I’d absolutely love an analysis on the energy-essence distinction in Eastern Orthodox theology. There’s yet to be a video on it philosophically and it would really boost your channel!
The argument coming from Aristotle/Aquinas is that everything is being. But if everything is being, and if being is univocal, then everything is the same and you cannot differentiate things. Whatever difference-maker you come up with, it will also be some being, and therefore it will not be useful to differentiate beings. What difference between two beings could there be that is not itself being? That's why Parmenides thought that only one thing existed. And that's the problem that pluralism (also called analogy) is supposed to solve. Duns Scot, in order to maintain the univocity of being, is constrained to say that some things (like the transcendentals) are not really beings after all, which allows him to give them the role of difference-makers between beings. But by doing that he inadvertently admits a form of pluralism: transcendentals are beings only "virtually", while most other things are beings "essentially" or "in quid" (see Jean Duns Scot: Introduction a Ses Positions Fondamentales p. 95 ) However, I think that thomistic analogy is not a real pluralism, but actually a disguised univocity. Indeed, when studying thomistic treaties on this subject, one finds that being is supposed to be in fact a disjunction of all possible beings. So for example, when I say that a lion is a being, what I'm saying is that a lion is either a, or b, or c, etc (where all those options are all the possible beings, including the lion). That's why you find Thomists sometimes say that the concept of "being" contains all beings. Because the concept of being is actually the disjunction of all possible concepts. Therefore, the concept of being is actually univocal, but its univocity is not very useful since it consists in an infinite disjunction, which means that for us it seems as a pluralism.
This is interesting because in classical logic the existential quantifier in "Exists x, P(x)" can be interpreted as the (potentially infinite) disjunction of all propositions of the form "P(c)" where c is some constant ranging over all individuals in the domain of discourse.
Thank you for this, it's very interesting. I think that you are right that St. Thomas' view is not a form of pluralism, and this definitely welcome news.
One reason to think that pluralism is true is that propositions of the form "x exists" would become meaningless by themselves in many circumstances unless they are supplemented by an appropriate adverbial expression. To say that "unicorns exist" is probably false if interpreted in the sense of "unicorns actually exist" but probably true if interpreted in the sense of "unicorns possibly exist". It is often assumed from context that whenever we speak of existence we are talking about actual existence, but the fact that this is omitted in discourse for practical convenience is still compatible with the idea that without assuming that this adverb is part of the meaning of the phrase, the verb "exists" would entirely lose its meaning, or at the very least be highly ambiguous. Now, the primary linguistic function of an adverb is to specify the mode, or manner (or "way"), in which the action expressed by the verb takes place, hence why it is said that there are multiple modes or ways of being (and also why "modal logic" is so called). There are many similar examples of this. For instance, what is the fundamental difference between a substance and an accident? It can be given in terms of an adverb appended to an existential claim. We say that some x is a substance if and only if "x exists *in itself*" is true, and say that it is an accident if and only if "x exists *in another*" is true. In fact, the monist position constantly needs to refer to "generic" existence to disambiguate the claim from other potential types of existence. That too is an adverb which betrays a way or mode in which the subject is said to exist. To give another example, it seems to me that a claim like "numbers exist" is so fundamentally ambiguous as to be unintelligible. I always have to ask for clarification about what that is supposed to mean in terms of a suitable adverb. Is the defender of the reality of numbers claiming that they exist "in my mind" or "in themselves" (as platonic objects) or "in physical things" or "in the mind of God"? These are completely different metaphysical positions. In particular the positions differ about whether the "numbers" in question are supposed to exist "as substances" or "as accidents", which are also nice adverbial expressions we can use. Perhaps the most general way of interpreting it is as a disjunction of the 4 aforementioned positions. In fact, one way to phrase the pluralist point of view would be to say that when we talk about existence in general we are only making a disjunction about different modes of existence (someone has commented this in this video before), so that the general existential claim is not really an existential claim but a distinctive claim, and in fact that general existence can be *defined* in terms of this disjunction. In this sense I would also deny the claim made in the beggining of the video to the extent that general existence is undefinable. Of course, in normal discourse we often omit many adverbs because they are inferred from context, so that when we say "Socrates exists" it is clear that we are referring to the existence of a substance so that the expression "in himself" is pressuposed. It could also be that we were referring to disjunctive geneeal existence in this case as well, but in either case it is clear which disjunct is supposed to be true and which are supposed to be, categorically, false. This is why such a claim is not ambiguous while "numbers exist" appears to be so. It also appears to me that when we say an accident exists "in another" we are saying it exists in a lesser and more improper sense than when we say a substance exists "in itself". This is not a distinction that is based on the fact that substances and accidents have different properties, but rather they have the properties of being substances and accidents precisely because one exists in a lesser mode of existence than the other. And this is an additional reason for pluralism: it appears intuitive. A third reason comes from Divine simplicity. If simplicity is true, God is the platonic form of Being. Since a platonic form always has the property in question in a more proper sense than anything else, it follows that whatever concept has a platonic form has multiple senses, hence also being would have multiple senses.
