To comment on the beginning, a vlog doesnt necessarily imply a singular person. For example "The traveling band's vlog" seems a reasonable use of the word, and functionally "andrews vlog" could include multiple people as andrew may be vlogging about his experiences with a team or group. Solo lets us know its just you showing up !
17:11 When Hobbes holds up custom (as showing respect) while practicing epistemic humility aka curiosity (a form of showing respect that at times may not be perceived as such) one must ask what he's actually pointing to. Was he also thinking about systems that could continue to improve themselves indefinitely?
Now why would Leo Strauss come to believe from this that religion could be used to maintain social order and how does that look like, how open ended is how that looks like?
This idea that people would mimic virtues that others intentionally model is pretty funny at this point, yeah. Show me people enjoying themselves in their unscripted interactions and I'll grant that there is virtue there somehow. Or tell me a good story that involves such. That's the minimum not necessarily sufficient.
Fascinating stuff besides the crude attempt to draft the law for some perfect state or whatever and justify it with a flourish or another (as if Hobbes knew what criticism God would seek or not seek; though maybe that's a nod to the aristocrats of the time?) and some preconceived notions. The dual character of power is quite relevant if we look at some of our institutions today that are supposed to e.g. inform us of reality but drift towards more looking out for their own reproduction or the reproduction of covert systems that may or may not be timely.
I want to defend liberal atomism to an extent, and thus defend Hobbes on this aspect. I think that Hobbes's notion that we started without sociality can actually be partially defended considering that we did not really "start" as humans, but rather we started as single celled organisms, which in turn needed to develop sociality. Either we have to consider instincts as having in and of themselves social content or we have to consider these instincts as inevitably leading to social content: the difference being humans having the instinctive capability to walk upright, but nonetheless need to learn how to walk upright: In the same way one could consider having instinctual capabilities that inevitably lead to social behavior, but the individual still is born without any social concepts as such, and is thus still born atomic. If on the other hand, instincts do have social content then while atomism cannot be justified as applying to the present directly, it still should be the bedrock of analysis historically through the evolution of life (and thus the progression of these instincts). Still, none of this justifies his emphasis of the negative advantages of sociality (preventing conflict) over the positive advantages of cooperation.
Noam Chomsky figured out.s Our language and, consequently, society are inherently structured; furthermore, I am uncertain that Hobbes would have contemplated contemporary evolutionary theories.
@@TheYoungtrust I know about the structure of language in the mind, but I don't get how that contradicts what I said. Presumably that would still fall under one the two possibilities I listed? I'm also not concerned with whether or how Hobbes himself would have contemplated contemporary evolutionary theories, I'm trying to argue that one aspect of his analysis (methodological atomism) is still possible with it.
@@lightningpuppies Tell me if I've got this wrong, but does the fact that humans have a similar structure not imply that it cannot be divided into smaller parts?
@@TheYoungtrust If I'm getting you right, maybe kinda? I think technically speaking just about anything can be divided into smaller parts, no matter how interconnected, but if you're concerned with the larger whole you, if you want to be 100% accurate, have to consider ALL interactions and potentials between these objects. Most of the time 'reductionists' don't fully do this, but consider the constitutive parts with some of their interrelations "simplified". This almost always is less accurate, as Varn likes to point out, it leads to part to whole fallacies. But less accurate does not necessarily mean useless. Whatever his intent, Hobbes effectively does such a simplification by imagining a time prior to sociality, and thus considering a time where people have way less interrelations, he then seeks to explain the creation of sociality in people from this time without it. The question is how useful is this simplified picture likely to be? I guess the position that you can understand a good deal of sociality from assuming individuals with no inherent sociality is what we call atomic since it suggests social facts can be explained by considering individuals (atoms) abstracted from their sociality (in order to explain this very sociality in aggregate). One issue is over whether or not the structure has content of its own which is strictly 'innate' or if it rather has content which is inevitable. If there is no innate social content then each baby/child has to go from a totally non-social consciousness to a social consciousness and this suggests that an explanation of sociality starting from positing asocial peoples will be less inaccurate than it otherwise would be. To use an analogy: in this case babies learning sociality would be like particles (babies) in a solution accumulating on an already partially formed crystal (society). In the analogy, Hobbes would propose we could understand