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- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 28 ก.ค. 2024
- This video introduces Nelson Goodman's worldmaking, the view that there are many actual worlds, and that these worlds are constructed by us. I examine in detail Goodman's "many worlds" argument for his worldmaking theory.
Declos's article on Goodman: jhaponline.org/jhap/article/v...
My Patreon: / kanebaker91
0:00 - Introduction
2:53 - Versions
5:55 - Two forms of the many-worlds argument
8:29 - Premise 1: True conflicting versions
24:55 - Two responses to premise 1
41:20 - Premises 2 and 3
2:45 succinct and opaque - the perfect combination.
Some philosophers wrote aphoristically to resist the temptations of reductionist metaphysics. Like Wittgenstein, and even Heraclitus
You should make another video about Nelson Goodman’s work- he’s my favourite.
0:01 yo dawg
Love Nelson Goodman
I read Ways of World Making twice and was confused both times, now i think I get it.
Would you please make a video on Goodman's Calculus of Individuals? Pleaseeeeee
Wassssuuupppppp!!!!!!!
Don't forget that the null set is a member of every set according to modern set theory. So that would be eight objects when you include { }. Or is that wrong? ;)
This cries out for us to pin down exactly what it means for versions to be "conflicting".
P3 says that conflicting versions cannot answer to one and the same world, and that reads like it might be a definition of "conflicting", as in any two versions which cannot answer to the same world are conflicting by definition, but such a definition makes the whole argument trivial and pointless, since it's going to cause people to reject P1, "There are true conflicting versions," on the grounds that if they cannot answer to the same world then they obviously cannot all be true.
We need a definition for _conflicting_ that allows P1 to seem plausible, something that gets to the core of where Goodman gets this idea. What makes versions seem to be in conflict to him, and how can he be identifying two "conflicting" versions as both true?
8:42 "The claim is that there are cases where one version asserts P, the other denies P, and where both are true."
That also sounds like a definition of _conflicting_ but this one is even worse for P1 since in order for a denial of P to be true, P must not be true. If that's not what it means to deny P, then we're going to need to come up with an explanation of what it means to deny P. If the premise P1 is literally claiming that P is true and P is not true, then P1 is far more controversial than the conclusion the argument is trying to prove.
9:24 "(E1) The Earth is at rest. (E2) The Earth moves."
Neither one of those versions denies anything in the other version. If we want to insist that a thing cannot be both at rest and in motion at the same time, that's a claim we're making; the versions didn't say that. If we want to have an example of conflicting versions under the denial definition, then we might use this instead:
(E1+) The Earth is at rest, and does not move.
(E2) The Earth moves.
Now we have E1+ denying E2, but we've also got the problem that E1+ is false, so we still don't have an example of true conflicting versions.
9:42 "Motion is relative to one's frame of reference."
So then when we say, "The Earth moves," what we're really saying is that Earth moves relative to some unspecified frame of reference, which is true in that we can find some reference frame in which the Earth is moving. In the same way E1+ is wrong in claiming that the Earth does not move thanks to all those reference frames where Earth is moving.
If we have a specific reference frame in mind, like Exeter, then we might leave the reference from unspoken, but it's still a silent part of the version, so then we should say:
(E1a) The Earth is at rest (relative to Exeter).
(E2a) The Earth moves (relative to Exeter).
In that case E2a is false, so they're not true conflicting versions.
In order to make this example work, we should get away from relative motion. We need a concept of absolute motion, so we don't have unspoken reference frames confusing the issue. It might be better to speak of acceleration rather than motion.
(E1b) The Earth is not accelerating.
(E2b) The Earth is accelerating.
Here we have two conflicting versions in that E1b denies E2b, and both claims can be understood in isolation, without the need to assume some reference frame. Even better, under General Relativity we have E1b as true, while Newtonian mechanics would have E2b as true.
Even so, it seems unlikely that anyone would hold that both General Relativity and Newtonian mechanics are true, especially in cases where they contradict each other.
11:18 "We take (E1) and (E2) as abbreviating:"
(E1r) According to the geocentric system, the Earth is at rest.