Thanks for your answer. May I just ask you: what do you think about non-analytical contologies? I mean, do you think that there is room for somekind of phenomemological ontology? I do think that there is, and I've trying to defend ontological pluralism from a phenomenological-hermeneutic point of view (which I took from Being and Time), but the debate is almost exclusively in analytical (first order logic quantificational) terms.
Another magnificent discussion on a subject that's been a recent interest of mine. Thank you for this, Dr. Merricks and Joe! There are a lot of really great resources packed in here that I'll have to mull over for a bit.
Putting aside if pluralism is correct or incorrect, one important point that it brings out is that it invites us to rethink a lot of meta-ontological basic questions. One of these is about the basis to justify our ontological claims, which criteria we employ to defend that something exists, and this leads us to questions about the meaning of existence in general (or even in direction to the meaning of being). One specific point that I think is important is about the ontological commitments: are they uniform for all sciences? If different sciences do not share the same criteria, what does this mean ontologically? There is one fundamental science? Which one? If we take physics as the standard science and take from it the criteria for our ontological commitments then maybe we will have problems including some kind of entities, such as biological ones. I mean, if "to exist" is in some way extracted or read off from what is admitted in some science, then we should look if all sciences share the same ontological commitments. Taking the works of John Dupré and Luciano Floridi we are presented with very different ontologies because they are oriented to different sciences: biology and e-sciences. The entities that they admit are not correctly treated as traditional substances or even material beings, but they have their own identity criteria and existential conditions. Even if it does not justify pluralism it puts some water in monistic's wine. Thanks for this video and I'm sorry for my terrible English (and eventually for my philosophical misplacing).
One possible solution for a pluralist could be to make a distinction between existence considered as a fact and existence considered as a principle which explains why something is not nothing. The former I believe would be similar to the quantificational account of existence, where the existence of something is just the fact that it is not nothing. It seems to me that a pluralist could accept generic existence when existence is being considered as a fact, for to say X exists or Y exists would be just to say that X and Y are not nothing. For example, consider the existence of God and the existence of creatures. On a classical theistic model, it seems to we that we could say God and creatures exist, as they are both not nothing. But, the act of existence that God has is not the same act of existence that creatures have. So, the generic existence that both God and creatures enjoy is the fact that they are not nothing, but it is still maintained that there are different ways or modes of being i.e. God's infinite act of existence which He is identical to, and creature's finite acts of existence which they participate in. Given the above, I think Dr. Merricks' point that the main motivations for pluralism removes generic existence seems to not be a problem. For when classical theists argue that there are different ways of being e.g. God's existence and creature's existence, they are referring to the real principle of existence which they both have in different ways, not merely the fact that they exist. In other words, when we are considering the real principle of existence that God has and the real principle of existence that creatures have, there is no generic existence which both God and creatures enjoy. But, when we are considering the fact that they exist, then there is a generic existence that they both enjoy.
I like your point about colours, I've been wondering about the relationship between red and the individual shades of red (specifically in relation to the view of some progressives that sex is a spectrum)
Any Wittgenstein proponents out there? I mean what would he say about "existence" being used the same way when philosophers talk about dogs existing and 2 existing? I'm asking cause I like his "vibe", though he's another philosopher I only barely understand.
It just seems insane that his worldview is that these transcendentals like universals, numbers, logic, etc just equally exist independent as matter and energy as brute facts being equally ultimate. One u it sent emergent from the other or grounded in anything with explanatory power they just are, and what is the unifier between mind and matter.
Not watched the video yet Joe (I really hope I haven’t just got your name wrong!) but just wanted to thank you for your videos, writings and your academic work. I just received your book which I’m going to read once I’ve finished my current one. I had a flip through and it looks brilliant! So... thank you! Also, I was wondering about your Arsenal plaque in the background? I’m from the U.K so it always interests me to see something from my little island out there in America. Hope everything’s good where you are. Peace.
@@MajestyofReason Hi Can you kindly also Do interview/Discussion on Non western philosophy and philosophers like hindus,Chinese, Islamic etc etc on many different topic in the future it will be interesting Thanks for your great works
What’s the problem with saying that people exist but that “peopleness” uncoupled from objects doesn’t? It’s like saying red balls exist but that redness uncoupled from any object doesn’t. (Properties are not existent but are merely true of objects). Would that result in any ugly philosophical commitments?
