Yes. They are. Flint, Michigan; in the US, is so "close a world" to our own, it's in fact a part of our own. The water from the tap was unsafe to drink there. Everyone assumed that it was. The city government made an egregious error. It failed to inform the population. Obviously, there's something amiss with induction.
Your channel is really a gold mine for people who are interested in philosophy. We're trying to do something similar in our italian channel, since in Italy there is almost no one who talks about contemporary philosophy (especially analytical philosophy) on TH-cam. You are a great inspiration to us. P.S. I hope you'll do a video about Pritchard's anti-luck epistemology :)
Heck yeah!! I used to think any source in English is superior by default, but such sources usually simply go along with what's mainstream amongst the 'global' community. Recently I've been amazed by the Dutch governmental research and documents available, as well as other amazing historical Dutch thinkers. You'd probably be amazed, too, when you uncover the local heritage and legacy of Italy, which is obviously available much more to those familiar with the local language What's more, is that every single country has produced amazing thinkers, and their ideas become much richer when you know the context (time and place) they wrote it in I'm already jealous I'm not Italian. After all, the main cause of the Renaissance has often been attributed to Italy, which must've been one among many sources for the creation of treasures of wisdom
As someone who aspires to do the same thing as Kane B in my native language (Tagalog), I’m surprised your channel is the first that I know of outside the English-speaking sphere who’s done this. Kudos.
@@captainzork6109 You're right, in the 15th and 16th century Italy was plenty of geniuses in all fields (science, art, philosophy...), but unfortunately now our country doesn't promote scientific and philosophical culture as it did at that time. If you look at highschool and university courses in philosophy you can notice that they are mostly historical courses and there is almost nothing about analytical philosophy. It is even hard to find classical analytical philosophy books (such as Nozick's ones) translated. We hope to change this situation a little using TH-cam
@@gruppo_filosofia Yes! You could totally function as a force which helps to shape the zeitgeist of Italy So, if you don't mind me asking: why do you think analytical philosophy should become more popular?
At 10:30, I don’t see how necessary truths pose any thread. The third condition for necessary truths is trivially true as, in every possible world where P is not true (which there are none), anything can happen (like with the elements of the empty set). To put it in another way, the third condition can be stated as “~P(W) ⇒ ~P(S)” which is trivially true for necessary truths as ~P(W) is always false and falsehoods can imply anything.
The problem with appealing to vacuous truths here is that although the counterfactual: If P were false, S would believe that P is true, so is the counterfactual: If P were false, S would not believe that P which is not a result that's friendly to Nozick's account! I assume this is why he favours saying that condition 3 is inapplicable, rather than that condition 3 is vacuously satisfied.
Closest world seems to relate to a latent space, a concept from machine learning. Which is a space where every point is a complete object but you can blend between any of the objects by taking the shortest distance between them in the space.
Obviously, the problem is with the first premise (16:21). If we take knowledge to be an intensional stance, then the vat-person knows they have hands. Even if we take knowledge to be a relation between the agent and the arena. The vat-person still has hands and knows it. I may not know that I have hands, but the vat-person certainly does, and since I could be a vat-person, I may know that I have hands. Actually the skeptic's argument really amounts to, "if you don't know there's an external world, then you don't know there's an external world. A tautalogy. But since we can't know anything, how can we know that? But since we do know that tautologies are always true. The skeptic must be doubly wrong.