(E2r) According to the heliocentric system, the Earth moves.
If that is actually what was meant by E1 and E2, then it was wildly misleading to put them side-by-side without clarifying their contexts. By the principle of charity, we cannot assume that this is what Goodman means by E1 and E2, because that would entail that Goodman is trying to trick us with out-of-context statements.
"Goodman objects that this does not solve the problem."
Goodman ought to object that this does not fairly represent what he meant when he gave us E1 and E2. We should not take E1 and E2 to have a particular meaning even when that meaning is contrary to Goodman's intention.
That's just twisting Goodman's words to make him say something he didn't mean and thereby constructing a strawman to knock down.
12:31 "Obviously, (V1r) and (V2r) do not tell us anything about the king of Sparta! They only tell us about what Herodotus and Thucydides said."
So was Goodman trying to tell us something about the Earth, or was he merely trying to tell us about the geocentric and heliocentric systems? Without knowing Goodman's intentions, we can't know whether it's wrong to use E1r and E2r in place of E1 and E2.
Is Goodman deliberately avoiding clarifying what he means by E1 and E2 because whenever the meaning is made clear the true conflicting versions tend to disappear? It seems like all this talk of the king of Sparta is a distraction from the actual issue.
On this part:
"If that is actually what was meant by E1 and E2, then it was wildly misleading to put them side-by-side without clarifying their contexts. By the principle of charity, we cannot assume that this is what Goodman means by E1 and E2, because that would entail that Goodman is trying to trick us with out-of-context statement.
... Goodman ought to object that this does not fairly represent what he meant when he gave us E1 and E2. We should not take E1 and E2 to have a particular meaning even when that meaning is contrary to Goodman's intention. That's just twisting Goodman's words to make him say something he didn't mean and thereby constructing a strawman to knock down."
I feel like there has been a serious misunderstanding here, which makes me wonder if I might have screwed up the video somehow. Goodman himself introduces the relativization strategy, since he thinks that some people might try to use this to remove the conflict. That is, Goodman proposes a potential objection to his view, and then responds to it. So I am not assuming that Goodman intends (E1) and (E2) to mean (E1r) and (E2r). It's the exact opposite. Goodman is saying something along the lines of: "okay, some people might suggest that (E1) and (E2) should be interpreted to mean (E1r) and (E2r), but here's why that doesn't work..."
I'm not twisting Goodman's words. I'm not even presenting an argument against Goodman at this point; I'm literally only reporting the argument that he gives.
I'm also concerned that these parts indicate misunderstanding as well:
(1) On the notion of "conflicting" versions -- What it means for versions to be conflicting is quite straightforward. V1 and V2 conflict just in case some proposition is true according to V1 but false according to V2. So, V1 says P and V2 says not-P. Then (P3), the premise that true conflicting versions cannot answer to the same world, is saying that it cannot be the case that P and not-P are both true of the same world. (P3) is basically just ruling out contradiction.
(2) "... since it's going to cause people to reject P1, "There are true conflicting versions," on the grounds that if they cannot answer to the same world then they obviously cannot all be true."
I mean, Goodman's claim is precisely that there are cases where two versions cannot answer to the same world, but they are nevertheless both true.
(3) "If the premise P1 is literally claiming that P is true and P is not true..."
Yes, that's exactly what (P1) is claiming. Then Goodman then tries to avoid contradiction by saying that P is true in one world and false in another. That's the whole point of introducing the plurality of actual worlds.
Reading over your comment again, I'm now pretty confident that you have misunderstood Goodman's position and argument. That's not meant as an insult -- this could well be my fault. I did find this particular video rather tricky to write, and maybe I just messed it up. But wherever the fault lies, I don't really have time to correct these mistakes. So, I'll just suggest that if you're interested in Goodman, you should check out his book "Ways of Worldmaking", particularly chapters 1, 6, and 7. Chapter 7 is where Goodman discusses the rest/motion example and the relativization strategy. I won't link it here, but it's easy enough to find a pdf of this book online.