47:57 saying something requires a 'truly universal quantifier' is self-negating. 'quantifiers' 'exist' as concepts, they have no causal powers to make other types of 'quantifiers' existence real or not as they themselves are a quantified type... It may be useful to think of this in terms of weak and strong emergence....strong emergence suffers from the problem of overdetermination...whereas weak emergence has causal power that collectively appears as higher function which is functionally equivalent to strong emergence which is only a concept with no causal power. ...in this same way a 'universal quantifier' is simply a concept of a collection of all 'quantifiers' that do have some form of existence. However, if 'universal quantifier' existed as more than a concept(i.e. as an existence with causal powers) then we would again sit with an overdetermination problem - what happens when a feature of existence 'a' conflicts with a feature of universal existence - this is another ontological pluralism problem. As a mereological nihilist, I say the only things that truly exist are the processes of the mereological simple (which currently appears to be energy or the universal wavefunction). Everything else is an error in perception, conception or language. i.e. things do not exist in the way we think they do. But I am happy to use poetic naturalistic language to communicate the effects of the processes- like saying they 'exist' in some other way without conceding that there is more than one type of ontological existence. I can say objects are processes, concepts are processes....there is just a field of energy. in other words, mereological nihilism solves ontological pluralism problems by stating there is only one way of existence...but it is not the way most people think of existence.
Could someone please help out a novice here? What's the background to this? There is obviously a long running debate going on over this topic (lots of names were dropped (so-and-so's position) without elaboration). What's wrong with the position that there are concrete things and abstract things (or physical and logical/virtual; or tangible and intangible)... the latter in each pair existing as tools for human language/communication? Is it that some are arguing that _only_ those 2 types of being exist? Or that the two are one? Cheers.
I really hope you stick with the channel. It's got some seriously deep content (like this discussion) which fit nicely in the knowledge gaps left by all the physics channels I watch.
38:00 basically, negative predications of God are univocally predicated of Him, insofar as when God is predicated as "non-composite," the word "composite" means the same as the word "composite" when it is said that humans are composite, and positive predications of God are always going to be analogical, like wise, powerful, good, etc.
Does this include ideas of being "beyond existence" like when Proclus claims the Henads are prior to being, is he making a pluralist argument? or is that different because it's transcending being?
Interesting, lol. Just a few days ago I read about Van Inwagen’s issue with ontological pluralism. This might be a dumb question, but would act and potency count as 2 modes of being?
Great question! It actually depends whether they’re modes of being. As Feser uses them, they *are* different ways or modes of being. But one might conceive them differently🙂
As there's no cheap education in the offing (so far) from youtube commenters, here's my attempt to "vibe" Wittgenstein a bit (i.e., don't take this to be an application of his rigorous thought, which I've only casually exposed myself to, and find interesting and refreshing, at least at times, because it seems non-rigorous to me, at least at times). If ones only evidence that really different extants (e.g. 2 and dog) have a univocal existence is the observation that logic works for both, one might just as well say, both 'exist' -- in a common way -- only by virtue of that particular context (i.e., the context of logical notation and mechanisms being applied to it). Call this view "minimal monism". Minimal monism can be combined with "pseudo-pluralism". I have to say "pseudo", because the paper/video holds monism/pluralism to be mutually exclusive, which is the only way I can understand subscripts becoming obligatory on quantifiers, whenever pluralism is discussed with respect to quantifiers (e.g., at 24:00/onward in the video). Pseudo-pluralism/minimal monism can do any kind of quantification pure monism can. Furthermore, minimal monism lacks philosophical depth (i.e., how all extants exist "generically" has been answered somewhat trivially); whereas the pluralism-like part still has depth (i.e., how dogs differ from 2, or how 2 from entropy, or how truth differs from beauty... are still questions).
I’m Sure there are counter arguments: but don’t see how under his definition of existence you can claim unicorns don’t exist. Wouldn’t unicorns, as an epistemic thought qualify as existing? The existence net he casts is so wide there seems to be nothing I can think of that wouldn’t qualify. Unless he’s saying that bc we have the ultimate category, we can now be confident in our subcategories, I.e unicorns don’t physically. I think we could keep that confidence with the opposing view even if the total number of types or gradations in being is not known.