I fail to see a problem with Nozick's concession that his truth-tracking does not apply to sceptical scenarios. Shouldn't we all end all of our statements with "unless I'm a brain in a vat" for the sake of accuracy? I believe that this video I just saw made me come up with this argument - unless I'm a brain in a vat. (in which case I didn't see what I believe to be a video and the vat-controller is to blame- in fact, there may not actually be such a thing as a video in the controller's world, they just thought it was a straightforward method of putting thoughts into brains)
So, given that it uses closeness of possible worlds, in steelman vervion, it should be formulated like "knowledge is when: 1) one has a sufficiently low expected false-positive and false-negative error rates evaluating truth value of statement P ignorring cases when one's uncertain (some arbitrary theshold or fuzziness is implicit; It's unclear which background knowledge we should use for calculating error rates, it seems that we should not include direct evidence for/against P. In any case, closeness of possible worlds is inherently not an external criterion) 2) one correctly believes that P is true or correctly believes that P is false"
I reject the premise that skeptics are affirming anything. The skeptics position can always be "I don't know, we don't know but maybe we will one day". Note that none of those are an affirmative statement accepting or rejecting a claim. I dont know is also the most intellectually honest position one can take. Furthermore, I tend to not be a pragmatist but whether or not we are a brain in a vat does us absolutely no good. If that were true then there is still nothing we could do about it. It gets us nowhere, it's a non sequitur. Yes while our senses are fallible the scientific method is still the best methodology by which we can test these hypothesis.
Regardless of whether the skeptic is genuinely affirming anything, there are still "skeptical arguments" which appear to contain premises supporting conclusions. Anybody who rejects the conclusions will want to say something about where those arguments go wrong. So I don't think Nozick's view rests on any substantive account of what skepticism is.
I don't think justification has anything to do with knowledge. I think if someone believes that P and P is true, that's enough to constitute knowledge. Suppose i flip a coin to know if P is true or not. Suppose that i acquired the belief that P is true by this method, and it turns out that P really is true. I think it's pretty obvious (to me) that i really had the knowledge that P is true. I guess the intuition of most people go against this account because they wouldn't believe in the truth of a proposition by the flip of a coin. But in this case, they never had the belief, so they never really had the knowledge. But if i really and honestly believe in the result of the coin flip, then i really have the knowledge of P. And if it turns out that P is false, then i simply had a false belief, which doesn't constitute knowledge. So there is no problem here.
I wonder (setting aside the other issues such as “what are the nearest possible worlds s.t. P?”), are there conditions under which some form of closure would apply under Nozick’s theory of knowledge? Like, “the nearest worlds such that P” and “the nearest worlds such that Q” may be different even when P entails Q, but, it seems like there must be some relationship between them? If in all worlds in which P, it holds that Q, then in the nearest worlds such that P, it holds that Q. So, the closest worlds such that Q, is at least as close as the nearest worlds such that P. Does this give us anything? Are there any more mundane situations, not involving skeptical hypotheses like BIV, which demonstrate/illustrate the lack of closure in Nozick’s formulation of knowledge? Perhaps it would be fitting to split the knowledge condition into two weaker forms of it, one which has the first two conditions and the third condition, and another which also has the first two conditions, and has the fourth condition. I feel like this *might* fit more nicely with implication. Suppose that the set of all possible worlds is a metric space (or, maybe something a bit more general than a metric space, but let’s keep things simple, say it is a metric space). Then, “the closest possible worlds such that P” is, the intersection of “the set of worlds such that P” with the sphere (not the punctured ball), centered at the actual world, with radius the minimum radius such that this intersection is non-empty. Uh... I guess there might not be any such minimum radius... ... let’s disregard that, by assuming that the metric takes only natural number values. Hmm... I suppose some kind of assumption about how beliefs of propositions, varies across worlds, would be necessary? Ah, but hm! If instead of using spheres centered at the actual world, we instead used *punctured balls*, Then something being true in all of the punctured ball centered around the actual world, of some larger radius, then it is also true in all worlds in the punctured ball (centered at the actual world) of any smaller radius. And, this also is true when you intersect both balls with some set, before quantifying over worlds in it. So, if r < r’ , and if in all worlds such that P and with distance at most r’ from the actual world, are such that M, Then all worlds such that P with distance at most r from the actual world, are such that M.
i don't see any way of getting around the notion that we cannot 'know' but can only 'believe we know'. to 'know' is to cognize every possibly connected relation.
