I found Chris' book "The ANZAC Experience" a most entertaining book... refreshingly straight forward yet insightful and pointed in it's "cutting through" the usual tropes about Dominion troops whilst emphasizing the real reasons for their failures, successes, and achievements. I especially enjoyed his thoughtful placement of the New Zealand troops within the greater Empire forces as distinct from their Australian neighbours. Anyway, great book.
I enjoyed your lecture very much. The subject of Haig has certainly been studied Ad Infinitum by this point in history. While most of the writing on his leadership is condemned in some form or another, you've observed it from the proper point of reflection upon his place in time as a coalition leader of the Commonwealth nations in arms under British command and his place alongside; yet subordinate to French leadership as to war aims.
I have ofter thought Haig was in a unique position on the Western front in that he was the only commander to command a coalition force with in a coalition army.
The painting shown does not show Ian Hamilton, excluded for the failure of Gallipoli, as well as Charles Monro, Godley commander of NZEF. Look at the positions of the South African commanders on the side lines as well. Also the Candian could as be called a British formation as the majority of troops were British born and only towards the end of the war was there 51% born in Canada.
Those five Australian divisions that a previous Murdoch demanded be made into an "Australian army" were about the total size of the four divisions of the Canadian Corps who hadn't allowed themselves to be diluted into a smaller number of battalions. The Canadians had fewer but more powerful and "punchier" formations.
As regard the general feeling’s in the BEF at that time ,it was not the blokes in the funny hats that won the war, but the ordinary English county regiments.Well known that GCHQ pampered colonial troops,just look at the time that Empire troops spent in front line trenches compared to British units.
I do get weary of this Australian and Canadian superiority attitude, as though they won the wars. I would remind them that they lost 40-60,000 each in WW1, the British lost 704,000 troops, many of whom were conscript. Though we know that Conscript divisions are less effective. That is not to demean the contribution of colonial troops I would stress. The British 46th Division broke the Hindenburg Line, an example of when the British got there first. Also I would remind people that the professional BEF lost many of its best troops earlier in the war. Thank you to Chris Roberts who acknowledges the British were at least patchy in performance, but had some equally good divisions. I would remind posters that 65% of Canadian troops at Vimy in 1917 were actually British-born lads. Also there were an additional 73,000 British troops at Vimy, along with 97,000 Canadian troops. Secondly, the key reasons for Canadian success was the tactical backing provided by Currie for his divisions, they were lavishly-supplied. For example, at Vimy, artillery was 3 times greater than afforded for British attacks, he also ensured immense preparation and training. Canadian divisions had one machine gun for every 13 men, it was just one machine gun for every 61 men in British divisions in 1917-18. Poor British soldiers in WW1 were only paid 1 shilling per week, whereas Canadians and Aussies received the equivalent of 5-6 shillings per week. The Colonial soldiers were jokingly referred to as the "five-bob fuckers" by British privates. Thirdly, Peter Simkins from IWM also looked at divisional performance in the Last Hundred Days of WW1, of the 56 British Divisions and the Colonial Divisions., examining success in offensive Ops when opposed. For example, the 'successful opposed-attack' record of the nine British divisions in Rawlinson’s Fourth Army during the Hundred Days was 70.7 per cent - exactly the same as in the five Australian Divisions, and only slightly lower than that of the four, much larger Canadian Divisions (72.5 per cent), and well above that of the New Zealand Division (64.5 per cent). Moreover two British divisions - the 19th Western Division and 66th Division (both comprising mainly soldiers from north-west and midlands of England) had success rates of 100 per cent, and the 9th Division (Scottish) had a success rate of 93 per cent, this last averaged out over fourteen separate attacks. The 24th Division (London and also East Anglia) racked up an 85 per cent success rate and the 16th Division (Irish) 80 per cent. The evidence hardly accords with the popular Dominion opinion that all the British divisions were useless. Simkins points out that six Dominion divisions (1st, 2nd and 5th Australian and 1st, 2nd and 3rd Canadian) achieved a success rate of between 70 and 80 per cent in 'opposed attacks', but so, quite apart, from the divisions mentioned above, did five more British Divisions - Guards Division (Coldstream, Grenadier, Irish, and Welsh Guards), 18th Eastern Division (London, Home Counties, East Anglia, and South Midlands), 24th Division (London area), 34th Division (Northumberland and Tyneside), and 38th (Welsh). From this it is possible to infer that ten British divisions did as well, or better, than the six crack Dominion divisions. Simkins gives many more examples and continues. ‘If one then considers the number of attacks carried out by British and Dominion divisions and also the “battle days” on which each division saw meaningful action, the British units again stand up well in comparison with the Dominion divisions’. Simkins research is not scientific and it will always be subjective, but it is suggestive that the picture about the best divisions is possibly more muddied than often thought.
Old wolf. A magnificent missive and puts to bed the endless whinging and disinformation by the Australian contingent in that war. Thank you. If I might add a criticism, the British conscripts were just a affective as were the regulars as it was shown in WW2 and the war in Korea.
Well they didn't, did they? Sort of explains why we won. After all, it wasn't the BEF that went to see the Germans in November, 1918, carrying a white flag
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I found Chris' book "The ANZAC Experience" a most entertaining book... refreshingly straight forward yet insightful and pointed in it's "cutting through" the usual tropes about Dominion troops whilst emphasizing the real reasons for their failures, successes, and achievements. I especially enjoyed his thoughtful placement of the New Zealand troops within the greater Empire forces as distinct from their Australian neighbours. Anyway, great book.