Interesting video and topic. I'm a pluralist and as for the second horn of Merricks' dilemma for pluralism* ["... So, the pluralist* must specify the truth conditions for the claim that _everything either 1-exists or 2-exists_ that relies only on fundamental notions, meaning they cannot avail themselves of the generic universal quantifier. And yet this is precisely what they cannot do, per the second horn of Merricks's dilemma."] I'm not that convinced of. Hm, I would say, that pluralism* is the notion of "nothing existing in one generic way" with nothing here meaning the empty set ∅={}. The quantifiers might be defined this way: Q1) ∀xFx iff ~∃~xFx - Everything is red iff "nothig" is non-red. Q2) ∃xFx iff ~∀~xFx - Something is red iff not everything is non-red. But we might also discribe the same propositions this way with sets: Let Ω be the set of all objects and non-empty and F the set of objects with a specific property (here the set of all red objects) and ~F:=F'=Ω\F the set of objects without a specific property (here the set of all non-red objects): S1) Ω=F [∀x∈Ω: x∈F (Ω⊆F) and ∀x∈F: x∈Ω (F⊆Ω)] iff ∅=~F - Everything Ω is red iff nothing ∅ is non-red. S2) F≠∅ [∃x∈Ω: x∈F] iff ~(Ω=~F) [∃x∈Ω: x∉~F (Ω⊈~F) or ∃x∈~F: x∉Ω (~F⊈Ω)] - Something is red iff not everything is non-red. So pluralism* is simply the notion of the set of objects existing in one generic way is the empty set ∅ or "nothing". In this sense the set of all objects Ω is really a set of all objects existing in a non-generic way. I guess, what that non-generic existence is supposed to be then dependent on the subject matter and topic. I also guess then, that I'm in the boot of aristotelian philosophers categorizing and building sets. Besides that I wouldn't say, that any fiction is true or existing since not any fiction is necessarily a fact, which is true and exists in some sense (mostly backed up by empirical evidence). But regardless of that fiction might be true and existente in some other sense. The fictional figure "Harry Potter" might have never actually existed, but regardless of that certainly "Harry Potter visited Hogwarts - School of Witchcraft and Wizardry".
Very, very bad. Elephant Philosophy and I made an episode criticizing it. unfortunately, though, that video as deleted upon the deletion of EP's channel
@@MajestyofReason Oh, the deletion of his channel was real loss, I hope he come back soon and that he's having a good time Anyway what would be your thoughts just on that? I think that his arguments are an absolute misunderstanding of what we mean by nothing, and that his arguments are just a wordplay because I can argue for example that nothing also imply strange metaphysical principles about things popping into existence lacking some impediment But I wanted to know the opinion of someone that actually knows philosopy (Sorry for my grammar)
@@leovere you’re absolutely right. He misunderstands “nothing” in that article. That was our principle criticism. When theists say the universe came into existence from nothing, they don’t mean absolute nothingness; it came into existence due to God’s causal activity. It was out of ‘nothing’ in the sense that there were no pre-existent materials out of which or from which God created the universe. Carrier completely misunderstood this point
@@MajestyofReason Yeah I think that he confuses many things, and not just in philosophy Anyway, thank you, there's no doubt that you are one of the best channels on philosophy of religion on TH-cam
The only thing that can be proven to exist your own mind, of course this proof is only valid for yourself. The reality that you experience can be an infinite number of things. You can be, for example, a god that was bored and wanted to feel what is it like to be a mortal, so you created an universe, created a bunch of NPCs, then erased your own memories and now live as a mortal. Or your mind can be inside a simulation.
I don’t think that’s right. Knowledge, for instance, is extremely hard to define, as we’ve learned since Gettier. In fact, nearly everything (except for stipulated terms) is hard to define. For instance, “chair” is extremely hard to define. But none of this prevents us from making useful contributions to debates about knowledge, chairs, etc.
@@MajestyofReason Knowledge per se is the reception and conformation of a form to an intellect ;) The reason chair is difficult is because a chair is an artifact, so the function of what a chair is is something extrinsically imposed from an agent, which is why anything can really be a chair.
![[TH] 2024 PMSL SEA W2D3 | Fall | ถ้าเล่นไม่ดี ไปแก้ตัววันเสาร์](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/CTmci32hvP8/mqdefault.jpg)
I’d absolutely love an analysis on the energy-essence distinction in Eastern Orthodox theology. There’s yet to be a video on it philosophically and it would really boost your channel!
The argument coming from Aristotle/Aquinas is that everything is being. But if everything is being, and if being is univocal, then everything is the same and you cannot differentiate things. Whatever difference-maker you come up with, it will also be some being, and therefore it will not be useful to differentiate beings. What difference between two beings could there be that is not itself being? That's why Parmenides thought that only one thing existed. And that's the problem that pluralism (also called analogy) is supposed to solve.