Is "If S knows that p and that p entails q, then S knows that q" also a popular version of closure? Versions of the closure principle which are only about S being able to know that q seem very plausible, but the one above seems obviously wrong to me
The principle is sometimes formulated that way for introductory purposes, but pretty much everybody rejects that specific version. It's widely accepted that knowledge requires belief, and surely, no person believes all of the logical consequences of their beliefs, unless we are using "belief" in a very unusual way.
@@KaneB Yeah, that version of closure can lead to very weird things, such as "I know and believe all axioms of peano arithmetic, therefore I personally know how to prove Fermat's last theorem."
34:03 "If knowledge involves the belief varying with the facts in this kind of way, then closure under known logical implication is false." I don't follow. How does simply being sensitive to changing conditions entail that the closure principle is false?
I explain this in the previous 10 minutes of the video, so I'm not sure what else to add here. Could you clarify what you feel is missing from my explanation?
I read his virtue epistemology stuff a while ago and honestly, I didn't find it very interesting. I'm more into general epistemology these days so maybe I should revisit it.
That's not correct. Suppose you believe that it is raining now because last night you dreamed that today would have rained (suppose you are a superstitious person or whatever). It is truly raining now. So P (it is raining now) is a true belief and satisfies conditions 1 and 2. Now consider the counterfactual "If P were true, then S would believe that P". You have to consider the closest worlds in which P is true. Among these worlds there are many in which you didn't dream that today would have rained. So in these worlds, in which P is true, you don't believe that P and hence condition 4 is not satisfied. Thus you can see that condition 4 doesn't follow from 1 and 2. Remember that in evaluating a counterfactual you have to consider other possible worlds (situations), not the actual world
@@lelouchvibritannia8172 yeah, the point of condition 4 is to consider slightly different circumstances in which P remains true, and we ask whether the subject still believes that P. If a slight variation in circumstances would lead the subject to lose her true belief that P, then she doesn't track the truth of P.
@@KaneB I think he’s really good but most of what I’ve read from him was more in the realm of political philosophy where I just disagree with him. It’s been a while but I remember there was also something where he argued that normative prescriptions shouldn’t be limited to what’s possible, and they should be based on unattainable ideals, which didn’t make sense to me
But truth doesn't depend on whether someone believes it or not. An objective truth just IS. The argument seems to be a long way around faith vs reality.
This is not about truth (which is another topic) but about knowledge. The Gettier examples all depend on untrue justification (e.g. the clock is reliable). I am not so sure that the Nozick adaptation is needed, and in any case I cannot see how his conditions 3 and 4 might not entail some form of reliable or true justification. I think you are right though that Plato or Nozick's or perhaps any theory of knowledge depends on an a background assumption of objective truth or realism.
@@OBGynKenobi No, truth is a precondition for knowledge. You might believe something that is untrue and believe you have good justification for believing the untruth, but this does not count as knowledge. It would just be a mistaken belief. There are difficulties with how you know that you have knowledge or in other words know what you believe to be true is in fact true (or objectively true). But irrespective of the difficulties (expressed by Gorgias 2 500 years ago) it is still possible that you do, with truly justified reason, believe something to be true that is in fact true. You might not have 100.000% certainty of your knowledge but it may well actually be knowledge. - That, I reckon, would be a realist way of putting it.
@martinbennett2228 so, if you only believe things after you have the evidence of its truthfulness it still doesn't count as knowledge. Many people live their lives like this, they will only accept something as truth only after they have objective evidence. I guess your answer might be, well, what if evidence? But then this just winds up being an infinite regression. On the other hand, there a vast numbers of people who will willingly accept abject untruths as knowledge and they're happy to live like this. Therefore, one could say that knowledge hinges on disposition. Unless we're talking about Platonic Knowledge, ie, the ideal of knowledge.