I enjoyed your lecture very much. The subject of Haig has certainly been studied Ad Infinitum by this point in history. While most of the writing on his leadership is condemned in some form or another, you've observed it from the proper point of reflection upon his place in time as a coalition leader of the Commonwealth nations in arms under British command and his place alongside; yet subordinate to French leadership as to war aims.
Great talk. Thanks.
I have ofter thought Haig was in a unique position on the Western front in that he was the only commander to command a coalition force with in a coalition army.
Hello from America 🇺🇸
Hello Jacko!
The painting shown does not show Ian Hamilton, excluded for the failure of Gallipoli, as well as Charles Monro, Godley commander of NZEF. Look at the positions of the South African commanders on the side lines as well. Also the Candian could as be called a British formation as the majority of troops were British born and only towards the end of the war was there 51% born in Canada.
When they put on the maple leaf they were Canadians of proud British birth.
Those five Australian divisions that a previous Murdoch demanded be made into an "Australian army" were about the total size of the four divisions of the Canadian Corps who hadn't allowed themselves to be diluted into a smaller number of battalions. The Canadians had fewer but more powerful and "punchier" formations.
2nd Ypres involved 1st Canadian division only.
As regard the general feeling’s in the BEF at that time ,it was not the blokes in the funny hats that won the war, but the ordinary English county regiments.Well known that GCHQ pampered colonial troops,just look at the time that Empire troops spent in front line trenches compared to British units.
I do get weary of this Australian and Canadian superiority attitude, as though they won the wars. I would remind them that they lost 40-60,000 each in WW1, the British lost 704,000 troops, many of whom were conscript. Though we know that Conscript divisions are less effective. That is not to demean the contribution of colonial troops I would stress. The British 46th Division broke the Hindenburg Line, an example of when the British got there first. Also I would remind people that the professional BEF lost many of its best troops earlier in the war. Thank you to Chris Roberts who acknowledges the British were at least patchy in performance, but had some equally good divisions.
I would remind posters that 65% of Canadian troops at Vimy in 1917 were actually British-born lads. Also there were an additional 73,000 British troops at Vimy, along with 97,000 Canadian troops.
Secondly, the key reasons for Canadian success was the tactical backing provided by Currie for his divisions, they were lavishly-supplied. For example, at Vimy, artillery was 3 times greater than afforded for British attacks, he also ensured immense preparation and training. Canadian divisions had one machine gun for every 13 men, it was just one machine gun for every 61 men in British divisions in 1917-18. Poor British soldiers in WW1 were only paid 1 shilling per week, whereas Canadians and Aussies received the equivalent of 5-6 shillings per week. The Colonial soldiers were jokingly referred to as the "five-bob fuckers" by British privates.
Thirdly, Peter Simkins from IWM also looked at divisional performance in the Last Hundred Days of WW1, of the 56 British Divisions and the Colonial Divisions., examining success in offensive Ops when opposed. For example, the 'successful opposed-attack' record of the nine British divisions in Rawlinson’s Fourth Army during the Hundred Days was 70.7 per cent - exactly the same as in the five Australian Divisions, and only slightly lower than that of the four, much larger Canadian Divisions (72.5 per cent), and well above that of the New Zealand Division (64.5 per cent). Moreover two British divisions - the 19th Western Division and 66th Division (both comprising mainly soldiers from north-west and midlands of England) had success rates of 100 per cent, and the 9th Division (Scottish) had a success rate of 93 per cent, this last averaged out over fourteen separate attacks. The 24th Division (London and also East Anglia) racked up an 85 per cent success rate and the 16th Division (Irish) 80 per cent. The evidence hardly accords with the popular Dominion opinion that all the British divisions were useless. Simkins points out that six Dominion divisions (1st, 2nd and 5th Australian and 1st, 2nd and 3rd Canadian) achieved a success rate of between 70 and 80 per cent in 'opposed attacks', but so, quite apart, from the divisions mentioned above, did five more British Divisions - Guards Division (Coldstream, Grenadier, Irish, and Welsh Guards), 18th Eastern Division (London, Home Counties, East Anglia, and South Midlands), 24th Division (London area), 34th Division (Northumberland and Tyneside), and 38th (Welsh). From this it is possible to infer that ten British divisions did as well, or better, than the six crack Dominion divisions. Simkins gives many more examples and continues. ‘If one then considers the number of attacks carried out by British and Dominion divisions and also the “battle days” on which each division saw meaningful action, the British units again stand up well in comparison with the Dominion divisions’.
Simkins research is not scientific and it will always be subjective, but it is suggestive that the picture about the best divisions is possibly more muddied than often thought.
Old wolf. A magnificent missive and puts to bed the endless whinging and disinformation by the Australian contingent in that war. Thank you. If I might add a criticism, the British conscripts were just a affective as were the regulars as it was shown in WW2 and the war in Korea.
Insanity is doing the same thing again and again and expecting a different outcome every time.
Well they didn't, did they? Sort of explains why we won. After all, it wasn't the BEF that went to see the Germans in November, 1918, carrying a white flag
Good thing they didn't do the same thing again and again!