Duns Scot, in order to maintain the univocity of being, is constrained to say that some things (like the transcendentals) are not really beings after all, which allows him to give them the role of difference-makers between beings. But by doing that he inadvertently admits a form of pluralism: transcendentals are beings only "virtually", while most other things are beings "essentially" or "in quid" (see Jean Duns Scot: Introduction a Ses Positions Fondamentales p. 95 )
However, I think that thomistic analogy is not a real pluralism, but actually a disguised univocity. Indeed, when studying thomistic treaties on this subject, one finds that being is supposed to be in fact a disjunction of all possible beings. So for example, when I say that a lion is a being, what I'm saying is that a lion is either a, or b, or c, etc (where all those options are all the possible beings, including the lion). That's why you find Thomists sometimes say that the concept of "being" contains all beings. Because the concept of being is actually the disjunction of all possible concepts. Therefore, the concept of being is actually univocal, but its univocity is not very useful since it consists in an infinite disjunction, which means that for us it seems as a pluralism.
This is interesting because in classical logic the existential quantifier in "Exists x, P(x)" can be interpreted as the (potentially infinite) disjunction of all propositions of the form "P(c)" where c is some constant ranging over all individuals in the domain of discourse.
Thank you for this, it's very interesting. I think that you are right that St. Thomas' view is not a form of pluralism, and this definitely welcome news.
One reason to think that pluralism is true is that propositions of the form "x exists" would become meaningless by themselves in many circumstances unless they are supplemented by an appropriate adverbial expression. To say that "unicorns exist" is probably false if interpreted in the sense of "unicorns actually exist" but probably true if interpreted in the sense of "unicorns possibly exist". It is often assumed from context that whenever we speak of existence we are talking about actual existence, but the fact that this is omitted in discourse for practical convenience is still compatible with the idea that without assuming that this adverb is part of the meaning of the phrase, the verb "exists" would entirely lose its meaning, or at the very least be highly ambiguous. Now, the primary linguistic function of an adverb is to specify the mode, or manner (or "way"), in which the action expressed by the verb takes place, hence why it is said that there are multiple modes or ways of being (and also why "modal logic" is so called).
There are many similar examples of this. For instance, what is the fundamental difference between a substance and an accident? It can be given in terms of an adverb appended to an existential claim. We say that some x is a substance if and only if "x exists *in itself*" is true, and say that it is an accident if and only if "x exists *in another*" is true. In fact, the monist position constantly needs to refer to "generic" existence to disambiguate the claim from other potential types of existence. That too is an adverb which betrays a way or mode in which the subject is said to exist.
To give another example, it seems to me that a claim like "numbers exist" is so fundamentally ambiguous as to be unintelligible. I always have to ask for clarification about what that is supposed to mean in terms of a suitable adverb. Is the defender of the reality of numbers claiming that they exist "in my mind" or "in themselves" (as platonic objects) or "in physical things" or "in the mind of God"? These are completely different metaphysical positions. In particular the positions differ about whether the "numbers" in question are supposed to exist "as substances" or "as accidents", which are also nice adverbial expressions we can use.
Perhaps the most general way of interpreting it is as a disjunction of the 4 aforementioned positions. In fact, one way to phrase the pluralist point of view would be to say that when we talk about existence in general we are only making a disjunction about different modes of existence (someone has commented this in this video before), so that the general existential claim is not really an existential claim but a distinctive claim, and in fact that general existence can be *defined* in terms of this disjunction. In this sense I would also deny the claim made in the beggining of the video to the extent that general existence is undefinable.
Of course, in normal discourse we often omit many adverbs because they are inferred from context, so that when we say "Socrates exists" it is clear that we are referring to the existence of a substance so that the expression "in himself" is pressuposed. It could also be that we were referring to disjunctive geneeal existence in this case as well, but in either case it is clear which disjunct is supposed to be true and which are supposed to be, categorically, false. This is why such a claim is not ambiguous while "numbers exist" appears to be so.
It also appears to me that when we say an accident exists "in another" we are saying it exists in a lesser and more improper sense than when we say a substance exists "in itself". This is not a distinction that is based on the fact that substances and accidents have different properties, but rather they have the properties of being substances and accidents precisely because one exists in a lesser mode of existence than the other. And this is an additional reason for pluralism: it appears intuitive.
A third reason comes from Divine simplicity. If simplicity is true, God is the platonic form of Being. Since a platonic form always has the property in question in a more proper sense than anything else, it follows that whatever concept has a platonic form has multiple senses, hence also being would have multiple senses.
