namely "The World" (or "wordly systems" or whatever you want to call it)!
31:04 "... treat the world as if it contained discrete categories, when it does not." ... But you just said that the world absolutely does exhibit "continuous variation" (or "smooth variation", etc.) - your entire exposition depends on this fact about the world. But if you think about it, this fact is really all that matters; and if you've accepted it, you've conceded realism in its most elementary form. ... It may well be true that perfectly sharp distinctions, demarcations or gradations (etc.) are impossible to make. But, again, as we've just emphasized, this does not mean the world does not exhibit variation. And so, this does not mean that distinctions, demarcations or gradations *as such* are impossible to make. More importantly, it does not mean that the various "discrete categories" we come up with do not and cannot ever track reality.
In other words, no one here is denying - as actual antirealism would seem to require - that, when scientists make certain distinctions, demarcations or gradations, they are making reference to something real. No one is denying that such distinctions, demarcations or gradations correspond to something real, "in the world" (or however you want to put it), namely, to "continuous variation". Further, it is the very fact of "continuous variation" that makes distinction-, demarcation- or gradation-making possible in the first place. And so, while it may be true that no schema of distinction-, demarcation- or gradation-making (whether "idealized", or otherwise) will ever "perfectly" represent the, as it were, "full-spectrum" reality of "continuous variation", this in no way justifies any sort of claim that such schemas do not capture reality - or that our various schemas are incapable of capturing reality, or whatever. ... The antirealist position, in this context, is just plain absurd. ...
It's like saying that, because our senses do not capture the full range of the electromagnetic spectrum, humans are actually incapable of navigating the world. That's just patently absurd. .... Of course, it would be accurate to say that we are, indeed, incapable of navigating the world, in some sense, in its "entirety" - for example, we lack the innate apparatus to detect, and hence avoid, x-rays, etc. But it does not follow that we are incapable of navigating the world, period ... and/or that we're all functionally and effectively "blind" because our sense apparatuses do not actually represent anything "real". Because, not only are we not functionally blind (we are perfectly capable of navigating a certain portion of the world), but, with the aid of science, we're actually also cognizant of realities beyond those furnished by our senses, such as the existence of the full electromagnetic spectrum, etc.
If you want to call my position on kinds "realist", fine. I don't really care what we call it. I call it "antirealist", and the majority of other philosophers would call it "antirealist", to distinguish it from the type of position outlined at the beginning of the video. But nothing important hangs on a name.
Having said that, I wonder if you have misunderstood the goal of this video. My intention here was to outline an antirealist view of *kinds* specifically. This is entirely compatible with realism in other respects. Everything I say here is compatible with certain forms of structural realism; indeed, the arguments for antirealism about kinds might help support the structural realist position. Furthermore, I grant for the sake of argument that we have knowledge of various unobservables. So this is not an argument for any general antirealism, it's an argument for antirealism about classification and kinds.
@@KaneB I may well have misunderstood your presentation. Or at least, I may be looking at it from a more general perspective, with your presentation being more granular - i.e., making a narrower point, as you say, about "kinds", etc.
But, though I don't have time for a full elaboration, I would say that my general point/observation would, ultimately, apply to your particular area of concern as well.
The very basic distinction to be made, here, is between, on the one hand, saying that nature itself (ultimately) determines our classificatory schemes; or, on the other hand, saying that it is our "purposes" that determine how our schemes end up carving up nature. The former view is essentially realist, and the latter "anti-realist". ....
My reaction to this particular presentation - and I'll have to watch more of your others - is that, because of the many concessions made in the direction of realism (some concessions are implicit and other explicit; some intentional and some perhaps unintentional), the antirealist case is not persuasively made. For more specifics, see my comments above, particularly re "smooth" or "perpetual" variation, etc.
But here's another: take, for example, the point about how it's difficult to precisely map the boundary between forests and wetlands, and that the boundaries are constantly shifting, and that we, therefore, map the boundaries in a somewhat arbitrarily manner, and/or make the demarcation of the boundary dependent on our purposes (or our tolerance levels for in/accuracy) etc. ... All of that is true.
Yet, the basic distinction between forest and wetland, as such, is not entirely arbitrary; and that distinction - as imprecise as it may be at any given point - is ultimately given to us by nature itself. In other words, it is ultimately "reality itself" (as quaint as that may sound) that drives/determines our scheme- or model-making. For: if nature itself did not exhibit a variation or a transition from wetlands over to forests, or vice versa, then we would not have that basic distinction at all. ... So, either way, the basic realist position reasserts itself.
@@AHM-to6gs None of these are concessions to realist accounts of classification and kinds. Basically, what this amounts to, it seems to me, is that you are defining "realism" so broadly as to be almost trivial in this context -- so that anybody who isn't a radical skeptic, who grants that we know things about the world, will count as a realist about kinds. Okay, fine. Then I'm a realist about kinds. I don't see this as an objection to my position.
Are chemical elements real? Are species real? Are natural kinds real? What is it to be real? What is it to be? No one that I know of has said it better than W. V. Quine: To be is to be the value of a bound variable. If your theory has Xs as bound variables, then Xs exist, are real. Chemistry seems to require elements, so elements are real. Biology seems to require species, so species are real. Framing operational definitions that pick out these things unambiguously is a dodgy enterprise, dodgier in some some disciplines than in others. Will there ever be a single theory that will solve for any X, whether Xs are real or not. Maybe, although I doubt it. Are natural kinds real? Is there any going theory which requires them? Not that I know of. Sure, my recollection is that on some readings of Aristotle, natural kinds are required. But is Aristotle still a going theory, except amongst historians?