The notion of true belief entails unbelief as in if P is my belief in shoulder pain is also the belief that this should not be the case. The 'should not' is a moral case against my pain being true (how could my body qua genetics or god qua eschatology do this to me given fatalism and god does not give false beliefs) and hence I don't believe the pain is true correlated to tendons being stressed but as a test of faith or even worse free will over my genetic or muscle fitness. This seems to play out in the world where folk psychology functions as a way to divert attention away from pain through clever diversions as a counter factual methodology as in if I didn't have shoulder pain I could lift it up so I will in this world which works nicely until it becomes functionally true where the person becomes totally incapacitated from doing their XYZ activities in the world and winds up rigged up. There seems to be two structures to truth in this case. First is ephemeral truth based on pain which can go away with medication based on neural firings changing but not visible in society, and the second is functional truth that stops bodily functions and which requires functional supports but visible in society. Hence it seems there is subjective real truth and objective real truth which are often incompatible to a persons objectives of being a kind of person they hope to be in a social set and setting predetermined by political economies. This suggests that for persons sensitive to objective verification who they are as a person tend to produce subjective false positives in the modes common to modernisation which produces all kinds of methods to produce positives like big Pharma that endlessly gives denizens ways manipulate internal states to simulate political economies of scale. For a lot of persons in underdeveloped economies they are skeptical they live in a modern world although through the upsurge of cheap digital devices they then have evidence they do live in a modern world but remain skeptical of the flow on impact of advanced technologies. So skepticism about the world as not an illusion is of secondary importance as the illusion of modernisation as a global phenomenon. True belief of the benefits of various waves of colonisation of the mind from the Industrial Revolution through to colonisation of brands can be viewed from a lens of scepticism about the world on a superficial sense but then also for the profound sceptic it goes all the way to the scientific claim of this car takes off at 160 Newton meters per second which is better than your 140 Newton meter per second car and so on to include for monastics that all is an illusion but knowledge of things in the world is applicable because of functionalism qua karma. Karma theory seems to track close possible worlds as the soul transmigrates but also tracks distant worlds where the soul bundle as it were is the super soul or all possible worlds and so is or knows being not a brain in a vat due to karma of being in the world but cannot rule out not being a soul in a vat as the case may be if a brain encased the soul. The soul-rebirth-release theory tends to work well with knowledge as truth-tracking but requires consciousness as a property with karmic properties and belief in limited conscious states but also linked to all conscious states which is not scientific but if taken to an extreme tends to violate ostensible object to words and hence why certain monastics take a vow of silence.
![[UNCUT] “อภิสิทธิ์” ครม.อุ๊งอิ๊ง แย่งเก้าอี้กันฝุ่นตลบ “ทักษิณ” บงการเอง Iคนดังนั่งเคลียร์I 21ส.ค.67](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/a_b-kItw2jY/mqdefault.jpg)
Are all counterfactuals false? th-cam.com/video/KPLRqics2Qg/w-d-xo.html
Thanks for linking the counterfactual video here. It made for a good refresher of some arguments in support and opposition of Nozick's account.
Yes. They are.
Flint, Michigan; in the US, is so "close a world" to our own, it's in fact a part of our own. The water from the tap was unsafe to drink there. Everyone assumed that it was. The city government made an egregious error. It failed to inform the population.
Obviously, there's something amiss with induction.
Knowledge can be tracked even better via likes and comments, like the ones I gave this video.
Thank you!
"Abominable Conjunctions" has to be my new favorite term. Fascinating video as always, thanks for your hard work Kane!
Your channel is really a gold mine for people who are interested in philosophy. We're trying to do something similar in our italian channel, since in Italy there is almost no one who talks about contemporary philosophy (especially analytical philosophy) on TH-cam. You are a great inspiration to us.
P.S. I hope you'll do a video about Pritchard's anti-luck epistemology :)
Heck yeah!!