Thanks for your answer. May I just ask you: what do you think about non-analytical contologies? I mean, do you think that there is room for somekind of phenomemological ontology? I do think that there is, and I've trying to defend ontological pluralism from a phenomenological-hermeneutic point of view (which I took from Being and Time), but the debate is almost exclusively in analytical (first order logic quantificational) terms.
Another magnificent discussion on a subject that's been a recent interest of mine. Thank you for this, Dr. Merricks and Joe! There are a lot of really great resources packed in here that I'll have to mull over for a bit.
Much love❤️
Putting aside if pluralism is correct or incorrect, one important point that it brings out is that it invites us to rethink a lot of meta-ontological basic questions. One of these is about the basis to justify our ontological claims, which criteria we employ to defend that something exists, and this leads us to questions about the meaning of existence in general (or even in direction to the meaning of being). One specific point that I think is important is about the ontological commitments: are they uniform for all sciences? If different sciences do not share the same criteria, what does this mean ontologically? There is one fundamental science? Which one? If we take physics as the standard science and take from it the criteria for our ontological commitments then maybe we will have problems including some kind of entities, such as biological ones. I mean, if "to exist" is in some way extracted or read off from what is admitted in some science, then we should look if all sciences share the same ontological commitments. Taking the works of John Dupré and Luciano Floridi we are presented with very different ontologies because they are oriented to different sciences: biology and e-sciences. The entities that they admit are not correctly treated as traditional substances or even material beings, but they have their own identity criteria and existential conditions.
Even if it does not justify pluralism it puts some water in monistic's wine.
Thanks for this video and I'm sorry for my terrible English (and eventually for my philosophical misplacing).
One possible solution for a pluralist could be to make a distinction between existence considered as a fact and existence considered as a principle which explains why something is not nothing. The former I believe would be similar to the quantificational account of existence, where the existence of something is just the fact that it is not nothing. It seems to me that a pluralist could accept generic existence when existence is being considered as a fact, for to say X exists or Y exists would be just to say that X and Y are not nothing.
For example, consider the existence of God and the existence of creatures. On a classical theistic model, it seems to we that we could say God and creatures exist, as they are both not nothing. But, the act of existence that God has is not the same act of existence that creatures have. So, the generic existence that both God and creatures enjoy is the fact that they are not nothing, but it is still maintained that there are different ways or modes of being i.e. God's infinite act of existence which He is identical to, and creature's finite acts of existence which they participate in.
Given the above, I think Dr. Merricks' point that the main motivations for pluralism removes generic existence seems to not be a problem. For when classical theists argue that there are different ways of being e.g. God's existence and creature's existence, they are referring to the real principle of existence which they both have in different ways, not merely the fact that they exist. In other words, when we are considering the real principle of existence that God has and the real principle of existence that creatures have, there is no generic existence which both God and creatures enjoy. But, when we are considering the fact that they exist, then there is a generic existence that they both enjoy.
Couldn't the existential pluralist just accept existence as a first order predicate, as opposed to a second order quantifier and bypass the objection?
I like your point about colours, I've been wondering about the relationship between red and the individual shades of red (specifically in relation to the view of some progressives that sex is a spectrum)
Any Wittgenstein proponents out there? I mean what would he say about "existence" being used the same way when philosophers talk about dogs existing and 2 existing? I'm asking cause I like his "vibe", though he's another philosopher I only barely understand.
It just seems insane that his worldview is that these transcendentals like universals, numbers, logic, etc just equally exist independent as matter and energy as brute facts being equally ultimate. One u it sent emergent from the other or grounded in anything with explanatory power they just are, and what is the unifier between mind and matter.
Would love you to have a dialogue with Perspective Philosophy about one of these kinds of topics. 🤞
Awesome video Joe, thanks for this.
Not watched the video yet Joe (I really hope I haven’t just got your name wrong!) but just wanted to thank you for your videos, writings and your academic work. I just received your book which I’m going to read once I’ve finished my current one. I had a flip through and it looks brilliant! So... thank you! Also, I was wondering about your Arsenal plaque in the background? I’m from the U.K so it always interests me to see something from my little island out there in America. Hope everything’s good where you are. Peace.
Much, much love❤️
I hope my book serves you in your pursuit of truth🥰
And yes, I’m a HUGE gunner. It’s a rough life, but I’m Arsenal ‘til I die.
@@MajestyofReason Hi
Can you kindly also Do interview/Discussion on Non western philosophy and philosophers like hindus,Chinese, Islamic etc etc on many different topic in the future it will be interesting
Thanks for your great works
Can one define "existence" as "forming a part of reality" and "being" as "an entailment of identity"?