the formation of a crystal by considering all of the particles in a solution, and then makes a theory for how, without any prior partially formed crystal, the crystal would nonetheless form. This might lead to inaccuracies, since a crystal might not form at all without prior nucleation sites (i.e. sociality might not always form without prior sociality, when it would if there were prior sociality), but nonetheless such an "atomic" outlook might get approximately correct conclusions. If, on the other hand, there is innate social content, then we would not expect such an analysis of humans to do anywhere near as well. It would be like if we once again tried to consider particles in a solution to explain a solid that was not made by crystal formation at all, but was formed by one priorly connected material being cooked into the material in question. Here is when the evolutionary story comes in. Here we ask about that "priorly connected material" and go up the chain of causation until it is not connected anymore, and then the 'atomic' (that is, less connected) assumptions once again seem more applicable. To drop the metaphor there must have been some point where asocial creatures became social, even if humans are born social. Atomism would then be applicable. This seems a bit silly, and clearly suggests less applicability of the atomic approach when it comes to humans, but, to the extent that these forms of sociality have not substantially changed, it would still offer some applicability. Aside from purely "disinterested" theoretical concerns, I think I'm attracted to Hobbesian-ish atomism since it seems more freedom oriented (ironically enough). For it states that sociality is made by the whims of the people, and thus is to some extent controllable by it. The creation of society itself is cast in Hobbes as a revolutionary act, no matter how much he disdains later revolutions. Varn's appeal to biological sociality in contrast posits a sociality which has certain aspects not at the whims of the people, and thus not free for them to change. This might be correct, but I tend to believe, when it is at all plausible, that some freedom is possible (which is not to say that that freedom would necessarily be likely). I think there is a teleological bias in discourse for touting the impossibility of some freedom or another, so I generally err on the side of more freedoms being possible.
Really been enjoying these. Our boy in top form.
It was an amazing reading.
Only Derick could render Hobbs intriguing to me.
To comment on the beginning, a vlog doesnt necessarily imply a singular person. For example "The traveling band's vlog" seems a reasonable use of the word, and functionally "andrews vlog" could include multiple people as andrew may be vlogging about his experiences with a team or group. Solo lets us know its just you showing up !
17:11 When Hobbes holds up custom (as showing respect) while practicing epistemic humility aka curiosity (a form of showing respect that at times may not be perceived as such) one must ask what he's actually pointing to. Was he also thinking about systems that could continue to improve themselves indefinitely?
Now why would Leo Strauss come to believe from this that religion could be used to maintain social order and how does that look like, how open ended is how that looks like?
This idea that people would mimic virtues that others intentionally model is pretty funny at this point, yeah. Show me people enjoying themselves in their unscripted interactions and I'll grant that there is virtue there somehow. Or tell me a good story that involves such. That's the minimum not necessarily sufficient.
Fascinating stuff besides the crude attempt to draft the law for some perfect state or whatever and justify it with a flourish or another (as if Hobbes knew what criticism God would seek or not seek; though maybe that's a nod to the aristocrats of the time?) and some preconceived notions. The dual character of power is quite relevant if we look at some of our institutions today that are supposed to e.g. inform us of reality but drift towards more looking out for their own reproduction or the reproduction of covert systems that may or may not be timely.
@@curiousfella4076 I need to cover Strauss after Dugin for this reason
Love me some smart enemies. Hobbes is one of the smartest.
See Pyrrho, Anaximander. Pyrrho also may have spoken with Jains see Non-Absolutism & Non-Possession aspects of Ahimsa
@@Experimental-Unit that is definitely possible
I want to defend liberal atomism to an extent, and thus defend Hobbes on this aspect.
I think that Hobbes's notion that we started without sociality can actually be partially defended considering that we did not really "start" as humans, but rather we started as single celled organisms, which in turn needed to develop sociality.
Either we have to consider instincts as having in and of themselves social content or we have to consider these instincts as inevitably leading to social content: the difference being humans having the instinctive capability to walk upright, but nonetheless need to learn how to walk upright: In the same way one could consider having instinctual capabilities that inevitably lead to social behavior, but the individual still is born without any social concepts as such, and is thus still born atomic. If on the other hand, instincts do have social content then while atomism cannot be justified as applying to the present directly, it still should be the bedrock of analysis historically through the evolution of life (and thus the progression of these instincts).