I used to think any source in English is superior by default, but such sources usually simply go along with what's mainstream amongst the 'global' community. Recently I've been amazed by the Dutch governmental research and documents available, as well as other amazing historical Dutch thinkers. You'd probably be amazed, too, when you uncover the local heritage and legacy of Italy, which is obviously available much more to those familiar with the local language
What's more, is that every single country has produced amazing thinkers, and their ideas become much richer when you know the context (time and place) they wrote it in
I'm already jealous I'm not Italian. After all, the main cause of the Renaissance has often been attributed to Italy, which must've been one among many sources for the creation of treasures of wisdom
As someone who aspires to do the same thing as Kane B in my native language (Tagalog), I’m surprised your channel is the first that I know of outside the English-speaking sphere who’s done this. Kudos.
Thank you, and good luck with the channel! It's great to see people making philosophy accessible to the world!
@@captainzork6109 You're right, in the 15th and 16th century Italy was plenty of geniuses in all fields (science, art, philosophy...), but unfortunately now our country doesn't promote scientific and philosophical culture as it did at that time. If you look at highschool and university courses in philosophy you can notice that they are mostly historical courses and there is almost nothing about analytical philosophy. It is even hard to find classical analytical philosophy books (such as Nozick's ones) translated. We hope to change this situation a little using TH-cam
@@gruppo_filosofia Yes! You could totally function as a force which helps to shape the zeitgeist of Italy
So, if you don't mind me asking: why do you think analytical philosophy should become more popular?
got a presentation on nozick next tuesday man this was a massive help, thanks
I’m so grateful for these videos!
Thanks for the video. Always appreciated. These are high quality videos.
At 10:30, I don’t see how necessary truths pose any thread. The third condition for necessary truths is trivially true as, in every possible world where P is not true (which there are none), anything can happen (like with the elements of the empty set). To put it in another way, the third condition can be stated as “~P(W) ⇒ ~P(S)” which is trivially true for necessary truths as ~P(W) is always false and falsehoods can imply anything.
The problem with appealing to vacuous truths here is that although the counterfactual:
If P were false, S would believe that P
is true, so is the counterfactual:
If P were false, S would not believe that P
which is not a result that's friendly to Nozick's account! I assume this is why he favours saying that condition 3 is inapplicable, rather than that condition 3 is vacuously satisfied.
Really loving your channel! Makes a great companion to what im learning in lectures!
Thanks! It's nice to hear that the videos are helpful!
It's ontologically good to like and subscribe to this channel
Closest world seems to relate to a latent space, a concept from machine learning. Which is a space where every point is a complete object but you can blend between any of the objects by taking the shortest distance between them in the space.
My top philosophy youtuber. No nonsense :)
Obviously, the problem is with the first premise (16:21).
If we take knowledge to be an intensional stance, then the vat-person knows they have hands. Even if we take knowledge to be a relation between the agent and the arena. The vat-person still has hands and knows it. I may not know that I have hands, but the vat-person certainly does, and since I could be a vat-person, I may know that I have hands.
Actually the skeptic's argument really amounts to, "if you don't know there's an external world, then you don't know there's an external world. A tautalogy. But since we can't know anything, how can we know that? But since we do know that tautologies are always true. The skeptic must be doubly wrong.
Spoiler alert: Kane B has no hands
But he can't be sure that he doesn't have hands in this one specific way :D
I fail to see a problem with Nozick's concession that his truth-tracking does not apply to sceptical scenarios.
Shouldn't we all end all of our statements with "unless I'm a brain in a vat" for the sake of accuracy?
I believe that this video I just saw made me come up with this argument - unless I'm a brain in a vat.
(in which case I didn't see what I believe to be a video and the vat-controller is to blame- in fact, there may not actually be such a thing as a video in the controller's world, they just thought it was a straightforward method of putting thoughts into brains)
I think nozick is on the right track.
Showing my support with a like and comment! Thank you for your videos.