What’s the problem with saying that people exist but that “peopleness” uncoupled from objects doesn’t? It’s like saying red balls exist but that redness uncoupled from any object doesn’t. (Properties are not existent but are merely true of objects). Would that result in any ugly philosophical commitments?
Thanks very much for this!
47:57 saying something requires a 'truly universal quantifier' is self-negating. 'quantifiers' 'exist' as concepts, they have no causal powers to make other types of 'quantifiers' existence real or not as they themselves are a quantified type...
It may be useful to think of this in terms of weak and strong emergence....strong emergence suffers from the problem of overdetermination...whereas weak emergence has causal power that collectively appears as higher function which is functionally equivalent to strong emergence which is only a concept with no causal power. ...in this same way a 'universal quantifier' is simply a concept of a collection of all 'quantifiers' that do have some form of existence. However, if 'universal quantifier' existed as more than a concept(i.e. as an existence with causal powers) then we would again sit with an overdetermination problem - what happens when a feature of existence 'a' conflicts with a feature of universal existence - this is another ontological pluralism problem.
As a mereological nihilist, I say the only things that truly exist are the processes of the mereological simple (which currently appears to be energy or the universal wavefunction). Everything else is an error in perception, conception or language. i.e. things do not exist in the way we think they do. But I am happy to use poetic naturalistic language to communicate the effects of the processes- like saying they 'exist' in some other way without conceding that there is more than one type of ontological existence. I can say objects are processes, concepts are processes....there is just a field of energy.
in other words, mereological nihilism solves ontological pluralism problems by stating there is only one way of existence...but it is not the way most people think of existence.
Could someone please help out a novice here?
What's the background to this? There is obviously a long running debate going on over this topic (lots of names were dropped (so-and-so's position) without elaboration).
What's wrong with the position that there are concrete things and abstract things (or physical and logical/virtual; or tangible and intangible)... the latter in each pair existing as tools for human language/communication?
Is it that some are arguing that _only_ those 2 types of being exist? Or that the two are one?
Cheers.
I really hope you stick with the channel. It's got some seriously deep content (like this discussion) which fit nicely in the knowledge gaps left by all the physics channels I watch.
38:00 basically, negative predications of God are univocally predicated of Him, insofar as when God is predicated as "non-composite," the word "composite" means the same as the word "composite" when it is said that humans are composite, and positive predications of God are always going to be analogical, like wise, powerful, good, etc.
yoooo this is so cool!
How does something being impossible to state make it untrue?
Does this include ideas of being "beyond existence" like when Proclus claims the Henads are prior to being, is he making a pluralist argument? or is that different because it's transcending being?
Trenton is a BAMF.
Btw when are you gonna do some streams on mereology. Special composition question is legit.
Interesting, lol. Just a few days ago I read about Van Inwagen’s issue with ontological pluralism.
This might be a dumb question, but would act and potency count as 2 modes of being?
Great question! It actually depends whether they’re modes of being. As Feser uses them, they *are* different ways or modes of being. But one might conceive them differently🙂
As there's no cheap education in the offing (so far) from youtube commenters, here's my attempt to "vibe" Wittgenstein a bit (i.e., don't take this to be an application of his rigorous thought, which I've only casually exposed myself to, and find interesting and refreshing, at least at times, because it seems non-rigorous to me, at least at times).
If ones only evidence that really different extants (e.g. 2 and dog) have a univocal existence is the observation that logic works for both, one might just as well say, both 'exist' -- in a common way -- only by virtue of that particular context (i.e., the context of logical notation and mechanisms being applied to it). Call this view "minimal monism". Minimal monism can be combined with "pseudo-pluralism". I have to say "pseudo", because the paper/video holds monism/pluralism to be mutually exclusive, which is the only way I can understand subscripts becoming obligatory on quantifiers, whenever pluralism is discussed with respect to quantifiers (e.g., at 24:00/onward in the video). Pseudo-pluralism/minimal monism can do any kind of quantification pure monism can. Furthermore, minimal monism lacks philosophical depth (i.e., how all extants exist "generically" has been answered somewhat trivially); whereas the pluralism-like part still has depth (i.e., how dogs differ from 2, or how 2 from entropy, or how truth differs from beauty... are still questions).
Hi 😍
I’m Sure there are counter arguments: but don’t see how under his definition of existence you can claim unicorns don’t exist. Wouldn’t unicorns, as an epistemic thought qualify as existing? The existence net he casts is so wide there seems to be nothing I can think of that wouldn’t qualify. Unless he’s saying that bc we have the ultimate category, we can now be confident in our subcategories, I.e unicorns don’t physically. I think we could keep that confidence with the opposing view even if the total number of types or gradations in being is not known.