SEP, of course, provides a useful, albeit brief overview: plato.stanford.edu/entries/goodman/#IrrWor
Declos's article "Goodman's Many Worlds" contains a fairly thorough discussion of Goodman's argument, and was useful to me in making this video: jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/3827
@@KaneB "Goodman is saying something along the lines of: 'okay, some people might suggest that (E1) and (E2) should be interpreted to mean (E1r) and (E2r), but here's why that doesn't work...'"
Does that mean that Goodman was pre-emptively knocking down a strawman of his own position that he anticipated other people constructing, or does it mean that (E1r) and (E2r) actually do fairly represent the meaning of (E1) and (E2) as Goodman intended them? If (E1) was never intended to mean (E1r), then that's the real issue and (E1) should probably have been modified so that it could not be so misunderstood, especially since Goodman anticipated the misunderstanding. On the other hand, if (E1) really is intended as an abbreviation for (E1r), then Goodman shouldn't claim that the objection does not work, and Goodman should have been using (E1r) and (E2r) from the beginning to avoid confusion.
"So, V1 says P and V2 says not-P."
If V1 says P and V2 says not-P and both V1 and V2 are true, then that would make P and not-P both true, which would require us to be dialetheists in order to accept (P1).
"Then Goodman then tries to avoid contradiction by saying that P is true in one world and false in another."
The contradiction is immediately entailed by (P1). If Goodman doesn't like contradictions, then (P1) was a poorly chosen premise.
"I don't really have time to write an essay attempting to correct these mistakes."
We all very much appreciate the work you do. Your channel has the best philosophy videos on TH-cam.
@@Ansatz66 "Does that mean that Goodman was pre-emptively knocking down a strawman of his own position that he anticipated other people constructing, or does it mean that (E1r) and (E2r) actually do fairly represent the meaning of (E1) and (E2) as Goodman intended them?"
Goodman suggests that (E1) and (E2) are true and conflicting. He then points out that a natural way to remove the conflict is to treat them as abbreviating the relativized claims in (E1r) and (E2r). And then he explains why he thinks that this interpretation doesn't work, and that the conflict stands.
"If V1 says P and V2 says not-P and both V1 and V2 are true, then that would make P and not-P both true, which would require us to be dialetheists in order to accept (P1).
...
The contradiction is immediately entailed by (P1). If Goodman doesn't like contradictions, then (P1) was a poorly chosen premise."
But Goodman takes these propositions to be true in different worlds. So, in Goodman's view: in world W1 (which corresponds to V1), P is true and not-P is false. In W2 (which corresponds to V2), P is false and not-P is true. There are no actual worlds in which a proposition and its negation are both true. Now, maybe you think that Goodman's solution here doesn't work, that even if we introduce a plurality of worlds, we are still committed to a contradiction. I'm sure an objection along these lines can be made, but it's not just *obvious* that the position entails contradiction.
"We all very much appreciate the work you do. Your channel has the best philosophy videos on TH-cam."
Thanks! I hope my comment didn't come across as rude or anything. It's just I am actually quite busy at the moment, and if I failed to communicate Goodman's arguments properly in the video... well, obviously it would be pretty time-consuming to attempt to do it over again!
I could go back and read Two Dogmas of Empiricism but it's easier to just ask if Goodman and Quine came to the same conclusion about reductionism for the same reason.
Quine was a physicalist. For Quine, there is only one true version: that of physics, and the failure of any theory to reduce to physics would only demonstrate that the theory is defective. When Quine talked about "reductionism" in Two Dogmas, it was a very specific kind of reductionism that he had in mind: the verificationist view that all meaningful statements can be translated into statements about immediate experience.
This just seems like a more complicated way to describe truth relativism
They should've thrown out the idea of universal truth (and the correspondence theory of truth to be specific) to get a more coherent perspective.
This argument is too simple so I don't trust it. Something is lost when we lose the original confusing language of the philosopher, not for obfuscatory purposes, but because the part of thinking differently in philosophy involves changing how we apprehend logic.