Thanks, I appreciate it!
the way you said The Water Is Safe To Drink had me slightly concerned
So, given that it uses closeness of possible worlds, in steelman vervion, it should be formulated like "knowledge is when:
1) one has a sufficiently low expected false-positive and false-negative error rates evaluating truth value of statement P ignorring cases when one's uncertain (some arbitrary theshold or fuzziness is implicit; It's unclear which background knowledge we should use for calculating error rates, it seems that we should not include direct evidence for/against P. In any case, closeness of possible worlds is inherently not an external criterion)
2) one correctly believes that P is true or correctly believes that P is false"
leaving a comment for the algorithm, great video and great channel!
I reject the premise that skeptics are affirming anything. The skeptics position can always be "I don't know, we don't know but maybe we will one day". Note that none of those are an affirmative statement accepting or rejecting a claim. I dont know is also the most intellectually honest position one can take. Furthermore, I tend to not be a pragmatist but whether or not we are a brain in a vat does us absolutely no good. If that were true then there is still nothing we could do about it. It gets us nowhere, it's a non sequitur. Yes while our senses are fallible the scientific method is still the best methodology by which we can test these hypothesis.
Regardless of whether the skeptic is genuinely affirming anything, there are still "skeptical arguments" which appear to contain premises supporting conclusions. Anybody who rejects the conclusions will want to say something about where those arguments go wrong. So I don't think Nozick's view rests on any substantive account of what skepticism is.
35:00 This is it, I'm fully behind Robert Nozick !
50:00 What is this *** theory ?
I like when I'm confused about what to think.
Who is this S person? The only hypothetical people I know are Sydney and Verity.
I don't think justification has anything to do with knowledge. I think if someone believes that P and P is true, that's enough to constitute knowledge.
Suppose i flip a coin to know if P is true or not. Suppose that i acquired the belief that P is true by this method, and it turns out that P really is true. I think it's pretty obvious (to me) that i really had the knowledge that P is true. I guess the intuition of most people go against this account because they wouldn't believe in the truth of a proposition by the flip of a coin. But in this case, they never had the belief, so they never really had the knowledge. But if i really and honestly believe in the result of the coin flip, then i really have the knowledge of P. And if it turns out that P is false, then i simply had a false belief, which doesn't constitute knowledge. So there is no problem here.
Is there any studies looking at thinking so philosophically deep on these topics and worsening mental health?
More hot philosophers in the thumbnail plz
I wonder (setting aside the other issues such as “what are the nearest possible worlds s.t. P?”), are there conditions under which some form of closure would apply under Nozick’s theory of knowledge?
Like, “the nearest worlds such that P” and “the nearest worlds such that Q” may be different even when P entails Q, but, it seems like there must be some relationship between them?
If in all worlds in which P, it holds that Q, then in the nearest worlds such that P, it holds that Q. So, the closest worlds such that Q, is at least as close as the nearest worlds such that P.
Does this give us anything?
Are there any more mundane situations, not involving skeptical hypotheses like BIV, which demonstrate/illustrate the lack of closure in Nozick’s formulation of knowledge?
Perhaps it would be fitting to split the knowledge condition into two weaker forms of it, one which has the first two conditions and the third condition, and another which also has the first two conditions, and has the fourth condition. I feel like this *might* fit more nicely with implication.
Suppose that the set of all possible worlds is a metric space (or, maybe something a bit more general than a metric space, but let’s keep things simple, say it is a metric space).
Then, “the closest possible worlds such that P” is, the intersection of “the set of worlds such that P” with the sphere (not the punctured ball), centered at the actual world, with radius the minimum radius such that this intersection is non-empty.
Uh... I guess there might not be any such minimum radius...
... let’s disregard that, by assuming that the metric takes only natural number values.
Hmm... I suppose some kind of assumption about how beliefs of propositions, varies across worlds, would be necessary?
Ah, but hm!