Interesting video and topic.
I'm a pluralist and as for the second horn of Merricks' dilemma for pluralism*
["... So, the pluralist* must specify the truth conditions for the claim that _everything either 1-exists or 2-exists_ that relies only on fundamental notions, meaning they cannot avail themselves of the generic universal quantifier. And yet this is precisely what they cannot do, per the second horn of Merricks's dilemma."]
I'm not that convinced of.
Hm, I would say, that pluralism* is the notion of "nothing existing in one generic way" with nothing here meaning the empty set ∅={}.
The quantifiers might be defined this way:
Q1) ∀xFx iff ~∃~xFx
- Everything is red iff "nothig" is non-red.
Q2) ∃xFx iff ~∀~xFx
- Something is red iff not everything is non-red.
But we might also discribe the same propositions this way with sets:
Let Ω be the set of all objects and non-empty and F the set of objects with a specific property (here the set of all red objects) and ~F:=F'=Ω\F the set of objects without a specific property (here the set of all non-red objects):
S1) Ω=F [∀x∈Ω: x∈F (Ω⊆F) and ∀x∈F: x∈Ω (F⊆Ω)] iff ∅=~F
- Everything Ω is red iff nothing ∅ is non-red.
S2) F≠∅ [∃x∈Ω: x∈F] iff ~(Ω=~F) [∃x∈Ω: x∉~F (Ω⊈~F) or ∃x∈~F: x∉Ω (~F⊈Ω)]
- Something is red iff not everything is non-red.
So pluralism* is simply the notion of the set of objects existing in one generic way is the empty set ∅ or "nothing".
In this sense the set of all objects Ω is really a set of all objects existing in a non-generic way.
I guess, what that non-generic existence is supposed to be then dependent on the subject matter and topic.
I also guess then, that I'm in the boot of aristotelian philosophers categorizing and building sets.
Besides that I wouldn't say, that any fiction is true or existing since not any fiction is necessarily a fact, which is true and exists in some sense (mostly backed up by empirical evidence). But regardless of that fiction might be true and existente in some other sense.
The fictional figure "Harry Potter" might have never actually existed, but regardless of that certainly "Harry Potter visited Hogwarts - School of Witchcraft and Wizardry".
What do you think of Richard Carrier's argument that something will come out of nothing?
Very, very bad. Elephant Philosophy and I made an episode criticizing it. unfortunately, though, that video as deleted upon the deletion of EP's channel
@@MajestyofReason
Oh, the deletion of his channel was real loss, I hope he come back soon and that he's having a good time
Anyway what would be your thoughts just on that?
I think that his arguments are an absolute misunderstanding of what we mean by nothing, and that his arguments are just a wordplay because I can argue for example that nothing also imply strange metaphysical principles about things popping into existence lacking some impediment
But I wanted to know the opinion of someone that actually knows philosopy
(Sorry for my grammar)
@@leovere you’re absolutely right. He misunderstands “nothing” in that article. That was our principle criticism. When theists say the universe came into existence from nothing, they don’t mean absolute nothingness; it came into existence due to God’s causal activity. It was out of ‘nothing’ in the sense that there were no pre-existent materials out of which or from which God created the universe. Carrier completely misunderstood this point
@@MajestyofReason
Yeah I think that he confuses many things, and not just in philosophy
Anyway, thank you, there's no doubt that you are one of the best channels on philosophy of religion on TH-cam
I recall reading Richard Carrier arguing that Laws of Logic are located at points in space-time. He needn't be taken seriously.
Hey peep!
33:27
The only thing that can be proven to exist your own mind, of course this proof is only valid for yourself. The reality that you experience can be an infinite number of things. You can be, for example, a god that was bored and wanted to feel what is it like to be a mortal, so you created an universe, created a bunch of NPCs, then erased your own memories and now live as a mortal. Or your mind can be inside a simulation.
You know why, though? If God didn't exist, it would absolutely be the fault of the people the heroes' blood of whom he destroys to cover them.
Without a clear and unambiguous definition of EXIST, this whole exercise is really not very useful. Sorry, but that is the fact.
I don’t think that’s right. Knowledge, for instance, is extremely hard to define, as we’ve learned since Gettier. In fact, nearly everything (except for stipulated terms) is hard to define. For instance, “chair” is extremely hard to define. But none of this prevents us from making useful contributions to debates about knowledge, chairs, etc.
@@MajestyofReason Knowledge per se is the reception and conformation of a form to an intellect ;) The reason chair is difficult is because a chair is an artifact, so the function of what a chair is is something extrinsically imposed from an agent, which is why anything can really be a chair.