Still, none of this justifies his emphasis of the negative advantages of sociality (preventing conflict) over the positive advantages of cooperation.
Noam Chomsky figured out.s Our language and, consequently, society are inherently structured; furthermore, I am uncertain that Hobbes would have contemplated contemporary evolutionary theories.
@@TheYoungtrust I know about the structure of language in the mind, but I don't get how that contradicts what I said. Presumably that would still fall under one the two possibilities I listed?
I'm also not concerned with whether or how Hobbes himself would have contemplated contemporary evolutionary theories, I'm trying to argue that one aspect of his analysis (methodological atomism) is still possible with it.
@@lightningpuppies Tell me if I've got this wrong, but does the fact that humans have a similar structure not imply that it cannot be divided into smaller parts?
@@TheYoungtrust If I'm getting you right, maybe kinda?
I think technically speaking just about anything can be divided into smaller parts, no matter how interconnected, but if you're concerned with the larger whole you, if you want to be 100% accurate, have to consider ALL interactions and potentials between these objects. Most of the time 'reductionists' don't fully do this, but consider the constitutive parts with some of their interrelations "simplified". This almost always is less accurate, as Varn likes to point out, it leads to part to whole fallacies. But less accurate does not necessarily mean useless.
Whatever his intent, Hobbes effectively does such a simplification by imagining a time prior to sociality, and thus considering a time where people have way less interrelations, he then seeks to explain the creation of sociality in people from this time without it. The question is how useful is this simplified picture likely to be? I guess the position that you can understand a good deal of sociality from assuming individuals with no inherent sociality is what we call atomic since it suggests social facts can be explained by considering individuals (atoms) abstracted from their sociality (in order to explain this very sociality in aggregate).
One issue is over whether or not the structure has content of its own which is strictly 'innate' or if it rather has content which is inevitable.
If there is no innate social content then each baby/child has to go from a totally non-social consciousness to a social consciousness and this suggests that an explanation of sociality starting from positing asocial peoples will be less inaccurate than it otherwise would be.
To use an analogy: in this case babies learning sociality would be like particles (babies) in a solution accumulating on an already partially formed crystal (society). In the analogy, Hobbes would propose we could understand the formation of a crystal by considering all of the particles in a solution, and then makes a theory for how, without any prior partially formed crystal, the crystal would nonetheless form. This might lead to inaccuracies, since a crystal might not form at all without prior nucleation sites (i.e. sociality might not always form without prior sociality, when it would if there were prior sociality), but nonetheless such an "atomic" outlook might get approximately correct conclusions.
If, on the other hand, there is innate social content, then we would not expect such an analysis of humans to do anywhere near as well. It would be like if we once again tried to consider particles in a solution to explain a solid that was not made by crystal formation at all, but was formed by one priorly connected material being cooked into the material in question.
Here is when the evolutionary story comes in. Here we ask about that "priorly connected material" and go up the chain of causation until it is not connected anymore, and then the 'atomic' (that is, less connected) assumptions once again seem more applicable. To drop the metaphor there must have been some point where asocial creatures became social, even if humans are born social. Atomism would then be applicable. This seems a bit silly, and clearly suggests less applicability of the atomic approach when it comes to humans, but, to the extent that these forms of sociality have not substantially changed, it would still offer some applicability.
Aside from purely "disinterested" theoretical concerns, I think I'm attracted to Hobbesian-ish atomism since it seems more freedom oriented (ironically enough). For it states that sociality is made by the whims of the people, and thus is to some extent controllable by it. The creation of society itself is cast in Hobbes as a revolutionary act, no matter how much he disdains later revolutions. Varn's appeal to biological sociality in contrast posits a sociality which has certain aspects not at the whims of the people, and thus not free for them to change. This might be correct, but I tend to believe, when it is at all plausible, that some freedom is possible (which is not to say that that freedom would necessarily be likely). I think there is a teleological bias in discourse for touting the impossibility of some freedom or another, so I generally err on the side of more freedoms being possible.
Atom ant
Kings of the Wild Frontier🥁