If instead of using spheres centered at the actual world, we instead used *punctured balls*,
Then something being true in all of the punctured ball centered around the actual world, of some larger radius, then it is also true in all worlds in the punctured ball (centered at the actual world) of any smaller radius.
And, this also is true when you intersect both balls with some set, before quantifying over worlds in it.
So, if r < r’ , and if in all worlds such that P and with distance at most r’ from the actual world, are such that M,
Then all worlds such that P with distance at most r from the actual world, are such that M.
i don't see any way of getting around the notion that we cannot 'know' but can only 'believe we know'. to 'know' is to cognize every possibly connected relation.
Is "If S knows that p and that p entails q, then S knows that q" also a popular version of closure?
Versions of the closure principle which are only about S being able to know that q seem very plausible, but the one above seems obviously wrong to me
The principle is sometimes formulated that way for introductory purposes, but pretty much everybody rejects that specific version. It's widely accepted that knowledge requires belief, and surely, no person believes all of the logical consequences of their beliefs, unless we are using "belief" in a very unusual way.
@@KaneB
Good to know👍
Yeah that's pretty much why it seemed obviously wrong to me
@@KaneB Yeah, that version of closure can lead to very weird things, such as "I know and believe all axioms of peano arithmetic, therefore I personally know how to prove Fermat's last theorem."
Comment for the algorithm.
How about a solid take down of pragmatic encroachnent.
Seems to me that on some versions of PE fearless psychopaths know more. Your thoughts?
34:03 "If knowledge involves the belief varying with the facts in this kind of way, then closure under known logical implication is false." I don't follow. How does simply being sensitive to changing conditions entail that the closure principle is false?
I explain this in the previous 10 minutes of the video, so I'm not sure what else to add here. Could you clarify what you feel is missing from my explanation?
Are you familiar with Ernest Sosas Triple A analysis of knowledge?
I read his virtue epistemology stuff a while ago and honestly, I didn't find it very interesting. I'm more into general epistemology these days so maybe I should revisit it.
What is the point of condition 4? "If P were true, S would believe that P" surely just follows from condition 1 and 2.
That's not correct. Suppose you believe that it is raining now because last night you dreamed that today would have rained (suppose you are a superstitious person or whatever). It is truly raining now. So P (it is raining now) is a true belief and satisfies conditions 1 and 2. Now consider the counterfactual "If P were true, then S would believe that P". You have to consider the closest worlds in which P is true. Among these worlds there are many in which you didn't dream that today would have rained. So in these worlds, in which P is true, you don't believe that P and hence condition 4 is not satisfied. Thus you can see that condition 4 doesn't follow from 1 and 2. Remember that in evaluating a counterfactual you have to consider other possible worlds (situations), not the actual world
@@lelouchvibritannia8172 yeah, the point of condition 4 is to consider slightly different circumstances in which P remains true, and we ask whether the subject still believes that P. If a slight variation in circumstances would lead the subject to lose her true belief that P, then she doesn't track the truth of P.
I am commenting to help the algorithm. Please don't turn me to paperclips when you'll be able to, algorithm.
Thanks!
wow i don’t like nozick but he’s looking kinda hot in that thumbnail
Nozick is one of my favourite philosophers. Any particular reason you don't like him?
@@KaneB I think he’s really good but most of what I’ve read from him was more in the realm of political philosophy where I just disagree with him. It’s been a while but I remember there was also something where he argued that normative prescriptions shouldn’t be limited to what’s possible, and they should be based on unattainable ideals, which didn’t make sense to me
First
.
Robert Nozick looks like a negative Anton Chigurh
But truth doesn't depend on whether someone believes it or not. An objective truth just IS.
The argument seems to be a long way around faith vs reality.
This is not about truth (which is another topic) but about knowledge. The Gettier examples all depend on untrue justification (e.g. the clock is reliable). I am not so sure that the Nozick adaptation is needed, and in any case I cannot see how his conditions 3 and 4 might not entail some form of reliable or true justification. I think you are right though that Plato or Nozick's or perhaps any theory of knowledge depends on an a background assumption of objective truth or realism.
@@martinbennett2228 But isn't truth knowledge? As opposed to non truth which is, for lack of a better word, fodder.
@@OBGynKenobi No, truth is a precondition for knowledge. You might believe something that is untrue and believe you have good justification for believing the untruth, but this does not count as knowledge. It would just be a mistaken belief.
There are difficulties with how you know that you have knowledge or in other words know what you believe to be true is in fact true (or objectively true). But irrespective of the difficulties (expressed by Gorgias 2 500 years ago) it is still possible that you do, with truly justified reason, believe something to be true that is in fact true. You might not have 100.000% certainty of your knowledge but it may well actually be knowledge. - That, I reckon, would be a realist way of putting it.
@martinbennett2228 so, if you only believe things after you have the evidence of its truthfulness it still doesn't count as knowledge. Many people live their lives like this, they will only accept something as truth only after they have objective evidence.
I guess your answer might be, well, what if evidence? But then this just winds up being an infinite regression.
On the other hand, there a vast numbers of people who will willingly accept abject untruths as knowledge and they're happy to live like this.
Therefore, one could say that knowledge hinges on disposition. Unless we're talking about Platonic Knowledge, ie, the ideal of knowledge.
The notion of true belief entails unbelief as in if P is my belief in shoulder pain is also the belief that this should not be the case. The 'should not' is a moral case against my pain being true (how could my body qua genetics or god qua eschatology do this to me given fatalism and god does not give false beliefs) and hence I don't believe the pain is true correlated to tendons being stressed but as a test of faith or even worse free will over my genetic or muscle fitness. This seems to play out in the world where folk psychology functions as a way to divert attention away from pain through clever diversions as a counter factual methodology as in if I didn't have shoulder pain I could lift it up so I will in this world which works nicely until it becomes functionally true where the person becomes totally incapacitated from doing their XYZ activities in the world and winds up rigged up. There seems to be two structures to truth in this case. First is ephemeral truth based on pain which can go away with medication based on neural firings changing but not visible in society, and the second is functional truth that stops bodily functions and which requires functional supports but visible in society. Hence it seems there is subjective real truth and objective real truth which are often incompatible to a persons objectives of being a kind of person they hope to be in a social set and setting predetermined by political economies. This suggests that for persons sensitive to objective verification who they are as a person tend to produce subjective false positives in the modes common to modernisation which produces all kinds of methods to produce positives like big Pharma that endlessly gives denizens ways manipulate internal states to simulate political economies of scale. For a lot of persons in underdeveloped economies they are skeptical they live in a modern world although through the upsurge of cheap digital devices they then have evidence they do live in a modern world but remain skeptical of the flow on impact of advanced technologies. So skepticism about the world as not an illusion is of secondary importance as the illusion of modernisation as a global phenomenon. True belief of the benefits of various waves of colonisation of the mind from the Industrial Revolution through to colonisation of brands can be viewed from a lens of scepticism about the world on a superficial sense but then also for the profound sceptic it goes all the way to the scientific claim of this car takes off at 160 Newton meters per second which is better than your 140 Newton meter per second car and so on to include for monastics that all is an illusion but knowledge of things in the world is applicable because of functionalism qua karma. Karma theory seems to track close possible worlds as the soul transmigrates but also tracks distant worlds where the soul bundle as it were is the super soul or all possible worlds and so is or knows being not a brain in a vat due to karma of being in the world but cannot rule out not being a soul in a vat as the case may be if a brain encased the soul. The soul-rebirth-release theory tends to work well with knowledge as truth-tracking but requires consciousness as a property with karmic properties and belief in limited conscious states but also linked to all conscious states which is not scientific but if taken to an extreme tends to violate ostensible object to words and hence why certain monastics take a vow of silence.